42 U.S.C. § 1983

A municipal-liability claim under Section 1983 is sufficiently pleaded when specific police acts or omissions support an inference of a policy or custom of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.

D'Elia v. City of New Britain, No. Cv89-0365279s (Dec. 6, 1993) · filed 1993-12-06

It has been held that some degree of specificity is required in the pleading of a custom or policy on the part of a municipality. The plaintiffs in the present case have alleged in their statement of facts a series of acts and omissions on the part of the defendant police officers and police department. "From this particularized pleading a pattern emerges that evidences deliberate indifference on the part of the police department." This raises an inference of "custom" or "policy" on the part of the police department. ... The court finds that the plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to indicate that the omissions of the police were sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to the rights of Paul D'Elia.

Section 1983 provides relief for violations of federal rights under color of law but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy · filed 2000-01-25

Because “Section 1983 itself does not create any substantive rights, but merely provides relief against those who, acting under the color of law, violate federal rights created elsewhere,” Reynolds v. School Dist. No. 1, 69 F.3d 1523, 1536 (10th Cir.1995), I dismiss the fourth claim against all Defendants.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal and constitutional rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Carney v. City of Shawnee, Kansas · filed 1998-10-09

Unlike Title VII, section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but rather creates a remedy for violations of federal and constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides a private action for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights by someone acting under color of state law, but creates no substantive rights itself.

Division of Family Services v. Cheryl B. · filed 1998-08-06

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights. Rather, it provides a procedural mechanism whereby an individual can assert a private right of action against someone who, while acting under the color of state law, violated that individual’s rights secured by the Federal Constitution or federal law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights created by the Constitution or federal law but creates no rights itself.

Morse v. Lower Merion School District · filed 1997-12-23

By itself, Section 1983 does not create any rights, but provides a remedy for violations of those rights created by the Constitution or federal law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights by state actors, but does not itself create substantive rights or confer jurisdiction.

Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger · filed 1996-11-22

Section 1983 does not function as a jurisdictional provision or create substantive federal rights but merely offers a remedy through which plaintiffs may vindicate those federal rights enumerated elsewhere in the face of interference by a state actor.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for rights created or protected by federal law but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Henderson v. Romer · filed 1996-02-20

Section 1983 neither confers substantive rights nor protects anyone against anything. It only provides a remedy to enforce or vindicate rights otherwise created or protected by federal law.

Section 1983 allows enforcement of rights created elsewhere but does not itself create property rights.

Andreucci v. City of New Haven · filed 1996-02-09

For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not create property rights; it merely allows enforcement of rights created elsewhere.

Section 1983 provides remedies for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights but creates no substantive rights itself.

Maniaci v. Michael D. Schwartz, Connie K. Dubois, and Edna Miller · filed 1995-12-19

There is some indication that the district court was under the impression that Sec. 1983 itself created such a right, but, as we have pointed out, Sec. 1983 only creates remedies for violation of constitutional provisions or federal laws and itself creates no substantive rights.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights arising from other sources but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Urban Ex Rel. Urban v. Jefferson County School District R-1 · filed 1994-12-03

It is axiomatic that § 1983 creates no substantive rights, but only a remedy for violation of rights originating from other sources. ... Because there is no underlying violation of the statutory rights of Plaintiff here, there can be no violation of § 1983.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; it provides a remedy for violations of pre-existing rights.

Vernazarro v. Collins · filed 1994-03-11

Neither the Federal nor State statute relied on create any new substantive rights. Both statutes are procedural in nature and seek to afford a remedy based upon violation of pre-existing rights.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of an independently secured federal right and does not create substantive rights.

St. Pierre v. Town of Dartmouth · filed 1993-07-06

Section 1983 is a remedial statute. It does not create any substantive rights.

Section 1983 supplies a remedy for deprivation of a right secured by federal law or the Constitution but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Triad Associates, Inc. v. Chicago Housing Authority · filed 1990-02-15

Section 1983, however, does not by itself confer any substantive rights. Rather, it is a remedial provision to be employed only in the event of the deprivation of some right, privilege, or immunity guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 enforces existing constitutional rights but creates no independent substantive constitutional rights or separate claim for relief.

Rosa R. v. Connelly · filed 1989-11-09

It is fundamental, however, that Sec. 1983 creates no independent, substantive constitutional rights but rather is a vehicle for enforcing such rights. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1915-16, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979). The district court thus properly concluded that plaintiffs' "fourth cause of action" did not constitute an independent claim or ground for relief.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; it provides access to court to vindicate rights guaranteed by the Constitution or other federal statutes.

Privette v. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill · filed 1989-11-07

§ 1983, a federal statute, “creates no substantive rights; it only provides for access to the courts to vindicate those rights already guaranteed by the Constitution or other federal statutes.”.

Section 1983 relief should return plaintiffs to the position they would have occupied absent the violation of their rights.

City of Huntsville v. Biles · filed 1986-02-14

The proper remedy under § 1983, however, is to return the plaintiffs to the position in which they would have been if the violation of their rights had not occurred.

Section 1983 supplies a remedy for violations of federal law but does not itself create substantive rights.

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1357 v. Hawaiian Telephone Co. · filed 1986-01-28

Hawtel also apparently alleges the violation of its “rights” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This claim is meritless. Section 1983 merely authorizes a remedy for federal law violations, and does not confer any substantive rights.

Section 1983 provides redress for violations of federal rights but does not create the underlying substantive rights.

Suess Builders Co. v. City of Beaverton · filed 1986-01-29

USC § 1983 (1982) provides a means for civil redress of a violation of federal rights. It does not create those substantive rights.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights and only supplies remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.

Habersham at Northridge v. Fulton County, Ga. · filed 1985-07-26

As has often been noted, section 1983 creates no substantive rights but merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; it supplies a remedy for violations of rights secured by the Constitution and federal law.

Kirchberg v. Joan Paillot Feenstra, Defendant-Third-Party v. David C. Treen and State of Louisiana, Third-Party · filed 1983-07-05

Section 1983 confers no substantive rights, but merely provides a remedy for the violation of rights secured under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 creates a remedy for violations of substantive rights guaranteed by the Constitution; it does not itself provide substantive rights.

Village of Arlington Heights, Etc. v. Regional Transportation Authority, Etc. · filed 1981-07-09

This principle also operates to bar plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because “§ 1983 does not provide any substantive rights at all” but merely creates a remedy for the violation of substantive rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Section 1983 provides no basis for claims premised on statutes that create no substantive rights.

Lloyd v. Illinois Regional Transportation Authority · filed 1982-09-30

Because neither § 16 of the UMT Act nor § 165(b) of the FAH Act create substantive rights that can be enforced through § 1983, it is clear that those statutes provide no basis for the § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights and supplies a remedy only for violations of the Constitution or substantive federal statutes.

Flowers v. Webb · filed 1983-12-06

This court is cognizant of the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide substantive rights, but merely serves to provide a remedy for violations of the Constitution or substantive statutes.

Section 1983 is a procedural vehicle for redressing violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights, not itself a source of substantive rights, so a plaintiff must first establish an underlying constitutional or statutory violation to state a claim under it.

St. Louis Developmental Disabilities Treatment Center Parents Ass'n v. Mallory · filed 1984-08-08

Section 1983 does not provide any substantive rights of its own. It is procedural in nature, designed to assure that an aggrieved individual has a vehicle by which to redress constitutional violations or the violation of certain federal statutes. ... Without the finding of an applicable statutory violation or a constitutional violation Section 1983 does not create a right of action.

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights but merely provides a remedy for violations of federal rights established elsewhere, so an implied cause of action directly under the Constitution is unavailable wherever section 1983 supplies a remedy.

Braintree Baptist Temple v. Holbrook Public Schools · filed 1984-09-18

Plaintiffs’ characterization of that statute as an independent source of substantive rights is inaccurate. ... Rather, § 1983 provides the remedy for the violations of plaintiffs’ civil rights alleged in the other counts of the complaint; indeed, where § 1983 provides a remedy an implied cause of action grounded on the Constitution is not available.

