42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims arising in Kansas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Selby v. Ed White · filed 1991-07-31

We agree with the district court that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The suit, which is based on incidents occurring in 1973 and 1976, was not filed until 1990, well beyond Kansas's two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims filed in Kansas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Lawton v. Medevac Mid-America, Inc. · filed 1991-08-21

The statute of limitations for a section 1983 claim is two years.

Section 1983 claims in Kansas have a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury underlying the claim.

Winkel v. Reserve Officer of City of Beloit, Kan. · filed 1991-09-23

We believe summary judgment against plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim, as asserted under § 1983, is warranted for two reasons. First, we believe plaintiff’s federal claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The relevant limitations period is two years. ... The limitations period begins to run when plaintiff knows or should know of the injury which is the basis of the action.

Section 1983 civil rights actions filed in Kansas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

D'Zurella v. State of Kansas Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services Ernie Dyer and Barbara Gaines · filed 1992-01-23

A two-year statute of limitations applies to all civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 civil rights actions in Kansas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Brodock v. Kansas Parole Board · filed 1992-09-18

It is well settled in this district that a two-year statute of limitations applies to civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims arising in Kansas are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

Jenkins v. F.L. Moss, Individually Kansas City, Kansas, Police Department City of Kansas City, Kansas, a Municipal · filed 1992-10-19

Federal civil rights claims arising in the State of Kansas are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims alleging federal constitutional violations in Kansas are governed by the state’s two-year statute of limitations.

Ruth Cooper, a Single Person v. State of Kansas · filed 1992-12-18

Such allegations are authorized to be brought in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The two-year statute, see Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(4), thus governs this action.

Section 1983 claims in Kansas are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Baker v. The Board of Regents of the State of Kansas and University of Kansas Medical School--School of Medici · filed 1993-04-12

We agree with the trial court’s analysis that the two year state statute of limitations should be applied to the federal law claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000d, and to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 29 U.S.C. § 794, which the appellant moved to add to the complaint.

Section 1983 claims arising in Kansas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Brodock v. Kansas Parole Board Kansas Secretary of Corrections Randy Kaufman Michael Straight Warren Barry · filed 1993-07-22

As the district court noted, Sec. 1983 actions arising in Kansas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Johnson v. Johnson County Comm'n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir.1991). Mr. Brodock did not file his complaint until December 1991. We thus agree with the district court that to the extent his claims arise out of the 1988 activities, they are time-barred.

Michigan’s three-year personal-injury limitations period applies to § 1983 actions filed in Michigan federal court.

Karal Hasani Eifa Battle v. Calhoun County Sheriff's Department · filed 1988-02-03

This pro se Michigan prisoner appeals the judgment of the district court for the Western District of Michigan which dismissed his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action pursuant to Michigan's three year statute of limitations for personal injuries, Mich.Comp.Laws Sec. 600.5805(8). ... Having carefully reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that no error or abuse of discretion was committed by the district court. The district court opinions of May 4, 1987, and June 19, 1987, are both correct in their legal analysis and recitation of the facts.

Section 1983 claims are treated as personal-injury actions for limitations purposes, so Michigan’s three-year limitations period applies.

Gordon v. City of Warren · filed 1976-05-06

The Court, therefore, restates that in such § 1983, § 1985 actions, deprivation of civil rights is a personal injury and the analogous state statute of limitations applicable to this action is the three-year period under M.C.L.A. § 600.5805(7).

For a § 1983 claim, the limitations period did not begin until the alleged taking was no longer in controversy, which occurred when the Michigan Supreme Court invalidated the ordinance.

Gordon v. City of Warren · filed 1978-06-26

This court's opinion in Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (1973), supports this conclusion, at least insofar as the claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 are concerned. ... It is our conclusion that, regardless of which statute applies, limitations did not begin to run on plaintiffs' cause of action until the Supreme Court of Michigan decided that the ordinance was invalid, and that the defendants engaged in a continuing course of action which made it impossible for the plaintiffs to enjoy the full use of their property until that time. ... Until the Michigan Supreme Court issued its decision the question whether the city had in fact taken the plaintiffs' property for public use remained in controversy. ... The action was not barred by limitations.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations, so courts borrow the appropriate state limitations period; here, Michigan’s three-year period governs the action.

Abshier v. Tichvon · filed 1980-08-22

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has no statute of limitations, the Court must look to the appropriate state statute. ... This Court therefore holds that Plaintiff’s action is governed by Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims are governed by the most analogous state statute of limitations, which here is Michigan’s three-year personal-injury limitations period.

Kurzawa v. Mueller · filed 1982-08-30

The court adheres to this line of decisions and holds, therefore, that plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are governed by the three-year statute of limitations. M.C.L.A. § 600.5805(8).

Section 1983 claims arising in Michigan are subject to the three-year limitations period in Mich.Comp.Laws Sec. 600.5805(8).

Burton v. Jaggers · filed 1988-11-16

On May 27, 1986, plaintiff, Willie Burton, Jr., filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in the District Court for the Western District of Michigan. ... Upon defendants' motion, however, the district court determined that plaintiff had filed his complaint after the expiration of the three year statute of limitations provided by Mich.Comp.Laws Sec. 600.5805(8). ... Careful review of the record discloses that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's complaint.

Section 1983 claims against a Michigan county are subject to Michigan’s three-year limitations period.

Donald Kenneth Carlson, Cross-Appellee v. Ronald Edward Zielinski, Det. Lt., Benzie County, Cross-Appellant · filed 1989-02-13

Plaintiff's claim against Benzie County was also properly dismissed as it is barred by Michigan's three year limitations period under M.C.L. Secs. 600.5805(2) and 600.5805(8).

In Michigan, a Section 1983 claim has a three-year limitations period.

Hunt v. Malcolm Thompson Dennis Baaki · filed 1990-02-07

In Michigan, the statute of limitations for section 1983 cases is three years.

Section 1983 civil rights actions in Michigan are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Walker v. Marjorie Van Ochten, in Her Individual and Official Capacity · filed 1990-05-09

First, Walker's civil rights action was barred by Michigan's three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Michigan are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Moreland v. Stark · filed 1990-09-04

The court held that the complaint was barred by Michigan's three-year statute of limitations. ... Upon review, we deny the request for counsel and affirm the district court's judgment for the reasons stated in Judge Bell's opinion and judgment filed on December 8, 1989.

Section 1983 claims in Michigan are subject to the three-year limitations period in Mich.Comp.Laws § 600.5805(1).

Wardlaw v. City of Detroit · filed 1991-10-01

The claim accrued on or between May 31, 1983, and April 3, 1984. Wardlaw filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on April 6, 1990. Wardlaw exceeded the three year statute of limitations period contained in Mich.Comp.Laws § 600.5805(1) by approximately three years.

