42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot use the discovery rule to delay the limitations period after learning the substance of the actionable conduct.

Sattler v. Johnson · filed 1988-09-19

We agree with the district court that under the circumstances of this case the “discovery rule” is not available to toll the statute of limitations. ... Sattler’s first complaint and the memorandum he filed in support of it show that he learned of the substance of any actionable conspiracy long before the statute of limitations expired.

Section 1983 claims for false arrest and false imprisonment must be filed within one year after accrual, and imprisonment does not toll the limitations period.

Murr v. Paul Shoemaker, Larry Cunningham, John Doe · filed 1988-10-04

Plaintiff failed to file his complaint within one year after the accrual of his cause of action. ... Furthermore, plaintiff's imprisonment is not a disability which tolls the statute of limitations. ... Plaintiff's claims are thus time-barred.

The discovery rule does not toll the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff knew the substance of the actionable conduct before that period expired.

Sattler v. Johnson · filed 1988-10-17

We agree with the district court that under the circumstances of this case the "discovery rule" is not available to toll the statute of limitations. Under the discovery rule, "[i]t is not necessary that [the plaintiff] knew ... all of the [defendants'] alleged torts. [The plaintiff's] action is time-barred as long as [he was] 'on notice' of the conduct about which [he] complain[s]." Id. at 820. Sattler's first complaint and the memorandum he filed in support of it show that he learned of the substance of any actionable conspiracy long before the statute of limitations expired.

The limitations period for a Section 1983 claim may be equitably tolled when a plaintiff diligently tries to learn an assailant’s concealed identity, even if the defendants did not conceal it.

Majid v. Fielitz · filed 1988-11-07

Thus, Majid need not show that Fielitz or Acken were involved in the alleged concealment of evidence, but just that Acken’s identity was concealed from him despite his attempts to ascertain the identity of the assailant. Equitable tolling is therefore an issue to be resolved, and the contested evidence is relevant to this issue.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state personal injury statute of limitations and state tolling rules.

Barnett v. David Williams, Warden David Garretty · filed 1988-11-28

There is no federal statute of limitations for Sec. 1983 actions, and the appropriate state statute applies. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42 (1984). The state statute governing personal injury is applied to all Sec. 1983 claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). State tolling statutes are applied as well as state statutes of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use state law to determine the limitations period and whether estoppel or equitable tolling applies.

Monroe v. Williams · filed 1988-12-15

For the purposes of § 1983, “the length of the limitations period, and closely related questions of tolling and application are to be governed by state law.” ... Accordingly, in evaluating plaintiffs argument that principles of estoppel and equitable tolling should apply in this case, we look to District of Columbia law.

For an Illinois § 1983 claim arising at arrest, continuous imprisonment from arrest tolls the applicable limitations period.

Knox v. Cook County Sheriff's Police Department and Robert Neapolitan · filed 1988-12-28

However, upon execution of the search warrant, Knox was arrested and imprisoned where he has remained ever since. Under these facts, Knox’s claim is deemed to have accrued while he was imprisoned. The statute of limitations is tolled during this time, and his original complaint therefore timely filed.

A Section 1983 claim based on an ongoing suspension under allegedly unconstitutional attorney reinstatement rules continues to accrue each day the alleged wrong persists.

Centifanti v. Nix · filed 1989-01-20

We find the Justices' arguments unpersuasive. First, we observe that Centifanti remains suspended from the practice of law, and thus he alleges what is in essence a continuing wrong. His cause of action continues to accrue on each day of the alleged wrong.

Section 1983 actions are treated as personal injury actions for limitations purposes and use the most appropriate state personal injury limitations period where the claim accrued.

Wilford v. City of Louisville · filed 1989-02-15

For statute of limitations purposes, all actions filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 are characterized as personal injury actions, and as such, they are governed by the most appropriate limitations period for personal injuries in the state where the cause of action accrued.

A direct criminal appeal or an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 does not toll the limitations period for a § 1983 civil rights claim.

Anderson v. Hood · filed 1989-02-22

Upon review, we conclude that this case was properly dismissed. Plaintiff's direct criminal appeal and his action filed under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 did not serve to toll the running of the statute.

Incarceration alone does not toll the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim arising in Michigan absent an equitable basis.

Ward v. Thomas Minick Mr. Henes · filed 1989-02-27

However, application of Michigan's tolling provision is inconsistent with federal policy considerations underlying Sec. 1983. Absent an equitable basis to do so, tolling Michigan's statute of limitations applicable to Sec. 1983 claims is not justified due to plaintiff's incarceration.

Section 1983 actions apply state tolling rules, including a state rule extending the filing period for prisoners when that rule is consistent with § 1983’s remedial purpose.

Hardin v. Straub · filed 1989-05-22

We do not agree with the Court of Appeals. A State’s decision to toll the statute of limitations during the inmate’s disability does not frustrate § 1983’s compensation goal. Rather, it enhances the inmate’s ability to bring suit and recover damages for injuries.

In New York, a § 1983 claim has a three-year limitations period, tolled when a defendant conceals facts critical to the claim until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover it.

Yeadon v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1989-08-04

Under appropriately borrowed New York law, the statute of limitations period applicable to § 1983 and § 1985 actions is three years. ... Additionally, if a defendant has concealed facts that are critical to a cause of action, then the statute of limitations is tolled until plaintiff discovers or with reasonable diligence should have discovered his claim.

Section 1983 actions by prisoners borrow applicable state limitations periods and give effect to state provisions tolling those periods during imprisonment.

Smith v. Baker · filed 1989-08-10

The Supreme Court in Hardin v. Straub, 109 S.Ct. 1998 (1989), reversed Higley and made it clear that a federal court applying a state statute of limitations to an inmate's federal civil rights action should give effect to the state's provision tolling the limitations period for prisoners. Under Ky.Rev.Stat. Sec. 413.310, "The time of the confinement of the plaintiff in the penitentiary shall not be counted as part of the period limited for the commencement of an action." ... Although more than one year passed since the action accrued, the action was not time-barred.

Section 1983 actions arising in Michigan must be brought within three years of accrual.

Jordan v. Robert Brown, Jr. Ted Koehler John Hawley Larry Thorton Benjamin T. Ulep C/o Corn · filed 1989-08-18

Pursuant to Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Sec. 600.5805(8), civil rights actions arising in Michigan must be brought within 3 years of their accrual.

Section 1983 actions arising in Ohio have a two-year limitations period, tolled during a plaintiff’s incarceration under Ohio law.

Farmer v. George F. Denton Ronald C. Marshall Wayne O. Chambliss Roger D. Crabtree Lonnie McGuire Arnold Hall P · filed 1989-08-21

Upon review, we must vacate the district court's judgment and remand the case for further consideration of the merits of Farmer's claims. In Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir.1989) (en banc), this court held that the two year statute of limitations contained in Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2305.10 was the appropriate limitations period to apply to a Sec. 1983 civil rights actions arising in Ohio. In addition, the running of the limitations period was tolled by Farmer's incarceration pursuant to Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2305.16. See Hardin v. Straub, 109 S.Ct. 1998, 2003 (1989).

Federal courts apply state tolling statutes to the limitations period for Section 1983 actions.

