42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a deprivation by private security guards to be attributable to the state; absent alleged concerted action with state officials, their conduct does not support a claim.

Zuyus v. Hilton Riverside · filed 2006-06-20

Because Zuyus has not alleged that any state official acted in concert with the private hotel security guards to deprive him of his rights, he fails to state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Hill v. Didio · filed 2006-06-20

To the extent that Hill properly placed before the district court her claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, those claims are meritless because Hill did not allege that DiDio or Metellus acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983, see, e.g., Coon v. Town of Springfield, Vt., 404 F.3d 683, 686 (2d Cir.2005), or that they engaged in any conspiracy within the meaning of § 1985, see Webb v. Goord, 340 F.3d 105, 110-11 (2d Cir.2003).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a doctor who acts as a private practitioner in committing a patient under a state statute.

Joyce v. Ferrazzi · filed 1963-10-30

Since it indisputably appears from the record that the defendant doctor acted as a private practitioner in committing the plaintiff to the mental institution under the Massachusetts statute, the constitutional validity of which is not challenged, it follows that his action was that of a private citizen. ... He is not a member of the class exposed to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement is satisfied when state action is established, even if the state’s role is not obvious.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Brown · filed 1966-09-02

If state action is established, color of law must follow, lest there be an incentive to discreet discrimination.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that an official acted through authority conferred by state law; holding public office alone is insufficient.

Sinchak v. Parente · filed 1966-12-29

But it must appear from the averments of the complaint that the defendant acted on state authority as it was delegated or vested in him, and that he abused such delegated or vested authority.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is met when physicians perform an operation under a state court order authorizing a transfusion if they deem one necessary.

Jehovah's Witnesses in State of Wash. v. King County Hosp. · filed 1967-11-20

In our view the doctors were, in these circumstances, acting under color of state law when they performed the operation.

Section 1983 applies to county-appointed commissioners who administer a public hospital because their actions are under color of law.

Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial Hospital Commission · filed 1968-06-19

Because the members of the commission hold office as a result of governmental appointment and because they administer a public facility, their actions must be regarded as having been taken under color of law. Hence, the provisions of § 1983 and § 1985(3) are applicable to them.

Section 1983 does not treat a lawyer representing a client in private litigation, who is not also a party in interest, as acting under color of state law.

Jones v. Jones · filed 1969-03-05

Lawyers who are not also parties in interest and are engaged in private litigation on behalf of clients do not act under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement may be sufficiently alleged when a private proprietor has police officers remove patrons from his business.

Nanez v. Ritger · filed 1969-09-11

To fall under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the defendant must have been acting under color of law, and from the allegations of the complaint, it appears that he was.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement is met when a private landlord uses state-conferred authority to seize a tenant’s property, a function traditionally performed by the state.

Claudine Hall v. Garson · filed 1970-07-22

Thus Article 5238a vests in the landlord and his agents authority that is normally exercised by the state and historically has been a state function. ... And here the state action requirement is also met.

Section 1983 does not cover a public school principal’s decision under student council bylaws when the principal is not acting under color of state law.

Manuel Palacios, as Next Friend of Pedro Palacios, an Infant v. Harry B. Foltz and Edward Fernandez · filed 1971-05-10

We therefore hold that the actions of the principals were not “under color of” any state laws, regulations, customs or usages.

Section 1983’s requirement that defendants act under color of state or local law is satisfied by the public utilities district’s conduct.

Morgan v. Kennedy · filed 1971-09-09

Consistent with the landmark decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 [1961], the lower courts such as the court in Marland v. Heyse, 315 F.2d 312 [10th Cir. 1963], and Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 [3rd Cir. 1965], have recognized that the statutory prerequisites to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are (1) that the defendants act under color of state or local law and (2) that the plaintiffs be subjected to a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws. The Court is satisfied that plaintiffs have met the first requirement and will pass on the question of deprivation of constitutionally guaranteed rights.

An off-duty law enforcement officer acts under color of state law for § 1983 when he invokes his official status to keep bystanders from interfering with his assault.

Anderson v. Warner · filed 2006-06-26

We hold that Warner was acting under color of state law when he invoked his law enforcement status to keep bystanders from interfering with his assault on Anderson.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Clements v. Chapman · filed 2006-06-27

To the extent that Clements sought relief against defendants Grier and Miller under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he was obligated to demonstrate that they were acting “under color of state law.”

A public supervisor acts under color of state law for § 1983 when handling harassment complaints through the responsibilities of the supervisory position.

Valentine, Donna v. City of Chicago · filed 2006-06-27

DiTusa was acting under color of state law because he was exercising his responsibilities as Yard Supervisor when he took Valentine’s complaints about Tominello, talked to Tominello about the complaints, and decided not to report or transfer Tominello.

A public supervisor acts under color of state law for § 1983 when handling complaints and personnel decisions as part of supervisory duties.

Valentine v. City of Chicago, a Municipal Corporation, John Tominello, Mike Ditusa, and Joseph Senese · filed 2006-07-06

DiTusa was acting under color of state law because he was exercising his responsibilities as Yard Supervisor when he took Valentine’s complaints about Tomi-nello, talked to Tominello about the complaints, and decided not to report or transfer Tominello.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of law; private citizens acting on their own during an arrest are not proper defendants.

Mickle v. Ahmed · filed 2006-07-10

At the outset, a § 1983 claim must name as proper defendants persons who were acting “under color of law” at the time of the alleged constitutional violation. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Defendants Ahmed and Muharan were acting as private citizens at the time of Plaintiffs arrest and are improper defendants to a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s challenged conduct to be fairly attributable to the state.

Willingham v. County of Albany · filed 2006-07-12

When a private individual or entity is sued under § 1983, the evidence must demonstrate that the conduct in question is “fairly attributable” to the state.

A private person can be liable under § 1983 when specific allegations show that the person conspired with state officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

SIERZEGA v. Ashcroft · filed 2006-07-21

Because of the specific factual allegations made in support of the conspiracy claim, and because Phillips is alleged to have conspired with government officials by intentionally providing false sworn statements, plaintiff has adequately stated a conspiracy claim for the purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, against Phillips.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a person merely because she was hired for a position the plaintiff sought, without any role in the hiring decision.

