42 U.S.C. § 1983

New York’s three-year general personal-injury limitations period applies to Section 1983 claims because the one-year intentional-tort period is too short to preserve an effective federal remedy.

Saunders v. State of NY · filed 1986-03-05

Therefore, under the law of this circuit, the one-year period of limitations in CPLR § 215(3) is too short to provide an effective federal remedy. Although CPLR § 214(5), the negligence statute of limitations, is not as close an analogue to § 1983 actions as § 215(3), the three-year period of limitation in § 214(5) better serves the interest in providing a federal civil rights remedy and should be applied to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims in New York are governed by a three-year limitations period.

Rodriguez v. Chandler · filed 1986-08-11

This Court, however, will apply a three-year statute of limitations, for several reasons. ... Since plaintiff brought his § 1983 claim within three years of his receipt of the June 1, 1983 letter, this court finds his § 1983 tenure discrimination claim is not time-barred.

Section 1983 actions filed in New York are governed by the three-year personal-injury limitations period in CPLR § 214(5).

Lee v. Coughlin · filed 1986-09-15

Until those two precedents are reconsidered by the Court of Appeals, this Court is compelled to hold that the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in New York is three years, in keeping with New York CPLR § 214(5).

New York Section 1983 claims use the three-year general personal-injury limitations period rather than the one-year period for intentional torts.

Surak v. Coughlin · filed 1986-11-10

In view of the broad remedial purpose of the statute and the lack of a specific analogous state statute of limitations for borrowing purposes, the Court agrees with Judges Weinfeld and Goettel that applying the one year intentional tort statute of limitations would unduly narrow the scope and purpose of § 1983.

New York Section 1983 claims use a three-year limitations period.

Selzer v. Board of Education of New York · filed 1986-12-15

In sum, a three year limitations period is applicable to plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims in this case.

New York's three-year general personal-injury limitations period in CPLR § 214(5) governs § 1983 actions.

Salahuddin v. Harris · filed 1987-04-03

A comparison of the two New York statutes at issue suggests that the three-year statute under CPLR § 214(5) governs. ... In New York, that statute is CPLR § 214(5).

Section 1983 claims brought within New York’s three-year limitations period under CPLR 214 (5) are timely.

Bryant Avenue Tenants' Ass'n v. Koch · filed 1988-03-24

Because the action was brought within the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214 (5), the claims under section 1983 are timely asserted (423 S. Salina St. v City of Syracuse, 68 NY2d 474, 480).

In New York, § 1983 claims have a three-year limitations period even when a one-year state limitations period applies to claims against a city marshal.

Jemison v. Crichlow · filed 1988-07-18

We must therefore apply the three-year Statute of Limitations to the plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 notwithstanding the provisions of CPLR 215 (1) (see also, Okure v Owens, 816 F2d 45 [2d Cir], cert granted — US —, 108 S Ct 1218).

Section 1983 actions arising in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Giannini v. City of New York · filed 1988-11-28

The statute of limitations for section 1983 actions is three years.

In New York, § 1983 civil rights claims are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Manti v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1989-01-26

Plaintiff’s sixth and seventh causes of action, both involving a Federal civil rights claim under 42 USC § 1983, are governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising in New York have a three-year limitations period.

Roitman v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1989-02-02

Defendant’s challenge to the timeliness of plaintiff’s § 1983 claim can be quickly dispatched. ... The instant claim arose well within three years before the Complaint was filed in February 1988. Accordingly, defendant’s challenge has no merit.

Section 1983 claims arising in New York are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Thaxter v. City of New York (Department of Environmental Protection) · filed 1989-02-03

The Second Circuit has held that a three-year statute of limitations applies to civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. ... Thus, under the three-year limitation period, Thaxter’s claim expired by the end of 1987. The complaint commencing this action was filed on August 2, 1988. Plaintiff’s second cause of action must therefore be dismissed as untimely.

Section 1983 claims in New York are governed by a three-year statute of limitations.

Rice v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1989-04-10

The plaintiff’s claim based on the appellant’s alleged violation of 42 USC § 1983 is governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations (see, Owens v Okure, 488 US —, 102 L Ed 2d 594, affg 816 F2d 45; 423 S. Salina St. v City of Syracuse, 68 NY2d 474; Jemison v Crichlow, 139 AD2d 332, 342, supra).

Section 1983 claims arising in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Gentile v. County of Suffolk · filed 1989-05-05

Causes of action arising in New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in New York are subject to the three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Corbett v. Reynolds · filed 1989-06-01

We disagree only to the extent of holding that the claim under 42 USC § 1983 is timely. ... Inasmuch as the action was commenced within three years of the alleged violations, the motion court erred in granting the motion to dismiss the second cause of action on Statute of Limitations grounds.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York are subject to a three-year limitations period under CPLR § 214(2).

Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing Home & Allied Services Union v. C.N.H. Management Associates, Inc. · filed 1990-06-01

Contrary to Neiman’s contention that the court should look to CPLR § 213(8) and 203(f) to determine the appropriate statute of limitation to be applied in this action, the Second Circuit has held that the three-year limitations period of CPLR § 214(2) is the controlling statute of limitations under New York Law for all actions commenced under § 1983.

Section 1983 actions in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Hood v. City of New York · filed 1990-06-19

In New York, the statute of limitations applicable to a section 1983 action is three years.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York have a three-year limitations period; an untimely amendment adding defendants whom the plaintiff already knew does not relate back merely because they share counsel with the original defendants.

Afrika v. Selsky · filed 1990-06-25

Nor is there any dispute that the New Defendants were served after the three-year statute of limitations applied to actions brought under § 1983 in New York. ... Consequently, the fact that the New Defendants are represented by the same counsel is irrelevant and not enough to bypass the statute of limitations. ... Because Afrika did not file his amended complaint against the New Defendants in a timely manner, it is barred, and we need not reach the question of the New Defendants’ personal involvement in the alleged violations of due process.

Section 1983 claims arising in New York have a three year limitations period under the state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations.

Wahad v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 1990-08-20

As a result, there is now no dispute that New York state law provides a three year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Citrak v. Town of Chenango · filed 1990-10-04

As for the cause of action alleging a violation of 42 USC § 1983, that was also barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [5]; Owens v Okure, 488 US 235; 423 S. Salina St. v City of Syracuse, 68 NY2d 474, cert denied and appeal dismissed 481 US 1008) insofar as plaintiff’s claim apparently accrued in June 1985 and the action was not commenced until four years later.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York are subject to the three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Aronson v. New York City Employees Retirement System · filed 1991-01-17

Because of Congress’s failure to provide a specific statute of limitations to govern § 1983 actions, federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are held to be governed by the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state where the action is brought. ... The applicable New York statute is the three-year statute of limitations governing general personal injury actions.

A claim under § 1983 is subject to a three-year statute of limitations in New York.

Walker v. Columbia University in the City of New York · filed 1991-02-05

Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is barely colorable because it is questionable whether any of the defendants are state actors within the meaning of that statute. In any event, that claim is also barred by the applicable statute of limitations, which is three years.

Section 1983 actions use the state limitations period for personal injury claims, which is three years in New York.

Jacobs v. Coiro · filed 1991-06-05

It is well-settled that an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by the state statute of limitations for personal injury which in New York is three years.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Powers v. Karen · filed 1991-07-03

Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim under section 1983 is time barred by New York’s applicable three year statute of limitations under section 214(5) of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Section 1983 claims in New York are subject to the three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Ortiz v. Morgenthau · filed 1991-09-13

It is well-settled that an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by the state statute of limitations for personal injury and that in New York the relevant statute is section 214(5) of the New York Civil Practice Law, which provides for a three-year limitations period.

Section 1983 actions brought in New York are subject to the three-year limitations period for personal injury actions under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Darvoe v. Town of Trenton · filed 1992-02-21

Relying on Wilson, this court previously determined that New York Civil Law and Rules section 214(5)’s three year statute of limitations period for personal injury actions is the appropriate statute of limitations period for section 1983 actions. ... Accordingly, the court will apply section 214(5)’s three year limitations period to the present action.

Federal courts sitting in New York apply a three-year limitations period to § 1983 claims.