A § 1983 action arising from alleged police misconduct in Michigan is time-barred if filed more than three years after the alleged conduct.

Zhou v. Ciarkowski, Officer Girard, Officer · filed 1991-11-06

The district court concluded that the complaint, filed more than three years after the events complained of, was time-barred. We agree. The record reflects that Ms. Zhou's action was filed over three years from the date of the alleged unconstitutional treatment. The law is clear that the complaint was out of time.

Section 1983 claims arising in Michigan are subject to a three-year limitations period for injuries to person or property.

McNeil v. Salan · filed 1992-05-14

This statute requires that actions for injuries to person or property be brought within three years of the time of the injury. Because the complaint in this case was filed on June 27, 1990, the applicable statute of limitations would bar actions brought for injuries to the plaintiff occurring before June 27, 1987. ... Most of the alleged injuries suffered by plaintiff occurred more than three years prior to the filing of the complaint, and his civil rights actions based on those injuries, therefore, are barred by the statute of limitations, as the district court held.

Section 1983 claims arising in Michigan are subject to a three-year statute of limitations under Michigan law.

Scott v. City of Pontiac Wargel, Detective John Doe Several Unknown Pontiac Police Officers · filed 1992-10-14

The three year statute of limitations contained in Mich.Comp.Laws § 600.5805(1) is the uniform limitations period to be applied to civil rights claims that arise from Michigan.

A § 1983 action challenging reduced union service fees is subject to Michigan’s three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, even when it also involves review of arbitration.

Bromley v. MICHIGAN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION-NEA · filed 1993-01-20

This action may be a “hybrid” arbitration review/§ 1983 action. Nevertheless, even from defendants’ view of the law, it is still a suit for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although there are some appealing policy reasons for a shorter period of limitations, it is the opinion of the Court that the applicable statute of limitations is three years.

Section 1983 claims arising in Michigan are subject to Michigan’s three-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Crawford v. Schlappi · filed 1993-05-05

Michigan's three-year personal injury statute of limitations applies to a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims in Michigan are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Morris v. Graven · filed 1993-09-30

Concerning the claims within counts three, four, and five of Morris's complaint (count one refers to jurisdiction, and count two contains general allegations), we are satisfied that they are barred by the three year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the borrowed state statute of limitations, and here the applicable period is Texas's two-year personal-injury limitations period.

Nolan v. Storey · filed 1979-08-09

I conclude that the Texas two-year personal injury statute of limitations (Article 5526) applies to claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Wells v. Hutchinson · filed 1980-08-25

The applicable limitations period for causes of action pursuant to these statutes is two years in Texas.

Section 1983 claims by Texas domiciliaries use the Texas tort statute of limitations.

Russell v. Board of Trustees of Firemen, Policemen and Fire Alarm Operators' Pension Fund of · filed 1992-08-11

As is well established, the prescriptive period applicable to a § 1983 claim involving an action by a Texas domiciliary is governed by the applicable Texas statute of limitations concerning torts.

Section 1983 claims brought by Texas plaintiffs are subject to the state’s two-year tort limitations period.

Russell v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen, Policemen and Fire Alarm Operators' Pension Fund of Dallas, Texas · filed 1992-09-10

As is well established, the prescriptive period applicable to a § 1983 claim involving an action by a Texas domiciliary is governed by the applicable Texas statute of limitations concerning torts. ... A two year period is the applicable Texas statute.

All section 1983 actions filed in Wisconsin courts are governed by the state's three-year personal-injury limitations period rather than the one-year administrative period for unfair-labor-practice proceedings.

Hanson v. Madison Service Corp. · filed 1985-05-28

Though administrative agency proceedings must be filed within one year as required by sec. 111.07 (14), we conclude that 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 (1978) (hereinafter sec. 1983) actions brought in court are governed by sec. 893.54, Stats., a three year statute of limitations. Because Hanson commenced this action within three years of the date it accrued, we reverse.

Wisconsin’s six-year limitations period for injuries to character or rights under Wis. Stat. § 893.53 governed § 1983 actions.

Saldivar v. Cadena · filed 1985-11-27

The Wisconsin statute governing actions to recover damages for an injury to “character or rights” is more closely analogous to the spirit of § 1983 than is the statute governing personal injury actions, ... it is the appropriate statute of limitations to apply in § 1983 actions.

All Section 1983 actions filed in Wisconsin are subject to Wisconsin’s three-year personal-injury limitations period.

Kempfer v. Evers · filed 1986-09-18

Congress has not provided a statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 actions. As a result, state statutes of limitation are applicable if they are not inconsistent with federal law. ... “all sec. 1983 actions brought in Wisconsin [must] be brought within the three year limitation of sec. 893.54(1), Stats.”

Section 1983 actions in Wisconsin are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Gray v. Lacke · filed 1988-10-25

This decision supports the conclusion that the three-year statute of limitations applied in Hanson is the appropriate statute for § 1983 actions in Wisconsin.

Section 1983 actions in Wisconsin are not subject to the two-year statute of limitations for intentional torts.

Felder v. Casey · filed 1989-06-27

We hold that the two-year statute is not applicable to the plaintiffs section 1983 action.

Section 1983 actions in Wisconsin are governed by the six-year limitations period for injuries to personal rights.

Gray v. Lacke · filed 1989-09-22

Because we hold that Wisconsin’s six-year personal rights statute of limitations applies to § 1983 actions, it is unnecessary for us to reach the issue of whether to apply this decision retroactively.

Section 1983 claims arising in Wisconsin have a six-year statute of limitations under controlling Seventh Circuit law.

Byrne v. BD. OF EDUC., SCHOOL DIST. OF WEST ALLIS · filed 1990-06-27

Subsequently, on September 22, 1989, the court of appeals for the seventh circuit decided that the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in Wisconsin is six years. ... I find it necessary to conclude that the school district’s statute of limitations contentions are unwarranted under existing law and are devoid of a “good faith argument.”

Section 1983 claims in Wisconsin are subject to the six-year limitations period for injuries to character or rights under Wis. Stat. § 893.53.

Kohlbeck v. Village of Pulaski · filed 1991-03-14

As § 1983 is a civil remedy for the deprivation of an individual’s constitutional rights, this court concludes that the Wisconsin limitations period for alleging injuries to an individual’s "character or rights" is applicable, and the statutory period is six (6) years.

Indiana's two-year limitations period for personal injuries applies to § 1983 claims.

Gaus v. COUNTY OF WELLS, IND. · filed 1985-11-06

In ... the Supreme Court of the United States held that all claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were best characterized as “personal injury actions” and the applicable statute of limitations was to be determined pursuant to state law. ... In Indiana, the statute of limitations governing “injuries to person or character” is found at I.C. § 34-1-2-2. That statute provides that an action for personal injury must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Section 1983 claims in Indiana are governed by the state’s two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions.

