42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires allegations that the defendant acted under color of state law.

O'Leary v. Robert P. Cutshaw Robert L. Taylor · filed 1994-09-13

The district court is correct that O'Leary has not stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, because he failed to allege that Taylor acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Abdullah v. Judge Penny Harrington Ann S. Ross Glenn F. Ross Lisa McCarter · filed 1994-09-30

Defendants McCarter and the Rosses are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. These defendants were not acting under color of state law as is required in a Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 applies only to actions taken under color of state law.

McGuiness v. Committee for Public Counsel Services · filed 1994-10-24

However, §1983 is applicable only to actions taken under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a constitutional tort claim against a federal official acting under federal law is treated as a Bivens claim.

Michael Wolf Segal v. Biller · filed 1994-10-31

Although Segal alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, because the defendant was acting under color of federal law, not state law, Segal's claim is more properly characterized as a constitutional tort claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 permits a finding of action under color of law when city officials allegedly plotted on city time and in city offices to injure a political opponent, even if the resulting acts were anonymous.

Zilich v. Thomas Longo David Mack Nancy Marincic Rose Marie Lovano Joseph Suster Michael Abella and Wilhelm Spieg · filed 1994-11-03

The defendants respond that these actions, even if true, were "anonymous" and thus cannot provide the basis for a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Here, it is alleged that the mayor and other city officials-on city time and in city offices-plotted to injure plaintiff for his political views. In light of the resolution and ordinance demonstrating hostility toward plaintiff; these allegations, if proved, are sufficient to support a conclusion that defendants were acting under color of official right.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a claim fails when the plaintiff cannot show state action.

Sweeney v. Great Western Bank · filed 1994-11-10

There are no state actors implicated in this case. Furthermore, the Sweeneys failed to allege that the defendants acted under color of law. After a review of the record, it is clear that the Sweeneys cannot show state action and the district court properly dismissed the Sweeneys' section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a telephone company’s inmate collect-call policies did not satisfy that requirement.

William Fears, David E. Lewis v. Chillicothe Telephone Company Chillicothe Telephone Company Inmate Services · filed 1994-11-14

Nonetheless, summary judgment for defendants on the merits was proper for the reasons stated by the district court in its opinion and order filed June 20, 1994. The defendants did not act under color of state law, and the defendants' policies were a reasonable response to its collect call losses.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, judged by a federal standard; authority to arrest under state law does not itself satisfy that requirement.

Landry v. A-Able Bonding, Inc. · filed 1994-11-18

Consequently, defendants had not acted under the color of state law. The ensuing analysis, which concludes the presence of the warrant and application of Texas statutes arguably indicates the authority of law, does not alter in any way disposition of plaintiffs federal civil rights claims. Clearly, whether one operates “under the color of state law” is measured by a federal standard, while acting “without authorization of law” involves a state analysis. Therefore, the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

A guardian ad litem acting in that role does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Oltremari Ex Rel. McDaniel v. Kansas Social & Rehabilitative Service · filed 1994-11-21

As to any claim for gender discrimination or other violation of constitutional rights protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, defendant Owens as guardian ad litem was not acting under color of state law.

A court-appointed attorney does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when representing a defendant at a probation violation hearing.

Lary E. Grimes v. Lynn Michaelson Gerald F. Zaetta John D. Burtch · filed 1994-12-02

The district court found that the claims against defendants Michaelson and Zaetta were barred by the doctrine of immunity and that Burtch did not act "under color of state law" while representing Grimes at his probation violation hearing for purposes of Sec. 1983 liability. ... We have considered Grimes's claims and find that they are frivolous for the reasons stated by the district court in its order of dismissal filed on February 28, 1994.

Section 1983 requires that the defendant act under color of state law; a corporate defendant whose actions are not fairly attributable to the state is not subject to suit under the section.

Barney v. The Lincoln Electric Company Robert B. Reich, U.S. Secretary of Labor Lloyd Bentsen, U.S. Secretary o · filed 1994-12-05

In order to state a claim under Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States and the deprivation was caused by a person while acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978). To be subject to suit, the defendant's actions must be fairly attributable to the state. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982). There is simply no evidence that Lincoln, a corporate entity, was acting under color of state law. Therefore, Barney failed to state a claim under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 reaches a private party that jointly participates with a state actor in unlawful conduct.

Carroll v. Blinken · filed 1994-12-08

A private party, such as NYPIRG, can be liable for attorney's fees under section 1988 only if it is subject to jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Taking these factors into consideration, it is clear that the co-defendants were joint participants in the unlawful conduct.

Section 1983 requires actual or purported state authority; an off-duty officer’s unauthorized use of a police-issued weapon in a personal dispute alone does not satisfy the under-color-of-state-law requirement.

Barna v. City of Perth Amboy · filed 1994-12-14

To hold otherwise would create a federal cause of action out of any unauthorized use of a police-issue weapon, without regard to whether there are any additional circumstances to indicate that the officer was exercising actual or purported police authority.

Section 1983 does not treat an off-duty officer’s use of a police-issued weapon in a personal dispute as action under color of state law without an actual or purported exercise of police authority.

Barna v. City of Perth Amboy · filed 1994-12-14

In short, we believe the unauthorized use of a police-issue nightstick is simply not enough to color this clearly personal family dispute with the imprimatur of state authority. ... The district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of Officers Otterbine and Echevarria on the assault-based claim because a jury could not reasonably find that the assault occurred under color of state law.

Section 1983 treats a private physician who accepts a state referral to treat a prisoner as acting under color of state law even without a contract with the prison.

Conner v. Kerry Donnelly, M.D., Clay Vance Conner v. Kerry Donnelly, M.D. · filed 1994-12-20

Today we go against these district courts and hold that a physician who treats a prisoner acts under color of state law even though there was no contractual relationship between the prison and the physician.

A private party does not act under color of state law for § 1983 when the complaint fails to plead a conspiracy with state officials.

DiBenedetto v. City of Chicago · filed 1994-12-27

Since the court holds that the complaint fails to properly plead a conspiracy, Ohanessian cannot be said to have acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging malicious prosecution by a private party to plead and offer sufficient evidence of a conspiracy between the private party and public actors.