Bailey v. TOWN OF EVANS, NEW YORK · filed 2006-07-24

Here, Bailey alleges only that Chase was hired for a position to which Bailey contends she should have been appointed. There is no allegation that Chase played any role whatsoever in the decision to hire herself and not Bailey. Thus Chase has not “acted” in an manner whatsoever, much less “under color of state law.” Therefore, any and all claims against Chase will be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Eriksen v. Nunemaker · filed 2006-07-27

The district court properly dismissed the action as to the remaining defendants because Eriksen failed to establish that these defendants acted under color of state law, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Conduct that constitutes state action under the Fourth Amendment also satisfies Section 1983’s under-color-of-law requirement.

Johnston v. Tampa Sports Authority · filed 2006-07-28

Conduct that constitutes "state action” under the Fourth Amendment necessarily constitutes conduct "under color of law” for purposes of determining § 1983 liability.

Section 1983's color-of-state-law requirement is met when state employees deprive someone of constitutional rights while acting under their state authority.

Ling v. Herrod · filed 2006-08-03

Because Defendants acted under their authority as employees of the state of Tennessee, the deprivation of constitutional rights was under color of state law.

Section 1983 covers claims against a state public aid department acting under color of state law.

Jeffries v. Swank · filed 1971-12-30

There can be no doubt that the Illinois Department of Public Aid acts under color of state law. ... As to Count I, plaintiffs state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 covers a private hotel proprietor’s seizure of a guest’s property under authority granted by a state innkeepers’ lien law.

Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corporation · filed 1972-02-02

Although this Court has found that the defendants seized plaintiff’s property “under color of” state law within the meaning of that phrase in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this does not make the defendants officers of the State for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2281.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement covers a school athletic league whose rules involve public school districts in their adoption and enforcement.

Brenden v. Independent School District 742 · filed 1972-05-01

In such a situation, where there is a tremendous public interest in educational functions, and where the public school machinery of the state is so involved in the effectuation and enforcement of rules which bind all public high schools in the state, the Court is left with no conclusion other than that defendant Minnesota State High School League and the defendant school districts are acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; the Seneca Nation and its officials were not acting under color of state law.

Seneca Constitutional Rights Organization v. George · filed 1972-08-09

The complaint states no claim of violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon which relief can be granted against any of the defendants. There is no allegation that Fisher-Price is acting under color of state law. ... In light of this case law, it cannot be said either that the Seneca Nation is a state instrumentality or that the Seneca defendants are acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 covers a high school athletic league acting under color of state law when public school districts participate in making and enforcing its rules.

Brenden v. Independent School District 742 · filed 1973-04-18

The High School League first contends that there is no jurisdiction over it under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 because it is a voluntary organization not acting under the color of state law. ... In such a situation, where there is a tremendous public interest in educational functions, and where the public school machinery of the state is so involved in the effectuation and enforcement of rules which bind all public high schools in the state, the Court is left with no conclusion other than that defendant Minnesota State High School League and the defendant school districts are acting under color of state law. ... We agree with the trial court and affirm its decision in this regard.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private security agent whose conduct was neither under color of state law nor part of a conspiracy with state actors.

Hampton v. Gilmore · filed 1973-05-07

First, there are no facts before this court from which it could be concluded that Umphres acted under color of state law. To the contrary, the facts show that Umphres acted at all times as the security agent for Southwestern Bell, a private corporation. There are no facts from which it might be concluded that Umphres conspired with persons who acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 covers a trustee attachment made pursuant to and under color of state law.

Trapper Brown Construction Co., Inc. v. Electromech, Inc. · filed 1973-05-14

State action sufficient to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 is, of course, involved; the trustee attachment was pursuant to and under color of New Hampshire law.

Section 1983 does not cover a creditor’s repossession under a private contract without government involvement, even when the Uniform Commercial Code recognizes the repossession.

Calderon v. United Furniture Co. · filed 1973-12-26

There was no city, county, state, or federal official involved, in any way, in this repossession. This repossession was pursued under the provisions of the contract which the Calderons had executed at the time of the purchase of the washing machine. So, the only question before the Court is whether or not the facts above stated are sufficient to permit the Plaintiff to proceed against the Defendant furniture company under 42 U.S.C., § 1983. The Court concludes they are not, regardless of which way the fact question above referred to might be decided. The Court makes this decision in the face of Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant acted pursuant to and in accordance with certain provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, and thus the repossession was accomplished under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires more than receipt of state money to treat a private person or organization as acting under color of state law.

Ozlu v. Lock Haven Hospital · filed 1974-01-21

In order to find that a person or organization acted under color of state law, more than receipt of money from the state is necessary.

Section 1983 requires sufficient allegations that private attorneys acted under color of state law.

Copple v. Astrella & Rice, P.C. · filed 2006-08-09

Accordingly, the Court concludes he has failed to state a claim because he has not— and cannot — sufficiently allege the Attorney Defendants acted under the color of law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private retailer that does not perform a public function does not satisfy that requirement.

Caldwell v. CVS Corp. · filed 2006-08-10

As set forth in the defendant’s moving papers, CVS owns and operates a convenience store and a pharmacy, and does not perform a public function. Therefore, the actions of CVS do not constitute state action and Plaintiff does not satisfy the requirements of § 1983.

A bare assertion that private defendants conspired with state officials is insufficient to state a claim under Section 1983.

Lawal v. Fowler · filed 2006-08-10

Although Lawal asserted that Fowler and Jones conspired with the other defendants to enter his home illegally, his bare assertion that such a conspiracy existed is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats physicians providing medical services to inmates as acting under color of state law, whether they are facility employees or contractors.

Rasmussen v. Skagit County · filed 2006-08-24

It is settled law that physicians providing medical services to inmates, whether as employees of the facility or pursuant to a contract for services, act “under color of state law” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law; a private employer is not liable when its conduct cannot fairly be attributed to the state.

McCauley v. Computer Aid Inc. · filed 2006-08-25

Defendants cannot be held liable under Section 1983, because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that Defendants acted under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not cover actions of the federal government or its officers.

