42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is unavailable to remedy violations of IDEA-created rights or Section 504 rights because those statutes provide private judicial remedies.

A.W. v. The Jersey City Public Schools · filed 2007-05-24

Given this comprehensive scheme, Congress did not intend § 1983 to be available to remedy violations of the IDEA such as those alleged by A.W. ... Accordingly, we conclude that § 1983 is not available to provide a remedy for defendants' alleged violations of A.W.'s rights under Section 504.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for IDEA violations when the IDEA’s comprehensive enforcement scheme precludes that remedy.

Blanchard v. Morton School District · filed 2007-09-20

The question before us now is whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action for money damages under the IDEA for the lost earnings and suffering of a parent pursuing IDEA relief. We hold that it does not.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of rights under the IDEA because the IDEA's comprehensive enforcement scheme precludes such claims.

Blanchard v. Morton School · filed 2007-09-20

We now join the First, Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits and hold that the comprehensive enforcement scheme of the IDEA evidences Congress’ intent to preclude a § 1983 claim for the violation of rights under the IDEA.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy against officers for alleged racially discriminatory warrant checks.

United States v. Nichols · filed 2008-01-15

Rather, we believe the proper remedy for any alleged violation is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the offending officers.

Section 1983 permits people confined in state mental institutions to challenge commitment procedures without exhausting state remedies when success would not automatically entitle them to release.

Chancery Clerk of Chickasaw County, Mississippi v. Wallace · filed 1981-03-26

Therefore, we conclude that those now involuntarily confined to the state mental institutions may challenge the constitutionality of the state commitment procedures under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that the subclasses of confined persons certified by the trial court are valid.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate cause of action for an EAHCA claim when the plaintiff has received the Act’s full administrative review process.

Gerasimou by Gerasimou v. Ambach · filed 1986-06-11

Accordingly, plaintiffs claims arise solely under the EAHCA, and she does not have available to her a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits relief for a state official’s purposeful invasion of a fundamental liberty when the state courts cannot provide a practically effective remedy.

Richards Ex Rel. Richards v. Thurston · filed 1969-10-06

In combination, the factors recited show that plaintiff claims relief against the “malicious” or purposeful invasion by a state official of one of plaintiff’s fundamental liberties, and that he has now no practically effective ... remedy in the state courts. This is sufficient not merely to meet the words of the 1871 Civil Rights Act but such glosses as have been applied by judicial authority.

Section 1983 permits a claim for prospective relief against a threatened increase in custody when habeas relief is not yet available.

Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina · filed 2010-06-10

Thus, because custodial status would be determined as of the date a habeas petition is filed, Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238–40 (1968), habeas would have not yet been available to them for this purpose, and their claim was correctly styled as a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights and requires an underlying federal constitutional or statutory violation, but adds no independent state-of-mind requirement.

Project Vote v. Kelly · filed 2011-07-27

This statutory provision “does not create substantive rights,” but instead “provides a remedy for the violation of rights conferred by the Constitution or other statutes.” ... A plaintiff cannot prevail in an action brought under § 1983 without establishing an underlying violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right. ... “Section 1983 ‘itself contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation’ of the underlying federal right.”

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole procedures when success would not necessarily result in immediate or speedier release.

Jones v. United States Parole Commission · filed 2012-05-16

Here, the plaintiff’s success on his challenge under § 1983 would not necessarily result in his immediate or speedier release from custody, and therefore, the Court finds that he need not bring his claims in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district of his confinement.

Section 1983 provides no claim for a statutory or constitutional rights violation on the facts alleged in this complaint.

Kost v. Hunt · filed 2013-11-15

On the motion of other Defendants, the Court previously held that claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are unavailable for violations of any statutory or constitutional rights under the facts alleged in the complaint. ... Counts II and III will be dismissed for the reasons stated in that order.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a direct challenge to the validity of a sentence.

Pruett v. William Stephens, Director · filed 2015-04-23

We agree with the district court that this is a direct challenge to the validity of his sentence and, therefore, cannot be maintained under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for enforcing IDEA rights.

JL Ex Rel. JL v. AMBRIDGE AREA SCHOOL DIST. · filed 2008-02-22

On July 11, 2007, this Court, pursuant to the recent Third Circuit decision in A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch ., holding that the IDEA cannot be enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, dismissed counts IV and V of the Plaintiffs' complaint.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim alongside Maine Rule 80B review when that review cannot adequately remedy the alleged harm.

Sacco v. New Gloucester · filed 2016-06-07

This alleged harm would not be adequately remedied under the Rule BOB appeal and petitioner is entitled to bring her section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s claim when success would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s conviction or sentence.

Cleveland Butler v. Chardo · filed 2020-01-22

We also note that, because success on Butler’s claim would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, it was properly brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 is an appropriate way to bring an access-to-courts claim, but the complaint must allege facts that state a claim.

Kosakoski v. Duprey · filed 2020-09-02

The problem is not that his § 1983 complaint was the incorrect format in which to bring his claims. The problem is that the allegations in the complaint, even liberally construed, do not state a claim.

Section 1983 is the remedy for a prisoner seeking removal of information from his prison file when success would not necessarily speed his release.

Cooper v. Davis · filed 2020-09-14

Accordingly, Petitioner’s sole remedy in having the challenged information removed from his “C” file is by filing a § 1983 action since his claim does not lie at the core of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 is the avenue for a prisoner’s challenge to the denial of DNA testing when success would not necessarily lead to immediate or earlier release.

Bailey v. Koening · filed 2020-12-04

Put simply, petitioner’s challenge of the state courts’ denial of his motion for DNA testing does not fall within the “core of habeas corpus” and consequently “must be brought, if at all, under § 1983.” Nettles, 830 F.3d at 934 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who is present and fails to take reasonable measures to protect a suspect from another officer’s excessive force.

Hale v. Townley · filed 1994-05-03

The district court correctly held that an officer who is present at the scene and does not take reasonable measures to protect a suspect from another officer's use of excessive force may be liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability against an officer who could have prevented another officer’s excessive force but failed to intervene.

Smith v. Delamaid · filed 1994-01-11

An officer is liable under § 1983 for the use of excessive force by another officer if he or she was in a position to prevent the excessive force, but failed to do so.

Section 1983 liability for prison officials who fail to intervene requires awareness of a pervasive risk of harm and an obdurate, wanton, or deliberately indifferent failure to address the plaintiff's condition.

Harrison v. Johnson · filed 1993-07-02

To state a claim against alleged by-standers Gay and Norwood, plaintiff must be able to show that these defendants were aware of a pervasive risk of harm to plaintiff and that they obdurately, wantonly, or with deliberate indifference failed to address plaintiffs condition.

Section 1983 can impose liability on an officer who fails to intervene to stop another officer’s unconstitutional conduct when the officer has a duty to act.

Gross v. Bohn · filed 1991-12-17

Based on these facts, it is possible that a jury may find Morgan liable under § 1983 for the failure to intervene to stop the unconstitutional activity.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a non-supervisory police officer who fails to intervene to stop another officer from beating a person in the officer’s presence.

