42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Jones v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc. · filed 2007-10-31

Because there are no facts in Plaintiffs proposed Second Amended Complaint that can be construed to allege that ERMC or Arden B engaged in acts under color of state law, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes liability only for conduct under color of state law; private conduct must be fairly attributable to the state.

Galloway v. Lawrence Journal World Newspaper · filed 2007-11-02

U nder § 1983, liability attaches only to conduct occurring under color of state law ; conduct constituting state action under the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies this requirement. ... The defendants’ conduct in this case, publishing an article allegedly containing false information about Galloway, does not satisfy Lugar.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws.

Keller v. Embassy of the United States · filed 2007-11-28

All of the Defendants in this case are federal employees or officers. None of them acted, to the extent they acted at all, under color of state law. It is not relevant, as Mr. Keller argues, that officials of the Department of State work in Washington, D.C., see Am. Compl. at 2, since none of them exercises authority under the laws of the District of Columbia. They are federal employees and hold authority only pursuant to federal law. There being no possible way for Mr. Keller to advance a § 1983 claim against federal officers and employees, this claim must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not cover a claim against an attorney appointed by a federal court because the statute requires action under color of state law.

Allred v. McCaughey · filed 2007-12-03

Because McCaughey was appointed by a federal court, an action cannot be brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor or to have acted under color of state law.

Johnson v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters · filed 2007-12-07

As the District Court correctly assessed, Johnson’s claim that the union and its officers violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be sustained because the defendants are not state actors, nor did they act under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law.

Williams v. St. Vincent Hospital · filed 2007-12-10

Williams’s conclusory and general allegations of a conspiracy by unnamed state and federal officials do not satisfy the elements of a § 1983 action. Additionally, the first named defendant, St. Vincent Hospital, is not a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; an officer’s filing of a California Civil Code § 47.5 defamation action does not satisfy that requirement.

Kinder v. Loshonkohl · filed 2007-12-10

The district court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Kinder’s claim. In Gritchen v. Collier, 254 F.3d 807 (9th Cir.2001), we held that an officer’s filing of a § 47.5 defamation action is not taken under color of state law, which is a “jurisdictional requisite for a § 1983 claim.”

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement reaches private parties who jointly participate with police officers in a repossession.

Santiago v. Reliable Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2007-12-11

Furthermore, under Estades-Negroni’s nexus-joint action test, Reliable and Correa can be fairly characterized as state actors because of their joint participation with Perez and Torres in the self-help repossession of Santiago’s automobile. Therefore, Reliable, Correa, Perez and Torres were all acting under color of law while carrying out the challenged activity.

A private citizen can be liable under § 1983 only if acting under color of state law, including by conspiring with state officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Fielding v. Tollaksen · filed 2007-12-12

A private citizen will not be subject to § 1983 liability unless he has conspired with state officials to deprive a plaintiff of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a constitutional violation committed by someone acting under color of state law; an attorney representing a client in a professional capacity does not ordinarily meet that requirement.

Samora v. Kerr · filed 2007-12-19

To state a claim under §§ 1343(a)(3) and 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a constitutional violation “was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). ... Mr. Samora does not allege that Kerr committed the violation under color of state law. Thus, the district court ruled correctly.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when state prison corrections officers act in their official roles.

Kounelis v. Sherrer · filed 2008-01-03

There is no question that at all relevant times, Sergeants Forde and Perez were acting under color of state law. Because both of them were corrections officers at a state prison, this element of Kounelis’s claim is not in dispute.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not cover actions taken under color of federal law.

Osahar v. Postmaster General of U.S. Postal Service · filed 2008-01-15

Because 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 apply only against impairment of equal rights, or violations of federal or constitutional rights, under color of state law, and because Osahar complains about actions taken under color of federal law, those claims were due to be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Section 1983 requires allegations sufficient to show that a defendant acted under color of state law; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Ogunsalu v. Nair · filed 2008-01-22

The district court properly dismissed Ogunsalu’s Fourteenth Amendment claim because Ogunsalu’s conclusory allegations were insufficient to show that defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private person who willfully participates in joint action with the state or its agents to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Hebert v. Louisiana Licensed Professional Voc. Rehab. Counselors · filed 2008-01-23

Private individuals are subject to liability in situations when the individual acts as a “willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; Google and its founders are not state actors.

Jayne v. Google Internet Search Engine Founders · filed 2008-02-07

As explained by the District Court, Google and its founders are not state actors, and Jayne’s allegation concerning his coded social security number does not constitute a violation of the Constitution or federal law.

Public employees act under color of state law for Section 1983 when acting in their official capacity or exercising responsibilities conferred by state law.

Robinson v. Pierce County · filed 2008-02-11

As a general rule, public employees act under state law if they are acting in their official capacity or while exercising responsibilities conferred by state law. ... Defendants do not demonstrate that the individual plaintiffs were acting outside of their official capacities.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue for rights violations committed under color of state law.

Turner, Quinshela v. Jackson Park Hosp · filed 2008-02-14

Mrs. Turner cannot state a claim under § 1983 because she has sued a private hospital and private individuals and, therefore, cannot claim that defendants were acting under color of state law, an element of any § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a deprivation of federal rights was committed under color of state law.

Keller v. Porter Hospital · filed 2008-02-15

Ms. Keller’s complaint was devoid of any allegations that the defendants were state actors. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint as legally frivolous.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against private employers whose actions were taken under color of federal law rather than state law.

Giles v. Volvo Trucks North America · filed 2008-02-20

Plaintiff does not appear to be asserting a claim against the Employee Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; however, to the extent that he is, Plaintiff would be unable to establish that the Employer Defendants were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy when a person acting under color of state law causes the deprivation of a federal right.