Dinger v. City of New Albany · filed 1987-09-08

Therefore this suit is governed by Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury, and under that limitations period the suit is time barred.

In Indiana, § 1983 claims have a two-year limitations period.

Perri v. Daggy · filed 1991-10-11

Because the statute of limitations applicable to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is two years, Wilson v. Gacia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), the claim would be untimely unless the amendment would relate back to the time of the filing of the original complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c).

Section 1983 actions arising in Indiana are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

McCrum v. Elkhart County Department of Public Welfare · filed 1992-12-22

In Indiana, a two-year statute of limitations governs § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims in Indiana are subject to Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations and state tolling rules, and incarceration does not extend that period.

Koch v. Bridge · filed 1993-10-07

He is bound by the Indiana statute of limitations and the tolling provisions of Indiana law. As noted in the Entry which accompanied the Judgment, the plaintiffs incarceration did not extend that period. ... Applying this standard to the plaintiff’s complaint in this case, the Court determined that the plaintiffs allegations were barred by Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations. ... Apart from whether the plaintiffs allegations would be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the claim he offers is time-barred.

Section 1983 claims challenging land-use ordinances accrue when the relevant state authorities render a final decision regarding the property, rather than upon enactment of the ordinance, and are subject to Florida’s four-year limitation period.

Patrick Media Group, Inc. v. City of Clearwater · filed 1993-10-22

Alternatively, Patrick correctly asserts that these actions did not accrue with the passage of the ordinance, but instead accrue from the time the relevant state authorities render a final decision regarding the future of the property. ... Thus, the four year limitation period as provided by Florida Statutes, section 95.11 (1991) has not expired as to these claims.

For a § 1983 action, the court uses the applicable state statute of limitations; here, Ohio’s one-year period governed the claim.

Kilgore v. City of Mansfield, Ohio Patrolman P. Messer · filed 1982-06-03

There is no federal statute of limitations governing actions brought pursuant to § 1983. ... We agree with the district court that Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.11 is the applicable statute of limitations governing the plaintiff’s § 1983 action. ... Because Kilgore’s complaint was filed well beyond the one year period of limitation set forth in Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.11, her action is barred.

Ohio’s one-year limitations period in Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.11 governed the plaintiff’s civil-rights claims under §§ 1983 and 1985.

Mulligan v. Hazard · filed 1985-11-26

Accordingly, we hold that the one year limitations period contained in § 2305.11 governs Mulligan’s actions.

Ohio’s one-year limitations period bars a § 1983 action filed almost two years after the alleged civil-rights violation.

Davis v. City of Youngstown · filed 1987-06-23

The complaint is clearly barred by Ohio's one year statute of limitations applicable to Sec. 1983 actions, and was therefore properly dismissed by the district court.

Section 1983 claims in Ohio are subject to a one-year limitations period that applies retroactively to this suit.

Humphries v. City of Akron · filed 1988-03-14

Plaintiffs appeal with the assistance of counsel the district court's judgment dismissing their claims filed under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983 and 1988 and their pendent state claim filed under Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2305.21. ... Upon review, we conclude the district court properly dismissed their suit under the authority of Mulligan. The plaintiffs have not offered sufficient reasons to preclude retroactive application of the one year statute of limitations to this suit.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are subject to the one-year limitations period in Ohio Rev. Code Sec. 2305.11.

Frank Aluise Steven Oakes Elizabeth Borror v. City of Gahanna, Ohio James F. McGregor Individually and as Mayor of the C · filed 1988-03-16

Plaintiffs appeal the district court's judgment dismissing their civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... The district court dismissed the suit as being filed beyond the applicable one-year statute of limitations, Ohio Rev. Code Sec. 2305.11. ... Upon consideration, in light of this court's holdings in Vodila v. Clelland, No. 85-3461, slip op. (6th Cir. Dec. 28, 1987) and Thomas v. Shipka, 829 F.2d 570 (6th Cir.1987), we affirm the district court's dismissal of this action for the reasons stated in its memorandum opinion dated January 12, 1987.

Section 1983 actions in Ohio are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, and that limitations rule applies retroactively.

Daniel Browning, D/B/A Daniel Browning Excavating Co. Linda Browning v. Pendleton · filed 1988-04-08

We find that this court has given full consideration to the very arguments made by the plaintiffs in this case and has rejected them in favor of its determination that the Ohio one-year statute of limitations applies to section 1983 cases and that Wilson v. Garcia should be applied retroactively.

Section 1983 actions arising in Ohio are governed by the two-year limitations period in Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.10.

Daniel Browning, D/B/A Daniel Browning Excavating Co. Linda Browning v. Pendleton · filed 1989-03-16

Accordingly, we hold that the appropriate statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights actions arising in Ohio is contained in Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.10, which requires that actions for bodily injury be filed within two years after their accrual.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are subject to a two-year limitations period under Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10.

Valerio v. Dahlberg · filed 1989-03-31

That is dispositive of the matter, and the Court declines the plaintiff’s invitation to adopt a four-year rule. Nevertheless, the pleadings assert that the significant events giving rise to the § 1983 cause of action occurred within a two year period before the complaint was filed. Accordingly, the Court orders the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reinstated.

Section 1983 claims filed in federal court in Ohio are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Southers v. Williams J. Dawson, Ted Hysell, H. Baeley, (J. Doe), Clyde Schultz · filed 1989-04-03

The complaint, filed in a federal district court in Ohio, is subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions arising in Ohio have a two-year limitations period borrowed from Ohio's personal-injury statute.

Lundblad v. Celeste · filed 1989-05-04

Thus, the correct limitation period for Sec. 1983 actions arising in Ohio is the two-year period found in O.R.C. Sec. 2305.10 which governs "action[s] for bodily injury or injuring personal property...."

Section 1983 actions arising in Ohio have a two-year limitations period under Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10.

Lundblad v. Celeste · filed 1989-05-04

Thus, the correct limitation period for § 1983 actions arising in Ohio is the two-year period found in O.R.C. § 2305.10 which governs “action[s] for bodily injury or injuring personal property....”

Section 1983 claims filed in federal district courts in Ohio are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Turner v. Richard P. Seiter, William H. Dallman, B. Torbert · filed 1989-05-18

Following Okure, this court has determined that claims filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in federal district courts in Ohio are subject to a two-year limitations period. Browning v. Pendleton, No. 86-4123 (6th Cir. Mar. 16, 1989). Because Turner filed his complaint within two years of the alleged assault and retaliatory transfer, the complaint was timely.