Baker v. Associates · filed 1992-03-23

Federal courts sitting in New York apply a three year limitations period to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims are subject to New York’s three-year limitations period under CPLR 214 (5), but a conclusory allegation that a Medicaid rate determination violates federal law does not make that period applicable to an article 78 proceeding.

Medical Arts Sanitarium, Inc. v. New York State Department of Health · filed 1992-06-23

Nor is the proceeding subject to the three year limitations period set forth in CPLR 214 (5) applicable to claims brought under 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1396a (a) (13) (A) (the Boren Amendment), merely because the petition recites a conclusory allegation that the determination violates Federal Medicaid ... Law.

In New York, a § 1983 employment claim has a three-year limitations period that accrues when the employee is notified of a final determination of employment status.

Szarejko v. Great Neck School District · filed 1992-07-23

Section 214(5) provides for a three year statute of limitations in personal injury actions. The accrual date of a section 1983 action under section 214(5) is the date on which the discriminatory act occurs, or, more specifically, the date on which the employee is notified of a final determination of his status.

Section 1983 actions in New York are governed by a three-year limitations period, subject to infancy tolling under CPLR § 208.

Mason Ex Rel. Mason v. Schenectady City School District · filed 1993-09-21

The Court shall, therefore, apply the three year statute of limitations to this action governing actions under Section 1983. ... The Court shall respect the tolling provisions of CPLR § 208.

Pro se status alone does not excuse filing a Section 1983 claim in New York after the three-year limitations period expires.

Varrone v. Bilotti · filed 1993-09-22

The parties do not dispute that the three-year statute of limitations provided in Section 214(5) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... However, even granting the plaintiffs the latitude they request and according them the benefit of this approach does not render their claims timely, as both Joseph and Claire’s complaints were not presented to the pro se clerk’s office until March 10, 1992, one day beyond the statutory bar. ... The plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate circumstances warranting greater judicial leniency than that already afforded them under the law. Accordingly, the Court finds that the plaintiffs Joseph and Claire’s Section 1983 claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so Illinois’s five-year period for civil actions not otherwise provided for applies.

Amen v. Crimmins · filed 1974-05-28

The statute under which this action was brought, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, does not provide for any period of limitations. ... It is clear to this Court that the applicable statute of limitations in Illinois for an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is Chapter 83 § 16 of the Illinois Revised Statutes, ... which creates a five-year statutory period for bringing civil actions not otherwise provided for. ... The defendants’ contention that the two year statute of limitations of Section 15 of Chapter 83 is incorrect.

Section 1983 actions in Illinois use the state’s five-year limitations period in Illinois Revised Statutes, chapter 83, section 16.

Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford · filed 1975-05-16

In fact, a review of the decisions of the Seventh Circuit as well as decisions of the District Court in the Northern District of Illinois indicates that in actions brought under 42 U.S.C., Section 1983 the applicable period of limitations is prescribed by Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 83, Section 16. That section contains a five year limitation period.

Section 1983 wrongful-death claims are subject to a specifically applicable state statute of limitations, so Illinois’s two-year wrongful-death limitation barred this claim.

Gates v. Montalbano · filed 1983-01-10

By contrast, this Court need not resort to analogies or policy analysis to determine the appropriate statute of limitations in this case. If the two-year period prescribed by the Act is indeed a statute of limitations, it specifically applies here. ... Administrator Gates is suing under Section 1983 for death caused by a “wrongful act, neglect or default” — the precise claim defined by the Act. ... Thus whichever way the Act’s two-year restriction is characterized, the wrongful death claim asserted by Administrator Gates is time-barred.

All § 1983 claims in Illinois were governed by the five-year residual limitations period for civil actions not otherwise provided for.

Shorters v. City of Chicago · filed 1985-09-06

This Court has determined the only satisfactory (and permissible) response to the ... directive is to select, as the single statute of limitations most appropriate for all Section 1983 claims, the Section 13-205 category of “all civil actions not otherwise provided for” — a five-year statute.

A newly shortened limitations period for Illinois Section 1983 actions should not apply retroactively when the plaintiff justifiably relied on binding circuit precedent allowing five years.

De Furgalski v. Siegel · filed 1985-09-18

From 1977 until the time this claim was filed, the Court of Appeals for this Circuit had clearly and consistently applied the five-year limitation period for § 1983 claims. Plaintiff justifiably relied on those cases in filing his suit. It therefore cannot be said that plaintiff slept on his rights when his action was timely under the law in effect at the time.

Section 1983 actions brought in Illinois are governed by the state’s two-year personal-injury limitations period.

Wegrzyn v. Illinois Department of Children & Family Services · filed 1986-01-30

Therefore, this Court finds that the appropriate statute of limitations for a 1983 action brought in Illinois is the two year limitation period set forth in Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, ¶ 13-202.

Section 1983 claims filed in Illinois before Wilson v. Garcia were subject to the five-year limitations period on which plaintiffs could reasonably rely, rather than retroactive application of a shorter personal-injury period.

Hapaniewski v. City of Chicago Heights · filed 1988-05-06

However, in Illinois, unlike Pennsylvania, all section 1983 cases had been subject to a five-year statute of limitations before the Wilson decision. ... Therefore, it is apparent that there was clear precedent in Illinois establishing a five-year statute of limitations for civil rights actions and upon which plaintiff could reasonably rely. ... Accordingly, based on the Goodman analysis, we vacate our 1985 order and remand this cause to the trial court with directions to apply the section 13 — 205 statute of limitations (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 13 — 205) to the count asserting a civil rights violation and, further, if payment has not been made to enter judgment against the city as to the costs assessed it by the Supreme Court.

For a § 1983 class filed in Illinois in 1987, the court applied the state’s five-year residual limitations period to define the class period.

Doe v. CALUMET CITY, ILL. · filed 1989-02-06

This Court therefore reconfirms the longer five-year period of class certification, based on the application of Section 13-205, that has previously been made in this case on a conditional basis.

Section 1983 claims filed in Illinois are governed by the state’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Kalimara v. Illinois Department of Corrections, Michael P. Lane, Richard Derobertis, Michael O'leary, and Vernell · filed 1989-07-14

In compliance with Wilson, this court explicitly held that Illinois’ two-year period was the appropriate statute of limitations and addressed the issue of the retroactivity of the holding in Wilson. ... The rule of Anton has been and continues to be the law of this circuit. We take this opportunity to expressly reaffirm that decision.

For Illinois Section 1983 class actions filed on April 17, 1987, the five-year limitations period reaches claims dating back to April 17, 1982 when the class claim relates back to the original complaint.

Doe v. Calumet City · filed 1989-09-19

What counsel has now accurately pointed out is that the April 17, 1987 filing date of the original individual Complaint in this action coincided precisely with the last day that a five-year statute of limitations for Illinois-grounded Section 1983 actions applied under Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir.1986). ... Accordingly the Opinion is modified to provide that the relation-back period measured from April 17, 1987 must go back to April 17, 1982 rather than to April 17, 1985.

Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois are subject to the two-year statute of limitations in Illinois Revised Statutes chapter 110, paragraph 13-202.

Kness v. Grimm · filed 1990-03-13

From this history, it is clear that section 1983 claims brought in Illinois are subject to 13-202’s two-year statute of limitations.

Illinois-based Section 1983 claims have a two-year limitations period, which begins by the time reasonable diligence could reveal the cause of action.

McCabe v. Caleel · filed 1991-05-31

We affirm the decision of the district court because the Sec. 1983 action was not brought within the limitations period. ... Therefore, by his own accounting of events, with reasonable diligence he could have discovered the political makeup of the Board and the existence of his cause of action at a much earlier point in time. We need not precisely identify a date at which the limitations period began to run, because the facts indicate that the date at least would be more than two years prior to the filing of the action in December 1989.

Section 1983 actions in Illinois state court are governed by the general two-year personal injury limitations period, not the shorter municipal tort immunity period.

Weiss v. Village of Downers Grove · filed 1992-02-26

We conclude that the special limitations provision embodied in the Tort Immunity Act is contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding that the applicable statute of limitations for a section 1983 action is the general personal injury limitations period. Consequently, any State attempt, through the Tort Immunity Act, to immunize a municipality from liability in a section 1983 action was ineffective.