Watkins v. Weber · filed 2008-02-20

In order to establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show “that the official acting under color of state law caused the deprivation of a federal right.” ... Thus, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendants Gualano or Serterides are state actors subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that a defendant acted under color of state law or abused power granted by the state.

Carey v. First National Bank · filed 2008-02-22

Further, as the District Court noted, all of the defendants named in Carey’s complaint are private individuals or businesses, none of whom are alleged to be state actors or to have abused power granted by the state.

A private attorney who does not act under color of state law cannot be liable under § 1983.

Stackhouse v. Crocker · filed 2008-02-25

Because his private attorney was not a state actor, however, he could not be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches a private rehabilitation program and its director when they act jointly with a state drug court.

Hanas v. Inner City Christian Outreach, Inc. · filed 2008-02-29

Rottiers and ICCO must have acted under color of law to be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Uncontested facts support the court’s determination that they did act under color of law.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for conduct under color of federal rather than state law; a pro se claim against federal actors may be construed as a Bivens claim.

Bender v. General Services Administration · filed 2008-03-05

Here, to the extent that defendants were clothed with public authority, it was that of federal and not state law, since HWA is a federal contractor providing security to SSA, a federal agency. However, particularly in light of Bender’s pro se status, we construe her § 1983 claim as a Bivens claim.

Section 1983 requires a connection between the state and a private defendant’s challenged conduct; medical licensing or employment in a state alone is insufficient.

Florence v. Peterson · filed 2008-03-06

Mr. Florence has not pleaded facts that suggest that any defendant was a government actor of some sort, state or federal, as required by both Bivens, see Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 2000), and § 1983, see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). The only allegations of government action that Mr. Florence has made are that one defendant was employed in Colorado and that the other defendants were medically licensed by Colorado. This is insufficient to establish the requisite nexus between the state and private conduct.

A private attorney’s representation of a client does not make the attorney a person acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Hagins v. Spina · filed 2008-03-07

As the District Court noted, Spina’s representation of Hagins does not render Spina a “person acting under color of state law” under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the alleged deprivation to be committed by a person acting under color of state law; a private law firm is not a state actor.

Martin v. Pachulski, Stang, Ziehl, Young & Jones, P.C. · filed 2008-03-10

In the present case, Martin’s complaint does not state a claim against a state actor, as the defendant is a private law firm.

A § 1983 claim against a private party must allege that it acted under color of state law or conspired to do so.

McQueen v. Susan Wickliff etc. · filed 2008-03-11

Following careful review of McQueen’s arguments on appeal, we conclude that the district court did not err in finding McQueen failed to state a claim against Cornell, Lynn, Bentson, CMS, Babich, and Brown, as to whom McQueen failed to allege facts, or against MCI, as to which there were no allegations it acted under color of state law or conspired to do so.

Section 1983 does not cover a prosecutor’s alleged assault merely because his position placed him in the courtroom; the prosecutor must use or invoke state authority in connection with the assault.

Rogers v. DEJOSEPH · filed 2008-03-14

There is no evidence that Mr. DeJoseph invoked the power of his office or of the state in any way in order to get close to Mr. Rogers or in connection with the alleged assault.

Section 1983 applies to persons acting under color of state law, not federal law.

Rosario v. United States · filed 2008-03-19

It must be noted that claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are inapposite in this type of suit inasmuch as this provision applies exclusively "to persons acting ‘under color of state law’ and not to persons acting pursuant to federal law.”

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when a state trooper acts in the course of his official duties.

RIVERSIDE TRANSPORTATION INC. v. Burke · filed 2008-03-26

Clearly Trooper Burke believed he was acting in the course and scope of his duties as a State Trooper when the incident at issue in this case occurred. Based on the particular facts and circumstances of this case we conclude, as did the trial court, that Trooper Burke was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party as acting under color of state law merely because it files a pleading in court.

Wallace v. Federal Judges of United States District Court · filed 2008-03-26

Neither GMA nor Stevens & Lee are state or federal actors, nor does the act of filing a pleading with a court transform a private actor into an entity acting under color of state or federal law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a constitutional or federal statutory right was violated by a person acting under color of state law.

Mills v. Greenville County · filed 2008-04-15

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a United States citizen to sue for a rights deprivation by a person acting under color of state law.

Bollen v. National Guard Bureau · filed 1978-04-13

Any actions performed by the individual defendants in their capacity as Pa. ANG officers were performed under “color of statutes, ordinances, regulation, custom, or usage” of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Baer v. Baer · filed 1978-04-14

The complaint as presently drafted fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it fails to allege action under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits claims against persons acting under color of state law and does not immunize a court-appointed receiver who acts beyond the court’s order.

City Partners, Ltd. v. Jamaica Savings Bank · filed 1978-07-13

There can be no doubt that Simone, as a court-appointed receiver, acted under color of state law. ... The Bank and Carol Management having been alleged to have joined with Simone in such activities they may also be held to have acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against private persons only when they act under color of state law, which requires more than merely giving information to police.

Butler v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc. · filed 1978-12-29

In applying these principles to the instant case, we are again unable to find in the record any significant evidence to suggest that Goldblatt’s did anything more than supply information to police officers who then acted on their own initiative in arresting Lewis; and we decline to hold that the mere act of furnishing information to law enforcement officers constitutes “joint [activity] with state officials in the prohibited action” (that is, the allegedly unconstitutional arrest of Lewis). Accordingly, we must also set aside the jury’s verdict against Goldblatt’s on Lewis’ claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement can be met even when a state or local official exceeds lawful authority.

Hoopes v. City of Chester · filed 1979-07-23

But a state or local official who exceeds his lawful authority may still be acting “under color of law” for purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against private litigants acting under color of state law through a conspiracy with a state judge.