Stewart v. Roe · filed 1991-11-01

This duty applies to non-supervisory officers as well as supervisory officers. Thus, Stewart can rightly plead a § 1983 violation on this basis.

Section 1983 permits liability for a correctional officer who observes an unlawful beating and fails to intervene, even if the officer does not actively participate in the beating.

McHenry v. Chadwick · filed 1990-02-08

Applying Bruner to the prison context, a correctional officer who observes an unlawful beating may, nevertheless, be held liable under § 1983 without actively participating in the unlawful beating.

Section 1983 permits liability under tort principles when a police officer negligently fails to stop other officers from beating a person, including when the officer is supervisory or nonsupervisory and present at the scene.

Byrd v. Brishke · filed 1972-07-18

In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 484, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), Mr. Justice Douglas stated in the opinion of the Court, “[42 U.S.C. § 1983] should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.” ... The Fifth Circuit reversed a judgment for Sheriff Kern entered upon a jury verdict, holding that negligent nonfeasance was a proper basis for the imposition of tort liability under section 1983 and finding a basis for its holding in the language of Monroe v. Pape, supra, 407 F.2d at 788. ... We believe it is clear that one who is given the badge of authority of a police officer may not ignore the duty imposed by his office and rfail to stop other officers who summarily punish a third person in his presence or otherwise within his knowledge. That responsibility obviously obtains when the nonfeasor is a supervisory officer to whose direction misfeasor officers are committed. So, too, the same responsibility must exist as to nonsupervisory officers who are present at the scene of such summary punishment, for to hold otherwise would be to insulate nonsupervisory officers from liability for reasonably foreseeable consequences of the neglect of their duty to enforce the laws and preserve the peace. Accordingly, the plaintiff was entitled to have his case against defendants Moran, Pfeiffer and F-innin submitted to the jury upon his having offered testimony that he was beaten by unknown officers in their presence.

Section 1983 permits liability without proof of conspiracy or racial animus and reaches an officer’s failure to enforce the law equally when that omission denies equal protection, including failures to protect unpopular persons from community hostility.

Arthur F. Smith, Jr. v. Ross · filed 1973-07-18

The question is closer with respect to the claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which, of course, requires no proof of conspiracy and no proof of racial animus. ... Acts of omission are actionable in this context to the same extent as are acts of commission. ... the remedies provided in § 1983 are most appropriately extended to persons who, because of the unpopularity of their life-styles or the pervasiveness of racist animus in the community, are not protected in their attempt to enjoy peacefully and on an equal basis the civil rights guaranteed them under law.

Section 1983 permits liability for a police officer's failure to intervene in an assault even when the officer did not actively strike the plaintiff.

Gerald C. Bruner, Cross-Appellant v. Wade Dunaway, Cross-Appellees, James Bates, Gregory Taylor, Christian Castellaw · filed 1982-08-11

The foregoing authority clearly counsels that it is not necessary, in order to hold a police officer liable under § 1983, to demonstrate that the officer actively participated in striking a plaintiff. Had the district court’s decision to grant a new trial rested solely on a contrary interpretation of the law plaintiff’s position would be decidedly more persuasive.

An officer present at another officer’s use of excessive force may be liable under § 1983 for failing to take reasonable steps to protect the victim even without personally using force.

Michael Jamie Fundiller and Rae Winder Fundiller, His Wife, Plaintiffs v. The City of Cooper City, a Municipal Corp. · filed 1985-12-11

It is not necessary that a police officer actually participate in the use of excessive force in order to be held liable under section 1983. ... Rather, an officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force, can be held liable for his nonfeasance.

A police officer may be liable under § 1983 for failing to stop another officer’s excessive force when the officer has a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Taylor v. Kveton · filed 1988-03-18

However, because we find as a matter of law that Kopczynski did not have a realistic opportunity to prevent the only incident of excessive force he could have witnessed, we grant his motion for summary judgment.

An officer’s failure to take reasonable steps to protect a person from another officer’s excessive force can support liability under § 1983.

Cabral v. Sullivan · filed 1991-02-19

Such nonfeasance supports liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Under § 1983, a police officer may be personally liable for failing to stop other officers from using excessive force in the officer’s presence or with the officer’s knowledge.

Diebitz v. Arreola · filed 1993-09-28

Most importantly, in the context of excessive force police brutality cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “it is clear that one who is given the badge of authority of a police officer may not ignore the duty imposed by his office and fail to stop other officers who summarily punish a third person in his presence or otherwise within his knowledge.”

Section 1983 makes an officer liable for failing to stop another officer’s constitutional violation when the officer had reason to know of it and a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Yang v. Hardin · filed 1994-09-28

An officer who is present and fails to intervene to prevent other law enforcement officers from infringing the constitutional rights of citizens is liable under § 1983 if that officer had reason to know: (1) that excessive force was being used, (2) that a citizen has been unjustifiably arrested, or (3) that any constitutional violation has been committed by a law enforcement official; and the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.

Section 1983 permits failure-to-intervene liability without personal participation in or physical presence during an assault, but requires knowledge of the assault.

Medley v. Turner · filed 1994-11-10

Although “personal participation” and physical “presence” are not necessary elements for imposing liability under § 1983 for failure to act, “knowledge” of the assault is an essential factor.

An officer cannot be liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene when the underlying officer did not violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Mercado v. Los Angeles Unified School District, Willie Armstead and Lyle Pope · filed 1995-03-30

If Armstead did not choke Mercado and violate his rights, then Pope cannot be held liable for failing to intervene.

Section 1983 requires an allegation of individual injury to a federally protected right before plaintiffs may invoke federal-court relief for alleged state-law violations.

Moore v. Kusper · filed 1972-07-18

Similarly, without such an allegation, the plaintiffs cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this court under the 1871 Civil Rights Act. As we said in Manion v. Holzman, 379 F.2d 843, 845 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976, 88 S.Ct. 479, 19 L.Ed.2d 470 (1967), injunctive relief for alleged violations of the Illinois election laws is not available in the federal courts “in the absence of an allegation to support the existence of some individual injury to the plaintiff.”

Section 1983 does not support federal relief for a state-law election violation unless the plaintiff alleges an individual injury to a federally protected or constitutionally guaranteed right.

Moore v. Kusper · filed 1972-09-07

In order to state a federal cause of action upon which relief could be granted, plaintiffs would have had to allege that the Election Board's actions violated some federally protected or constitutionally guaranteed right of the plaintiffs. Although the complaint does allege the requisite constitutional rights, it does not allege an individual injury to these plaintiffs. ... Similarly, without such an allegation, the plaintiffs cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this court under the 1871 Civil Rights Act. ... Appellants, having not alleged an injury to a federally protected right, have failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff relying on its liability remedy to show actual or threatened injury sufficient to establish constitutional standing.