Nghiem v. United States Department of Veteran Affairs · filed 2006-09-05

Actions of the federal government or its officers are exempt from the proscriptions of § 1983.

An off-duty police officer acts under color of state law for § 1983 when his conduct presents an exercise of police authority.

Swiecicki v. Delgado · filed 2006-09-15

We therefore hold that Delgado was a state actor for the duration of the incident.

A private entity alleged to act jointly with city officials to violate constitutional rights may be liable under § 1983.

Presley v. City of Charlottesville · filed 2006-09-22

Moreover, because Presley has alleged that the RTF engaged in "joint activity with" City officials, conspiring to commit the various constitutional violations, the RTF is also potentially liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires that the alleged injury be caused by a person acting under color of state law.

Habecker v. Town of Estes Park, Colorado · filed 2006-09-25

Finally, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have no claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the injury of which Plaintiff Habecker complains was not one caused by persons acting “under color of’ state law, as required by section 1983.

Section 1983 treats a state official’s issuance of binding directives authorized by state law as action under color of state law.

American Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Blackwell · filed 2006-09-26

The Ohio Revised Code expressly grants defendant the authority to issue directives binding upon the boards of election. Ohio Rev.Code. § 3501.05(B). In issuing the Oral Directive, defendant was acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.”

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a private animal welfare organization or its employees when they do not act under color of state law.

Chambers v. Doe · filed 2006-09-26

The S.P.C.A. and its employees are private individuals engaged in the prevention of cruelty to animals under the umbrella of a private non-profit organization. They are not “clothed with the authority of state law.” ... Therefore, plaintiffs § 1983 claims against the S.P.C.A. and John Does 6 and 7 have no arguable basis in law or in fact and will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Allen v. Gold Country Casino · filed 2006-09-28

The district court also properly dismissed Allen’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because there is no allegation that any defendant was acting under the color of state law.

Private bail enforcement agents may be liable under § 1983 when they act under a state-granted privilege and obtain significant aid from police officers.

Tirreno v. Mott · filed 2006-09-29

Therefore, when Mott and Phang entered plaintiffs’ home, they acted pursuant to a common law privilege granted by Connecticut law, and the first element of the Lugar test is satisfied. ... Mott and Phang may also be considered state actors because they acted together with, and obtained significant aid from, the Westport Police Department. ... Therefore, Mott and Phang may be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Sielck, Linda v. Sielck, Jeffrey R. · filed 2006-10-05

And although Sielck did not cite 42 U.S.C. § 1983, she could not state a claim under that statute because she does not assert that the defendants acted under the color of state law, Valentine v. City of Chicago, 452 F.3d 670, 682 (7th Cir. 2006).

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private contractor whose alleged participation with state police in removing someone from a public area plausibly constitutes action under color of state law.

Carmack v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 2006-10-10

This court finds that Mr. Carmack has alleged enough facts to support a claim that MBCR was a state actor based on the traditional public function and symbiotic relationship theories.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; the correctional officers named as defendants satisfied that requirement.

Lyons v. Wall · filed 2006-10-13

The initial inquiry in a Section 1983 action is (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right or a federal statutory right. ... There is no dispute that the named defendants acted under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; federal employees acting under federal law do not meet that requirement.

Bell v. LaBorde · filed 2006-10-13

Bell originally brought his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the district court rightly construed these counts as Bivens claims. ... In this case, Bell brought suit against federal employees, who acted under color of federal, not state law.

Section 1983 permits claims against a private foster care agency and its employee when their supervision of city-placed children constitutes action under color of state law.

Phillips Ex Rel. Green v. City of New York · filed 2006-10-16

In addition, the actions at issue, consisting of the policies and procedures by which CHB supervises foster parents, as well as its staff in handling the supervision of foster parents, relate to the handling of children placed with CHB by the City and are actions that would have been performed by the City had CHB not undertaken those actions. Accordingly, this Court finds that the actions of the Foster Agency Defendants at issue here were taken under color of law and thus that Plaintiffs may bring § 1983 claims against these defendants.

Section 1983’s color-of-law element is satisfied when officers issue a traffic citation and tow a car in their official capacity.

Boyd v. City of Oakland · filed 2006-10-17

The citation, as an official departmental document, represents an exercise of official police power that was applied to Cammerin Boyd, which is sufficient to establish that the Defendant Officers “acted under color of state law.” Similarly, Exhibit B, the towing report, establishes that the towing of Mr. Boyd’s car was an official action of the Oakland Police Department, and thus was an action undertaken “under color of state law.”

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied at the pleading stage when plaintiffs allege that the defendant acted as a state law enforcement officer.

Rynn v. Jaffe · filed 2006-10-20

Here, plaintiffs allege that Officer Jaffe was acting at all times as a state law enforcement officer, rather than as a private individual. Because the acts were presumably committed “under color of state law”, the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ claims turns on the asserted deprivation of constitutional rights.

A prison warden acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when ordering prison lockdown procedures.

Hayes v. Garcia · filed 2006-10-27

Here, there is no dispute that Warden Garcia acted under color of state law when she ordered implementation of lockdown procedures at CAL which limited Plaintiffs access to outdoor exercise from December 27, 2001, through September 27, 2002.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private defendant absent allegations that the defendant acted under color of law.

Benard v. Washington County · filed 2006-11-02

Nonetheless, the § 1983 claim in Count VI cannot lie against defendant Straffon, as there are no allegations that she acted under color of law.

Section 1983 requires defendants to act under color of law.

Curry v. Advocate Bethany Hospital · filed 2006-11-02

Lastly, Carlos fails to state a claim under § 1983 because all defendants, being private individuals and a private hospital, have not acted under color of law.

For a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim, a formal supervisory title alone does not establish that a defendant acted under color of state law; the defendant’s actual supervisory role matters.

Houlihan v. Sussex Technical School District · filed 2006-11-16

To establish a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation under the First Amendment, the plaintiff must, as a threshold matter, demonstrate that he or she was deprived of a Constitutional right by a person acting under color of state law. ... Rather, the operative question is whether the individual assumed a supervisory role over the Plaintiff. In this ease, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Huber had any supervisory power over Plaintiffs daily activities, and Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Huber took any adverse employment action against her.