Antelman v. Lewis · filed 1979-11-13

Here, then, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against defendants Hoffman and Lewis is viable only if they were conspiring with defendant Adams, for only then would they have been acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for damages when state actors, acting under color of state law, violate constitutional rights.

Smith v. Heath · filed 1980-08-26

The court finds: (1) the acts of Heath and Rohtert, as well as the other Metro police officers, were performed under color of state law; (2) the entry of the shooter into the kitchen and his opening the bedroom door was an unconstitutional infringement of plaintiffs’ rights and constituted an unlawful entry; (3) the shooting of the shootee by the shooter was not justified and was an unlawful, unconstitutional act which violated the constitutional rights of the shootee; (4) the entry of the police officers into the building and the subsequent search thereof constituted an unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Constitution of the United States; (5) the taking of Grandma into custody constituted an illegal arrest in violation of the Constitution of the United States; and (6) the acts of Heath, Rohtert, and the other police officers were willful, reckless, and in complete disregard of the constitutional rights of both plaintiffs.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to deprive the plaintiff of a federal right while acting under color of state law.

Peragine v. Maimone · filed 1980-09-22

In this action, the necessary allegation that the alleged wrong was perpetrated-under color of state law is clearly lacking. For purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, attorneys are not state officers.

Section 1983 permits suits against persons acting under color of state or territorial law, generally excluding federal officials.

Richardson v. Virgin Islands Housing Authority · filed 1981-02-23

Federal officials generally are not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which by its language limits actions to persons acting under color of state or territorial law.

Section 1983 does not treat a private security guard’s conduct as under color of state law merely because the guard holds a state license that grants no authority to act for the state.

Jenkins v. White Castle Systems, Inc. · filed 1981-03-31

Under that test, nothing in the Illinois Detective Act renders the action of a licensee “state” action for Section 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law to state a claim.

Strait v. Mehlenbacher · filed 1981-11-25

Since they have failed to demonstrate that plaintiffs acted under color of state law, defendants have not stated a cause of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy when state actors, or private parties acting jointly with them under color of state law, deprive people of federally protected rights.

Green v. Williams · filed 1982-03-17

The individual defendants are of 2 classifications for the purposes of this consideration: (a) Messrs. Williams, sheriff, and Fann and Boyce, deputies sheriff, are stipulated to have been at the times pertinent hereto officials of Bedford County, Tennessee, acting under color of Tennessee law; and (b) the other individual defendants were engaged jointly with such law-enforcement officials in prohibited activity and, thus, also were deemed acting herein under color of Tennessee law. United States v. Price (1966), 383 U.S. 787, 794, n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157, 16 L.Ed.2d 267, 272, n. 7[5]. Accordingly, the deprivation by the defendants of the plaintiffs’ right to security was proscribed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a person to seek relief when the State, acting under color of law, deprives the person of constitutional rights.

Seide v. Prevost · filed 1982-03-19

Once the State assumes responsibility for a patient by admitting him to a State mental hospital that is operated under State authority, the State is acting under color of law. ... Regardless of whether a patient was voluntarily admitted or committed, the State may not subject any citizen “to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches private persons who willfully participate jointly with state agents.

Clay v. Friedman · filed 1982-04-09

Public defenders, like any other private person, act “under color” of law when they are willful participants in a joint action with state agents.

Section 1983 applies when a person acts under color of state law.

A & a Concrete, Inc. v. The White Mountain Apache Tribe · filed 1982-05-13

Section 1983 of 42 U.S.Code is applicable only where the person sued acts “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory or the District of Columbia.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private creditor who acts under color of state law by using Virginia’s attachment procedure.

Fuller v. Hurley · filed 1983-03-02

This court, in reliance on the Lugar decision, finds that the defendant Hurley acted under color of state law in using Virginia’s attachment procedure; therefore, the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss on its first ground is denied.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not reach purely private conduct.

Dykes v. Weinberg · filed 1983-04-15

Action taken “under color of state law” is an essential element of any suit brought under this statute and it is well settled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not reach purely private conduct.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law.

Miller v. Indiana Hospital · filed 1983-04-27

Therefore, the facts as alleged by Plaintiff, even if fully proven, do not provide a basis for holding the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania responsible for the Hospital’s act and do not enable us to find that the Hospital’s conduct was action under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law for liability to attach.

Vigil v. Arzola · filed 1983-07-05

Defendants contend plaintiff’s failure to prove color of state law requires reversal. We agree. We apply federal substantive law in determining this issue. ... Thus, plaintiff’s discharge was not compelled or influenced in any way by any state action. The judgment based on the § 1983 claim must be reversed and the claim dismissed.

Private persons who willfully participate in joint action with a state official may be sued under § 1983 even when the official is immune.

Scott v. Greenville County · filed 1983-09-14

The district court was also in error when it held that private parties who conspire with immune public officials cannot be liable under § 1983. This proposition was rejected in Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980).

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right under color of state law to support a civil action.

Anderson v. Randall Park Mall Corp. · filed 1983-09-29

Anderson’s allegations that the security guards acted under color of state law by virtue of 1) their state licensing and 2) their authority to detain shoplifters, is not well taken.

Section 1983 treats a school board’s decision as action under color of state law even when federal officials influence it by threatening to withhold funding.

Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Realm of Louisiana v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board · filed 1984-07-09

It was the Board which decided to deny the Klan permission to hold its meeting at the school. Indisputably, the Board was influenced by federal officials who stated that the Board's action might require HEW to withhold federal funding to the school district. Whether the Board was willing to risk loss of federal funds to allow the Klan to hold their meeting, however, was a decision made under color of state law.

Section 1983 reaches federal officials who act jointly with state officials to deny constitutional rights when the state officials supply the requisite state action.

Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board · filed 1984-07-09

Ordinarily, when federal officials conspire or act jointly with state officials to deny constitutional rights, “the state officials provide the requisite state action to make the entire conspiracy actionable under section 1983.” ... Here, the school board’s role was crucial to the deprivation and it acted under color of state law. ... HEW and the Board implicitly agreed to prevent the Klan from using the facilities.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to be taken under color of state law; substantial public funding alone does not make a private hospital’s personnel decisions state action.

Beverley v. Douglas · filed 1984-07-30

However, the fact that an institution receives significant public funding does not make the personnel decisions of that institution acts of the state or federal government, as the Supreme Court recently made clear in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn.

A city acts under color of state law under § 1983 when it enacts and enforces an ordinance.

Meros v. CITY OF EUCLID, OHIO · filed 1984-08-15

Defendant City of Euclid acted under color of state law in enacting and enforcing Ordinance 75-1982, which by implication prohibits political lawn graphics.

Section 1983 treats actions by the University of Pittsburgh and Temple University as taken under color of state law because of their symbiotic relationship with Pennsylvania.

Krynicky v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1984-08-23

Therefore, we are bound by Third Circuit precedent to hold that a “symbiotic relationship” exists between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on the one hand and Pitt and Temple on the other. Actions taken by those two institutions are, therefore, actions taken under color of state law and are subject to scrutiny under section 1983.

Section 1983 treats a township board’s discharge of its police chief as action under color of state law.

Viola v. Bensalem Township · filed 1984-11-08

Here it is clear that the defendant Board acted under color of state law when it discharged plaintiff.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Lukovsky v. Herstad · filed 1984-11-28

In a thorough and well-reasoned report, the magistrate correctly applied the law to the facts of this case. ... Alternately, the magistrate found that the Lukovskys failed to allege sufficient facts to give rise to a 1983, 1985 or 1986 cause of action because they failed to allege that the officials acted under color of state law or with an unlawful discriminatory motive.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement is not satisfied merely because a private business is incorporated under state law.

Banks v. VIO Software · filed 2008-04-29

Mr. Banks’ theory is simple: because Vio Software and Three Monkey Karaoke were incorporated in the state of Colorado, they necessarily are state actors. It is also simply incorrect and frivolous as a matter of law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private bank that surrenders a customer’s funds at a state agency’s explicit direction because the bank acts under color of state law.

Keenan v. First California Bank · filed 2008-05-01

The district court erred in dismissing the complaint with regard to Keenan’s § 1983 claims because he sufficiently alleged that First California Bank deprived him of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), and acted under the color of state law by surrendering Social Security funds in his bank account at the explicit direction of the California Franchise Tax Board.

Section 1983 requires the alleged deprivation to have been committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Xuan v. Fort Worth Star Telegram · filed 2008-05-06

Turning to Plaintiff’s claims that the Star-Telegram’s alleged libel violated his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, it is axiomatic that to “state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant deprived them of a federal right while acting under color of state law.

Abiff v. Yusuf · filed 2008-05-16

The Plaintiffs have failed, however, to make any allegation whatever that the Defendants have deprived them of that right while acting under color of state law. Therefore, the second element of a section 1983 claim is lacking.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement can be met when private security personnel jointly arrest and detain someone with police.

Moore v. Detroit Entertainment, LLC · filed 2008-05-27

We therefore hold, in conformity with the Chapman majority, that defendants’ joint engagement with the Detroit police in the arrest and detention of plaintiff also satisfies the symbiotic relationship or nexus test of action “under color of state law.”

A mental health provider authorized to treat prison inmates can act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes despite being employed by a private contractor.

Tatsch-Corbin v. Feathers · filed 2008-05-30

She provided mental health care to inmates, in this case to Corbin, which she could not have done without the authorization of the state. Therefore, Feathers can be deemed a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Feacher v. Intercontinental Hotels Group · filed 2008-06-03

To maintain a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal law, (2) by a person acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private person whose conduct is attributable to the state through official direction or conspiracy with state officials.

Baltz v. County of Will · filed 1985-02-21

In sum, we hold that the facts alleged in the complaint state a claim that Dr. Hilger acted “under color of state law,” under either a direct state action theory or a more inferential conspiracy approach.

A private towing company acting at a police officer’s direction under a traffic enforcement scheme acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Soffer v. City of Costa Mesa · filed 1985-03-28

Two Ninth Circuit opinions have held that a private towing company “acting at the behest of a police officer and pursuant to a statutory scheme designed solely to accomplish the state’s purpose of enforcing its traffic laws act under color of state law for the purposes of Section 1983.” ... Therefore, this Court is compelled to reject defendant Harbor Towing’s argument in its motion for summary judgment that it is not liable under § 1983 for merely towing plaintiff’s vehicle.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Newhouse v. Probert · filed 1985-04-15

To succeed on his section 1983 claim, plaintiff must show that Probert was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a plaintiff of a federal right.

Culebra Enterprises Corp. v. Rios · filed 1985-06-27

The two essential elements of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as stated by the U.S. Supreme Court and the First Circuit Court of Appeals, are: (1) that the conduct complained of was carried out under color of state law, and (2) that this conduct deprived plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... The first requirement is met here.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show a constitutional violation by a person acting under color of state law.

C.T. v. Liberal School District · filed 2008-06-10

But, this argument misses the critical threshold inquiry that a § 1983 claim must be based, first and foremost, on a constitutional violation by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires proof that a defendant acted under color of state law; private prison personnel who had no state-law duty to calculate jail time credits did not meet that requirement.

Beil v. Lake Erie Correction Records Department · filed 2008-06-13

Nonetheless, here, Beil did not establish the first requirement for a § 1983 claim because he has not raised a genuine issue of material fact that any of the nonstate defendants acted under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a state official invoked state authority; official status alone does not establish action under color of state law.

