42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the alleged civil-rights violation was committed under color of state law.

Dieffenbach v. Buckley · filed 1979-01-29

In order to state a cause of action in a § 1983 suit, plaintiff must show that the alleged civil rights violation was accomplished “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” of the State of New Hampshire.

Section 1983 permits liability for private persons acting under color of state law through conspiracy with state officials and does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state remedies before invoking the federal remedy.

Archer Gardens, Ltd. v. Brooklyn Center Development Corp. · filed 1979-03-22

To state a claim for relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by “the Constitution and laws” of the United States; and second, that the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory.” ... It is well established that private persons may act “under color” of state law, and hence be held liable under section 1983 when they act in conspiracy with state officials. ... There is no requirement under section 1983 that plaintiffs exhaust state remedies. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has stated unequivocally that “[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of a federal right under color of state law; a private person who acts jointly and in concert with a state officer may be treated as a state agent and held liable.

Coggins v. Carpenter · filed 1979-03-22

To state a claim based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Coggins must allege that the defendants deprived her of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and that the defendants deprived her of this constitutional right while acting “under color of state law.” ... Purely private action is, by definition, not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, private individuals who act jointly with and in concert with a state officer are considered to have become agents of the state and to have acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action only for deprivations carried out under color of state law.

City of Winston-Salem v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local Union No. 391 · filed 1979-04-16

In any event, the Court does not believe that plaintiff in fact could allege a federal cause of action on behalf of its employees with respect to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As to Section 1983, plaintiff has not, nor could it, have alleged that these defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 covers state or local officials acting pursuant to their duties because that conduct is under color of state law.

Rudisill v. Flynn · filed 1979-05-31

The allegations of the complaint sufficiently establish the first requisite to such suits: state or local officials acting pursuant to their duties are acting “under color of state law” for the purposes of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 applies only to actions taken under color of state law.

Bertman Ames and Gloria Ames v. United States · filed 1979-06-20

By its very terms, however, section 1983 applies only to actions taken under “color of state law.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against a person acting under color of state law, but not against a private party without state action.

Joseph v. Ulster County Community Action Committee Inc. · filed 1979-08-23

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against private parties, but only against those persons acting “under color of state law”.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show both deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right and action under color of state law; private conduct unsupported by state action does not suffice for a Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection claim.

Spirt v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n · filed 1979-09-12

Such an exercise of a choice allowed by state law where the initiative comes solely from the private party and not from the state is insufficient to constitute state action. Accordingly, Spirt fails to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 covers claims against a housing authority for conduct under color of state law even when the governmental activity is proprietary in nature.

Chavez v. The City Of Santa Fe Housing Authority · filed 1979-09-24

Defendants also argue that the allegedly proprietary nature of the governmental activity in this case prevents the Housing Authority's actions from being conducted under "color of state law" for purposes of § 1983. This argument also fails.

Section 1983 reaches an authorized agency caring for and taking custody of state wards when it acts under color of state law.

Brooks v. Richardson · filed 1979-10-16

As an authorized agency empowered to care for and take custody of children who are wards of the state, BHC was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 covers an intentional tort inspired by racial animus and committed under color of state law when it denies equal protection.

Harris v. Richard G. Harvey, Jr. · filed 1979-11-01

In contrast, the present case concerns a racially motivated campaign to discredit and damage the plaintiff, resulting in serious injury to him. We agree with the district court that such an intentional tort inspired by racial animus and perpetrated under color of state law constitutes a denial of equal protection. Defendant has produced no case holding that such an action is not cognizable under Section 1983. Here the defendant was acting under color of law, and the jury found that his racially motivated actions had injured plaintiff. Such a claim is clearly within the purview of Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires defendants to act under color of state law for a claim to be sustained.

White v. Walnut Hill Telephone Co. · filed 1979-11-02

To sustain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it must be shown that the defendants acted under color of state law. ... The § 1983 claim is dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law, and a claim cannot proceed when that allegation is absent.

Settles v. Pinkerton, Inc. · filed 1979-11-12

As to any alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if any such allegation has been made by the plaintiff, it is clear that plaintiff has alleged no action under the color of state law so as to state a claim for violation of said statute. ... As defendant has previously pointed out plaintiff makes no allegations whatsoever of any state action or any action “under color of state law” by defendant so as to state a claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The failure to make such allegations clearly requires that this court dismiss plaintiff’s claim, if any he has made, for any violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 may apply to actions by state administrators in a mixed federal-state program when the actions are under color of state law.

Rowe v. State of Tennessee · filed 1979-11-13

We have held that under the proper, liberal construction of § 1983, the actions of the state administrators of a “mixed” federal and state program may, as a matter of law, be actions “under color of state law,” as required for application of the civil-rights statute.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a sheriff’s defense of a personal lawsuit is not state action merely because of the sheriff’s office or unexercised state-law authority.

Brown v. Chaffee · filed 1979-12-26

To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Brown must show defendants acted “under color of law.” ... Lawyers do not act under color of state law solely by engaging in private litigation on behalf of their clients. ... Acting under color of state law as required by section 1983 is defined as the “[mjisuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” ... Chaffee’s position as sheriff does not make his every action one under color of law; only when he is using the power granted by the state does it become state action. ... Defending a personal lawsuit in a way harmful to another is not action made possible because the wrongdoer has state authority. ... Unexercised authority under state law is not action under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and claims under it are subject to the applicable state statute of limitations.

John A. GUY, Appellant, v. SWIFT AND COMPANY, Appellee · filed 1980-01-08

If Guy’s fourteenth amendment claim were recast as a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it would still be deficient in view of § 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement. In addition, it would be barred by the three-year Nebraska statute of limitations.

Section 1983 applies only to acts under color of state law, and court-appointed attorneys do not act under color of law and therefore are not amenable to suit under the statute.

Jackson v. Salon · filed 1980-01-23

Nor did the allegation that the defendant Salon was, for a time, court-appointed and then allowed to withdraw establish a basis for Jackson’s suit in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the jurisdictional counterpart of which is 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)). Section 1983 is applicable only to acts under color of state law, and we have taken the view that court-appointed ... attorneys do not act under color of law and therefore are not amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for constitutional deprivations committed under color of state law.

Biederman v. Scharbarth · filed 1980-02-12

Plaintiffs also seek to ground their action on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. In order to maintain a cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment or § 1983, plaintiffs must show that the alleged constitutional deprivation was under color of state law. ... This, however, does not constitute the “affirmative support” which is necessary in order to confirm jurisdiction upon this court.