Section 1983 requires a private entity to have acted under color of state law when the alleged violation occurred.

Johnson v. Health Central Hospital · filed 2006-11-30

In any event, Health Central was entitled to summary judgment on the claim since Johnson established neither a violation of a constitutional right nor that when the alleged violation occurred, Health South -- a private entity -- was acting under color of state law.

A § 1983 claim against a federal marshal can survive dismissal when the complaint sufficiently alleges that he acted under color of D.C. law.

Bame v. Clark · filed 2006-12-11

The Court concludes that the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that former Marshal Dillard and the unnamed Doe defendants were acting under color of D.C. law when they strip searched Plaintiffs and the putative class members.

Section 1983 requires state action in the conduct that allegedly deprived the plaintiff of a federal right; a defendant’s state-actor status in another capacity does not suffice.

Bates v. Northwestern Human Services, Inc. · filed 2006-12-11

Thus, even assuming that the defendants were acting under color of state law in their capacity as a DMH-authorized service provider, the plaintiffs have provided no support for the proposition that the defendants must then be considered state actors in their capacity as an SSA-certified representative payee.

Section 1983 does not cover a police officer’s private conduct unrelated to the performance of police duties.

Chavez v. Guerrero · filed 2006-12-15

In sum, the allegations regarding Chavez’s interactions with Guerrero demonstrate that his actions were not related to the performance of police duties. Instead, he was engaged in a purely private pursuit fueled by his romantic interest in Chavez. While we are disturbed by allegations that a police officer would engage in this type of conduct, we find that Guerrero’s actions fall outside the scope of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach a private creditor’s peaceful repossession merely because state law recognizes that preexisting remedy.

McDuffy v. Worthmore Furniture, Inc. · filed 1974-07-09

The action of the defendants in this case was not action “under color of law” as that phrase is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; private enforcement of a repairmen’s lien without sufficient state involvement does not qualify.

Parks v. " MR. FORD" · filed 1975-01-10

We therefore conclude that plaintiffs have failed to show sufficient state involvement in the conduct of these defendants to constitute state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, or acts under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.

A private company can act under color of state law for § 1983 when it operates a residential community that functions as a municipality.

Illinois Migrant Council and Roy Villareal v. Campbell Soup Company · filed 1975-06-26

In sum, in our view, the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged sufficient facts upon which it could be concluded that the Campbell Soup Company’s town of Prince Crossing was a company town within the meaning of Marsh v. Alabama, and accordingly when the defendant Company acted, it did so under color of state law.

Section 1983 covers acts of officials enforcing municipal ordinances even when state law does not authorize those acts.

Cobb v. Beame · filed 1975-09-30

Although municipalities are not considered to be “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, the statutory words “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory” do not exclude the acts of an official or policeman who can show no authority under state law to support Ills actions.

Section 1983 requires state involvement in the challenged conduct; government support or regulation of a private defendant alone is insufficient.

Gerrard v. Blackman · filed 1975-10-06

Applying the standard reflected by the aforementioned cases, we do not find that the plaintiffs have alleged the requisite involvement by the state in the wrongful conduct at issue here. Regardless of the extent to which the defendants receive governmental support, or the degree of government regulation, unless the state activity or involvement related to the alleged interception in question, the instant cause of action is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Service Arms Co. v. United States Treasury Dept., Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms · filed 1975-10-09

The Complaint fails to allege the individual Defendants were acting under color of State law which is an essential element to a § 1983 violation.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is not met when party leaders fill an internal party office outside a primary or general election.

McMenamin v. Philadelphia County Democratic Executive Committee · filed 1975-10-30

Under Lynch, supra, the filling of such an office is not state action or action under color of state law.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement is adequately pleaded when the complaint alleges that public officials removed police protection and directed an assault on picketers.

Bradley v. Clegg · filed 1975-11-07

The defendants argue specifically that the plaintiffs have not alleged the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or statutes of the United States, nor sufficient state action required to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants’ state action argument repeats a similar argument respecting the first cause of action and will be denied here for the same reasons as above.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is not met when private defendants merely pretend to be affiliated with state law enforcement.

Mauro v. Beil · filed 2007-01-10

Here, the defendants are not state actors, nor did they act under color of state law. Even if true, Mauro’s allegations that the defendants pretended that they were somehow affiliated with law enforcement for the state of New Jersey, does not suffice to make their conduct attributable to the state.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is sufficiently pleaded when defendants are alleged to have acted as authorized peace officers exercising authority conferred by state law.

Schindler v. French · filed 2007-01-12

Plaintiffs’ complaint sufficiently alleges that defendants Spinato and Sasse were acting under color of state law because they were allegedly acting as “duly authorized peace officers” and exercising authority conferred by state law by virtue of their status as peace officers.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim against state prison officers acting under color of state law for an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.

Wagner v. United States · filed 2007-01-16

Officers of RCI are persons acting under color of state law as meant by § 1983, and the Complaint asserted that these officers deprived Wagner of his constitutionally protected right of access to the courts.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a private party that is not a state actor does not meet that requirement.

Thompson v. Hicks · filed 2007-01-17

Circle K was a private party, not a state actor. Thus, Thompson’s complaint failed to state a claim against Circle K, and he was not entitled to Rule 60(b) relief.

A private security guard who merely follows a suspect, and a college that does not act under color of state law, cannot be liable under § 1983.

Sanders Ex Rel. Sanders v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2007-01-23

Neither Garcia, who did nothing more than follow Alfred, nor Augsburg College was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not provide a claim against federal officers acting within the scope of their federal duties.

Diaz-Romero v. Ashcroft · filed 2007-01-26

We further find that there is no cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this action since this provision applies exclusively “to ... persons acting under color of state law’ and not to persons acting pursuant to federal law” ... and there is no controversy over the fact that all challenged actions in these proceedings arise from conduct of federal officers acting within the scope of their federal duties.

Private security personnel do not become state actors under § 1983 merely by restraining people until police arrive.

