42 U.S.C. § 1983

A Pennsylvania port authority acted under color of state law for § 1983, while the private defendants in that dispute lacked an individual § 1983 claim against them.

Erie Builders Concrete Co. v. Erie-Western Pennsylvania Port Authority · filed 1989-02-07

There can be no argument that the action of the Port Authority was done under color of authority of state law. If there is any claim of civil rights violation to be made against the private parties individually, it must be made under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 as a conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 does not treat an attorney representing an indigent criminal defendant as a state actor.

Thomas v. Goyette · filed 1989-02-22

An attorney who represents an indigent criminal defendant is not a state actor for purposes of Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against private parties who are neither government actors nor in conspiracy with a government actor.

Leeuwen v. United States · filed 1989-02-23

On August 9, 1988, the district court sua sponte dismissed the van Leeuwens' complaint for the reasons that ... (3) the van Leeuwens did not state a claim under Bivens 2 or 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against the bank, its attorneys, or the van Leeuwens' attorney, because none was a government actor or in conspiracy with a government actor, see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1605-06, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); ... Upon careful review, we agree with the district court's conclusions as set forth in its well-reasoned opinion.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the challenged action was done by a state actor under color of state law.

Van Daam v. Chrysler First Financial Services Corp. · filed 1989-02-24

Here, plaintiffs failure to allege that the challenged action was done by a state actor under the color of state law as an essential element of his complaint renders his complaint fatally defective.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a federal official acting under color of federal law.

Abramson v. Bennett · filed 1989-02-27

Section 1983 only applies to state officials acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; private protesters do not satisfy that requirement through their protest activity.

Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. Mcmillan · filed 1989-02-28

The clash between these competing groups is a private one. MWMC fails to show that the protestors were acting under color of state law and as a result fails to satisfy the second prong needed to establish a claim under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is identical to the Fourteenth Amendment’s state-action requirement when the claim rests on a due process right.

Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District · filed 1989-03-08

As Gorenc’s § 1983 claim is based on a constitutional right of due process, for purposes of this case the “state action” requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment and the statutory requirement of action “under color of state law” of a § 1983 claim are identical.

Section 1983 treats private parties who act in concert with state officers as acting under color of state law.

Evans v. Mckay · filed 1989-03-16

It is well established that private parties who act in concert with officers of the state are acting under the color of state law within the meaning of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat retained or appointed counsel’s representation of a client as action under color of state law.

Edward Nathaniel Carlton, Jr. v. Rolf E. Berg · filed 1989-03-30

Because neither retained nor appointed counsel's representation amounts to state action, see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), neither can be sued under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private party jointly engaged with a state official in the challenged action may meet that requirement.

Todaro v. John M. Bowman, Warden John A. Watkins, Sheriff · filed 1989-04-10

The exact nature of Watkins’ official capacity must be resolved to determine whether he was “acting under color of state law.” The need for a resolution of this issue is paramount since state action is a requisite for an individual to be liable in a § 1983 claim. It is not as simple as whether or not Watkins was indeed the sheriff or even the acting sheriff at the time of the incident. A private party jointly engaged with a state official in a challenged action can be considered as acting under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 permits claims against private parties who act jointly with state officials, but conclusory allegations of conspiracy do not establish action under color of state law.

Khadijah v. Conrail Rail Road · filed 1989-04-17

To be sure, a private party may be held liable under Section 1983 when he acts jointly with state officials (Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 435 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028, 107 S.Ct. 1952, 95 L.Ed.2d 525 (1987)). But Khadijah’s wholly conclusory allegations of conspiracy do not meet the “color of state law” requirement (Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, 754 F.2d 1336, 1352 (7th Cir.1985); Tarkowski v. Robert Bartlett Realty, 644 F.2d 1204, 1206 (7th Cir.1980); cf. Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 192 (7th Cir.1989) (facile allegations of conspiracy insufficient to circumvent absolute witness immunity)).

Section 1983 applies to violations of constitutional or federal statutory rights committed under color of state law; purely federal action does not satisfy that requirement.

Yalkut v. Augie Gemignani and Myron Gold · filed 1989-04-18

Section 1983, however, applies only to actions taken under the color of state law that violate constitutional or federal statutory rights. Yalkut makes no allegation of state action, nor can he, because defendants’ actions were purely federal in nature.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of law; a state employee who merely gives a factual report to a prosecutor without using or abusing official authority does not act under color of law.

Jerry Garrett and Doris Garrett v. Jim Huffman and Robert Hamlin · filed 1989-05-08

Because one holds a job with the state does not make his every action one done under "color of law" within the context of section 1983. Huffman played no role here that could not have been played by any lay person. He did not use or abuse his power as Labor Department investigator. He merely made a factual report to the county attorney.

Section 1983 covers deprivations of rights under color of state law, so federal officials acting under color of federal law are not subject to a § 1983 action.

Walker v. Secretary of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service · filed 1989-05-11

Likewise 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only covers deprivations of rights under color of state law. The instant law suit involves federal officials acting under color of federal law rather than state law and are not, therefore, subject to an action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach a public defender’s representation of a criminal defendant merely because the defender is paid by the state.

Ramirez v. Harris · filed 1989-05-18

Moreover, we note that public defenders, although paid by the state, do not act “under color of state law.”

A Section 1983 complaint can adequately allege that Commonwealth officials acted under color of state law when challenging their conduct in a public bidding process.

Viajes Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Martinez-Monge · filed 1989-05-25

Reading the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we must conclude that it properly alleged that defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Ervin R. Sims v. Johnston · filed 1989-06-13

Sims has failed to prove that Johnston specifically acted to deprive him of any right secured under the Constitution or that Johnston acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 treats a private creditor as acting under color of state law when the creditor initiates a state foreclosure procedure that extinguishes another party’s property interest without notice to that party.

Davis Oil Company v. William P. Mills, Iii, William P. Mills, III v. Davis Oil Company · filed 1989-06-14

We agree with the district court that insofar as Davis challenges the constitutionality of the Louisiana procedure on these grounds, FNB may be considered a “joint participant” with the state because it set into motion the procedures that would extinguish Davis’ interest in the subject property.