Section 1983 actions filed in federal district courts in Ohio are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Brofford v. Ivan Teets Roger Crabtree McAllister Sgt. Grant Campbell Terry L. Morris Richard P. Seiter · filed 1989-05-31

Upon consideration, we conclude that the district court's order must be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. A recent decision of this court held that the proper statute of limitations to be applied to civil rights actions filed in federal district courts in Ohio is the two year period set forth in Ohio Rev.Code Ann. Sec. 2305.10. Browning v. Pendleton, No. 86-4123 (6th Cir. March 16, 1989) (en banc). Under this statute, the complaint in this case was timely filed.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Baker v. Cumba · filed 1989-06-15

In Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.1989) (en banc), this court held that the two year statute of limitations contained in Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2305.10 was the appropriate limitations period to apply to a Sec. 1983 civil rights action arising in Ohio. ... Thus, under Owens and Browning, Baker's complaint was timely as it was filed within two years after his cause of action accrued.

Section 1983 actions arising in Ohio are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Parks v. Garry L. Kelly, Capt. · filed 1989-06-15

In Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 922 (6th Cir.1989) (en banc), the court held that the two year statute of limitations contained in Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2305.10 was the appropriate limitations period to apply to a Sec. 1983 civil rights action arising in Ohio. ... Thus, under Owens and Browning, Parks' complaint was timely as it was filed within two years after his cause of action accrued.

Section 1983 actions in Ohio are subject to a two-year limitations period, and that rule applies retroactively where defendants show no resulting inequity.

Emma Jean Griffin, Tommy Griffin, Christopher Griffin v. City of Cleveland, David Stokes, Paul Payne, John Doe, Samuel D · filed 1989-06-22

After the district court rendered its judgment, this court overruled its decision in Mulligan and determined that Ohio's two year statute of limitations applies to Sec. 1983 actions in Ohio. Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.1989) (en banc). We conclude that the factors considered under Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971) permit retroactive application of the Browning decision because defendants have not shown that any inequity would result otherwise. Applying the two year limitations period, we conclude that, plaintiffs complaint was timely because they were permitted until Monday, August 24, 1987 to file under state law, see Ohio Rev.Code Ann. Sec. 1.14, as well as under federal law.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are subject to Ohio’s two-year limitations period for bodily injury.

Emmons v. Robert McLaughlin Donald Ratliff, Gary Dewalt, City of Norwalk, Reese Wineman · filed 1989-06-30

In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Owens v. Okure, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989), however, this court now holds that the Ohio two-year limitations period for bodily injury, see Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.10 (Anderson 1988), applies to section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 actions arising in Ohio are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Haddix v. Weber · filed 1989-07-26

Even though we concluded that Ohio's two-year statute of limitations is the appropriate time frame, the decision does not benefit the plaintiff because the plaintiff filed his complaint two years and 23 days after his alleged Sec. 1983 cause of action accrued.

Section 1983 claims brought in Ohio are timely when filed within two years of the alleged misconduct under Ohio’s limitations period for civil rights actions.

Clark v. Russell Bradley, Sheriff Greene County Jail Staff · filed 1989-07-28

Upon consideration, we conclude that because plaintiff's Sec. 1983 claim was filed within two years of defendants' alleged transgressions, it was not time-barred under Ohio's statute of limitations for civil rights actions.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio have a two-year limitations period.

Ray v. T.E. Judd, Major Jenkins, Correctional Officer Bowger, Correctional Officer · filed 1989-07-28

In Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.1989) (en banc), this court held that the two year statute of limitations contained in Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2305.10 was the appropriate limitations period to apply to a Sec. 1983 civil rights action arising in Ohio. ... Thus, under Owens and Browning, Ray's complaint was timely as it was filed within two years after his cause of action accrued.

Section 1983 actions in Ohio use the two-year limitations period for general bodily-injury actions, and that period applies retroactively when doing so causes no inequity.

Spruce v. Brown · filed 1989-08-03

After the district court rendered its judgment, this court overruled its decision in Mulligan and determined that Ohio's two-year statute of limitations for general actions for bodily injury, Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2305.10, applies to Sec. 1983 actions in Ohio. Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.1989) (en banc). We conclude that the factors considered under Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), permit retroactive application of the Browning decision because defendants have not shown that any inequity would result otherwise. Applying the two-year limitations period, we conclude that plaintiff's complaint was timely.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are subject to a two-year limitations period.

King v. Thomas Hamman, Robert J. Barada, James Caldwell, Donald W. Arledge, Ross County Commissioners · filed 1989-08-15

In Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir.1989) (en banc), this court held that the two year statute of limitations contained in Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2305.10 was the appropriate limitations period to apply to a Sec. 1983 civil rights action arising in Ohio. ... Thus, under Browning the complaint was not time-barred as it was filed within two years after King's cause of action accrued.

Section 1983 actions filed in Ohio are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

Martin v. Terry L. Morris Richard P. Seiter · filed 1989-10-02

However, Mulligan has been overruled by our decision in Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.1989) (en banc) (two-year statute of limitations governs Ohio Sec. 1983 actions). Although defendants contend that Browning should not be retroactively applied in this case, they point to no specific inequity which would result. See Vodila v. Clelland, 836 F.2d 231, 233 (6th Cir.1987). Therefore, plaintiff's complaint is timely because it undisputedly was filed within two years of the acts which form the basis of plaintiff's action.

Section 1983 actions filed in Ohio are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Riordan v. City of Lakewood · filed 1989-12-08

In Ohio, the applicable limitations period is two years under Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.10.

Section 1983 claims filed in Ohio are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for bodily injury.

Delaney v. State of Ohio · filed 1990-03-20

Upon review, we find no error. This court has held that the Ohio two-year limitations period for bodily injury applies to Sec. 1983 claims. ... Delaney's complaint was brought nearly five years after the alleged deprivation. It is clearly time-barred.

Section 1983 actions filed in Ohio are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Peluso v. Smith · filed 1990-06-14

The acts complained of were alleged to occur prior to plaintiff's conviction in 1985, yet this action was not filed until December, 1988; it is thus barred by the two year statute of limitations on Sec. 1983 actions filed in Ohio.

Section 1983 claims filed in Ohio are subject to the two-year limitations period for bodily injury actions.

Farber v. Massillon Board of Education · filed 1990-07-12

Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10 accordingly allows two years from accrual for filing of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such as Appellant’s and she was timely.

Section 1983 claims filed in Ohio are subject to the two year limitations period in Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2305.10.

Haller v. Borror · filed 1990-09-27

The two year statute of limitations set forth in Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2305.10 applies to Haller's claims filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and Sec. 1985.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Davis v. City of Columbus, Ohio · filed 1991-03-19

The limitations period for Sec. 1983 claims arising in Ohio is two years.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are subject to the two year statute of limitations in Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.10.

Claypoole v. Hamilton County Dept. of Human Services · filed 1992-05-18

Claypoole failed to file his action within the two year statute of limitations contained in Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.10, that is applicable to civil rights claims arising in Ohio.

Section 1983 actions in Ohio are subject to Ohio's two-year statute of limitations.