Section 1983 actions in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations.

Worthington v. Wilson · filed 1992-04-27

As an initial matter, there is no doubt that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 action in Illinois is two years.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois use the two-year personal injury limitations period and Illinois tolling rules; knowledge of the people and acts underlying a claim defeats tolling based on fraudulent concealment.

Kotsias v. Richard M. Daley, Gerald MacNamara Patrick Flaherty · filed 1992-07-16

The question of the statute of limitations in § 1983 cases is controlled by state law, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985), including the state's tolling provisions. Knox v. Cook County Sheriff's Police Dept., 866 F.2d 905, 907 (7th Cir.1988). In Illinois, the limitations period for personal injury is two years. ... Mr. Kotsias' allegations do not constitute fraudulent concealment. He had notice of his claim prior to obtaining the documents and had made no attempt to procure copies of any document he might need to pursue a civil rights claim. Since he claims that he was aware of the individuals involved in his alleged false arrest, it defies reason that he did not know that the county officials or police officers were acting under color of state law until 1990. Smith v. City of Chicago Heights, 951 F.2d 834, 838 (7th Cir.1992) (Illinois' fraudulent concealment statute does not apply when plaintiff knew of sufficient facts upon which to base a cause of action). The statute of limitations was not tolled as to Mr. Kotsias' claims.

In Illinois, a § 1983 claim accruing before April 17, 1985, must be filed within five years of accrual or by April 17, 1987, whichever is earlier.

Foster v. Plaut · filed 1993-08-27

In Anton, the court held that a plaintiff whose section 1983 cause of action accrued before the Wilson decision on April 17, 1985, must file suit within the shorter period of either five years from the date his action accrued or two years after the date of the decision in Wilson. Anton, 787 F.2d at 1146. ... Plaintiff’s amended complaint asserted that his civil rights claims were discovered, and therefore accrued, on April 25, 1984. This accrual date predates the decision in Wilson. Thus, under the statute of limitations set forth in Anton, plaintiff was required to file his civil rights claims by April 17, 1987, two years after the decision in Wilson.

Section 1983 actions in Illinois are subject to a two-year limitations period and state tolling rules, under which release ends imprisonment tolling and subsequent incarceration does not restart it.

James P. Clayton, Also Known as Paul Scott, Also Known as C. Morrison v. A. Lett, Badge No. 5563 and R. Peck, Badge No. · filed 1993-11-15

The statute of limitations in Illinois for actions brought under section 1983 is two years. ... Federal courts must apply not only a state's statute of limitations for actions brought under section 1983, but also the state's rules for tolling its statute of limitations. ... Subsequent periods of incarceration will not further toll the statute of limitations.

For a § 1983 selective-enforcement claim, learning of an alleged discriminatory pattern years later does not extend the filing time when the plaintiff knew at the time that the arrest might be illegal.

LOVE v. CITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK · filed 2019-07-10

Love offers no way to distinguish this case from the Third Circuit’s decision in Williams v. Trenton Police Department, 591 F. App’x 56 (3d Cir. 2015), in which the Court of Appeals found the discovery rule inapplicable where the plaintiff “knew of the potential for the illegality of the arrest the same night,” though he did not learn of alleged selective-enforcement policies many years later. ... Accordingly, Love demonstrates no clear error of law, and reconsideration is denied.

For § 1983 claims in Oklahoma, imprisonment does not toll the limitations period as a legal disability under Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 96.

Hogan v. Oklahoma Department · filed 1999-02-22

The assertion that prisoners are under a “legal disability” and thus the limitation period for bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is tolled for prisoners during the period of their confinement by Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 96 is unsupported.

Section 1983 claims filed in Oklahoma use a two-year limitations period, and state law governs tolling of that period.

Maynard v. Casebolt · filed 1997-05-19

This court has determined that the appropriate period of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in the State of Oklahoma is two years, pursuant to Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 95(3). ... The Supreme Court has also held, however, that in addition to the limitations period, the “closely related questions of tolling and application” are also governed by state law.

Section 1983 claims filed in Maryland are subject to a three-year limitations period, and commitment to the Patuxent Institution alone does not toll that period.

McDonald v. Boslow · filed 1973-06-30

Accordingly, this Court holds that commitment to the Patuxent Institution does not constitute an adjudication of non compos sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Therefore, all claims arising out of events alleged to have occurred in excess of three years prior to the filing of the instant suit are hereby dismissed.

For a § 1983 claim tied to pending criminal proceedings that could undermine a future conviction, the limitations period does not begin until those proceedings end.

Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan · filed 1999-07-01

We conclude that it is only appropriate that the statute of limitations not begin to run for criminal defendants seeking to file the same § 1983 claims until the Disposition of any pending criminal proceedings.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s limitations period and tolling rules, while federal procedural rules determine when a voluntary dismissal takes effect.

Jenkins v. Village of Maywood · filed 2007-11-05

Although we borrow the statute of limitations and coordinate tolling rules from Illinois, federal procedural rules govern the determination of when the action was voluntarily dismissed. Contrary to Jenkins’ claims, a rule governing dismissal is not a coordinate tolling rule.

Each paycheck reflecting a past discriminatory compensation practice creates a fresh cause of action under Section 1983 and starts a new limitations period.

Groesch v. City of Springfield, Ill. · filed 2011-03-28

If it was not already clear that Hildebrandt extended the paycheck accrual rule to pay discrimination claims under Section 1983, we hold here that paychecks reflecting a past discriminatory compensation practice create fresh causes of action under Section 1983, just as they do under Title VII after the Ledbetter Act.

Section 1983 claims alleging Fifth Amendment self incrimination violations accrue within the criminal proceeding itself and may receive deferred accrual under Heck.

Saunders v. City of Chicago · filed 2015-11-17

Applying the general rule that.accrual of § 1983 claims occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, Fifth Amendment claims alleging self-incrimination violations accrue within the criminal proceeding itself.

A Section 1983 claim normally accrues when the injury occurs, and the discovery rule does not toll the limitations period when the plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable diligence.

Amesbury v. City of Pawtucket · filed 2019-09-11

A claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 normally accrues at the time of the injury. ... Thus, because Mr. Amesbury did not exercise reasonable diligence, he cannot take advantage of the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations for Claims 1 through 10.

Equitable tolling of a Section 1983 claim is governed by the applicable state law.

CARROLL v. KEEDY · filed 2019-12-26

Any equitable tolling argument must rely on Indiana law.

Section 1983 claims filed in Texas use the state’s two-year personal-injury limitations period and its tolling rules, including the COVID-19 filing extension.

Argueta v. City Of Galveston · filed 2021-01-14

And pointing to a supposed administrative discrepancy between state and federal courts does not to refute the well-established rule that, when hearing a § 1983 claim, federal courts borrow the limitations and tolling law from the forum state.

Federal law governs accrual of Section 1983 claims, and a claim alleging an unlawful search and seizure accrues on the date of the search and seizure.

Bowen v. Phil Rogers Len Smith John Cook, Joseph McNamara · filed 1995-06-12

It is well-settled that federal law determines when a cause of action accrues under section 1983, Elliot v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 801-02 (9th Cir.1994), and that an action for a Fourth Amendment violation accrues on the date of the illegal search and seizure.

A state court action for administrative review of a liquor-license denial does not toll the limitations period for a separate Section 1983 claim arising from that denial.

Sports Bar, Inc. v. Village of Downers Grove · filed 1989-10-23

The status of the state court action seeking administrative review of the denial of the liquor license has nothing whatever to do with tolling the appropriate statute of limitations on this separate and distinct Section 1983 action.

Section 1983’s limitations period is not suspended while an administrative claim is pending unless state law tolls the limitations period for personal injury claims during such proceedings.

Maddox v. Hopkins · filed 1988-09-16

On appeal, Maddox contends that the time his administrative claim was pending before the Sundry Claims Board should be excluded from the three-year period he had to file the Sec. 1983 suit, thereby rendering the suit timely. This contention lacks merit. In the absence of a state law tolling the statute of limitations for personal injuries during the pendency of administrative proceedings, the limitation period is not suspended by such proceedings.