Edwards v. Okie Dokie, Inc. · filed 2007-02-06

The mere fact that security “took down” the Plaintiffs does not constitute willful participation in the law enforcement activity of the District of Columbia. Because Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence that Okie Dokie was a state actor, the § 1983 claim against Okie Dokie must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not reach a police officer’s private participation in a repossession when the officer does not use or claim police authority.

Mitchell v. Gieda · filed 2007-02-06

His activities on the morning at issue were undoubtedly “purely private acts” and therefore “not acts under color of state law.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an entity that is not acting under color of state law.

Gandy v. Jiffy Fulfillment, Inc. · filed 2007-02-13

The district court did not err by dismissing Gandy’s complaint; Gandy may not proceed under § 1983 against an entity that is not acting under color of state law.

A Section 1983 claim against a private person requires facts supporting an allegation that the person acted under color of state law.

Acrivos v. Vaskov · filed 2007-02-14

Accordingly, we will examine the District Court’s alternate holding that Acrivos failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Rich because there was no allegation that Rich acted under color of state law and no facts supporting such an allegation. We agree with this determination, and therefore will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Acrivos’s claim against Rich based upon its alternative reasoning.

Section 1983 does not treat a private citizen as a state actor merely for prompting a prosecution or service of process.

How v. Baxter Springs, KS · filed 2007-02-22

Thus, absent more, causing the state, or an arm of the state, to initiate a prosecution or serve process is insufficient to give rise to state action.

Section 1983 does not treat a private citizen as acting under color of state law merely because the citizen’s complaint causes the state to initiate a prosecution or serve process.

How v. City of Baxter Springs · filed 2007-02-22

Thus, absent more, causing the state, or an arm of the state, to initiate a prosecution or serve process is insufficient to give rise to state action.

An off-duty police officer’s private conduct is not under color of law when the officer does not exercise or invoke police authority.

Cotz v. Mastroeni · filed 2007-02-23

Construing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, every relevant fact militates in favor of finding that Weidel was not acting under color of law. He was off-duty, not in uniform, did not identify himself as a police officer, did not show a badge, possessed no weapons or handcuffs, did not threaten or attempt to arrest plaintiff, and was playing with his children in front of his home.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law element is satisfied for a motion to dismiss when the complaint alleges that defendant officers acted within the scope of their state duties.

Castro v. Negron · filed 2007-03-01

According to the complaint the defendants were acting within the scope of their duties as state officers at all relevant times. Therefore, the first section 1983 element is satisfied for purposes of the outstanding motion.

Section 1983 does not reach claims against attorneys for conduct in their capacity as counsel because they are not acting under color of state law.

Thompson v. Shilling · filed 2007-03-01

Thompson failed to state a federal claim against defendants Werner and Paulsen because they were acting in their capacity as Thompson’s attorneys at the time they allegedly violated his constitutional rights.

A private party’s failure to seek a permit and agreement with a county’s decision not to require one do not establish joint action under Section 1983.

Continental Coal, Inc. v. Cunningham · filed 2007-03-02

The facts that the Cunninghams did not seek a permit and that they agreed with the Board’s decision not to require one are insufficient to establish joint action between the Cunninghams and the Board.

A privately retained attorney does not act under color of law for purposes of § 1983.

Ray v. State of NJ · filed 2007-03-05

A privately retained attorney does not act under color of law for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 treats police officers acting in their official capacity as acting under color of state law.

Brooks v. Knapp · filed 2007-03-07

In the present case, the police officers were acting in their official capacity and hence under color of law.

Section 1983 treats humane society employees as acting under color of state law when the government gives the society traditional law enforcement powers.

Daskalea v. Washington Humane Society · filed 2007-03-13

An examination of the explicit powers and functions bestowed by the Government upon the Washington Humane Society demonstrates that the Humane Society must be considered a government actor.

Section 1983 does not cover private casino employees’ testimony before a grand jury or at a criminal trial because they do not act under color of state law when testifying.

Bethea v. Trump · filed 2007-03-15

He cannot maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his civil rights against the Casino employees because they did not act under ... color of state law when they testified before the grand jury or at the criminal trial.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a public official’s challenged conduct drew on the authority of the office or abused official duties.

Parks v. City of Horseshoe Bend · filed 2007-03-15

Second, Parks has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue as to whether the defendants acted under color of state law. Even if one were to assume, as the district court did, that Parks suffered a constitutional deprivation, there is no evidence that the conduct of Police Chief Mitchell or Mayor Spear was sustained by the authority of their offices, or that their actions were abuses of their official duties.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private entity that acts jointly with city police to enforce speech restrictions.

Bill Wickersham etc. v. Salute to Veterans · filed 2007-03-22

Since Salute and the city were knowingly and pervasively entangled in the enforcement of the challenged speech restrictions, we conclude that Salute was a state actor when it interfered with appellees' expressive activities. The district court did therefore not err in holding that Salute's curtailment of appellees' freedom of expression constituted state action and was actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private entity knowingly and pervasively entangled with a city in enforcing the challenged restrictions.

Bill Wickersham Maureen Doyle v. City of Columbia, Memorial Day Weekend Salute to Veterans Corporation · filed 2007-03-22

Since Salute and the city were knowingly and pervasively entangled in the enforcement of the challenged speech restrictions, we conclude that Salute was a state actor when it interfered with appellees’ expressive activities. The district court did therefore not err in holding that Salute’s curtailment of appellees’ freedom of expression constituted state action and was actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a private engineering firm that did not act as a government official and to which the government's actions cannot be imputed.

Madison County Bd. of Commrs. v. Bell, Unpublished Decision (3-26-2007) · filed 2007-03-26

"It appears beyond doubt that defendants can prove no set of facts entitling them to recover against URS. Defendants fail to allege, nor could they, that UPS [sic] appropriated their property; URS did not act as a government official under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985 ; defendants allege no duty [URS owed] to them and failed to allege elements of tortious interference by URS against them." {¶ 107} This conclusion is supported by the record. The claims brought by appellants against URS are contingent upon URS being an appropriating agency. The sole appropriating agency in this case is appellee, the Madison County Board of Commissioners. URS, an engineering design firm, is neither a government entity nor an appropriating agency. Appellee's actions related to this lawsuit and the appropriation cannot be imputed to URS.