Section 1983 treats a private person as acting under color of state law when the person actively conspires with an immune state official to deprive someone of constitutional rights and the conspiracy has a significant nexus or entanglement with the official’s actions; the official’s immunity does not shield the private conspirator.

Norton v. Liddel · filed 1980-03-06

It is our view that the critical inquiry in making this determination is: Has the plaintiff demonstrated the existence of a significant nexus or entanglement between the absolutely immune State official and the private party in relation to the steps taken by each to fulfill the objects of their conspiracy? The resolution of such issues must, of necessity, be made on a case-to-case basis. ... Thus, drawing the inferences in the light most favorable to the Nortons, we hold that there are sufficient allegations of entanglement between Assistant District Attorney Pace and Liddel which, if proven, clothe Liddel’s actions with color of state law in conspiring with Pace to maliciously prosecute the Nortons.

Section 1983 does not require a public agency to have followed or violated a particular statute; allegedly unconstitutional action taken under color of law can suffice.

Faulkner v. Sadowski · filed 1980-03-18

To have violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however, it is not necessary that the Board have followed any particular statute. It is enough that the Board’s allegedly unconstitutional actions were taken under color of law in its capacity as a public agency.

Section 1983 requires an alleged constitutional deprivation to be taken under color of state law, meaning it regulates state governmental conduct rather than private conduct.

Baker v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority · filed 1980-05-06

However, for purposes of this determination, “color of law” and state action have the same affect; together, they mean that § 1983 regulates state governmental conduct, as distinct from private conduct. ... Hence, the state involvement requirements of both § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment are satisfied.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federal right under color of state law, and a private person qualifies only when willfully participating in joint activity with the State or its agents.

Prahl v. Brosamle · filed 1980-07-10

The elements for recovery under sec. 1983 are twofold. First, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the United States. Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted under color of state law. ... The record does not support a conclusion that Brosamle acted under color of state law. Brosamle acted exclusively for his private employer. Section 1983 is directed only to state action. Section 1983 “does not reach purely private conduct . . . .” ... A private person nevertheless acts under color of law for purposes of sec. 1983 if that person is “a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.”

For an equal-protection claim under § 1983, the challenged conduct must be under color of state law and purposeful discrimination must be shown; sufficiently pleaded allegations warrant further inquiry.

Golden Rule Life Insurance Co. v. Mathias · filed 1980-07-17

We have already held that ETS’s function was State action, and therefore the “color of law” requirement of the statute is met. The next requirement is that purposeful discrimination must be shown. Washington v. Davis (1976), 426 U.S. 229, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597, 96 S. Ct. 2040. ... “By using and relying on the Illinois Insurance Agents and Brokers License Qualification Examination, as formulated, administered, and graded by defendant ETS, under the circumstances set forth in paragraphs 10 through 16 above, defendants have intentionally and knowingly discriminated against applicants who are black or members of other racial and minority groups.” ... There are sufficient allegations under section 1983 to require further inquiry. Washington.

Section 1983 does not reach a private rehabilitation foundation’s conduct merely because a parolee is required by the state to attend its program; the conduct must be under color of state law.

Tilbe v. Entitas Foundation, Inc. · filed 1980-08-06

The Court believes that a condition of parole requiring a parolee to attend an alcohol and drug rehabilitation foundation will not necessarily give color of state law to the rehabilitation foundation’s actions. The condition is between the parolee and the state, not the state and the foundation. The foundation is not required to accept the parolee into its program, and if it does so, it does so on its own terms, not those of the state. ... From the foregoing, the Court concludes that there was no action by defendant under color of state law as required by Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; an off-duty police officer’s status alone does not resolve that issue, which depends on the nature of the act and may present a factual question for the jury.

Layne v. Sampley · filed 1980-08-11

It is clear that whether or not a police officer is off-duty does not resolve the question of whether he or she acted under color of state law. ... Rather, it is necessary to scrutinize the nature of the act. ... Although in certain cases, it is possible to determine the question whether a person acted under color of state law as a matter of law, ... there may remain in some instances “unanswered questions of fact regarding the proper characterization of the actions” for the jury to decide.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law, which can include an off-duty police officer’s response to a private employer’s request when indicia show he acted as a police officer.

Traver v. Meshriy · filed 1980-08-25

At the outset we reject the appellants’ contention that there was insufficient state involvement in Gibson’s actions to render them “under color of state law.” ... All these indicia of state action compel the conclusion that Gibson was acting “under color of state law” when he responded to Meshriy’s call for help.

Section 1983 requires defendants to have acted under color of state law.

Wade v. New York Telephone Co. · filed 1980-09-18

The complaint does not state a cause of action under § 1983 for it lacks an allegation that defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 applies to deprivations of rights accomplished under color of state law.

Gillespie v. Civiletti · filed 1980-10-06

Section 1983 is based upon the fourteenth amendment and thus concerns deprivations of rights that are accomplished under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and a private community action agency's discharge decision is not actionable without state involvement in the personnel decision.

Joseph v. COMMUNITY ACTION COM'N, ETC. · filed 1980-10-15

Similarly, plaintiff does not here claim, nor does it appear from all the facts presented, that the State of New York regulated CACHE's personnel policies or was in any way involved in plaintiff's discharge.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and a private community action agency's discharge decision is not actionable without state involvement in the personnel decision.

Joseph v. Community Action Commission to Help the Economy, Inc. · filed 1980-10-15

We therefore follow Judge Sand in finding that there was no State action and conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a deprivation of a constitutional right under color of state law; an on-duty sheriff’s conduct may satisfy the color-of-law requirement when related to official duties, but not when purely private.

Robert E. Blomberg, Jr. v. Schneiderheinz · filed 1980-10-24

In this section 1983 suit the issue is whether the Blombergs sufficiently alleged that (1) defendant deprived them of a constitutional right (2) while acting under color of state law. ... If that suit was against Schneiderheinz in his official capacity, it seems reasonable to conclude that his receipt of the summons and accompanying conduct related to his official duties and raised a claim within the purview of section 1983. On the other hand, if the suit was against Schneiderheinz merely in his private capacity, his receipt of the summons and accompanying conduct should be considered private and no more than tortious.

Section 1983 requires challenged activity to be under color of state law, a requirement treated as equivalent to Fourteenth Amendment state action.

Lestrange v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 1980-11-04

The requirement in § 1983 actions that the challenged activity be “under color of state law” is treated as equivalent to the “state action” requirement for actions under the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Therefore, since defendant’s activity did not constitute the required “state action” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment claim, it does not constitute “under color of state law” activity for the § 1983 claim. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims, as well as his § 1983 claims, therefore, will be dismissed.