Perreault v. Hostetler · filed 1989-09-01

Whether a limitations period is tolled is an inherent aspect of a state’s statute of limitations and, therefore, federal courts are obligated to apply state tolling statutes in § 1983 actions.

Ohio law tolls the limitations period for § 1983 claims that accrue while the plaintiff is incarcerated.

Eubank v. Calvin Crawford Norris W. McMackin Supt. Richard P. Seiter John F. Kinkela Anita Reese · filed 1989-10-18

Furthermore, Ohio law provides for tolling of the statutory period where, as here, plaintiff's claim accrues during incarceration. See Austin v. Brammer, 555 F.2d 142, 143 (6th Cir.1977) (per curiam). Such tolling is applicable to Sec. 1983 actions.

Section 1983's limitations period is tolled during a plaintiff's incarceration when applicable state law provides for that tolling.

Caise v. McFadden · filed 1989-11-14

The district court properly relied upon this court's decision in Higley v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 835 F.2d 623 (6th Cir.1987), in concluding that the statutory period applicable to Sec. 1983 is not tolled by provisions of state law providing for tolling during incarceration. However, Higley was recently overruled by the Supreme Court in Hardin v. Straub, 109 S.Ct. 1998 (1989). Thus, the statutory period must be tolled during plaintiff's incarceration pursuant to Ky.Rev.Stat. Sec. 413.310.

Section 1983 claims brought in Tennessee must be filed within one year after accrual, and imprisonment does not toll that period.

Grizzell v. McWherter · filed 1989-11-15

First, plaintiff's claims are time-barred. In Tennessee, actions brought under the federal civil rights statute are to be taken within one (1) year after the cause of action accrues. Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 28-3-104. Grizzell's cause of action, if any, accrued in April of 1977 when he was returned to Tennessee from the state of Florida. Grizzell filed his complaint in October of 1988, some eleven years later. The state of Tennessee does not provide for tolling due to imprisonment. Clearly, plaintiff's cause of action was time-barred.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim against a peace officer is tolled under California Government Code § 945.3 while criminal charges against the potential plaintiff are pending, even though that provision cannot bar the filing of the claim.

Harding v. David Galceran Terry Gingerich Lawrence Moser James D. Chisim · filed 1989-11-16

We hold that although section 945.3 may not prohibit a potential plaintiff from bringing a section 1983 claim against a peace officer while criminal actions are pending, section 945.3's tolling provision may still apply to toll the limitations period while criminal actions are pending against the potential plaintiff.

Filing a declaratory action to interpret a contract does not toll the limitations period for a separate § 1983 claim.

Subryan v. Regents of the University of Colorado · filed 1989-11-16

Here, in contrast, the plaintiffs § 1983 claim is not a remedy that arises from the breach of his contract; it is, rather, a new and different claim for relief. Thus, the filing of the plaintiffs declaratory action did not toll the statute of limitations for his § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 damages claims against peace officers may benefit from California Government Code § 945.3 tolling while related criminal charges are pending, allowing the plaintiff to delay filing federal and related state claims together.

Johnson v. City of Chico · filed 1989-11-17

Thus, under the factual circumstances described by the statute, a federal civil rights plaintiff may either (a) elect to delay bringing his federal action pending resolution of state criminal proceedings should he wish to file his pendent state claims jointly with federal claims arising out of the same operative nucleus of facts in a single proceeding; or (b) bring his § 1983 claim in federal court within the one-year period proscribed by § 340(3) without joining the pendent state claims.

Section 1983 suits by Illinois inmates against correctional officials are subject to a two-year limitations period without prisoner tolling under amended Illinois law.

Knox v. Lane · filed 1989-11-22

By excluding actions against correctional officials from any relief via tolling, Section 13-211 effectively makes all prison-related inmate Section 1983 suits subject to the general two-year limitations period endorsed by Kalimara.

Section 1983 employment claims in Michigan are subject to a three-year limitations period, and a late claim requires proof of a continuing violation.

Richard F. Conlin, Richard L. Fitzpatrick v. Blanchard · filed 1989-11-27

Both parties agree that the proper statute of limitations to apply for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the Michigan three year statute of limitations period for general tort actions. ... The lawsuit was filed in April 1988, so the promotions specifically challenged fall outside the statute of limitations period. We hold that appellants have also failed to prove a continuing violation.

In New York, a Section 1983 claim has a three-year limitations period and accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Babigian v. ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NY · filed 1990-01-11

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held, in light of Wilson, that the statute of limitations in New York for a section 1983 claim is three years. ... Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when "the plaintiff `knows or has reason to know' of the injury that is the basis of his action." ... The Court finds that plaintiff's section 1983 claim accrued at the latest on May 16, 1975, when the Grievance Committee advised plaintiff that it was closing its file on the matter.

The limitations period for a Section 1983 claim in Michigan is tolled under the state prisoner tolling statute if the claim accrues while the plaintiff is incarcerated.

Ward v. Miklos Szylagyi Rick L. Boyd, and Others Unknown, in Individual and Official Capacities · filed 1990-02-01

However, the district court erred in its determination that Ward's incarceration did not toll the limitations period under Michigan law. Pursuant to Mich.Comp. Laws Ann. Sec. 600.5851(1) (West 1987), imprisonment tolls the limitations period for up to one year after the incarceration ends if the cause of action accrues while the plaintiff is incarcerated. Ward has been a federal prisoner since May 1981, and avers that he was continuously incarcerated in Michigan from March 1979 until he was turned over to federal custody. The district court relying on our holding in Higley v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 835 F.2d 623 (6th Cir.1987), found that the limitations period had not been tolled by Ward's incarceration. Recently, however, in Hardin v. Straub, 109 S.Ct. 1998 (1989), the Supreme Court effectively overruled the decision in Higley and stated that a Michigan state prisoner who filed an untimely Sec. 1983 action was entitled to avail himself of the state statute tolling the limitations period for prisoners. Hardin, 109 S.Ct. at 2003.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico borrow the personal-injury limitations period and tolling rules supplied by Puerto Rico law.

Narvaez v. Ariel Nazario, Etc. · filed 1990-02-05

Hence, it is clear that for the resolution of this case resort must be had not only to the limitations period for personal injury actions in Puerto Rico but also to the tolling rules provided by its laws.

Filing a California Tort Claims Act claim does not equitably toll the limitations period for a Section 1983 action because the state and federal remedies are separate and independent.

Stone v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 1990-03-14

The court concludes that plaintiffs tort claim is not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations on his section 1983 action. Accordingly, as a matter of law, plaintiffs section 1983 claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

A § 1983 false arrest claim accrues when the plaintiff is aware of the alleged harm, and is subject to a two-year limitations period in Ohio.

Gallagher v. Yeagley · filed 1990-05-14

Gallagher's complaint centers around an alleged improper arrest on September 14, 1985. At that moment Gallagher's claim accrued, that is, he was then aware of the harm to him assuming the truth of his false arrest allegations. Hicks v. Hines Inc., 826 F.2d 1543, 1544 (6th Cir.1987). His complaint, filed March 29, 1989, was filed well beyond the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir.1989) (en banc).