Section 1983 does not cover actions taken under color of federal law.

Cobb v. United States Department of Education Office for Civil Rights · filed 2007-03-27

No claim lies under § 1983 when the actions are taken under color of federal law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and deprivation of a federally secured right; allegations of actions by a state university and its officials plead the state-action element.

Montalvo-Padilla v. University of P.R. · filed 2007-03-29

In general, to sketch an actionable § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must allege that an act or omission was undertaken under color of state law, and that she was deprived of some federally secured right. ... Following the lead of Aponte-Torres, we deem the first element appropriately pled, because the Second Amended Complaint alleges actions attributed to the U.P.R. and its functionaries and the U.P.R. is an arm of the Commonwealth. ... Thus, Plaintiff pled the necessary state action.

Section 1983 permits recovery for constitutional violations only for conduct under color of state law.

Collins v. Sovereign Bank · filed 2007-04-03

Plaintiff asserts a 14th Amendment violation against the Hoffman Ford Defendants, see Compl. at 14, but recovery for constitutional violations under Section 1983 is limited to actions committed under color of state law, and there is no allegation implying that the Hoffman Ford Defendants were acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a lawyer representing a party in divorce and custody proceedings when the lawyer was not acting under color of state law.

Hunt v. Lamb · filed 2007-04-04

Finally, defendant M itchell, the lawyer who represented Francheska Lamb in the divorce and child custody proceedings, was not acting as a representative of the state or under color of state law. Consequently, she is not subject to suit under § 1983. ... W e agree Hunt failed to state a claim against any defendant.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders performing traditional defense functions because they do not act under color of state law.

Clark v. Vernon · filed 2007-04-05

Public defenders performing the traditional functions of representing an indigent criminal defendant do not act under color of state law and cannot be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a public university coach as a state actor when he engages in misconduct while functioning in his coaching capacity.

Jennings v. University of North Carolina · filed 2007-04-09

As we spell out in detail in part II, supra, Jennings has proffered evidence (1) that Dorrance was a state actor, functioning in his capacity as a coach, when he engaged in sexual harassment and (2) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to interfere with her educational activities. The district court therefore erred in granting summary judgment to Dorrance on the § 1983 claim for sexual harassment.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an entity that is not acting under color of state law.

Gandy v. Lexington · filed 2007-04-17

The district court did not err by dismissing Gandy’s complaint; Gandy may not proceed under § 1983 against an entity that is not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right committed under color of state law.

Jack Yetiv and Aspenwood Apt. Corp. v. Beatrice Link and Heley Huey · filed 2007-04-19

To state a claim for relief in an action brought under section 1983, Yetiv must establish that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed "under color of state law."

Section 1983 does not cover claims against a defense attorney for conduct as counsel in a criminal proceeding when the attorney was not acting under color of state law.

Robert Holt, Jr. v. Crist · filed 2007-04-19

Thus, these claims cannot proceed under § 1983 because Suskauer was not acting under color of state law.

City employees acting in their capacity as city employees act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Albra v. City of Fort Lauderdale · filed 2007-04-25

The police officers and other City employees in this case were all acting under color of state law, given that they were acting in their capacity as employees of the City.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations that a private defendant acted under color of state law, such as by jointly engaging with state officials in the challenged action.

Canatella v. Van De Kamp · filed 2007-05-03

Appellant § 1983 claims against Appellee Daetwyler fail because he has failed to raise any factual allegations indicating that Appellee Daetwyler acted under color of state law by “jointly engaging] with state officials in the challenged action.”

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law for a constitutional claim to proceed.

Delkhah v. Moore · filed 2007-05-04

The court further held that M r. Delkhah did not state a claim under the First or Fourteenth Amendments, redressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because M s. M oore did not act under color of state law, M r. Delkhah produced no evidence that she treated others differently and in fact so stipulated, and M r. Delkhah’s speech did not address matters of public concern, but instead sought redress for private grievances. ... Applying the standards set out above, we affirm the summary judgment substantially for the reasons stated in the district court’s well-reasoned and thorough decision.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private citizens whose actions do not amount to state action.

Woods v. Valentino · filed 2007-05-14

Because Andrew and Deborah Williams are private citizens, and because the Plaintiff has not presented any facts establishing that their private actions rise to the level of state action, Andrew and Deborah Williams are entitled to summary judgment on all claims against them.

Humane societies authorized to enforce state animal cruelty laws act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Allen v. Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals · filed 2007-05-14

The defendants in the instant suit satisfy the “acting under color of state law” requirement. Defendants HSHA and PSPCA were entities statutorily authorized to enforce Pennsylvania laws pertaining to criminal cruelty-to-animals violations under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5511.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege how each defendant acted under color of state law; an unsupported conspiracy allegation does not establish that element.

Gales v. Gatterman · filed 2007-05-16

The district court dismissed the claims against M r. Gales’s appellate attorneys because M r. Gales failed to allege how either attorney acted under color of state law, a requisite element of his § 1983 claim. ... Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that M r. Gales failed to state a claim against these two defendants.

Section 1983 does not reach a private company’s conduct when the company is not acting under color of state law or collaborating with a state official.

Gonzalez v. L'OREAL USA, INC. · filed 2007-05-24

Defendant is a private company and was not accused of collaborating with an official state actor. Accordingly, Defendant’s actions cannot be understood to fall under color of state law and no cause of action lies against Defendant under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a criminal defense attorney does not do so when representing a client.

Martinez-Tull v. Gonzalez-Aleman · filed 2007-05-31

Indisputably, a claim will not lie against Gonzalez-Aleman under § 1983 because he did not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; private attorneys and a privately employed nurse do not meet that requirement based on those roles alone.

Buchanan v. Gay · filed 2007-06-06

Therefore, the court will grant Mrs. Gay’s motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims on the basis that she is not a State actor. The court will also dismiss, sua sponte, the § 1983 claims raised against Attorneys J. Brady and Gay inasmuch as the complaint fails to allege that they acted under the color of State law.

A § 1983 claim against private defendants requires evidence that they acted under color of state law, such as by conspiring with a city.