Section 1983 supplies a remedy for vindicating independently secured federal rights but does not itself create substantive rights.

Craine v. Alexander · filed 1985-03-25

Additionally, § 1983 is not a source of substantive federal rights but a remedy provided for their vindication.

Section 1983 supplies a remedy rather than substantive rights, so a plaintiff must identify an independent federal right and cannot rely merely on violation of a federal statute.

New York Airlines, Inc. v. Dukes County · filed 1985-12-04

It is clear that § 1983 is an exclusively remedial statute and does not itself give rise to any substantive rights. ... In order for the remedy provided by § 1983 to be available, a party must establish the violation of a federal right independent of § 1983. The violation of a federal statute, by itself, is insufficient to give rise to a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 supplies a remedy for constitutional or federal statutory rights violated through a state official's abuse of office but creates no substantive rights itself.

Doe v. Coughlin · filed 1986-07-15

That statute affords a remedy in the form of an action at law or other proceeding ... where a party has been deprived of constitutional rights, privileges or immunities by a State official’s abuse of his position. It is not a source of substantive rights, but rather, was enacted as a vehicle to ensure that rights obtained through the United States Constitution or Federal statutes are enforced ... .

Section 1983 provides remedies for violations of rights established elsewhere but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Eftekhara v. Illinois Department of Children & Family Services · filed 1987-06-03

Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights which may be violated; it merely provides remedies for deprivation of rights established elsewhere.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights and provides a remedy only for deprivations of federal rights established elsewhere.

Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hospital · filed 1987-09-08

It is well established that section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it merely provides a remedy for deprivations of federal rights established elsewhere.

Section 1983 provides judicial relief for violations of substantive federal rights but creates no substantive constitutional rights of its own.

Wal-Juice Bar, Inc. v. Elliott · filed 1990-04-05

Federal claim (4) is really not a claim at all, since section 1983 provides judicial relief but does not itself establish substantial constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides judicial relief for substantive federal violations but does not itself create substantive constitutional rights.

Wal-Juice Bar, Inc. v. Elliott · filed 1990-05-21

Federal claim (4) is really not a claim at all, since section 1983 provides judicial relief but does not itself establish substantial constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere and does not create substantive rights of its own.

Kocienski v. City of Bayonne · filed 1991-02-22

To the extent that counsel for plaintiff has attempted to state a separate cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is pertinent to note that Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but only provides a remedy for a deprivation of rights established elsewhere.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal statutory or constitutional rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Eva TRUJILLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GRAND JUNCTION REGIONAL CENTER and William Jackson, Defendants-Appellees · filed 1991-03-25

Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights but rather “creates only a remedy for violations of rights secured by federal statutory and constitutional law.”

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of statutory and constitutional rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Britt v. Grocers Supply Co., Inc. · filed 1992-12-09

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but was designed to provide a remedy for violations of other statutory as well as constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides a right of action for violations of statutory or constitutional rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

McGregor v. Louisiana State University Board of Supervisors · filed 1993-09-24

These civil rights statutes do not create substantive rights, but provide a right of action for violation of his statutory and constitutional rights. ... We have already affirmed the district judge’s grant of summary judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claims and due process claims, so that these rights cannot form the basis of his §§ 1983, 1985, or 1988 claims.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; it authorizes a cause of action for deprivation of civil rights guaranteed by other laws.

Sachdev v. Good · filed 1994-10-03

Section Í983 creates no substantive rights. Rather, §1983 authorizes a cause of action based on the deprivation of civil rights guaranteed by other legislative acts.

Section 1983 provides a way to obtain relief for violations of existing federal rights but does not itself create those rights.

Atlanta School of Kayaking, Inc. v. Douglasville-Douglas County Water & Sewer Authority · filed 1997-04-25

Section 1983 does not create constitutional or other federal rights; instead, it provides plaintiffs with a method for securing relief for violations of already established federal rights.

Section 1983 provides a way to vindicate federal rights but does not itself create substantive rights.

Colson v. Grohman · filed 1999-06-07

It is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for federal civil rights claims against a municipality.

Homere v. Inc. Vill. of Hempstead · filed 2018-03-22

As Magistrate Judge Tomlinson correctly noted, although the complaint fails to invoke 18 U.S.C. § 1983, that statute provides the authority to bring these claims against the Village. The Court, like Magistrate Judge Tomlinson, will therefore review the complaint and R&R as though plaintiffs had invoked Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law that involve no federally secured right.

Ruman v. Com. of Pa., Dept. of Revenue · filed 1979-01-08

A violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Law, Act of December 17,1968, P.L. 1224, §§ 2(4)(vii), (ix) and xvii), 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(vii, ix, and xvii) does not give rise to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as it is a state law claim involving no federally secured right.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of a constitutional or statutory right; an election error without purposeful discrimination or a protected right to error-free administration does not establish such a deprivation.

Powell v. Power · filed 1970-12-23

The plaintiffs invoke the first section of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S. C. § 1983, as a second Congressional authorization for the federal courts to remedy errors in the election process. This concededly broadly-drafted statute provides a remedy against “[e]very person who, under color of any statute * * * subjects * * * any citizen of the United States * * * to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” ... These claims do not require extended consideration. Uneven or erroneous application of an otherwise valid statute constitutes a denial of equal protection only if it represents “intentional or purposeful discrimination.” ... Similarly, the due process clause and article I, section 2 offer no guarantee against errors in the administration of an election.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy only when the plaintiff was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Flemming v. Adams · filed 1966-05-02

The Civil Rights Acts protect rights guaranteed to citizens by the laws or Constitution of the United States. Plaintiff’s sole contention here is that she has been deprived of the “right to an education.” No decision is offered to support the contention that the federal Constitution guarantees a right to an education, nor are facts presented which in any way reveal how defendants’ alleged acts worked to completely deprive plaintiff of “an education.” The alleged facts reveal no discrimination against this plaintiff amounting to a deprivation of her federally-protected rights to due process and equal protection of the law. The Colorado State Board of Education promulgated a ruling that chiropractors did not qualify as licensed physicians under certain regulations of the Board. The fact that such ruling adversely affected plaintiff’s application for special education and was later declared void does not support plaintiff’s allegations of violation of federally-protected rights. Nor do conclusionary allegations of conspiracy and malice, unsupported by any factual allegations, afford any basis for inferring discrimination or other equal protection violations.

Section 1983 requires action under color of law and deprivation of a federally protected right; merely acting under a state license is not state action.

Van Daele v. Vinci · filed 1968-12-23

The allegations fail to state a cause of action under these statutes on several grounds. First, the defendants did not act under color of law, required expressly by § 1983 and held applicable also to § 1985(3). ... Merely acting under a state license is not state action within the context of the civil rights acts. ... Secondly, the plaintiff has not been deprived of any federally protected right, as required by the civil rights acts. ... Count Three, therefore, also fails to establish a basis for this court’s jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not provide relief when the challenged state-court procedure has not deprived the plaintiff of due process or another protected federal right.

Melikian v. Avent · filed 1969-06-09

Plaintiff’s argument that the Mississippi Justice of the Peace Courts are unconstitutional and that he was deprived of rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed to him by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958) must fail when considered in the light of the facts of this case.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for ordinary negligence that does not deny a constitutional or federally protected right.

Nettles v. Alfred T. Rundle, Warden and Arthur T. Prasse, Commissioner of Prisons · filed 1971-12-08

While such negligence is a tort, cognizable under state law, it does not amount to such a denial of a constitutional or federally protected right as can be redressed under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 provides a claim for recovery when state jail officials violate a prisoner's federally protected rights, including by retaliating against the prisoner for filing a state-court action.

Christman v. Skinner · filed 1972-10-30

If this were shown, Christman would establish a violation of his federally protected rights and thus a claim for recovery against defendants under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows federal relief for prison-authority actions that deprive a person of federally protected rights.