Davis v. Union National Bank and William Owens, Individually · filed 1994-12-28

We hold, once again, that plaintiffs must plead and offer sufficient evidence to support a conspiracy between private and public actors in order to state a claim under § 1983 against the private party for malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 permits an action for conduct that infringes Fourteenth Amendment rights when the conduct occurs under color of law.

Edward Valves, Inc. v. Wake County · filed 1995-01-03

Conduct which infringes upon Fourteenth Amendment rights is actionable under Section 1983, when, as is the case here, it is done under color of law.

Section 1983 treats state university faculty as acting under color of state law when they exercise state authority to grant or deny tenure.

Collin v. Rector & Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia · filed 1995-01-03

State university faculty clearly act under color of state law when they exercise their authority to grant or deny tenure.

Section 1983 does not cover a counsel substitute’s actions as an advocate in a prison disciplinary hearing because those actions are not under color of state law.

Banuelos v. McFarland · filed 1995-01-04

We therefore hold that the actions of counsel substitute in a prison disciplinary hearing are not actions under the color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private person who jointly acts with state officials, but conclusory allegations of conspiracy do not establish that joint action.

Willbanks v. Jim Crotts John Keck Calvin Allred James Riley Francis Ranaccelli · filed 1995-01-06

A private person may act under color of state law if he willfully participates in joint action with state officials to deprive others of their constitutional rights. ... Willbanks conclusory allegations that the private defendants conspired with Judge Riley are insufficient to support his section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not apply to a federal official’s enforcement of a federal regulation.

Karacsonyi v. Radloff · filed 1995-01-11

Because Karacsonyi is challenging a federal official’s enforcement of a federal regulation, section 1983 is inapplicable.

A private party does not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes merely by seeking state approval of an agreement.

Han v. United States Department of Justice · filed 1995-01-19

The fact that the lessee defendants sought state approval was not sufficient to show the lessees conspired with state actors or otherwise acted under color of state law.

An off-duty police officer working for a private employer may act under color of state law under § 1983, depending on the nature of the officer’s acts rather than duty status alone.

Pickrel v. City of Springfield, Illinois, David Dyer, and McGraw Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1995-01-23

Deciding whether a police officer acted under color of state law should turn largely on the nature of the specific acts the police officer performed, rather than on merely whether he was actively assigned at the moment to the performance of police duties.

Section 1983 does not reach a private defendant whose conduct was not under color of state law.

Etta Collier v. State of California · filed 1995-02-01

Here, defendant Feagin did not act under color of state law; thus, Collier's section 1983 action against him is frivolous.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when a township engineer inspects development plans and a site at the township supervisors’ direction.

Anselma Station, Ltd. v. Pennoni Associates, Inc. · filed 1995-02-03

Pennoni’s counsel concedes in its brief (Appellee’s brief at 4) that Pennoni’s inspection of the development plans and of the site were “[in] accordance with township supervisors’ directions.” We conclude from the Complaint and from this concession that this question is clearly answered in favor of Anselma and that the first prong of a Section 1983 cause of action is satisfied.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; appointed counsel representing a criminal defendant does not satisfy that requirement.

Smith v. Terryl D. Martin · filed 1995-02-06

As for Smith's claim that his attorney did not adequately represent him in state court criminal proceedings, a Sec. 1983 claim is not the proper vehicle by which to make such a challenge because Smith's appointed counsel was not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 claims fail when the defendants did not act under color of state law.

Brown v. Maintenance & Indus. Services, Inc. · filed 1995-02-09

The plaintiff's claims must also fail under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, because none of the defendants were acting "under color of state law."

Section 1983 requires an affirmative causal connection between a defendant’s actions under color of state law and a constitutional deprivation.

Hatley v. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service · filed 1995-02-13

Section 1983 requires proof “of an affirmative causal connection between the actions taken by a particular person ‘under color of state law' and the constitutional deprivation.”

Officers who remove vehicles under statutory authority act under color of state law for Section 1983.

Dunbar v. Lindbolm, No. Cv93-0043579s (Feb. 16, 1995) · filed 1995-02-16

The court finds that the defendants acted under this section and therefore under color of state law when they caused the removal of the plaintiff's vehicles form the Sursum Corda Pavilion on August 6, 1992.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on people who furnish recommendations to a bar character and fitness committee.

Zielinski v. Schmalbeck · filed 1995-02-17

While we find that section 1983 of the Act does not apply to those furnishing recommendations to the Committee, we also recognize the necessity of absolute immunity.

Section 1983 does not treat a private shelter as acting under color of state law when a minor stays there voluntarily and the shelter follows child services’ advice not to disclose its address.

Robbins v. Hamburger Home for Girls · filed 1995-02-22

Just as the hospital in Miriam P. was not acting under color of law despite detaining the small child on a “special hold” by the special services for children, defendants in the instant case were not acting under color of law in allowing Tricia voluntarily to stay at the shelter and following advice of the department of children’s services not to disclose the address of the shelter.

A private person acts under color of state law for § 1983 when the person willfully joins state officials in depriving someone of constitutional rights; conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to survive summary judgment.

Kristina Salka Ludovit Salka v. City of Los Angeles Arthur Azdair Harold Vites, and Daniel Drake Linda Paugh · filed 1995-02-22

A private person may act under color of state law if he willfully participates in joint action with state officials to deprive others of their constitutional rights. ... The Salkas failed to present any evidence to establish that Paugh and Drake conspired with any member of the Los Angeles Police Department or the City Attorney's Office to violate their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law, so federal officials acting under color of federal law do not state a claim under it.

Rosado v. Curtis · filed 1995-02-27

Because plaintiffs’ action involves federal officials acting under color of federal law, plaintiffs fail to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a court-appointed defense counsel representing a defendant does not meet that requirement.

Allen v. Zbinden · filed 1995-02-27

The district court properly dismissed Allen's claims brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 because Zbinden was not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not reach searches by private security personnel at a public university venue when the university neither directs nor participates in the searches.

No. 93-4122 · filed 1995-02-28

Under Section 1983, liability attaches only to conduct occurring "under color of law." ... The pat-down searches conducted at the Huntsman Center on March 20, 1991 cannot be fairly attributed to the State of Utah under any of the tests for state action.