Baxter v. Strickland · filed 1974-09-04

The complaint is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343. As § 1983 provides for liability to the “party injured” the constitutional requirement of an actual case or controversy remains; parties relying on § 1983 must show actual or threatened injury of some kind to establish standing in the constitutional sense.

Section 1983 does not require proof of physical injury when a person is beaten or subjected to equivalent psychological intimidation during custodial interrogation.

Johnny Gray v. Detective Spillman Detective Bishop Detective Riggs Detective Cartner · filed 1991-02-07

We hold that the existence of physical injury is not an essential element of a § 1983 claim when a person during custodial interrogation is beaten or psychologically intimidated in a manner equivalent to beating.

Section 1983 does not require a serious or permanent injury to support a claim.

McNeal v. Owens · filed 1991-06-04

A serious or permanent injury is not a prerequisite to a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement claims require an allegation of injury.

Diversified Numismatics, Inc. v. City Of Orlando · filed 1991-12-27

However, allegation of injury is a necessary component of appellants' section 1983 discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement claims.

Section 1983 requires injury caused by the defendant’s conduct; defamation that harms reputation alone does not supply a qualifying injury.

Miller v. Yvonne M. Williams Ken Bell, Ausa · filed 1992-09-16

Defamation, however, does not constitute an injury under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires injury beyond the mere denial of disability determinations made by doctors.

Goodnight v. Chater · filed 1997-04-14

This court disagrees with Plaintiffs' assertion that the deprivation of their right to have disability determinations made by doctors is itself an injury sufficient to support a cause of action under § 1983.

A § 1983 plaintiff must allege threatened or actual injury.

Berry v. Oswalt · filed 1998-05-08

A § 1983 plaintiff must allege threatened or actual injury, O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974), and Berry has done that.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim based solely on a state's failure to meet Medicaid participation goals or other systemwide performance standards that do not create individual rights.

Frazar v. Gilbert · filed 2002-07-24

Under Blessing, a state's failure to meet such a participation goal or other systemwide performance standard does not give rise to individual rights actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits recovery for excessive force even when the injuries are neither permanent nor severe.

Burbank v. Davis · filed 2003-01-06

Thus, though the extent of Burbank’s injuries are relevant to a determination on the merits of this claim, the fact that the injuries may not be permanent or severe does not bar recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show an injury from the challenged conduct.

McCrary v. Aurora Public Schools · filed 2003-01-29

As to Ms. McCrary’s claim that her right to equal protection was violated when she was not considered for a fourth-grade classroom position and instead was transferred to a CST position, we have already concluded that neither of those actions constituted an adverse employment action, and Ms. McCrary has not otherwise shown that they gave rise to an injury for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an excessive force claim to proceed without proof of physical injury when mental anguish supports the claim.

Frohmuth v. Metropolitan Government · filed 2004-06-03

Contrarily, the instruction on the excessive force claim contained no such limitation. As the district court succinctly noted: “The jury may have concluded that Frohmuth did not suffer a physical injury so as to entitle him to recover for assault and battery. By contrast. Frohmuth’s mental anguish may have formed the basis for the jury finding in the § 1983 context.”

Section 1983 provides a civil action for a person deprived of federal rights under color of state law and requires an injury.

Astrop v. Brunswick Co Transp · filed 2005-10-26

To the extent Astrop’s complaint could have been construed as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), Astrop admits in his complaint that he was not injured in the automobile accident at issue.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that official action deprived them of a constitutional right, including an injury to state a claim.

Williams v. Town of Greenburgh · filed 2008-07-22

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts indicating that some official action has caused the plaintiff to be deprived of his or her constitutional rights — in other words, there is an injury requirement to state the claim.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 action must allege an injury arising from the challenged conduct.

Johnson v. Rell · filed 2010-03-09

Furthermore, an allegation of injury is a prerequisite under federal law to the maintenance of an action under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires injury from the challenged conduct for a damages claim.

Latham v. Palin · filed 2011-03-18

Latham's § 1983 claims are similarly predicated on injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that government officials "shall be liable to the party injured." Here, it has been established that Latham was not injured by the 1995 legislative change. Because Latham's claims are premised on this injury, they are barred by collateral estoppel.

Section 1983 provides a basis for claims against state officials acting under color of state law, but it does not apply to federal officials.

Christian v. New York State Department of Labor, Division of Employment · filed 1972-07-24

The so-called “civil rights” statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies to State, not Federal officials. ... However, the situation is different as to the State defendants. Plaintiffs have properly based their claim on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. ... It is settled that the phrase ‘under color of’ comprehends all official behavior, even that which is patently unlawful under state, as well as federal, law.

Section 1983 does not cover damages claims against retained or appointed attorneys for failing to provide reasonable assistance during a state criminal trial because such attorneys do not act under color of state law.

Szijarto v. Legeman · filed 1972-08-24

But this Circuit, in common with others, has held that such a claim is not within the purview of the Civil Rights Act, the reason being that an attorney, whether retained or appointed, does not act “under color of” state law. Hence, the claim is not one coming within the jurisdiction of the district court.

Section 1983 provides a claim for deprivation of federal rights caused by a person acting under color of state law, and a private person who proceeds in a public-nuisance action in the state's name may satisfy that requirement.

Larkin v. Bruce · filed 1972-11-22

The defendant correctly points out that the elements of a claim under § 1983 are (1) a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and laws of the United States and (2) causation of such deprivation by a person acting under color of state law. ... The private individual secures consent from a state court, acts in the place of the Attorney General, and proceeds in the name of the state. ... There can be little doubt that the defendant is acting under color of state law in the public nuisance proceedings.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law causing denial of a federally protected right, and accepting employment as a Colorado public defender alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Espinoza v. Rollie R. Rogers, Colorado State Public Defender · filed 1972-12-27

It is well settled that in order for a defendant to be liable under the federal Civil Rights Act he must have acted under color of state law to cause the denial of a federally protected right. ... Therefore, we hold that an attorney does not act under color of state law-simply because he has accepted employment as a Colorado Public Defender: See Thomas v. Howard, 455 F.2d 228 (3rd Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Wood v. Blacker, 335 F.Supp. 43 (D.C N.J.1971); Peake v. County of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 280 F.Supp. 853 (E.D.Pa.1968).

Section 1983 permits a damages action against state officials for deprivations carried out under color of state law, although officials may assert reasonableness and good-faith defenses.

Wheeler v. Glass · filed 1973-01-18

It is settled law that "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law is action taken 'under color of' state law." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184, 81 S.Ct. 473, 482, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941). The officials here are alleged to have subjected the plaintiffs to the "deprivation of . . . rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution" of the United States by virtue of the power and authority which they possessed under color of state law. It is true that some or all of the defendants may be able to assert the defense of reasonableness and good faith, 1 see Briscoe v. Kusper, 435 F.2d 1046, 1058 (7th Cir. 1970), and McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1968), but we conclude that the plaintiffs are entitled to the opportunity to prove that the defendants were responsible for the acts alleged to have occurred.