Section 1983 treats private persons who willfully participate in joint action with state officials as acting under color of state law, even when the state official is immune from damages liability.

Dennis v. Sparks · filed 1980-11-17

As the Court of Appeals correctly understood our cases to hold, to act “under color of” state law for § 1983 purposes does not require that the defendant be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents. ... Under these allegations, the private parties conspiring with the judge were acting under color of state law; and it is of no consequence in this respect that the judge himself is immune from damages liability. Immunity does not change the character of the, judge’s action or that of his co-conspirators.

Section 1983 treats a private individual as acting under color of state law when the individual allegedly conspires with state officials to deprive another of constitutional rights.

Health Care Equalization Committee v. Iowa Medical Society · filed 1980-11-05

A private individual can be found to be acting under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983 if that individual allegedly conspired with state officials to deprive another of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 treats otherwise private acts as under color of state law when they are part of a conspiracy with state officials.

Goadby v. Philadelphia Electric Co. · filed 1981-01-09

Goadby has alleged a conspiracy between PECO and PUC and it is settled that otherwise private acts are performed under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when they are part of a conspiracy with state officials.

Section 1983 reaches a private party who acts in concert with someone acting under color of law, even if the state official has a valid defense or immunity.

Arment v. Commonwealth Nat. Bank · filed 1981-01-14

Concert of action between a private person and one acting under color of law exposes the private person to liability even if the state official presents a valid defense or enjoys complete immunity.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law.

Kirshner v. Goldberg · filed 1981-01-15

Plaintiff has failed to allege that Morgan Guaranty acted under color of state law as required in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 imposes liability for conduct under color of state law; an official's private conduct is not enough.

Delcambre v. L. E. Delcambre, Jr. · filed 1981-01-26

Second, the court correctly dismissed the entire action on the grounds that Amy Delcambre failed to prove a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Although Chief Delcambre allegedly assaulted Amy Delcambre on the premises of the municipal police station, it is clear that he was not acting under color of law as required for liability under that statute.

Section 1983 permits a claim for wrongful deprivation of property by persons acting under color of state law, including concerted action by public and private persons that deprives individuals of federal constitutional rights.

Jonez P. Suthoff, Frances P. Miller and Inez W. Philibert, Plaintiffs v. Yazoo County Industrial Development Corporation · filed 1981-02-17

Sufficient to sustain § 1983 federal jurisdiction are allegations of concerted action by public and private persons to deprive individuals of federal constitutional rights through color of state law. ... A § 1983 action may be based upon the wrongful deprivation of property by persons acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 is unavailable when officials act as federal agents rather than under color of state law.

Ellis v. Blum · filed 1981-02-18

Plaintiff would base her damages claim on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, assuming the state defendants were acting under color of state law, or alternatively, on the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, if they were not. We agree with the district court that the state officials were not acting under color of state law, 17 with the result that § 1983 is unavailable.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim against private parties alleged to have jointly acted with a state official even when that official is absolutely immune, while a state prosecutor acting within prosecutorial duties is absolutely immune from damages.

MacKo v. Bryon · filed 1981-02-19

A state prosecuting attorney, so acting, is absolutely immune from a civil suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The allegation of joint action with a state official satisfies the requirement of § 1983 that the unlawful actions of the other defendants be taken under color of state law, even though the state official in question enjoys absolute immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private parties unless their conduct amounts to action under color of state law, including sufficiently concerted involvement with the state.

Jones v. Taibbi · filed 1981-03-05

Taibbi and the LAPD had a coincidence of interest in the plaintiff as a suspect, but not the concert of involvement that would transform Taibbi’s telecast from a private venture to action taken under color of state law.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for deprivation of constitutional or statutory rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Cain v. Archdiocese of Kansas City, Kan. · filed 1981-03-03

Section 1983 prohibits deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws by anyone acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against officials who, acting under color of state law, deprive a person of constitutional rights.

Biancone v. Kramer · filed 1981-05-04

Plaintiff has alleged that the sheriffs acted under color of state law to deprive him of rights guaranteed by the Constitution; plaintiff has stated a claim.

Section 1983 provides a remedy against persons acting under color of state law for infringement of constitutional or federal statutory rights, and its scope is coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment.

Womack v. Shell Chemical Co. · filed 1981-05-18

In Section 1983, Congress has provided, a remedy to plaintiffs who are wronged by “persons” acting “under color of state law” where the plaintiff has a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal laws which is infringed. Thus Section 1983 is coextensive in scope with the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1983 requires challenged conduct to be taken under color of state law, and private conduct lacks that character without a sufficient nexus to state action.

Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff's Posse Comitatus · filed 1981-05-28

The unilateral and unauthorized adoption of "San Joaquin Sheriff's" as a modifying phrase to the organization's basic title of "Posse Comitatus" and the wearing of badges substantially identical in design and appearance to the badges worn by deputies of the Sheriff's Office do not constitute state action or involvement.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege and prove that the person or entity causing a deprivation of a federal right acted under color of state law.

Madon v. Long Island Univ. C. W. Post Center · filed 1981-07-06

More precisely, the “under color of state law” prerequisite applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, while the term “state action” is employed in Fourteenth Amendment cases.

Section 1983 makes conspiracies to deprive constitutional rights actionable without a class-based-discrimination showing and permits liability for private participants acting jointly with state officials, if the plaintiff proves a constitutional deprivation under color of state law.

Pizzolato v. Perez · filed 1981-09-04

Conspiracies to deprive one of his constitutional rights are actionable under Section 1983, and a showing of class-based discrimination is not a prerequisite to liability. ... To sustain a claim under Section 1983, plaintiff must show both a deprivation by defendant of a constitutionally secured right and that defendant acted under color of state law. ... Private persons, conspiring or participating in joint activity with state officials in prohibited conduct, may be sued under Section 1983, inasmuch as they are deemed to be acting under color of state law. ... Private individuals may be held liable for damages under Section 1983 even if they have conspired with immune state officials.

Section 1983 prohibits deprivation of individuals’ rights under color of state law and may be invoked against state officials and organizations.

Engblom v. Carey · filed 1981-09-02

Therefore 42 U.S.C. § 1983, prohibiting deprivation of individuals’ rights under color of state law, properly is invoked against all defendants.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of rights under the Constitution or federal law to occur under color of state law.

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority · filed 1981-09-22

In order to support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the deprivation of asserted rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States must be “under color of state law”.

Section 1983 treats a private party as acting under color of state law when the party willfully participates in joint action with state agents.