Roebuck v. City of Youngstown the City of Youngstown Police Department John Doe, 1 & 2 · filed 1993-10-15

Roebuck's complaint is clearly time-barred by Ohio's two year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio have a two-year limitations period governed by state tolling rules and federal accrual law, with accrual delayed until the plaintiff reasonably should have discovered both the injury and its cause when either could not reasonably be discovered earlier.

Patton v. Bechtler · filed 1993-10-21

A two-year statute of limitations applies to civil rights actions arising out of Ohio. Browning v. Pendelton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir.1989) (en banc). While state statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to determine the timeliness of civil rights claims, see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1985), federal law determines the accrual of those claims. Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir.1984). A statute of limitations generally begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action. Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir.1991). However, when the injured person sustains an injury which cannot itself reasonably be discovered, or the cause of which cannot reasonably be discovered, the limitations period starts to run when the plaintiff reasonably should have discovered both the cause and the injury. Hicks v. Hines Inc., 826 F.2d 1543, 1544 (6th Cir.1987).

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio have a two-year limitations period even when equitable relief is sought, and continuing effects of an original violation do not extend that period.

Blackwell, Inc. v. Fisher · filed 1993-11-08

Blackwell argues that a limitations period other than the one mandated by Browning is appropriate for its Sec. 1983 claim because part of the relief it seeks is equitable in nature. We see no such exception recognized by Browning. ... The only alleged violation of law here was the holding of the unconstitutional particular premises local option election in November of 1989. Once that election was held, all other state actions of which Blackwell complains were merely the "continuing effects" of that violation and not continuing violations themselves. ... Had Blackwell been so inclined, it could have challenged the local option election as unconstitutional within the two-year limitations period following that election, which period ended on November 9, 1991.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are subject to the two-year limitations period in Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10, and characterization of the borrowed limitations statute is a question of federal law.

Deaton v. City of Dayton · filed 1993-12-08

When federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations for Sec. 1983 claims, it is well settled that "the problem of characterization 'is ultimately a question of federal law.' " Collard v. Kentucky Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 183 (6th Cir.1990) (quoting Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269-70 (emphasis added)). The Sixth Circuit, following Owens and Wilson, has repeatedly characterized Sec. 2305.10, with its two-year statute of limitations, as the applicable Ohio personal injury statute for Sec. 1983 civil rights actions. ... Plaintiffs' claims are therefore barred.

Every § 1983 claim is characterized for limitations purposes as an action to recover damages for personal injury.

Springfield Township School District v. Knoll · filed 1985-04-17

... we have held that all § 1983 claims should be characterized for statute of limitations purposes as actions to recover damages for injuries to the person.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the claim arose.

Bridgeman v. Nebraska State Pen · filed 1988-06-14

Section 1983 claims are governed by the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the claim arose.

Section 1983 claims brought in Oregon state court are governed by Oregon’s two-year personal injury limitations period.

Sanok v. Grimes · filed 1988-07-26

For this reason, plaintiffs’ claim under section 1983 is governed by the two-year limit of ORS 12.110, rather than the similar limit of ORS 30.275(8).

Section 1983 claims in Wisconsin are governed by the state’s three-year general personal injury limitations period.

Ratzel v. Marinette County · filed 1988-09-16

Rather, I will heed the Court’s admonition that section 1983 is “a uniquely federal remedy,” id. at 271-72, 105 S.Ct. at 1944, and I find that Wisconsin’s general personal injury limitation of three years best advances the remedial purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania use the two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Cahill v. Carroll · filed 1988-09-20

In an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the relevant statute of limitations ... is determined by the state statute of limitations applicable to personal injuries. ... In Pennsylvania, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 5524(2) (Purdon Supp. 1988) permits actions for personal injuries to be brought within two years.

Section 1983 suits in Georgia are governed by the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Giles v. Thomas Garwood, Charles Weston, Assistant District Attorney and C. Cloud Morgan, Judge · filed 1988-10-05

As the district court found, this section 1983 suit is governed by Georgia’s two year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state personal injury statute of limitations.

Clark v. Department of Corrections Lloyd T. Griffith, M.D. Griffith Clinic, Inc. Lynn C. Brownley · filed 1988-11-15

The state statute governing personal injury is applied to all Sec. 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims are characterized as personal injury actions.

Billie v. Abbott · filed 1988-11-10

We further find that claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are best characterized as personal injury actions.

When a state has multiple limitations periods for personal injury actions, § 1983 claims use the state’s residual or general personal injury limitations period.

Owens v. Okure · filed 1989-01-10

This case raises the question of what limitations period should apply to a § 1983 action where a State has one or more statutes of limitations for certain enumerated intentional torts, and a residual statute for all other personal injury actions. We hold that the residual or general personal injury statute of limitations applies.

Section 1983 employment claims receive the same state personal injury limitations period as other Section 1983 claims; mounting back-pay damages alone do not shorten the time to sue.

Herman v. City of Chicago · filed 1989-03-03

Wilson, Owens, and the practical goals that led to those decisions require us to treat this § 1983 employment case just like any other § 1983 case. As a matter of law, mounting damages do not give the former employee a shorter time to file suit than state law provides for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims for deprivation of constitutional rights in connection with Alabama State Bar admission have a two-year limitations period under Alabama’s residual personal injury statute, applied prospectively.

Grubbs v. Alabama State Bar · filed 1989-03-03

In Alabama, the general or residual statute of limitations for personal injury is two years. Therefore, all actions for money damages or other remedies for the deprivation of a constitutional right in connection with admission to the State Bar must be commenced within two years from the deprivation of such right. The United States Supreme Court had not released Owens v. Okure, supra, and this Court had not set this time-bar prior to the commencement of this proceeding; therefore, we will not hold that Grubbs’s action is time-barred by this two-year statute of limitations, which shall, in cases of this kind, have prospective application only.

Section 1983 claims must be filed within the limitations period for personal injury actions in the state where the federal court sits.

Gleason v. McBride · filed 1989-03-13

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be commenced within the statute of limitations period applicable to personal injury actions occurring in the state in which the federal court sits.

Section 1983 actions in Virginia are subject to the state’s two-year personal injury limitations period.

Hoggard v. Minetti · filed 1989-03-20

The Virginia two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries applies to this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 actions borrow the state’s general or residual personal injury limitations period when the state has multiple limitations periods for personal injury actions.

Allen Thornton and Kanette Thornton v. Patrolman Paul Spooner, Patrolman Robert Simon, Lieutenant William Tell, Patrolma · filed 1989-03-21

However, the Supreme Court recently settled the issue of what statute of limitations to borrow for application in Sec. 1983 actions when a state has multiple statutes of limitations for various personal injury actions. Owens v. Okure, 57 U.S.L.W. 4065 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1989). There, the Court held, contrary to our holding in Mulligan, that a state's general or residual statute for personal injury actions, and not the intentional tort statute, should apply. Id. at 4069. Thus, it would appear that the district court erred in following Mulligan, and the case must be remanded for further consideration in light of Okure.