Section 1983 does not treat an attorney as acting under color of state law merely because the court appointed the attorney.

Fletcher v. Tennessee Dept. of Corrections · filed 1989-06-14

It is well settled that attorneys, even when appointed by the court, do not act under color of state law within the meaning of Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private laboratory as acting under color of law merely because it furnishes test results to a state board.

McNeely v. Board of River Port Pilots Commissioners · filed 1989-06-29

Simply furnishing information to the Board of Commissioner does not create a sufficient nexus between the Board and LSI so as to make LSI a joint participant in the termination of McNeely’s pilot license.

Section 1983 does not treat a private association as a state actor merely because its members are public employees, absent state coercion or delegated authority over the challenged conduct.

Clonlara, Inc. v. Runkel · filed 1989-07-18

Nothing in the record shows state coercion of any associational conduct or that the state delegated any authority to MPAAA and MASA. Adoption of plaintiffs’ position would transform all private, independent associations whose members are public employees into state actors. ... Summary judgment is appropriate for MPAAA and MASA on the § 1983 claims on the basis that neither is a state actor for purposes of either § 1983 or the fourteenth amendment.

A private casino does not act under color of state law for Section 1983 merely by relying on state precedent to justify its tip-pooling policy.

Cotter v. Desert Palace · filed 1989-07-28

Plaintiffs claim that Caesar's Palace was acting under color of state law because it relied on Nevada precedent to support its right to require tip-pooling. Plaintiffs do not have a fair chance of success on this argument. In Flagg Brothers, plaintiffs claimed that private warehousemen were acting under color of state law because they relied on the self-help provisions of New York's version of the UCC. The Supreme Court found this fact insufficient to transform private parties into state actors.

Section 1983's color of state law requirement is treated the same as the Fourteenth Amendment's state action requirement.

Rannels v. Meridian Bancorp, Inc. · filed 1989-08-08

The § 1983 "color of state law" requirement is treated the same as the Fourteenth Amendment's "state action" requirement.

A court-appointed receiver acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Lebbos v. Judges of the Superior Court, Santa Clara County · filed 1989-08-28

Because Munn was acting in his capacity as court-appointed receiver, he was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 treats a state commissioner acting in his official capacity as a state actor.

Mehta v. Surles · filed 1989-08-29

Clearly, defendant Surles, acting in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Office of Mental Health of the State of New York is a state actor.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law or that its conduct constituted state action.

Rhodes v. Charter Hospital · filed 1989-08-31

No lengthy analysis is necessary to conclude that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under section 1983. Defendant is a private entity, and plaintiff has alleged no facts that indicate that defendant acted under color of state law or that its acts constituted state action.

Private towing operators acting as a sheriff’s agents act under color of state law for § 1983, even when they simply follow a deputy’s orders.

Bins v. Artison · filed 1989-09-11

That these private defendants exercised no discretion and simply followed the orders of a deputy sheriff does not affect the “under color of state law” character of their agency.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Jacob v. Curt · filed 1989-09-20

Although plaintiff framed her claim against Dr. Curt as a § 1983 action, the claim, in reality, is a Bivens-type action. Section 1983 requires that a person, acting under color of state law, deprive another of his or her constitutionally or federally-protected right.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party’s furnishing of information to law enforcement, even false information, as sufficient joint activity with state officials to support a claim against that party.

Young v. Arkansas Children's Hospital · filed 1989-09-29

Furthermore, the mere furnishing of information by a private party to a law enforcement official, even if the information is false, is not sufficient to constitute joint activity with State officials in prohibited action or to state a claim against a private party under § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches a private defendant who willfully participates in joint action with the state or its agents.

Phelps v. Eagle-Beacon · filed 1989-09-29

Section 1983 applies only to actions performed under color of state law. That requirement does not mean that all defendants must be officers of the state. If a private defendant is “a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents,” that is sufficient.

Section 1983 does not treat a defense lawyer as acting under color of state law when defending a client.

Long v. Stanley E. Tolliver, Sr. · filed 1989-10-02

Clearly, a defense lawyer does not act under color of state law when undertaking to defend a client.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a private person’s testimony in open court because testifying is not acting under color of state law.

Davidson v. Harvey · filed 1989-10-10

Davidson failed to state a cause of action under Sec. 1983 because when a private person gives testimony in open court, the act of testifying is not performed under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private party does not become a joint actor with state judges merely by obtaining a default judgment in court.

Thompson v. Liberty National Bank & Trust Company of Louisville Donald J. Eckerle, Judge John Carter, Judge · filed 1989-10-18

To maintain a suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Federal Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 533 (1981). Thompson cannot establish that Liberty National Bank acted under color of state law. Private persons can act under color of state law when they conspire or willfully participate with state officials to deprive others of constitutional rights. See United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc). Thompson only complains, however, that Liberty National resorted to the courts and won a default judgment against him. Such actions are insufficient to render the bank a co-conspirator or joint actor with the state judges. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a federal agent acting in his federal capacity because that conduct is not under color of state law.

Smith v. United States · filed 1989-10-27

Mr. Loeb was an agent of the federal government and was acting as such within the scope of his authority when he illegally disclosed the confidential tax information to the Illinois Department of Revenue. Therefore, Mr. Loeb was not acting under color of state law and thus an action pursuant to section 1983 will not lie against him individually.

Section 1983 applies only to persons acting under color of state law; a private magazine writer is outside its reach absent any suggestion of state action.

Sheperd v. Konstantine · filed 1989-11-13

The statute under which Sheperd filed his complaint applies only to persons acting under color of some state statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, and there is no suggestion that Konstantine was so acting.

Section 1983 reaches a public employee’s conduct performed under color of official authority even when that conduct was unauthorized or contrary to agency policy.

Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1989-11-14

The fact that his activities were not authorized by the Authority, or even that they conflicted with express Authority policy, does not render Sec. 1983 inapplicable so long as it can be shown that his actions were performed under color of official authority.

A private person exercises a delegated state function for Section 1983 purposes when an official municipal policy defers crime investigation to that person.