Wright v. City of Reno · filed 1981-10-28

For § 1983 purposes, to act “under color of” state law or authority does not require that the defendant be an officer of the state. It is enough that a private party was a willful participant in joint action with state agents.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendants acted under color of state law to state a cause of action.

Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp. · filed 1981-10-29

And finally, to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the fourteenth amendment, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires an alleged deprivation of federal rights to be carried out under color of state law; a private defendant does not meet that requirement absent allegations of conspiracy with state officials.

Rios v. Marshall · filed 1981-11-23

It is well-settled that to state a claim for relief under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that the persons who allegedly deprived them of a federal right acted under color of state law. ... The color of state law requirement will not be satisfied by claims against private defendants such as the New York apple defendants absent allegations that they conspired with state officials.

Section 1983 requires a claim to allege action under color of state law; reliance on a state statute satisfies that element even if the reliance is ultimately misplaced.

Mombro v. Louis Capano & Sons, Inc. · filed 1981-11-30

A claim under Section 1983 must also allege action “under color of state law.” Defendants admit they acted in reliance on Section 5715(d). This element is satisfied, even if that reliance is determined to be misplaced.

Section 1983 does not treat a public defender as acting under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Polk County v. Dodson · filed 1981-12-14

With respect to Dodson’s §1983 claims against Shepard, we decide only that a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for actions taken under color of federal law.

Bauer v. McCoy · filed 1982-01-22

Section 1983 is not a remedy against action under color of federal law.

Section 1983 requires a complaint against private parties to allege facts showing that they acted under color of state law.

Davis v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co. · filed 1982-01-28

At least in this context a Section 1983 (or Section 1343) complaint must state some factual predicate for that conclusion.

Section 1983 applies to actions taken by defendants under color of state law.

Santana v. Collazo · filed 1982-02-15

Defendants’ actions in connection with the matters alleged in this case constitute action by color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state action within the meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights only when the deprivation is committed under color of state law.

Dailey v. Sutton · filed 1982-03-30

This Court recognizes that it has a duty to hear prisoner complaints where the prisoner is deprived of his property by one acting under color of state law and the deprivation is without due process of law. ... In the case of plaintiff Dailey the deprivation was not under color of state law. ... Neither the prisoner Riggs who allegedly misappropriated plaintiff’s toy boat nor the nurse who purchased the boat from prisoner Riggs acted under color of state law. ... Section 1983 suggests no such translation.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law, and an attorney’s state licensure or status as a court officer does not establish that requirement merely because the attorney was retained or appointed.

Moss v. Varian · filed 1982-04-15

Moss’ action is maintainable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, only if defendant Varian’s actions were taken “under color of [a] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of [a] State or Territory.” Although attorneys are licensed to practice by the various states, and they are deemed officers of the court, such a nexus with the state is an insufficient basis for concluding that lawyers act “under color of state law” for the purposes of jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires both conduct by a person acting under color of state law and deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal laws.

Occhino v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1982-04-14

[I]n any § 1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two essential elements of a § 1983 action are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private party acted under color of state law before the party can be sued under the statute.

Klimzak v. City of Chicago · filed 1982-04-26

To invoke Section 1983 Klimzaks must adduce facts that convert such private parties into persons acting “under color” of state law.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; an off-duty officer acting in personal pursuits is not acting under color of state law when the conduct is not committed in the performance of an actual or pretended duty.

Bonsignore v. City of New York · filed 1982-06-15

Finally, Mrs. Bonsignore cross-appeals from the denial of her motion to amend her complaint to include a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court was correct in denying this motion. Officer Bonsignore, who was off-duty when he shot his wife, was not acting under color of state law since his actions were not "committed in the performance of any actual or pretended duty," Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F.Supp. 933, 937 (E.D.Pa.1968), but were performed "in the ambit of (his) personal pursuits," Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1040, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945) (plurality opinion); see Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 439, 441 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 429 U.S. 118, 97 S.Ct. 514, 50 L.Ed.2d 269 (1976) (per curiam ).

Section 1983 requires alleged state action; claims against private defendants fail when the complaint does not allege state involvement.

Seidel v. Chicago Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1982-07-21

Seidel’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the fourteenth amendment must also fail for lack of an allegation of state action. It is beyond dispute that “unless the requisite state involvement has been alleged, the complaint does not state a claim actionable under Section 1983.”

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to be under color of state law; a private voluntary medical society’s acts do not satisfy that requirement merely because state statutes recognize the peer-review system.

Greenfield v. Kanwit · filed 1982-08-04

That this endeavor has proven successful; and that the state has responded with occasional statutory references recognizing the existence and utility of that system ... simply does not suffice to transform acts taken by members of a private voluntary society, operating in a traditionally private preserve, into action conducted under color of state law for purposes of a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to be committed under color of state law.

Thompson v. Dereta · filed 1982-10-12

As defendants are all agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms of the United States Department of Treasury, they did not act under color of state law, as required for an action under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to qualify as state action, and its state-action analysis is the same as under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Phillips v. Youth Development Program, Inc. · filed 1982-11-08

Plaintiff asserts in her brief that the action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which prohibits interference with Federal rights “under color of” State law. ... Nevertheless, to find the requisite “State action” at issue in this case, our analysis is identical under either the Fourteenth Amendment or § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private party to show that the party acted under color of state law, which is equivalent to state action and requires the alleged infringement to be fairly attributable to the state.

Milonas v. Williams · filed 1982-11-09

When a private party, as compared to a state employee, for example, is charged with abridging rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States, the plaintiff, in order to prevail under Section 1983, must show that the private party was acting under the color of state law. The reason for this is fundamental. The fourteenth amendment, which prohibits the states from denying federal constitutional rights and which guarantees due process, applies to the acts of the states, not to acts of private persons or entities. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 842, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 3 S.Ct. 18, 21, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883). And Section 1983, which was enacted pursuant to the authority of Congress to enforce the fourteenth amendment, prohibits interference with federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Conduct that constitutes "state action" for fourteenth amendment due process purposes is also action "under color of state law" for purposes of Section 1983 civil rights suits. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1156 n.7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966). The United States Supreme Court has stated that the ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under Section 1983 is whether the alleged infringement of federal rights is fairly attributable to the state. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982).

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law, and a private person’s action does not satisfy that requirement absent state authority or willful participation in joint activity with the State or its agents.