Section 1983 actions in Maryland are subject to Maryland's three-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Smith v. Culver · filed 1989-03-23

Maryland's three-year statute of limitations for personal injury applies to this Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims in Virginia are subject to the state’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

McDaniel v. Terry · filed 1989-04-14

Jean McDaniel appeals from the district court's order denying relief on her sexual harassment and employment termination claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... We affirm the dismissal of the claims regarding defendant Moore because the allegations of sexual harassment occurred more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint and are therefore barred by Virginia's two-year statute of limitations on personal injury claims.

Section 1983 actions in Oregon are subject to Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Cooper v. City of Ashland Brian Almquist Vic Lively Mel Clements John Does I-V · filed 1989-05-11

Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 actions arising in Ohio are governed by the two-year limitations period for general personal injury actions.

Harry Richter, Jr. v. T.D. Taylor, George Denton, Padet Wattanasarn, M.D., Lou Ann Smith, R.N., Sharon Schnake, R.N. · filed 1989-08-10

Section 1983 actions arising in a state that has multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, as Ohio, are governed by the state's general or residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Owens v. Okure, 109 S.Ct. 573 (1989). We have held that the appropriate limitations period for Sec. 1983 actions arising in Ohio is the two-year period contained in Ohio Rev.Code 2305.10.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state's general personal injury limitations period because the section specifies no federal limitations period.

Burrell v. Jimmy Newsome, Chief of Police, Port Arthur Police Dept. · filed 1989-09-19

Because there is no specified federal statute of limitations for section 1983 suits, federal courts borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 claims in Colorado are governed by the residual personal injury limitations period, which was three years when this claim arose.

Dillingham v. Univ. of Colo., Bd. of Regents · filed 1989-10-12

In Colorado, § 1983 claims brought in federal district court are subject to the residual statute of limitations. ... The residual statute that applied at the time this claim arose provided for a three-year limitations period. ... Given that plaintiffs complaint was first filed within that three-year period, we hold that this action was timely.

Section 1983 actions use the applicable state personal injury statute of limitations.

Lara, Inc. v. South Whitehall Township · filed 1989-10-27

Section 1983 actions are governed by the personal injury statute of limitations of the States.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so courts borrow the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations.

Louis Butler O'Neal v. C/o Peterson of 21 Gun Tower of Old Folsom State Prison · filed 1989-12-18

Because § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, we borrow the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury torts.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period, which is two years in Texas.

Ali v. Higgs · filed 1990-01-25

It is well established that federal courts borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period. ... In Texas, the applicable period is two years.

Section 1983 actions use the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions.

Jones v. City of Hamtramck Milewski, Sgt. Andrew Kozinski, Lt. Det. Joseph Harjay, Officer · filed 1990-04-10

It is well established that the appropriate statute of limitations for actions under § 1983 is the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims are characterized as personal injury actions for statute of limitations purposes.

Lillios v. Justices of New Hampshire District Court · filed 1990-04-11

The Court rejects this argument. Claims under section 1983 are best characterized as personal injury actions for statute of limitations purposes.

Section 1983 claims use the general personal injury limitations period of the state where the challenged action occurred.

Gilbert v. City of Cambridge · filed 1990-08-09

The statute of limitations for a claim under § 1983 is the general personal injury statute of limitations of the state whose action is under review.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are governed by the four-year limitations period in Ohio’s residual personal injury statute, R.C. 2305.09(D).

Bojac Corp. v. Kutevac · filed 1990-10-29

It is clear that appellants' claim under Section 1983 does not fit into any of the categories of R.C. 2305.10 through R.C. 2305.12. It must, therefore, fall within the general or residual statute for personal injury actions, which is R.C. 2305.09(D). ... R.C. 2305.09(D) provides for a four-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the state personal injury statute of limitations; in Virginia, that period is two years.

Tyco Associates, Inc. v. Fairfax County · filed 1990-12-11

Congress has not enacted a specific statute of limitations for § 1983 actions. However, the U. S. Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have established that § 1983 actions are essentially personal injury claims and therefore are governed by the state statute of limitations applicable to such actions. ... Thus, the plaintiff’s cause of action is barred if it was not brought within the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries set forth in Va. Code § 8.01-243(A) (1990 Supp.).

Section 1983 claims in Kansas use the residual two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Elam v. Williams · filed 1990-12-13

In 1989, the Supreme Court held “that where state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions.” ... As the defendants are attempting to apply one of several statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in Kansas, this court must look to the residual two-year limitations period set forth in K.S.A. 60-513.

Section 1983 actions borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period because no federal limitations period applies.

Henson-El v. D.C. Rogers · filed 1991-02-01

There is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 actions. The Supreme Court has thus directed federal courts to borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 actions in Ohio use the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Dixon v. Anderson · filed 1991-03-21

In section 1983 actions, the appropriate statute of limitations is the analogous state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... In Ohio, the two-year limitations period of Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.10 (Anderson 1981) governs.

Section 1983 claims arising in Massachusetts are subject to the state’s three-year personal injury limitations period.

Howard H. Gilbert, Jr. v. City of Cambridge · filed 1991-05-03

In Massachusetts, Mass.Gen.L. ch. 260, § 2A fixes a three-year limitation for the commencement of tort actions and, consequently, applies to section 1983 suits.

Section 1983 actions borrow the analogous state personal injury limitations period; in Ohio, that period is two years.

Dixon v. Anderson · filed 1991-05-07

In section 1983 actions, the appropriate statute of limitations is the analogous state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1947-49, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). In Ohio, the two-year limitations period of Ohio Rev.Code Ann. Sec. 2305.10 (Anderson 1981) governs. Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.1989).

Section 1983 claims brought in Arkansas have a three-year limitations period borrowed from the state personal injury statute.

Morton v. City of Little Rock Phillip Wilson, and Ronnie Gatewood, Individually and in Their Official Capacities · filed 1991-05-30

Thus, in Arkansas the applicable period for a § 1983 action is three years.

Section 1983 actions borrow the local statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Wonderwheel v. Medocino Superior Court · filed 1991-05-30

In order to determine the proper statute of limitations to apply in a section 1983 action, we look to the local statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period for personal injury actions because the statute has no federal limitations period.

Lewis v. Richmond City Police Department, Director of Public Safety, City Manager · filed 1991-10-22

There is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, so the state limitations period which governs personal injury actions is applied.

Section 1983 claims in Ohio use the two-year limitations period for personal injury actions under Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.10.

Duncan v. Village of Middlefield · filed 1991-12-20

The appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is the analogous state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1985). In Ohio, the applicable statute of limitations is Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.10. Brown v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir.1989) (en banc). Section 2305.10 provides that the plaintiff must bring an action within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury limitations period and tolling rules of the state where the claim arose.

