42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not make a private complainant liable as a participant with state actors in an arrest when his only alleged involvement was signing a complaint affidavit six months earlier.

Dzinanka v. County of Suffolk · filed 1996-07-02

Finally, summary judgment is also appropriate in favor of Lessard on the claim that he willfully participated with state actors in violating plaintiffs constitutional rights. There is no allegation that Lessard was involved in the arrest other than that he signed a complaining affidavit six months before the arrest was made.

Section 1983 requires a state actor acting under color of state law; allegations concerning only federal actors acting under federal law are treated as a Bivens claim.

Lattimore v. RKK Enterprises Inc · filed 1996-07-09

Plaintiff, however, neither cited to § 1983 nor makes allegations of a state actor acting under the color of state law. Plaintiff’s action is more accurately characterized as a Bivens action because her complaint concerns only federal actors acting under the color of federal law.

Section 1983 does not cover a medical malpractice claim against a private physician for treatment before the plaintiff was incarcerated.

Moore v. Killam · filed 1996-07-09

Although Moore is now incarcerated for murdering his wife, Moore’s allegations against Dr. Killam related to his treatment by the physician prior to his incarceration. To the extent that Moore asserted a medical malpractice claim against his private physician, Dr. Killam, his § 1983 action was properly dismissed by the district court.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation by a person acting under color of state law; that requirement is satisfied by the alleged conduct of prison officials.

Douglas v. DeBruyn · filed 1996-07-10

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. ... The element of state action is satisfied in this cáse.

A political party selection committee acts under color of state law for Section 1983 when it excludes a candidate from a primary ballot under authority granted by a state statute.

Duke v. Massey · filed 1996-07-11

We follow Duke II in holding that the Committee's decision to exclude Duke from Georgia's presidential primary ballot pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2- 193 constituted state action.

Section 1983 does not reach independent medical treatment of a detainee by a private hospital or physician absent state compulsion or a sufficiently close state nexus.

Rudy v. Village of Sparta · filed 1996-07-17

This Court holds that defendants Butterworth Hospital and Dr. McNinch were not state actors and were therefore not acting under color of state law in catheterizing plaintiff.

Section 1983 requires state action; a former state employee acting after leaving state employment is not a state actor on that basis.

Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Insurance · filed 1996-07-22

Furthermore, it appears that, at least from the time Thompson performed his second investigation, he was no longer employed by the State of Idaho and was therefore not a state actor for the purposes of invoking section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make joint action among private parties actionable without an agreement between private and state actors.

Cinel v. Connick · filed 1996-07-26

Without an agreement between private and state actors any possible joint action involving only private parties is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action in the challenged conduct; a private contractor’s management of its employees does not generally qualify merely because the contractor performs a government function.

George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough · filed 1996-07-31

The day-to-day management of private contractors performing government functions does not generally constitute state action.

Section 1983 treats an officer who acts outside the scope of employment or without color of state law as a private citizen.

Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich · filed 1996-08-06

If a government officer does not act within his scope of employment or under color of state law, then that government officer acts as a private citizen.

Section 1983 does not treat an officer’s private conduct as action under color of law merely because the victim recognizes the officer as a police officer.

Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich · filed 1996-08-06

Merely because a police officer is recognized as an individual employed as a police officer does not alone transform private acts into acts under color of state law.

A private defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983 without allegations supporting an inference that it acted under color of state law.

Labickas v. Dept. of Education · filed 1996-08-07

As to Simmons, Labickas made no allegations from which it can be inferred that Simmons acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires allegations from which a private defendant’s action under color of state law can be inferred.

Labickas v. U.S. Department of Education Arkansas State University Simmons First National Bank · filed 1996-08-07

Contrary to his assertions, Labickas also cannot proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As to Simmons, Labickas made no allegations from which it can be inferred that Simmons acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of tribal law.

Deardorff v. Lummi Indian Nation · filed 1996-08-08

Subsection 1343(a)(3) grants federal jurisdiction over actions based on deprivation of any right or privilege under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, "no action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be maintained in federal court for persons alleging deprivation of constitutional rights under color of tribal law." R.J. Williams, 719 F.2d at 982 (emphasis added).

Section 1983 does not treat a city employee’s conduct as under color of state law when he acts as an elected union president for the union’s benefit.

Kern v. City of Rochester · filed 1996-08-15

First, Cavuoto did not hold his position as president of Local 1071 by virtue of any action by the City. Cavuoto was elected president by union members, irrespective of his position in the RFD. Furthermore, in his capacity as Local 1071’s president, Cavuoto performed functions solely for the benefit of the union, not for the benefit of the City. Finally, while Cavuoto may have met with City officials in Local 1071’s offices, this does not alter the fact that he did so in his capacity as president of Local 1071 and not as an employee of the RFD. Accordingly, we think that the district court properly dismissed Kern’s § 1983 claims against Cavuoto.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a public defender acting under color of state law, and whether failing to assign personnel to a habeas petition or losing the petition was an administrative rather than a traditional lawyer function can present a genuine issue of material fact.

Day v. Zubel · filed 1996-08-16

We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the state and county public defenders’ actions of (1) failing to assign personnel to handle Day’s writ petition and (2) losing the writ petition were administrative functions or traditional lawyer functions. Therefore, summary judgment was improperly granted on this issue, and we remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.

Section 1983 does not reach a television crew that independently enters a home during a police search to record events without exercising a right or privilege created by the state.

Parker v. Boyer · filed 1996-08-16

KSDK’s entry into the Parkers’ house and videotaping the events that occurred there was therefore not an act committed under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a police officer for conduct that was not under color of state law.