Virginia's two-year personal-injury limitations period governs Section 1983 actions, with state weekend-extension rules determining the filing deadline.

Winslow v. Norfolk City Jail, Sheriff Mapp · filed 1987-11-27

Pursuant to Virginia law, he had two years to file his Sec. 1983 action, and as April 11, 1987, fell on a Saturday, he would have had until Monday, April 13, 1987, to file his complaint.

In Section 1983 actions, a court borrowing a state limitations period must also consider the state's tolling, revival, and similar provisions when they are raised.

Winters v. Patrick Lynch City of Euclid Euclid Police Department Anthony J. Giunta, Mayor Unknown Police Officers · filed 1986-10-27

The recent Supreme Court case of Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), wiped away a good part of our case law relating to statutes of limitation in Sec. 1983 actions. Yet, despite this sweeping change, it is clear from the Wilson opinion that some of the principles established by earlier cases have survived. As suggested by footnote 17 in Wilson, the case of Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974), remains part of the law on borrowing state statutes of limitation. Therefore, it is always necessary to consider state provisions on tolling, revival, and similar concepts whenever they are raised as a defense to the statute of limitations. See Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1943 citing Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. at 464.

When fraud or concealment delays discovery of a § 1983 injury, the borrowed state limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovered the fraud or could have done so with reasonable diligence.

Briley v. California · filed 1977-10-19

In light of the prevailing federal doctrine as to fraud and concealment, we feel that the broad remedial policies of the Civil Rights Act are best served by holding that the California limitations period did not commence until Briley discovered the fraud, or could have done so in the exercise of reasonable diligence.

A § 1983 action borrows the most analogous state statute of limitations, but the time when the claim accrues is determined by federal law.

Kaiser v. Cahn · filed 1974-12-19

Although the state statute of limitations most analogous to the civil rights claim is borrowed, the question of when the claim for relief accrued remains a question of federal law.

A § 1983 action in Virginia is subject to a two-year statute of limitations, and the period recommences when tolling ends.

Landman v. Brown · filed 1972-11-07

The statute of limitations in Virginia for an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is two years. ... Even if it was tolled, however, the statute recommenced running on February 3, 1971, when the Court denied Landman’s motion to amend his complaint on procedural grounds. ... By April 17, 1972, the date of the filing of this action, two years had passed, and the action is barred.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state's limitations and tolling rules when no federal policy requires a different rule.

Rosa Lee Vickers Powell v. Laurent v. Radkins, Jr., M.D. · filed 1975-02-21

This case was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Florida state law by a female who was sterilized while a ward of the Florida State Department of Health & Rehabilitation Service, Division of Mental Retardation. ... This date was more than four years preceding the filing of the action, which was longer than the limitation periods under Florida law — four years for several counts, three for another— which is the governing law in this instance. ... We find no federal policy that would support the adoption of a different federal rule concerning tolling in the circumstances of the present case. Therefore, the Florida tolling principle is applicable.

Section 1983 actions borrow the applicable state limitations period, but federal law governs when the cause of action accrues.

Cox v. A. M. Stanton, M.D. · filed 1975-10-06

The time limitation for civil rights actions, such as those under § 1983, is borrowed from state law because Congress did not set a tolling period for such actions, but the state law concerning time of accrual is in no sense loaned to the body of federal civil rights law along with the tolling period. The time of accrual of a civil rights action is a question of federal law.

Section 1983 claims borrow the most analogous state statute of limitations, and an administrative reinstatement proceeding does not toll that limitations period when it is a different cause of action.

Gonzalez v. Santiago · filed 1976-01-21

What may be called the cause of action pursued before the Personnel Board is an administrative proceeding seeking reinstatement and cannot be interpreted as being the same cause of action as the Civil Rights action herein presented and arising under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985. Mizell v. North Broward Hospital, supra. Hence, the applicable statute of limitations of one year as prescribed by Section 5298(2) of Title 31 LPRA has not been tolled by the Plaintiff's seeking administrative redress before the Personnel Board.

The court applied a two-year statute of limitations to the § 1983 claim and held that a claim accruing almost nine years earlier was time-barred.

Carson v. Elrod · filed 1976-02-04

Mrs. Carson points to the fact that she was deprived of the custody of her child before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on 25 May 1967, and she urges that this deprivation is a continuing offense entitling her to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regardless of the fact that it took place almost nine years ago. ... Even if she had been entitled to damages or other relief for alleged wrongful acts on the part of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, recovery for those damages is time barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions. ... Whether the limitation period be computed at one, two or five years, plaintiff’s cause of action, having accrued almost nine years ago, is time barred.

For a § 1983 action, the applicable statute of limitations is the most analogous state limitations period in the state where the claim accrues.

Lynn v. Danforth · filed 1976-12-08

Since there is no limitation provision contained in the civil rights acts, these actions are governed by the most applicable statute of limitation for the state (here, Missouri) in which the particular action accrues.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the analogous state statute of limitations, and the limitations period is not tolled when a plaintiff could have brought the federal action while pursuing different claims in state court.

Meyer v. Frank · filed 1977-01-12

It is well settled that the federal courts have the power to toll statutes of limitations borrowed from state law in appropriate circumstances. ... We hold that the federalism considerations urged by Meyer are of insufficient substance to outweigh the statute of limitations policy so directly brought to bear by the facts of this case.

Section 1983 claims in New York use the state's analogous statute of limitations, and fraudulent concealment can toll that period only subject to New York's discovery-period rule.

Cestaro v. MacKell · filed 1977-04-01

Normally, “the applicable statute of limitations in a federal civil rights case brought in New York is the three years provided by N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(2) — liability based on a statute.” ... Similarly here, the federal concealment doctrine tolls the limitation period until “discovery”. Once the facts are discovered, however, New York law determines the length of the applicable period. Under § 203(f) either of two periods may apply: two years from “discovery” or three years from injury, whichever is longer. Since plaintiffs’ claims here are clearly barred by both periods, the complaint must be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims are not tolled by Texas's imprisonment-disability provision because prisoners are not disabled from prosecuting federal civil rights suits.

Miller v. Smith · filed 1977-05-11

We find, therefore, that incarceration is no bar to the prosecution of federal civil rights claims and that the “tolling” provision, Art. 5535, does not “apply” to civil rights actions within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1652.

Section 1983 claims generally borrow the most analogous state statute of limitations, but a federal court may toll that period when strict application would effectively defeat the federal civil-rights right.

Eubanks v. Clarke · filed 1977-07-01

The controlling statute of limitations in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the most analogous one provided by state law. ... We do not believe that the Third Circuit intended to change the rule that a federal court can and should fashion a tolling provision for a state statute of limitations in those rare cases where it is appropriate. ... But where a federal cause of action may effectively be defeated, a federal court may have the duty to fashion a tolling provision.

Section 1983 claims borrow the most analogous state limitations period—three years in California—and accrue when the plaintiff knows the position was openly filled; punitive damages remain available in appropriate circumstances even when the claim is joined with a Title VII claim.

Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego · filed 1978-02-03

Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations and the federal courts must apply the most analogous state statute of limitations. ... This court has held that the three-year statute of limitations of California Code of Civil Procedure § 338(1) is applicable to § 1983 actions brought in California. ... This holding we approve. ... Accordingly we hold that, under federal or state law, the statute starts to run from the date on which the position sought was openly assumed by the successful applicant or was filled by him to appellant’s knowledge. ... We recognize that punitive damages are recoverable under § 1983 in appropriate circumstances. ... Such damages are not barred where the § 1983 claim is joined with a Title VII claim and we conclude that the district court was in error on this issue.

For a § 1983 suit in Puerto Rico, the one-year limitations period is tolled by an extrajudicial claim only when the demand seeks monetary compensation for the alleged injury.

Del Valle v. Jesus Santa Aponte, Etc. · filed 1978-05-10

None of the cases cited by the district court stand for the proposition that a demand for monetary compensation is unnecessary. Money would seem to be the very essence of a creditor’s claim. ... Because these letters did not toll the one year statute of limitations, plaintiff’s complaint was untimely and should have been dismissed.