Showalter v. Brubaker · filed 2008-06-13

In this case, Showalter inadequately alleged action under color of state law. Although Brubaker and Ebersole are state officials, the Complaint provides no facts from which we could reasonably infer that they invoked their state authority or otherwise attempted to exercise the power vested in them by state law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private person who acts under color of state law by helping a government official carry out a search.

Radunz v. Von Haden · filed 2008-06-19

A plaintiff states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by alleging that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a federal right. ... Von Haden proposed the search and thus obviously anticipated that Gemoll would conduct it, and Gemoll’s very purpose was to help Von Haden, which suggests beyond a speculative level that Gemoll was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Marchand v. William W. Backus Hospital · filed 2008-06-20

An action pursuant to Section 1983 can only be brought against a state actor.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a rental company’s report of an unreturned car and a public defender’s traditional representation did not meet that requirement here.

Wilson v. Dollar-Thrifty Auto Group-South Fla Transport · filed 2008-07-03

The district court did not err in dismissing Wilson’s constitutional claims against Dollar-Thrifty and Torres because neither party acted under color of state law.

Agents of a state-funded institution involved in alleged rights violations act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Johnson v. Community College of Allegheny County · filed 2008-07-10

As CCAC is a state-funded institution, the involvement of its agents, the individually named defendants, in the alleged violations of plaintiffs rights under section 1983 makes it undisputed that defendants acted under color of state law.

A Section 1983 claim cannot survive summary judgment without a triable issue as to whether the defendant acted under color of state law.

Begley v. County of Kauai · filed 2008-07-10

The district court did not err by granting summary judgment to defendants on Begley’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims because Begley failed to raise a triable issue as to whether defendants were acting under color of state law when Begley was allegedly assaulted.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek relief from a person who, under color of state law, deprives the plaintiff of a federal right.

Hall v. Witteman · filed 2008-08-06

To state a claim under Section 1983, plaintiff must allege that a person has deprived them of a federal right, constitutional or statutory, and that the person acted under of color of state law in doing so.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law, and a public defender performing traditional defense functions does not satisfy that requirement.

Garza v. Bandy · filed 2008-08-13

The district court was correct in finding that the facts alleged--that Mr. Bandy was a public defender performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding--were insufficient to state a plausible claim that Mr. Bandy was acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show both deprivation of a federal right and action under color of state law.

Singer v. Bell · filed 1985-07-10

To state a claim under section 1983, Singer must allege not only that defendants Emily and Michael Bell deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, but also that, in doing so, they were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution and laws.

Arthur D'amario, III v. The Providence Civic Center Authority · filed 1986-01-24

There is no question that the enforcement of the “no camera” rule by the Civic Center employees supplies the state involvement nexus that is a jurisdictional requisite under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes liability for constitutional deprivations committed under color of state law and does not apply to actions by federal officials under federal law.

Church of Human Potential, Inc. v. Vorsky · filed 1986-02-24

Accordingly, actions of federal officials taken pursuant to federal law cannot form the basis of a Section 1983 claim. ... Since respondent was an IRS employee acting under the color of federal law while issuing a third party summons to Fucetola and authorizing a federal tax lien upon petitioner’s property, Section 1983 is inapplicable on its face.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state or local law.

Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2008-08-18

Nor does section 1983 give Ibrahim a cause of action against United Air Lines and its employee, David Nevins, because she hasn’t alleged that either party was acting under color of California or local law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only against persons acting under color of state law.

Ibrahim v. Homeland Security · filed 2008-08-18

And section 1983 only provides a remedy against persons acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the alleged deprivation to be committed by a person acting under color of state law; a private person lacking state authority does not meet that requirement.

McDuffy v. Marsico · filed 2008-08-21

Marsico is a private individual who was involved in a car accident with plaintiffs. Quite simply, he is not “clothed with the authority of state law” and, therefore, the § 1983 claim fails as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private parties who cooperate with state investigators without an agreement to act jointly with them.

Horton v. Williams · filed 2008-08-27

Without any evidence that Williams, either for himself or on behalf of National Seating, entered into a conspiracy with Shockley, Horton’s § 1983 claims against Williams and the company must fail because Williams and the company are private actors who do not meet the under-color-of-state-law requirement.

Section 1983 does not reach a private nonprofit organization that does not act under color of law.

Sloan v. Truong · filed 2008-08-28

Moreover, clearly the USCF—a private not-for-profit organization—does not act under “color of law.”

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement can be satisfied when a municipal entity purports to exercise official authority, even if it acts outside its actual authority.

Neighborhood Enterprises, Inc. v. City of St. Louis · filed 2008-08-29

Even though the LCRA acted outside of its authority, the plaintiffs have nonetheless sufficiently alleged that the LCRA acted under the color of law in purporting to deny the permit.

A nominally private entity acts under color of state law for § 1983 when government is pervasively entwined in its membership, management, and supervision.

Hughes v. Region VII Area Agency on Aging · filed 2008-09-08

For the reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM the district court’s ruling that Region VII is subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against a nominally private entity acting under color of state law when government is pervasively entwined in its supervision and management.

Hughes v. Region VII Area Agcy · filed 2008-09-08

In view of the pervasive entwinement of governmental entities and representatives in the supervision and management of Region VII, as well as Region VII’s own conduct manifesting an acceptance that it is a public body, we AFFIRM the district court’s ruling that Region VII acted under color of law and is subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a physician and a lawyer in private practice did not meet that requirement here.

Atamian v. Simpson · filed 2008-09-19

The district court properly dismissed the action against defendants Rich and Casheros because Rich, a physician, and Casheros, a lawyer in private practice, were not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat private nightclubs as state actors when they independently set admission charges, even though they hold state alcohol licenses.