Pruitt v. Pernell · filed 2005-01-05

As such, Bottoms was not acting under color of law and cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A union representing city employees in contract negotiations acts adversely to the city and does not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Kasper v. City of Middletown · filed 2005-01-13

When a union represents city employees in contract negotiations, however, it is considered to be acting adversely to the city government and not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a private person as acting under color of state law solely because the person contacts and cooperates with police.

Mehta v. Des Plaines Development Ltd. · filed 2005-01-14

But a private person does not act under color of state law solely by virtue of contacting and cooperating with the police.

A federal officer does not act under color of D.C. law merely by arresting someone for a D.C. offense when the officer’s arrest authority comes from federal law and D.C. officials do not participate.

Williams, Theodore v. United States · filed 2005-01-25

Following this approach, we conclude that Hardwick’s arrest of Williams cannot “be fairly treated as that of” the District of Columbia, see Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295, and thus cannot be called D.C. action. Hardwick was a federal official, not a D.C. official. Only the federal government gave him the power to make arrests for violations of D.C. law; the District of Columbia had no authority over him and thus did not “exercise . . . coercive power” through him, see id. at 296.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Olson v. Ellingboe · filed 2005-01-25

After de novo review, ... we conclude that dismissal was proper because neither defendant was acting under color of state law, ... (2002).

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when a state university department chair has authority by virtue of that position to make decisions affecting other professors.

Millar v. Ojima · filed 2005-01-28

Likewise in this case, the Defendant was not only a professor employed by a state university, but he was the head of the Chemistry Department, which vested him with the authority to make decisions that could affect the other professors in the department. As such, Professor Ojima’s position as a Chairman of the Chemistry Department at SUNY Stony Brook satisfies the requirement that the defendant exercised powers under color of state law.

A plaintiff must establish that the challenged conduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law to prevail under § 1983.

Torgerson v. Hynes · filed 2005-01-28

The District Court correctly ruled that, in order to prevail on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must establish that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law, see e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980); Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 755-56 (2d Cir.2000).

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Matthews v. MARTEN TRANSPORT, LTD. · filed 2005-01-31

Insofar as plaintiff is asserting a claim under § 1983, defendants are correct that such an action is proper only if the defendants are acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is not met by student editors’ independent publication decision merely because school officials could overrule it.

Douglass v. Londonderry School, et al · filed 2005-02-14

The fact that the school’s principal, the yearbook’s faculty advisors, and/or the school board (all of whom are unquestionably “state actors”) retained authority to overrule the students’ editorial decisions does not, standing alone, convert the students into state actors.

Section 1983’s color of state law requirement is satisfied when a private entity acts with a public agency to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

McGlumphy v. Fraternal Order of Police · filed 1986-04-16

The requisite state action for § 1983 purposes arises from the contractual relationship between the F.O.P. and the city based on the collective bargaining agreement. The color of state law requirement is satisfied when a private entity acts in concert with a public agency to deprive a person of constitutional rights.

Private persons who conspire with a state judge to deprive someone of constitutional rights act under color of state law for § 1983.

Eitel v. Holland · filed 1986-04-18

Like the plaintiff in Dennis, Eitel alleges that the private defendants conspired with the state judge to deprive him of his constitutional rights. This provides the necessary link to the state to make the private defendants’ acts come “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 permits a civil action for federal rights violations only when the defendant acts under color of state law.

Sabeta v. Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. · filed 2005-02-23

Because the first amended complaint does not allege any action committed under color of state law, then, the plaintiffs cannot maintain an action under § 1983, and Count 12 must be dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations committed by state actors and requires conduct under color of law.

Elliott v. Chrysler Financial · filed 2005-02-24

Under § 1983, liability attaches only to conduct occurring “under color of law.” ... Applying any of these four tests, Mr. Elliott fails to demonstrate sufficient evidence of state action to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. ... Mr. Elliott’s allegations, even if true, simply fail to establish that Chrysler is a state actor subject to a federal civil rights claim under §1983.

Section 1983 imposes liability for actions taken under color of law that deprive a person of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Dossett v. First State Bank · filed 2005-02-28

We agree with Dossett that the disputed instruction was error, because it excluded from the scope of “under color of” law actions taken by a school official who was purporting to act in the performance of official duties, but was acting outside what a reasonable person would believe the school official was authorized to do.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Givens v. O'Quinn · filed 2005-03-03

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law.

Martin v. UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAVEN, INC. · filed 2005-03-08

In order for a cause of action to exist under section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, any alleged deprivation of federal rights must have taken place “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim for deprivation of constitutional rights only when the defendant acted under color of state law.

Ijemba v. Litchman · filed 2005-03-09

In dismissing Ijemba’s allegation that the defendants violated his constitutional rights, the district court correctly: (i) construed those claims as actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (ii) found that it lacked federal question jurisdiction over those claims, as the defendants are private parties and there is no allegation that they were acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show a constitutional or statutory violation caused by a person acting under color of state law.

Cornish v. Correctional Services Corp. · filed 2005-03-09

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”

Section 1983 does not cover an independent editorial decision by public school student editors acting as private citizens rather than under color of state law.

Douglass Ex Rel. Douglass v. Londonderry School Board · filed 2005-03-17

Finally, I conclude that the students were acting as private citizens, and did not make the decision to reject Blake’s proposed photograph while “acting under col- or of state law.”

Section 1983 requires evidence of joint action with state officials to hold a private union liable for violating constitutional rights.

Thomas v. Bodnar · filed 2005-03-17

First, there was no evidence demonstrating that the Union and the City participated in joint action against Thomas to violate his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires evidence connecting a private defendant to state action; unsupported accusations do not establish action under color of state law.

Cardillo v. Cardillo · filed 2005-03-23

Unsupported accusations of multiple arrests, business closings, and stolen assets are insufficient to connect Edward to the state pursuant to Glaros, and thus, the Cardillos’ § 1983 claim must fail.