Section 1983 provides a federal claim only when a person deprives another of federal rights under color of state law; it does not authorize claims against a private person or state official acting in a purely private individual capacity.

Parker v. Graves · filed 1973-06-13

An action under 42 U. S.C. § 1983 does not lie as against a private person in his individual capacity. It is only where the person acts to deprive another of his federal rights under color of state law that § 1983 provides authority for a federal claim. An action against a state official is not authorized by § 1983 where the official has acted in a purely private individual capacity.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; conduct by private casino operators was not actionable under the statute because it was not performed under color of state law.

Rowe v. Harris · filed 1961-06-29

The record before the court is convincing that what happened or what was done at the time complained of was not done by anyone under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for due-process deprivation under color of state law, but does not remedy due-process violations caused by private actors.

Tsermengas v. Pontiac Press · filed 1961-12-05

On its face this section does not afford a remedy for due process violations by reason of actions which are not under col- or of law. What plaintiff has alleged, at most, is a denial of due process effectuated by the conduct of defendants, all of whom are private persons acting as such.

Section 1983 covers actions by state officials taken without state authorization when the officials act under the authority of state law.

Sostre v. Rockefeller · filed 1970-05-14

The phrase, therefore, includes action taken by state officials without state authorization.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Gilliard v. Craig · filed 1971-06-10

The defendants contend, however, citing Stinson v. Finch, 317 F.Supp. 581 (3-J. Court, N.D.Ga., 1970), that because 42 U.S.C., Section 602(a) (7) requires agencies administering state AFDC plans to take into consideration “other income and resources of any child” in the home, in determining the need “of the child,” the actions of the defendants are under color of federal rather than state law; that no cause of action is stated under Section 1983; and that this court does not have jurisdiction under Section 1343. ... We think there is adequate color of statewide law and regulation to satisfy Sections 1983 and 1343. ... Therefore, either under King v. Smith and other recent decisions of the Supreme Court, or under the theory that in this nation children have a right to subsistence and that infringement upon that right is a deprivation of personal liberty, we conclude that a cause of action is properly alleged under Section 1983 and that there is jurisdiction under section 1343.

Section 1983 requires the challenged deprivation to occur under color of state law, a requirement the court equates with state action.

Gerald B. Lefcourt, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. The Legal Aid Society · filed 1971-06-18

The “under color * * * ” requirement of § 1983 is synonymous with the term “State action.”

Section 1983 does not treat a state court’s judicial error or disagreement over federal law, without more, as conduct under color of state law that can support an injunction.

Caramico v. Romney · filed 1973-06-13

But in no real sense is the present case a Section 1983 case. In a formal way plaintiffs assert that the State Courts are proceeding under color of their own law to deprive the plantiffs of rights which the plaintiffs have asserted under Federal Law. However, plaintiffs at best complain, in this respect, that the State Courts have disagreed with their interpretation of the Federal Law, that the State Courts have judicially determined that plaintiffs have not the claimed Federal rights. Such determinations by a State Court are not conduct which can be treated as enjoinable under Section 1983; plaintiff’s complaint is of judicial error and not of an invasion of federal constitutional or other federal rights under color of State Law.

Section 1983 applies only when the challenged conduct is taken under color of state authority.

Bradford v. Peoples Natural Gas Co. · filed 1973-06-25

Disposing of the easy questions first, it is clear that Count II must be dismissed since 42 U.S.C. 1983 by its terms applies only to action under color of State authority, and plaintiff does not allege that Pennsylvania is hostile to women workers, but merely complains of the defendant gas company’s corporate policy and practice.

Section 1983 reaches a wholly unofficial assault when a state law-enforcement officer uses his official position to make the assault possible.

Henry v. Cagle · filed 1973-07-13

We believe that the Cagles’ approach to appellant when he was a prisoner under guard of Sheriff’s deputies could have been viewed by the jury as having “been made possible only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of state law.” United States v. Classic, supra, 313 U.S. at 326, 61 S.Ct. at 1043. It seems clear to us that there was evidence that Constable Cagle consciously or unconsciously used his official position so as to be able to commit a wholly unofficial assault, and that Danny Cagle acted in concert with him.

Section 1983 covers deprivations carried out by virtue of an official position even when the conduct is not mandated by statute.

Ward v. Kentucky State University Board of Regents · filed 1973-07-20

Section 1983 focuses not only upon deprivations commanded by statute — its scope includes conduct permitted solely by virtue of official position.

Section 1983 reaches private conduct only when it is supported by state action and the actor acts under color of state law.

Silas v. Smith · filed 1973-07-30

The “under color of” provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 encompasses only such private conduct as is' supported by state action. ... PMAIC’s and H-B’s action in terminating or modifying compensation benefits is, therefore, not conduct “under color of” state law, within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 applies to actions performed under color of state law.

Suckle v. Madison General Hospital · filed 1973-08-23

The defendant hospital is a private, nonprofit organization organized under Wisconsin statutes. However, counsel for defendant have conceded in this case, and I find, that by virtue of its articles of incorporation, by-laws, customs and usages, contracts, and sources of funds, the defendant hospital was interrelated with the city government to such a degree that the disputed actions of the defendant, including those of its board of directors, medical staff, medical staff members and committees, and administrators, were actions performed under color of state law, within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3).

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of constitutional or federal rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center · filed 1973-10-23

In order to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it must be shown that Mercy Medical Center and its Board of Directors were acting under color of State law when they denied Dr. Watkins staff privileges. ... Therefore, Dr. Watkins has not stated a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat an attorney acting only in a professional capacity for a client in private litigation as acting under color of state law, absent the attorney's own direct interest in the litigation.

Tunheim v. Bowman · filed 1973-11-29

lawyers who are not also parties in interest and are engaged in private litigation on behalf of clients do not act under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply to officials of a non-federal governmental unit acting in a proprietary rather than governmental capacity, so ordinary public-employer personnel disputes do not qualify absent a constitutionally protected-rights allegation.

Sherman v. City of Pasadena · filed 1973-12-04

The court holds that § 1983 does not apply to officials of a non-federal governmental unit when they act in a proprietary and not a governmental capacity, and hence does not afford a basis of relief for plaintiff’s claim of misapplication of Pasadena’s personnel procedures. When a city acts as an employer it is functioning in a proprietary capacity, and, absent specific legislation to the contrary, the employer-employee relationship cannot be treated any differently than it is in the private sphere.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of federal rights under color of state law before a cause of action arises.

Edwards v. Philadelphia Electric Company · filed 1974-01-18

If not, a cause of action does not arise under Section 1983 even if the utility’s conduct would otherwise deprive plaintiffs of a federal right.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a private foreclosure under a deed of trust does not satisfy that requirement without significant state involvement.

Hoffman v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development · filed 1974-02-06

Thus this court is of the opinion that the foreclosure and sale of property pursuant to a deed of trust agreement does not have the requisite “significant state involvement” to constitute an act under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private person unless the person's wrongful action was taken under color of state law or state authority.