Hollander v. Copacabana Nightclub · filed 2008-09-29

The motions to dismiss filed by AER, Lotus, and Sol are granted because Den Hollander cannot show that private nightclubs are state actors in setting cover charges for admission to their facilities.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Ghafoor v. Four Queens Hotel & Casino, Inc. · filed 2008-09-29

The district court properly dismissed Ghafoor’s section 1983 claim because he did not allege actions taken under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a private business does not satisfy that requirement without evidence that a state actor encouraged or coerced its conduct.

Ceslik v. Miller Ford, Inc. · filed 2008-09-30

Miller Ford was not acting under color of state law. It is a privately owned car dealership, and there is no evidence that any state actor encouraged or coerced it to deprive Ceslik of his First Amendment rights. Therefore, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Section 1983 does not apply to officials acting under color of federal law, including federal prosecutors acting within the scope of their duties.

Jones v. Lieber · filed 2008-09-30

By its own terms, § 1983 does not apply to officials acting under color of federal law, that is, it does not apply to a federal prosecutor acting within the scope of her duties.

Whether an off-duty officer working as a private security guard acted under color of law for Section 1983 can require a jury to assess his claims of police authority and his conduct.

Dean v. City of Buffalo · filed 2008-09-30

Turning now to Perrin’s other contention — that he was not acting under color of law — I conclude that questions of material fact exist as to that issue as well. ... On this record, I find that the jury must determine the exact nature of Perrin’s representations to and actions towards plaintiffs, as well as the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom about the authority under which Perrin was acting.

Section 1983 does not treat a municipality as acting under color of state law merely because it files a lawsuit; the suit must involve a misuse of authority conferred by state law.

Mabe v. City of Galveston Park Bd. of City of Galveston, Tex. · filed 1986-04-04

Accordingly, the Court concludes the City’s suit against Mabe is in the nature of a private action, and as such, does not implicate § 1983 relief. That the litigant happens to be a municipality does not necessarily furnish the “color of state law” requirement. Here, the municipality’s status did not make the litigation possible; nor did the decision to sue result from a misuse of power clothed by state law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private person who conspires with public officials acting under color of state law.

Hawk v. Perillo · filed 1986-04-14

However, a private person may be liable under Section 1983 when he engages in a conspiracy with individuals who are acting under color of state law, such as public officials.

Section 1983 reaches a private party whose joint action with state officials makes the party a state actor.

Quinones v. Durkis · filed 1986-06-25

It is clear that where a private party acting jointly with or through state officials becomes so allied with the state as to characterize the party as a state actor, the private party acts under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to act under color of state law; state regulation alone does not make the defendant’s conduct state action.

Eupha Hurt v. G.C. Murphy Company, a Pennsylvania Corporation Authorized to Do Business in West Virginia · filed 1986-09-11

A private defendant acts under color of state law if "he is a willful participant in a joint action with the State or its agents." ... The mere fact that the State regulates certain conduct does not imbue that conduct with state action.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; the pleadings did not show that a private party acted under color of state law by filing voter challenges.

Montana Democratic Party v. Eaton · filed 2008-10-10

Nothing in the pleadings indicates that Eaton, when he filed his challenges, was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on attorneys acting in their professional capacity for a client because that conduct is not under color of state law.

Good v. Khosrowshahi · filed 2008-10-15

The magistrate judge properly dismissed the first three claims for basic legal deficiencies that may be summarized briefly as follows: (1) under New Mexico law, attorneys owe a professional duty of care only to their clients and thus cannot be held liable for professional negligence to an adversary, Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., 750 P.2d 118, 122 (N.M. 1988); (2) defendants were not state actors or acting under color of state law and thus cannot be liable for a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1073 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The conduct of an attorney acting in his professional capacity while representing his client does not constitute action under color of state law for the purposes of § 1983.” (quotation omitted)); and (3) rules governing procedure in the federal courts do not give rise to private causes of action, see Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 431 F.3d 353, 372 (9th Cir. 2005); Digene Corp. v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452 (D. Del. 2007); Rogers v. Furlow, 729 F. Supp. 657, 660 (D. Minn. 1989).

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement is sufficiently pleaded when alleged acts can reasonably be inferred to have been performed by a District of Columbia employee in that capacity.

Deschamps v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-10-23

Ms. Hill has not contested that she is or was employed by the District of Columbia in that capacity during the relevant time period; thus, it may be reasonably inferred that her alleged acts were performed as a District of Columbia employee. The plaintiff therefore has sufficiently pleaded a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action against a person who deprives one of a constitutional right while acting under color of, inter alia, District of Columbia law.

Section 1983’s requirement that a defendant act under color of state law is satisfied when city animal control officers seize property while exercising their official authority.

Folkers v. City of Waterloo, Iowa · filed 2008-10-27

Accordingly, Folkers has established the first “essential element” of a 1983 action; namely, that the conduct complained of was committed by persons acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires state action for a claim against an individual defendant.

Brown v. NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF CORREC. SERVICES · filed 2008-10-29

To the extent that plaintiff seeks to pursue § 1983 claims against the individual defendants, such claims fail because there is no showing here of any state action.

Section 1983 generally does not cover harassment by a state employee’s coworkers unless they act under color of state law.

Brown v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 2008-10-29

Harassment by a state employee’s coworkers, then, typically will not satisfy the state action requirement.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; the retired officer’s lack of a connection to the city or police department defeated the claim against him.

Lore v. City of Syracuse · filed 2008-10-30

A plaintiff may not bring a § 1983 claim, however, without showing that the defendant acted under color of state law. ... Even if plaintiffs allegations are assumed true, defendant Lemm lacked the requisite connection to the City of Syracuse or the SPD for purposes of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law.

Holmes v. Department of Navy · filed 2008-10-31

Holmes’s action, which is styled as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, must be dismissed. A section 1983 action may only be prosecuted against individuals who took action “under color” of state law.

Section 1983 applies to officials acting under color of state law and does not provide a claim against federal officers acting under color of federal law.