Carr v. Riley · filed 1992-04-29

We agree with the district court that Carr's action is time-barred. Carr's claim accrued in 1983. "Section 1983 claims are governed by the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the claim arose." ... Further, "[t]he use of a state's statute of limitations also requires the use of its tolling statutes and the operation thereof is governed by state law." ... Assuming that Missouri's five-year limitations period for personal injury actions applies, see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4), the limitations period ended in April 1990; because Carr did not file his action until May 1991, over a year later, it is time-barred.

Section 1983 claims filed in Indiana use the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Fultz v. Jack R. Duckworth, Warden, Harlan C. Hicks, Patricia A. Ravinet · filed 1992-05-08

Federal courts apply the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions when determining the timeliness of a § 1983 claim. ... The Indiana statute of limitations allows two years for claims of injuries to the person.

Section 1983 claims use the state's general or residual personal injury limitations period.

Wilson v. Don Helling, Counselor Baca, Ltd. Budge and C/o Odell · filed 1992-05-08

In claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the state's general or residual personal injury statute of limitations period applies.

Section 1983 claims in the Northern Mariana Islands are subject to the Commonwealth’s two-year general personal injury limitations period.

Materne v. Marianas Public Land Corp. · filed 1992-06-16

The Commonwealth Code provides a two year limitation for "[a]ctions for injury to or for the death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another...." 7 CMC § 2503(d). We conclude this statute is the Commonwealth's general personal injury statute, and it provides the proper limitations period for actions under section 1983.

Section 1983 claims use the forum jurisdiction’s residual or general personal injury statute of limitations.

Julian N. Taman, for Himself and Other Heirs of Felipe Fanama Pilar F. Lisua v. Marianas Public Land Corporation · filed 1992-07-08

The period of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is determined by adopting the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 actions are treated as personal injury tort actions for limitations purposes; in North Carolina, the applicable period is three years.

Nello L. Teer Co. v. Orange County · filed 1992-09-09

All actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983) are characterized as personal injury tort actions for purposes of the statute of limitations. ... Since the actions upon which Teer bases its § 1983 claim all occurred within three years of the filing in state court, that claim is not barred by the statute of limitations.

In California, § 1983 claims are subject to the state's three-year statute of limitations for civil rights actions.

Blake v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1977-05-13

It is well settled in California that the applicable statute of limitations for civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the three year statute provided in section 338(1) of the California Code of Civil Procedure.

Section 1983 claims in California use a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows the position was filled, and punitive damages remain available even when the claim is joined with a Title VII claim.

Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego · filed 1978-02-17

Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations and the federal courts must apply the most analogous state statute of limitations. E. g., Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 854 (9th Cir. 1977). This court has held that the three-year statute of limitations of California Code of Civil Procedure § 338(1) is applicable to § 1983 actions brought in California. ... Accordingly we hold that, under federal or state law, the statute starts to run from the date on which the position sought was openly assumed by the successful applicant or was filled by him to appellant's knowledge. We conclude that the district court was in error in holding the § 1983 claim time barred. ... We recognize that punitive damages are recoverable under § 1983 in appropriate circumstances. ... Such damages are not barred where the § 1983 claim is joined with a Title VII claim and we conclude that the district court was in error on this issue.

Section 1983 claims in California are subject to a three-year limitations period for actions based on a liability created by statute.

League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Salinas Fire Department · filed 1980-08-19

The subclass of alleged discriminatees which will be allowed to go forward on the claim under section 1983 may not include persons whose individual 1983 claims had become barred by the applicable statute of limitations as of the date this action was filed in this court. It has long been the rule in the Ninth Circuit that claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to California’s three-year period of limitations for an action “upon a liability created by statute,” section 338(1) of the California Code of Civil Procedure.

Section 1983 actions arising in California are subject to California’s three-year statute of limitations.

Ward v. Caulk · filed 1981-07-17

Accordingly, both § 1981 and § 1983 actions arising in California have been limited to this three-year filing period.

Wilson’s shorter personal-injury limitations period was not applied retroactively to bar a § 1983 survival claim filed in reliance on California’s previously established three-year period.

Parker v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County · filed 1985-12-19

On the other hand, as we stated above, retroactive application of ... Wilson ... in this case would shorten the limitations period on which petitioner has relied and would bar the survival action altogether.

California § 1983 claims are characterized as personal-injury actions and governed by a one-year limitations period.

McMILLAN v. GOLETA WATER DISTRICT · filed 1986-06-30

The proper statute of limitations for this action is one year.

Section 1983 claims filed in California are governed by the one-year limitations period in California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(3).

Harrison v. County of Alameda · filed 1989-07-18

The court finds that California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(3), providing a one year statute of limitations, governs claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 in the state of California.

Section 1983 claims filed in California are subject to the state’s one-year residual personal injury limitations period.

Conway v. Johnson · filed 1989-12-11

The district court did not err when it originally dismissed the action. The district court must apply the state statute of limitations that applies to personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). If the state has a residual statute of limitations for personal injuries that statute should be used rather than a specific statute that only refers to distinct types of enumerated torts. Owens v. Okure, 109 S.Ct. 573, 582 (1989). In California the residual statute of limitations for personal injury is California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(3) which provides a one-year time limit "for injury to or for the death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another." Thus, Conway's action, which was brought on December 30, 1987, exceeded the one-year limit for the injuries allegedly caused on December 28, 1986.

Section 1983 claims filed in California are governed by the state’s one-year personal injury limitations period; for claims arising before Wilson v. Garcia, the earlier expiration under the prior three-year period or the new one-year period controls.

Jackson v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center · filed 1990-05-30

The pre-Wilson statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claim filed in California was three years. ... Under Wilson, this case is controlled by California’s one-year statute of limitations for personal injury. Wilson was decided in April 1985. Since, as stated in Usher, the earlier expiration date is to be applied, Jackson had one year, or until April 1986, to file under the post-Wilson formula. As Jackson filed the action against the hospital after April 1986, the federal civil rights cause of action is time barred.

Section 1983 claims brought in California are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Van Pool v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 1990-12-10

In California, the statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is one year.

Section 1983 claims filed in California are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

No. 90-55774 · filed 1991-08-20

Moreover, well before the time the tolling of the limitations period ended in 1988, Wilson and decisions interpreting it had established that the proper statute of limitations period for § 1983 actions in California was one year.

Section 1983 claims filed in California are governed by the one-year limitations period in Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340(3), rather than the four-year period in § 343.

McDougal v. County of Imperial · filed 1991-08-20

The statute of limitations in § 1983 actions filed in California is § 340(3), not § 343.

Section 1983 claims are subject to California’s statutory tolling period under Government Code § 945.6 when a claimant pursues an administrative claim against a public entity.

Hood v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1992-05-27

Although, under the Supremacy Clause, this policy cannot be served by prohibiting a party from bringing a section 1983 claim, it can be served by tolling the statute of limitations in section 1983 under section § 945.6.