Horton v. Flenory · filed 1989-11-14

The function of investigating crimes is clearly a governmental function. An official policy of deferring to private owners with respect to the investigation of crimes in private clubs, which the jury could have found from the evidence, suffices to permit a legal conclusion that Flenory, maintaining custody over Mr. Powdrill, was exercising a delegated state function.

Section 1983 reaches a condominium association whose enforcement of a restriction on displaying the American flag is sufficiently attributable to the state to constitute state action.

Gerber v. Longboat Harbour North Condominium · filed 1989-11-17

In summary, this Court finds that the Condominium Association's conduct was sufficiently attributable to the state to constitute action by the state. This action acted to deprive the Plaintiff of his rights, privileges and immunities secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; federal agents acting under federal law are not liable under it.

Rourke v. United States · filed 1989-11-17

In the first instance, state action is required to maintain a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute specifically requires that the actions alleged to have violated the plaintiffs rights must have been taken under color of state law. Liability will not attach for action taken under color of federal law.

Section 1983 does not treat an individual decision to place a mental health patient in a treatment program as state action, even when the state mental health system creates financial incentives affecting placement.

Lee v. Gateway Institute & Clinic, Inc. · filed 1989-11-27

This argument, however, collapses together the financial incentives to "dump" which are allegedly built into the Pennsylvania Mental Health System, which is the result of a legislative decision of the Martinez v. California type, and the individual patient care decision to place this or that patient in a given treatment program, which is not under any circumstances state action.

Section 1983 does not treat a private mental health patient as a state actor merely because he received care through the public mental health system.

Lee v. Gateway Institute & Clinic, Inc. · filed 1989-11-27

Wom-mer can in no sense be considered a state actor.

Section 1983 does not reach a mortgage foreclosure sale conducted by a sheriff when the sheriff’s authority comes from the parties’ mortgage agreement and there is no significant state action.

Kottcamp v. Fleet Real Estate Funding Corp. · filed 1989-11-28

There is no direct state involvement and thus no significant state action. The power of the state is invoked by the private contractual agreement between the parties which is the driving force. The term “nexus” is used to identify a connection with the state. In the facts before us, there was no such nexus.

Section 1983 does not treat an attorney representing a client on a criminal charge as acting under color of state law.

McNeil v. Robert W. Brott, Esq. · filed 1989-12-06

Clearly, an attorney does not act "under color of state law" when representing a client on a criminal charge.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an attorney who was not acting under color of state law.

Parham v. Washington · filed 1989-12-18

Judge Helms was entitled to judicial immunity, for the reasons stated by the district court, and Parham's attorney was not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law element is satisfied when members of a Puerto Rico licensing board act in the exercise of their official duties.

Martinez-Velez v. Simonet · filed 1989-12-20

With regard to whether it was properly established that defendants acted under color of state law, the facts admitted by both parties lead us to conclude that this was the case.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is met when municipal agencies and employees allegedly act in the course of their official duties.

Levy v. City of New York · filed 1989-12-26

With regard to the City defendants before the Court on this motion, there is no doubt that plaintiffs meet the requirement that a defendant’s actions be taken under color of state law. All the City defendants are either parts of the municipality of the City of New York or its employees, and all their alleged actions were, on the face of the complaint, taken in the course of their duties as City employees.

Section 1983 covers deprivations of constitutional rights through state action even when local officials act by resolution rather than ordinance.

Planned Parenthood of Kansas, Inc. v. City of Wichita · filed 1990-01-03

The distinction drawn by the defendant is artificial and frivolous. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides protection for persons deprived of constitutional rights through state action. ... Having acted under color of state law, the defendants may not cloak their actions now under the semantic distinction currently advanced.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; an inmate who is not alleged to act in concert with state officials does not meet that requirement.

Gonzales v. Martinez · filed 1990-01-10

To sustain an action under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of rights secured by the federal constitution or laws. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). Morales is not an officer of the state, nor does the complaint allege that Morales acted in concert with state officials or demonstrated conduct otherwise chargeable to the state. At present, therefore, the complaint fails to state a claim against inmate Morales because Morales is not alleged to have acted under color of state law, such as by acting in concert with state officials. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a private telephone company’s independent decision to stop providing billing services does not meet that requirement absent state coercion or significant encouragement.

Integrated Information Service, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1990-01-18

In order to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must show: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law and (2) that the conduct deprived the person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... The Court finds no evidence of such impermissible coercive power by a state in this case.

Section 1983 does not cover federal officials acting without state agents because they do not act under color of state law.

Yocum v. Dixon · filed 1990-01-26

Federal officials, who are not acting in concert with state agents, are not considered to be state actors for the purpose of section 1983 and thus are not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against private citizens who did not act under color of state law.

Mwonyonyi v. Gieszl · filed 1990-02-09

Mwonyonyi failed to state a cause of action against defendants Scott, Brown, Johnson, Cooke, Radigan, Ingwerson, and McKiernan under section 1983 as these defendants are private citizens and, thus, did not act under state law.

An off-duty officer may act under color of law for § 1983 when he invokes official authority to make an arrest, even if a private dispute prompted it.

Rivera v. La Porte · filed 1990-02-16

The off-duty status of an arresting officer does not mean that he is not acting under color of law. ... Though the dispute that precipitated the arrest was private, the response, including the arrest and the use of excessive force, was unquestionably action under color of law.

Section 1983 treats a private entity exercising statutory authority delegated by the state as acting under color of state law.

Holloway v. Conger · filed 1990-02-23

We have held that services provided by a private entity pursuant to governmental delegation of statutory power is action under color of state law for purposes of section 1983. See Lawyer v. Kernodle, 721 F.2d 632, 635 (8th Cir.1983). In this case, there is no dispute that the Board delegated its statutory authority to conduct a brand inspection program to Stockgrowers when the parties executed the annual contract. Thus, Stockgrowers acted "under color of state law" for purposes of this suit.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a federal agency acting under color of federal law rather than state law.

Pauline Walber D/B/A Walber Construction Co. v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, Jack Kemp, Se · filed 1990-03-05

HUD, of course, is a federal agency, operating under color of federal rather than state law; section 1983 is hence unavailable on these facts.