Chapman v. US MARSHAL FOR NORTHERN DIST. OF ILL. · filed 2008-11-03

However, "an action brought pursuant to § 1983 cannot lie against federal officers acting under color of federal law," because section 1983 applies to officials acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 applies to officials acting under color of state law and does not provide a claim against federal officers acting under color of federal law.

Chapman v. United States Marshal · filed 2008-11-03

However, “an action brought pursuant to § 1983 cannot lie against federal officers acting under color of federal law,” because section 1983 applies to officials acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not apply to officials acting under color of federal law.

Farag v. United States · filed 2008-11-24

Because Smith was a deputized special agent acting under color of federal law at the time of these events, § 1983 is inapplicable.

Under § 1983, merely summoning police does not make a private party a state actor without evidence of joint action.

Dietrich v. Cardella · filed 2008-12-01

There is no evidence that Defendants Nugget, Harvey, and Malchow did anything more than summon police. “[M]erely complaining to the police does not convert a private party into a state actor.”

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a state-employed prison dentist who exercises independent professional judgment in treating inmates, because that treatment is not under color of state law.

Greenstein v. Huffman · filed 1986-10-07

The court finds that defendant Dr. Shilling-er was not acting under color of state law in engaging in the treatment of the inmates’ dental needs. Therefore, because the requisite element of state action has not been established, the claims brought against Dr. Shillinger fail to present a federal cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a private person who jointly restrains someone with a state officer as acting under color of state law.

Dirocco v. Anderson · filed 1986-10-20

Since both Officer Anderson and Valentino acted jointly to restrain Dussell, Valentino acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against federal employees for actions taken under color of federal law.

Taylor v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board · filed 1986-11-19

Because the actions taken by the federal employee defendants were taken under color of federal law, the federal employee defendants may not be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983’s state action requirement may be satisfied when a private person uses a state procedure to cause a constitutional deprivation for a purpose state law did not intend or the Constitution does not permit.

Motes v. Myers · filed 1987-02-20

The state action requirement of § 1983 may be satisfied if the constitutional deprivation results from a private person’s use of a state procedural law to effectuate a purpose not intended by state law and not permitted by the Constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for civil rights deprivations committed under color of tribal law.

Evans v. Little Bird · filed 1987-03-05

Redress for an alleged deprivation of civil rights accomplished under color of tribal law must be sought in the appropriate tribal court under the Indian Civil Rights Act. ... Relief is not available under either a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 state action analogy theory, or a Bivens doctrine theory.

A dentist contracted to treat state prisoners acts under color of state law when providing that treatment.

McCarthy v. Maitland Place, D.D.S. · filed 2008-12-02

Inasmuch as Dr. Place acted under the color of state law when he provided treatment to McCarthy, this Court must determinate whether McCarthy created a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his alleged Eighth Amendment violation.

Section 1983 does not treat an attorney as a state actor merely for issuing a state subpoena, absent an allegation that state officials enforced it.

Broadley v. Hardman · filed 2008-12-10

We agree with the district court that defendant’s use of this procedural device did not transform him into a state actor, at least absent any allegation that state officials were used to enforce the process.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law, so it does not cover judges acting solely under federal law.

McMurray v. Smith · filed 2008-12-12

Moreover, § 1983 requires that the defendant act under color of state law, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983; but both judges were acting solely under federal law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Odom v. Brutger Equities, Inc. · filed 2008-12-15

We further conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Brutger Equities and Kathleen Buford, because there was no genuine dispute that they were not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Bunch v. Craig · filed 2008-12-19

A claim under § 1983 requires the defendant to have acted “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires a claim against federal officials to allege that they acted pursuant to state law.

Chavis v. Bush · filed 2008-12-23

In short, the Court held that: ... (4) Chavis failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because she did not allege that the Federal Defendants acted pursuant to state law; ... (6) to the extent Chavis sought to assert constitutional torts against the Federal Defendants, she failed to allege that any of them had personal knowledge or involvement in any action taken. ... Because this appeal presents no “substantial question,” we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court for all of the reasons set forth in the District Court’s well-reasoned opinions.

A private club does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 solely because it holds a state-issued liquor license.

Schultz v. Wilson · filed 2008-12-23

Contrary to the Stouffers’s contention, however, a private club does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 solely because it holds a state-issued liquor license.

Section 1983 does not cover private attorneys performing their traditional functions because they do not act under color of state law.

Perez v. Griffin · filed 2008-12-23

Private attorneys performing their traditional functions are not considered to act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability when a person uses power granted by state law to violate federal constitutional rights.

Dorr v. City of Ecorse · filed 2008-12-29

In order for Salisbury to be held liable under § 1983, he “must [have] possess[ed] power by virtue of state law, then misuse[d] that power in a way that violates federal constitutional rights.”

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s conduct to be fairly attributable to the state; filing ballot access challenges does not, by itself, satisfy that requirement.

Nader v. McAuliffe · filed 2009-01-07

And because the court rejects the plaintiffs’ allegation that the defendants acted “under color of state law” as required for a § 1983 claim, the court grants the defendants’ motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ federal claims.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; public defenders performing traditional defense counsel functions and private attorneys are not state actors.

Wilkerson v. Sullivan · filed 2009-01-15

Public defenders do not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in criminal proceedings. ... Nor is a private attorney considered a state actor. ... Because defendants are not considered state actors, plaintiffs claim fails under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private security guard when the allegations support that he acted jointly with police.

Carr v. City of Chicago · filed 1987-09-14

The threshold issue before this court is whether James Lindsey was “acting under the color of state law” when he detained plaintiff and signed a complaint against plaintiff. This court believes Lindsey was acting under the color of state law. This court rules Lindsey was not acting as a private citizen in his capacity as a private security guard when he detained plaintiff and signed a complaint against him.