Holland v. Connors · filed 1974-03-22

Certainly, the charges that prison authorities coerced a false eonfession, placed an unwarranted statement relating to a homosexual offense in plaintiff’s file and improperly imposed heightened confinement in administrative segregation, if true, would amount to such deprivation of federally protected rights as to form an ample predicate for federal relief under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a claim when the alleged misconduct did not impair the plaintiff's right to a fair trial or another federally protected right.

Christman v. Edward v. Hanrahan · filed 1974-07-18

We therefore hold that the failure to allege any facts disclosing an impairment of plaintiff’s right to a fair trial, or the impairment of any other federally protected right, is fatal to plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 imposes liability only when conduct under color of state law deprives a person of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws; a violation of state-law due process alone is insufficient.

Hill v. Ford · filed 1978-02-22

That section provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” ... It is arguable that Mr. Hill might, with the above proof, show that he was deprived by the defendants of due process of Tennessee law; but, due process of Tennessee law, in so far as it is not identical with federal due process, is not secured to the plaintiff Mr. Hill by the federal Constitution or laws.

Section 1983 requires a claim to allege deprivation of a federally protected right, meaning a right secured by the Constitution, federal law, or a state-law entitlement recognized as a Fourteenth Amendment due-process right.

United States ex rel. Frisbee v. Rapone · filed 1978-04-26

Specifically, that statute requires us to locate a federally protected right of petitioner’s which has been violated as a predicate for his civil rights action. Section 1983 protects against the deprivation of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Therefore, petitioner’s claim must allege a violation of (a) a right secured by the United States Constitution; or (b) a right secured by a federal statute; or (c) a right secured by a state statute or by common law which may be deemed an “entitlement,” and hence a 14th Amendment due process right under the federal Constitution.

Section 1983 provides redress only when state officials violate a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Rhodes v. Schoen · filed 1978-04-27

We affirm the district court opinion on the grounds that the undisputed facts do not demonstrate a violation of a right secured by the United States Constitution and laws, for which redress is provided under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law; a state-law tort by public officials is not enough.

Victor Havas and Arlene Havas v. Thornton · filed 1979-12-26

It is well settled that in order to recover under either § 1983 or § 1985(3) it is necessary to allege facts showing a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that merely because the acts are performed by public officials, a state-law tort claim is not thereby transmuted into one for the deprivation of rights secured under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal remedy for an injury unless the plaintiff's asserted interest is protected by the Constitution or federal law.

Gordon Junior College Chapter of the American Ass'n of University Professors v. Board of Regents of the University Syste · filed 1980-02-21

Not every injury inflicted by an agent of state or local government may be redressed in federal court under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil-rights claim for an ordinary state condemnation proceeding when the property owners challenge only valuation and consequential damages.

Jackson v. Department of Transportation · filed 1981-07-01

We perceive the taking in this case to be no more than an ordinary legal action by the DOT to condemn private property in accordance with the condemnation statutes of this state. We have difficulty converting this procedure into a civil rights’ violation. Appellants raised no legal objection to the propriety of that taking, contesting only the value of the property taken and consequential damages.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a public employee's termination absent deprivation of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest.

Johnson v. City Council of Green Forest, Ark. · filed 1982-03-25

In short, what the cases say is that a public employee who is terminated by a public employer, absent a property right in his employment, has no federally protected right for which he is entitled to a remedy simply by reason of the termination.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for deprivations of federally protected rights and does not make violations of a merely procedural prison grievance right actionable absent a substantive liberty interest.

Azeez v. DeRobertis · filed 1982-11-02

Section 1983, by its very terms, applies only to deprivations of federally protected rights. ... Thus, it does not provide a remedy for deprivations of state protected rights. ... For this reason, plaintiff’s state constitutional claims do not state a claim for relief under § 1983. ... But the grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates. Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment. Thus, the Board’s failure to process plaintiff’s grievances as required by A.R. 845 is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for a deprivation of a right protected by the Constitution or federal law; a plaintiff lacking a protected liberty or property interest cannot maintain a due-process claim under it.

Crim v. Harrison · filed 1982-12-13

Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore must present a claim of deprivation of a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... Under these circumstances, we conclude there could have been no expectation or entitlement on the part of plaintiffs that Sharon Lynn would remain permanently in their home. We therefore conclude that plaintiffs have no liberty or property interests which are entitled due process protection under the fifth or fourteenth amendment.

A party with no state-law entitlement as an intended third-party beneficiary has no protected property interest on which to base a § 1983 due-process claim.

Coastland Corp. v. County of Currituck · filed 1984-05-11

Because Coastland is not a third party beneficiary, it has no basis in state law to claim a property interest in the liquidated damages and, thus, has no basis for a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 remedies only violations of constitutionally protected rights.

Gale v. Moore · filed 1984-06-13

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for violation of constitutionally-protected rights.

A § 1983 evidence-destruction claim fails without a protected property or liberty interest.

Spano v. McAvoy · filed 1984-06-15

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim fails for want of either a cognizable property or liberty interest in the destroyed evidence, the underlying civil lawsuit, or in any potential recovery.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a right secured by the United States Constitution, so a discharge that violates no constitutional right provides no cause of action.

Hamilton v. City of Wake Village · filed 1984-09-27

To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a right secured by the United States Constitution. ... Since Hamilton’s discharge did not violate the constitution, he has no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 plaintiff must show deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Brown v. Schweitzer · filed 1984-10-29

Plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must also be dismissed for failure to state a claim. In order to state a claim under § 1983 plaintiff must show that he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. ... Thus, plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federally protected right; conduct potentially actionable only under state law does not satisfy the statute.

Freeman v. Hittle · filed 1984-11-23

Although this contention may be actionable under state law, we find that Freeman does not show, as he must under § 1983, that he has been deprived of a federally protected right by reason of the officers’ alleged conduct.

Recovery under § 1983 requires proof that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Julien v. Meachum · filed 1985-01-30

Accordingly, the Court finds that one of the essential elements for recovery under Sec. 1983 is not extant herein. That is, the Plaintiff has not shown that the Defendant deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

A Section 1983 claimant must establish a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest.

Dominguez v. Babcock · filed 1985-02-04

In order to state a claim for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the claimant must establish the existence of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest.

An at-will municipal employee may pursue § 1983 relief for deprivation of wages already earned because the right to payment for completed work is a protected property interest regardless of any right to continued employment.

City of Brighton v. Gibson · filed 1987-01-16

Regardless of whether the employee’s job could be terminated at any time or whether she had the right to expect continued employment, the employee had the right to be paid for the twenty weeks that she did work. ... Under such circumstances we do not think that the trial court erred in concluding that the employee had shown an unconstitutional deprivation of her property interest under § 1983 and that she was entitled to attorney fees.

A state’s failure or inadequacy in providing police protection is not actionable under § 1983 because the Fourteenth Amendment generally imposes no affirmative duty to provide protective services.

Thompson v. Lancaster · filed 1987-02-05

Accordingly, a claim by a plaintiff that the state did not provide certain governmental services, or inadequately provided those services, and death ensued as a proximate result, would not be cognizable under section 1983 because the state had no constitutional obligation to provide these services. ... the Fourteenth Amendment does not create a duty upon the state to provide, for example, police protection.

An inmate has no constitutionally protected property or liberty interest in obtaining or retaining a particular prison job, so such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Pearson v. Brown · filed 1987-04-24

We must affirm the district court's dismissal because an inmate's expectation of obtaining or keeping a particular prison job does not amount to a property or liberty interest protected by the Constitution. ... Thus, plaintiff's claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and we affirm dismissal.

A prophylactic identification rule is not independently actionable under § 1983 absent violation of the underlying constitutional right to a fair trial.

Hensley v. Bernard Carey, Robert Stanley, Theodore Williams · filed 1987-07-16

The rule against admission of evidence from unnecessarily suggestive lineups is a prophylactic rule designed to protect a core right, that is the right to a fair trial, and it is only the violation of the core right and not the prophylactic rule that should be actionable under § 1983.