Hill v. McClellan · filed 1974-03-08

A private person cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless his wrongful action was done under color of state law or state authority.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to occur under color of state law; conduct under color of federal law does not support a § 1983 claim.

Syrek v. Pennsylvania Air National Guard · filed 1974-03-13

It is elemental, of course, that conduct alleged to be in violation of the Civil Rights Act must occur under color of state law; and that if the conduct is ... practiced by a citizen or organization acting privately and not under color of state law, or by a citizen or organization acting under color of federal law, then there is no § 1983 claim and § 1343 does not confer jurisdiction on federal district courts. ... We refuse to hold, however, that the constitutional deprivation alleged here occurred under color of federal law. In our judgment the defendants were acting under color of state law, exercising authority vested in them by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. ... Accordingly, we find that the defendants did act under color of state law and the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 is denied.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and allegations of sufficient state involvement can allow claims against private unions, subcontractors, and apprenticeship committees to survive a motion to dismiss.

Byrd v. Local Union No. 24, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers · filed 1974-03-19

Whether treated as motions to dismiss or as motions for summary judgment under Rule 12(b), F.R.Civ.P., the defendant unions’ motions on this point must be denied at this stage of these proceedings since it is not absolutely certain that defendant unions are not acting “under color of state law” through their relationship with the JATCs. ... In short, sufficient state action has been alleged to justify the conclusion that the subcontractors have acted under color of state law, at least when engaged in the performance of public contracts. ... The allegations of “state action” are at least enough to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that individual defendants acted under color of state law to deprive him of federally protected rights.

Anderson v. Louisiana Dental Association · filed 1974-03-20

In order for the plaintiff to state a cause of action cognizable by this Court under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, he must show that the individual defendants were “acting under color of state law” to deprive him of federally protected rights.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional deprivations by persons acting under color of state law; state-authorized prejudgment garnishment satisfies that requirement.

Stuckers v. Thomas · filed 1974-04-04

There is no question in this Court’s mind but that the pre judgment garnishment procedures employed by the defendant herein, were done under color of state law as is required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches conduct under color of state law, not federal action absent a conspiracy between state and federal officials.

Rev. Donald L. Jackson v. The Statler Foundation · filed 1974-04-05

Appellant’s § 1983 claim against the foundations raises a slightly different problem. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 proscribes only conduct “ . . . under color of any statute ... of any State . . . ” and has been construed as not applying to the actions of the federal government, District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424-425, 93 S.Ct. 602, 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650, n. 2, 83 S.Ct. 1441, 10 L.Ed.2d 605 (1963), unless there is conspiracy between the state and federal officials, Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 448-449 (2d Cir. 1969). Since no colorable claim of such conspiracy can be made here (and none has been made), in determining whether appellant has a claim under § 1983 the district court should look only to the state exemptions.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for federal-rights violations involving state power, and a violation jointly produced by state and non-state power satisfies the statute when state officials play a significant role in the result.

Lyons v. Weinberger · filed 1974-04-11

“ [i] t was the evident purpose of § 1983 to provide a remedy when federal rights have been violated through the use or misuse of a power derived from a State, [citation omitted], When the violation is the joint product of the exercise of a State power and of a non-State power then the test under the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 is whether the state or its officials played a ‘significant’ role in the result.” ... Therefore, the state plays a critical role in defendant’s determination to reduce or terminate benefits in advance of a hearing.

Section 1983 reaches conduct only when a person acts under color of state law; merely private conduct is not covered.

Barrett v. United Hospital · filed 1974-05-23

Neither § 1983 nor the Four-1 teenth Amendment erect a shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.

Section 1983 requires the alleged constitutional deprivation to occur under color of state law.

Milburn v. Blackfrica Promotions, Inc. · filed 1974-05-23

Under Section 1983 the constitutional deprivation alleged must have occurred “under color of state law”. ... Even giving this pro se complaint the broad reading mandated by Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), the wrong alleged involves a private. dispute between private citizens and is not in any way alleged to have been performed “under color of state law”.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a defendant who took no action in the matter.

Hatfield v. Williams · filed 1974-05-29

Furthermore, defendant Williams having taken no action in this matter, it appears that jurisdiction as to her cannot be shown under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), (4) or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal cause of action for a fellow inmate's assault unless the inmate was acting under color of state law.

Barnes v. Childs · filed 1974-06-26

There is no express allegation in the complaint, nor can it be fairly implied from facts set forth in the complaint, that Reed was at any time acting under color of state law, either by ordinance, regulation, prison rule, custom or usage as required by § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches private individuals or organizations whose allegedly unconstitutional conduct is sufficiently connected to state authority to constitute action under color of state law.

Hatfield v. Williams · filed 1974-07-02

It is the court’s view that defendants Crittenton Home and Ebbert did act under color of state law and jurisdiction as to them is thus established under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), (4) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches conduct taken under color of state law.

Doe v. Mundy · filed 1974-07-24

There is no doubt here that the acts of the defendants in formulating and implementing their own rules relating to the performance of abortions amount to action “under color of” state law for purposes of jurisdiction under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of constitutional or statutory rights under color of state law, and private conspirators may be liable when at least one conspirator is a state officer acting under color of state law.

Frank Phillips, Sr., and Frank Phillips, Jr., by His Natural Guardian, Frank Phillips, Sr. v. Trello · filed 1974-07-26

An action based upon § 1983 involves two distinct elements. First, the plaintiff must assert a deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. Next an assertion must be made that the defendants acted “under color of” state law. ... But the law has long been settled that when two or more persons conspire to violate the civil rights ,of another, if one or more of the conspirators is a state officer acting under color of state law, then the mere fact that other conspirators are not state officers is no defense to them in a suit under the Civil Rights Act. ... Thus the district court’s stated reason for dismissing, “that no State action is involved insofar as they are concerned” must be rejected.

Section 1983 permits liability when an official acts beyond lawful state authority or arbitrarily and grossly abuses powers within the scope of office.

Palmer v. Hall · filed 1974-07-29

An official may abuse his position and subject himself to liability under this section by acting beyond the bounds of his lawful authority under state law — outside the scope of his office ; he may likewise subject himself to liability by acting within the scope of his office in an arbitrary manner, grossly abusing the lawful powers of his office.

Section 1983 permits an action against private parties who are delegated state power and process and thereby act under color of state law to deprive a person of constitutional rights.

Watson v. Branch County Bank · filed 1974-08-12

The defendants are certainly proper parties within the terms of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 provides a claim for relief only against defendants who act under color of state law or custom.

Boruski v. Stewart · filed 1974-09-13

Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 gives no support to the claim herein since it provides a claim for relief only against defendants who act under color of state law or custom.

Section 1983 requires the defendant's conduct to be undertaken under color of state law.

Elton Orchards, Inc. v. Brennan · filed 1974-09-17

There is no factual basis for jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security, Benjamin C. Adams, made it clear in his testimony that the action complained of was pursuant to federal law. There is, therefore, no “color of state law” that would support a section 1983 civil rights action.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for conduct taken under color of state law.