Section 1983 claims arising from a continuing wrong may accrue with each new injury, but recovery for damages is limited by the applicable state statute of limitations; California applied a one-year period.

Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1990-05-31

Under the continuing wrong theory, although the statute of limitations is tolled as to the cause of action, damages are limited by the state' statute of limitations. ... The applicable California statute of limitations limiting damages in this case is one year.

Section 1983 claims barred by the statute of limitations remain barred when the plaintiff shows no valid basis to toll it.

Rutkowski v. Extradition Corp. of America · filed 1990-06-07

Plaintiff has not shown a valid basis to toll the statute of limitations which bars his claims.

Federal law determines when a section 1983 claim accrues, even though federal courts borrow the applicable limitations period from state law.

Herman Corn, Trustee v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, a Florida Municipal Corporation · filed 1990-06-27

While federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations for section 1983 actions, a determination of when the federal cause of action accrues — that is, comes into existence — is governed by federal standards.

Section 1983 claims may have their limitations period tolled during incarceration in a state penitentiary under an applicable state tolling statute.

Cothran v. Jefferson County Corrections Dept. · filed 1990-06-27

Richard Cothran, a Kentucky state prisoner, appeals pro se from the summary judgment in favor of defendants in this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Pursuant to Hardin v. Straub, 109 S.Ct. 1998, 2003 (1989), findings are needed concerning Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 413.310, which tolls the running of the statute of limitations during incarceration in a state penitentiary.

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot toll the limitations period for mental incapacity based only on complaint allegations when her own testimony establishes capacity and she offers no contrary evidence.

Branch v. Carr · filed 1990-07-06

Appellant-plaintiff sued defendant and others seeking damages pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 based upon her allegations that defendant assaulted her on January 4, 1985, at the time of her admission to a hospital. ... Other than the averments of her complaint, appellant has produced no evidence of incapacity which would constitute a tolling of the statute of limitations. ... Accordingly, on the basis of the record before the trial court, no genuine issue of material fact remained, and the trial court correctly granted summary judgment based upon appellee’s statute of limitations defense.

Section 1983 claims arising from an unlawful arrest and search are subject to a three-year limitations period in New York, with the filing deadline on the third anniversary of accrual.

Day v. Morgenthau · filed 1990-08-29

We determined that Day’s claims, pleaded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), were subject to a three-year statute of limitations, ... and that the first day of that three-year period was December 13, 1985, the day following the date the claims accrued, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a). ... Day’s complaint was not filed until December 13, 1988, one day after the third anniversary date of the date of accrual, and is therefore time barred.

Section 1983 civil rights actions arising in Ohio are subject to a two-year limitations period beginning at accrual.

Richard A. Paladin, Sally J. Paladin v. Thomas C. Doyle, Detective, Robert Jaksa, Detective, William Depledge, Chief of · filed 1990-09-27

In Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir.1989) (en banc), this court held that pursuant to Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2305.10 civil rights actions arising in that state must be brought within two years of their accrual. Plaintiffs' cause of action, which was grounded upon allegations of false arrest and imprisonment, accrued on July 3, 1986. McCune v. City of Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 906 (6th Cir.1988). As plaintiffs did not file their complaint until more than three years after that date, their cause of action is clearly barred by the statute of limitations.

A timely § 1983 action in New York can become time-barred if dismissed for exhaustion after the limitations period expires; dismissal without prejudice does not toll that period.

Jewell v. County Of Nassau · filed 1990-10-30

Jewell's Sec. 1983 action was brought timely. Contrary to the district court's intentions, a dismissal of the action to permit exhaustion of Jewell's state remedies would work a time-bar to reassertion of the Sec. 1983 claim.

A Section 1983 claim accrues, and its limitations period begins, when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Smith v. Jimmy Keck, Officer, John Mangum, Officer, City of Detroit · filed 1990-11-19

A cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations commences when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Section 1983 damages claims arising in Michigan are subject to a three-year limitations period running from accrual of the injury.

Clay v. Bruce Weaver, Police Officer, David Benson, Police Officer, City of Grand Rapids · filed 1990-11-20

Upon review, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that this complaint is barred by the Michigan statute allowing a plaintiff to file an action for damages within three years from the time the injury accrues.

A § 1983 claim based on discrete conduct accrues when that conduct occurs; continuing harm alone does not make it a continuing violation.

Mary Deimler and Mark Deimler v. Judge George Pease and Judge Harry Hartell, of the 19th Judicial Circuit of Illinois · filed 1990-11-26

Although harm may continue, all the allegedly improper conduct by Judge Pease occurred in 1984. Any claim Mark Deimler may have accrued in 1984 and was barred by the statute of limitations when this action was filed in 1989.

Section 1983 borrows state tolling rules; under Illinois law, a prisoner incarcerated from the date of the alleged violation may sue within two years after imprisonment ends.

Dortch v. Thomas Shine, Thomas Lazar and Officer McKenna · filed 1990-12-06

Under the Illinois tolling statute, when a prisoner is incarcerated from the date that the alleged civil rights violation occurred, he may bring his section 1983 action within two years after the termination of his imprisonment.

Section 1983 claims filed in Ohio have a two-year limitations period from accrual under Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10.

Farber v. Massillon Board of Education · filed 1990-12-11

Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10 accordingly allows two years from accrual for filing of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, thus Appellant’s 1980 claim for the position of Director of Instruction was timely filed.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois that accrued before Wilson v. Garcia must be filed by the earlier of five years after accrual or two years after Wilson.

Stimac v. United States Department of Justice, Agent Conway, Agent Fincher · filed 1990-12-18

In Illinois, all plaintiffs whose section 1983 cause of action accrued before the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), must file suit within the shorter period of either five years from the date the action accrued or two years after Wilson.

Section 1983 actions in Iowa are subject to the general limitations provisions of chapter 614 and the discovery rule, rather than the Iowa Tort Claims Act limitation in section 25A.13.

Callahan v. State · filed 1990-12-19

The plaintiff’s section 1983 action, therefore, is subject to the general limitation provisions of chapter 614, not section 25A.13, and the discovery rule clearly applies under Chrischilles and its progeny, as discussed above.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying it; pending habeas proceedings do not delay accrual.

Hughes Anderson Bagley, Jr. v. Cmc Real Estate Corporation, AKA Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Donald E · filed 1991-01-22

In view of all of this precedent, we make explicit the implicit ruling of Young, and hold that Bagley’s § 1983 and Bivens actions accrued for statute of limitations purposes when he first learned of the injury ... giving rise to his claims, and not at the completion of his habeas corpus proceeding.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers the wrongful act, and later discovery that the resulting injury was greater than first thought does not restart the limitations period.

Holland v. David H. Bland, C. Walker, R. Hendricks, W. Henderson, John Thomas, N. Aldridge · filed 1991-02-04

Holland's claim accrued in 1976 when he discovered that the defendants had withheld his mother's autopsy report. Id. Even though he later discovered that the injury he suffered at that time was greater than originally thought, the commencement date for the statute of limitations does not change.

Section 1983 claims borrow state limitations and tolling rules, including savings provisions; a savings provision does not preserve a refiled claim against defendants absent from the earlier action.