Absent a special custodial or other relationship, the state has no constitutional duty to protect a person from crime and its failure to do so is not actionable under § 1983.

Williams v. Fred Stone, Bob Jones, John R. Harman, R.E. Panosh · filed 1987-12-22

This Court has adopted the view that individuals have no constitutional right to be protected from crime and therefore the state's failure to provide this protection is not actionable under Sec. 1983 absent "some special custodial or other relationship[ ] created or assumed by the state in respect of particular persons."

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federally protected right; an inmate’s claim that prison transport was unsafe is not cognizable without an alleged injury or deprivation of such a right.

Castillo v. Bowles · filed 1988-04-08

Plaintiff has not alleged that the condition of the bus in which he was transported injured him in any way. At most Plaintiff has alleged that at some point in the future some inmate may be harmed because of the condition of the bus. Because Plaintiff has not alleged a deprivation of a protected right, his claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 gives users of federally funded bridges a private right of action against state officials to enforce the toll-free right in 23 U.S.C. § 301.

Clallam County v. Department of Transportation · filed 1988-06-14

Having fully considered the parties’ arguments, we conclude that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides an express right of action to enforce 23 U.S.C. § 301.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federally protected right; a violation of state law alone does not establish a claim.

Hankins v. Dallas Independent School District · filed 1988-08-31

To establish a cause of action under section 1983, Plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a federally protected right. It is not enough to allege violation of state law.

Section 1983 provides no remedy without colorable allegations of a federally protected right.

Thomas Ray Newsome, Jr. v. Patrick G. Baca, Individually and as Secretary, New Mexico Department of Labor · filed 1994-07-20

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy without colorable allegations of a federally protected right.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a federally guaranteed right to recover.

Hightower Ex Rel. Dehler v. Olmstead · filed 1996-09-30

§ 1983 requires articulation of a federally guaranteed right in order to recover.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of a federally protected right.

Mitchell v. City of Moore · filed 2000-07-11

Section 1983 and § 1985 claims share a common element: a plaintiff must show some deprivation of a federally protected right in order to be successful.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove that a federally protected right was violated.

Bowen v. Department of Human Services · filed 1992-04-17

In order to bring an action under § 1983 a plaintiff must prove that a federally protected right has been violated.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking relief for a constitutional violation to identify a constitutionally protected right.

Clayton v. Branson · filed 2005-06-07

Accordingly, identification of a constitutionally protected right is a prerequisite of plaintiffs right to sue under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federally protected right by a person acting under color of state law; an ordinary state law contract dispute does not suffice.

Muchler v. Greenwald · filed 2015-08-18

“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a person acting under color of state law engaged in conduct that violated a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” ... As the Magistrate Judge and the District Court recognized, Muchler’s complaint and amended complaint are legally deficient, as neither the Constitution nor any federal law protects an individual citizen’s right to avoid the type of contract dispute alleged in this matter against the County Defendants.

Section 1983 requires an actual deprivation of a protected constitutional right.

Bonta, LLC v. City of Marysville · filed 2019-11-14

Both statutes require Bonta to show an actual deprivation of a protected constitutional right.

Section 1983 authorizes federal courts to enjoin state criminal proceedings, but that power must be exercised sparingly and only in extraordinary cases involving fundamental constitutional violations or denial of basic due process.

Mayberry v. Weinrott · filed 1966-06-02

This court has jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to enjoin state criminal proceedings, Cooper v. Hutchinson,1184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950), but that power must be exercised sparingly in the interest of preserving the delicate balance of federal-state relations. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 72 S.Ct. 118, 96 L.Ed. 138 (1951). Intervention by injunction against state criminal proceedings should be resorted to only to prevent manifest injustice in extraordinary cases involving the violation of fundamental constitutional rights or the denial of the basic requirements of due process of law.

Section 1983 does not make an arrest unlawful when probable cause exists, even if the arrestee is later acquitted.

Beauregard v. William H. Wingard and Ernest C. Michael · filed 1966-06-20

Although the circumstances under which an arrest without probable cause gives rise to a claim under the Civil Rights Act may not yet be clearly established, see, e. g., Note; The Civil Rights Act of 1871: Continuing Vitality, 40 Notre Dame Law., 70, 80-84 (1964), it should in any event be clear that where probable cause does exist civil rights are not violated by an arrest even though, innocence may subsequently be established.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state officers for violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights, including a false-imprisonment claim against state police officers.

Carmack v. Wallace Gibson, Judge, Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Birmingham, Alabama · filed 1966-07-26

However, as to the state police officers, the complaint arguably states a claim for false imprisonment under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S. C.A. § 1983. See Nesmith v. Alford, 5 Cir., 1963, 318 F.2d 110; Monroe v. Pape, 1961, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492; Pierson v. Ray, 5 Cir., 1965, 352 F.2d 213, cert. granted, 1966, 384 U.S. 938, 86 S.Ct. 1457, 16 L.Ed.2d 537 [May 16, 1966]. Monroe v. Pape, supra, specifically cited in Appellant’s complaint, has just recently been vitalized by the Supreme Court: “Other sanctions, civil and criminal, are available in the federal courts against officers of a State who violate * * * federal constitutional and statutory rights. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964 ed.) the officers may be made to respond in damages not only for violations of rights conferred by federal equal civil rights laws, but for violations of other federal constitutional and statutory rights as well. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 [81 S.Ct. 473].” City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 1966, 384 U.S. 808, 86 S.Ct. 1800, 1813, 16 L.Ed.2d 944 [June 20, 1966].

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against persons acting under color of state law for constitutional deprivations, including a state prisoner's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

Jordan v. Fitzharris · filed 1966-09-06

The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a cause of action for deprivations, by persons acting under color of state law, of rights secured by the Constitution. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). Persons confined in state prisons are within the protection of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1964); Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1963); Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963). The right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment is one of the rights that a state prisoner may, in a proper case, enforce under § 1983. Talley v. Stephens, 247 F.Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark.1965); United States ex rel. Hancock v. Pate, 223 F.Supp. 202 (N.D.Ill. 1963); Redding v. Pate, 220 F.Supp. 124 (N.D.Ill.1963); Gordon v. Garrson, 77 F.Supp. 477 (E.D.Ill.1948); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965) (Dictum).

Section 1983 provides a basis for the action without requiring the plaintiff to satisfy § 1331's $10,000 amount-in-controversy threshold.

Holt v. Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority · filed 1966-09-06

Jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1348(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction is also invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, alleging an amount in controversy in excess of $10,000. The defendants have moved to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and because the amount in controversy is less than $10,000. As the Court has previously noted, jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Neither of these sections require that the amount in controversy of $10,000 be established.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights action only when the Constitution or laws actually secure the claimed right, privilege, or immunity.

Quinault Tribe of Indians v. Gallagher · filed 1966-09-19

We will assume, without deciding, that rights secured by Indian treaties ratified by Congress, and enabling acts and statutes enacted by Congress, as well as rights secured by the Constitution, are subject to vindication under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act referred to above. ... The question remains whether any of these laws secure a right, privilege, or immunity within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act. ... We accordingly hold that the district court did not have jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not treat a State or its governmental subdivision acting in its sovereign capacity as a “person” subject to suit.

Fowler v. United States · filed 1966-09-21

Turning now to the State of California, it is clear that the word “persons” as used in the Civil Rights Acts (42 U.S.C. § 1983) does not include a State or its governmental subdivision, acting in its sovereign, as distinguished from its proprietary, capacity.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or its agency as a suable “person,” and quasi-judicial prosecutorial functions receive immunity from suit.

Clark v. State of Washington, and Washington State Bar Association, an Agency of State Government, the State Bar of California, Amicus Curiae · filed 1966-10-31

A prosecuting attorney, as a quasi-judicial officer, enjoys immunity from suit under the Civil Rights Act insofar as his prosecuting functions are concerned. ... A state is not a “person” within the meaning of Rev.Stat. § 1979 (Sires v. Cole, 9 Cir., 320 F.2d 877, 879), and this must likewise be true of the Bar Association, which is an agency of the state.