Allegations that officers of an integrated state bar used their positions to control its newsletter and refuse a submission can support a finding that they acted under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Barnard v. Chamberlain · filed 1990-03-08

Keeping in mind our duty when reviewing a motion for summary judgment to draw all factual inferences in the manner most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, Ewing v. Amoco, 823 F.2d 1432, 1437 (10th Cir.1987), we find sufficient facts alleged from which one could conclude that the defendants' conduct amounted to state action and that the refusal to publish the plaintiff's article was taken under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires conduct attributable to the state; a sheriff’s minimal aid to private defendants, without significant state aid, does not satisfy that requirement.

Boulter v. Jordan · filed 1990-03-20

Sheriff Jordan’s alleged minimal actions in aiding the other defendants to evict the plaintiff from the home, taken as true, do not amount to “the exercise of some right or privilege created by the state.” Furthermore, the plaintiffs complaint fails to allege that the defendants “obtained significant aid from the state officials.”

Section 1983 does not reach irregularities in a political party’s internal officer elections absent a credible allegation that the officers perform a governmental function.

William G. Banchy, Douglas B. Robinson, Donna Carnevale, and Marilyn Schutte v. The Republican Party of Hamilton County · filed 1990-03-26

Absent some credible allegation that ward chairmen engage in a governmental function, the Republican Party is not subject to suit under section 1983 for irregularities in its internal ward chairmen elections.

Section 1983 does not treat an off-duty officer’s private use of a gun as action under color of law merely because the officer was permitted to carry the gun to and from work.

John W. Corder and Lois A. Ewin v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, Troy Stevens, Jo · filed 1990-03-27

The fact that he may have been permitted to carry his gun to and from work does not by itself render any use of the gun an act done under color of law.

Section 1983 does not treat news reporters’ access to official reports and documents, by itself, as action under color of state law.

Brooks v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. · filed 1990-03-28

News reporters often have access to official reports and documents to aid them in investigating and preparing a story, yet that alone does not convert these acts into state action.

Section 1983 treats city supervisors as acting under color of state law when they misuse their official authority to procure a subordinate employee’s arrest, even if they exceed their authority.

Yeksigian v. Ralph Nappi, Howard Nicholas, and City of Chicago · filed 1990-04-16

By contrast, this case involves city supervisory personnel, who allegedly abused their authority as city supervisory personnel, to secure without justification the arrest of an employee under their supervision at a city-owned facility. The fact that these city employees may have acted in excess of their authority is irrelevant to the color of law inquiry.

Government inaction or acquiescence in private wrongdoing does not make that conduct action under color of state law for § 1983.

New Hampshire Podiatric Medical Ass'n v. New Hampshire Hospital Ass'n · filed 1990-04-26

Mere inaction or acquiescence by the government in private wrongful conduct will not convert a private right of action into government action.

Section 1983 treats a private tax lien purchaser as acting under color of state law when she obtains deeds through a county treasurer’s extrajudicial assistance.

Rinaldo v. Stone · filed 1990-05-07

Having chosen to obtain the deeds through the Treasurer’s extrajudicial assistance, her affirmative action was taken "under color of law”.

Section 1983 does not treat counsel representing a client, whether retained or appointed, as acting under color of state law.

Bilal v. Philip E. Kaplan, Attorney, Little Rock, Arkansas · filed 1990-05-10

The conduct of counsel, either retained or appointed, in representing clients, does not constitute action under color of state law for purposes of a section 1983 violation.

A court-appointed attorney defending a criminal case does not act under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983.

Barnes v. State of Tennessee Guy R. Dotson Gerald Melton Joseph S. Daniel, Judge William H. Bryson · filed 1990-05-15

The court-appointed attorney was not acting under color of state law for Sec. 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Bobal v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute · filed 1990-05-15

Finally, her civil rights claim cannot withstand scrutiny as pleaded. Apparently, she attempted to charge a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but cannot properly allege that any of the defendants acted “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Robert Clifton Johnson, Jr. v. Kaplan · filed 1990-05-17

Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court and on the additional ground that the defendant did not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party as a state actor merely because the state acts on that party’s recommendation or motion.

Anderson v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co. · filed 1990-06-18

Even if defendants had commenced such proceedings, a private party is not transformed into a state actor because the state acts on its recommendation or motion.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private nonprofit that is not a state actor cannot be held liable under it.

Greening v. Moran · filed 1990-06-21

We additionally agree with. LTF that Greening’s failure to allege that this Defendant acted under color of state law is fatal to this complaint, see Barrio v. McDonough District Hospital, 377 F.Supp. 317, 319-20 (S.D.Ill.1974), and that even if the allegations of color of state law were sufficient, Greening has failed to show that the LTF is a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Whether conduct is under color of state law for § 1983 is a question of law that counsel cannot establish by judicial admission.

Fletcher v. Eagle River Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 1990-06-26

It is clear that the question — is the conduct "under color of state law" — is a matter of law that cannot be bargained away by counsel nor shielded from ab initio consideration by successive court reviews.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a federal officer acting under color of federal law.

Saddler v. D'AMBROSIO · filed 1990-06-28

Actions under color of federal law are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats de facto public officials who hold themselves out as commissioners as acting under color of state law.

Spinka v. Brill · filed 1990-07-20

The defendants clearly acted under color of state law. They admittedly held themselves out as drainage commissioners, and the Illinois Appellate Court has affirmed the Circuit Court’s ruling that defendants were de facto commissioners.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law element is sufficiently pleaded when the alleged facts reasonably support an inference that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Davis v. Kirby · filed 1990-07-24

As long as the court may reasonably infer from the facts alleged that the defendant was acting under color of state law, the plaintiff has successfully alleged this element of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not support an employment discrimination claim against a defendant that has not acted under color of state law.

Fair v. Guiding Eyes for the Blind, Inc. · filed 1990-07-24

Although section 1983 has been the predicate for many types of employment discrimination suits, including suits alleging sexual harassment, section 1983 is not a basis for such claims where the defendant has not acted under color of state law. No nexus between the defendant’s action and the state is alleged.

Section 1983 requires an allegation and evidence that the defendant acted under color of law.