Section 1983 does not treat lawyers as state actors merely because they are officers of the court.

Cicchini v. Blackwell · filed 2005-03-24

Lawyers are not, merely by virtue of being officers of the court, state actors for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a federal agency or its officer when they act under federal authority rather than state or local law.

Jones v. National Institutes of Health Police Department · filed 2005-03-29

Thus, the plaintiffs cannot state a claim under § 1983 because neither the NIHPD, nor Detective Noul-ett, were acting pursuant to state or local law.

A county recorder acts under color of state law for § 1983 when discharging employees from the recorder’s office.

Garvey v. Montgomery · filed 2005-04-04

It is clear that Montgomery acted under the color of state law in discharging Clark and Garvey.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; an off-duty officer acting only as a concerned parent does not meet that requirement.

Galindo v. Town of Silver City · filed 2005-04-05

Granting summary judgment in favor of Mr. Acosta was appropriate because a person must be acting under color of law to be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right by someone acting under color of law; private movers’ alleged theft during an eviction does not meet that requirement.

Thomas v. Sheahan · filed 2005-04-05

But, as explained above, to state a § 1983 claim, plaintiff must allege that someone acting under the color of law deprived him of a constitutional or statutory right. Just as the movers’ search does not constitute action under color of law, their alleged theft does not constitute governmental action.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant was a person acting under color of state law.

Weissleader v. Lerner · filed 2005-04-11

Weissleader’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim failed because she did not allege facts showing that any defendant was a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat an appointed guardian as acting under color of state law merely because a court supervises the guardianship.

Cummings v. GSS · filed 2005-04-18

Mere supervision by a superior court is not sufficient for a finding that an appointed guardian was acting under color of state law. Summary judgment dismissing the Estate's section 1983 claims was proper.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; the alleged conduct of private business competitors did not qualify.

Fiore v. Thornburgh · filed 1987-04-07

Mill Service and its employees, plaintiffs competitors, argue and we agree that they did not act under color of state law under the facts which plaintiff alleges.

A private forensic consultant who assists a state criminal investigation can be subject to suit under § 1983 and eligible for qualified immunity.

Burke v. Town of Walpole · filed 2005-04-26

As a result, Dr. Levine is "both subject to suit under section 1983 and eligible for the balm of qualified immunity."

Section 1983 ordinarily does not cover defamatory statements by private parties because they do not act under color of state law absent very unusual circumstances.

BECKEFELD v. Jansma · filed 2005-05-05

Absent very unusual circumstances, private persons do not “act under color of state law,” and the facts presented in this action do not suggest that these defendants acted “under color of state law” when they made the statements Mr. Beckefeld believes defamed him.

A criminal defense attorney whose conduct is not fairly attributable to the state does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Winters v. Devecka · filed 2005-05-12

Winters cannot show that Devecka acted under the color of state law or that Devecka’s actions are fairly attributable to the state.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private softball association and its coach did not meet that requirement by removing a player from the team.

Johnson v. Lyddane · filed 2005-05-13

The Court-dismisses the § 1983 claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because RNF and Mr. Lyddane did not act under color of state law in discharging Mr. Johnson’s daughter from the team.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a private citizen whose petitioning activities were not under color of state law.

Fromm v. Boston Redevelopment Authority · filed 2005-05-13

The Court cannot sidestep the fact that Harding is not a state actor, and under no reasonable inference may the Court conclude that Harding was acting under the color of law in her petitioning activities. Thus, the plaintiffs’ claim against Harding under 42 U.S.C. §1983, and accordingly, under §1988, fails on this ground.

Section 1983 requires the challenged action to be fairly attributable to the state for a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Douris v. Genuardi's Family Markets, Inc. · filed 2005-06-02

The District Court correctly noted that the relevant inquiry in determining whether a person acted under color of state law is whether the action at issue can be fairly attributed to the state.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s conduct to have a sufficient connection to state action; allegations of cooperation with police alone do not establish that connection.

Dunn v. Carrier · filed 2005-06-07

Dunn’s conclusory allegations that the Carriers had cooperated with the police in the criminal investigation is insufficient to establish the required nexus.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; private parties who merely file complaints with or testify before a state licensing board do not meet that requirement.

Mills v. Brown · filed 2005-06-09

Because Defendants were not acting under color of state law, an action against them pursuant to § 1983 is barred, and Judge Martin was correct in denying her Motion to Amend on this ground.

Section 1983 treats a foster care agency assisting a county with a child’s placement as acting under color of state law, whether or not the child was forcibly removed from home.

Harris v. Lehigh County Office of Children & Youth Services · filed 2005-06-16

Thus, whether or not Isaiah Harris was forcibly taken from his home, Lutheran acted under color of State law when it assisted Lehigh County in the placement of Isaiah Harris.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law element is sufficiently alleged when a prosecutor makes statements to the media about a trial prosecuted by his office.

Mezibov v. Allen · filed 2005-06-16

As to the first element, by alleging that Allen, in his role as prosecutor, made defamatory statements to the media concerning a trial that his office prosecuted, Mezibov has sufficiently alleged that Allen was acting under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Private attorneys who jointly engage with a judge in the challenged conduct may be liable under § 1983 even if the judge has absolute immunity.

Ballard v. Wall · filed 2005-06-17

Indeed, Ballard is correct that even if a judge is entitled to absolute immunity, the state actors, here the attorney defendants, who acted in concert with the judge may still be held liable under § 1983 if they “jointly engaged with [the] state official[] in the challenged action.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a court-appointed attorney who was not acting under color of state law.

Jones v. Baysinger · filed 2005-06-22

The district court properly dismissed Jones’ section 1983 claim against Hudson, Jones’ court-appointed attorney, because Hudson was not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for constitutional deprivations committed under color of state law.