Brown v. Hartshorne Public School District 1, Janie Trueblood Lorraine Hollis Jack Holloway Tommy McCullar Dr. · filed 1991-02-20

The same reasoning applies to the savings provision, which is an integral part of a state’s limitations and tolling rules. ... Because the board members were not named in the prior action, the saving statute does not apply to the suit against them and it is therefore untimely.

Section 1983 actions filed in Kansas have a two-year limitations period, and imprisonment does not toll that period when the prisoner has access to the courts.

Martinson v. James Wolney and Randy Linck · filed 1991-02-26

The Supreme Court has held the statute of limitations for a section 1983 action is the state statute of limitations for a personal injury action. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-77 (1985). We noted in Newcomb v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 675, 679 n. 7 (10th Cir.1987), that "[i]t is well-established that the statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 actions commenced in the District of Kansas is two years." All of the actions plaintiff complains of occurred before July 1987. Although the limitations period is tolled for a person imprisoned for less than a life term, the tolling statute states that "if a person imprisoned for any term has access to the court for purposes of bringing an action, such person shall not be deemed to be under legal disability." Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 60-515(a). We find no evidence in the record indicating plaintiff's access to the courts was unduly restricted during his incarceration. We therefore conclude the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants.

Pursuing post-conviction relief does not toll the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim.

Hendrix v. Borkowski · filed 1991-03-05

However, his pursuit of post-conviction relief does not toll the statute of limitations applicable to his Sec. 1983 claim.

Section 1983 false arrest and unlawful search claims accrue when the plaintiff knows of the injury, which can be the date of the arrest and search.

Day v. Moscow · filed 1991-05-14

The accrual date was December 12, 1985, the date that the “decisive events,” namely the arrest and search, occurred and the date on which Day gained knowledge of the wrong.

A section 1983 claim based on a single unlawful act accrues when that act injures the plaintiff; continuing ill effects do not extend the limitations period.

Hyon Waste Management Services, Inc. v. City of Chicago · filed 1991-05-21

Although Hyon attempts to portray the sealing of the incinerator as a continuous violation, we find that any alleged damages resulting from the City’s act were instead continued ill effects from a single alleged due process violation. Because a continuing violation is occasioned by continuing unlawful acts and not from the continued ill effects from an initial violation, Hyon’s complaint, filed more than five years after the City sealed its incinerator, is time barred.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury; extending an ordinance without changing its effect does not start a new limitations period.

De Anza Properties X, Ltd. v. County Of Santa Cruz · filed 1991-06-28

Appellants allege a violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run when a potential plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the asserted injury. ... The county's amendment in 1987 giving the ordinance an indefinite rather than a definite duration did not create an entirely new cause of action for purposes of the statute of limitations.

A § 1983 claim over lost pension eligibility accrues when the employee is dismissed and has reason to know of the loss; pursuing arbitration does not toll the limitations period.

Fleischman v. Grinker · filed 1991-08-05

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim therefore accrued upon his dismissal on July 15, 1985, and the running of the statute of limitations on that claim was not tolled by his resort to an arbitral remedy.

Section 1983 claims in Oregon are subject to the state personal injury limitations period, which is tolled during qualifying imprisonment under Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.160(3).

Lane v. Art Martinak · filed 1991-12-11

Accordingly, because (1) Lane's imprisonment tolled the statute of limitations; and (2) Lane filed his section 1983 complaint within the extended limitations period specified in Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.160(3), his complaint was timely filed.

For a § 1983 claim subject to the borrowed Texas limitations period, pursuing required state remedies may toll the period only while state litigation is actually pending.

Jackson v. Howard Johnson, Dallas Police Officer · filed 1992-01-09

The time during which the litigant is pursuing the available state remedies would toll the statute of limitations, thus allowing the litigant to return to federal court within the limitations period. This conclusion presumes, however, that the litigant promptly files any necessary state action; only the time during which the state litigation is actually pending would toll the statute of limitations.

A § 1983 claim for denial of visitation is not a continuing violation when the denial and final state court judgment would have alerted an average person to protect his rights.

Ronald Ott Robert Troll Lynch, Attorney-Appellant v. Mancini · filed 1992-02-06

Plaintiff's allegation of a continuing violation was meritless, as the denial of visitation in 1984 and the final state court judgment in 1987 were events which would have alerted the average lay person to protect his rights.

Section 1983 claims in California use a one-year limitations period that is not tolled by presenting a claim under California’s Tort Claims Act.

Joyce Ann Williams, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for Minor Children v. City of San Jose, a Municipal Corporatio · filed 1992-03-11

The parties agree, as they must, that the applicable statute of limitations for section 1983 actions is California's one-year statute. ... In short, California neither purports to require the filing of a claim against a public entity in a federal civil rights case, nor purports to toll the general statute of limitations for cases in which no claim need be filed.

A § 1983 claim against corrections officers for an allegedly unsupported prison disciplinary finding accrues when they issue the decision.

Street v. Cameron · filed 1992-04-02

The district judge properly determined that Street's claims against the corrections officers accrued when they issued their decision. Thus, his claims became time-barred as of November 3, 1990.

Section 1983 claims refiled in federal court after a voluntary dismissal may use Illinois’s savings provision as part of the borrowed limitations and tolling rules.

Ill v. Roland · filed 1993-02-10

The court determines that this provision is part of the limitation and tolling scheme of Illinois law such that it should be adopted for purposes of § 1983.

A defendant asserting a statute-of-limitations defense to a § 1983 claim bears the burden of proving when the cause of action accrued.

VACOM, Inc. v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors · filed 1993-09-22

Defendants have the burden of proving the date of accrual. ... The Defendants’ having failed to do, the Plea in Bar is overruled.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to the tolling provisions of California Government Code § 945.6 because they are exempt from the California Tort Claims Act’s claim-presentation requirements.

Emmert v. County of Sonoma · filed 1993-11-02

Accordingly, the court holds that the tolling provisions of § 945.6 do not apply to § 1983 claims, and that Mr. Emmert’s federal claims must therefore be DISMISSED.

Section 1983 borrows Ohio’s limitations tolling rule for persons of unsound mind, including persons with intellectual disabilities, because that rule is consistent with its remedial purpose.

Martin v. Voinovich · filed 1993-12-14

Just as the Court in Hardin held that the Michigan tolling statute for persons who are imprisoned is consistent with § 1983’s remedial purpose, this Court holds that the Ohio tolling statute for persons “of unsound mind” (which includes mentally retarded persons) is consistent with § 1983’s remedial purpose.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury, and a later act too remote from and unrelated to earlier acts does not toll the limitations period under the continuing violation doctrine.

Steven Russo, Jr. Samuel J. Reyes v. Casey · filed 1993-12-22

Thus, for Sec. 1983 claims, a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run from when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis for the action. ... Even though the Russo and Reyes' discovery of the July 12, 1991 contract breach occurred within the limitations period, the event was too remote from and unrelated to the many prior time-barred acts of which they had knowledge in March and April 1991.

A § 1983 claim challenging a development fee becomes ripe when the agency definitively imposes the fee and causes concrete injury, starting the applicable limitations period.