Section 1983 imposes liability only for conduct under color of law, so defendants must represent the state in some capacity.

Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert · filed 1995-02-28

Under Section 1983, liability attaches only to conduct occurring “under color of law.” Thus, the only proper defendants in a Section 1983 claim are those who “ ‘represent [the state] in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it.’ ”

Section 1983 does not cover a claim that appointed counsel was incompetent because counsel’s conduct is not action under color of state law.

Halverson v. Clay County Court System · filed 1995-03-01

Halverson's claim that his counsel was incompetent lacks an arguable basis in law. See Holbird v. Armstrong-Wright, 949 F.2d 1019, 1020 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (counsel's conduct not action under color of state law for purpose of Sec. 1983 violation).

Section 1983 reaches only conduct under color of state law, so it does not cover federal judges acting in their federal roles.

Tolefree v. Cudahy · filed 1995-03-01

The suit is frivolous, not only because the bringing of a' suit against judges is not a proper method of challenging their decisions, and not only because judges have absolute immunity from damages suits challenging their judicial acts, but also because the reach of section 1983 is limited’ to conduct under color of state law, and the defendants are federal judges.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law element is satisfied by allegations that correctional officers acted as officers at the time of an inmate assault.

Thomas v. Clark · filed 1995-03-09

The allegations of Thomas' complaint are sufficient to allege that defendants were acting under color of state law as correctional officers at the time of the assault.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a federal agency acting under color of federal law.

Seber v. Unger · filed 1995-03-15

Because the D.E.A. is a federal agency acting under color of federal law there is no valid basis for Seber’s § 1983 claim against it.

Section 1983 does not treat defense counsel as acting under color of state law when counsel performs a traditional lawyer function, even if inadequate performance deprives the client of constitutional rights.

Harris v. Champion · filed 1995-03-30

Thus, even if counsel performs what would otherwise be a traditional lawyer function, such as filing an appellate brief on his or her client's behalf, so inadequately as to deprive the client of constitutional rights, defense counsel still will not be deemed to have acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private corporation that neither performs a state function nor conspires with the state because it is not acting under color of state law.

Harris v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 1995-04-03

Since Defendant, a private corporation, neither performing a state function nor conspiring with the State, does not qualify as a person acting under color of state law, the Court agrees with Defendant that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is ineffectual either to state a claim against Defendant under federal law, or to invoke federal question jurisdiction under either § 1331 or § 1343.

Section 1983 requires a private party alleged to have acted with a judge to be pleaded as part of a corrupt conspiracy to establish action under color of state law.

Lamar Chapman, III v. Burton Berger & Associates and James Gregory Smith · filed 1995-04-06

As Chapman has failed to plead that there was a corrupt conspiracy between BB&A and Judge Smith, he has failed to demonstrate that BB&A was acting under the color of state law for the purposes of Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 treats directors of a public employer as state actors when they act in those roles.

Schouweiler v. Findley · filed 1995-04-06

To state a claim under section 1983, Schouweiler must allege the violation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Noble and Findley, in their roles as directors of a public employer, are state actors.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on state-employed coworkers who lack supervisory authority and do not use state authority to create a hostile work environment.

Edwards v. Wallace Community College · filed 1995-04-19

We hold that defendants Vardaman, Howell, and Swindal, all coemployees of Edwards and without any supervisory authority over Edwards, are not liable pursuant to § 1983. These defendants did not use their state authority to create an environment hostile to Edwards.

A private union is not liable under § 1983 on a conspiracy theory without evidence connecting its conduct to state actors.

Storlazzi v. Bakey · filed 1995-04-25

Since Storlazzi failed to show the required nexus between the private actors and the state actors, his claim for relief against the Union defendants must fail.

Section 1983 does not apply to defendants acting under color of federal rather than state law.

Zolicoffer v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 1995-04-28

Since plaintiff was convicted in federal court, and the entities and individuals named as defendants were acting under color of federal (not state) law, § 1983 does not apply.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when prison guards act while employed to watch over a prisoner.

Johnson v. Desmond · filed 1995-04-28

In order to state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a party must establish two essential elements: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... In this case, the first element is satisfied because the conduct complained of was committed by two state prison guards acting while employed to watch over the plaintiff-prisoner.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; private parties who did not do so cannot be sued under the section.

Della Brown Alice G. Harris v. Chester D. Harris Rosemary Hunt Denise Deberry Wayne Cook Dennis Bradley Lexington Fayett · filed 1995-05-03

Brown's claims are barred under the res judicata doctrine, White v. Colgan Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 1214, 1216 (6th Cir. 1986), Harris's claim against LFUCG is time-barred, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 413.140(a)(8); Collard v. Kentucky Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990), and the remaining defendants were not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law to be liable.

Jones v. Employees (Past, Present, Future), Officers, Agents, Attorneys, Proxies, Investors, & Affiliates of the Souther · filed 1995-05-04

Unless the defendants were acting under color of state law, they cannot be held liable for anything under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead and prove a real connection between a public employee’s challenged conduct and the employee’s state authority to establish action under color of state law.

Jojola v. Chavez · filed 1995-05-11

Therefore, it is the plaintiff's burden to plead, and ultimately establish, the existence of "a real nexus" between the defendant's conduct and the defendant's "badge" of state authority in order to demonstrate action was taken "under color of state law."

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a complaint lacking any indication of such action is subject to dismissal.

Juranek v. Farm Credit Bank of Omaha · filed 1995-05-11

We agree with the district court that there is no indication defendants acted under color of state law, and thus we conclude dismissal of the complaint was warranted.

Section 1983’s rule that defense counsel does not act under color of state law under Polk County depends on an adversarial relationship between counsel and the state.

Whitehead v. Leggitt · filed 1995-05-18

However, because Polk County relies on the adversarial relationship between defense counsel and the state, which is not present in this case, in finding that an attorney does not act under the color of state law, we prefer to rely on the reasoning of Murphy v. Morris, 849 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir.1988).

Section 1983 reaches a private person only if that person acted under color of state law, such as by willfully acting jointly with state officials to deprive someone of rights.