Section 1983 actions against Virgin Islands government employees in their official capacity are subject to 48 U.S.C. § 1541(b)'s requirement that plaintiffs obtain and aver consent from the Virgin Islands legislature.

Ocasio v. Bryan · filed 1966-12-02

Under the rules of statutory construction set forth it is the opinion of this court that the limitation imposed by 48 U.S.C. § 1541 (b) applied to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that it is necessary for plaintiffs to aver that they have obtained consent from the legislature of the Virgin Islands as required by 48 U.S.C. § 1541 (b).

Section 1983 allows damages liability for law-enforcement officers whose conduct violates federal rights even if the conduct is lawful under state law.

Ellenburg v. Shepherd · filed 1966-12-05

However, in determining liability under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is immaterial whether the defendants' conduct is legal or illegal as a matter of state law.

Section 1983 does not create an exception to the federal anti-injunction statute, so it does not authorize a federal court to enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

Cameron v. Johnson · filed 1966-12-24

We are of the further opinion, following the decision in Baines, that § 1983, 42 U.S.C., creates no exception to this anti-injunction statute.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy when a state actor uses state law or regulation to deprive a person of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law, including the right to seek federal habeas relief.

Smartt v. Harry S. Avery, Commissioner of Correction, State of Tennessee · filed 1967-01-06

It appears clear to this court on the face of the resolution that it assesses an additional year of incarceration prior to consideration for parole upon any state prisoner who files a petition for writ of habeas corpus and has same denied. The right of a state prisoner to petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts on a claim that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is squarely authorized by federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 (1964). The exercise of this right may not be denied by state law. 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). No more may its exercise be discouraged by the withholding of a privilege (which would otherwise be accorded) by state law or regulation. ... We believe that appellee (and those similarly situated) are part of a class as to which the Civil Rights Act clearly may be invoked.

Section 1983 does not confer jurisdiction over an action based on constitutional deprivations of property rights.

Booth v. General Dynamics Corporation · filed 1967-01-25

The “civil rights” statutes do not confer jurisdiction over action based on constitutional deprivations of property rights.

Section 1983 gives a prosecutor immunity for official acts, but not for acts clearly outside the jurisdiction of the prosecutor's office.

William J. Bauers, Jr. v. Herbert T. Heisel, Jr · filed 1966-06-09

The immunity of a prosecutor, however, is not without limitation; it is not absolute. The immunity of judges, from which the immunity of prosecutors is derivative, does not extend to acts which are clearly outside their jurisdiction.

Section 1983 provides a federal civil action, including damages, for violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights by state officers, but it does not support an injunction against a pending state criminal prosecution when 28 U.S.C. § 2283 bars the injunction or the required clear and imminent irreparable injury is absent.

Sheridan v. Garrison · filed 1967-08-28

The rights which the plaintiffs seek to vindicate are federal rights — rights which this court sits to protect. But there are other ways to protect the First Amendment than by enjoining interference with it. Appeals from conviction, habeas corpus applications, and suits for damages are all time-tested swords with which federal courts protect federal constitutional and statutory rights. Government by injunction, long ago abandoned in the federal system as a means of resolving labor controversy, should not spring up again in the area of inter-governmental relationships. ... Considering then the purpose of Section 2283, the decisions of the courts that have considered whether the Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides an express exception to it, and the effect that the issuance of injunctions in’ cases like this one would have, I conclude that Section 2283 forbids issuance of an injunction here. Even if it does not, giving utmost credence to the plaintiffs’ affidavits, in the circumstances surrounding the case, the necessary showing of threatened “irreparable injury, clear and imminent” has not béen made, and therefore the court should exercise its discretion and refuse to issue the injunction sought.

Section 1983 damages claims require specific supporting facts rather than conclusory allegations.

Wagner v. Maroney · filed 1967-01-27

In an action for damages under the Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff must allege highly specific facts. It is not enough to state conclusory allegations without support in facts alleged.

Section 1983 does not treat the Pennsylvania Board of Parole as a person subject to suit.

Taylor v. Pennsylvania Board of Parole · filed 1967-02-08

Thus there is no doubt but that the Pennsylvania Board of Parole is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and it is not subject to suit thereunder.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for deprivation of a state-created right that is not secured by the federal Constitution or laws.

Bacon v. Holzman · filed 1967-02-17

Thus it is our opinion that plaintiffs cannot state a claim under Sec. 1983 since they assert a deprivation of a right, which under Snowden, is derived only from their state citizenship.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for deprivation of a federal right by state officers acting under color of state law, but a procedural-due-process claim based on undisclosed material considered by a state licensing authority requires pleading and proof that the official acted primarily for a purpose other than securing appropriate action by the authority.

Rose Chalet Functions Corporation v. Evans · filed 1967-02-17

§ 1983 gives a federal cause of action to a person who has been deprived of a federal right by the “purposeful” action of state officers, acting under color of state law. ... In short, it is the conclusion of this Court that where a plaintiff complains that a member of a state licensing authority has deprived it of procedural due process by considering material not produced at a hearing, plaintiff cannot maintain an action under § 1983 unless it both pleads and proves that the member acted primarily for a purpose other than that of securing appropriate action by the authority.

Section 1983 provides a claim when a person is deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Nathaniel Denman and Jack Graiver v. William Wertz, Nathaniel A. Denman · filed 1967-03-27

Beyond being prolix and inartificial, the complaint is inadequate as a statement of a claim under the old Civil Rights Acts. ... we have concluded that the facts alleged are insufficient to establish that Denman himself was deprived of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States or “of the equal protection of the law, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws”, as those limiting phrases are used in the controlling statutes.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a prisoner's use-of-force assault during summary discipline unless the facts show cruel and unusual punishment or invidious and persistent discrimination.

Cullum v. California Department of Corrections · filed 1967-04-03

The real issue then is whether an assault which is not a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and which occurred in the disciplinary setting of a prison, constitutes a claim for relief under the Civil Rights Act. For the reasons outlined below, this Court believes that it does not. ... However, in the absence of factual allegations sufficient to establish either that plaintiff is being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, or that he is the subject of invidious and persistent discrimination by prison officials, this Court believes that the summary administration of discipline, including the use of physical force, does not constitute a claim for relief under the Civil Rights Act. Cole v. Smith, 344 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1965).

Section 1983 authorizes an injunction action against persons acting under color of state law who deprive plaintiffs of constitutional rights, without requiring plaintiffs to seek state-law relief first.

Madera v. Board of Education of City of New York · filed 1967-04-10

Plaintiffs in amending their complaint rely on a Federal Civil Rights Statute, i. e., Title 42, U.S.C., § 1983. This statute gives plaintiffs the right to bring this action for injunction to enjoin defendants who, plaintiffs claim, acting under color of state law, are unconstitutionally enforcing the “no attorneys provision” of Circular No. 16 against plaintiffs. ... This court has jurisdiction of such an action. ... It is now a well settled principle that relief under the Federal Civil Rights Acts may not be defeated because relief was not first sought under state law which provided a remedy.

Section 1983 does not support relief for a prisoner's dissatisfaction with the kind and quality of medical treatment when the prisoner was permitted access to medical help and treatment and alleged no acute condition or tangible residual injury.

Stiltner v. B. J. Rhay, Superintendent, Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla, Washington · filed 1967-04-10

The district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s cause on the ground that his amended complaint failed to state any claim under the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983). ... Finally, keeping in mind the “wide discretion” necessarily vested in state prison authorities as to the nature and extent of medical treatment of prisoners [Snow v. Gladden, 338 F.2d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1964)], we “find no showing here of inadequate medical care and treatment that would justify federal intervention.” United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Ragen, 323 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1963). ... Thus, plaintiff’s allegations show only that he has not been receiving the kind and quality of medical treatment he believes is indicated. Like the Seventh Circuit, “[w]e know of no authority standing for the proposition that such a claim as plaintiff attempts to assert here is cognizable under the Federal Civil Rights Act.” United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Ragen (supra).