Ponderosa Homes, Inc. v. City of San Ramon · filed 1994-04-08

This one-year period runs from the same event as that which triggers the running of the one-hundred-eighty-day period set by section 66020, subdivision (d), that is, the imposition of the fees of which Ponderosa complains. Civil rights claims under 42 United States Code section 1983 are ripe for adjudication when the government agency has arrived at a definitive position on an issue that inflicts an actual concrete injury.

The limitations period for a Section 1983 claim challenging the constitutionality of a conviction is tolled while the plaintiff completes required habeas exhaustion.

Zuliani v. Boardman · filed 1994-10-20

Therefore, the Court holds that the statute of limitations is tolled while Plaintiff completes the required exhaustion.

Section 1983 unlawful seizure claims accrue at the time of arrest.

Day v. Conwell · filed 2003-02-18

Section 1983 claims of unlawful seizure accrue at the time of arrest.

A § 1983 unlawful search claim accrues when the search is complete, provided the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of it.

Spencer v. Connecticut · filed 2008-06-18

Accordingly, so long as the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the search, a claim for an illegal search accrues, and a plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, when the act of searching the property is complete.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for arrest and incarceration solely because the evidence supporting the arrest came from an unlawful search.

Gannon v. City of New York · filed 2013-01-08

I agree with Defendants that Plaintiffs claim with respect to the arrest and incarceration for unlawful seizure must be dismissed. The Second Circuit has clearly rejected an attempt to recover damages under § 1983 based on the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine.

Section 1983 provides a remedy against a person acting under color of state law who deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution and laws, but these plaintiffs' patronage-based termination claim did not come within its protection.

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Shapp · filed 1971-06-24

The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983, provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution *536and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” ... It is clear that these plaintiffs do not come within the provisions or protection of any of the aforesaid Acts.

Section 1983 provides a civil-rights cause of action for a state-official discharge that violates an employee’s constitutional rights, including First Amendment rights based on political affiliation.

Janda v. State of Illinois · filed 1972-07-06

Therefore Count I states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 plaintiff challenging a public-employment decision must prove that protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision.

Avery v. Jennings · filed 1985-01-16

The second prong of the test requires the plaintiff to prove that her protected conduct was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor in the defendants’ failure to hire her.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim to an applicant denied nonpolicymaking public employment for political-patronage reasons.

Messer v. Curci · filed 1985-06-04

In effect, the plaintiffs ask this court to mandate a merit system for all state and local public employees. Whatever the court’s personal views of patronage hiring, there exists no authority persuasive to this court for judicial activism of that sort.

Political affiliation is not an appropriate job requirement for low-level road-grader operators, so patronage dismissals of those employees fall within § 1983’s First Amendment protection.

Horton v. Taylor · filed 1985-07-11

As we have already determined as a matter of law that the road-graders were not excepted from the rule, should the court reach this finding, judgment should then be entered for those plaintiffs.

Nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential public employees cannot be dismissed solely for political affiliation when party loyalty is irrelevant to effective job performance.

Horton v. Taylor · filed 1985-07-11

Here, however, the nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential nature of the plaintiffs’ jobs as such is clear from the record, as is the irrelevance of party affiliation to the effective operation of a road-grading machine.

A Section 1983 claim may challenge refusal to hire for a nonpolicymaking government position based on political beliefs because patronage hiring can chill First Amendment rights just as patronage dismissal can.

Ind. St. Employees Ass'n v. Ind. Repub. St. Cent. · filed 1986-03-21

Finally, defendants argue that although patronage dismissals are prohibited, patronage hirings are valid. The Court finds little reason to distinguish between the two. The Government cannot achieve an unlawful end either directly or indirectly. The refusal to hire someone based on political beliefs can chill a person's First Amendment rights as easily as firing someone for political reasons.

A public employee’s Section 1983 political-discrimination claim fails when the government has an adequate nonpolitical basis for the challenged employment action, even if political motivation also existed.

Gendalia v. Gioffre · filed 1986-03-31

Under ... if there exists a non-political basis for the action taken, whether or not there is a political motivation as well, the ... claim fails.

A public employee states a section 1983 claim when discharged or denied rehire solely because of political affiliation.

Cox v. Thompson · filed 1986-05-12

Thus, under either the failure to rehire or discharge scenario, the plaintiff states a valid 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

A politically motivated demotion violates Section 1983 when the public employer cannot show that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for effective performance of the position.

Echevarria v. Anselmi · filed 1986-08-20

Having considered the evidence received at trial, we enter our findings of fact and conclusions of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52. We find for plaintiff. His demotion was motivated by political considerations. Defendant Gracia and his successor Cordero, as the hiring authority, could not demonstrate that party affiliation was an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.

A public employee cannot maintain a Section 1983 political-affiliation claim when political loyalty is an appropriate requirement for a broad, confidential policymaking position.

Hernandez v. Hernandez · filed 1987-07-09

In sum, the duties of the Executive Secretary are broad and far reaching. She has an intrinsic and ongoing access, as part of her duties, to information which is sensitive and confidential. Therefore, plaintiff cannot, under any set of conceivable facts, maintain her Section 1983 suit and the same must be dismissed.

A public employee cannot maintain a Section 1983 political-affiliation claim when party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the position's inherent duties.

Chabran v. Nieves · filed 1987-07-24

As can readily be seen, the inherent functions of the Regional Director concern matters of partisan political concern, involve policymaking responsibilities, and allow the plaintiff to be both privy to confidential communication and a spokesman for the agency at the regional level. Having determined that the second inquiry is satisfied, we conclude that plaintiff’s position as Regional Director of the Department of Natural Resources is one where political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the office involved.

A public employee cannot maintain a Section 1983 political-affiliation claim when party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the position's inherent duties.

Lorenzo v. Almodovar · filed 1987-07-24

political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.

Political affiliation may be required for a public position whose inherent powers include high-level policy implementation, so discharge from that position does not violate § 1983.

Matta v. Delgado · filed 1987-09-10

It was therefore proper for the Administrator to require party loyalty of the person responsible for implementing these sensitive functions.

Dismissing nonconfidential career employees because of political affiliation violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under § 1983.

Torres v. Hernandez Colon · filed 1987-09-21

The Court finds that the defendant violated plaintiff’s first and fourteenth amendment rights in dismissing them because of their political affiliation.

Political affiliation may be an appropriate requirement for a public trust position whose inherent duties include confidential advice, discretion, and policy implementation.

Morales v. Alicea · filed 1987-09-28

As a matter of law and in accordance with the jurisprudence, plaintiff’s position is one which may require political affiliation, and defendants may dismiss him for political reasons consistent with the first amendment.

A public employee's political affiliation can support § 1983 liability when it was a substantial factor in the employer's decision not to renew the appointment.

Torres v. Awilda Aponte Roque, Etc. · filed 1987-10-16

In sum, there was ample evidence to support the district court’s finding that plaintiffs’ political affiliation was a “substantial factor” leading to the nonrenewal of their appointments.

Political affiliation may justify dismissal only for positions whose intrinsic duties place employees in a confidential relationship to policymakers or the policymaking process, not jobs with merely incidental exposure to sensitive material.