In California, Section 1983 claims are subject to a one-year limitations period, so claims based on incidents more than a year before filing are untimely.

O'Shea v. City of San Francisco · filed 1992-06-08

Plaintiffs concede that, in California, claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 are subject to a one year statute of limitations. Thus, section 1981 and 1983 claims based on incidents occurring prior to November 21, 1988 are untimely.

A Section 1983 complaint alleging an illegal search and seizure in California has a one-year filing period.

Diamond v. John Gutierrez, Officer of the Oakland Police Dept. City of Oakland, California · filed 1992-06-15

The allegedly illegal search and seizure occurred on October 22, 1987, and Diamond had one year to file a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 actions borrow the forum state's personal-injury limitations period and equitable-tolling rules consistent with federal policy, and pursuing state tort claims in California does not toll the limitations period for federal civil rights claims.

Siavash Human v. City of Santa Monica · filed 1993-09-10

Section 1983 actions are governed by the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury torts. ... Whether the statute of limitations is equitably tolled in a section 1983 action is determined by forum state law not inconsistent with federal policy. Bacon v. City of Los Angeles, 843 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir.1988). Under California law, pursuing state tort claims does not toll the statute of limitations on federal civil rights claims.

Equitable tolling of the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim follows forum-state law and ordinarily cannot be resolved at the pleading stage when the complaint alleges facts supporting tolling.

Cervantes v. City of San Diego San Diego Police Department Dennis Sesma Officer Carlos Garcia Les Wardwell Off · filed 1993-09-27

As with the limitations period itself, we borrow our rules for equitable tolling of the period from the forum state, California. ... We hold that ordinarily equitable tolling is not properly resolved at the pleading stage. We conclude that Cervantes’ complaint adequately alleges facts supporting equitable tolling under California law, and reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state's personal-injury limitations period and generally accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Schaefer v. Williams · filed 1993-11-08

Section 1983 actions are governed by the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985); Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 558 (9th Cir.1987). In California, the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions is one year. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340(3); Del Percio v. Thornsley, 877 F.2d 785, 786 (9th Cir.1989). For purposes of this limitations period, a cause of action generally accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. Cline v. Brusett, 661 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir.1981).

Section 1983 actions in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations for liabilities created by statute.

Santora v. Civil Service Commission · filed 1977-04-04

In this jurisdiction, it has been established beyond peradventure that the state statute of limitations applicable to section 1983 actions is the three-year period for actions “to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute” found in section 214(2) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) (McKinney 1972). ... Accordingly, since this action was instituted more than three years after the demotion took place, plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim is time-barred and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 actions brought in federal court in New York are governed by New York CPLR § 214(2), which provides a three-year limitation period.

Jackson v. Alcan Sheet & Plate · filed 1978-10-06

It is well established that New York CPLR § 214(2) governs actions brought in Federal District Court in New York under § 1983.

Section 1983 actions borrow the limitations period for the most similar state cause of action; here, the court applied New York's three-year period.

Fiesel v. Board of Ed. of City of New York · filed 1980-05-28

In determining whether a three or six-year limitation applies here, the court concludes that plaintiff’s interest in prosecuting claims of this nature under § 1983 are sufficiently protected by a three-year limitation and that defendants’ rights to be free from stale claims is best satisfied by application of such a period of limitation.

Section 1983 actions against sheriffs and their deputies are governed by a three-year state statute of limitations rather than New York's one-year limitation for official-capacity actions against sheriffs.

Taylor v. Thomas Mayone, Sheriff of Ulster County, Deputy John Doe and Sergeant John Doe · filed 1980-06-27

Given the facts that (a) the courts have refused to apply § 50-i to bar a § 1983 action, despite its purpose of limiting the municipality’s liability for indemnification, (b) no New York State court has held that § 215(1) may be applied to bar a civil rights action, and (c) the purposes of § 215(1) and § 50-i are indistinguishable, we hold that the appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 actions against sheriffs and their deputies is the three-year provision of CPLR § 214(2) rather than the one-year provision of § 215(1).

A § 1983 action filed in a New York federal district court is subject to New York's three-year limitations period under CPLR § 214(2).

Leonhard v. United States · filed 1980-08-28

As to § 1983 actions, like Bivens -type actions, Congress has not specified a statute of limitations, and again we must look to state law. With respect to § 1983 actions brought in federal district courts in New York, this Court has repeatedly held that the appropriate period is the three-year limitation of CPLR § 214(2).

Section 1983 claims in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations under Section 214(2) of the N.Y.C.P.L.R.

Barcia v. Sitkin · filed 1981-02-06

As to plaintiff’s federal claims, jurisdiction of which is based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000d), it is settled that the applicable statute of limitations is the three-year limitations period contained in Section 214(2), N.Y.C.P.L.R.

Section 1983 suits in New York are subject to the three-year limitations period in New York CPLR § 214(2).

Pauk v. The Board of Trustees of the City University of New York · filed 1981-09-11

Until that happens, we hold that the three-year limitations period of § 214(2) applies to § 1983 suits in New York.

Section 1983 has no federal statute of limitations, so courts borrow the most closely analogous state period; in the Second Circuit, municipal § 1983 actions use New York's three-year period under N.Y.C.P.L.R. 214(2).

Chodos v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 1982-01-04

Jurisdiction for plaintiff’s claim against the New York City Police Department is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There is no federal statute of limitations for a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court has held that in the absence of a federal statute of limitations, the most closely analogous state statute of limitations will be applied. ... The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that the state statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions asserted against individual municipal officers is the three year period found in N.Y.C.P.L.R. 214(2) for actions “to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute.” ... The Second Circuit has also applied by analogy the same three-year period to federal civil rights actions against municipalities.

The three-year limitations period prescribed by New York CPLR § 214(2) applies to suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Whitmore v. City of New York · filed 1982-06-15

It is now settled law in this circuit, and counsel have not argued the contrary, that the three-year limitations period prescribed by New York CPLR § 214(2) for liabilities created or imposed by statute, applies to suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

New York state courts apply CPLR 214(2) as the limitations period for § 1983 actions, the same period applied by federal courts in New York.

Fields v. Board of Higher Education · filed 1983-06-16

Inasmuch as these factually dissimilar appeals present a common issue of law as to the appropriate Statute of Limitations to be applied in a State action brought under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code, we decide them together and hold that the appropriate Statute of Limitations is found in CPLR 214 (subd 2).

New York Section 1983 claims use the state's three-year limitations period for general personal-injury actions rather than the one-year period for specified intentional torts.

Okure v. Owens · filed 1986-01-23

Accordingly, the court holds that the correct limitations period to apply in civil rights actions is New York’s three-year statute of limitations for general personal injury actions, N.Y.Civ.Pract.Law § 214(5).