Section 1983 preserves common-law judicial immunity for judges acting within their judicial jurisdiction and allows police officers to assert a good-faith-and-probable-cause defense to an unconstitutional-arrest claim.

Pierson v. Ray · filed 1967-04-11

We do.not believe that this settled principle of law was abolished by ••§ 1983, which makes liable “every person” who under color of law deprives another person of his civil rights. ... We hold that the defense of good faith and probable cause, which the Court of Appeals found available to the officers in the common-law action for false arrest and imprisonment, is also available to. them in the action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a basis for federal jurisdiction over a voter's equal-protection challenge to malapportioned municipal legislative districts.

Kapral v. Jepson · filed 1967-05-31

The complaint sets forth a justiciable controversy between the parties over which the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4). ... This Court accordingly holds that the admitted disproportion in population between the five voting districts in the City of Milford on the basis of which aldermen are elected to the legislative body of that City presents a justiciable controversy over which this Court has jurisdiction.

Section 1983 applies to conduct under color of state law and does not apply to federal officers acting under federal law.

Congress of Racial Equality v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 1967-06-20

Section 1983 is inapplicable because it refers to action taken “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory”. It does not apply to federal officers, required to act under federal law.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek federal relief against state prison administrators for deprivation of federally protected religious freedom, while permitting consideration of prison administrators’ judgment about necessary prison practices.

Thomas Cooper, and v. Frank J. Pate, Warden of the Illinois State Penitentiary, And · filed 1967-06-29

Here the federal court is asked to give relief against the administrators of a state prison. It is asserted that the prison authorities have so greatly impaired Cooper’s federally-protected freedom of religion as to give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But although the deference to administrative discretion is not as complete in a case like the present, weight is still given to the judgment of the administrators in determining the practices which are necessary and appropriate in the conduct of a prison. ... It is clear that prison authorities must not punish a prisoner nor discriminate against him on account of his religious faith. ... Courts will closely scrutinize the reasonableness of any restriction imposed on a prisoner’s activity in the exercise of his religion, and specially so where the adherents of one faith are more heavily restricted than the adherents of another.

Section 1983 does not support a claim where plaintiffs lack standing and have not been deprived of any statutory or constitutional right.

Sola v. Vilella · filed 1967-07-14

Plaintiffs also contend that Law Number 1 has the effect of depriving them of their civil rights, namely, to vote in the July 23, 1967, plebiscite, and that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1983, the Civil Rights Act, and because there is diversity of jurisdiction in that plaintiffs all reside outside Puerto Rico and sue for $20,000.00 each under the Civil Rights Act. However, these particular plaintiffs, and the class they desire to represent, do not possess standing to make such a contention, and, this for the reasons above set out concerning the lack of standing of plaintiffs to bring this suit. Their complaint clearly discloses on its face the fact that they have not been deprived of or denied any right, statutory or constitutional, by reason of Law Number 1. Thus, not only do plaintiffs lack standing to make this contention, but also their contention itself as pleaded in their complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted and totally lacks substantiality.

Section 1983 claims may proceed against an individual when the complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Tolefree v. Harry Ritz, Badge No. 19, City of Richmond Police Department, First Doe, Second Doe, Third Doe, Seventh Doe · filed 1967-08-03

In his amended complaint Tole-free alleges sufficient facts to establish subject matter jurisdiction as to his Civil Rights Act claim against Ritz, and sufficient facts to state a claim against Ritz under that Act upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the action should not have been dismissed for either of these reasons.

Section 1983 permits a federal action without exhausting state remedies, does not make the constitutionality of the state statute a defense to improper conduct under it, limits federal injunctions to exceptional cases of clear and imminent irreparable injury, and does not treat a police department as a suable “person.”

Burmeister v. New York City Police Department · filed 1967-08-29

Initially, it must be noted that the constitutionality of the “statute” (such as § 1533) under “color” of which the prohibited action is taken, is not a material issue, since the constitutionality of the statute is no defense to improper action taken under color of that statute. ... Also, the aggrieved party is not required to exhaust his state remedies before seeking Federal relief. ... Accordingly, the equitable injunctive power of the Federal court will not be exercised save in exceptional cases “to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and imminent”. ... Finally, the . Police Department is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983, and therefore the complaint as against it must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not encompass a public housing authority acting in its sovereign capacity.

Randell v. Newark Housing Authority · filed 1967-03-21

Defendant Newark Housing Authority was acting in its sovereign, as distinguished from its proprietary, capacity in regard to the eviction here of plaintiffs; and hence does not come within the ambit of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require proof of intent, holds defendants responsible for the natural consequences of their acts, and permits good faith and probable cause in making an arrest as defenses.

Daniels v. Gerald Van De Venter, Dennis Peterson, and Reed Miller · filed 1967-09-08

Also good faith and probable cause in making an arrest are defenses which may be raised under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (U.S. April 11, 1967). ... We held in Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir.), that intent is not a necessary element to be shown, but as in any tort action a defendant in an action under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act is responsible for the natural consequences of his acts. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492; Pierson v. Ray, supra.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on police officers who reasonably and in good faith believed that their conduct was lawful, even if it was not.

Quinnette v. Garland · filed 1967-12-27

In Notaras v. Ramon, 383 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. September 22, 1967), our Court of Appeals referred to the Pierson decision as having announced the rule “ * * * that it is a defense to an action for damages against police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the officers reasonably and in good faith believed that their conduct was lawful, even though it was not.” The same rule covers this case, and judgment will be entered in favor of defendant Garland.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to the party injured by a person acting under color of state law who deprives that party of constitutional rights.

Parine v. Levine · filed 1967-10-16

The Civil Rights Act of 1871 creates a cause of action against a person who deprives another of constitutional rights and in favor of “the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. An interesting question arises as to whether the alleged violation of the civil rights of Pearson may be the basis of an action for damages by the plaintiff, on the grounds that this violation was the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. However, it is not necessary to reach this question, since here the plaintiff asserts a violation of his own civil rights.

Section 1983 does not make a tort committed by a state official under color of law actionable by itself; the plaintiff must show an invasion or deprivation of a constitutional or federal right.

Kent v. Prasse · filed 1967-11-14

Nor are we able to perceive that a tort committed by a state official acting under color of law is, in and of itself, sufficient to show an invasion of a person’s right under the Act.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy when a state remedy is inadequate in practice, and a federal court may consider the adequacy of state remedies when deciding whether to grant equitable relief.

Potwora v. Dillon · filed 1967-11-15

The quotation from Monroe v. Pape states the rationale of that decision incompletely. ... simply emphasizes that the federal court must be certain that a remedy that seems “adequate in theory” will be “available in practice”; it is not enough that the state statute will be adequate “if enforced.” ... The fact that the decision was stated in terms of “the traditional doctrines of equity,” id. at 490, at 85 S.Ct. 1123, demonstrates that the Court sought to control equitable discretion, not to abolish it. ... Since on the limited record before him the district judge was not warranted in finding state remedies adequate for the prompt protection of plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, we are constrained to reverse with directions to enter the injunction requested by them.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy only for a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law, and a nonfinal state action is not such a deprivation until it has been given legal effect.

Chaney v. The State Bar of California · filed 1967-11-21

Thus the situation here is not a matter of exhausting state remedies in respect to an alleged federal right but of there being no basis for any alleged federal right to exist as to the Committee’s actions until the California Supreme Court in the exercise of its original power over admissions has allowed these actions to serve as a deprivation. The holding of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 482, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, and McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 671-672, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 1435, 10 L.Ed.2d 622, that it is not necessary to exhaust state remedies before a suit can be instituted under the Civil Rights Act, is therefore without application. Whatever may be the scope of the right to sue granted by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it extends in any event only to “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States]”. (Emphasis added).