Santiago-Correa v. Hernandez-Colon · filed 1987-12-18

Access to sensitive material was incidental at best. They were not “confidential” employees, like personal secretaries, whom public officials may fire because of political affiliation.

Section 1983 allows a public employee to bring a First Amendment claim for a politically motivated demotion even if the employee lacks tenure.

Estrada-Izquierdo v. Awilda Aponte-Roque, Etc. · filed 1988-06-28

Likewise, even if Estrada did not have tenure because of some technical difficulty under Article 7.9, she would still have a cause of action against Aponte if Aponte demoted her because of her political affiliation.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of individually enforceable federal rights unless Congress’s remedial scheme forecloses it.

Stahura-Uhl v. Iroquois Central School District · filed 2011-12-19

A plaintiff suing pursuant to § 1983 bears an initial burden of demonstrating that the federal statute she claims has been violated creates an individually enforceable right. ... The defendant may defeat this presumption by demonstrating that Congress did not intend that remedy for a newly created right. ... Applying that analysis leads to the inevitable conclusion that the Rehabilitation scheme is not “comprehensive” and does not preclude a parallel § 1983 claim. ... Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim must be denied.

Section 1983 provides damages for constitutional violations only when its liability requirements are met; an unlawful identification procedure alone does not support damages unless tainted evidence is introduced at trial.

Thompson v. City of New York · filed 2009-03-19

In Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189 (2d Cir.2007), the Second Circuit held that a police officer’s unduly suggestive show up was not independently actionable under § 1983. Id. at 193. Instead, a constitutional violation occurs only if tainted evidence produced in an unlawful identification procedure is introduced at trial. See id. (“[T]he constitutional violation is that Wray’s right to a fair trial was impaired by the admission of testimony regarding the unreliable identification .... ”). As no tainted evidence was introduced at trial (there was no trial) any illegality in the lineups Thompson participated in does not support liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows an inmate to bring a procedural challenge when success would not necessarily result in immediate or speedier release.

Fain v. Morgan · filed 2007-11-28

An inmate may file a § 1983 action for procedural challenges if the action would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner.

A trial court’s later remedy for wrongful conduct does not eliminate a section 1983 claim arising from that conduct.

Furlong Companies v. City of Kansas City · filed 2006-03-21

The fact that a trial court remedied the city’s wrongful and irrational conduct has no bearing on whether that conduct was violative of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy of arresting defendants for extortion or relief from a journal entry against a plaintiff’s wife that supports wage garnishment.

Jenkins v. Whiteman · filed 1996-06-03

He contends they should be arrested for extortion. He also seeks relief from a journal entry against his wife that supports a wage garnishment proceeding. He asserts general allegations of denial of due process and Fourth Amendment guarantees, and failure to grant him a speedy trial. The requested remedies are not available under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil rights action to seek disbarment of a judge or prosecutor.

Clark v. Rodger Case Jerry Muse Bonnie Bass Larry Combs Vicky Marshall William H. Sewell, II · filed 1992-03-27

Clark's call for the disbarment of the judge and prosecuting attorney were not presented to the district court and, in any event, are not properly raised in a federal civil rights action.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; it provides a remedy for violations of rights conferred by the Constitution or other statutes.

Maher v. Gagne · filed 1980-06-25

Inasmuch as it does not create substantive rights at all, but merely provides a remedy for the violation of rights conferred by the Constitution or other statutes, § 1983 does not fall within the category of statutes providing for equal rights or civil rights.

Section 1983's availability as a federal remedy does not make a state mandamus proceeding unavailable.

State Ex Rel. McLendon v. Morton · filed 1978-12-19

The State in the present case argues that the mandamus should be dismissed, as Professor McLendon should pursue a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We accept this view and hold that the availability of a federal remedy is irrelevant here.

Section 1983 is not an appropriate remedy for obtaining federal review of ineffective-assistance claims when the plaintiffs have a full opportunity to develop those claims in their state criminal proceedings.

Noe v. County of Lake, Ind. · filed 1978-07-20

Since each concerned plaintiff has a full opportunity for such review 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not the appropriate remedy to achieve same in the procedural and factual context of this case.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for wrongs arising from a municipality’s lawful exercise of extraterritorial zoning powers.

Donald L. Garren and James A. Eddinger v. City of Winston-Salem, North Carolina · filed 1972-07-18

The remedy for any wrongs which appellants may have suffered or may suffer at the hands of the municipality in the exercise of its extraterritorial zoning powers does not lie under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 provides a federal forum and supplementary remedy for people denied rights under color of state law when state-law remedies are unavailable or inadequate.

James BATTLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Solon MULHOLLAND Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1971-03-23

A complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an appropriate method for Battle to pursue, since this statute was intended to provide a forum for persons denied their rights under color of state law where there is no remedy under state law or where state remedies are inadequate, and further “to provide a remedy in the federal courts supplementary to any remedy any State might have.” McNeese v. Board of Education, 1963, 373 U.S. 668, 672, 679, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 1435, 10 L.Ed.2d 622.

Section 1983 does not provide the federal remedy when a state prisoner challenges the fact of imprisonment itself rather than the conditions of confinement; such relief must be pursued through habeas corpus.

Mason v. Ruben Askew, Governor of the State of Florida · filed 1973-08-10

Since appellant challenges not the conditions of his confinement, but the fact of imprisonment itself, the court below correctly held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could not provide the requested remedy, and that appellant’s federal relief would have to come in habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not supply an additional damages remedy for a violation of duties created by the Communications Act when Congress withheld that remedy against connecting carriers.

Comtronics, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Telephone Company · filed 1977-05-18

While we may concede that § 414 would not deprive anyone of an independent action under § 1983, any viable § 1983 action here would be based on property rights alleged to have been created under the Communications Act. As such, a § 1983 action would be no more than an additional remedy for a violation of a duty created by the Communications Act. Because we hold that Congress withheld a damages remedy under the Act against connecting carriers (and as our brother Coffin’s dissent indicates the question is concededly not open and shut), we think it would make little sense to hold that a damages remedy exists against them under § 1983 for violations of the very same Act.

Section 1983 allows an action challenging state-law provisions alleged to deprive plaintiffs of rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Wisconsin Socialist Workers 1976 Campaign Committee v. McCann · filed 1978-11-14

After careful consideration of this issue, the Court concludes that this suit is proper under § 1983.

Section 1983 is unavailable for an unequal-taxation claim when state procedures provide a complete remedy.

Backus v. Chilivis · filed 1976-03-11

We hold that the procedures provided by Georgia statutes for resolving ad valorem tax disputes bar taxpayers from instituting a § 1983 action founded only on the claim that the assessments are unequal.

Section 1983 permits plaintiffs seeking relief that does not include release from custody to pursue their claims without proceeding by habeas corpus.

Johnson v. Solomon · filed 1979-08-17

Consequently, plaintiff class members will not be barred from pursuing their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

For constitutional due-process and equal-protection claims against local governments, § 1983 is the exclusive remedy when its elements are satisfied.

Ocean Acres Ltd. Partnership v. Dare County Board of Health · filed 1981-05-18

Accordingly, the court holds that plaintiff’s due process and equal protection claims may be asserted only pursuant to Section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for an equal-protection violation when a public employer assigns an employee to a job because of race.