Bester v. Roadway Express, Inc. · filed 1990-07-25

The plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is patently frivolous. The second amended complaint does not allege and there is not a scintilla of evidence to show that the defendant acted under color of law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; an officer acting outside his jurisdiction without actual or apparent authority does not meet that requirement.

Wallace v. Chrysler Credit Corp. · filed 1990-07-27

A law enforcement officer who has neither actual nor apparent authority to act in another state cannot be acting under color of state law when outside his jurisdiction because he has no colorable authority there.

Section 1983 does not treat public defenders as acting under color of state law when performing their functions as counsel.

Tate v. Joseph B. Brown, Jr., Louis Lambert · filed 1990-08-01

The defendants did not act under color of state law in performing their functions as counsel to Tate.

Section 1983 does not subject a state-employed appellate defense attorney to suit when the attorney acts only as a client representative, rather than under color of state law.

Medina v. Lydick · filed 1990-08-14

Upon consideration, we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed the case. Even though the attorney was employed by the state, his function involved only the representation of a client as in Polk County.

A private person who willfully participates in joint activity with the state or its agents can act under color of law and be liable under § 1983.

Norton v. Cobb · filed 1990-08-15

Although § 1983 does not reach purely private conduct, a private person, acting “under color of law,” can be held liable if “he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.”

A § 1983 claim that private defendants acted under color of state law by conspiring with state actors requires particularized facts showing a conspiracy.

Heldstab v. Liska · filed 1990-08-20

To show that the private defendants acted under color of state law, Heldstab will have to show that they acted in concert with state actors. ... It is not enough merely to raise a metaphysical possibility that the defendants might have conspired; there must be allegations of particularized facts which show the existence of a conspiracy.

Section 1983 treats state social workers placing a child for adoption as acting under color of state law.

Engstrom v. State · filed 1990-09-19

Clearly, the department’s social workers were acting under color of state law in placing Melody for adoption.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against private citizens whose conduct cannot be ascribed to the state.

Geraldine Borrink, on Behalf of Her Minor Children, Jenny, Shana, Thomas, Robert and Jana Borrink v. Barba · filed 1990-09-19

Upon consideration, we conclude that the motion to amend the complaint was properly denied, and the case correctly dismissed, as no claim was stated under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Defendants are private citizens whose conduct cannot be ascribed to the state.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; alleged malpractice before incarceration, without such action, does not state a claim.

Thomas D.E. Hale v. Dr. Kahn Dr. David Snow Dr. Richard Kirk Watauga Mental Health Lakeshore Mental Health Woodridge Psy · filed 1990-09-19

Since the alleged malpractice occurred prior to the plaintiff's incarceration, he has not alleged any action under color of state law. Therefore, even construing his complaint most liberally, he would not have a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is not satisfied when a private party disregards a law that the state fails to enforce, without sufficient joint action or conspiracy.

Patty v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1990-09-27

Under Flagg Brothers, it is clear that a private party’s adherence to the law, or a state-tolerated disregard for the law, does not support a joint action or conspiracy claim sufficient to establish the “under col- or of state law” element of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats private persons who conspire with state officials as acting under color of state law when the officials participate through their state functions.

Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc. · filed 1990-10-01

Private persons acting in a conspiracy with state officials act under color of state law, provided that the officials take part in the conspiracy in a manner stemming from their state functions.

Section 1983 does not treat a private involuntary commitment as state action merely because state law permits the commitment.

Harvey v. Harvey · filed 1990-10-17

A private commitment such as this does not become a state action merely because it is allowed by a state statute.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Bobal v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute · filed 1990-10-22

Apparently, she attempted to charge a violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, but cannot properly allege that any of the defendants acted "under color of state law."

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish both a constitutional violation and conduct under color of state law.

Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corporation · filed 1990-11-19

To maintain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he suffered a violation of a constitutional right and that the violation was committed under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law; an alleged wrong by a federal official alone does not suffice.

Donnelly v. United States Department of the Interior · filed 1990-11-29

Moreover, Donnelly cannot sustain an action under section 1983 because there are no facts that any federal official committed a wrongful action under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits tenants to enforce their federal rights against a public housing authority acting under color of law.

Richmond Tenants Organization, Inc. v. Richmond Redevelopment & Housing Authority · filed 1990-12-03

Plaintiffs are authorized to enforce their rights under federal law by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because RRHA at all times was acting under color of law.

Private physicians and hospitals do not act under color of state law when they admit a minor to a private facility on a custodial parent’s consent, without exercising powers traditionally exclusive to the state.

R.J.D. v. Vaughan Clinic, P.C. · filed 1990-12-07

We cannot find that nexus here. Dr. Grayson's admission of R.J.D. into Children's Hospital, and the contract of Children's Hospital with R.J.D.'s mother for the care of R.J.D., are not exclusive state prerogatives. We find that R.J.D. failed to establish the required nexus sufficient to show that the defendants acted "under color of state law."

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private parties for seeking and obtaining a temporary injunction under state law without evidence of joint activity with the State.

Valenzuela v. Aquino · filed 1990-12-13

Absent some additional evidence of “interlocking” activities with the State, the Aquinos cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for seeking and obtaining a temporary injunction under Texas law.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is met when an on-duty fire captain acts in his capacity as station chief while engaging in the alleged misconduct.

MacDowell v. Manchester Fire Department · filed 1990-12-14

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. ... The Court concludes that Captain Paradis was acting in his capacity as Chief of Station 3 of the Manchester Fire Department when he performed the acts complained of, and accordingly, rejects defendants’ first argument.

A county coroner acts under color of state law for § 1983 when state law permits the challenged removal of corneas and the coroner’s office carries it out under its customary practice.

Brotherton v. Cleveland · filed 1991-01-18

The latter requirement, under color of state law, is easily satisfied in this case: Ohio Rev.Code § 2108.60 permitted the coroner, an employee of Hamilton County, to have a technician remove Steven Brotherton’s corneas without regard to anyone’s consent; the coroner’s office took advantage of this statute by customarily removing corneas before inspecting records or receiving consent.

A state correctional facility superintendent acts under color of state law when recommending an employee’s demotion and termination in that capacity.

Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center · filed 1991-01-31

Steve Long recommended the demotion and termination of plaintiff in his capacity as superintendent of a state correctional facility. Therefore, Long acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law; actions by a tribal health services director that lack that character cannot support a claim.

Mckinney v. State Of Oklahoma · filed 1991-02-08

Finally, we conclude that the actions of the Director of Health Services for the Citizen Band Pottawatomie Tribe were not under color of state law for the purposes of maintaining plaintiff's suit against him under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Officials acting under Puerto Rico law satisfy Section 1983’s requirement that the challenged conduct occur under color of state law.

Nestor Colon Medina & Sucesores Inc. v. Custodio · filed 1991-02-08

The initial inquiry in a Section 1983 ease focuses on two essential elements: (1) whether the conduct at issue was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... The first requirement is easily met since plaintiffs are complaining of conduct committed by persons acting under Puerto Rico law.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a tribal health-services director whose challenged actions were not under color of state law.

McKinney v. Oklahoma, Department of Human Services · filed 1991-02-08

Finally, we conclude that the actions of the Director of Health Services for the Citizen Band Pottawatomie Tribe were not under color of state law for the purposes of maintaining plaintiff’s suit against him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a public defender as acting under color of state law merely because the defender is publicly employed.

Anderson v. D.C. Public Defender Service · filed 1991-02-12

Although Buchanan was employed by the public defenders office, she is not, by virtue of her employment as a public defender, a state actor.

A private party acts under color of state law for § 1983 when it invokes state officials to use a constitutionally deficient state procedure.

Jordan v. Berman · filed 1991-02-22

When invoking the aid of state officials in utilizing constitutionally infirm, albeit presumptively valid, state procedures, however, a private individual does act under color of state law for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not treat an attorney representing a client as acting under color of state law merely because the court appointed and the state paid the attorney.

Koenig ex rel. Koenig v. Snead · filed 1991-02-28

Attorneys who serve clients pursuant to court appointment and who are paid by the state do not act under color of state law by reason of the means of their appointment and payment.

Section 1983 treats a state employee’s conduct as under color of state law when it is related to supervisory authority conferred by the state.

Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico · filed 1991-03-13

Therefore, we must conclude that these residents were acting directly under color of state law as their conduct was “related to the state authority conferred on [them]” and related to the nature of the powers and duties assigned to them.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights by a person acting under color of state law; a federal prisoner’s constitutional claim against a federal employee is treated as a federal question action instead.

Muhammad v. Moore · filed 1991-03-20

This statute provides a remedy for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights caused by a person acting under color of state law. Because plaintiff, a federal prisoner suing a federal employee for alleged constitutional violations, is proceeding pro se, the court will liberally construe his complaint as an action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Butcher v. Milner II · filed 1991-03-27

The district court found appellants' suit frivolous because they failed to allege appellees acted under color of state law, as required by section 1983. The court also found their suit was a vexatious attempt to relitigate matters already decided in the state courts. The record supports both conclusions.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against an attorney who was not acting under color of state law.

Hoffman v. Moss · filed 1991-03-28

Hoffman failed to state a cause of action against his attorney because counsel was not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 reaches actions of Purdue University officials acting under color of state law.

Kashani v. Purdue University · filed 1991-04-01

There is no question that appropriate state action exists and that the officials at Purdue University acted under col- or of state law.

A private party alleged to have conspired with a government actor is subject to § 1983 only if specific facts support joint action under color of law; vague, conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Spear v. Town of West Hartford · filed 1991-04-17

First, the allegations are conclusory and too vague to support a claim of conspiracy between a private party and a government actor for purposes of the “action under the color of law” requirement.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations of joint action between a private defendant and state officials; a bare claim that they acted in concert is insufficient.

Roush v. Roush · filed 1991-04-18

Thus, Mr. Roush has failed to allege that RP had a common understanding or meeting of the minds with any state actors. Instead, Mr. Roush’s complaint merely asserts that RP acted “in concert with the other defendants.” More conclusory allegations of this nature will not suffice.

Section 1983 treats a state permitting agency’s refusal to process construction drawings as action under color of state law.

Pfz Properties, Inc. v. Rene Alberto Rodriguez, Etc. · filed 1991-04-23

Assuming that PFZ had a property interest in obtaining the construction permit, it was deprived of that interest when ARPE refused to process the' construction drawings. This deprivation was “under color of state law” for the purposes of § 1983.

Officials enforcing Pennsylvania’s professional and judicial conduct rules act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Stretton v. DISCIPLINARY BD. OF S. CT OF PA. · filed 1991-04-24

When enforcing either the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct or the Code of Judicial Conduct, defendants act under color of state law.

A state public defender representing a defendant on appeal does not act under color of state law and cannot be sued under § 1983 for that representation.

Sayles v. Veza · filed 1991-04-25

The district court correctly dismissed this defendant pursuant to Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 102 S.Ct. 445 (1981). The Polk County decision held that state public defenders do not act under color of state law and, therefore, cannot be subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a federal agency executing a federal sentence because it is not acting under color of state law.

Jackson v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 1991-05-08

Jackson failed to state a claim under Sec. 1983 because the Bureau was not a state actor for Sec. 1983 purposes because it did not act under color of state law when it executed Jackson's federal sentence.

A federal official acting jointly with a state official in the challenged conduct satisfies § 1983’s state-action requirement.

Merritt v. John E. MacKey and Jerry Howard, Knowlton Merritt v. John E. MacKey Steve Vincent · filed 1991-05-08

Actions filed under § 1983 require state action. ... We agree with the district court that Mackey is liable for attorney’s fees under Section 1988, because he acted in concert with Vincent, a state official.

Section 1983 permits claims against federal officials who exercise state authority under color of state law, without requiring a conspiracy with state officials.

Terrell v. Petrie · filed 1991-05-17

Defendants claim that there must be some conspiracy with state officials; however, neither the statute nor case law supports this proposition. The capias was issued under state law, to enforce the decision of a state court. Defendants effected the search and arrest pursuant to the capias, therefore they were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 reaches conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of a right guaranteed by federal law or the Constitution.