Lee v. Quillar · filed 2005-06-24

The district court properly dismissed Quillar’s action because his claims are not cognizable under section 1983. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992) (emphasizing a public defender’s actions as advocate are not done under color of state law for purposes of section 1983).

Zoning decisions made by township governing bodies under their regulatory authority are actions under color of law for Section 1983 purposes.

J.D. Partnership v. Berlin Township Board of Trustees · filed 2005-06-28

Finally, the Court holds that Defendants acted under color of law because both Defendants’ actions related to the zoning regulations and resolutions.

Section 1983 does not cover the LHSAA’s investigation and enforcement of its internal rules because those actions are not under color of state law.

Johansen v. LA. HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASS'N · filed 2005-06-29

Its actions in investigating and enforcing its internal regulations are clearly not conducted under color of state law, nor with the compelling weight and authority of the state behind them, as in the case of criminal law enforcement.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is not met when a private athletic association investigates and enforces its internal rules without state authority.

Johansen v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n · filed 2005-06-29

Its actions in investigating and enforcing its internal regulations are clearly not conducted under color of state law, nor with the compelling weight and authority of the state behind them, as in the case of criminal law enforcement.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; an off-duty officer who merely reports an alleged assault as a private citizen does not satisfy that requirement.

Hendricks v. OFFICE OF THE CLERMONT COUNTY SHERIFF · filed 2005-06-30

Because the evidence of record unequivocally establishes that Defendant McConnell was off-duty and out of uniform at the time and that he did not arrest, restrain, or attempt to restrain Plaintiff or to direct the ensuing investigation, Plaintiff cannot establish that he was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat bail bondsmen as state actors merely because the state licenses and regulates them.

Murillo v. Liz & Stan Bail · filed 2005-07-08

Moreover, the licensing and regulation of bail bondsmen do not transform bail bondsmen into state actors.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant accused of conspiring with state officials to have acted under color of state law.

Limehouse v. State of DE · filed 2005-07-12

Because there is no evidence that defendant Cobb was “acting under color of state law” for the purposes of § 1983, we hold that the District Court properly dismissed Limehouse’s § 1983 conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 covers a deputy sheriff’s actions against a detainee when the deputy acts under color of law.

Brown v. Triche · filed 1987-05-11

Triche admittedly acted under color of law throughout the time and by all his actions identified in the Findings.

Court-appointed attorneys do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Brown v. Taylor · filed 2005-07-19

... and that Brown’s court- appointed attorneys do not act under “color of state law” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat private misuse of state law as action under color of state law merely because police execute the resulting court order.

Yanaki v. Iomed, Inc. · filed 2005-07-26

The involvement of the police in executing the court-ordered search, without more, does not convert Defendants’ abuse of state law into conduct attributable to the state for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires a connection between a public official’s challenged conduct and official authority; a mayor’s instruction to an officer not to intervene, without more, does not establish action under color of state law.

Rodriguez-Rodriguez v. Ortiz-Velez · filed 2005-08-01

Merely telling the officer not to intervene, that he would “take charge of this,” without more, is insufficient to establish that he was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant acted under color of state law; an independent medical examination requested by the prisoner did not create a genuine factual issue on that requirement.

Daniel v. Harway · filed 2005-08-05

The district court properly granted summary judgment to Dr. McAdams because Daniel failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. McAdams was acting under color of state law when he conducted an independent medical examination pursuant to Daniel’s request.

A private contractor’s financial relationship with the government is relevant to whether it acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Doe v. District of Columbia · filed 2005-08-09

Furthermore, information related to defendant’s financial relationships with ARE and PSI is relevant to establishing whether those defendants were acting under color of state law when they allegedly deprived plaintiff of his rights in violation of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a public employee’s privately motivated conduct unconnected to official duties.

Kohler v. City of Wapakoneta · filed 2005-08-12

Harrison’s prurient act had purely private motives and was unconnected to the execution of his official duties. Harrison therefore did not act under the color of law when he attempted to tape record Kohler, and that incident cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits claims against private defendants who act in concert with state officials to deprive a person of constitutional rights.

McWilliams v. Escambia Charter School · filed 2005-08-15

However, private defendants can be held liable in a § 1983 action if they act in concert with the state officials depriving a plaintiff of constitutional rights.

A lawyer in private practice who is not acting under color of state law cannot be held liable under § 1983.

Palismo v. California Department of Corrections · filed 2005-08-15

The district court properly concluded that Palismo failed to state a claim against his defense attorney, Kenneth Allen, because he is a lawyer in private practice who was not acting under color of state law, and therefore, cannot be held hable under section 1983.

A § 1983 claim against a private person requires a sufficient legal nexus between that person’s conduct and the state.

BPNC, Inc. v. Taft · filed 2005-08-16

In this case BPNC has failed to assert any allegation that would demonstrate a sufficient legal nexus between the state and Taft for a court to determine that she acted under color of state law.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law question may be submitted to a jury when its resolution depends on disputed facts.

Dean v. Byerley · filed 2005-08-17

In the aftermath of this conclusion, it was not only proper, but indeed quite necessary, for the district court to submit the “color of state law” question and the competing factual allegations surrounding it to the jury.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Benjamin v. Brookhaven Science Associates, LLC · filed 2005-08-24

However, the section 1983 action is not cognizable against the Defendant because there are no allegations that it is a state or municipal entity acting under color of state law as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires evidence that the defendant acted under color of state law; a juvenile court’s general order for residential treatment did not make the parent-selected private schools state actors.

Blair v. Bob Wills · filed 2005-08-25

Because Blair presented no evidence that the Appellees were acting under color of state law, the District Court did not err in granting the Appellees' motion for summary judgment on Blair's § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private person whose participation in state action is compelled rather than voluntary.