Section 1983 claims are subject to Illinois’s five-year statute of limitations, which is tolled when a plaintiff is continuously imprisoned from the time the claim accrues, even before conviction.

Hurst v. Hederman · filed 1978-05-23

This is an action brought by a prisoner in state custody alleging a violation of his civil rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Ordinarily, claims under the Civil Rights Act are subject to the five year statute of limitations of Chpt. 83, § 16, Ill.Rev.Stat. (1969). ... Were we to accept defendants’ argument that § 22 applies only when a cause of action accrues after conviction, individuals who, like Mr. Hurst, suffer a violation of their rights anytime after arrest but before conviction and who are in continuous custody from the time of arrest would be effectively barred from pursuing an action. This result would be contrary to the clear intent of § 22.

Section 1983 actions are not subject to Georgia Code Ann. § 3-801's tolling provision for persons imprisoned when the cause of action accrued.

Neel v. Rehberg · filed 1978-07-27

We agree with the district court and find that as a matter of federal law, Ga.Code Ann. § 3-801 does not apply to suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are not tolled under Georgia's prisoner-disability statute.

Commercial Metals Co. v. Balfour, Guthrie, & Co. · filed 1978-07-27

We agree with the district court and find that as a matter of federal law, Ga.Code Ann. § 3-801 does not apply to suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

For § 1983 actions accruing before October 1, 1977, the applicable Virginia limitation period is two years rather than the special one-year period for § 1983 actions.

Johnson v. Davis · filed 1978-09-05

Absent a fair grouping and valuation of § 1983 actions within the Virginia scheme of limitation periods and absent some other reasonable basis for applying a shorter period for remedying a "constitutional tort" than for remedying the underlying state tort, we will disregard this special limitation on § 1983 actions accruing before October 1, 1977, in favor of applying the two-year period previously found in Almond to be appropriate.

Section 1983 actions accruing before October 1, 1977 are governed by the previously applicable two-year limitation period rather than Virginia's special one-year period.

Johnson v. Davis · filed 1978-09-05

We disagree and hold that the district court should not have applied this special one-year limitation period for § 1983 actions because to do so would disregard the constitutional values to be protected by those actions and would condone an unreasonable discrimination between the assertion of federally protected rights and rights protected under Virginia law.

Section 1983 actions use state tolling principles for tolling the applicable state statutes of limitations.

Gee v. CBS, INC. · filed 1979-03-07

We hold that state tolling principles govern the tolling of the applicable state statutes of limitations in federal civil rights actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations, so a federal court borrows the limitations period and compatible tolling exceptions of the state where the incident occurred.

Swietlowich v. Bucks County · filed 1979-12-05

Since the Civil Rights Acts contain no statute of limitations, we look to that of the state in which the incident occurred. Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119, 122 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc). In Pennsylvania, the limitations at the time of the occurrence were one year for false arrest, one year for wrongful death, and two years for the survival action. When borrowing a state period of limitations in a civil rights case, a federal court will also adopt the state's exceptions thereto as long as policies underlying the federal cause of action are not undermined. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 464-65, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). Whenever suit is filed after the limitations period, as it had been in this case, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the statute has been tolled.

Section 1983 claims may have their borrowed state statute of limitations tolled while interrelated state criminal and Article 78 proceedings are pending when federalism considerations support tolling.

Leigh v. McGuire · filed 1979-12-19

To summarize: we hold, under the special circumstances of this case, that federalism considerations support the tolling of the statute of limitations governing the § 1983 action during the pendency of the interrelated state criminal and Article 78 proceedings; and that the policies of repose underlying the statute of limitations will not be adversely affected by such tolling.

Section 1983 claims for politically motivated demotion in public employment accrue when the employee receives official notice of the demotion and is aware of the illegal motives behind it, starting the applicable limitations period.

Velazquez v. Chardon · filed 1980-04-02

For all the above cited reasons we find that a cause of action for demotion in public employment for political reasons accrues when the employee is given official notice of his demotion and he is aware of the illegal motives behind such action.

Section 1983 is a separate and independent federal remedy, and a state rule precluding tolling while a related state judicial remedy is pursued is not inconsistent with Section 1983.

Board of Regents of Univ. of State of NY v. Tomanio · filed 1980-05-19

Thus the very independence of § 1983 reveals that the New York rule precluding tolling in the circumstances of this case is not “inconsistent” with the provisions of § 1983.

Section 1983 claims must be filed within the applicable state limitations period, and pursuing an administrative grievance does not toll that period when state law provides no tolling rule.

Betty Q. Keasler Rubin v. O'KOren · filed 1980-07-07

It follows that Rubin’s pursuit of her administrative grievance with the University does not absolve her from the responsibility to file § 1983 claims within the appropriate statutory time period.

Section 1983 actions are subject to state statutes of limitations and tolling rules, and those rules are not inconsistent with § 1983 merely because they may leave no federal forum during the limitations period.

Leigh v. McGuire · filed 1981-01-12

The fact that they could at no time have maintained a § 1983 action in federal court due, in part, to New York’s rules on limitation of actions and tolling of limitation periods does not mean that those rules are inconsistent with federal law and therefore invalid.

Section 1983 borrows the applicable state statute of limitations, while federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Paul W. Gowin and Louise A. Gowin v. Leroy Altmiller, Harry Capaul, Carl Finke, Gerald Finke and Finke Lumber Company, I · filed 1981-03-23

Section 1983 itself contains no statute of limitations. We must look to state law for the applicable limitations period. ... Liability for a civil rights violation is created by federal statute. Therefore, the claims are governed by Idaho Code § 5-218, which provides a three-year statute of limitations for “an action upon a liability created by statute.” ... Federal law, however, determines when the limitations period begins to run. ... In this case, the last act complained of by the Gowins occurred in July 1974, when the complaint was filed and the arrest occurred. Therefore, the cause of action arose at that time. ... Because the Gowins filed this suit in August 1977, their claim under § 1983 is barred by the statute of limitations.

For a § 1983 action with no federal limitations period, the most closely analogous state limitations period applies, along with that state's tolling rules.

Clymer v. Grzegorek · filed 1981-04-24

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the absence of a federal limitation on such actions, the most closely analagous state limitation must apply. ... Thus, the Court holds that this action is to be ruled by Virginia’s provisions for the tolling of the Virginia statute of limitation.

Section 1983 actions borrow state tolling rules unless applying the state rule would be inconsistent with federal policy; on these facts, Michigan’s imprisonment tolling rule did not apply.

Campbell v. Guy · filed 1981-07-02

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Michigan tolling rule, when limited to these facts, is inconsistent with federal policy and law, pursuant tó 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 claim arising from an employee discharge accrues, for statute-of-limitations purposes, when the employee receives advance notice of termination.

Elizabeth HOLDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant v. COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION OF the COMMONWEALTH OF… · filed 1982-02-17

For statute of limitations purposes, the date of the wrong is the date of the advance notice of termination in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 claims use New York's three-year limitations period, while federal law determines when the claim accrues and when the action commences.

Cohen v. Board of Education of East Ramapo Central School District · filed 1982-03-31

The Court of Appeals has held that the three-year statute of limitations, N.Y.Civ. Prac.Law § 214(2), applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Federal law “governs the date of the accrual of federal claims” such as those asserted here. ... Thus, once a plaintiff has suffered from a defendant’s illegal act and once the plaintiff is aware of or should be aware of the injury, the statute of limitations begins to run. ... Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 3 provides that “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Because federal law is not deficient on this subject, state law does not apply.

Section 1983 actions generally use state statutes of limitation, but federal procedural rules govern tolling when the issue arises from federal class-action procedure.

Pavlak v. Church · filed 1982-07-14

As a general rule, in actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state statutes of limitation, including state rules of tolling, apply. ... Federal procedural rules will modify the application of state limitations policy in federal question cases. ... There is need for procedural uniformity in all class actions in federal courts and under this principle the federal rule, not the state law, governs the tolling issue relevant here. ... Under these principles, the issue of whether the American Pipe tolling rule applies here is one of federal procedural law.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state's limitations period for the most analogous state action, including applicable state tolling rules, while federal law determines when the limitations period begins to run.