James B. KNIGHT, Appellant, v. NASSAU COUNTY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Appellee · filed 1981-05-18

The Commission’s assignment of Knight to minority recruitment based on his race is also a violation of equal protection, remediable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state official’s breach of an employment contract when the contract creates no constitutional property interest in the job.

Bleeker v. Dukakis · filed 1981-12-04

But where state officials violate the terms of an employment contract that does not create a constitutional “property” interest in the job itself, the proper remedy lies in a suit for breach of contract, not a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for condemnation and inverse-condemnation claims brought under color of state law.

Boland v. City of Rapid City · filed 1982-02-03

We do not believe that this expansion of sections 1983 and 1988 includes condemnation and inverse condemnation under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides an independent remedy for federally protected rights even when state law also provides a means of obtaining relief.

Stratos v. Department of Public Welfare · filed 1982-08-31

Section 1983 provides an independent remedy for violation of rights protected by Federal law. If such a right is at issue, the § 1983 remedy is available, even if the State has also provided a means of obtaining relief.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal remedy for a parent's asserted constitutional right to a child's continued life when the claim challenges a specific act affecting a family member.

Jackson v. Marsh · filed 1982-12-07

Individuals who have been subjected to those acts are not without redress; however, as I see their right, it is not one protected by the United States Constitution in a manner which would make it cognizable under § 1983. In short, any right arising out of facts such as those before me in this case must be pursued in state court.

Section 1983 provides a claim for relief when a prison official deliberately loses or refuses to deliver an inmate's legal mail in violation of constitutional rights.

Woods v. Aldworth · filed 1983-04-04

Thus, Woods’ allegations that Aldworth deliberately lost or refused to deliver certain items of his legal mail clearly state a colorable claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 creates a remedy for violations of constitutional rights but does not itself provide a substantive right.

Gobla v. Crestwood School District · filed 1985-02-01

Section 1983 does not provide a plaintiff with a substantive right but instead provides a remedy through which a plaintiff may vindicate alleged violations or deprivations of constitutional rights.

A property owner cannot pursue a § 1983 deprivation claim when the state and its subdivisions provide adequate compensation mechanisms for the taking or demolition.

Lewis v. City of St. Louis · filed 1985-04-25

As to plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is well settled that the State of Missouri and its subdivisions and municipalities provide adequate mechanisms for compensating property owners whose property is either taken for public use or demolished because of failure to conform to building code requirements. The availability of these mechanisms precludes plaintiff from asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A plaintiff who knowingly files against Ohio in its Court of Claims may be required to waive § 1983 claims against individual state officers arising from the same conduct because state courts can adjudicate the federal claim.

Leaman v. Ohio Department of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities · filed 1985-05-14

Rather than cut off Plaintiff’s § 1983 cause of action and remedy as did the Wyoming statute, application of the Ohio statute would leave Plaintiff’s claim intact. Ohio merely requires adjudication of the claim in a special state court. Plaintiff’s action and the policies behind § 1983 are preserved as state courts have jurisdiction to hear § 1983 cases.

A counseled plaintiff who voluntarily invokes a state's court of claims may waive the right to pursue related Section 1983 claims against individual officials.

Mary Kate LEAMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL RETARDATION & DEVELOPMENT DISABILITIES, Et Al., Defe · filed 1987-07-23

Under the circumstances of this case, we consider this an adequate foundation for the finding of voluntariness.

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's comprehensive enforcement scheme precludes a cause of action under § 1983.

Garcia v. Cecos International, Inc. · filed 1985-05-15

The plaintiffs have no cause of action under section 1983 because the RCRA has precluded that approach.

Title VII and § 1983 employment-discrimination claims are not mutually exclusive and may be maintained together.

Snell v. Suffolk County · filed 1985-06-05

Defendants assert that plaintiffs cannot maintain actions under both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The two statutory claims are not mutually exclusive.

Section 1983 may remedy denial of access to the Education of the Handicapped Act’s impartial hearing process when the local educational agency effectively deprives a child of that due process.

Manecke v. School Board of Pinellas County, Florida, Etc. · filed 1985-06-11

With these principles in mind, we conclude that where, as here, the local educational agency deprives a handicapped child of due process by effectively denying that child access to the heart of the EHA administrative machinery, the impartial due process hearing, an action may be brought under § 1983.

A separate § 1983 action is unavailable when the asserted due-process claim is not independent of the Education of the Handicapped Act’s comprehensive review scheme.

Bonar v. Ambach · filed 1985-08-14

Because plaintiffs asserted no due process claims independent of the EHA, no separate section 1983 action could be maintained; plaintiffs similarly failed to demonstrate that their procedural claims within the EHA could not have been resolved through the proper administrative channels.

Not every violation of federal law gives rise to a § 1983 action.

Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority · filed 1985-08-26

Not all violations of federal law, however, give rise to § 1983 actions.

No separate § 1983 claim exists when the Education of the Handicapped Act supplies the exclusive remedy.

ADAMS BY ADAMS v. Hansen · filed 1985-10-21

Plaintiffs do not have a separate claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and are not entitled to greater relief under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, than they are under the EHA.

A plaintiff may assert Section 1983 claims alongside a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because Section 504 does not itself preclude the Section 1983 remedy.

Shuttleworth v. Broward County · filed 1986-07-08

The court concludes, on the basis of the above authority, that the plaintiff may assert claims under both the Rehabilitation Act § 504 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A comprehensive statutory remedy that directly supplies appropriate injunctive relief can preclude duplicative relief under Section 1983's “and laws” provision.

John Doe, Jack Smith, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant v. Maher · filed 1986-07-28

The availability of this avenue of relief barred them from seeking similar relief— along with the added bonus of attorney’s fees — under the “and laws” provision of section 1983.

A Title VII disparate-impact claim may not be asserted through § 1983.

Foster v. Donald Wyrick, Warden Board of Classification & Placement Board of Classification Assistants Vestal · filed 1987-07-08

We thus conclude that a Title VII disparate impact claim may not be asserted in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 is available to redress violations of enforceable rights under the Food Stamp Act because that Act does not foreclose private enforcement.

Gonzalez v. Pingree · filed 1987-07-20

Given the similarity of the remedial schemes provided by Congress in the Housing Act and the Food Stamp Act, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Wright compels the conclusion that a Sec. 1983 action is available to redress a violation of the Food Stamp Act.

Section 1983 is unavailable to enforce statutory limitations and standards that can be enforced through a sufficiently comprehensive citizen-suit remedy.

Oregon Natural Resources Council Breitenbush Community, Inc. Michael Donnelly v. U.S. Forest Service Bugaboo Timber Comp · filed 1987-12-21

Second, we interpret ... to stand for the proposition that section 1983 is not available to plaintiffs seeking to enforce limitations and standards they could enforce pursuant to the citizen suit provision of the Act. The Court concluded that “[w]hen the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demon strate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.”

When a disabled child seeks a free appropriate public education and the EHCA remedy is available, neither the EHCA claim nor a parallel equal-protection claim may be pursued through § 1983.