Price v. Baker · filed 1982-12-01

Lola Baker was clothed with no authority under state law. ... The Court has said that the "under color" requirement is satisfied if an individual "is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents." ... Her action was not under the color of state law. The court properly directed a verdict in her favor as a matter of law.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law; a person with no state-law authority who acts individually does not satisfy that requirement.

Price v. Baker · filed 1982-12-01

Lola Baker was clothed with no authority under state law. ... No authority was directly or indirectly vested in the wife. ... Her action was not under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Landfried v. TERMINAL RR ASS'N OF ST. LOUIS · filed 1982-12-15

A prerequisite to success on a § 1983 claim is a showing that a defendant acted "under color of state law." Wallach v. Cannon, 357 F.2d 557 (8th Cir.1966). After careful review of plaintiffs' complaint, the Court is aware of no way in which plaintiffs' allegations could be taken as meeting this requirement. Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches private persons whose conduct is attributable to the state, including a private contractor that jointly participates with state officials by carrying out the City's demolition procedure.

Verdi v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1982-12-22

In order to be held liable under section 1983, the actions of private persons must be somehow attributable to the state. ... Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting ‘under color’ of law for purposes of the statute. To act ‘under color’ of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents. ... Therefore, I find that Liberty acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires state action equivalent to the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Avallone v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc. · filed 1982-12-30

However, § 1983 requires the same “state action” as the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 permits a cause of action against a private party whose joint participation with state officials in seizing and selling property constitutes state action and conduct under color of state law.

Charles T. Coleman, Sr. v. Michael C. Turpen, District Attorney Bill Vinzant, Sheriff Keifer Wrecker Service · filed 1983-01-13

We hold that Kiefer’s sale of the camper was state action under the fourteenth amendment and was therefore under color of state law for purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federally secured right under color of state law; violating a state-law duty alone does not satisfy the under-color-of-state-law element.

Henson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. · filed 1983-03-31

Even if Dr. Franz was under a duty imposed by state law to disclose the existence of plaintiffs’ said diseases, his breach of that duty, standing alone, would not constitute action taken under state law. Nor would any such breach, even if other members of the Medical Board similarly breached such duty, constitute a state policy pursuant to which Dr. Franz’s alleged breach amounted to action under color of state law. To the contrary, such action was, according to plaintiffs, action taken in clear and direct contravention of state law.

Section 1983 does not reach a private corporation that did not act under color of state law.

Cavileer v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 1983-04-12

Plaintiffs concede in their Reply Memorandum to Warner’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment that Warner is a party to this lawsuit only because of the contract between the City and Warner. Plaintiffs do not contend that Warner acted under color of state law or as part of a conspiracy. Because of our finding that Warner is a private corporation which did not act under color of state law, Warner is not subject to the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, this action is dismissed as to Warner for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state or local law.

Taylor v. Flint Osteopathic Hospital, Inc. · filed 1983-04-15

To establish a claim under section 1983, plaintiff must allege and prove that defendants acted under color of state or local law. ... In sum, this court concludes that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the PSRO acted under color of state law, and accordingly, the PSRO is entitled to summary judgment on the section 1983 claim as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for acts taken under color of state law, and state action under the Fourteenth Amendment need not be proved separately for a claim under both the statute and the amendment.

Gilmore v. Salt Lake Community Action Program · filed 1983-04-18

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for acts “under color” of state law. However, state action under the fourteenth amendment is a species of action under color of state law. ... Hence, the latter need not be separately proved for a cause of action under § 1983 and the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1983 does not reach a federal employee's request for or receipt of information gathered by state officials in an independent investigation, because that conduct is not action under color of state law.

Reverend W. Eugene Scott, Phd. v. Rosenberg · filed 1983-04-22

Any FCC request for and receipt of information gathered by the state officials in the course of their independent investigation did not constitute action under color of state law.

Section 1983 treats private creditors who invoke state garnishment procedures with state officials as acting under color of state law, while allowing a good-faith defense for private individuals who resort to such procedures in good faith.

Buller v. Buechler · filed 1983-05-05

In summary, we hold that the defendants’ conduct which allegedly deprived the plaintiffs of their property constituted state action as a matter of law. ... Thus, we conclude that in enacting section 1983 Congress did not intend to subject to liability private individuals who in good faith resorted to state garnishment or prejudgment attachment procedures.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the challenged conduct was taken under color of state law.

Michaelis v. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n · filed 1983-05-06

The basis of this First Amendment claim before this court appears to be 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court, however, seriously questions whether Michaelis has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted under this statute. He fails to indicate that any of the alleged conduct by defendants constituted action under color of State law, a necessary allegation in bringing a § 1983 action.

A Section 1983 claim requires both state action and action by the defendant under color of state law; conduct merely taken with knowledge of and pursuant to state law is insufficient unless it is attributable to the state.

Blue Cross v. Peacock's Apothecary, Inc. · filed 1983-07-13

To demonstrate that a person has acted under color of state law, the plaintiff must at least show that the person acted “with the knowledge of and pursuant to” the state law. ... To demonstrate that it has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, plaintiff must demonstrate state action: plaintiff must show that the actions of the person acting under color of state law are “properly attributable” to the State of Alabama. ... In summary, plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) the existence of state action and (2) action by the defendant under color of state law.

The Civil Rights Act may cover an official's wrongful acts even when the official lacked authority to commit them.

Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie · filed 1983-07-13

The Civil Rights Act does not exclude from its purview the wrongful acts of an official for which the official has no authority.

Section 1983 is an appropriate vehicle for constitutional claims against officials whose challenged actions were taken under color of state law.

Barnes v. Bosley · filed 1983-07-27

There is no question that defendants' actions were taken under color of state law and thus § 1983 is an appropriate avenue by which plaintiffs may proceed in this action.

A defendant’s status as a state actor is insufficient for § 1983 liability when the challenged decision did not result from a state rule, policy, or decision.

Gilmore v. Salt Lake Community Action Program · filed 1983-07-27

While we conclude that SLCAP is a state actor, we find that this personnel decision did not result from any rule, policy, or decision attributable to the state.

Section 1983 provides redress only for action under color of state law, not conduct by federal agents and private parties acting under federal law.

Zernial v. United States of America · filed 1983-09-12

His claim under section 1983 has a similar basic defect. That statute only provides redress for actions taken under color of state law, while the actions complained of here were taken pursuant to federal law by federal agents and private parties.

A § 1983 claim fails when the alleged federal-law violation was not committed by anyone acting under color of state law.

Jackson v. Guissinger · filed 1984-06-12

Thus, Jackson has failed to present a claim under section 1983 in regard to this particular alleged violation of federal law because the alleged violation was not accomplished by anyone acting under color of state law.