Swan v. Matthews · filed 1982-10-13

There is no federal statute of limitations for civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore federal courts apply that statute of limitations which the forum state has prescribed for the most analogous state action. ... The claims of Swan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both defendants (items numbers 20 and 23) were subject to the two-year period of limitations imposed by § 27-2-211 M.C.A. (1979). As the previous discussion with respect to Swan’s malpractice claims evinces, however, that period of limitations was tolled for a period of five years pursuant to § 27-2-401(1) M.C.A. (1979). ... Therefore, Swan had a period of seven years, from the date a cause of action for the alleged constitutional deprivations leading to his conviction accrued, within which to commence an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking redress for those constitutional deprivations occasioned by the conduct of either the defendant Matthews or Missoula County, Montana. ... Accordingly, application of the seven-year period of limitations to the foregoing claims reveals that any actions upon them would have expired on May 3, 1979 and July 10, 1979, respectively. Having failed to file an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 within the prescribed period of time, Swan is now barred from raising those claims.

Section 1983 claims borrow an analogous state limitations period; in New York, the period is three years, and accrual occurs when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Smitherman v. NYC DEPT. OF CORR. INV. COM. UNIT · filed 1983-01-19

Congress has not provided a federal statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. It is well settled that federal courts reviewing such claims must apply an analogous state period of limitations. ... The appropriate statute of limitations for civil rights actions brought in district courts in New York is the three year period [1] found in N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law and Rules § 214(2). ... Federal law governs the time of accrual of claims under the federal civil rights statutes. ... Plaintiff's claim in this case accrued at the time that he knew or had reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his claim.

Section 1983 claims in New York federal courts use the analogous state limitations period, and accrual begins when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury.

Smitherman v. New York City Department of Correction Investigation Complaint Unit · filed 1983-01-19

Congress has not provided a federal statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. It is well settled that federal courts reviewing such claims must apply an analogous state period of limitations. ... Federal law governs the time of accrual of claims under the federal civil rights statutes. ... Plaintiff’s claim in this case accrued at the time that he knew or had reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his claim. ... As calculated from August 3, 1977, plaintiff’s § 1986 claim is time-barred under the one year period of limitations and his § 1983 and § 1985 claims are time-barred under the borrowed New York three year period of limitations.

Section 1983 claims borrow the applicable state statute of limitations and the state's tolling provisions.

Armon v. Jones · filed 1983-02-23

In deciding if the tolling provision applies, this Court must apply state tolling provisions whenever state statutes of limitations are borrowed. ... In other words, this Court must determine the status of Texas law on the question of whether the tolling statute applies to prisoners bringing § 1983 actions.

The timeliness of a § 1983 action is governed by the most appropriate state limitations period, while federal law determines when the claim accrues and fraudulent concealment may toll the period.

Keating v. Carey · filed 1983-04-18

The timeliness of Sec. 1983 actions is determined by the most appropriate state statute of limitations. ... Although state law determines the three year period of limitation, federal law determines when the claim arises. ... Under federal law, Keating's cause of action arose when he knew or had reason to know of his injury. ... Under federal law, when the defendant fraudulently conceals the wrong, the time does not begin running until the plaintiff discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the cause of action.

Section 1983 claims borrow the analogous state statute of limitations, while federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Covington v. Winger · filed 1983-04-25

Generally, in civil rights actions the Court must look to state law for the statute of limitations which applies in analogous state causes of action, since § 1983 and § 1985 do not contain their own limitations provisions. ... However, federal law determines when the cause of action "accrued."

Section 1983 claims accrue when the underlying civil-rights violation occurs, and the applicable two-year limitations period is not tolled while related criminal proceedings are pending.

Lafferty v. Nickel · filed 1983-05-09

Appellant’s civil rights claims based on his March 24,1979 arrest accrued at that time, and the applicable two-year statute of limitations was not tolled during the pend-ency of the criminal prosecution. Inasmuch as appellant’s action was not filed until more than two years after his claims accrued, they are barred.

In § 1983 actions, federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations and state rules governing tolling and its effect unless those rules conflict with federal law.

Chardon v. Soto · filed 1983-06-20

In a § 1983 action, however, Congress has specifically directed the courts, in the absence of controlling federal law, to apply state statutes of limitations and state tolling rules unless they are “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 42 U. S. C. § 1988.

For § 1983 limitations purposes, lodging a complaint with an in forma pauperis petition tolls the limitations period until the complaint is filed.

Downton v. Vandemark · filed 1983-09-06

Binding precedent teaches that the date of the pauper petition tolls the statute until the complaint was filed. ... Accordingly, upon reconsideration it appears the action was timely filed and) the previous order of this court dismissing the § 1983 claim was in error. Thus, the motion to alter or amend is well taken.

A state tolling statute applies to Section 1983 actions when the borrowed state limitations period is enumerated in the chapter covered by that tolling statute.

Whitson v. Baker · filed 1985-01-11

Since the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions is contained in Chapter 2, it appears to us that the requirement of "enumeration" in Chapter 2 contained in the tolling statute is satisfied with regard to § 1983 actions.

New York’s rule against tolling while a plaintiff pursues an independent remedy applies to § 1983 claims, so pursuing Title VII relief does not suspend the § 1983 limitations period.

Zangrillo v. Fashion Institute of Technology · filed 1985-01-28

Accordingly, New York’s rule against tolling during the period plaintiff pursues independent remedies must be applied. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is therefore barred by New York’s statute of limitations.

Because § 1983 contains no limitations period, federal courts borrow state limitations and tolling rules; Alabama's prisoner-tolling statute did not cover a pretrial detainee whose claim accrued before conviction and a sentence of less than life.

Whitson v. Charles Baker and Troy Howton · filed 1985-03-22

§ 1983 contains no limitations period. Federal courts look to state law to determine the applicable limitations period. Federal courts also apply the tolling statutes applicable to state statutes of limitations. ... Since Whitson was being held pending trial when the action accrued, he does not fall within the class of persons protected by the statute. The fact that Whitson was later convicted and sentenced to a term less than life does not bring him within the operation of the tolling statute.

When federal courts borrow a state limitations period for a section 1983 action, they must also borrow the state’s applicable tolling provisions unless doing so conflicts with federal policy.

Bailey v. Gordon Faulkner, Department of Corrections, and G.B. Valdez · filed 1985-06-19

But what places the correctness of ... beyond question is the Supreme Court’s decision in ... which holds that when a federal court borrows a state statute of limitations to do service in a suit under section 1983, it must borrow the tolling provisions as well; and though tolling while the plaintiff is a prisoner was not in issue in ... we cannot see any reasonable basis for distinguishing the case on that ground.

Federal law determines when a § 1983 limitations period begins to run, although state law supplies the length of the limitations period.

Ruley v. Nelson · filed 1985-06-28

Although state law governs the length of the limitations period, federal law determines when that period begins to run.

New York’s three-year personal-injury limitations period governs § 1983 claims and is not tolled while a related Article 78 proceeding is pending.

Ladson v. New York City Police Department · filed 1985-07-11

The New York statute of limitations consequently was not tolled during the pendency of the Article 78 proceeding.

Section 1983 supplies no limitations period, so courts borrow a local limitations rule consistent with federal law and use state law for the period, tolling, and application.

Orticelli v. Powers · filed 1985-07-23

There is no limitation provision contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 setting forth a time period within which the right must be enforced. ... Where Congress has not established a time limitation for a federal cause of action, the settled practice has been to adopt a local limitation if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so. The length of the limitations period, and related questions of tolling and application, are to be governed by state law.

In Puerto Rico, a related action does not toll the limitations period for Section 1983 damages unless the plaintiff requests damages before the period expires.

Altair Corporation, Formerly Caribbean Finance Co., Inc. v. Carmen Pesquera De Busquets and Angel S. Biaggi · filed 1985-08-07

Thus, the policy of repose underlying the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 cases mandates that an aggrieved party in Puerto Rico not only assert some rights within the specified period, but requires that the plaintiff call for an award of damages before the statute runs.

A § 1983 claim accrues under federal law when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the action.

Giovannetti v. Dormitory Authority of State · filed 1985-12-12

Under Federal law, a cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action ... .