Section 1983 permits damages suits against state actors, but common-law judicial immunity protects judges from liability for acts within their judicial jurisdiction, even when the acts are alleged to be malicious or corrupt.

Sammie J. Franklin, Jr. v. Charles Meredith, John G. Ralston, and Edward J. Keating · filed 1967-11-24

The Supreme Court, in Pierson v. Ray, certainly put at rest any question as to the application of the common law doctrine of judicial immuity to damage suits brought under § 1983. In that case the Chief Justice said, “This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly * * Also, the decision expressly applied the doctrine to actions brought under § 1983. This immunity is, however, limited to acts committed within the judicial jurisdiction of the judge.

Section 1983 does not make the Johnson Act inapplicable to a federal challenge seeking to enjoin or obtain declaratory relief against state tax collection.

American Commuters Association v. Levitt · filed 1967-12-19

The Johnson Act not only prevents plaintiffs from obtaining an injunction but also prevents them from obtaining declaratory relief with respect to the constitutionality of the challenged statutes imposing taxes (Gray v. Morgan, supra; Collier Advertising Service, Inc. v. City of New York, supra), and the allegation that defendants have deprived plaintiffs of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) does not make the Johnson Act inapplicable. Abernathy v. Carpenter, supra; Gray v. Morgan, supra.

Section 1983 imposes liability for a constitutional or statutory-rights deprivation carried out under color of state law, but reasonable, good-faith conduct supported by legal cause does not establish liability.

Klor v. Hannon · filed 1967-12-19

The complaint herein adequately states a claim under Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 2because it alleges facts which show that the defendants: (1) while aeting under color of state statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, (2) subjected, or caused to be subjected, a person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... Defendants and each of them reasonably and in good faith did search and seize property of the Plaintiff incident to a lawful arrest pursuant to a valid warrant which property was evidence of the crime for which the Plaintiff was arrested and reasonably related thereto. ... Defendants and each of them had and have a good and valid defense to this action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 for reasonable conduct in the performance of their duties in good faith and with legal cause to act.

Section 1983 permits claims against individuals acting under color of state authority for deprivations of federal rights, but an arrest made with probable cause or pursuant to a properly issued warrant generally does not support liability absent aggravating circumstances.

Daly v. Pedersen · filed 1967-12-21

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against individuals acting under color of state authority to deprive a citizen of federally protected civil rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. ... As a general rule an arrest, lacking an appropriate warrant or without probable cause, constitutes a violation of due process giving rise to a claim under § 1983. ... Irrespective, however, the courts consistently reject claims under the Civil Rights Act when, without other aggravating circumstances, the arrest is shown to have been with probable cause or pursuant to the dictates of a properly issued warrant. ... The court is of the view that where two legal warrants are followed in executing an arrest, the invalidity of a third (if true) will not make the arrest unconstitutional. ... Plaintiff therefore has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted regarding his allegedly unconstitutional arrest and summary judgment on this issue is granted.

Section 1983 permits an action for an unreasonable, negligent omission by state officials who have an affirmative duty to protect persons from foreseeable attacks when the omission denies equal protection under color of state law.

Huey v. Barloga · filed 1967-12-27

City officials and police officers are under an affirmative duty to preserve law and order, and to protect the personal safety of persons in the community. This duty applies equally to negroes, as well as to white persons. If such officials have notice of the possibility of racial disorder and the possibility of attacks upon negroes or other persons, they are under an affirmative duty to take reasonable measures to protect the personal safety of such persons in the community. Their failure to perform this duty would constitute both a negligent omission and a denial of equal protection of the laws. Accordingly, an unreasonable omission of this nature would be actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain federal relief for alleged constitutional violations arising from a state criminal proceeding when the action is effectively a habeas petition that bypasses federal habeas requirements.

Martin v. Roach · filed 1968-01-15

Plaintiff, a prisoner at Ossining State Prison, seeks damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). ... But an application for .relief under the Civil Rights Act for alleged civil rights violations incurred in state criminal proceedings, thereby skirting the requirements of the federal habeas corpus statutes, is improper.

Section 1983 requires action under color of law and does not provide a cause of action against an appointed attorney treated as a private individual.

Reinke v. Richardson · filed 1968-01-15

An indispensable element of suits brought under § 1983 is a showing that the defendant acted under “color of law”. ... It has been held, however, that an attorney’s status as an officer of the court does not make him a person who is acting under color of law. He is considered a private individual for purposes of § 1983. ... A cause of action does not lie against an appointed attorney under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, meaning misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law; a private license to detain shoplifters or operate as a detective does not by itself confer that authority.

Weyandt v. Mason's Stores, Inc. · filed 1968-02-09

A threshold issue in actions based on § 1983 is whether the alleged tortfeasor acted “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.” For action to be taken under color of State law requires “misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, * *.” ... The fallacy of plaintiff’s argument appears to be in equating acting under license of state law with acting under authority of state law. ... The nomenclature of this Act, however, is sufficient indication that it is an Act licensing purely private action and invests the licensee with no authority of state law. ... Since we conclude that no action is stated against these private defendants under § 1983 because they did not act under color of law, we need not consider at length whether the allegations of the Complaint, viewed most favorably to her, support plaintiff’s conclusion that she was deprived of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for conduct under color of state law, not conduct under color of federal law.

Long v. Parker · filed 1968-02-16

Since section 1983 grants a cause of action against those acting under color of state law and not those acting under color of federal law, relief could not be predicated on this section.

Section 1983 requires that the defendant act under color of state or local law, and it does not provide redress for deprivations by private individuals acting in a professional capacity.

Peake v. County of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania · filed 1968-03-05

As a statutory prerequisite to maintaining a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, it is essential that the defendants act “under color of” State or local law. For the defendants’ action to be “under color of” State law, there must be a “[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law”. ... It is not the alleged deprivation of civil rights by private individuals acting in a professional capacity for which the act affords redress, but the deprivation of such rights by persons acting “under color of” State or local law.

Section 1983 gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear a state prisoner's claim that prison officials unreasonably deprived the prisoner of the constitutional right of access to the courts.

Taylor v. Burke · filed 1968-01-24

A federal court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to entertain a petition wherein it appears that a state prisoner is unreasonably deprived of a constitutional right to access to the courts.

Section 1983 permits a claim to proceed past a motion to dismiss when plaintiffs allege that defendants acted under color of state law to deprive them of constitutional rights and the allegations could support relief.

Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. · filed 1968-01-31

Finally, plaintiffs allege that defendants have acted alone and with others under color of state law to deprive plaintiffs of personal and property rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Under these circumstances the Court is unable to say at this time that plaintiffs cannot prove facts which will entitle them to relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1985 (1964), with respect to which this Court has jurisdiction by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for the refusal to give a prisoner copies of trial transcripts when the defendants had no duty to furnish them.

Price v. Rundle · filed 1968-03-05

It follows that the named defendants were under no duty to make their copies of the notes of testimony available to the petitioner and their refusal to do so did not thereby deprive the petitioner of his civil rights within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 authorizes a federal injunction against pending state-court proceedings, so the federal anti-injunction rule does not bar that relief.

Grove Press, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1969-05-20

More importantly, however, although the Supreme Court as yet has not decided the question, see, Dombrowski, supra, 380 U.S. at 484, f. n. 2, 85 S.Ct. 1116, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that § 2283’s prohibition does not apply where the federal court action is predicated on Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which by its terms specifically authorizes the granting of an injunction to stay state court proceedings. See, Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (C.A.3, 1950). Accordingly, the City’s motion to dismiss Civil Action No. 69-972 is denied.

Section 1983 permits federal injunctive relief against a pending state prosecution in narrowly limited Dombrowski circumstances when a bad-faith prosecution chills First Amendment rights and no effective alternative protection exists.