Harvey v. Plains Twp Pol Dept · filed 2005-08-30

Chukinas would therefore not be liable here because she had not willfully participated in the state action, as compulsion by the state negates the presence of willfulness.

Section 1983 requires a private party to participate willfully in joint state action; participation compelled by a state actor does not satisfy that requirement.

Harvey v. Plains Township Police Department Edward J. Walsh Ronald Dombroski Plains Township Board Joan A. Chu · filed 2005-08-30

Chukinas would therefore not be liable here because she had not willfully participated in the state action, as compulsion by the state negates the presence of willfulness.

Section 1983 allows a private person to be liable when he acts jointly with state officials to deprive someone of civil rights.

Wagenmann v. Adams · filed 1987-09-09

Inasmuch as Anderson is and was a private citizen, liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 requires a showing that he collogued with state actors--persons acting under color of state law--to deprive the plaintiff of his civil rights.

Section 1983’s state action requirement is not satisfied merely because a private party follows a procedure established by state law.

Elliott v. Chrysler Financial · filed 2005-09-02

Merely following a procedure established by state law does not transform a private party’s activity into state action.

A private party does not act under color of state law for § 1983 when officials exercise independent judgment and there is no evidence of joint action or conspiracy.

Lane v. Johnson · filed 2005-09-06

Since the county exercised independent judgment and there is no evidence of a conspiracy, plaintiffs claims for unlawful searches and seizures, malicious prosecution, and unlawful arrest are not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege that the defendant acted under color of law.

Catanzaro v. Wallenstein · filed 2005-09-07

The amended complaint in this case, even read very liberally, does not allege any constitutional violation by Wallenstein, or indeed, that Wallenstein acted under color of law.

Puerto Rico counts as a state under Section 1983, and allegations against its agency and officials satisfy the under-color-of-state-law requirement.

Behavioral Healthcare Partners, Inc. v. Gonzalez-Rivera · filed 2005-09-28

Plaintiffs satisfy the first condition by alleging that the deprivation of rights occurred “under color of state law.” Puerto Rico is considered a state for section 1983 purposes, see Deniz v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 285 F.3d 142, 146 (1st Cir. 2002), and the complaint challenges actions attributed to ASES (an agency of the Puerto Rican government) and its functionaries (the individual commonwealth defendants).

Section 1983 requires a union sued as a private party to act under color of state law, which may be shown through joint action with the state.

Perry v. Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority · filed 2005-09-28

In this case, there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the Union was a state actor. There is no evidence that the Union’s conduct was jointly undertaken with the State, namely, LI Bus.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private employer that does not act jointly with state officials does not meet that requirement.

Brandon v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems · filed 2005-09-29

Only when a private party acting either jointly with or through state officials becomes so allied with the state as to characterize that party as a “state actor” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment is the private party held to have acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right by someone acting under color of state law.

Carter v. Bennett · filed 2005-10-28

Two elements are necessary for recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: petitioner must show that respondent deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the respondent acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 imposes liability on a person who, while acting under color of state law, deprives another of a constitutional or federal right.

Romanski v. Detroit Entertainment, L.L.C. · filed 2005-10-28

Section 1983 makes liable only those who, while acting under color of state law, deprive another of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law. ... A private actor acts under color of state law when its conduct is “fairly attributable to the state.” ... One consequence of Brown’s possession of this authority, the authority to make arrests at one’s discretion and for 2any offenses, is clear: at all times relevant to this case, Brown was a state actor as a matter of law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor acting under color of state law.

Gant v. Lockheed Martin Corp. · filed 2005-10-31

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Gant’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Lockheed Martin Corporation (“Lockheed”) based on Gant’s allegations failing to satisfy the requirement that Lockheed was a state actor acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a suit for deprivation of federal rights by a person acting under state authority.

Reichley v. Pennsylvania Department Of Agriculture · filed 2005-11-02

Here, even assuming that appellants could somehow establish an unconstitutional taking, the record would still not establish that Penn Ag Industries acted under color of state law. ... However, participation of the stakeholders does not mean that the PDA delegated state authority to them. The Secretary of Agriculture, and only the Secretary of Agriculture, had authority to impose a quarantine or order depopulation.

Section 1983 requires a person who deprives someone of a constitutional right to act under color of state law.

Barr v. Camelot Forest Conservation Ass'n · filed 2005-11-03

Likewise, under § 1983, Barr must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law, in addition to alleging a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue state actors who, acting under color of state law, deprive them of federal rights.

Carr v. Lake Village Police Department · filed 2005-11-07

The district court ruled that although the defendant police officers acted under color of law when they seized Ms. Carr's automobile, they were nevertheless not liable because Ms. Carr had a post-deprivation remedy for any loss of property, see Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541-43 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986), and because there was no evidence that in seizing the car the defendants failed to treat similarly-situated people alike, see Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1185 (1995). We agree with the district court's conclusions and, having nothing to add to its well-reasoned opinion, we affirm the judgment.

Section 1983 does not cover a privately retained defense attorney who does not act under color of state law.

Millan v. Mansfield · filed 2005-11-16

The district court correctly denied Millan’s IFP application because Mansfield, a privately-retained attorney, did not act under color of state law, and therefore the complaint was frivolous.

A township contractor and its employee can act under color of state law for § 1983 liability by virtue of their contract with the township.

AARDVARK CHILDCARE AND LEARING CENTER, INC. v. Township of Concord · filed 2005-11-21

Similarly, by virtue of the contract between Pennoni Associates, Inc. and the Township, both Pennoni and defendant Moore were acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits liability for private parties acting under color of state law who violate federal constitutional rights.

Nicholas v. Goord · filed 2005-11-28

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, private parties acting under color of state law can be held liable for violations of federal constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Kabbani v. Council House, Inc. · filed 2005-11-29

As set forth above, Council House, Inc. is not a state actor; for the same reasons, its actions were not performed under color of state law for purposes of a Section 1983 action.