Davis v. Halpern · filed 1991-06-05

Section 1983 proscribes conduct under color of state law which deprives a plaintiff of a right guaranteed by the federal Constitution or laws. Defendants have never contested that state action exists here, and this claim, therefore, withstands this motion as well.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal employees acting under color of federal law rather than state law.

Terrell v. R.D. Brewer, Warden Jon Morales Christopher C. Phillips · filed 1991-06-05

He incorrectly asserts that he has stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As his complaint alleges, each defendant was a federal employee acting under color of federal law, not state law, “during all the time relevant to this complaint.”

Section 1983 does not categorically exclude guardians ad litem from acting under color of state law; their role must be assessed case by case.

Kohl v. Murphy · filed 1991-06-27

Unlike the public defender, however, the function of the GAL is not necessarily adverse to the state. Therefore, it is not appropriate to extend the per se rule which Dodson established for public defenders, to GALs. This court concludes, therefore, that under the reasoning of Atkins, it is appropriate to apply the Dodson test to GALs only on a ease-by-case basis.

Section 1983 applies only to action taken under color of state law, so it does not cover an agency shop authorized by federal statute.

Pilots Against Illegal Dues (Paid) v. Air Line Pilots Association (Alpa) · filed 1991-07-11

Nevertheless, we affirm the dismissal because § 1983 applies only to actions taken under color of state law. The authorization for the agency shop at issue here was based on a federal statute, the Railway Labor Act, and § 1983 is therefore inapplicable.

Section 1983 requires sufficient factual allegations that private defendants acted under color of state law.

Price v. Hawaii · filed 1991-07-11

In other words, since there was no sufficient pleading that the private appellees were acting under color of state law, the district court properly dismissed the action as to them.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a mutual agreement between a private party and state officials to hold the private party liable for conspiring to deprive someone of constitutional rights; cooperation or a shared purpose alone is insufficient.

John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Anderson · filed 1991-07-15

The case law, however, requires more than a common purpose; it requires a common understanding--some evidence, that is, of a mutual agreement. We have searched the record in vain for any evidence that John Hancock conspired with the Solicitor or with the police to suppress information.

Section 1983 treats a public official as acting under color of state law when he uses authority to carry a gun granted by his office to threaten someone.

Cassady v. Thurman Tackett, Individually and in His Capacity as Johnson County Jailer · filed 1991-07-24

Here, we are obliged to conclude that in allegedly flourishing and threatening to use his gun against Cassady, Tackett acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not make a private firm a state actor merely because it sells products to the government.

Steading v. Thompson · filed 1991-08-19

A private firm does not become a state actor by selling its products to the government.

Section 1983 treats private parties as acting under color of state law when they conspire with law enforcement officers to carry out a deprivation.

Soldal v. County of Cook · filed 1991-08-27

The deputy sheriffs prevented Soldal from exercising his right, and while this by itself may not have made them actual participants in the eviction, the condition of the record (the case was dismissed on summary judgment) requires us, as the panel opinion explained, to assume that there was a conspiracy between the private and the public defendants — that the deputy sheriffs joined Terrace Properties in a scheme to get rid of a pesky tenant, a troublemaker. 923 F.2d at 1247-48. If so, it is as if the deputy sheriffs themselves seized the trailer, disconnected it from the utilities, and towed it away. Equivalently it is as if they had deputized the private defendants to assist them. Thus, on the state of the record, we must regard all of the defendants as having acted under color of state law.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law element is sufficiently pleaded when a state insurance department employee allegedly acts through authority conferred by the state.

Universal Security Insurance v. Koefoed · filed 1991-08-28

Regarding the first element, Hakemian sufficiently alleges that Koefoed was acting under color of state law by means of the authority given to him by the State of Illinois as an employee of the Illinois Department of Insurance.

Section 1983 treats public college officials as acting under color of state law when they use authority conferred by the state to take the challenged actions.

Levin v. Harleston · filed 1991-09-04

More to the point, these College officials undertook all actions germane to this lawsuit, or undertook to refrain from acting, in order to affect the teaching and academic environment of the College. They did so through the functional power of the positions of leadership conferred upon them by and through the State, which funds the College’s operations.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a state employee who uses his state authority to sexually assault people he encounters while providing employment services.

Dang Vang Yia Moua Yang Xiong Maichao Vang v. Vang Xiong X. Toyed, Individually and in His Capacity as Refugee Counselor · filed 1991-09-05

Because the evidence was sufficient to lead the jury to conclude Xiong acted in abuse of his state authority, and to find that he acted under color of state law in raping the plaintiffs, we hold the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to establish a § 1983 claim and thus that the jury verdict was not plain error.

Section 1983 does not cover actions of the federal government or its officers.

John's Insulation, Inc. v. Siska Construction Co. · filed 1991-09-11

Actions of the Federal Government or its officers are exempt from the proscriptions of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that private defendants acted under color of state law; receiving and using land granted by the State alone does not suffice.

Price v. State Of Hawaii · filed 1991-09-18

None of these forms of connection between the State and the private appellees is pled here, nor are any of them hinted at. On the contrary, HSHS received a grant of property and has treated that property as its own for almost one hundred years. In other words, since there was no sufficient pleading that the private appellees were acting under color of state law, the district court properly dismissed the action as to them.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against private physicians and hospitals for involuntary commitments under Pennsylvania’s Mental Health Procedures Act because the Act does not compel or sufficiently connect those commitments to the state.

Janicsko v. Pellman · filed 1991-09-25

Given the language of the relevant sections of the MHPA, this court cannot say that the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill by private physicians and hospitals is, under the MHPA, a function compelled by or sufficiently connected to state directives to attribute those actions to the state. Accordingly, no cause of action may be stated under § 1983 against the three sets of private defendants.

Section 1983 does not treat private parties as acting under color of state law merely because they wanted the state to act, even if the state action violated § 1983.

Hoagy Wrecker Service, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne · filed 1991-10-15

Clearly, private defendants do not act under color of state law merely because they wished the state to take action, even if that state action itself was a violation of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires proof that private airline or security personnel acted as state actors before they can be held liable.