Smith v. Armstrong · filed 1974-10-29

Defendants further maintain that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not appropriate in this case because the complaint does not allege that the defendants acted under col- or of state law. I agree and consider further discussion of such an obvious point unnecessary.

Section 1983 does not cover the conduct of retained or appointed counsel in representing clients because it is not action under color of state law.

Harkins v. Gary Eldredge and the Missouri Bar Association · filed 1974-11-22

The conduct of counsel, either retained or appointed, in representing clients does not constitute action under color of state law for purposes of a § 1983 violation.

Section 1983 protects only federal rights violated by a person acting under color of state law.

Jones v. TENNESSEE EASTMAN COMPANY · filed 1974-11-25

Neither does the plaintiff state a claim on which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although the plaintiff makes reference in his brief to some symbiotic relationship between the defendant and the state wherein it does business, no facts are alleged in his complaint giving rise to an averment that the defendant was acting in the premises under color of state law. The immediately aforecited statute protects only federal rights that are violated under color of state law.

Section 1983 covers actions by municipal officials taken pursuant to municipal law because those actions are under color of state law.

Calo v. Paine · filed 1974-11-27

In light of this authoritative analysis of the relationship of the city of Waterbury to the state, it is clear that whenever an official of that city acts pursuant to municipal law, he also acts under color of state law.

Filing an eviction action in state court is not action under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Fallis v. Dunbar · filed 1974-12-04

The Court therefore finds that filing an eviction action in state court is not action by the defendant under color of state law within § 1983 and plaintiffs have thus failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes relief against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Holman v. Board of Education of City of Flint · filed 1975-01-29

Of course Section 1983 also requires that the person who allegedly deprives the plaintiff of his “rights, privileges, or immunities served by the Constitution” must have acted under color of state law. This requirement of state action is amply met by the instant case.

Section 1983 requires conduct committed under color of state law.

Williams v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribal Council · filed 1975-01-30

“Color of state law” is an essential element in all actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Because plaintiffs allege no conduct committed under “color of state law”, their action cannot lie under these sections.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights claim against a private entity that participates in a state-created monopoly and acts under color of state law.

Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Commission · filed 1975-02-28

Horse racing is a state monopoly. It appears from the pleadings that the Association conducts the horse racing activities at Rockingham Park in conjunction with the Commission and other state agencies. In addition, an essential by-product of horse racing is the raising of state revenues. I find that the Association plays an integral role in the state monopoly of horse racing and that it acts under color of state law. Plaintiff is given leave to amend his complaint to allege a violation of 42 U. S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages against a private individual who invokes state subpoena power to exclude someone from a public function or to harass or punish them because that conduct is under color of state law.

Timson v. Weiner · filed 1975-04-15

I hold that a private individual may be held to respond in damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for invoking the subpoena power of the state if it is shown that the purpose of the subpoena was not to require the presence of a potential witness but to exclude the subpoenaed person from being present at a public function or to harass or punish the person.

Section 1983 provides a remedy against public officials who act under color of state law and deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Ragin v. Schwartz · filed 1975-04-15

Here, the public official has power to act only because he is an official, and thus performs '‘under color of law” as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations committed under color of state law, so it does not cover conduct not taken under color of state law.

White v. Boyle · filed 1975-02-21

It is clear that the acts of the defendants for which plaintiff seeks relief were not done under color of state law and plaintiff’s reliance on the above statutory sections is misplaced.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

O'Dea v. Massachusetts Board of Education · filed 1975-05-02

Section 1983 provides an action against a person who deprives a party of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” while acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . .” As has already been pointed out, the actions complained of in this case were performed pursuant to an order of a federal district court and not pursuant to any state statute. The facts alleged, therefore, do not set forth a claim cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Dry Creek Lodge, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation v. The United States of America · filed 1975-05-09

The trial court correctly ruled that the claim under § 1983 lacks merit because there is no showing that the defendants acted under color of state law, an essential requirement of the § 1983 suit. The court’s dismissal of the § 1983 action was then correct.

Section 1983 applies only to deprivations carried out under color of state law, not federal law.

Smith v. United States Civil Service Commission · filed 1975-07-14

Inasmuch as the plaintiffs are here complaining about acts done by the defendants under color of federal law rather than state law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, which is satisfied when a judge uses the authority of his office to commit the challenged acts.

McGlasker v. Calton · filed 1975-07-17

The Court further finds that Judge Calton was acting under color of State law. Clearly, he would not have been in the position to do what he did had he not been in the position of being Judge at that time and place.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when defendants act under color of law and deprive a person of federal rights; private persons may be included when jointly engaged with state officials, and diversity of citizenship is not required.

Gaulter v. Capdeboscq · filed 1975-08-19

To maintain a cause of action under § 1983 it must be shown that the defendants acted under color of law and deprived the plaintiff of her rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... § 1983 includes the actions of private persons when engaged jointly with state officials in prohibited conduct. ... Diversity of citizenship is not a prerequisite to a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 applies to constitutional misconduct committed under color of state law, not conduct taken under color of federal law.

Vargas v. Chardon · filed 1975-10-14

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 over actions for imposition of liability and/or for the issuance of injunctive relief against persons whose misconduct under color of state law violates the constitutional rights of another within the jurisdiction of the United States under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, what is assailed in this action is plaintiff’s dismissal based on the regulation adopted pursuant to the National Guard Technicians Act (32 U.S.C. § 709) approved subsequent to plaintiff’s initial employment. Furthermore, although the defendant is a state appointed officer, he in fact administers a federally funded activity and pursuant to regulations issued by the National Guard Bureau and as stated, in taking the alleged illegal action, the defendant acted as an agent of the Federal Government and therefore under color of federal not state law.

Section 1983 permits liability for a deprivation committed under color of state law even when the defendant acted from purely personal motives.

Hanshaw v. Delaware Technical & Community College · filed 1975-11-07

While the defendants must be proven to have been acting under color of state law as to section 1983, the deprivation of plaintiffs’ rights may be for purely personal motives of defendants and still be actionable.

Section 1983 covers municipal-official enforcement of utility ordinances when that enforcement is undertaken under color of state law.

Uhl v. Ness City, Kansas · filed 1975-12-05

The termination of utility services, pursuant to municipal ordinances, is action taken under “color of state law” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for violations committed under color of state law, so it does not apply to federal officials acting under federal law.

Bijeol v. Benson · filed 1975-10-31

Since the defendants herein are federal officials acting under authority of federal law, the plaintiffs have no claim against them based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, and this court does not have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state officials who, under color of state law, deprive people of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and federal laws.

Bartels v. Biernat · filed 1975-12-24

This cause of action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the complaint clearly charges that these state officials have acted to deprive the plaintiffs of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, under color of state statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.

Section 1983 requires the challenged deprivation to be carried out under color of state law, and a custom constitutes state action only when it has the force of law through persistent practices of state officials.