A police officer acting in the line of duty acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Russo v. Voorhees Township · filed 2005-11-29

Here, Detective Monahan was acting under color of state law because he was a police officer acting in the line of duty.

Section 1983 generally provides relief for conduct under color of state law; a claim against federal officers acting in their individual capacities may instead proceed under Bivens.

Williams v. Metropolitan Detention Center · filed 2005-12-01

Section 1983 generally provides relief only in situations where defendants act under color of state law, but Williams’s complaint can be read to bring a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), for constitutional violations by federal agents acting in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law for a damages claim.

Awala v. Wachovia Corp. · filed 2005-12-08

We agree with the District Court that the Defendants are not state actors.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a state actor acting under color of state law and sufficient allegations to state a claim.

Schiappa v. Brookhaven Science Associates, LLC · filed 2005-12-12

However, none of the four causes of action at the conclusion of the amended complaint mention Section 1983 and the amended complaint does not allege that BSA is a municipal or state entity-acting under color of state law as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Under Rule 8 of the Fed.R.Civ.P., this bare allegation alone is insufficient to state a Section 1983 claim. Accordingly, to the extent that the amended complaint alleged a cause of action under Section 1983, the motion to dismiss this cause of action is granted.

Section 1983 does not cover a criminal defendant’s personal lawyer acting as counsel because the lawyer is not acting under color of state law.

VILLARAN v. Soto · filed 2005-12-14

The proposed complaint is insufficient because Caratini was not acting under color of state law when she worked as Carrasquillo’s personal lawyer.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; claims against federal postal officials fail when no such action is alleged.

Moore v. United States Postal Service · filed 2005-12-14

An independent review of the record indicates that ... the Moores do not allege any action “under color of state law” undertaken by the USPS or Phelan. Therefore, the district court properly concluded that the Moores’ claims under § 1983 must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not reach a public appellate defender or supervising attorney who files a habeas petition as counsel, because that work is not done under color of state law.

Stroman v. South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense · filed 2005-12-21

Filing a habeas petition is a lawyer’s traditional function as counsel to a criminal defendant. Hence, Ms. Clare and Mr. Stacey acted as counsel to Plaintiff and were not acting under color of state law in performing this action. Accordingly, because Plaintiff failed to allege a necessary element of a § 1983 claim, the Magistrate correctly recommended that Plaintiffs claim as against Clare and Stacey should be summarily dismissed for failing to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private defendants to show that they acted under color of state law.

Burditt v. Geneva Capital, LLC · filed 2006-01-05

Insofar as Burditt has asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he has shown neither that the private defendants were acting “under color of state law” nor that they violated any specific constitutional or federal right.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law; a police officer’s private consensual sexual conduct does not meet that requirement even when the officer is on duty and in uniform.

Burris v. Thorpe · filed 2006-01-09

As Thorpe was not acting under color of state law, we need not decide if Burris’s constitutional rights were implicated. Therefore, Burris’s § 1983 claim against Thorpe must fail.

Private entities can be liable under Section 1983 when they jointly engage with state officials to deny a federal right.

Jones v. National Communication & Surveillance Networks · filed 2006-01-12

Private entities, such as the remaining Defendants, can be subject to Section 1983 liability only if they “ ‘jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action’ ” to deny a person a federal right.

Section 1983 covers conduct by employees of a state agency while performing their government duties as action under color of state law.

Monge v. Cortes · filed 2006-01-23

As employees of an arm of the government, and given that the incident occurred at work during the execution of their duties as government employees, the Court concludes that the actions of co-Defendants Cortés, Díaz, Marín, Aquino, and Matos constitute state action by individuals for whom the state is responsible.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of constitutional rights by someone acting under color of state law.

Jerrytone v. Musto · filed 2006-01-23

In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that his constitutional rights were violated by someone acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not cover discrimination by a purely private entity that was not acting under color of state law.

McCreary v. Vaughan-Bassett Furniture Co., Inc. · filed 2006-01-26

As its plain language indicates, § 1983 applies only to persons acting under color of state law, and Plaintiff here does not (nor could she) allege that the Defendant Vaughan-Bassett was acting under color of any state law when it allegedly violated her “civil rights.” ... Now that the matter has been referred to me for all proceedings, the Recommendation entered on December 19, 2005, is HEREBY ADOPTED by the court as its ORDER.

Section 1983 permits a claim against private parties when the complaint alleges facts showing their joint activity with state officials.

Hughes v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of New York, Inc. · filed 1988-06-15

Rather, appellee’s § 1983 claim and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, rested on allegations that the New York City Police Department participated in the conspiracy, thus constituting joint activity considered to be state action by all parties involved. ... Thus, viewing the complaint on its face, it alleged facts sufficient to establish — assuming the facts were proven — a violation of § 1983.

Private medical providers under contract with a state to care for inmates act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Chapman v. Arnold J. Hopkins, (Commissioner) Frank A. Hall, (Asst. Commissioner) Howard Lyles, (Warden) Php Medi · filed 1988-08-03

The Supreme Court reversed our decision in West and held that private physicians under contract with a state to provide medical services to state inmates act under color of state law for Sec. 1983 purposes. West v. Atkins, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4667-68, (U.S. June 20, 1988) (No. 87-5096). To the extent, therefore, that the district court's judgment relies on our decision in West, the judgment is in error.

Federal officials generally do not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes; an alleged conspiracy with state officials may provide a basis to treat their actions as occurring under color of state law.

Kali v. Bowen · filed 1988-08-10

Because the plaintiffs make no allegation that federal and state officials conspired so that the actions taken by the federal officials could be deemed to have been under "color of state law," the plaintiffs have not demonstrated a statutory basis for an award of attorneys' fees under Sec. 2412(b) (West Supp.1988).