Drew P. v. Clarke County School District · filed 1987-12-23

In the ... case, the Supreme Court held that where a handicapped child asserts a right to a free appropriate public education, and the EHCA is available, a claim based either on the EHCA or on the Equal Protection Clause may be brought only under the EHCA. ... Therefore, this court concludes that Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief under section 1983.

Section 1983 cannot enforce rights created by Title VII, but it remains available for constitutional and statutory rights that predate and exist independently of Title VII.

McCauley v. Greensboro City Board of Education · filed 1987-12-30

Thus, Section 1983 may not be used to assert violations of Title VII, but it remains available for the assertion of constitutional and statutory rights which existed prior to and independent of Title VII.

Section 1983 permits an action for violations of section 5(f) of the Hawaii Admission Act because that provision’s enforcement mechanism does not preclude a section 1983 remedy.

Ulaleo v. Paty · filed 1990-05-04

The enforcement device provided by section 5(f) was not so comprehensive as to signal preclusion of a section 1983 action, based on violation of section 5(f).

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights created elsewhere; a constitutional violation does not itself violate § 1983.

International Insurance v. Guaranty National Insurance · filed 1991-11-26

The statute merely provides a remedy for the violation of rights created elsewhere. ... Therefore the defendants in the Rosenbaum case did not violate § 1983 when they infringed on the plaintiff’s fourth and fifth amendment rights; they violated the Constitution.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce the IDEA's EDGAR complaint procedures while federal education officials are already working to correct the same deficiencies; the claim may be reasserted after those efforts end or June 30, 1995, whichever is earlier.

Beth v. Ex Rel. Yvonne v. v. Carroll · filed 1995-02-14

I also conclude that, under the current circumstances of this case, plaintiffs may not use section 1983 to enforce the EDGAR complaint procedures, although plaintiffs are free to raise the section 1983 claim again after the termination of OSEP’s current efforts to rectify DOC’s deficiencies or after June 30, 1995, whichever is earlier.

Section 1983 remains a remedy for an Equal Protection Clause violation involving a public employment decision despite the personal staff exemptions in Title VII and the ADEA.

Smith v. Lomax · filed 1995-02-22

The appellants' argument that, in providing the personal staff exemption contained in Title VII and the ADEA, Congress intended to eliminate section 1983 as a remedy for Equal Protection Clause violations in a setting such as the one before us is patently frivolous.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate route for a claim that must proceed through the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

Glen III Ex Rel. Glen II v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board of Education · filed 1995-09-25

However, as previously shown, the Supreme Court has stated that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act is the exclusive avenue through which the Plaintiffs can pursue their claim. ... Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are redundant and summary judgment will be granted as to those claims.

Section 1983 remains available to enforce an IDEA hearing decision when state enforcement procedures provide only fiscal sanctions against the school district.

Hoekstra Ex Rel. Hoekstra v. Independent School District No. 283 · filed 1996-02-20

A similar state enforcement scheme, therefore, cannot preclude Plaintiff from bringing a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole procedures when success would not automatically entitle the prisoner to immediate or speedier release.

Phelps v. Charles Traughber, Rose Hill, Dawn Chase · filed 1996-03-20

Since Appellant will not automatically be entitled to an immediate or speedier release if he prevails, his claim is cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of Medicaid Act rights when the Act neither expressly precludes its use nor provides a sufficiently comprehensive remedial scheme to show congressional intent to preclude it.

Daniels v. Wadley · filed 1996-05-15

The Medicaid Act does not expressly preclude resort to § 1983, nor does it create a remedial scheme that is sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude remedy of suits under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a treatment program affecting parole eligibility when success would not necessarily invalidate the conviction or continuing confinement.

Neal v. Shimoda · filed 1997-12-11

Because the inmates’ challenge in this case does not necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions or continuing confinement, it is properly brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Jaouad v. City of New York · filed 1998-05-11

Thus, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not itself confer any substantive rights on litigants, but rather provides a remedy in instances in which a plaintiff demonstrates a violation of a right protected by the Constitution or by federal law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Citizen Action Fund v. City of Morgan City · filed 1998-09-17

Section 1983 confers no substantive rights but only provides a cause of action to obtain “redress” for the violation of federal rights.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of federal constitutional rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Thorp v. Town of Lebanon · filed 1999-03-11

Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights, but rather provides a remedy for the deprivation of federal constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federally protected rights by persons acting under color of state law, but creates no rights of its own.

Hoyle v. Priest · filed 1999-07-30

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for any claimant whose federally protected rights have been violated by a state or local official or any other person acting under color of state law. Section 1983 does not confer any rights, it merely offers a means of redress. Therefore, it is imperative for a successful section 1983 litigant to identify the specific federally protected right that was violated.

Section 1983 cannot be used to vindicate rights under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by framing a disability benefits claim as a constitutional claim.

Hills v. California Department of Health & Human Services · filed 2003-03-21

The district court properly dismissed counts 1-4 in Hills’s complaint because, though framed in terms of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, these claims are plainly based on the failure to provide Hills with the tuition reimbursement to which he asserts entitlement as an individual with a disability. Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that Hills could not bring these claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an equal protection challenge to a prisoner's place of confinement when the claim does not attack the justification for confinement.

Cooper v. Elrod · filed 1985-07-17

This Court finds that plaintiffs claim of an equal protection violation is properly brought as a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits challenges to confinement conditions, but claims seeking immediate or speedier release must be brought through habeas corpus.

Boutwell v. Keating · filed 2005-02-23

An inmate’s denial of PPCS placement is analogous to a denial of parole for purposes of determining whether the inmate may file suit under § 1983 or must petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 provides a private right of action against a person who, under color of state or territorial law, deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws.

TN v. Chattanooga · filed 2005-02-24

Because we conclude that a § 1983 remedy is available for violations of the TCA, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City on this issue and REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 1983 allows a state prisoner to challenge parole procedures when success would not necessarily invalidate the conviction or shorten the prison term.

Wilkinson v. Dotson · filed 2005-03-07

Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that respondents’ claims are cognizable under § 1983, i. e., they do not fall within the implicit habeas exception.

Section 1983 allows enforcement of federal rights through a civil action, but a separate statutory enforcement scheme can foreclose a § 1983 remedy.

Anderson v. City of Columbus, Georgia · filed 2005-06-23

A more fundamental approach to Plaintiffs § 1983 claim reveals that Plaintiffs claim must fail. Plaintiff has not set forth a cognizable claim under § 1983 because she is already able to vindicate her statutory rights under Title III by bringing a civil action for damages as authorized in that statute.

Section 1983 does not furnish a claim based solely on the Title VII employment discrimination allegations pleaded here.

Kapusta v. Rockwood Area School District · filed 1989-10-06

In light of Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1, 20, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2626, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981) no claim could be stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s suit concerning parole even when the ultimate goal is release on parole.

Grennier v. Frank · filed 2006-07-05

Grennier’s suit rests on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is proper even though the end in view is release on parole.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek declaratory relief for alleged constitutional violations concerning parole when the prisoner does not seek immediate or speedier release.

Altman, Lewis v. Frank, Matthew · filed 2006-10-04

Because Mr. Altman requested declaratory relief for these alleged constitutional violations rather than his immediate or speedier release from prison, he properly brought suit under § 1983.