Moore v. City of Pacific · filed 1976-01-06

We fail to see how racial discrimination under color of state law can be found in the exercise of free choice by those claiming to be the victims of discrimination. For custom or usage to constitute state action, it must have the force of law by virtue of persistent practices of state officials.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for deprivations carried out under color of state law.

Clark v. Morgan's Austintown Foods, Inc. · filed 1976-01-20

The Court must also strike plaintiff’s claims made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, since this provision is only available to remedy injustices perpetrated under color of state law, and there is no indication whatsoever that anyone acted “under color of state law” in regard to the alleged discrimination against plaintiff.

A private actor cannot invoke state authority as a shield when the challenged acts fall outside the bounds of color of law under § 1983.

Rogers v. Fuller · filed 1976-03-23

he thus steps outside of the bounds of “color of law” in committing those acts.

A private individual's alleged conspiracy with a state official who has judicial immunity does not state a § 1983 claim when the private individual otherwise did not act under color of state law.

Dennis v. Hein · filed 1976-04-19

This court is in agreement with the decisions noted above and holds that a complaint such as this one, founded upon allegations of a conspiracy between a private individual and one who enjoys judicial immunity from such suits, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to be taken under color of state law, and private conduct unsupported by state authority does not satisfy that requirement.

Jacobs v. Huie · filed 1976-04-27

Delegation of a public function to a private citizen or tolerance of private performance of a public function is indicative but not determinative of the existence of state action. ... Under Art. 5236d, the state is not neutral toward the summary seizure of a tenant’s property. Such self-help is forbidden unless “. . . pursuant to the terms of a written rental agreement . . . ” ... The statute thus by its own terms contemplates only seizures by private citizens pursuant to their own understandings. Art. 5236d does not clothe anyone with authority of state law; to the contrary, state authority is stripped from the landlord.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law to cause the denial of a federally protected right, and a witness's false testimony at trial does not satisfy that requirement.

Smith v. Sinclair · filed 1976-06-25

In order for a defendant to be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 it is essential that he must have acted under color of state law to cause the denial of a federally protected right. ... A witness in a trial is not acting under color of law and his false testimony does not give rise to a cause of action under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights claim when a complaint alleges deprivation, under color of state law, of a constitutional right.

Alvin J. Syrek, Jr. v. Pennsylvania Air National Guard · filed 1976-07-16

Accordingly, we believe plaintiffs’ complaint has sufficiently alleged a deprivation, under color of state law, of a constitutional right to warrant the invocation of federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Section 1983 applies only to conduct under color of state law, not conduct attributable solely to federal authority.

Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting Co. · filed 1976-12-20

The question of jurisdiction must also be considered. Since our finding of governmental action is premised on licensing and regulation by the FCC, a federal agency, clearly it is the first amendment that has been violated and not the fourteenth; thus 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is inapplicable, since there has been no action “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for constitutional deprivations carried out under color of state law.

Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n · filed 1976-12-17

Furthermore, § 1983 creates a cause of action for a deprivation of constitutional rights carried out “under color” of state law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional deprivations carried out under color of state law, including disciplinary action taken against a public employee for protected speech.

Ruhlman v. Barger · filed 1976-12-30

Initially, the court notes that defendants’ actions in issuing any transfer order, in the course of their duties, would constitute conduct “under color of state law” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, the necessary state action is present in this case alleging deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. ... However, because plaintiff has allegedly been subject to disciplinary action for his exercise of protected speech, he has stated a justiciable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize a claim for a civil-rights deprivation committed under color of federal law.

Rowe v. State of Tenn. · filed 1977-03-08

The first issue presented is whether the amended complaint adequately alleges that defendants deprived plaintiff of his civil rights while acting “under color of state law.” Deprivations of civil rights occurring “under color of federal law” are not actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 applies only to individuals acting under state law, not federal law.

Stockheimer v. Underwood · filed 1977-03-15

The defendants Doyle, Underwood, Byrnes, and Mattison are all federal officers, not state or local officers. It is well settled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies only to individuals acting under state, as opposed to federal, law.

Section 1983 requires challenged conduct to be under color of state law, and private retention of vehicles under Pennsylvania's common-law garageman's lien does not satisfy that requirement.

Parks v. Mr. Ford · filed 1977-04-04

We are not persuaded that the retention of plaintiffs’ vehicles by the defendants pursuant to Pennsylvania’s common law garageman’s lien constitutes action “under color of” state law as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches deprivations carried out under color of Commonwealth law or regulation, and in this context its “under color of” requirement uses the same standard as constitutional governmental action.

Tenorio v. Interuniversitaria · filed 1977-05-03

Although we have previously noted that there may be an analytical difference between the “under color of” requirement of § 1983 and the governmental action doctrine of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, we are fully satisfied in the present context that the governing standards with respect to these two issues are identical. ... We hold that Commonwealth action is present and that the district court accordingly did have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights by persons acting under color of state law.

Griffin v. Burns · filed 1977-05-17

Based on the arguments presented at trial, the Court understands the defendants to have conceded the existence of a deprivation of constitutional right by defendants who were acting under color of state law. The Court’s attention was directed by the defendants exclusively to the question of the appropriate remedy. In any event, as the Court held in its order of May 2, 1977, there has indeed been a deprivation of constitutional right actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 applies only to parties acting under color of state law, so federal officers are not subject to suit under it.

Cave v. Beame · filed 1977-06-01

Jurisdiction over federal officers cannot be predicated upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and its jurisdictional counterpart 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), since § 1983 applies only to parties acting under color of state law. Federal officers do not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 applies when a private warehouseman enforces a state-created lien in a manner that constitutes action under color of state law.

Brooks v. Flagg Bros. · filed 1977-04-07

The question presented by this appeal is whether the warehouseman’s enforcement of his lien in this manner constitutes action “under color of” state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or state action under the fourteenth amendment. ... We hold that it does, and therefore reverse the lower court’s dismissal of the complaint and remand for a determination of whether the statutory scheme involved comports with due process.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, so private conduct by a person who did not act under color of state law does not support a civil rights claim.

Taylor v. H. Michael Nichols, Robert L. Pinet, R. Michael Latimer, James Allen, Michael T. Allen, Joe Ferns, Jack · filed 1977-06-30

Michael T. Allen, whose conduct gave rise to the litigation, cannot be held liable under the Civil Rights Act for the reason that he did not act under color of state law. Section 1983 requires this. The same is true of the father, James Allen. The tort case of malicious prosecution is not coterminous in its elements with a civil rights suit based upon misuse of the process. True, the same facts could give rise to violations under both federal and state law, but color of state law would have to be present in order to have a civil rights case. Because of the lack of state action, the judgment dismissing the complaint as to the Allens must be and is summarily affirmed.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for deprivations of constitutional rights committed under color of state law.

Turner v. Roy Bridges Motors, Inc. · filed 1977-06-30

The court finds that the operation of Title 33, Section 25, Code of Alabama 1940 (Recomp.1958), does not constitute “state action” or action taken “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 provides relief only when the deprivation of rights was committed under color of state law; using state courts does not by itself establish state action.