A private entity or its employees act "under color of" state law for section 1983 purposes only if the entity is fairly considered a state actor and the deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right, privilege, or rule of conduct having its source in state authority, i.e. is attributable to a governmental decision rather than merely tangential governmental involvement.

Casias v. City of Raton · filed 1984-07-06

First, the party charged with the alleged deprivation of a federal right must be one who may “fairly be considered a state actor.” ... Second, the deprivation must have resulted “from the exercise of a right, privilege, or rule of conduct having its source in state authority.” ... In other words, it must be “in some sense attributable to a governmental decision.”

A private corporation can be held liable under § 1983 for depriving someone of constitutional rights when it acted as an agent of a state actor, or acted jointly with a state actor, in the challenged conduct.

Planned Parenthood Ass'n/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 1984-08-09

Winston is liable under Section 1983 (at least for injunctive purposes) because it acted as an agent of CTA and Board when it rejected or participated in the rejection of PPA’s messages and because it acted jointly with CTA and Board in rejecting PPA’s messages.

Section 1983 provides no remedy against persons acting under federal law, since it reaches only conduct under color of state law.

Beerbower v. United States · filed 1984-09-13

Section 1983 provides no relief against those who act pursuant to federal rather than state law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against public officials who, acting in their official capacities under color of law, violate a plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Ammons v. DADE CITY, FLA. · filed 1984-09-21

Plaintiffs properly maintain their substantive cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this case involving allegations of violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States, Constitution, where such rights have been violated by public officials acting in their official capacities under “color of law.”

Section 1983 does not apply to conduct under color of federal law, except territorial law, and cannot circumvent an exclusive federal remedial scheme.

McGuinness v. United States Postal Service, Felix J. Jackson, and A.A. Winslow, Defendants · filed 1984-10-05

The exclusivity of section 505 defeats McGuinness’s efforts to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — which anyway does not apply to action under color of ... federal, ... other than territorial, law, see ... — or 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) or the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Federal employees who do not act under color of state law cannot satisfy Section 1983's color-of-law requirement.

Hewitt v. Grabicki · filed 1984-10-23

As the defendants were federal employees not acting under color of state law, plaintiff cannot ... satisfy the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 claim against a private mortgage company fails without a showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Washington v. The Lomas & Nettleton Company · filed 1985-02-13

There are two necessary elements for a Sec. 1983 action: 1) the defendant was acting under color of state law, and 2) the plaintiff was deprived of constitutional rights. ... In this case, there is no showing of state action.

Section 1983 does not cover claims that federal officials acting under federal law deprived a plaintiff of statutory or constitutional rights.

39 Fair empl.prac.cas. 162, 38 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,583 Eligio Castro and Rafael Diaz Diaz v. United States of America · filed 1985-03-14

Such allegations are not within the purview of § 1983, and appellants therefore have failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted under that provision.

An off-duty police officer may act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes because the nature of the act, rather than duty status or clothing, controls.

Alvarado v. City of Dodge City · filed 1985-05-02

An off-duty police officer may act under color of law. “ ‘It is the nature of the act performed, not the clothing of the actor or even the status of being on duty, or off duty, which determines whether the officer has acted under color of law.’ ”

A state actor acts under color of state law for § 1983 purposes even when carrying out rules prescribed by federal law.

Dozier v. Loop College, City of Chicago · filed 1985-11-06

This is a possible reading of § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), its jurisdictional counterpart, but the Supreme Court has held that all acts of the state are automatically “under color of state law” no matter the source of the substantive rule.

A city acts under color of state law when it delegates to a private corporation powers conferred by state law and traditionally exercised by the city, including eminent domain.

Williams v. City of St. Louis · filed 1986-01-29

Pursuant to state law, the City delegated its authority to set housing standards for residential properties and its power of eminent domain to MMCRC. This delegation under state law of powers possessed by virtue of state law and traditionally exercised by the City satisfies us that the City’s action here is under color of state law.

National Guard technician supervisors and a state adjutant general act under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes when participating in technician discharge decisions, despite the Guard’s hybrid federal-state status.

Johnson v. Orr · filed 1986-03-17

In short, we agree with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits that the 1968 Act left the Guard's administrative authority largely at the state level. ... Accordingly, we see nothing that permits, much less compels us to depart from our holding in ...

A Section 1983 claim fails without an allegation that the challenged conduct occurred under color of state law.

Barton v. Alabama Electric Cooperative, Inc. · filed 1986-04-11

Third, the § 1983 civil rights claim must fail because there is no allegation of action done under color of state law.

Municipal waterworks officials acting under color of state law are subject to § 1983.

Freeman v. Hayek · filed 1986-04-30

There is no dispute in this case that the defendants acted under color of state law and are therefore subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An official acts under color of state law for § 1983 when carrying state authority, whether the official properly exercises or misuses that authority.

Doyle v. Dukakis · filed 1986-05-16

Thus, § 1983 will reach those acting “under color of” law, that is those “who carry a badge of authority of a state and represent it in some capacity whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it.”

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for deprivations under color of state law, so handicap-discrimination claims against a federal agency or federal officials acting under federal law cannot proceed under the statute.

Fallett v. United States Postal Service · filed 1986-08-25

The statute, by its terms, is directed only to state wrongdoing. ... The court concludes that it has no jurisdiction over a claim of discrimination, based on a handicap, against a federal agency or official predicated upon § 1983 or the Fourteenth Amendment. On this basis, any claim in plaintiff’s first amended complaint asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the Fourteenth Amendment is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of law when depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Lamoureux v. Haight · filed 1986-10-28

An individual must be acting under color of law in depriving a plaintiff of a constitutional right for § 1983 to be implicated.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not cover acts taken under color of federal law.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 71,526 Lonneker Farms, Inc. And Robert Lonneker v. John Klobucher, Allen Hatley, Allen Hatley and Assoc · filed 1986-11-19

Next we point out that section 1983 requires that the act alleged to be wrongful must have been taken under color of state law. The actions about which Lon-neker complains were taken under the color of federal law. Section 1983 provides Lon-neker no help.

Section 1983 applies to persons acting under color of state law, not federal officials acting pursuant to federal law.

Philip Roberts Chatman, Jr. v. Commodore D.E. Hernandez, U.S.N. · filed 1986-11-21

However, Section 1983 applies to persons acting “under color of state law” and not to persons acting pursuant to federal law.

A state agency acts under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes when it uses state authority to implement a policy, even if the policy also follows federal guidance.