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement is not met merely because a private religious organization receives government funding.

Department of Housing and Urban Development Restrictions on Grants to Religious Organizations That Provide Secular Socia · filed 1988-09-14

It is also clear that mere receipt of government financial assistance will not transform the religious organiza­ tion into a state actor subject to constitutional prohibitions on religious discnmination.

Section 1983 requires a defendant acting under color of state law; a private party in a custody dispute is not a state actor merely because she is subject to state custody laws.

Galluzzo v. Champaign County Court of Common Pleas · filed 2006-01-31

Teresa Cook, the only defendant in this case, is not a state actor. She was simply involved in a custody dispute more than ten years ago, subject to the same Ohio laws that Galluzzo now contests. The Magistrate’s reliance on Section 1983 is therefore in error. Inasmuch as Galluzzo’s claim rests on Section 1983, it fails as a matter of law.

Section 1983 requires allegations that the defendant acted under color of state law.

RODRIGUEZ v. Pagan · filed 2006-02-02

Indeed, not only are the allegations against PADILLA insufficient to depict a violation of a federally protected right, but they also do not suffice to state a claim under color of state law, a requirement of section 1983.

A private attorney does not act under color of state law for § 1983 merely by being an officer of the court.

Forbes v. McCrystal · filed 2006-02-07

However, private attorneys are not state actors on the basis of their position as officers of the court.

Section 1983 requires a private party’s conduct to be attributable to the state; Weyco’s security personnel did not act under color of state law when they searched employees’ vehicles.

Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser Co. · filed 2006-02-13

Our circuit has recognized four tests to be used to determine whether conduct by private, non-state individuals is chargeable to the state. The district court carefully and thoroughly examined each of the four tests in the context of this case and determined that the Weyco personnel who conducted the search were not acting under color of state law. We affirm that conclusion, for substantially the reasons set out in the three orders issued by the district court.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a public official’s private refusal to provide records in his own possession does not meet that requirement.

Uniontown Newspapers, Inc. v. Roberts · filed 2006-02-27

Therefore, whether the conduct complained of is that Respondent treated Mr. Sunyak and the Herald-Standard differently from others, or that he acted in a retaliatory fashion in denying access, it is insufficient to state a Section 1983 claim because Respondent acted only as a private citizen.

Section 1983 treats a city’s and its officials’ actions in the city’s zoning capacity as actions under color of state law.

Anderson v. Alpine City · filed 1992-10-05

Because the actions of Alpine City and its officials alleged in the complaint involve the city in its zoning capacity, it is undisputed that the actions arose under the color of state law.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when the alleged deprivations arise in the context of official city business.

Worden v. Provo City · filed 1992-11-23

Because the actions of Defendants Provo City and Swen Nielsen arose in the context of official city business, it is undisputed that the alleged deprivations arose under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; police presence alone at a private repossession does not satisfy that requirement.

Adams v. Coastline Community Credit Union · filed 2006-03-16

Appellees’ succeeding repossession of Adams’ automobile was not done under color of state law merely because the police were present.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a teacher when a real nexus between the alleged misconduct and the teacher’s duties creates a factual question about whether the teacher acted under color of state law.

Chivers v. Central Noble Community Schools · filed 2006-03-23

Although this case falls somewhere between Doe, at one end of the spectrum, and D.T. and Becerra at the other, this Court finds that there is a question of fact whether there was a real nexus between Gillespie’s conduct and his obligations as a teacher such that he was acting under color of state law for purposes of Chivers’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private school bus contractor whose conduct was not under color of state law.

Goodwin v. Moyer · filed 2006-03-29

We are therefore in agreement with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Defendant Husband is a private party who did not act under color of state law such that he cannot be held liable under § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private person requires evidence of a conspiracy with state officials.

Dye v. Will Radcliff · filed 2006-03-30

Although this may bear on Dye’s state law claims, none of it demonstrates the conspiracy necessary for a successful § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law to state a claim.

Martin v. Farmers First Bank · filed 1993-07-02

Had Plaintiffs conducted a reasonable inquiry, they would have discovered that the court dismissed the Engles’ complaint on August 31, 1992 and would have learned that to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 they were required to allege that the defendants acted under color of state law, and that to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) they were required to allege that the defendants acted with racial or class-based animus.

Section 1983 requires defendants to have acted under color of state law.

Fleming v. United States Postal Service Amf O'Hare and Marvin Runyon, Postmaster General, United States Postal · filed 1994-06-16

At all events, the present case was not brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (and could not have been, because the defendants were not acting under color of state law), but under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791 et seq.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to occur under color of state law.

Silva v. University of New Hampshire · filed 1994-09-15

The record clearly shows that defendants’ conduct, as set forth herein, occurred under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides no cause of action against a privately operated business that was not acting under color of state law.

Sutton v. Chesapeake General Hospital Jeannie Roth · filed 1995-02-10

Sutton conceded that she does not have a cause of action under Sec. 1983 because the Defendant is a privately operated business and was not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private hospital that is not a state actor or otherwise acting under color of law.

Moses Muzquiz, Jr., M.D., (94-1088), Cross-Appellee v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hospital, Inc., (94-1089), (94-1420) · filed 1995-11-16

The breach of contract claim was barred by Michigan law, the antitrust claim was barred by Sixth Circuit precedent, and the § 1983 claim was barred by the fact that the hospital was not a state actor and could not otherwise be deemed as “acting under color of law” for purposes of that provision.

A private hospital does not act under color of state law for § 1983 when it is not acting in concert with a state agency to deprive constitutional rights.