Mike Honey and Martha Allen v. Jon Goodman, Shelby M. Howard, and J. W. Shines · filed 1970-10-09

We need not, and do not, decide that section 1983 is an “express exception” to section 2283 under all circumstances. We do find, however, that where the “highly unusual and very limited circumstances” of Dombrowski are plead and proved, the frustration of superior federal interests that would ensue from precluding an aggrieved citizen from obtaining a stay of state court proceedings would be so great as to pose a threat of irreparable injury to a national interest. ... In so holding, we emphasize that we decide only the case presently before us. We believe that section 1983 provides federal injunctive relief in meritorius Dombrowski cases where the state prosecution has been instituted, but limit this decision to those First Amendment cases where it is alleged that the prosecution itself, as opposed to a possible conviction and punishment, results in a “chilling effect” of a kind similar to that described in Dombrowski; where the proceeding may technically be under way, but not where the state trial of the accused has begun; and solely where the only effective protection available is by way of federal injunction. See Sheridan v. Garrison, supra, 415 F.2d at 708.

An action under § 1983 does not, by itself, create an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act’s bar on enjoining pending state criminal proceedings.

Andrews v. Dillon · filed 1970-11-24

Moreover, plaintiffs’ argument that an action brought under the Civil Rights Act, Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983,9 is an express exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, Title 28, United States Code, Section 2283, is not in accordance with the prevailing decisions in this circuit.

Section 1983 permits a federal court, in some circumstances, to enjoin proceedings in a state court.

Kennan v. Warren · filed 1971-05-15

For these reasons, as well as those expressed in Landry v. Daley, 288 F.Supp. 200, 224 (N.D.Ill.1968) and my dissent in Zwicker v. Boll, 270 F.Supp. 131, 144-146 (W.D.Wis.1967), I conclude that a temporary restraining order is permissible in some circumstances, and I conclude further that the circumstances of the present case render such an order appropriate.

Section 1983 does not create an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283's prohibition on federal injunctions against pending or threatened state criminal prosecutions.

Sandquist v. Pitchess · filed 1971-09-13

1. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 prohibits a federal district court from enjoining pending or threatened state criminal prosecutions except in extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown. ... The prohibitory effect of Section 2283 has not been limited by either the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

Section 1983 does not authorize a federal court to enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution in violation of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

Turco v. Allen · filed 1971-11-19

Although the Supreme Court has many times referred to the anti-injunction statute in Civil Rights eases where injunctive relief was denied, the denial of such relief has been grounded on general equity principles and on at least three separate occasions the Supreme Court has declined to rule on whether 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 creates an exception to Section 2283. ... The matter, at least in the Fourth Circuit, has been set at rest by the exhaustive and often-cited opinion of then Circuit Judge, now Chief Judge Haynsworth in Baines v. City of Dan-ville, 337 F.2d 579 (1964), holding that the Civil Rights Act does not constitute an exception to the mandate of Section 2283. ... For the reasons above stated, the Court declines to grant any interlocutory or permanent injunction against the State Court’s prosecution of the Plaintiff Turco because of this Court’s view that Title 28, Section 2283 is an absolute prohibition against such action.

Section 1983 authorizes a federal court to enjoin a pending state-court proceeding because it falls within the expressly authorized exception to the federal anti-injunction statute.

Mitchum v. Foster · filed 1972-06-19

For these reasons we conclude that, under the *243criteria established in our previous decisions construing the anti-injunction statute, § 1983 is an Act of Congress that falls within the “expressly authorized” exception of that law.

Section 1983 permits a federal court to enjoin a pending state-court proceeding, although principles of comity limit when that remedy may be used.

Russell v. Monroe · filed 1972-11-09

Although it is now established that a federal court in a suit alleging a violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, may grant an injunction to stay a proceeding pending in a state court, see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972) , a federal court should intervene in a pending state court prosecution only in certain exceptional circumstances which are not present in the instant case.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against state judges for improper use of judicial authority that violates citizens' civil rights.

Lynch v. Snepp · filed 1972-11-20

State judges are not immune from injunction, under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, against improper use of judicial authority in violation of the civil rights of citizens.

Section 1983 permits a federal court to hear a constitutional-rights suit, but equitable principles can require it to refrain from enjoining a pending state civil proceeding.

Lynch v. Snepp · filed 1973-01-26

The application of these principles must always be considered by federal judges in the course of determining whether or not to exercise jurisdiction to restrain state .courts in a suit brought under § 1983. ... A district court thus cannot enjoin a state civil proceeding unless he finds that the state proceeding cannot eliminate the threat to the plaintiff’s rights.

A § 1983 action does not eliminate the federal court's obligation to follow principles of equity, comity, and federalism when considering interference with state proceedings.

Hartford Consumer Activists Association v. Hausman · filed 1974-08-21

Although the United States Supreme Court has held that suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as this one purports to be, may in some cases come under the “expressly authorized” exception to § 2283, it remains clear that even in § 1983 actions a federal court must continue to follow “the established principles of equity, comity and federalism.” ... Under the circumstances of this case, not only the principles of equity, comity and federalism, but also the clear intent of the Johnson Act, preclude this Court from imposing any restraint on the operation of the PUC’s interim rate order.

Section 1983 does not override the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that ordinarily restrain federal courts from enjoining pending state-court proceedings.

Bedrosian v. Joseph Mintz, Administrator, Erie County Bar Association Aid to Indigent Prisoners Society · filed 1975-06-20

The fact that the action is one brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not necessitate a different conclusion. The mere fact that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutes an “expressly authorized” exception to the absolute bar against federal injunctions directed at state proceedings provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2283 in no way qualifies “the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding”.

Section 1983 does not entitle a plaintiff to federal injunctive relief against a pending state criminal prosecution absent the special circumstances required by federalism principles.

United States v. Kuehn · filed 1977-09-19

In Dombrowski, as the Younger Court pointed out, special circumstances of prosecutorial harassment and bad faith established the kind of irreparable injury to the exercise of First Amendment rights that authorized federal injunctive relief. Here there was no evidence presented which could be characterized as irreparable injury, bad faith, or harassment. Dombrowski simply does not apply even though the intervenor's claim is asserted under the provisions of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not allow a federal court to enjoin state judicial orders when available state-court procedures permit the plaintiff to present the same federal constitutional claims.

Blue v. Revels · filed 1977-12-02

The question presented by this motion is whether this Court can properly entertain plaintiff’s § 1983 action for redress of constitutional rights, and enjoin a state judge from enforcing his injunctive orders, when there exist several, available state forums in which to raise the same constitutional questions arising under federal law. ... In short, so long as plaintiff has available to her procedures and remedies in the state courts, including the opportunity to contest the existing state court injunctions before the court that issued them, this Court is obligated to refrain from interfering with those state court orders and procedures. ... Instead, the Court holds only that respect for the existing orders and available remedies of the state courts, as well as for their integrity and fidelity in enforcing federal constitutional law, requires that this Court abstain from injunctively interfering with those courts.

Section 1983 authorizes equitable relief for deprivations of federal rights under color of state law and is an expressly authorized exception to the federal anti-injunction statute.

United States v. State of Washington · filed 1978-06-30

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the remedy available for such deprivations includes equitable relief. The Supreme Court has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is within the "expressly authorized" exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972).

Section 1983 is an express exception to the federal Anti-Injunction Act, permitting a federal court to enjoin pending state-court proceedings when federal rights are being protected.

National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp. · filed 1981-09-30

These rights are protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which is an express exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.

The federal anti-injunction statute does not bar enjoining a pending state proceeding when a Section 1983 violation is at issue, but such relief requires great, immediate, and irreparable loss of constitutional rights.

Village of Port Chester v. Port Chester Yacht Club, Inc. · filed 1984-11-21

Although the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, does not bar a federal court from enjoining a pending state court proceeding when a § 1983 violation is at issue, such drastic relief is proper only if it is “essential to prevent great, immediate, and irreparable loss of a person’s constitutional rights”. ... Based upon the record presently before the Court, it is apparent that none of these conditions is present or threatened and therefore issuance of such an injunction is not warranted.