Garcia v. Perez · filed 1991-10-31

There has been absolutely no showing that either the EAL and/or Security Associates’ personnel were state actors subject to the constraints of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on lawyers merely for representing clients in private litigation because that conduct is not under color of state law.

Cooks v. Franklin · filed 1991-11-15

We have previously stated that "[l]awyers do not act under color of state law solely by engaging in private litigation on behalf of their clients." Brown v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497, 501 (10th Cir.1979). Therefore, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Crowder, Shepard, and Shoop must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; an adjutant general making personnel decisions for a federal National Guard technician acts as a federal agent, so those decisions do not satisfy that requirement.

Williams v. Colorado Air National Guard · filed 1991-11-21

Because the adjutant general’s actions complained of here occurred in his role as a federal agent, under authority delegated pursuant to a federal statute and regulations promulgated by the United States Secretary of the Air Force, there was no legally sustainable allegation of action under color of state law to support a § 1983 claim.

A private corporation operating a county detention center under contract acts under color of law for purposes of § 1983.

Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc. · filed 1991-11-21

Although the precise question raised by Pri-Cor has not been directly addressed by the Supreme Court, several of the Court’s decisions suggest that under the facts before us Pri-Cor acted under color of law for purposes of § 1983. ... Therefore, for the purposes of this appeal, we conclude that Pri-Cor was acting under color of law.

Section 1983 does not treat counsel’s conduct in representing a client as action under color of state law, whether counsel is retained or appointed.

Holbird v. Armstrong-Wright · filed 1991-11-26

The conduct of counsel, either retained or appointed, in representing clients, does not constitute action under color of state law for purposes of section 1983 violations.

Section 1983 is not satisfied when a private party merely pursues state law remedies, even if state employees are alleged to have assisted her.

Roush v. Roush · filed 1991-12-18

Mrs. Roush was merely pursuing remedies available under West Virginia law, and although certain state employees are alleged to have assisted her, this is not sufficient to satisfy § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a private party who conspires with a state actor to deprive someone of rights as acting under color of state law.

Lewis v. News-Press & Gazette Co. · filed 1992-01-07

It is well settled, however, that a private party acts under color of state law, for purposes of § 1983, when he or she conspires with a state actor to deprive someone of their rights.

Section 1983 does not treat private initiative petitioners as acting under color of state law merely because their petitioning serves a public function.

Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Casey · filed 1992-01-10

Although the acts of the defendants in participating in the legislative process serve a public function, such service does not transform their conduct into state action.

Section 1983 requires a complaint against a private entity on a conspiracy theory to allege facts showing that the entity acted with a state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.

Spear v. Town of West Hartford · filed 1992-01-13

To state a claim against a private entity on a section 1983 conspiracy theory, the complaint must allege facts demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.

Section 1983 reaches officials who issue and enforce writs of execution under color of state law, even when judgment creditors initiate the writs.

Hutchinson v. Cox · filed 1992-01-21

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of constitutional due process by persons acting under color of state law. Despite the fact that writs of execution are initiated by judgment creditors, it is undisputed that Defendants act under color of state law in issuing and enforcing those writs.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a private individual who does not act under color of state law.

Simmons v. The Executive Lodge · filed 1992-02-03

Because private individuals who do not act under color of state law are not subject to suit under section 1983, see Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1345 (9th Cir.1981), the district court properly dismissed the action as frivolous, see Jackson, 885 F.2d at 640.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

McGraw v. United States · filed 1992-02-06

Finally, with regards to plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1986, plaintiffs have failed to allege that the United States acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a state university professor when alleged conduct connected with his university duties may have been under color of state law.

McCann v. Ruiz · filed 1992-02-11

As a result, plaintiff has set forth more than sufficient information to suggest that defendant La-rue might have been acting under color of law and Larue’s request for summary judgment on this ground is therefore hereby DENIED.

Private individuals may be state actors under § 1983 when they act in conjunction with state officials during garnishment proceedings.

Washington v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc. · filed 1992-02-12

The Washingtons correctly note that defendants, although private individuals, may be state actors for purposes of § 1983 because they acted in conjunction with state officials during the garnishment proceedings.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal officials acting under color of federal law.

GRIMES, BY AND THROUGH GRIMES v. Cavazos · filed 1992-03-12

Here, the Department of Education is a federal agency, and the Secretary is a federal official acting under color of federal law; plaintiffs have not alleged otherwise. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the federal defendants must thus be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead or demonstrate that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Nicoleau v. Brookhaven Memorial Hospital Center · filed 1992-03-23

In addition, the plaintiffs’ failure to either plead or demonstrate that the defendants acted under color of State law destroys their claim under 42 USC § 1983 (see, e.g., Dahlberg v Becker, 748 F2d 85, 89, cert denied 470 US 1084; Fine v City of New York, 529 F2d 70, 74).

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting pursuant to federal law.

Lacen-Remigio v. United States · filed 1992-03-24

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting pursuant to federal law.

Section 1983 does not make private parties liable as joint actors with public officials merely because they misled those officials; a conspiracy requires the officials to be aware of the rights-violating nature of their actions.

Gilbert v. Feld · filed 1992-03-30

These allegations preclude a finding that there was a conspiracy between the private and public parties. A conspiracy cannot exist, for purposes of § 1983, where the public officials áre unaware of the violative nature of their actions due to the misrepresentations of the private parties.

Defense attorneys, whether appointed or retained, are not subject to suit under Section 1983 for representing a defendant because they do not act under color of state law.

Chris Myers, Jr. v. Judge Vogal, Judge Rushmyer, Tom Walters, John Knight, Ed Dentle, Kirk Daily · filed 1992-04-03

The attorneys who represented Myers, whether appointed or retained, did not act under color of state law and, thus, are not subject to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Smith v. Frank · filed 1992-04-03

First, claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law. The Court is unable to divine any such allegation in plaintiffs complaint.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against private parties when their conduct has no factual nexus to action under color of state law.

Price v. State of Hawaii · filed 1992-04-08

This court has already found that there was no factual basis for the claim that HSHS was acting under color of state law. ... For the same reason, the court finds that the action filed against defendants Smith and Okada was frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.