State agency officials acting in their official duties act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Fewquay v. Page · filed 1987-09-16

At all times pertinent to this cause, all Defendants acted under color of State law, statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs and usages.

Section 1983 permits suits against private citizens who conspire with state officials to violate constitutional rights.

Brown v. Johnston · filed 1987-11-24

Private citizens can be sued under § 1983 when they conspire with state officials to violate constitutional rights.

Section 1983 reaches private persons acting under color of state law when they conspire with or wilfully participate with state officials to deprive others of constitutional rights.

United Steelworkers Of America v. Phelps Dodge Corporation · filed 1987-12-01

To prevail, the union was required to prove the existence of a conspiracy, as private persons act under color of state law only when they conspire with or wilfully participate with state officials to deprive others of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; that element is satisfied when state officers act within the scope of their duties.

Rodríguez-Borton v. Pereira-Castillo · filed 2009-01-16

All parties appear to agree that defendants acted within the scope of their duties as state officers and employees at all times relevant to this case. ... The first element required under section 1983 is therefore satisfied.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for harassment by a person who lacks formal or de facto supervisory authority over the plaintiff, because the conduct is not under color of state law.

Ivan v. County of Middlesex · filed 2009-01-21

A harasser who has no formal or de facto supervisory authority over plaintiff cannot be held liable under section 1983 because the requisite element of state action is lacking.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Hammond v. D.C. Record Center · filed 2009-01-22

The law is well settled in this area, and the court dismisses the plaintiffs § 1983 claims for failing to allege that a “deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Glendora v. Sellers, 2003 WL 22890043, at *1 (D.C.Cir. Nov. 25, 2003).

Section 1983 does not treat attorneys as state actors merely because they represent a state or local government.

Horen v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF TOLEDO CITY SCH. DIST. · filed 2009-01-23

Parents’ § 1983 claim fails because they do not sufficiently allege that defendants acted under color of law. Defendants are only connected to the State through their provision of legal services to TPS. In their complaint, Parents rely on this relationship to assert that the defendants are state actors. This contention fails, however, because attorneys do not become state actors by representing state or local governments.

Section 1983 applies only to persons acting under color of state law, so it does not cover federal agents acting under federal law.

Simmons v. Wolff · filed 2009-01-27

But, § 1983 claims apply only to persons “acting under color of state law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case, however, involves federal, not state, law.

Section 1983 does not treat a private landlord as acting under color of state law merely for filing an eviction action; a conspiracy claim requires specific facts showing agreement and concerted action with state actors.

DeNardo v. Maassen · filed 2009-01-30

DeNardo here reprises his § 1983 claim from Cutler, arguing that FED actions are a construct of the state court system and that instituting an FED action is thus sufficient to show requisite conspiracy with state actors. This is the same argument we rejected in Cutler. DeNardo has not shown that the Foremans acted under color of state law, nor has he specifically presented any facts "tending to show agreement and concerted action" between the Foremans, Sawicki, and any individuals who would qualify as state actors.

Public defenders performing traditional functions as criminal defense counsel do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Jackson v. Brummett · filed 2009-02-09

With respect to the federal claims against the individual public defenders named in Mr. Jackson’s suit, the district court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that (a) a § 1983 suit may be brought against only defendants who act under color of state law, and (b) public defenders performing traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding do not do so. ... Even with these generous standards in mind, we conclude that Mr. Jackson’s suit does not state a plausible federal claim for relief for the very same reasons given by the district court.

Section 1983 claims require a defendant who acted under color of state law.

Cox v. Ashcroft · filed 2009-02-19

Any claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 are legally deficient and dismissed as such, because no state actors have been named as defendants.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a CJA-appointed attorney representing a client does not meet that requirement.

Rice v. McCann · filed 2009-02-20

Atty. McCann’s argument is well-taken because § 1983 applies only to defendants who have acted “under color of any statute ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia”.

Section 1983 claims against a private prison contractor and its employees can survive dismissal when they are alleged to perform a traditional governmental function and act under color of state law.

Wormley v. United States · filed 2009-02-24

Plaintiffs § 1983 claims, brought against CCA defendants under the theory that CCA was performing a traditional governmental function and its employees were acting under color of state law, cannot be dismissed.

Section 1983 applies to officials acting under color of state or territorial law and does not apply to conduct under federal veterans’ benefits law.

Mehrkens v. Blank · filed 2009-02-25

Sections 1983 and 1985 both regulate officials acting under color of any statute of any “State or Territory.” ... Because the VJRA was enacted under federal law, §§ 1983 and 1985 do not apply.

Section 1983 does not apply to officials acting under federal law rather than state or territorial law.

Mehrkens v. Art Blank · filed 2009-02-25

Because the VJRA was enacted under federal law, §§ 1983 and 1985 do not apply.

A private party is liable under § 1983 only if it willfully participates in joint activity with state officials; merely giving an officer information, even false information, does not establish joint activity.

Gibson v. Regions Financial Corp. · filed 2009-03-02

A private party may be held liable under § 1983 only if it is a “willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” ... The district court dismissed Gibson’s § 1983 claim because no employee of Regions was involved in Glover’s decision to obtain and execute the search warrant, and because the mere furnishing of information to a law enforcement officer, even if the information is false, does not constitute joint activity with state officials. After careful review of the record, we again agree.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against private attorneys who do not act under color of state law.

Agrawal v. Pallmeyer · filed 2009-03-02

He also insists that he stated a claim against his attorneys under both § 1983 and Bivens, but the Schiff Hardin defendants are all private attorneys who acted neither under color of state law nor federal authority.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Campbell v. Stein · filed 2009-03-02

There was no federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because Campbell alleged no facts that Dr. Alexander Stein acted under color of state law, required to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.