ATUAHENE v. City of Hartford · filed 2007-06-11

In his response to the instant motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff does not offer any evidence to support his claim that the Defendants conspired with the City or in any other way acted under color of state law. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is being granted with respect to Count Five.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a public defender and a private attorney performing the alleged representation did not meet that requirement.

Curry v. South Carolina · filed 2007-06-20

The Magistrate Judge thus properly determined these two defendants are entitled to be dismissed for lack of state action. The Magistrate Judge also properly determined that the Charleston County Public Defender’s Office is entitled to be dismissed from Plaintiffs lawsuit.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a physician who assumes a state prison’s duty to provide medical care because the physician acts under color of state law.

Primus v. Lee · filed 2007-06-22

Accordingly, Plaintiff appropriately alleges Dr. Lee provided the complained of medical treatment “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; recognizing defendants as state officials does not establish state action when they did not invoke state authority.

Showalter v. Brubaker · filed 2007-06-22

These defendants did not arrest, file charges against Showalter, or in any other way invoke State authority when the alleged constitutional deprivations occurred. Showalter relies on her recognition of Brubaker and Ebersole as state officials and their immediate reaction to her photographing their meeting to demonstrate state action. These allegations, without more, fail to create state action.

Section 1983 does not treat a municipal employee’s private filing of a criminal complaint as action under color of law merely because of her employment.

Boyce v. Eggers · filed 2007-06-25

There is not merit to Plaintiffs argument that Eggers was acting under color of law when she filed her complaint merely because she was employed by the Borough at the time. It is clear that she was complaining to the police and filing a complaint in the same manner as would any private citizen. ... As such, no reasonable jury could find that she was acting under color of law.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is sufficiently pleaded when a complaint alleges that a hospital had a contract with a sheriff’s office to provide inmate care.

Crenshaw v. Lister · filed 2007-06-25

The Court finds that the alleged contractual relationship between Fawcett Memorial and the Charlotte County Sheriffs Office (Doc. # 112, p. 14) is sufficient to allege action under color of state law at the pleading stage.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public defender for representing a criminal defendant because that representation is not action under color of law.

Radocesky v. Munley · filed 2007-06-29

Finally, no liability attaches under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for representation of a criminal defendant, because a public defender does not act under color of law in representing his or her client. ... The District Court properly dismissed the amended complaint on the basis of immunities and the absence of state action.

Section 1983 requires facts showing agreement and concerted action to plead that private defendants acted under color of state law through a conspiracy with state officials.

Raiser v. Kono · filed 2007-07-05

However, “[w]hen a plaintiff in a § 1983 action attempts to assert the necessary ‘state action’ by implicating state . . . judges in a conspiracy with private defendants, mere conclusory allegations with no supporting factual averments are insufficient; the pleadings must specifically present facts tending to show agreement and concerted action.” Sooner Prods. Co. v. M cBride, 708 F.2d 510, 512 (10th Cir. 1983).

Section 1983 claims against private parties based on conspiracy with state actors require facts showing an agreement to deprive someone of federal rights.

Raiser v. Kono · filed 2007-07-05

Mr. Raiser’s amended complaint contains extensive allegations, but he does not present any facts establishing an agreement or meeting of the minds between BYU, its attorneys, and the state actors to deprive him of any federal rights. Thus, he failed to state a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement presents a factual issue when police officers allegedly take property from a home and place it in a police department property room.

Roemer v. City of Dayton · filed 2007-07-06

Instead, the fact that the personal possessions allegedly taken from Plaintiffs home by Defendants were apparently placed in the City of Dayton property room creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants acted under of color of state law.

Section 1983 treats state prison officials’ denial of an inmate grievance in the exercise of official authority as conduct under color of state law.

Jackson v. Russo · filed 2007-07-11

The first element of § 1983, that Superintendent Russo and IGO Carney are state officials and that the denial of Jackson’s grievance was an exercise of official authority, is not. open to dispute.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law element is satisfied when the defendant’s challenged conduct is conceded to have occurred under color of state law.

Snead v. Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals · filed 2007-07-11

It is conceded that SPCA was acting under color of state law when it took possession of and euthanized Snead’s dogs; therefore, the first prerequisite for making out a Section 1983 claim is satisfied.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 action bears the burden of proving that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Smith v. Devline · filed 2007-07-11

As we have explained, a plaintiff in a § 1983 action bears the burden of proving that the defendant was acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; an official’s conduct does not meet that requirement merely because it was intended to protect the official’s position.

Bryant v. Mississippi Military Department · filed 2007-07-17

However, a state actor does not act “under color of state law” simply because his actions were undertaken in an attempt to protect his position as a state official.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement is satisfied when private defendants enlist city officials to help enforce a discriminatory policy and the officials act under that agreement.

Johnson v. Heinemann Candy Co., Inc. · filed 1975-11-18

The involvement of the city officials in making an agreement with Heinemann to enforce the policy and the subsequent action pursuant to the agreement imbued the discriminatory policy with sufficient state involvement to satisfy § 1983’s requirement that the actions be taken under color of law.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-law requirement is not met when hotelkeepers detain guests’ property under a state lien statute without significant state involvement or a delegated function traditionally exclusive to the state.

Anastasia v. The Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago, Etc. · filed 1976-02-23

This degree of involvement falls short of the significant degree of encouragement or affirmative support necessary to the existence of state action. ... We see little similarity between this case and the public function cases decided by the Supreme Court and therefore find no basis for concluding that there is state action here.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement is not met when private individuals use procedures authorized by state law without joint activity with the state or its agents.

Board of Education of Independent School District Number 53 of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma v. Board of Education of Indepe · filed 1976-03-15

Austin and Parker utilized procedures authorized, but not compelled, by state law. In so doing they did not engage in any joint activity with either the state, its officials, or its agents. The § 1983 requirement of "color of law" has not been met.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state or local law; a utility’s termination of service does not support a claim when the state is insufficiently connected to that action.