Medicare&medicaid Gu 35,941 Sandra Rose v. Heintz · filed 1986-12-02

That it did so pursuant to a telephone conversation with an HHS official does not make DIM’s action any less an action under color of state, as well as federal, law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for constitutional deprivations committed under color of state, territorial, or District of Columbia law, not for acts of federal officials under color of federal law.

Daly-Murphy v. Michael Winston, E. Carmack Holmes, Arthur S. Kling, Ronald L. Nelson and the Veterans Administr · filed 1988-01-20

There is no valid basis for a claim under section 1983, in that Daly-Murphy’s allegations are against federal officials acting under color of federal law. Section 1983 provides a remedy only for deprivation of constitutional rights by a person acting under color of law of any state or territory or the District of Columbia.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; this court held that prison dentists without custodial or supervisory duties did not meet that requirement.

Vester v. Murray · filed 1988-02-17

Plaintiff has not stated a claim under § 1983 against the medical defendants because he has not alleged and the record does not indicate that these defendants exercised custodial or supervisory duties in the Virginia Department of Corrections. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to characterize these defendants’ activities as under color of state law.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-law requirement can be adequately alleged when county officials use their official power and public funds to initiate litigation, even if they file the action as private citizens.

Jones v. Duncan · filed 1988-03-07

It was the exercise of their official power to set the wheels in motion to bring the suit and their financing of the suit that qualifies as "state action."

Section 1983 claims against private defendants must plead in some detail the relationship with the state that makes their conduct state action.

Gauvin v. Trombatore · filed 1988-03-25

Moreover, plaintiff has failed to allege that the private defendants acted under color of state law. The relationship between the state and the private actor which establishes state action must be pled in some detail.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; public officials do not meet that requirement by sending anonymous letters without using their official positions.

Gleason v. McBride · filed 1988-04-22

Assuming for purposes of this motion that Spota and Zegarelli were responsible for the anonymous letters, the fact that they were sent anonymously precludes a finding that they were acting under color of state law at the time they sent the letters. Therefore, Gleason’s § 1983 claim based on the anonymous letters is dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not apply to conduct undertaken only under color of federal law.

Lovelace v. Whitney · filed 1988-05-03

Because the alleged actions taken by defendants Hall, Whitney and Turow in this case could only have been taken under color of federal law, §§ 1983 and 1985 are inapplicable. Therefore, Lovelace cannot state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law.

Hill v. McKay · filed 1988-05-03

Ronnie L. Hill, a North Carolina inmate, appeals from the order of the district court dismissing his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. We agree with the district court that the defendant did not act under color of state law and therefore affirm its dismissal on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Hill's action.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; federal employees acting without state authority do not satisfy that requirement.

Dixon v. Veterans Administration · filed 1988-05-19

The section 1983 claims were properly dismissed because the federal employees involved did not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not reach an appointed attorney’s representation of an indigent criminal defendant because the attorney does not act under color of state law.

Adkins v. Jacobs · filed 1988-05-23

An attorney who is appointed to represent an indigent defendant in criminal proceedings does not act under color of state law for purposes of Sec. 1983.

Court-appointed mental health professionals employed by a public court office act under color of state law for § 1983 when they evaluate parties for the court and owe their duty to the court.

Williams v. Rappeport · filed 1988-06-09

Accordingly, since Drs. Rappeport and Dvoskin were public employees appointed by the court to assist Judge North, saw their responsibility running to the court and owed no ethical duty to protect the interests of any individual, both defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private posse’s use of a sheriff’s name and similar badges alone does not establish state action.

Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff's Posse Comitatus · filed 1981-04-06

The unilateral and unauthorized adoption of “San Joaquin Sheriff’s” as a modifying phrase to the organization’s basic title of “Posse Comitatus” and the wearing of badges substantially identical in design and appearance to the badges worn by deputies of the Sheriff’s Office do not constitute state action or involvement.

Section 1983 treats private parties who act jointly with state officials to violate constitutional rights as state actors, and specific allegations of that joint activity can state a claim.

Hughes v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Association Of The City Of New York, Inc. · filed 1988-06-15

Rather, appellee's Sec. 1983 claim and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343, rested on allegations that the New York City Police Department participated in the conspiracy, thus constituting joint activity considered to be state action by all parties involved. ... Thus, viewing the complaint on its face, it alleged facts sufficient to establish--assuming the facts were proven--a violation of Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 treats a physician hired by a state to provide medical care to prisoners as acting under color of state law when treating those prisoners, even if the physician works by contract.

West v. Atkins · filed 1988-06-20

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that respondent’s delivery of medical treatment to West was state action fairly attributable to the State, and that respondent therefore acted under color of state law for purposes of §1983.

Section 1983 treats private litigants as acting under color of state law when substantial participation by state officials in their litigation makes them joint state actors.

Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. · filed 1988-06-30

The interlocking activities of the State, through the criminal district attorneys, the Attorney General and the sheriff of Deaf Smith County, and the growers constituted a joint effort which justified the lower court's characterization of the growers as state actors.

Section 1983 reaches private parties who act in concert with state officials acting in their official capacity and thereby deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. · filed 1988-06-30

The onion growers, by acting in concert with various state officials who were acting in their official capacity, were state actors for purposes of § 1983, and caused Jesus Moya to be deprived of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right by a defendant acting under color of state law; a claim fails when the pleadings do not show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Pitts v. Turner and Boisseau, Chartered · filed 1988-07-05

To state a claim for relief under section 1983 a plaintiff must show that he has been deprived of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws and that the defendant acted under color of state law. ... After viewing the pleadings in the light most favorable to appellant, we are unable to ascertain how any of the appellees acted under color of state law. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's dismissal of appellant's section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not authorize a suit against a federal official acting under color of federal law.

Washington v. Secretary of Health & Human Services · filed 1988-07-11

A reading of the statute reveals that, facially, § 1983 does not authorize suit by an individual aggrieved by a federal official acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; an official with no colorable authority to act in the jurisdiction where the conduct occurs does not meet that requirement.

Firman v. Abreu · filed 1988-08-19

Although it is true that state officials can act under color of state law even if they overstep their authority, ... that rule can have no application where, as here, the official has no colorable authority to act in the jurisdiction in which he purports to act.

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant officer acted under color of state law.

Gilliam v. Smith · filed 1988-09-02

She failed to show that in any of the incidents of which she complains Smith was acting in his official capacity or under color of state law.

Section 1983 treats a private physician under contract to provide medical care to jail inmates as acting under color of state law when performing those duties.