Wendell B. Phillips, Iii v. International Association Of Bridge, Structural And Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 118 · filed 1977-07-01

Section 1983 does not provide relief, since it was not alleged that the deprivation of rights in question was under color of state law. Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24, 30 (9th Cir. 1962). The fact that in the deprivation resort was had to the courts of the state does not supply the necessary state action. See Hill v. McClellan, 490 F.2d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 1974), Skolnick v. Martin, 317 F.2d 855, 857 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 908, 84 S.Ct. 199, 11 L.Ed.2d 146 (1963).

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for constitutional violations committed under color of state law.

Spears v. Conlisk · filed 1977-11-03

There is no question that the conduct of which plaintiff complains was performed by all of the defendants under color of state law. ... Nor can there be any question that their conduct was actionable under § 1983. ... Accordingly plaintiff is entitled to recover damages from all of the defendants who remain in the case.

Section 1983 applies to actions committed under color of state law, not to a challenge alleging that a federal statute enacted by Congress is unconstitutional.

Clark v. United States · filed 1978-01-30

Plaintiffs argue that jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, yet these statutes confer federal jurisdiction only regarding actions committed under col- or of state law, whereas here the plaintiffs are alleging the unconstitutionality of a statute enacted by the Congress of the United States.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional right under color of state law.

Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency · filed 1978-01-30

Section 1343 is the jurisdictional statute for civil rights actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). In order to establish a claim cognizable under § 1983, appellant must show that he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and that such deprivation was achieved under color of state law. ... Since the challenged actions were taken by the individual officers pursuant to authority conferred by the Compact, the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights could not have been under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federally protected right caused by a person acting under color of state law, and an official's status alone is insufficient without state authority connected to the challenged act.

Triplett v. Azordegan · filed 1978-02-21

To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 two elements must exist. First, the plaintiff must have suffered the deprivation of federally protected rights, privileges or immunities as the result of action taken. ... Second, such deprivation must have been caused by a person acting under color of state law. ... It is the nature of the act performed by a state official, not the status of a state official as such, that is determinative of the applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... To establish that an act was performed under color of state law, there must exist some authority vested by the state in the official to act in regard to the constitutional right of which appellant contends he has been denied.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federally protected right caused by a person acting under color of state law; an official’s private inaction outside the authority of the relevant jurisdiction does not satisfy that requirement.

Triplett v. Azordegan · filed 1978-02-21

As to the alleged concealment by O’Brien, during appellant’s trial and subsequent incarceration, of his knowledge that the confession was drug induced, we hold that O’Brien was not acting under color of state law and thus the § 1983 cause of action must fail. ... The failure of O’Brien to take affirmative action in a jurisdiction where he was not empowered or required by the state to take such action simply was not a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In sum, we hold that O’Brien’s acts prior to April 1, 1955 deprived appellant of no rights secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States and inflicted no injury upon him. As to O’Brien’s failure to come forward with exculpatory information at appellant’s trial and thereafter, we hold that O’Brien was not acting under color of state law. Thus, no claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has been stated.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for deprivations carried out under color of state law.

Saad v. Burns International Security Services, Inc. · filed 1978-03-15

Claims under the 14th Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are available only where a cause of action alleges deprivation “under color of state law.” ... Plaintiff’s complaint makes no allegation of state action or involvement. Accordingly, these claims are dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of federal rights under color of state law and does not reach purely private conduct.

Raitport v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1978-05-18

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to governmental and not private action. ... It is not alleged that the actions of either defendant were performed under color of state law, and therefore plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil-rights remedy for conduct under color of state law, but not for conduct by federal officials acting under federal authority.

J. D. Pflaumer, Inc. v. United States Department of Justice · filed 1978-05-18

It is clear from the express language of this statute that it provides an aggrieved individual with a cause of action to redress a civil rights violation caused by actions taken under the color of state law. In this case, the defendants are all federal officials whose actions were taken pursuant to their federal authority. Section 1983 is an improper basis upon which to assert a cause of action for an alleged civil rights violation perpetrated under the color of federal law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of rights under color of state law and does not apply when defendants act under color of federal law.

Mack v. Donald C. Alexander, Commissioner · filed 1978-06-19

Plaintiff has also alleged jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Section 1343 places original jurisdiction in the district courts when there is a substantive claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. However, we agree with the district court’s ruling that these statutes provide a remedy for deprivation of rights under color of state law and do not apply when the defendants are acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983's “under color of” requirement is satisfied when the state has clothed the defendant with apparent authority to act.

Kedra v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1978-06-29

That requirement is addressed to the source of authority for the defendant’s conduct, and, so long as the state has clothed the defendant with apparent authority to act, the requirement has been met.

Section 1983 reaches governmental associations performing their functions under color of state law.

Kite Ex Rel. Kite v. Marshall · filed 1978-07-27

UIL, an association of governmental entities, clearly performs its functions under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and conduct that does not meet that requirement cannot support a claim under the statute.

Citizens League for Civil Rights, Inc. v. Baker · filed 1978-09-20

The complaint does not, and cannot, allege that the defendants have acted “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . .” Therefore, it does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1984.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional or federal right under color of state law, and its under-color requirement can be met by a private person who jointly participates with state officials.

Adkins v. Adkins · filed 1978-11-06

There are two essential elements to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, Plaintiff must show that Defendant deprived her of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and second, that Defendant acted under the color of state law. ... An action may be maintained, however, against private individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985(2) where they have jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action. "To act `under color' of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents."

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to be committed under color of state law, or state action.

Williams v. Yazoo Valley-Minter City Oil Mill, Inc. · filed 1978-11-22

Similarly, plaintiff has failed to prove a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 since plaintiff has not shown that defendant has acted under “color of law” (which amounts to state action), as required by § 1983.

Section 1983 applies to deprivations carried out under color of state law, not to conduct under color of federal law.

Bush v. Bays · filed 1978-11-22

Because § 1983 does not apply to those who act under color of federal law, plaintiffs’ suit against the federal defendants is not brought to enforce a provision of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to occur under color of state law, including action taken under a state law, regulation, or state-enforced custom.

Novella H. Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., T/a Libbie Convalescent Home · filed 1978-12-18

Section 1983 requires Trageser to show that Libbie acted under color of either a state law or regulation or a state-enforced custom.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil-rights action for acts not performed under color of state law.

Honicker v. Hendrie · filed 1979-01-12

None of the acts of which plaintiff complains were performed under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and so plaintiff cannot maintain this as a civil rights action pursuant to that statute.

A Section 1983 claim requires conduct under color of state law.

Sauls v. Bristol-Myers Co. · filed 1978-12-22

The conclusory allegations of government involvement in the alleged discrimination, premised apparently on nothing more than unsupported inferences drawn from adverse administrative rulings, ... fail to satisfy the government action requirement of a First Amendment claim ... or the “color of state law” requirement of a section 1983 claim.