Sager v. Rochester General Hospital · filed 1996-08-09

The claims alleging a civil rights violation failed, in part, because Rochester General Hospital is a private institution, and therefore, was not acting under color of State law for purposes of 42 USC § 1983, nor was it shown that it was acting in concert with any State agency in an effort to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires allegations that the defendant acted under color of state law; private parties with no indication of such action are not liable.

Lewis v. City of Trenton Police Department · filed 2006-04-12

Because the newspaper defendants are private parties and there is simply no indication that they acted under color of state law, the District Court did not err in dismissing Lewis’ claims against them.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; extensive state regulation and funding of a private treatment facility did not make its employees state actors.

Doe v. Senechal · filed 2006-04-12

To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that the defendants acted “under color of state law” and (2) that the defendants deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... We agree with the motion judge that the defendants cannot be considered State actors and therefore summary judgment was properly granted on the Federal civil rights claims.

A private corporation that performs municipal jail functions may be sued under § 1983.

Stephens v. Correctional Services Corp. · filed 2006-04-13

Accepting the pleadings as true, CSC performs the same public functions as a municipal entity in maintaining jail facilities. It therefore may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Vaughn v. City Of Athens · filed 2006-04-20

We also reject Plaintiff’s assertion that he stated a § 1983 claim against Brown. Plaintiff pled no facts showing that Brown, a drug dealer whom the officers wished to set up, was acting under color of state law when he killed McLemore.

A sheriff’s sergeant performing his duties is a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Rose Marie Reyes v. Maschmeier · filed 2006-04-20

Maschmeier, when performing his duties as a sergeant in the Lee County Sheriff’s office, is a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires evidence that the defendant acted under color of law.

Thurman, Clifton v. Village of Homewood · filed 2006-05-02

Thurman has provided no evidence indicating that the defendants acted under color of law, and therefore the court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

An off-duty state employee does not act under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes when the employee does not abuse official authority or a state-granted position.

Priller v. Town of Smyrna · filed 2006-05-03

The Court concludes that Leggett was not acting under color of state law at the time of the alleged rape. Leggett was not abusing his official authority or a position granted by the state when he allegedly raped Plaintiff.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is sufficiently pleaded against private doctors when a county allegedly delegates its public coroner function to them.

Marsh v. San Diego County · filed 2006-05-05

Further, Plaintiff satisfies the Single Moms nexus requirement by alleging Defendant County of San Diego delegated the public function of county coroner in child death cases to Defendants Williams and Chadwick.

Section 1983 allows recovery for constitutional violations committed under color of state law, but does not apply to defendants acting under color of federal law.

Brewer v. Commissioner, Internal Revenue · filed 2006-05-05

To the extent that any of plaintiff's claims are asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this court holds that § 1983 is not a proper jurisdictional basis for a suit against the United States or the IRS because this section is intended to allow a plaintiff to recover for violations of his or her constitutional rights when the violation is committed by a person acting under color of “state law and do[es] not apply when the defendants are acting under color of Federal Law.”

Section 1983 requires the alleged deprivation of a federal right to be attributable to state action.

Shortz v. United Parcel Service · filed 2006-05-05

Even accepting all of Shortz’s allegations as true, he failed to allege a set of facts upon which relief can be granted because he did not demonstrate how any deprivation of a constitutional right was attributable to the state.

Section 1983 covers parish officials acting under color of state and parish law.

Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson · filed 1997-06-20

These defendants were and have been acting under the color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs and usages of the State of Louisiana, Parish of Jefferson.

Section 1983 requires alleged harassers to have acted under color of state law.

Klug v. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees · filed 1999-11-23

Furthermore, Klug does not allege that the harassers were “acting under col- or of state law,” which is, of course, a requirement for a suit under § 1988.

A private person may act under color of state law by conspiring with state officials, but mere allegations of conspiracy do not sustain a Section 1983 claim.

Steele v. City of Bemidji, Minn. · filed 2000-08-29

The Supreme Court has held, that an otherwise private person acts "under color of” State law when engaged in a conspiracy with State officials to deprive another of Federal rights. ... However, "mere allegations of joint action or a conspiracy do not demonstrate that *** defendants acted under color of state law *** [and] are not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” ... Consequently, even though we have indulgently read Steele’s Complaint, and afforded it a broad reading, the dismissal of his Section 1983 claim would, nonetheless, be required.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, so a claim ordinarily will not lie against a federal actor acting as such.

McCloskey v. Mueller · filed 2006-05-16

Given the nature of this requirement, a section 1983 claim ordinarily will not lie against a federal actor.

Section 1983 requires a public defender to act under color of state law to be liable.

Dunlap v. Pretrial Services · filed 2006-05-19

Dunlap failed to state a claim against public defender Harriette Levitt because she was not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of a federally protected right.

Hoblock v. Albany County Board of Elections · filed 2006-05-24

They did not act under color of state law to deprive Plaintiffs of constitutionally protected rights, and, thus, a Section 1983 claim cannot be maintained against them.

Section 1983 requires evidence that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Wasko v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-31

After considering the record in this matter, we agree with the District Court that there is simply no evidence that Mr. Gonzales was acting under color of state law in the issues raised in this appeal.

Private prison contractors can act under color of law for § 1983 when they jointly carry out a program with the state corrections department.

Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries · filed 2006-06-02

The contractual agreement between InnerChange, Prison Fellowship, and the Iowa Dept, of Corrections, and the executing of its terms is sufficient to show that the Defendants engaged in a joint action for the purposes of § 1983.

An off-duty officer can face a § 1983 claim when the complaint sufficiently alleges that he participated in a conspiracy under color of state law.

McDORMAN v. Smith · filed 2006-06-14

The court cannot find no set of facts under which Sanchez participated in the alleged conspiracy under color of state law. Plaintiffs have thus sufficiently alleged that Sanchez was acting under color of law.