Ropoleski v. Rairigh · filed 1995-05-22

Defendant Rairigh is a private citizen. She cannot be proceeded against under § 1983 unless she can be deemed to have acted under color of state law by virtue of having willfully acted jointly with agents of the state in depriving plaintiff of his rights.

Private hospitals and physicians act under color of state law for § 1983 when they involuntarily detain patients using authority delegated by state commitment statutes.

Cummings v. Charter Hospital of Las Vegas, Inc. · filed 1995-05-25

We conclude that Nevada statutory provisions allowing private persons to detain the mentally ill constitute a delegation of state power, and the restraint of individuals against their will under a statutory grant of power constitutes state action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on store employees for detaining a suspected shoplifter when the evidence does not show that they acted under color of state law.

Filion v. Bellows Falls Foods · filed 1995-06-01

The court finds that the totality of the evidence presented, even when construed in plaintiff's favor, is insufficient to support a finding that the store employees were acting under color of state law when they detained plaintiff.

Section 1983 provides no cause of action against federal agents acting under color of federal law.

Billings v. United States · filed 1995-06-12

Because Sec. 1983 provides no cause of action against federal agents acting under color of federal law, Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir.1987), we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Ms. Billings' Sec. 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party as acting under color of state law merely for providing information to authorities, even if the information is false.

Scott v. First Family Financial Services · filed 1995-06-19

No genuine issue of fact exists in this case as to whether First Family or its agents acted under color of state law. An individual does not act under color of state law by merely supplying information to authorities, even if that information is false.

Section 1983 reaches an officer’s conduct under color of state law when it occurs in an actual or apparent official duty or depends on the authority of the officer’s office.

Wilfredo Martinez, A/K/A Wilfredo Martinez Rodriguez v. Rafael Colon, A/K/A Rafael Colon Pizarro · filed 1995-06-20

In general, section 1983 is not implicated unless a state actor’s conduct occurs in the course of performing an actual or apparent duty of his office, or unless the conduct is such that the actor could not have behaved in that way but for the authority of his office.

Conclusory allegations that private defendants conspired with government officials do not establish action under color of state law for a Section 1983 claim.

Morda v. Scott · filed 1995-06-30

First, Morda's conclusory allegations that the private defendants Scott and Horspool conspired with county officials to assume conservatorship of the estate are insufficient to satisfy the tests for determining whether a private individual has acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 generally treats a private party as acting under color of state law only when the party conspires or participates in joint activity with state actors.

Stephens v. Schroeder · filed 1995-07-06

A private party is generally considered to act under color of state law only in certain circumstances, such as when that party is involved in a conspiracy or participates in joint activity with state actors.

Section 1983 does not treat a state employee as acting under color of state law merely because she reports alleged criminal conduct to the authorities in her capacity as a private citizen.

Boykin v. Bloomsburg University · filed 1995-07-07

The furnishing of information by McAfee to the proper authorities concerning Michael Boykin’s alleged criminal conduct was the act of a private individual and not that of a state actor.

Section 1983 does not reach purely private conduct, and an attorney does not act under color of law merely by being an officer of the court.

Tierney v. Tokerud · filed 1995-07-09

Defendants argue that the scope of 5 1983 is limited to deprivation of rights accomplished by actions under "color of law"; that this statute does not reach purely private conduct; and that an attorney is not acting under "color of law" merely because he or she is an officer of the court. Moss v. Varian (N.D. Ohio 1982), 537 F. Supp. 711, 712. Therefore, defendants contend that there is no basis for the 5 1983 claim against them. We agree and conclude that for this reason Count IV was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private association for calling and holding a general assembly when its conduct cannot be fairly attributed to the state.

Velazquez v. Asociacion De Empleados Del Estado Libre Asociado De Puerto Rico · filed 1995-07-17

Accordingly, we hold that defendants’ actions in calling and holding a general assembly, in alleged violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, were not taken under color of state law for the purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires sufficient state involvement to hold a private company liable; a state’s purchase of the company’s products for a prison does not suffice.

Hudgins v. Charles B. Miller, Robin Koopman, Jim Johnson, Fred Rice, Three Rivers Aluminum Company and Its Su · filed 1995-08-02

Generally, a Sec. 1983 violation occurs when a state, or one of its agents, violates a plaintiff's constitutional right. However, "[w]hen a private actor is implicated, the section 1983 plaintiff may nevertheless prevail if he shows sufficient state involvement in the action in question to trigger constitutional protections." Cunningham v. Southlake Center for Mental Health, Inc., 924 F.2d 106, 107 (7th Cir.1991) (citing National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988)). Neither Three Rivers nor TRACO are agents of the State of Indiana. The only "involvement" between Indiana and Three Rivers and TRACO alleged is Indiana's purchase of TRACO's windows for installation in the CIC.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, so a federal judge’s rulings cannot support a claim under the section.

Ortman v. Thomas · filed 1995-08-07

Obviously, a section 1983 claim can only be brought for actions done under color of state law. For this reason alone, the claims against Judge Taylor based upon her rulings in plaintiffs prior lawsuit are frivolous.

Section 1983 requires proof that defendants acted under color of state law; a claim fails when that element is not established.

Welch v. Board of Directors of Wildwood Golf Club · filed 1995-08-10

The Court found that the record was devoid of any evidence that any Defendant was required or encouraged by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to deprive Plaintiffs of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims brought under § 1983 as they failed to establish that Defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of law; purely private conduct without delegated state power or a conspiracy with officials does not satisfy that requirement.

Messa v. Allstate Ins. Co. · filed 1995-08-11

Such conduct by purely private persons does not satisfy the requirement of § 1983 that the acts complained of be performed under color of law.

An appointed criminal defense attorney is not liable under Section 1983 for conduct as counsel because the attorney is not acting under color of state law.

Lance Douglas Linton, Sr. v. Traverso · filed 1995-08-22

As the district court correctly concluded, Traverso, as Linton's appointed counsel, was not subject to Sec. 1983 liability because he was not acting under "color of state law."

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law in depriving the plaintiff of a federal right.

Oropallo v. Parrish · filed 1995-09-08

I also dismiss the complaint as far as it alleges retaliation by John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 because Oropallo fails to allege any facts which demonstrate that these defendants acted "under color of state law" in depriving him of his First Amendment rights. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1994).

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law or conspired with state actors to violate federal rights.

Barker v. Marilyn Carr Susanne Ward Denise Randall · filed 1995-09-08

First, Barker has alleged no facts to indicate that any of the three defendants, his ex-girlfriend, the girlfriend's mother or the girlfriend's sister, acted under color of state law or that they conspired with state actors to violate Barker's federal rights. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir.1988). Therefore dismissal of Barker's section 1983 claims was proper.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private party for misusing constitutional state service procedures when that conduct cannot be attributed to state policy.

Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. Brauer · filed 1995-09-15

Thus, the alleged actions by McDermott in misusing service procedures could not be attributed to State policy (see Roudybush v. Zabel, 813 F.2d 173) and do not state a cause of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that defendants acted under color of state law; alleging only that they were uniformed police officers is insufficient.

Machos v City of Manchester · filed 1995-09-20

Simply alleging that the individuals involved in that gathering were uniformed police officers is insufficient.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private attorney does not meet that requirement merely by representing a client.

McKee v. Fayette Circuit Court David L. Van Horn · filed 1995-09-20

With respect to defendant Van Horn, a private citizen, there is nothing in the record to show that Van Horn was acting under color of state law when he represented McKee, a fact which is required in order to state a viable Sec. 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not treat private landlords as acting under color of state law merely because they issue termination notices under a state landlord and tenant statute.

Gustin v. Dailey · filed 1995-09-22

We agree with the district court that Gustin's complaint failed sufficiently to allege that defendants acted under color of state law. The only acts of defendants which are remotely connected to the utilization of the Oregon Landlord and Tenant Act by defendants was the issuance of notices of termination to plaintiff. This does not rise to the level of significant involvement necessary to fairly attribute the acts of the defendants to the state.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Harvey v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n · filed 1995-09-27

Harvey failed to show that Hollins or Soda acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 treats a prison officer’s purported strip search as action under color of state law even if the officer was motivated by personal gratification.

Seltzer-Bey v. Paul Delo Don Roper Donna McCondichie James Reed Charles Gillam Daniel Blair James Amacker · filed 1995-10-02

The fact that Blair’s true motivation may have been his own personal gratification does not exempt him from liability for actions taken under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party only when the private party and a state actor jointly deprived the plaintiff of civil rights.

Alexis v. McDonald's Restaurants of Massachusetts, Inc. · filed 1995-10-10

Where a private individual is a defendant in a section 1983 action, there must be a showing that the private party and the state actor jointly deprived plaintiff of her civil rights.

A private party may be sued under § 1983 for joint action with police, and a genuine factual dispute over that joint action precludes summary judgment.

Gilbert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. · filed 1995-10-11

This Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Sears acted jointly with the TPD. Accordingly, the Court denies Sears’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I, violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; federal officers are not subject to a Section 1983 claim absent an allegation that they acted under color of state law.

Grayson v. Fed Prison Ind Facto · filed 1995-10-13

However, the court erred in applying § 1983, because Grayson sued only federal officers and did not allege that they acted under color of state law, as required by § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach purely private conduct; defendants must have acted under color of state law.

Washington v. Wishard Memorial Hospital, Custodian of Records Wishard Memorial Hospital Jane Doe(s) John Doe · filed 1995-10-18

Washington's complaint charges purely private conduct, conduct not reached by Sec. 1983.

A plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant acted under color of state law to prevail under § 1983; a missing allegation affects the claim’s sufficiency, not subject matter jurisdiction.

Johnson v. Hollon, No. 0125524 (Oct. 19, 1995) · filed 1995-10-19

It is so that without such an assertion and proof thereof, the plaintiff cannot prevail on his § 1983 claim. This does not, however, affect the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the subject of the litigation, as aforesaid, but rather directs itself to the CT Page 11879 question of whether the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to prevail on his § 1983 claim; The court has subject matter jurisdiction over the § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action only against a person acting under color of state, territorial, or District of Columbia law.

Frazier v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 1995-10-20

Because Ms. Owens is not a federal and not a state actor, plaintiff can not bring a cause of action against her under § 1983. That section only provides an action for deprivation of civil rights against a person who deprives another of civil rights "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 liability requires that the defendant’s challenged conduct be fairly attributable to the state.

Randolph Muhammad Talley Bey v. Diann Fox · filed 1995-10-25

A defendant's liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 must be fairly attributable to the state.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for breaching a state-law duty to report abuse unless the person also had a state-conferred duty and power to control the events causing the injury.

John Doe and Jane Doe, as Next Friend of Sarah Doe v. Rains County Independent School District, Dana White · filed 1995-10-31

Because we find that the existence of a right of legal control is a compelling distinction in the question whether state law has located a person as a constitutional actor, we insist that a breach of a state-law duty to report cannot render a person liable under § 1983 as a responsible state actor unless that person also had a duty and power under state law to exercise state authority in controlling the events that produced the unreported injury.

Section 1983 does not apply when state entities administer federal regulations under federal authority rather than state statutory authority.

Marks v. United States Social Security Administration · filed 1995-11-02

However, since the Court finds that the state entities acted pursuant to the federal regulations, rather than to state statutory authority, § 1983 does not apply.

Section 1983 does not support claims against defense counsel who do not act under color of state law.

Marts v. Hines · filed 1995-11-08

Marts' claims against the defendants, dehors the alleged conspiracy, are clearly without an arguable basis in law or fact, given the absence of acts under the color of state law on the part of Spears and Hines7 and the absolute prosecutorial immunity8 of the John Doe defendant.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; private conduct in a nonjudicial foreclosure without sufficient state involvement does not meet that requirement.

Bullock v. Resolution Trust Corp. · filed 1995-11-09

By its terms, § 1983 requires that the person accused of injuring another be acting under state statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, which has been shortened into the term “under color of state law.” ... This court finds no facts here to show that Haddock acted in any other capacity except that of a private individual. ... Therefore, finding no “state action” as alleged by plaintiff, this court concludes that Bullock cannot prove an element of his case on which he bears the burden of proof.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a private neighbor who is neither a county employee nor a state actor does not meet that requirement.

Stanislaw v. Navajo County Bd. of Sup'rs · filed 1995-11-15

Nelson is Stanislaw's neighbor and a witness to the incident. He is neither a sheriff's department nor county employee; nor is he a state actor. Therefore, Nelson did not act "under color of state law" as required under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not reach a capital collateral representative or assistants acting as counsel to criminal defendants because their representation is not under color of state law.

Medina v. Minerva · filed 1995-11-21

Thus, the Capital Collateral Representative and his or her assistants clearly fall under the doctrine enunciated in Dodson, and their actions in representing defendants in criminal proceedings are generally not under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a court-appointed attorney acting in that capacity as acting under color of state law.

Cassidento v. Harry Hammer, Arnold Aaronson, Larry Meachum, Al McGrail Dominic Galuzzo, Michael Dilullo, Aaron Me · filed 1995-11-21

We add only that McGrail, in his capacity as a court-appointed attorney, did not act "under color of state law" within the meaning of § 1983. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981).

Section 1983 may reach a private person who acts in concert with a government agent in the challenged conduct.

Raines v. Shoney's, Inc. · filed 1995-11-22

Hence, Pelham may be liable to the Plaintiffs for her actions if it can be shown that she, as a private person, acted in concert with a government agent.

Section 1983 reaches a state secretary of state acting under color of state law when enforcing state election laws.

Cotham v. Garza · filed 1995-11-27

As chief election officer, defendant acts under color of state law in enforcing the election laws of the State of Texas.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law; for a police officer, the nature of the challenged act controls.

Ray v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 1995-11-27

To prevail on a claim of a civil rights violation under 42 USC § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was acting "under color of state law” at the time of the acts in question (see, Zarcone v Perry, 78 AD2d 70, affd 55 NY2d 782, cert denied 456 US 979). In determining whether a police officer is acting under color of State law, the nature of the act complained of is controlling (see, Revene v Charles County Commrs., 882 F2d 870).

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Benko v. Compton · filed 1995-11-28

Benko's Sec. 1983 claims were properly dismissed as well because he did not allege that any of the remaining defendants were acting under color of state law.

A § 1983 claim requires allegations that the defendant acted under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Steinke v. Milwaukee Area Technical College · filed 1995-12-20

Steinke's district court complaint contained only one substantive reference to Mihlbauer and failed to allege the elements required for a Sec. 1983 action. On appeal, Steinke does not convince this court that he can show that Mihlbauer acted under color of state law to deprive Steinke of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law and does not permit a claim against private news reporters on these facts.

Jones v. Warden of the Stateville Correctional Center · filed 1995-12-22

Plaintiff has no grounds for a § 1983 suit against the defendant news reporters because they are private parties.

Section 1983 reaches a nonstate actor who jointly participates with state officials in the challenged conduct.

Ellis v. Ficano · filed 1995-12-27

In order to hold an individual liable under Sec. 1983, he must be acting under color of state law. This liability is normally enjoyed by state officials. However, a non-state actor, such as a private person, can be liable under Sec. 1983 together with state officials if the private person is involved in joint conduct.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federally protected right.

Turner v. Irene Brown Nellie Brown Turner-Thompson · filed 1995-12-27

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts showing a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States.

A § 1983 conspiracy between a private defendant and a state actor may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

Niemann v. Whalen · filed 1996-01-02

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 may, however, be proven by circumstantial evidence.

Section 1983 requires state action and does not cover a private organization’s independently made employment decision.

Henderson v. Center for Community Alternatives · filed 1996-01-11

In sum, CCA is not a state actor for the purposes of § 1983 and application of the First Amendment. Claim Five will, therefore, be dismissed.

Federal marshals who join state officers in an arrest grounded in state law may act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Brown v. Stewart · filed 1996-01-12

Since the Federal Defendants appear to have derived the grounds for making the subject arrest from Commonwealth law in this particular case, their actions can legitimately be labelled as taking place under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a state agency’s decision that it lacks authority over a dispute does not establish a claim against private defendants.

Patsy Rylance v. Wendell Ellis, Sue Ellis, Elaine Peterson · filed 1996-01-23

Also, the fact that a State Water Board determined that it lacked authority to decide this issue does not give rise to a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires that a defendant act under color of state law.

Cox v. Treadway · filed 1996-01-25

The written instructions directed that the defendants had acted under color of state law, while the oral instructions asked the jury to decide whether the defendants had acted under col- or of state law. Appellants cannot have been prejudiced because the written instructions directed the jury to find in their favor on one necessary element of their claim.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private person who conspires with state officials only if evidence supports an understanding between them to deprive someone of a right.

D'AGOSTINO v. New York State Liquor Authority · filed 1996-01-30

To establish § 1983 liability based upon an alleged conspiracy with a public official, then, there must be some evidence, circumstantial or direct, upon which the jury could infer that the private party and the state actor had a “meeting of the minds” and thus reached an understanding that the plaintiff should be deprived of some right.

A private volunteer ambulance squad does not act under color of state law under § 1983 when it dismisses a member without state involvement in the dismissal or performance of a traditionally exclusive public function.

Gove v. Grafton Vol. Fire & Am b . · filed 1996-02-01

The court agrees with the holdings of these courts, and therefore concludes that the defendant was not acting under color of state law when it dismissed the plaintiff.

A § 1983 claim against a private defendant may proceed at the pleading stage when allegations of public service contracts and discussions with government officials sufficiently assert action under color of state law.

Obbards v. Horton Community Hospital, Inc. · filed 1996-02-07

The court here must decide whether the proposed § 1983 claim can withstand a motion to dismiss. ... Such allegations satisfy the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for notice pleadings. ... The court, therefore, does not find the proposed amendment futile. It will allow the amendment.

Section 1983 permits claims against prison employees or officials acting under color of state law and private individuals who willfully participate in joint action with the state or a state agent.

Osborne v. Department of Corrections Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 1996-02-08

We note that Osborne can save this action by amending his complaint to include allegations against specific prison employees or officials who acted under color of state law, or against private individuals who were willful participants in a joint action with a State or agent of a State.

A private company contracted by a state agency to perform a traditional state function acts under color of state law and may be sued under § 1983.

Willis v. U.S. Corrections Corp. And Grace Smith, Individually and in Her Official Capacity · filed 1996-02-12

It is clear that defendant U.S. Corrections Corporation, as a private entity under contract with an agency of the state to perform a traditional state function, is subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as one acting "under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988); Hicks v. Frey, 992 F.2d 1450, 1458 (6th Cir.1993).

Section 1983 applies only to persons acting under color of state law and does not reach purely private conduct.

Lynn v. United Technologies Corp., Inc. · filed 1996-02-14

Section 1983 applies only to persons acting “under color of state law” and does not reach the conduct of private individuals.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only against persons acting under color of state law.

Thompson v. Harper · filed 1996-02-14

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only against those acting "under color of state law."

A bail bondsman does not act under color of state law merely by possessing an arrest warrant when he neither purports to act pursuant to it nor enlists law enforcement to execute it.

Landry v. A-Able Bonding, Inc. · filed 1996-02-15

On these facts, we hold that the mere possession of an arrest warrant does not render a bail bondsman a state actor under § 1983, where he neither purports to act pursuant to the warrant, nor enlists the assistance of law enforcement officials in executing the warrant.

Section 1983 treats a sheriff as acting under color of state law when he uses his official authority to coerce a person into sex.

Bennett v. Pippin · filed 1996-03-01

We also find no error in the district court's conclusion that the Sheriff acted under color of state law when he raped Ms. Bennett.

Section 1983 treats an official’s misuse of state-conferred authority to direct an arrest, imprisonment, and prosecution as action under color of law, even if the official pursues a personal aim.

Bordages v. McElroy · filed 1996-03-01

A misuse of power of this sort, if proven, suffices to establish action “under color of law.”

Section 1983 reaches a private entity acting under color of state law when the state is responsible for the challenged action through a symbiotic relationship, coercion, or significant encouragement.

Fleming v. Worker's Compensation Com'n of Virginia · filed 1996-03-05

An indisputably private entity will not ordinarily be deemed to have acted under color of law unless the state is, in essence, responsi ble for the specific action at issue, either through the existence of a "symbiotic relationship" with the private entity, or by so thoroughly regulating the entity as to impose its will through coercion or, at least, "significant encouragement."

Private parties who neither act in concert with state agents nor otherwise act under color of state law cannot be liable under § 1983.

Combs v. Waremart Inc. Randy Gerber Douglas Garrett · filed 1996-03-05

Combs made no allegation nor does the record support that Waremart or Gerber acted in concert with state agents to deprive him of any constitutional right. Consequently, as neither Waremart nor Gerber acted under color of state law, the district court properly dismissed Combs's first and third causes of action for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 does not reach a private workers’ compensation insurer’s suspension of benefits when the state provides the regulatory mechanism but does not compel or direct the suspension.

Fleming v. Workers Compensation · filed 1996-03-05

Although the Commonwealth created the underlying statutory and regulatory mechanism challenged in the instant proceeding, it did not compel or direct the suspension of Fleming's benefits. That decision instead rested squarely on the shoulders of USF&G.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the alleged violation occurred under color of state law.

Glendora v. Hostetter · filed 1996-03-12

To recover under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1981, a plaintiff must show the alleged violation occurred “under color of state law.” It is at best unclear whether Continental Cablevision acted under state law in reducing the number of monthly cablecast dates to two.

Section 1983's color of state law requirement is unmet when a student aide's assault has no nexus to his authorized school duties.

Fort v. Dallas Indep Sch Dis · filed 1996-03-12

There is no nexus between the student's duties as an aide and his rape of Elizabeth; therefore, Fort has failed to allege a constitutional violation or to satisfy the color of state law requirement of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a private defendant acted under color of state law to sustain a claim against that defendant.

Schueller v. Michael Edgar Karen Hernandez Diane Lassor Nanette Names City of Martinez Officer Miller Officer Le · filed 1996-03-13

Here, appellant has provided no evidence to prove that these three defendants were state actors within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of federal rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Nelson v. Butler · filed 1996-03-20

In order to successfully assert a Section 1983 claim, the Plaintiff must prove that the claimed deprivation of Federal rights was committed by one or more persons who were acting under "color of State law.”

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law; a police officer’s harassment of coworkers does not qualify when it has no relationship to his state-conferred authority or duties.

Rouse v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1996-03-25

For the above reasons, the court dismisses plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against all defendants. Although plaintiffs did not directly address the § 1983 claim against defendants Jones and the City of Milwaukee, the “color of law” question is dispositive of the issue.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s alleged wrongful acts are fairly attributable to the State.

Harvey v. Harvey · filed 1996-03-25

In order to hold an individual liable under § 1983, however, a plaintiff must establish that the alleged wrongful acts can be fairly attributed to the State.

Section 1983 does not reach an altercation among private parties when the complaint alleges no facts showing that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Budnick v. Baybanks, Inc. · filed 1996-03-28

The fracas at the Baybanks constituted at most an altercation among private parties. The lawsuit arising from it may not, therefore, be maintained under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats prison officials acting in their official capacity as acting under color of state law.

Richmond v. Cagle · filed 1996-03-29

Prison officials acting in their official capacity are acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a public employee’s personal conduct as action under color of state law merely because the employee holds a state job.

Becerra v. Asher · filed 1996-04-04

The mere fact that Asher was a teacher employed by HISD at the time of the sexual assaults is insufficient to show state action. The acts of state officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are not acts under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; without an allegation of such action, the plaintiff has no claim under the section.

Riley v. Transamerica Ins. Group Premier Ins. Co. · filed 1996-04-08

As defendants point out, there is no allegation here that defendants were acting under color of state law. Therefore, plaintiff has no claim against defendants for a violation under § 1983.

A public defender acting in the traditional role of defense counsel is not presumed to act under color of state law and cannot be sued under § 1983 for that representation.

Tubbs v. Wayne · filed 1996-04-16

Public defenders serve in the traditional role of an attorney for a defendant in a criminal proceedings and are not presumed to act under the color of state law. Therefore, they cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when a state official acts in that capacity in connection with a state highway contract decision.

Clark Const. Co., Inc. v. Pena · filed 1996-04-18

Here, the court finds that Mr. Butts was acting under color of state law at all material times.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Cotten v. Roger Casler Mansfield News Journal Paul I. Hutchison · filed 1996-04-19

To state a viable § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Federal Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person while acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978).

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a claim fails when the plaintiff does not allege that element.

Marthel v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. · filed 1996-04-22

The plaintiff has not alleged that Bridgestone was acting under color of state law in connection with any of the actions taken against him. Accordingly, the Court finds that the defendant has proven the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to this element of plaintiffs Section 1983 claim, and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim.

Section 1983 may reach a state-paid union grievance chairman acting in that role when the evidence permits a finding that he acted under color of state law.

Forbes v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers · filed 1996-04-23

At the very least, a genuine issue exists as to whether Rivard acted under color of state law in his capacity as Grievance Chairman of the Brotherhood.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private citizen who willfully participates in joint action with state officials.

Bang v. Utopia Restaurant · filed 1996-04-24

Section 1983 imposes liability only on persons who act “under color of state law.” However, a private citizen may be deemed to be a state actor when he is “a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.”

Section 1983 does not cover federal task force officers acting in their federal capacity because they are not acting under color of state law.

Pou v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration · filed 1996-04-26

Where, as here, it is undisputed that defendants Rogers and Frit-zen were acting in their capacity as federal officers as DEA task force agents, they were not acting under color of state law, and a § 1983 claim must fail.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officers for a personal prank that does not use authority conferred by state law.

Haines v. Fisher · filed 1996-04-29

Applying these standards, we hold that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants on Haines' § 1983 claims. This is not a case in which the defendants "exercised power 'possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of state law.'" Atkins, 487 U.S. at 49 (quoting Classic, 313 U.S. at 326).

A public employee acts under color of state law for § 1983 when exercising official authority or responsibilities.

Kalmas v. Wagner · filed 1996-05-03

Thus, it is generally true that "a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” ... Here, then, the defendants were acting under color of law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege and prove deprivation of a federally protected right by a person acting under color of state law.

Cox v. Rap-A-Lot Records · filed 1996-05-06

Unless the complaint alleges both elements, it does not state a claim under section 1983. Here, Cox’s complaint specifically states that the defendants were not acting under the color of state law. Accordingly, the district court acted properly when it dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires conduct fairly attributable to the state; acting pursuant to or under the authority of a state statute alone does not make a private person a state actor.

Foshee v. Health Management Associates · filed 1996-05-10

Just because one acts pursuant to, or even under the authority of a statute does not make one a state actor under § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not cover a private attorney representing a defendant, even if court-appointed, unless the attorney conspires with state officials.

Nelson v. Henson · filed 1996-05-23

In general, a private attorney, even one appointed by the court, does not act under color of state law when he represents the defendant. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18, 102 S.Ct. 445, 449-50, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981). Therefore, Nelson's civil rights claims against Banker under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must fail, unless he can spell out a conspiracy between Banker and state officials.

A plaintiff need not know that a defendant is a police officer for the defendant to have acted under color of state law under § 1983.

Niemann v. Whalen · filed 1996-05-24

First, defendant could be arguing that as a matter of law, plaintiff cannot establish that Whalen was acting under color of state law if plaintiff did not know that Whalen was a police officer. This is precisely the argument that we rejected when we denied defendant’s Rule 50(a) motion made at the close of plaintiffs case. ... Defendant has advanced no new arguments on this point, and we see no reason to reach a different result at this time.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a federal officer acting as a federal officer because relief requires action under color of state law.

Reynolds v. United States · filed 1996-05-29

It is undisputed that Lisenbee, as a special agent for the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, is a federal officer. Therefore, I find that a § 1983 action against Lisenbee will not lie and should be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private persons who merely report activities to public officials because they are not acting under color of state law.

Patsy Hoy Yarbrough v. Barbara D. Johnson, Judge Christine Gregoire James Mead Dennis Hunter Lou Braasladt, Officer · filed 1996-06-07

Persons who merely report activities to public officials are not liable as actors behaving under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983’s color-of-law element is satisfied by the conduct of Florida Highway Patrol defendants.

White v. Fl. Hwy. Patrol, Div. of Fl. Dept. of Hwy. · filed 1996-06-10

While it is clear that the Florida Highway Patrol Defendants were acting under color of law, Plaintiff has not sustained his burden of showing that Defendants deprived him of a property interest.

Section 1983 treats supervisory school officials as acting under color of state law when their hiring and supervision practices have a real nexus to the alleged violation of a student’s rights.

John Doe, as Next Friend of Jane Doe, a Child v. Hillsboro Independent School District, Larry Zabcik · filed 1996-06-17

Thus, the correct color-of-law or state-actor inquiry in this case is whether there was a “real nexus” between the School Officials’ hiring and supervising practices and the violation of Doe’s rights.

Section 1983 requires sufficient evidence that defendants acted under color of state law to sustain a claim.

Ng v. Quiet Forest II Homeowners Assoc. · filed 1996-06-19

Because Ng did not present sufficient evidence to establish that defendants were acting under color of state law, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendants on Ng's section 1983 claims. See Lopez v. Department of Health Servs., 939 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir.1991); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir.1979).

A private party is subject to § 1983 only if it acts under color of state law, including by willfully participating in joint action with state actors.

Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company of Bloomington, Illinois, an Illinois Corporation · filed 1996-06-19

Because State Farm was neither a state actor nor acting under color of state law, it is not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private accreditor as acting under color of state law when it sets professional standards without state involvement and lacks power to remove employees.

Shoemaker v. Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Educ. · filed 1996-06-19

In short, there is no basis for concluding that ACGME was acting under color of California law when it promulgated standards governing the practice and teaching of emergency medicine.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an attorney acting in a purely private capacity without action by a state governmental official.

Raine v. Colle · filed 1996-06-20

The relationship between plaintiff and his attorney involves no action by a state governmental official. Plaintiff’s attorney was acting in a purely private capacity.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a complaint must be dismissed when the plaintiff admits the defendants were not state actors.

Bolding v. Leonard · filed 1996-06-25

On appeal, Mr. Bolding again admits that neither defendant is a state actor. Because Mr. Bolding failed to meet this specific requirement of section 1983, we agree with the district court that his complaint must be dismissed.