Cochran v. Public Service Co. · filed 1976-07-26

Before relief can be granted under § 1983 the plaintiff must establish that the prohibited action was taken “under color of” state or local law. ... Premised on the rulings of Jackson and Teleco and the facts presented in this case, it is the conclusion of the Court that the State of Oklahoma is not sufficiently connected with the actions of the defendant, Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, and therefore with the actions of the individual named defendants, in terminating the plaintiff’s electrical service to constitute action attributable to the State of Oklahoma for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; state regulation of a Head Start program alone does not make its employee discharge state action.

Kelley v. Action for Boston Community Development, Inc. · filed 1976-08-16

Accordingly, this Court holds that there is insufficient state action to bring the defendants’ alleged actions within the ambit of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a bail bondsman’s conduct as state action merely because the state regulates and licenses bail bondsmen.

Lemmons v. Tranbraw · filed 1976-11-23

This, however, is not sufficient to convert their conduct into that of the state for the purposes of the 14th Amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation under color of state law; officers acting under authority conferred by this congressionally approved interstate compact did not meet that requirement.

Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency · filed 1977-12-21

Since the challenged actions were taken by the individual officers pursuant to authority conferred by the Compact, the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights could not have been under color of state law.

A private party may be liable under § 1983 when it acts in concert with a state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.

Mani v. United Bank · filed 2007-07-25

Despite this more common configuration of § 1983 cases, a purely private party may be liable when “the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.”

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a private hospital’s suspension of medical privileges does not meet that requirement without a sufficient nexus between the government and the suspension.

Philips v. Pitt County Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 2007-08-02

Having examined all of the relevant facts and circumstances, the court concludes that the conduct of Defendants in suspending Plaintiffs medical privileges is not fairly attributable to Pitt County. Accordingly, the court concludes that Defendants did not act under color of state law in suspending Plaintiffs medical privileges and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED with respect to Plaintiffs Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 can impose liability on a police officer who abuses authority under color of law even without witnessing a crime.

Ortega v. Brock · filed 2007-08-07

Under § 1983, however, a police officer can be held liable for damages when he does not witness a crime but abuses his authority under color of law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, which criminal defense attorneys do not provide when acting as defense counsel.

Jackson v. Greenlee · filed 2007-08-17

Jackson will be unable to prevail on his § 1983 claim because he does not allege that the Appellees did anything other than act in the role of defense counsel, and cannot show action under color of state law.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement can be met by a private towing company that tows, stores, and sells a vehicle for a sheriff’s criminal investigation.

Smith v. Insley's Inc. · filed 2007-08-22

Accordingly, we find that Smith has established the threshold section 1983 requirement that Insley’s was acting under color of state law in towing, storing, and selling his vehicle.

Section 1983 does not cover an attorney filing suit on behalf of a client when the attorney is not acting under color of state law.

Mothershed v. Thomson · filed 2007-08-24

The district court also properly concluded defendant Thomson was not acting under color of state law in filing suit against Mothershed on behalf of his client.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; private attorneys and law firms do not become state actors merely by representing a client.

Ojserkis v. Aprile · filed 2007-08-28

Because the Appellees are not state actors, Ojserkis has failed to state a claim under § 1983.

Private attorneys performing traditional legal functions do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Ames v. Grammer · filed 2007-09-06

Private attorneys performing traditional legal functions as counsel do not act “under color of state law.”

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement can be satisfied by allegations that special police officers exercised state-granted arrest authority or took actions related to an arrest.

Maniaci v. Georgetown University · filed 2007-09-10

Accordingly, at this time, the Court shall not dismiss Plaintiffs Section 1983 claim on the grounds that the Public Safety Officers were not acting under color of state law, as Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to suggest that an arrest or actions related thereto occurred.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right by someone acting under color of state law.

Lindsey v. Thomson · filed 2007-09-10

Furthermore, the amended complaint fails to state any actionable claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Such a claim requires a showing that the Defendants “deprived [the Plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States while ... acting under color of state law.”

A private actor may act under color of state law through willful joint activity with state agents, but an unsupported allegation of conspiracy does not suffice for a Section 1983 claim.

Mooney v. County of Monroe · filed 2007-09-11

It is well settled that a private actor may be found to have acted under color of state law if it is “a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” ... However, plaintiffs complaint offers no explanation of how Strong allegedly conspired with the state defendants, and provides no factual basis whatsoever to support his conspiracy theory. As such, his Section 1983 claim against Strong must be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a person deprived of federal rights by someone acting under color of state law to seek redress.

Probst v. Central Ohio Youth Center · filed 2007-09-21

For the reasons stated herein, this Court finds that CCI and Plumley were state actors under the public function test for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, their Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law, and private parties' use of the court system for litigation does not satisfy that requirement.

Denardo v. Cutler · filed 2007-09-21

This is not sufficient to support a finding of conspiracy with a state actor and use of the court system by private parties for the purpose of litigation is not sufficient to bring them under "color of state law."

Section 1983 provides a private right of action for constitutional rights violations committed under color of state law.

Murawski v. Pataki · filed 2007-09-26

There is no allegation in the complaint that Yahoo!, Inc. acted under color of state law, and the Court rejects plaintiffs contention in his opposition that Yahoo!, Inc. is transformed into a state actor because it benefited from early public funding of the development of 'the internet.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of a federal right under color of state law and excludes merely private conduct.

Jack Yetiv and Aspenwood Apt. Corp. v. Beatrice Link and Heley Huey · filed 2007-09-27

To state a claim for relief in an action brought under section 1983, Yetiv must establish that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed "under color of state law."

A public defender representing an indigent defendant in a state criminal proceeding does not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Zapata v. Public Defenders Office · filed 2007-10-24

Zapata’s claims against his defense attorneys fail to state a § 1983 claim because a public defender representing an indigent defendant in a state criminal proceeding does not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Mitchell v. Clinkscales · filed 2007-10-24

Additionally, although Mitchell argues that Clinkscales is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mitchell does not allege facts demonstrating that Clinkscales acted under color of state law; thus, Mitchell failed to plead and establish subject-matter jurisdiction based on the existence of a federal question.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public defender performing a lawyer’s traditional functions because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Stankowski v. Farley · filed 2007-10-24

A public defender does not act “under color of state law” and is not liable under § 1983 when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions.