42 U.S.C. § 1983

An off-duty deputy sheriff does not act under color of state law merely by announcing “Sheriff’s Office” while protecting his own property, where his actions are unrelated to his official duties.

Hill v. Barbour · filed 1992-04-10

Drawing all inferences in favor of Hill, Barbour’s announcement of “Sheriff’s Office” is insufficient to transform his actions into acts under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a federal agent acting solely in a federal capacity does not meet that requirement.

Gregg v. Tague · filed 1992-04-13

Here, Hills is a federal agent and, therefore, was not acting under color of state law. See Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982). There are no allegations in the complaint that suggest that Hills was ever acting under color of state law. Thus, the district court correctly concluded that Gregg had failed to state a section 1983 claim against Hills.

Section 1983 reaches a state commissioner acting under color of state law by promulgating regulations; when only injunctive relief is sought, pleading official or individual capacity does not affect the claim.

Farmland Dairies v. McGuire · filed 1992-04-14

Since the Commissioner was clearly acting under color of state law in promulgating the regulations and is sued for injunctive relief only, this difference is not material to the outcome of this § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 racial discrimination claim requires proof of purposeful discrimination and action under color of state law.

Allen v. City of Yonkers · filed 1992-04-15

Section 1983 requires the plaintiff to prove not only that the defendant has purposefully discriminated against him, but also that the defendant was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Lonesome v. Lebedeff · filed 1992-04-16

In the first place, a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must allege facts showing that the defendant acted under color of a state "statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage____” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Lartey v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 1992-04-24

The law is also clear that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal officials acting under color of federal law.

A court-appointed attorney serving as defense counsel in a criminal proceeding does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Fitzgerald v. Allen Beck, P.C. · filed 1992-04-24

Fitzgerald's complaint lacks an arguable basis in law because a court-appointed attorney does not act under color of state law when serving as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

A private defendant who invokes a state procedure is liable under § 1983 only when the procedure itself is unconstitutional and state officials provide significant aid.

Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien, and Frankel · filed 1992-05-01

To be liable under § 1983, however, a private defendant must invoke a state procedure that is itself unconstitutional, with significant aid from state officials.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against United States Marshals acting under color of federal law.

Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Unknown Agents of the United States Marshals Service · filed 1992-05-05

However, because this Court finds that the Marshals were acting under color of federal law, the Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim will be dismissed.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-law requirement is not satisfied when firefighters claim to be law enforcement but law enforcement is outside their official duties.

Vanderlinde v. Brochman · filed 1992-05-18

On that score Vanderlindes’ fatal deficiency lies in their inability to satisfy the “under color of law” requirement of Section 1983. Just because Brockman and Jensen may have proclaimed themselves as “the law in Oak Lawn” does not of course make it so, any more than similar statements by self-proclaimed vigilantes or those intent on terrorizing towns in the standard Western movie plot had no legal effect.

Section 1983 provides no remedy when no defendant is alleged to have acted under color of state law.

Kingston Square Tenants Ass'n v. Tuskegee Gardens, Ltd. · filed 1992-05-26

Unlike the cases previously discussed, the remedy of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not available to the Plaintiffs. No Defendant is alleged to have acted “under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-Iation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory....”

A volunteer prison chaplain can act under color of state law for § 1983 when he works within the prison chapel program under institutional policies and uses that role to deny an inmate access to religious services.

Phelps v. Wayne Dunn and Clark Edwards · filed 1992-05-28

While Rev. Edwards may well have retained the general attributes of a clergyman performing in a non-prison setting when he was conducting services, Rev. Edwards was not in a non-prison setting. Rather, he was working in a prison and had signed an agreement that specifically restricted him from denying prisoners access to religious services on the basis of his own religious beliefs. Thus, even if the district court had relied on state action grounds, that decision would not have been correct under these factual circumstances.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private bus company and its ticket agent do not meet that requirement.

Alton Bea Whatley, Jr. v. Greyhound Buslines, Inc. · filed 1992-06-01

Because there is no state action, Whatley's section 1983 suit lacks an arguable basis in law and was properly dismissed by the district court.

Section 1983 does not subject private parties to suit when they do not act under color of state law.

Callahan v. Bettinelli · filed 1992-06-04

Fourth, the attorneys and other private parties are not subject to suit under section 1983 because they are private parties who do not act under color of state law. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981).

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law.

Wolf v. Harjo · filed 1992-06-05

§ 1983, on its face, creates a legal liability against any "[p]erson who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any state...." Thus, a defendant must be acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private person whose use of state procedures receives enough assistance from state officials to make the conduct state action.

Apostol v. Eliot Landau, Mark Gallion, and Chris Haloulos · filed 1992-06-08

Accordingly, Apóstol may successfully assert a § 1983 claim against Landau if officers Haloulos and Gallion provided a level of assistance sufficient to bring Landau’s conduct under the rubric of state action.

Section 1983 does not apply to officers acting as federal agents in a federal investigation because they are not acting under color of state law.

Amoakohene v. Bobko · filed 1992-06-10

Equally important, it is legally inconsistent to allow simultaneous claims for violations of Section 1983 and Bivens against the same defendants. The defendant officers are either state actors or federal actors—they cannot be both. We find that they are federal actors. Accordingly, we sustain the federal defendants’ second objection. Count I was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not apply to persons acting under color of federal law.

Leo M. Mullen, M.D. v. United States of America Jean Paul Bradshaw · filed 1992-06-10

Additionally, Mullen's section 1983 claim against Bradshaw is meritless because section 1983 "is inapplicable to persons acting under color of federal law." Haley v. Walker, 751 F.2d 284, 285 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).

Section 1983 does not treat a person as acting under color of state law merely because the state issued that person a driver's license.

Ketchum v. Robert Rankin, Clyde Randolph · filed 1992-06-12

There is clearly no basis for concluding that Montana's decision to issue the defendants drivers' licenses made these defendants agents of the state for purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law; a private actor’s slander does not state a claim under it.

Heulon Perrin, Jr. v. Xelco, Inc. · filed 1992-06-19

We are in full agreement with the district court that plaintiff has not stated a claim cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There is no allegation that defendant acted under color of state law, and indeed it appears that defendant is not a state actor. The tort of slander is not cognizable under the civil rights laws either.

Section 1983 treats private parties as state actors when their close cooperation with a coroner’s office makes them participants in the alleged deprivation of civil rights.

Brotherton v. Cleveland · filed 1992-06-30

Thus, the plaintiffs have alleged a situation in which the eye banks must be considered state actors for purposes of § 1983, and we reverse the district court on this point.

Section 1983 does not treat a private purchaser as acting under color of state law merely because the purchaser bought property at an IRS sale.

Manuel v. Thomas · filed 1992-07-02

Here, Manuel alleged that Thomas acted under color of state law by purchasing the property at an IRS sale. This allegation fails to establish that Thomas acted jointly with IRS officials or deliberately cloaked himself with state authority.

A prison superintendent who approves and implements a prison mail system in his official capacity acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Boyd v. Petsock · filed 1992-07-06

Superintendent Petsock, a prison official acting in his official capacity, clearly acted under color of state law when he approved and implemented the mail delivery system at SCIP pursuant to Directive 803.

A private physician who provides medical care to state prisoners acts under color of state law for § 1983 purposes even if employed through a private contractor.

Calvert v. Hun · filed 1992-07-15

Therefore, Hart is a state actor for the purposes of § 1983. The fact that Hart is a private physician contracting with Correctional Medical Systems, Inc. does not alter this conclusion.

Section 1983 covers local officers who exercise authority derived from state law while working with a federal agency; later federal forfeiture procedures do not erase the state basis of their conduct.

Jones v. United States Drug Enforcement Administration · filed 1992-07-16

The officers were state employees, authorized by the state, and without formal federal authority. The federal procedures used to complete the seizure and commence forfeiture do not retroactively immunize the officers’ conduct at the time of the seizure itself, which is the basis for the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against them. Summary judgment must be denied on this issue.

A public defender acting as counsel to an indigent criminal defendant does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Lawrence v. Susan K. Carpenter and Linda Nicholson · filed 1992-07-21

A public defender does not act under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983 when acting as counsel to an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Section 1983 makes deprivations of federal rights actionable when committed under color of state law; allegations indicating that some defendants were state actors can suffice to avoid dismissal as frivolous.

Weidman v. Thomas · filed 1992-07-29

The court construes these claims to be made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which makes actionable deprivations of federal rights done under color of state law. Although it is unclear from the complaint whether all the defendants may have acted under color of state law, the factual allegations are sufficient to indicate that at least some of the defendants were state actors.

Section 1983 does not reach a private testing service’s score decisions when its conduct lacks a sufficient connection to the state to be attributable to it.

Tolleson v. Educational Testing Service · filed 1992-08-06

Recent Supreme Court pronouncements compel the conclusion that ETS did not act under color of state law and that there is not a sufficient nexus to ETS’s action and the DOE so that ETS’s actions can be fairly attributable to the state.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a private cab company did not meet that requirement by implementing its challenged driver classification scheme.

Wolfe v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters · filed 1992-08-06

We agree with the district court's conclusion that DeSoto did not act under color of state law in implementing the challenged classification scheme.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private person who willfully participates in joint action with state agents.

Hobbs v. Hawkins · filed 1992-08-11

But the defendant need not be an officer of the state to satisfy this requirement; private persons may be held liable under § 1983 if they willfully participate in joint action with state agents.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against public defenders and other private parties who do not act under color of state law.

Lawrence S. Krain, M.D. v. State Bar of California, Michael Capizzi Corinne S. Shulman, Keith Monroe Daniel Lundgren, At · filed 1992-08-14

The public defenders and other defendants as private persons are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they are private parties who do not act under color of state law.

An off-duty public employee may act under color of law for § 1983 purposes if the challenged conduct was an exercise of state-created authority; a complaint survives dismissal when facts could establish that connection.

Navarro v. De Ramos · filed 1992-08-20

In this case, although the possibility appears extremely remote, plaintiffs may be able to show that defendant Matos, in shooting and killing—while off-duty and off the premises of any property of the Puerto Rico Corrections Authority—an individual who apparently had no connection with the Puerto Rico penal system or Corrections Authority, was acting under color of his state-created authority.

Section 1983 does not cover conduct by a person who was not acting under color of state law.

Donald J. Minniecheske and Robert Brown v. Donald W. Gudmanson, Larry Stahowaik, Michail India · filed 1992-08-20

What may be taken to be Minniecheske's claim of libel is not cognizable under § 1983 because the conduct complained of was not committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits claims against federal officials acting under federal authority when they conspire or act in concert with state officials to a substantial degree.

Cabrera v. Martin · filed 1992-08-21

Although federal officials acting under federal authority are generally not considered to be state actors, they may be liable under § 1983 if they are found to have conspired with or acted in concert with state officials to some substantial degree.

Private creditors do not act under color of state law for Section 1983 merely by using state statutes that grant and permit enforcement of liens.

Nieves v. Santa Clara Land Title Company Gail Christenson, Christenson Realty Yuet-Lin Tang, AKA Elaine Tang Itt · filed 1992-09-01

Thus, we have found that state statutes giving creditors liens, and authorizing them to enforce liens by a sale, do not result in the creditors acting under color of state law for purposes of section 1983.

A private person who jointly participates with state officers in seizing property acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Kennedy v. Widdowson · filed 1992-09-03

Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil, Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1981), the Court finds that Nelson’s joint participation with officers Jones and Lewis in removing the property from the Kennedy’s garage render him a state actor. ... Thus, he is also a person acting under the color of state law under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private contractor when municipal contract terms coerce or significantly encourage the contractor to violate federally protected wage rights.

Chan v. City of New York · filed 1992-09-08

In short, plaintiffs have alleged facts asserting that the municipal defendants ensured that any successful bidder would be forced, for economic reasons, to violate 42 U.S.C. § 5310. If proven true, these facts would be sufficient to demonstrate that the municipal defendants “exercised coercive power or ... provided such significant encouragement” as to establish 42 U.S.C. § 1983 state action under the close nexus test.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Boeckman v. Los Angeles Times · filed 1992-09-17

To state a civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts showing a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States.

Section 1983 does not reach a private contractor’s independently made exclusion decision when the government did not direct or participate in that decision.

Weaver v. AIDS Services of Austin, Inc. · filed 1992-09-23

Nothing in the record indicates that ASA’s decision to exclude Weaver from its workshops can be ascribed to a governmental decision. Neither contract directs ASA to admit or exclude certain persons from its workshops, and ASA submitted summary judgment proof that it independently exercised its discretion in deciding to exclude Weaver from the safer-sex workshops. We conclude that no state action entered into in ASA’s decision to exclude Weaver. Absent state action, ASA cannot be said to have violated Weaver’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a county public defender’s office performing the private function of representing criminal defendants does not meet that requirement.

Datz v. Hutson · filed 1992-09-24

The Cobb County Circuit Defenders Office performs the essentially private function of representing criminal defendants. Thus, the Court holds that the office was not acting under color of state law and that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983.

A public defender acting as defense counsel is not a state actor for purposes of Section 1983.

Jackson v. Ira Harris Gilbert Donahue · filed 1992-09-25

A public defender, while acting in that capacity, is not considered a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321 (1981). This is dispositive of the § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; an attorney representing a habeas petitioner does not act under color of state law when performing the role of counsel, even if appointed and paid by the state.

Young v. Needle · filed 1992-10-19

Here, Young cannot successfully state a section 1983 claim against his attorney for failing to file a timely notice of appeal or for failing to adequately represent him in his habeas action. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (a private attorney, even if appointed and paid for by the state, is not acting under color of state law when performing his function as counsel).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public defender for conduct in the role of counsel because that conduct is not under color of state law.

Smith v. Aaron E. Haith, Indiana Public Defender, Marion County, Indiana, Indiana Public Defender's Office · filed 1992-10-23

The disposition of the action as to him, however, rests not only on this basis, but also on the long-recognized fact that in his role as public defender defendant Haith did not act "under color of state law."

Section 1983’s color-of-law inquiry is fact specific and focuses on the nature of an officer’s conduct rather than whether the officer was on duty.

Postma v. Waters · filed 1992-11-05

The determination whether an officer acted under color of law is fact specific and focuses on the nature of the conduct, not whether the officer was on duty.

A court-appointed attorney defending a criminal case does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Moses v. Carnes · filed 1992-11-13

William Isom Moses, a pro se Kentucky prisoner, appeals the district court's judgment dismissing his civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Seeking two million dollars in damages, Moses sued the attorney appointed by the court to defend him in his state criminal proceeding. ... In a report issued May 6, 1992, the magistrate judge recommended that Moses's complaint be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) because the defendant was not acting under color of state law. ... Moses's claim lacks an arguable basis in law for the reason stated by the magistrate judge.

Section 1983 requires allegations that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Steinberg v. Allen · filed 1992-11-17

While criminal conduct otherwise remediable as unconstitutional under the civil rights laws is not insulated from such redress by virtue of its doubly wrongful character, here the essential allegations of action under color of state law (§ 1983), obstruction of justice (§ 1985(2)), racial or other class-based animus (§ 1985(3)), and state action are lacking in any event.

Section 1983 makes private entities liable for depriving someone of federal constitutional rights only when they act under color of state law.

Independence Public Media of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Television Network Commission · filed 1992-11-18

Acknowledged by plaintiff to be private entities, the TV Defendants will be liable to plaintiff under section 1983 only if plaintiff proves, first, that they deprived plaintiff of its federal constitutional rights and, second, that they were acting under color of state law in doing so.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private contractors for pressuring a county to fire an employee when county officials made the challenged decisions.

Roper v. County of Chesterfield, Va. · filed 1992-12-02

The plaintiffs argument that the Contractor Defendants could somehow direct the firing of Roper while being cloaked with the color of state law is simply untenable. It is the County, and not any of the Contractor Defendants, which allegedly discharged Roper in violation of his constitutional rights.

Private parties may be liable under § 1983 if they wilfully participate in a conspiracy with the state or one of its agents.

Bowman v. City of Franklin · filed 1992-12-02

Examining first the state action requirement of a § 1983 claim, we note that Waste and Zimmerman are private parties, not state actors. As such they may be subject to liability under § 1983 only if they wilfully participate in a conspiracy with the state or one of its agents.

Section 1983 requires joint activity with the state to treat a private party as acting under color of state law; merely supplying information about suspected arson to state authorities is insufficient.

Hatch v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 1992-12-10

Appellants have failed to allege or prove any requisite “joint activity” between State Farm or its employees, and the state. Supplying of information concerning suspected arson to state authorities, standing alone, is not enough to amount to “joint activity.”

A § 1983 claim against a private adult care facility survives dismissal on the pleadings when the record does not establish whether the facility acted under color of state law.

Trautz v. Weisman · filed 1992-12-11

Given our uncertainty regarding the state’s relationship with defendants and the historic role of the state in adult home care, we cannot say with any confidence based solely on the pleadings, whether defendants were acting under color of state law. We thus decline to dismiss plaintiffs’ § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 requires a sufficient nexus between the state and a private party’s conduct before that conduct can be treated as state action.

Grosvenor v. Des Moines Area Community College · filed 1992-12-11

Grosvenor has not shown a sufficient nexus between the state and his allegedly involuntary treatment to justify deeming the Health Center's action as that of the state.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public defender for work in the traditional role of counsel because that work is not under color of state law.

Lennox v. Robert A. Ravitz, Lee Ann Peters, and Carolyn L. Merritt · filed 1992-12-18

A public defender performing his traditional role as counsel is not acting under color of state law for purposes of stating a § 1983 claim.

A district attorney who sends a private letter to a critic’s employer without invoking prosecutorial authority does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Piercy v. Andrew Vandergaw Lake County, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1992-12-24

Under these circumstances, we agree with the district court that Piercy has failed to demonstrate that Vandergaw acted under color of state law when he sent the letter to Piercy's employer.

Section 1983 treats an officer’s arrest under color of state law when the officer uses the outward authority of the office, even outside the officer’s jurisdiction.

Keller v. District of Columbia · filed 1993-01-06

Making an arrest, by means of a marked police car, a police uniform and badge, and a state-issued firearm, is an act performed “under color of” state law, regardless of whether the state official has the actual jurisdiction to make an arrest.

Section 1983 treats a police officer as acting under color of state law when he uses his position to cause the police to enforce his private demand, even if he is off duty and out of uniform.

Esposito v. Town of Derby, No. Cv90 03 23 91s (Jan. 14, 1993) · filed 1993-01-14

However, the court finds that his acts in requesting private citizens to report on plaintiffs' activities and causing the police department to enforce his request that nothing be removed from the store were clearly actions taken as a police officer under the color of law which proximately caused violations of plaintiffs' civil rights. See City Exhibit 11. Whether or not he was in uniform or on duty on May 7, 1987 has no bearing on the actions taken.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private club when the complaint alleges neither concerted action with state actors nor the exercise of power specifically authorized by the state.

Mertik v. Blalock · filed 1993-01-15

Yet Mertik’s complaint makes no allegation that defendant Greenbrier Figure Skating Club acted in concert with any state actors. There is no allegation of conspiracy or agreement between Greenbrier and the defendant city and/or its employees. There is no allegation that any policy under which Greenbrier may have operated was an exercise of power specifically authorized by the state. ... It is clear to us that no set of facts which could be proven consistent with the allegations in Mertik’s complaint would entitle her to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Greenbrier.

Section 1983 treats a public supervisor’s sexual harassment as action under color of state law when the supervisor uses authority over an employee to treat her differently from male coworkers.

Poulsen v. City of North Tonawanda, NY · filed 1993-01-26

However, when the harasser has some authority over his female victim and uses that authority to treat her differently from her male co-workers, this activity constitutes sexual harassment under the color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement may be satisfied when state officials harass an employee in the course of their state employment.

Soltani v. Smith · filed 1993-02-04

The court further determines that in presenting evidence sufficient to support a finding that defendants Smith and Thomas engaged in conduct violative of plaintiff’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech, plaintiff has also presented evidence sufficient to support a finding that defendants Smith and Thomas engaged in such conduct in the course of their employment with the Treasury Department, i.e., under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat private lessees as state actors merely because they lease land through a state program.

Han v. Department of Justice · filed 1993-02-24

The mere fact that lessee defendants are lessees under the Hawaiian Homestead program does not mean that they act under “color of state law” for purposes of a civil rights claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a federal agency acting under color of federal law.

Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development · filed 1993-02-26

Because HUD is a federal agency acting under color of federal law, we hold that the Plaintiffs have not stated a claim against it under § 1983.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is not satisfied when a private creditor obtains prejudgment attachment or garnishment by falsely claiming to meet state statutory requirements.

Gene Thompson Lumber Co., Inc. v. Davis Parmer Lumber Company, Inc. · filed 1993-02-26

Under Lugar, Davis-Parmer's malicious and unlawful conduct cannot properly be attributed to the state for section 1983's under color of state law purposes.

A private creditor’s misuse of a state prejudgment relief statute does not satisfy § 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement.

Gene Thompson Lumber Co. v. Davis Parmer Lumber Co. · filed 1993-02-26

In short, proof of a defendant’s misuse of a state’s prejudgment relief statute does not satisfy section 1983’s demand for under color of state law action and, hence, cannot christen a section 1983 claim.

A public defender can act under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983 by conspiring with a prosecutor to deprive a defendant of constitutional rights.

Cabututan v. Hunsaker · filed 1993-03-01

Accordingly, if the appellant is determined to have alleged sufficient facts to establish a conspiracy between the appellee and the prosecutor, the appellee can be found to have acted under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires action fairly attributable to the state; a private store employee with no government affiliation does not act under color of state law.

Antoinette Greene Martha Spann v. K-Mart Corporation Jerry Nettles, Employee, Agent And/or Servant · filed 1993-03-02

It is undisputed that Nettles, who was a K-Mart employee in no way affiliated with a government entity, was not acting under color of state law when the incident occurred. As action fairly attributable to the state is required to state a claim unders 1983, the award of summary judgment to Defendants was correct.

A § 1983 claim against an individual requires facts showing that the individual acted under color of state law.

Hart v. Clearfield City, Davis County · filed 1993-03-04

In addition, the Court finds in favor of defendant Shelley Campbell as Ms. Hart has not cited any facts to demonstrate that Shelley Campbell acted under color of state law by monitoring Ms. Hart’s telephone calls after February 28, 1990, and Ms. Hart has not alleged that she was harmed in any way as a result of Ms. Campbell’s monitoring of her telephone calls.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a public official used the power of her office in the alleged deprivation; holding office alone does not establish action under color of state law.

Urbanic v. Rosenfeld · filed 1993-03-04

Even though we are required to review all evidence and inferences most favorable to Urbanic, the allegation that Claire Rosenfeld used the badge of her office to deprive him of his civil rights, merely because she holds an office, is insufficient by itself to establish that she was acting “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party when specific factual allegations support a reasonable inference that the party conspired with state officials to deprive someone of a federal right.

Rubin v. Smith · filed 1993-03-11

The final question before the court is whether these statements made by plaintiffs and any reasonable inferences drawn from the statements adequately allege a conspiracy between Harvey Rubin and the various state officials sufficient to create liability under section 1983. ... The court finds that plaintiffs have met their burden by pleading sufficient facts in regard to Harvey Rubin’s alleged conspiracy with the other defendants to allow this action to go forward.

A private bondsman is not liable under § 1983 without a showing that he acted under color of state law.

Housley v. Williams · filed 1993-03-12

The appellant failed to state a claim under § 1983 because he failed to show how the bondsman, a private economic actor, acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private entity when the complaint alleges no joint action with state actors or exercise of state-authorized power.

Mertik v. Blalock · filed 1993-03-17

Yet Mertik's complaint makes no allegation that defendant Greenbrier Figure Skating Club acted in concert with any state actors. There is no allegation of conspiracy or agreement between Greenbrier and the defendant city and/or its employees. There is no allegation that any policy under which Greenbrier may have operated was an exercise of power specifically authorized by the state. ... It is clear to us that no set of facts which could be proven consistent with the allegations in Mertik's complaint would entitle her to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Greenbrier.

A public defender may be liable under § 1983 when conspiring with state officials, although traditional defense representation alone is not action under color of state law.

Brymer v. Treabech · filed 1993-03-17

A public defender "performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding" does not act under color of state law and cannot be liable under section 1983. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Nevertheless, a public defender who conspires with state officials does act under color of state law and may be liable. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984).

A court-appointed attorney representing a defendant in a state criminal case does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Budnick v. Barnstable County Bar Advocates, Inc. · filed 1993-03-30

A court-appointed attorney when representing a defendant in a state criminal proceeding does not act under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches local governments and state or local officers acting under state law, but not the federal government or federal officers acting under color of federal law.

Dan T. Slaughter & Associates, Incorporated, Clay T. Slaughter, and Florence Slaughter v. Federal Bureau of Investigatio · filed 1993-04-01

Section 1983 serves as the basis for suits against local governments and state and local government officers acting under state law to redress violations of federal law. It does not apply to violations of federal law by the federal government or officers of the federal government who are acting under color of federal law, as the Corporation has alleged.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against private parties requires more than conclusory allegations that they conspired with a state actor.

Rounseville v. Zahl · filed 1993-04-15

However, mere conclusory allegations regarding the existence of a conspiracy are insufficient to support a § 1983 conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 applies only to actions taken under color of state law, so the United States and a bankruptcy court are not proper defendants.

Scott W. Veale and David T. Veale v. Town of Marlborough, N.H., Scott W. Veale and David T. Veale v. United States of Am · filed 1993-05-06

First, we note that because § 1983 applies only to actions taken under color of state law, the United States and the bankruptcy court obviously are not proper defendants.

Section 1983 requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Ewing v. Agency Rental Car · filed 1993-05-06

Mr. Ewing failed to demonstrate how Defendant-appellee Agency Car Rental acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 reaches private conduct only when it is chargeable to the state, such as through joint action with or significant aid from state officials.

Martin v. Richard Watson, Roberta Melton, and Brent Brown, Individually and in Official Capacities as Pri · filed 1993-05-11

Nevertheless, § 1983 redresses official action in which public officers violate clearly established constitutional rights. ... The complaint fails to show these private individuals were jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, obtained significant aid from prison officials, or the private conduct was in some other way chargeable to the state.

Section 1983 requires that a person or entity acting under color of state law cause the deprivation of a federal right, privilege, or immunity.

Dennie v. Riegle · filed 1993-05-26

Any case under § 1983 must demonstrate both a deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and causation of such deprivation by a person or entity acting under color of state law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There are no state actors implicated in this case.

A private party is liable under § 1983 for joint action with a state actor only when the evidence supports a mutual understanding or meeting of the minds between them.

Mershon v. Beasley · filed 1993-05-26

After reading the trial transcript, however, we are convinced that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law on the question of a mutual understanding, or a meeting of the minds, between Mr. Beasley and the county prosecutor and therefore that the § 1983 claim against Mr. Beasley should not have been submitted to the jury.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Liberty Mortgage Banking, Ltd. v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation · filed 1993-05-28

In order to state a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must establish that defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived plaintiff of a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 treats a private organization as acting under color of state law when it relies on government assistance, performs governmental functions, and exercises sovereign compulsion.

Suss v. American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals · filed 1993-05-31

The ASPCA, although a private entity, was a' state actor in this situation because: (1) the ASPCA cannot carry out its statutory mission- without governmental assistance and it relies on its contract with the city to operate, (2) its services involve governmental functions and (3) the break-in here was done under an -assumption of sovereign powers of compulsion.

A private person may be sued under § 1983 if the person acts in concert with state actors to deprive someone of federal rights.

Koltz v. Bezmen · filed 1993-06-01

Thus, Nilson may be sued under § 1983, despite the fact that she is not a government actor, if plaintiff can show that she acted in concert with state actors.

A private party can be liable under Section 1983 for acting with a public official only if the party agreed with the official to violate someone’s constitutional rights.

Ceszyk v. Francis J. Cuneo, Jr., Louise MacGaffey Richard P. Doria · filed 1993-06-01

Thus, it is essential that plaintiff show an agreement between the public and private actors to violate her constitutional rights.

A prison doctor alleged to be a prison hospital employee is a state actor for § 1983 liability at the motion to dismiss stage.

Coades v. Jeffes · filed 1993-06-03

Because we are considering a motion to dismiss, we must consider the allegations of the complaint to be true, and Johnson is clearly a state actor for the purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a state official acting under color of state law who deprives plaintiffs of federally protected rights.

Radio Common Carriers of New York, Inc. v. State · filed 1993-06-09

Honorable James Wetzler, as Commissioner of the New York Department of Taxation and Finance qualifies as a State official who, acting under color of State law, has deprived plaintiffs of their Federally protected rights. Accordingly, the request for attorneys’ fees is granted.

Government contracts alone do not make a private contractor's employment decisions state action actionable under Section 1983.

Kang v. Omni Technology and Micro Semi Corp. · filed 1993-06-17

Although Omni and Micro have contracts with the government, this by itself does not raise their acts to the level of state action. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. at 840-41. Omni's failure to hire Kang, regardless of its reasons, is not actionable under § 1983 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right under color of state law.

Suarez v. Chuck Cole Wimes · filed 1993-07-01

In order to recover under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant deprived him of a constitutional right under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or a federal statute.

Mahlerwein v. Alan Herrmann Matthew J. Crehan · filed 1993-07-08

Concerning the remaining defendants, in a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was acting under color of state law and that the defendant's conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or federal statute. Cassady v. Tackett, 938 F.2d 693, 695 (6th Cir.1991). Mahlerwein's allegations did not demonstrate that the Herrmanns or attorney Moser acted under color of state law pursuant to § 1983, and, therefore, they were properly dismissed from the suit.

Section 1983 liability requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Gaul v. Orseno · filed 1993-07-16

The remaining defendants, McCoy and the union, cannot be held liable under § 1983 because there is no allegation that they acted "under color of state law", which is a prerequisite to such claims.

A municipal zoning board’s denial of a zoning application in violation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act constitutes state action and a deprivation of federally secured statutory rights under § 1983.

Pulcinella v. Ridley Township · filed 1993-07-26

A denial of a zoning application in violation of FHAA would clearly constitute “state action,” and would be a deprivation of rights and privilege secured by the laws of the United States.

A private party’s unlawful invocation of state attachment procedures does not constitute action under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Keystone Builders, Inc. v. Floor Fashions of Virginia, Inc. · filed 1993-07-29

This court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that plaintiff does not have a cause of action under § 1983 for defendant’s alleged misuse of Virginia attachment procedures, but that plaintiffs Claim I can stand only as a constitutional challenge to the facial validity of Virginia’s attachment procedures.

State law enforcement officers act under color of state law for purposes of section 1983 when their authority to participate in a federally led search under a federal warrant derives from state law.

Brant v. County of Stanislaus · filed 1993-07-29

Condit and David participated in the search only because they were state law enforcement officers; they possessed the authority to participate by virtue of state law. ... Accordingly, Condit and David acted under color of state law within the meaning of section 1983.

Under Section 1983, a child's law guardian does not act under color of state law when functioning as a fiduciary who must act in the minor's best interest.

Levine v. County of Westchester · filed 1993-07-30

To the extent that Levine claims that the child’s law guardian, Maria Joy Frank, has violated his Constitutional rights through her representation of the child in the custody and sex abuse proceedings, this Court is persuaded by the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153 (10th Cir.1986), that law guardians do not represent their clients under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when they function as fiduciaries who must act in a minor’s best interest.

A state court reporter acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when exercising state-conferred authority to file or fail to file appeal documents.

Presnick v. Santoro · filed 1993-08-05

First, the plaintiff has adequately alleged that Santoro, when she allegedly failed to file plaintiffs appeal certifications, was acting “under color” of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The power she exercised to file (or to fail to file) such documents was power exercised by virtue of state law and made possible only because she was “clothed with the authority of state law.”

A claim under § 1983 must allege that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Jones v. Adam's Mark Hotel · filed 1993-08-16

Plaintiffs complaint, consisting of 43 pages of detailed factual allegations and legal conclusions, does not allege that these defendants’ conduct was “under color of any statute ... of any state.” ... Considering the applicable law and the facts pled in this case, the court finds that it could not grant relief to plaintiff under § 1983 under any reading of the facts. Accordingly, that claim is dismissed.

Section 1983 claims against fellow inmates are not cognizable without an allegation that they acted under color of state law or in conjunction with state actors.

Curry v. Farmer · filed 1993-08-18

Curry's claims against fellow inmates McCorn and Hatfield are not cognizable under Sec. 1983 because of the absence of an allegation of actions under color of state law or in conjunction with state actors.

A private individual may be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with city officials to deprive a person of constitutional rights.

Reitz v. Persing · filed 1993-08-25

Such factual allegations, if proven, would render Morgan culpable as a co-conspirator with city officials in violating plaintiffs civil rights. As such, plaintiffs § 1983 claim against Morgan is appropriate and his factual allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

An officer's on-duty status does not make a personal domestic shooting an act under color of state law when it is outside the officer's official duties.

Vincent v. City of Lexington · filed 1993-09-01

Although Officer Knick was on duty at the time these unfortunate events occurred, he was not acting within the scope of his official duties when he stopped by his house or when he shot his wife.

Under § 1983, allegations that a borough council president was cloaked with council authority can support an inference that his alleged discriminatory harassment occurred under color of state law.

Palace v. Deaver · filed 1993-12-03

We likewise read paragraphs 6, 7, 9, 11,13 and 24 of the amended complaint together and find that given the averments that Deaver was at all relevant times a member and President of Darby Borough Council, he was sufficiently cloaked with authority from Borough Council as to justify an inference that he was acting under color of state authority when he undertook the actions alleged, in the amended complaint. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied as to the § 1983 claims.

City officials acting deliberately in their official capacities act under color of state law under Section 1983 even when the city performs a proprietary function.

Gentry v. Lee's Summit, Missouri · filed 1993-12-03

No similar distinction exists in other areas of constitutional law, and the Supreme Court has clearly articulated a rejection of such a view for purposes of Sec. 1983. See West, 487 U.S. at 49-57, 108 S.Ct. at 2255-2260. Accordingly, we find that the City officials, as employees of the City acting deliberately and in their official capacities, were acting under color of state law for purposes of Sec. 1983.

City officials act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when acting deliberately in their official capacities, even when performing a proprietary function.

Gentry v. Lee's Summit · filed 1993-12-03

No similar distinction exists in other areas of constitutional law, and the Supreme Court has clearly articulated a rejection of such a view for purposes of § 1983. ... Accordingly, we find that the City officials, as employees of the City acting deliberately and in their official capacities, were acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an officer to act with actual or pretended state authority; purely private conduct does not satisfy its color-of-law requirement.

Pitchell v. James F. Callan, Gregory Sargis and City of Hartford, David J. Lesser and Steven Del Sole, Special M · filed 1994-01-03

Unlike in a negligence action, the focus of inquiry in the instant case is not on the standard of care used by the officers but rather on whether there was an abuse or misuse of a power conferred upon them by state authority. If Callan was not acting with actual or pretended authority, he was not acting under color of law, and his actions were not state actions.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Lisa A. Johnson, D.D.S. v. Home Savings of America, Fsb Serrano Reconveyance Co. City of Hayward · filed 1994-01-12

Moreover, because Johnson failed to allege that Home acted under color of state law, she failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional claim against a private party that assists a state actor in the challenged deprivation.

AIDS Action Committee of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 1994-01-25

The parties agree that the MBTA is a state actor. Because PTD assisted the MBTA in denying ad space to AAC’s advertisements, AAC may bring this constitutional claim against both.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law; action under color of federal law does not satisfy that requirement.

Pascucci v. R.W. Sharn, Case Manager, Federal Prison Camp (Fpc) Sheridan, Oregon, in His Individual and Official · filed 1994-02-01

Pascucci's Complaint did not allege Scharn acted under color of state law. Additionally, Scharn's Declaration clearly reflects that at all times relevant he acted under color of federal law. Pascucci offered no evidence to the contrary. Pascucci's claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not reach a political party’s internal endorsement decision when the party is not exercising authority delegated by the state.

Valenti v. Pennsylvania Democratic State Committee · filed 1994-02-02

We reject the plaintiffs position. As we have noted, regardless of who becomes the endorsed candidate, the plaintiff remains on the ballot and can campaign to win the primary. This type of indirect influence on the election is too remote to justify imposing limitations on the party’s right to conduct its internal affairs. Moreover, and most significantly, it does not arise from any state action, such as the state’s delegation of authority in the primary election cases.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff for a proceeding he lacked authority to institute or prosecute when the district attorney brought it and a judge issued the restraining order.

ACCREDITED SUR. & CAS. v. McElveen · filed 1994-02-02

Sheriff McElveen had no authority to either institute or prosecute a proceeding under La.C.Cr.P. art. 321 and, under the circumstances, did not act "under color of state law" to deprive Accredited of any of its rights, privileges etc. secured by the Constitution.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a private defendant acted under color of state law and exercised powers traditionally exclusive to the State.

Myers, Smith & Granady, Inc. v. New York Property Insurance Underwriting Ass'n · filed 1994-02-08

Finally, the IAS Court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs cross motion seeking leave to amend the complaint to add a cause of action for deprivation of property without due process premised upon 42 USC § 1983, where, as here, plaintiffs conclusory allegations in the complaint are insufficient to establish that the alleged violations of fair claims practices were committed under "color of State law” and that the defendant exercised powers that are traditionally ... the exclusive prerogative of the State (Miriam P. v City of New York, 163 AD2d 39, 41, lv denied sub nom. Paredes v City of New York, 76 NY2d 712).

Section 1983 requires a constitutional violation committed by a state official acting under color of state law.

Bolivar v. Director of the FBI · filed 1994-02-14

Since claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can only be asserted for constitutional violations committed by state officials under color of state law, the jurisdictional basis alleged in the original petition was fatally flawed.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private doctor’s disclosures outside the state’s involuntary confinement law cannot be attributed to the state.

Jensen v. Robert S. Gould, M.D. · filed 1994-02-14

However, these acts fall outside the California statute allowing for involuntary confinement. Gould's acts thus cannot be ascribed to the state. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 940; Collins, 878 F.2d at 1152-53. Accordingly, the district court properly determined that Jensen failed to show that Gould acted under color of state law regarding these claims.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations of agreement with state actors to treat a public defender as acting under color of state law through a conspiracy.

Hunt v. Bennett · filed 1994-02-18

Because Hunt’s conclusory allegations of conspiracy between Manter, Sublette, and the state actors are unsupported by facts, Hunt has failed to demonstrate that Manter and Sublette acted “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private person whose actions were not under color of state law.

Koch v. Mirza · filed 1994-02-18

With respect to defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs other claims, their motion to dismiss defendant Smith’s cross-claim for indemnity, and Magistrate Judge Foschio’s recommendation that the complaint be dismissed as to defendants Smith and Swearingen, based on the Court’s review of the Report and Recommendation and the submissions of the parties, and no objections having been timely filed, the Court grants these motions and adopts these proposed findings for the reasons set forth in the Report and Recommendation. ... Smith, acting as a private citizen, can not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as any action by him was not made under color of state law.

Section 1983 applies to conduct under color of state law and does not provide a claim against persons acting under color of federal law.

Jones v. United States · filed 1994-03-01

We have held, as noted by the district court, that the statute is inapplicable when a person acts under color of federal law.

A private party’s conclusory allegations of conspiracy with state judges, unsupported by facts, do not satisfy Section 1983’s color of state law requirement.

Hickey v. Robert B. Hollister, Oxley, Malone, Fitzgerald & Hollister · filed 1994-03-02

In sum, Hickey's conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim under Sec. 1983's color of state law requirement.

Section 1983 does not make private parties liable for joint action solely among themselves without an agreement with a state actor.

Cinel v. Harry F. Connick, Individually and as District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana · filed 1994-03-11

Without an agreement between private and state actors, any possible joint action involving only private parties is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim for coworker harassment by a state official when the abuse is related to authority or duties conferred by the state.

Anthony v. County of Sacramento, Sheriff's Department · filed 1994-03-15

A state official may be liable for coworker harassment under section 1983 when the abuse is related to state-conferred authority or duties—the same test that applies when the victim is not a state employee.

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant acted under color of state law; without that proof, the claim fails.

John M. Lekan, Dba Lekan Enterprises, Dba Lekan Oil & Gas Company v. American Energy Services, Inc. · filed 1994-03-18

The district court held that Lekan failed to offer any proof that AES acted under color of state law. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). Therefore, the district court reasoned, Lekan failed to satisfy the prima facie requirements of a Sec. 1983 claim. ... Upon de novo review, see EEOC v. University of Detroit, 904 F.2d 331, 334 (6th Cir.1990), we find no error. Accordingly, the district court order dated September 20, 1993, granting defendant AES's motion for summary judgment is hereby affirmed for the reasons set forth therein.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law; a private restaurant and its employees are not liable absent a basis to attribute their conduct to the state.

Robertson v. Burger King, Inc. · filed 1994-04-05

Plaintiff has not shown, nor can the Court ascertain, any basis for finding that the defendants were acting under color of state law. Furthermore, plaintiff has not shown that the actions of Burger King or its employees are such that such actions can be appropriately attributed to the State.

A § 1983 complaint sufficiently alleges the color-of-state-law element when it alleges that a person acting under color of state law committed the challenged conduct.

Smith v. Town of East Lyme, No. 527383 (Apr. 5, 1994) · filed 1994-04-05

Construing the plaintiff's complaint in a manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency, the court finds that the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged conduct committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 treats alleged constitutional deprivations by a college belonging to a state-created junior college district as acts under color of law.

Knapp v. Junior College District of St. Louis County · filed 1994-04-26

Additionally, the Junior College District, within which St. Louis Community College at Meramec belongs, was created and exists according to Missouri statutes, Chapter 178 RSMo (1986). Therefore, the alleged Constitutional deprivations by the college were governmental acts done under color of law.

A § 1983 claim against local officers alleged to have acted under color of law has an arguable basis when the identified state remedy reaches only the State.

Eaton v. Don Farmer Bill Rutherford · filed 1994-04-26

The Tennessee Claims Commission statute Sec. 9-8-301, T.C.A., provides a possible remedy against the State but would not provide a remedy against local officials. The District Court's reliance on this statute and Smith v. Rose, 760 F.2d 102 (6th Cir.1985), appears misplaced because the defendants are local officers and the wrongs alleged were committed by local officers under color of law.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Pattillo v. Michael Singer, Susan N. Wasko · filed 1994-04-28

Initially, we note that while the complaint alleges a conspiracy to violate Pattillos' civil rights, it fails to state a claim under section 1983 because it does not allege that any of the defendants acted under color of state law.

An attorney representing a prisoner in a state habeas proceeding is not a state actor under § 1983 based on that representation.

David Lee Prince, Jr. v. Haley · filed 1994-05-04

After giving Prince an opportunity to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed as frivolous, the district court concluded that Haley was not a state actor under Sec. 1983. We agree.

Section 1983 may reach a private party for a taking when the state encouraged or compelled the conduct, the party performed an exclusively governmental function, or the party became an instrumentality of state power.

Pepper v. J.J. Welcome Construction Co. · filed 1994-05-06

A court may find state action if (1) the state affirmatively supported, encouraged or compelled the actionable conduct, or (2) the private party was performing a function traditionally and exclusively performed by the sovereign, or (3) the private party by his conduct became an instrumentality of state power.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a discrimination claim fails without evidence or an allegation of that element.

Ladson v. Ulltra East Parking Corp. · filed 1994-05-10

There is no evidence nor allegation before the Court indicating any basis for a finding that the discrimination alleged on the part of Defendants was conducted under color of state law. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to the § 1983 count.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a federal agent acting in a federal capacity is outside its reach.

Brown v. Quigley · filed 1994-05-19

Although plaintiff is a state prisoner, he names as the defendant responsible for his alleged constitutional injury, a federal agent. Therefore, this action does not present a claim under § 1983 as the defendant does not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private actor does not meet that requirement merely by relying on a federal statute.

Tommy Land, Cross-Appellee v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union (Independent) Health and Welfar · filed 1994-05-26

As the lower court indicated, that argument has no legal basis because it would mean that any private actor who relies on a federal statute acts under color of state law for section 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 does not treat a private accreditation organization as acting under color of state law merely because it contracts to inspect and accredit a state prison.

Jensen v. Zuern · filed 1994-05-31

ACA’s contract to provide accreditation services to the penitentiary does not render its conduct under color of state law, and Jensen’s claim that he was somehow a third-party beneficiary of that contract is meritless.

Private parties can be liable under Section 1983 if they willfully participate in a conspiracy with the state or its agents.

Slagel v. Shell Oil Refinery · filed 1994-06-07

Shell Oil Refinery, Dr. Michael H. Ralph, and Renee and Dr. Adolf Lo are all private parties, not state actors, and cannot be subject to Sec. 1983 liability unless they willfully participate in a conspiracy with the state or its agents.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to have acted under color of state law or conspired with state officials.

Simeona v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 1994-06-08

Here, first, Simeona fails to show that defendants acted under color of state law or conspired with state officials when they prevented Simeona and his companion from boarding their scheduled flight.

Private physicians and hospitals that involuntarily admit a patient under a permissive state mental health statute do not thereby act under color of state law for § 1983.

Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hospital · filed 1994-06-16

In other words, we must decide whether private physicians and a private Hospital who “admit” a mentally disturbed person pursuant to the Massachusetts statute act under color of state law. ... We find that they do not and hence, they are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law; a bare allegation is insufficient.

Anderson v. Penza · filed 1994-06-16

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, Anderson must allege that: (1) a person or persons acting under color of state law, (2) deprived Anderson of some right secured by the Constitution or federal laws. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Here, the defendants are private parties, and Anderson failed to allege any facts supporting his bare allegation that the defendants acted under color of state law in committing the conduct at issue.

Section 1983 does not cover claims against federal officers acting under color of federal law rather than state law.

Causey v. United States · filed 1994-06-24

Despite Causey's arguments to the contrary, because IRS Officer Tousley was acting under color of federal law, not state law, the district court properly characterized Causey's action as one under Bivens.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a volunteer fire company that is not a state actor.

Mark v. Borough of Hatboro · filed 1994-06-30

In conclusion, I hold that the Enterprise Fire Company is not a state actor, and therefore cannot be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches an officer’s conduct under color of law only when it relates to an official duty and arises in circumstances calling for state intervention.

Hudson v. Maxey · filed 1994-07-01

In order for liability to attach, the action alleged by the plaintiff to be “under color of law” must be pursuant to some official duty or function of the officer and the factual context must be one which might reasonably be expected to require the intervention of the state through one of its agencies.

To survive summary judgment on a § 1983 claim against private defendants, a plaintiff must produce affirmative evidence that they deprived him of a federal constitutional right while acting under color of state law.

Worrall ex rel. Worrall v. Irwin · filed 1994-07-01

In order for Irwin’s § 1983 claims to survive the motions for summary judgment, Irwin must produce affirmative evidence indicating that Mr. Worrall and the third-party defendants deprived him of a federal constitutional right while acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 permits liability for a private actor who acts under color of state law or jointly engages with government officials, including by willfully participating in a conspiracy to deprive someone of civil rights.

Freedman v. Coppola · filed 1994-07-15

In order to establish section 1983 liability on the part of defendant, a private actor, plaintiff must show that defendant acted under color of State law or otherwise jointly engaged with government officials in the prohibited action; it is sufficient to establish that defendant willfully participated with State actors in a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights (see generally, Adickes v Kress & Co., 398 US 144, 151-152; United States v Price, 383 US 787, 794).

A public defender acting as criminal defense counsel is not liable under § 1983 for that work, but may be liable if the defender conspires with state officials.

Marvin J. Gregory Judy A. Gregory v. Dennis R. Scott Charles A. Baechler · filed 1994-07-18

A public defender "performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding" does not act under color of state law and cannot be liable under section 1983. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Nevertheless, a public defender who conspires with state officials does act under color of state law and may be liable.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Lichtor v. Missouri Board of Registration for the Healing Arts · filed 1994-07-19

However, Lichtor has failed to allege that Ketcherside acted under color of state law which is a necessary element to establish liability in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against defendants whose alleged conduct was not under color of state law.

Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co. · filed 1994-07-27

The defendants as described in the Complaint clearly have not acted “under color of state law,” and they therefore are not subject to a section 1983 suit.

Section 1983 permits a claim against local officials when the alleged misconduct was carried out in their governmental capacities.

McBride v. Village of Michiana · filed 1994-07-28

Accordingly, when all of the allegations are viewed in a light that is most favorable to McBride, it is our conclusion that the Defendants were acting in their capacities as Village officials. Given the sympathetic construction that is necessary when evaluating a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), we find that McBride has asserted sufficient allegations to support a viable claim under Sec. 1983.

A correctional officer acts under color of state law under § 1983 when he abuses authority conferred by his position.

Cardenas v. Skillings · filed 1994-08-01

An abuse of that authority is an action taken under color of state law.

A section 1983 claim against public defenders requires allegations that they conspired with state actors.

Bieros v. Nicola · filed 1994-08-05

However, as Plaintiff fails to allege that these public defenders conspired with any state actors, the section 1983 claim against these defendants must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to have acted under color of state law; unsupported allegations of conspiracy with a state actor do not suffice.

Knight v. Knight · filed 1994-08-10

Here, Pierren is a private party and was not otherwise acting under color of state law. See Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 624. Furthermore, Knight failed to allege any facts to support a claim that Pierren conspired with a state actor. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1048. Thus, Knight failed to state a section 1983 claim against Pierren.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing federal military officials to plead and prove that they acted under color of state law.

McDonald v. Resor · filed 1994-08-10

McDonald failed to plead and prove that the defendants (past and present employees of the United States Department of Defense and Department of the Army) acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when an alleged municipal policy uses regulatory authority under color of state law to interfere with a federally protected right.

Falcon Associates, Inc. v. City of O'Fallon · filed 1994-08-11

Therefore, plaintiff has alleged that the purpose underlying the policy is interference in the bargaining process, which constitutes a claim that the defendant was acting in the capacity of a regulator, which is an action taken under the color of state law.

Private parties act under color of state law for § 1983 when they willfully participate with state officials in depriving others of constitutional rights.

Lysiak v. Town of Lowell, Indiana · filed 1994-08-12

Private parties act under color of state law for purposes of Sec. 1983 when they willfully participate with state officials in depriving others of constitutional rights. ... The district court properly granted summary judgment to the Noerenbergs on Lysiak's Sec. 1983 claims because they did not act under color of state law.

A § 1983 complaint against a private defendant must allege sufficient facts showing that the defendant acted in concert with a state actor to commit an unconstitutional or unlawful act.

Scheiner v. Wallace · filed 1994-08-16

In other words, the complaint must allege sufficient facts demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the State actor to commit an unconstitutional or unlawful act.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have sufficient state authority to be subject to suit.

Stewart v. Westside Eastside Child Care Centers Association · filed 1994-08-17

Further, Stewart cannot proceed with his Sec. 1983 claims because the defendant is not cloaked with sufficient state authority to render it subject to suit.

Section 1983 requires sufficient facts showing that an official acted under color of state law with respect to the challenged conduct; sharing a tenant list with federal agencies alone does not establish authority over federal housing projects.

Comer v. Cisneros · filed 1994-08-26

We conclude that the BMHA plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that Higgins has acted under color of state law with respect to the federal projects. The fact that Higgins shares a tenant list with the federal agencies is not enough to demonstrate that Higgins had authority over these projects.