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff is or should be aware of both the injury and its connection to the defendant's acts, not when the plaintiff later learns the acts may have been wrongful.

Ruben Longoria and Alvina Longoria v. City of Bay City, Texas · filed 1986-01-08

The limitations period thus begins to run when the plaintiff either is or should be aware of both the injury and its connection with the alleged acts of the defendant.

Section 1983 claims use Ohio’s personal-injury limitations period, and later periods of incarceration do not toll the limitations clock once it has begun running.

Hargrove v. Cazarelli · filed 1986-01-30

Civil rights actions brought pursuant to Section 1983 should be characterized as personal injury actions for the purpose of determining the applicable statute of limitations. ... This Court recently held that O.R.C. Sec. 2305.11 is applicable to federal civil rights actions. ... Plaintiff was released October 14, 1978, and the statute of limitations started to run. However, subsequent incarcerations which occurred after the action accrued did not toll the statute of limitations.

Federal law determines when a Section 1983 claim accrues, while the forum's law supplies the limitations period and tolling rules.

Malave v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico · filed 1986-03-03

Carmelo Batista’s cause of action definitely accrued when he was dismissed from his job in August, 1982. To determine the moment at which the cause of action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we look at federal law, ... but to determine the applicable period of limitation and whether it has been tolled or not, we look to the law of Puerto Rico.

Section 1983 claims are characterized as personal-injury actions for limitations purposes, and Arizona's two-year personal-injury period is tolled during imprisonment under the law then applicable.

Chester Marks v. Parra · filed 1986-05-05

The Supreme Court recently held that § 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions for statute of limitations purposes. ... The applicable Arizona statute of limitations for personal injuries provides a two-year limitations period. ... This holding tolls the statute of limitations for appellant Marks’s cause of action.

In Illinois, a Section 1983 claim accruing before Wilson v. Garcia had to be filed by the earlier of five years after accrual or two years after Wilson.

Anton v. Lehpamer · filed 1986-05-02

Therefore, we hold that, in Illinois, a plaintiff whose section 1983 cause of action accrued before the ... decision, April 17, 1985, must file suit within the shorter period of either five years from the date his action accrued or two years after ...

A § 1983 claim ordinarily accrues when the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of the challenged act.

Thorne v. Village of Sanford, Michigan · filed 1986-05-23

Ordinarily the time of accrual of a civil rights action runs from the time that a plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of the challenged act.

Incarceration by itself does not toll the limitations period for a prisoner's § 1983 conditions-of-confinement claim.

Vargas v. Jago · filed 1986-06-10

Thus we will conclude, for purposes of section 1983 suits brought by prisoner over the condition(s) of their confinement, that the fact of incarceration, in and of itself, is not enough to toll the relevant statute of limitations.

In Illinois, a pre-Wilson Section 1983 claim filed less than five years after accrual and within two years after Wilson was timely.

Photos v. Township High School District No. 211 · filed 1986-07-08

the Court held that § 1983 actions should be characterized as personal injury actions for purposes of choosing (since Congress did not) the appropriate limitations period. In Illinois, that statute is two years. ... Plaintiff filed this case on September 13, 1985, which is less than five years after his cause of action accrued in 1983 and well within two years after ... Therefore, his claim based on the 1983 demotion is timely.

State law supplies the limitations period for a § 1983 claim, but federal law makes the claim accrue when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury underlying it.

Hobson v. Government of the Virgin Islands Fire Division · filed 1986-07-23

While state law determines which statute of limitations is to be applied in a civil rights action, federal law determines when the claim arises. Sandutch v. Muroski, 684 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1982); Pauk v. Board of Trustees of City University of New York, 654 F.2d 856, 859 (2d Cir. 1981). Under federal law, a civil rights cause of action arises when the plaintiff “knew or had reason to know of the injury that constitutes the basis of [the] action,” Sandutch v. Muroski, supra, at 254.

A § 1983 claim in Ohio must be brought within one year after accrual, including claims filed before Wilson v. Garcia.

Dr. John D. Vodila v. Roderick Clelland Dorothy Demharter Jim Ghersi Dr. Donald Cotton, Jr. Dorothy Cooper William Spike · filed 1986-08-01

As this court held in Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3808 (June 9, 1986), where the limitations period for a section 1983 action is established by reference to Ohio Law, the action must be brought within one year after the cause of action accrued. The one year limitations period applies whether or not suit was filed before the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Garcia, supra, 777 F.2d at 343-44.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on denial of a requested hearing accrues when the government formally refuses the hearing, rather than when the employee was earlier suspended.

Sockman v. CITY OF ERIE, PA. · filed 1986-08-26

Since it is this refusal to grant a hearing which plaintiff claims has violated his right to due process, and since this appears to be the first formal notification that the City was refusing such a hearing, we accept plaintiff’s argument that his complaint was timely filed and we will not dismiss on that basis.

A § 1983 employment claim accrues when the employee receives notice of the final demotion or termination decision, not when it later becomes effective or collateral review concludes.

Greenwood v. STATE OF NY, OFF. OF MENTAL HEALTH · filed 1986-09-26

The Supreme Court has held that a § 1983 action accrues on the date that an employee is notified by letter that a final decision has been made to demote him or to terminate his employment, even if the effective date of the action is sometime later. ... Subsequent events which occurred as a consequence of Greenwood’s demotion do not postpone the accrual date or toll the running of the statute of limitations.

An Ohio Section 1983 damages action against state officers had to be filed within one year of accrual, and imprisonment alone did not toll that period absent unsound mind.

Swanson v. Captain Tacket Gordy Pullman Betty John Doe · filed 1986-12-15

The plaintiff sued officers of the State of Ohio and sought monetary damages. He was required to do so within one year after the accrual of his cause of action. ... Only if the plaintiff is imprisoned and is of unsound mind will the running of the statute of limitations be tolled for a suit brought against the State of Ohio or its officers.

A § 1983 action accrues when the injured party knows or has reason to know of the injury forming the basis of the action.

Peter Henderson Oil Company and Pinnacle Company v. City of Port Arthur, Texas · filed 1987-01-06

Section 1983 actions accrue when the injured party knows or has reason to know of the injury which forms the basis for the action.

A § 1983 employment claim accrues once the circumstances put the employee on notice that a requested transfer was denied; an explicit statement of denial is unnecessary.

St. Amant v. Ronald J. Benoit and John H. Robichaux, Sr. · filed 1987-01-07

Combined with the city’s silence regarding his previous requests for transfer, the reasonable inferences from the April 8 letter put St. Amant on notice that his transfer request had been denied. ... Accordingly, St. Amant’s section 1983 claim had already prescribed on May 5, 1983, and the district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendant.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows of the injury, and summary judgment on limitations is improper when a material factual dispute remains about when the challenged sentence calculation occurred or became known.

Davis v. Kay Bryan, Raymond Lopes, Aaron Ment, John D. Brennan and George Bronson · filed 1987-01-27

Since an issue of material fact exists as to when the statute of limitations actually began to run, the summary judgment order was erroneously granted.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury forming the basis of the action.

Payne v. Geary · filed 1987-01-27

In a § 1983 claim, the cause of action accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis for his action.” ... In the present case, the plaintiff plainly had reason to know of his injury on the date the alleged beating and refusal to treat took place, February 5, 1982.

When a federal court borrows a state's limitations period for a § 1983 claim, it also applies the state's tolling rules unless doing so would offend federal policy.

Cullen v. Margiotta · filed 1987-02-02

We agree with plaintiffs' contentions, for when a federal court looks to state law to determine the most appropriate statute of limitations, it must also, so long as federal policy is not thereby offended, apply the state's rules as to the tolling of the statute.

A state tolling rule cannot govern § 1983 claims when it withholds tolling from federal civil-rights claims while granting it to analogous state-law claims.

Hughes v. Sheriff of Fall River County Jail and Jeff Tarell, Jailer Fall River County Jail · filed 1987-03-24

South Dakota has singled out federal claims, subjecting them to more restrictive tolling provisions than those governing analogous state-law claims. Section 15-2-22’s exclusion of federal civil-rights claims from the tolling effects of § 15-2-22(3) is thus inconsistent with federal law, and should not be incorporated to govern federal civil-rights claims.