Stephen E. Carswell, Cross-Appellant v. Bay County, Lavelle Pitts, William Grigsby, Graham Belz, Thomas G. Merrill, Cros · filed 1988-09-07

We therefore reject Merrill’s contention and hold that he acted under color of state law and is liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law; a private person’s initiation of criminal proceedings does not establish liability without that allegation.

Parker v. Hearn · filed 1988-09-19

In the case at bar, it is clear from the pleadings that the plaintiff has failed to allege that Jon Parker was acting “under color of state law” at the time he initiated criminal proceedings against the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s § 1983 action against Jon Parker must be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a claim against private parties alleged to conspire with state actors to violate First Amendment rights.

Burrell v. Board of Trustees of Georgia Military College · filed 1988-09-28

If, however, a state actor is involved in the alleged conspiracy to violate first amendment rights, then the claim becomes actionable under sections 1983 and 1985(3).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of a federal right caused under color of state law.

Lane v. Famous Shoe Store · filed 1988-09-30

Plaintiff clearly failed to allege that he was deprived of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United States and that the deprivation was caused under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a court-appointed attorney who was not shown to have done so was properly dismissed.

Soon Tae Kim v. Western State Hosp. · filed 1988-09-30

Kim's court-appointed attorney was properly dismissed as a defendant because he was not shown to have acted "under color of state law." See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981).

Defense attorneys, whether appointed or retained, do not act under color of state law for purposes of a Section 1983 action.

Carson v. Vincent D. Giovanni Leroy W. Daggs George E. Jacobs Regina Veasy · filed 1988-10-14

Defense attorneys, whether appointed or retained, do not act under color of state law for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not apply to a federal official acting under federal rather than state law.

Plowman v. United States Department of the Army · filed 1988-10-19

Section 1983 is, therefore, inapplicable.

A physician under contract with a state to treat prisoners acts under color of state law when treating an inmate.

Thomas v. C.O. Barclay, Jr., Doctor, Portsmouth City Jail, Gary Waters, Sheriff · filed 1988-11-08

Dr. Barclay accordingly was a state actor in this case However, we conclude that Dr. Barclay did not exhibit deliberate indifference to Thomas's serious medical need in this case.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Thomas v. United States · filed 1988-11-21

As elaborated in some detail in the February 23,1988 Order, section 1983 cannot support an action against federal actors arising out of actions taken under color of federal law, as is the case when federal officials promulgate and then enforce a federal regulation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private estate administrator whose conduct is not fairly attributable to the state.

Howard v. Brown · filed 1988-11-23

The Court is convinced that, at least as to the allegations set forth in the complaint, defendant Brown did not act under color of state law, and there was no constitutional violation on which to premise federal jurisdiction.

Section 1983 reaches deprivations of federal statutory and due process rights carried out pursuant to state agency policies.

Doston v. Duffy · filed 1988-11-23

In depriving plaintiffs of their rights under the Social Security Act, implementing regulations, and due process clause, IDPA has been acting pursuant to state policies, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not cover federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Henry Boyd, Jr. v. United States of America, Farmers Home Administration · filed 1988-11-30

The district court properly granted the FmHA’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment. ... The court held that Boyd did not have a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the defendants acted under color of federal law, not state law. Therefore, the defendants’ actions did not form the basis of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 treats action based on state case law, including state common law, as action under color of state law.

Jones v. Marion County Small Claims Court · filed 1988-12-06

Action based on state case law, even if based solely on state common law, would qualify as “custom or usage of a state” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law.

May v. Fleming Companies, Inc. Ned N. Fleming Richard D. Harrison · filed 1988-12-07

Among the various constitutional and statutory provisions cited by the plaintiff, the only proper statutory basis for this action would be 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Under that statute, the defendants must act under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Shumaker v. Mercy Hospital, Div. Of Sisters of Mercy Health Care Barbara Supanich, M.D. Dr. Mejia, M.D. · filed 1988-12-09

We construe the complaint to raise a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. In order to state such a claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Schroder v. Volcker · filed 1988-12-20

Plaintiffs failed to allege that defendants acted under color of state law as required by section 1983, or that defendants' actions were motivated by racial or class-based bias as required under section 1985(3).

Section 1983 does not make private persons state actors merely because they use a state law procedure to commit someone involuntarily.

Spencer v. Bumyong Lee, M.D., and St. Elizabeth Hospital · filed 1989-01-03

When family members commit a person who has just tried to kill himself, they do not, by virtue of this action, become state actors subject to suit under section 1983. ... But a private commitment is no more state action than a citizen’s arrest, the repossession of chattels, or the ejection of trespassers is.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private complainant whose use of a state criminal warrant process is not fairly attributable to the state.

Laster v. Star Rental, Inc. · filed 1989-01-05

From those facts, we have determined the trial court was correct in finding that appellee’s actions may not fairly be attributed to the state.

A public official does not act under color of state law for § 1983 when the harmful conduct is unrelated to authority conferred by office.

Morgan v. Tice · filed 1989-01-11

because of a failure to establish that any conduct of Whitt that was deleterious to the plaintiff was done under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a Federal Reserve Bank acting under federal rather than state authority does not satisfy that requirement.

Scott v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York · filed 1989-01-13

Scott does not state a § 1983 claim against the New York Fed because it does not act “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 permits liability against private parties who willfully participate with state officials in a conspiracy to deprive others of constitutional rights.

United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corporation, a New York Corporation, Defendants · filed 1989-01-18

Private parties act under color of state law if they willfully participate in joint action with state officials to deprive others of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant deprived them of a protectable right while acting under color of law.

Vickey v. Nessler · filed 1989-01-25

Even with the liberal interpretation of § 1983, a plaintiff must still establish a deprivation of a protectable right by defendant while defendant was acting "under color of" local, state or federal law. ... Here, plaintiff was unable to establish a prima facie case that Nessler and Trump acted under color of law and that plaintiff was deprived of a protectable right.

Section 1983 does not treat a private community action agency’s employment decision as state action merely because some board members are state or county employees serving in private capacities.

Chasson v. Community Action of Laramie County, Inc. · filed 1989-01-31

No implication of state involvement can be drawn from the fact that some members of the Board may be state or county employees. They are only appointed to such positions as a category of community representatives, not to act for the State, but only in their private capacity. ... There was no Wyoming state action in this case in the discharge of appellant.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a defense attorney representing a defendant at a criminal trial does not act under color of state law.

Darwall v. Michigan · filed 1989-02-01

Nor did Darwall establish that any of the defendants acted under color of state law. Defendant Ziemba, Darwall's defense attorney at his criminal trial, did not act under color of state law.