A § 1983 false-arrest claim accrues on the date of the arrest.

Davis v. Shelby County, Tennessee and Shelby County Sheriff's Office, Defendants · filed 1987-03-24

In Rinehart v. Locke, 454 F.2d 313 (7th Cir.1971), the court held that the Sec. 1983 cause of action accrues on the date the arrest was made when the claim is for false arrest. ... Clearly, plaintiff's claims under Sec. 1983 are time-barred.

Voluntary pursuit of administrative remedies does not toll the Section 1983 limitations period because exhaustion is not a prerequisite to suit.

Black v. Broward Employment & Training Administration · filed 1987-04-28

Since exhaustion of administrative remedies is ... not ... a prerequisite to filing suit, the statute was not tolled during plaintiffs voluntary pursuit of her administrative remedies.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim accrues when the prosecution terminates in the plaintiff's favor.

Encarnacion v. Department of the Treasury · filed 1987-07-24

However, as previously stated, this action is characterized as a malicious prosecution. That cause of action does not accrue until the malicious action is terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. ... The date of the acquittal is the date her cause of action accrued.

Federal law determines when a § 1983 cause of action accrues, although the limitations period is borrowed from state law.

Newcomb v. Ingle · filed 1987-08-27

We now hold, therefore, that federal law controls questions relating to accrual of federal causes of action.

An Indiana § 1983 claim accruing before Wilson v. Garcia is timely if filed within the shorter of five years from accrual or two years after Wilson.

Dinger v. City of New Albany · filed 1987-09-08

an Indiana ‘plaintiff whose section 1983 cause of action accrued before the ... decision, April 17, 1985, must file suit within the shorter period of either five years from the date his action accrued or two years after ... .’

When a § 1983 plaintiff voluntarily complies with a state exhaustion procedure, federal courts must give the plaintiff the benefit of any resulting toll of the borrowed state limitations period.

Lawson v. Glover · filed 1987-12-02

Given that plaintiffs may, if they choose, seek to exhaust state administrative remedies, we conclude that the rule that federal courts must employ the applicable state statute of limitations in section 1983 cases ... clearly requires federal courts to give a section 1983 plaintiff the benefit of any toll effected by his compliance with a state exhaustion requirement.

Illinois's prisoner tolling statute applies to prisoner § 1983 suits under controlling Seventh Circuit precedent.

Strong v. Fairman · filed 1987-12-03

Although this argument has a certain surface appeal, it overlooks several more recent Seventh Circuit decisions indicating the propriety of applying the Illinois tolling statute to prisoner Section 1983 lawsuits.

Michigan's statutory tolling period for imprisonment does not apply to prisoner § 1983 actions because delayed litigation conflicts with the federal policies of prompt rehabilitation and deterrence.

Higley v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 1987-12-15

We accordingly find application of M.S.A. § 27A.5851’s [M.C.A. § 600.5851] tolling provision to prisoners’ § 1983 actions to be inconsistent with the policies embodied in § 1983.

Ohio's one-year personal-injury limitations period governs § 1983 claims, and imprisonment alone does not toll that period because prisoners retain access to federal court.

Miller v. Stevens · filed 1988-01-15

Therefore, this court holds that imprisonment, standing alone, is not a disability which tolls the statute of limitations in a Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims may be filed despite California Government Code section 945.3’s bar on suits during related criminal proceedings, so that provision does not toll their limitations period.

Mangels v. City of Orange · filed 1988-02-22

The Court concludes that section 945.3, when applied to claims brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, is plainly inconsistent with important federal policies underlying such causes of action. Because no basis exists for treating section 945.3 differently in this respect than other state exhaustion requirements, Mangels need not have refrained from filing the instant claim until the criminal charges against him were resolved. ... Plaintiff may not prevail upon section 945.3’s tolling clause without having been subject to its disabilities.

A Section 1983 action arising in Ohio is barred by Ohio’s one-year limitations period when filed more than a year after the alleged wrongful act, absent facts supporting later accrual or tolling.

Doyle v. City of Brookpark Mayor Coyne Thomas Dease, Chief of Police John Doe, Police Officer of Brookpark · filed 1988-03-09

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his action filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in which he alleged that police officers violated his civil rights by firing gunshots in his direction on March 23, 1985. ... Upon consideration, we agree with the district court that the savings statute did not toll the limitations period for the reasons stated in its opinion and order entered September 23, 1987. Further, plaintiff alleged nothing which would establish that his cause of action arose at some time later than the time that the allegedly tortious act was committed. ... Therefore, the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint as barred by Ohio's one-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims follow state equitable tolling law consistent with federal policy, and unjustifiably abandoning a delayed state suit for an identical federal suit does not satisfy California’s good faith requirement.

Bacon v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1988-03-31

Whether the statute is tolled in section 1983 cases is determined by state law not inconsistent with federal policy. ... Under California law, the law applicable to this case, three conditions must be met to toll the statute of limitations: (1) defendant must have had timely notice of the claim; (2) defendant must not be prejudiced by being required to defend the otherwise barred claim; and (3) plaintiffs conduct must have been reasonable and in good faith. ... We hold that it was not reasonable and not in good faith. Plaintiffs behavior reflects an effort to delay the disposition of this claim at the state level for as long as the state court would permit. Only when that court’s tolerance was exhausted did plaintiff drop his state proceedings and file the identical claim in federal court.

A § 1983 claim based on a single discriminatory discharge is not a continuing violation merely because the effects of the discharge persist.

Rivera-Gomez v. De Castro · filed 1988-04-07

We affirm the dismissal of the amended complaint insofar as it purports to state claims based on a continuing violation of plaintiffs’ civil rights, and we remand the case to the district court with an express direction that it permit plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint limited to their claim(s) based on equitable tolling as described in the course of this opinion.

Incarceration does not toll the three-year limitations period applied to a § 1983 excessive force claim.

Hudson v. Pontiac Police Dept. · filed 1988-05-09

Plaintiff filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 alleging defendants used excessive force during the arrest of plaintiff June 21, 1978. ... Upon consideration, we agree with the district court's decision. Plaintiff's position, that his incarceration acted to toll the running of the three-year limitations period, has been squarely rejected by this court. Higley v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 835 F.2d 623 (6th Cir.1987). The dismissal was correct.

Section 1983 claims challenging final parole commission actions are barred by the three-year limitations period when the plaintiff knew of the actions at the time and cannot show a continuing violation.

Strader v. Does · filed 1988-05-18

Carroll Eugene Strader, a North Carolina inmate, appeals from the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. We affirm the judgment below for the reason that Strader failed to show that the Parole Commission's actions constituted a continuing violation in order to lift the bar of the three-year statute of limitations. The Parole Commission's actions took place in 1968 and 1974 and were final upon completion and, therefore, Strader should have been aware of them at that time.

Section 1983 claims filed in federal court in Ohio are subject to a one-year limitations period, and Ohio’s imprisonment tolling provision does not extend that period because it conflicts with federal policy favoring prompt resolution of prisoner civil rights claims.

Perotti v. Carty · filed 1988-05-23

We accordingly find application of Ohio Rev.Code Ann. Sec. 2305.16's tolling provision to prisoners' section 1983 claims to be inconsistent with the policies embodied in section 1983. That decision leads to the further conclusion that Perotti's suit was time-barred under the applicable Ohio law and period of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Ohio are not governed by the state’s catch-all four-year limitations period, so filing nearly four years after accrual is untimely even if a two-year period applies.

Lester W. Smith and Western Reserve Group, Inc. v. Combustion Engineering, Inc. · filed 1988-08-24

Even if this court should conclude upon rehearing that Mulligan v. Hazard was incorrectly decided insofar as it selected Ohio's one-year statute of limitations rather than the two-year statute, such a decision would not benefit the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs waited until nearly four years after their alleged Sec. 1983 cause of action accrued before filing their complaint. As the Mulligan court pointed out, Ohio's catch-all four-year statute of limitations, Ohio Rev. Code Sec. 2305.09(D), does not apply to Sec. 1983 actions.