42 U.S.C. § 1983

All § 1983 claims are characterized as personal-injury actions for selecting the borrowed state statute of limitations.

Wilson v. Garcia · filed 1985-04-17

In view of our holding that § 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the 3-year statute of limitations governing actions “for an injury to the person or reputation of any person.” N. M. Stat. Ann. §37-1-8 (1978). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

A time limit on filing a section 1983 action is not by itself inconsistent with federal law.

Scoggins v. Douglas · filed 1985-04-29

We also note that the mere placing of a time constraint on the filing of a § 1983 action is not a consideration sufficient to find an inconsistency with federal law.

Section 1983 supplies no statute of limitations, so courts apply the most nearly analogous limitations period of the forum state.

Phillips v. Elrod · filed 1985-05-07

Section 1983 does not itself provide a statute of limitations; therefore, such actions are governed by the most nearly parallel statute of limitations of the forum State.

The personal-injury limitations rule announced for section 1983 claims in Wilson v. Garcia does not apply retroactively when prior circuit precedent justified reliance on a different rule.

Winston v. Sanders · filed 1985-06-03

Thus, the history from ... in 1977 to ... in 1985 leans very heavily against the retroactive application of ... and toward its prospective application only.

A § 1983 action borrows the state limitations period for personal-injury actions.

Williams v. Allen · filed 1985-08-26

The applicable statute of limitations in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the state limitations period for personal injury actions.

The personal-injury limitations rule governing Section 1983 actions applies retroactively even when doing so revives a claim defendants reasonably believed was time-barred.

Farmer v. Cook · filed 1986-01-29

Here, the effect of retroactivity is to revive an action that the defendants once reasonably believed was barred. ... the reasoning of our Wycoff opinion therefore requires that Wilson be applied retroactively here, just as it was there.

Section 1983 actions in Idaho are governed by Idaho's two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions.

Henderson v. State · filed 1986-02-27

Since Henderson failed to file his § 1983 claim within two years of that date, as required by I.C. § 5-219(4), it is barred.

Puerto Rico’s one-year tort limitations period governs the time to file a Section 1983 action arising there.

Morales v. Viera · filed 1986-04-02

Pursuant to ... the present 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 cause of action is governed as to the time-for-suit provision by local statute. ... Tort actions in Puerto Rico prescribe or become time barred after one year.

Wilson v. Garcia did not apply retroactively to bar a Section 1983 claim where the plaintiff reasonably relied on clear circuit precedent allowing a longer limitations period and retroactivity would be inequitable.

Ridgway v. Wapello County, Iowa Bud Irwin, Wapello County Sheriff John Smith, Deputy Sheriff and Tom Smith, Deput · filed 1986-07-08

The only issue before us is whether ... should be applied retroactively to bar Ridgway’s section 1983 action. ... After considering each of the ... factors, we agree with the District Court that the facts of this case militate against applying ... retroactively.

Section 1983 actions alleging civil-rights violations or personal injuries borrow the state's statute of limitations for personal-injury actions.

Berndt v. State of Tennessee and Lakeshore Mental Health Institute · filed 1986-07-22

In all actions brought under § 1983 alleging a violation of civil rights or personal injuries, the state statute of limitations governing actions for personal injuries is to be applied.

A Section 1983 claim filed in Puerto Rico is governed by Puerto Rico’s one-year personal-injury limitations period, and alleged misuse of state law by state officials does not by itself establish a federal deprivation actionable under Section 1983.

Dennis v. Figueroa · filed 1986-08-27

Even assuming a well-pleaded 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 cause of action, the complaint is time-barred under the one-year Puerto Rico statute of limitations. ... Mere alleged misuse or disregard of state law by state officials does not constitute a deprivation of plaintiffs’ rights.

Federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations for § 1983 actions, and a generally applicable limitations statute treats those actions nondiscriminatorily.

Bathanazas-Bey v. Prince George's County, Maryland, Individually and in Its Official Capacity · filed 1987-01-16

Federal courts turn to state law for statutes of limitations in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The statute by its terms is generally applicable to actions for which no other limitations period is provided. Hence, it treats § 1983 actions in a nondiscriminatory fashion.

A plaintiff cannot avoid the limitations bar on a § 1983 failure-to-hire claim by invoking a longer period without showing justifiable reliance on clear precedent.

Clyborn v. Smith · filed 1988-04-06

We further conclude the district court correctly determined that plaintiff's claim of failure-to-hire was time-barred. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that at the time he filed his suit there was clear precedent upon which he justifiably relied establishing a longer limitations period for the type of claim brought by plaintiff under Sec. 1983.

A § 1983 claim based on a government act depriving a person of the use of property may remain timely under the continuing wrong theory while state court proceedings continue.

De Botton v. Marple Township · filed 1988-04-22

A continuing wrong theory is available where, as here, an act by a governmental entity actually deprives an individual of use of his property pending court proceedings. ... Accordingly, I hold that Mr. de Botton’s claims are not time-barred.

A Section 1983 action seeking expungement of a conviction can be barred by the statute of limitations.

McDonald v. Thomas Shriver, District Attorney, the State of Tennessee · filed 1988-05-25

This pro se plaintiff appeals the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). In his complaint filed in 1987, the plaintiff sought to have a 1973 conviction expunged from his record due to its alleged unconstitutionality. The district court correctly found that the action was time-barred.

Section 1983 suits may be dismissed as time-barred.

Bishop v. Wicomico County, Maryland, City of Salisbury, Maryland · filed 1988-08-17

A review of the record and the district court's opinion discloses that this appeal from that court's order dismissing Bishop's 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 suits as time-barred is without merit.

The statute of limitations applicable to a § 1983 action is a waivable personal defense that a court may not raise sua sponte.

Fletcher v. City of Memphis Police Dept. · filed 1988-10-19

The district court dismissed the case sua sponte, stating that venue was improper in the Middle District of Tennessee, and that the action was barred by the one year statute of limitations applied to Sec. 1983 cases in Tennessee. ... Furthermore, the grounds relied on by the district court are personal defenses waivable by the defendants, and are accordingly not properly raised sua sponte.

A pending state habeas corpus action does not suspend the limitations period for a § 1983 claim.

Howard v. Bangs · filed 1988-11-15

Finally, the pendency of Howard's state habeas corpus action did not suspend the running of the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico use the one-year limitations period in Puerto Rico’s general tort statute.

Narvaez v. Nazario · filed 1988-12-06

The parties properly agree that the applicable statute of limitations in this case is Puerto Rico’s general tort statute, 31 L.P. R.A. § 5298(2). See Altair Corp. v. Pesquera de Busquets, 769 F.2d 30, 31-32 (1st Cir.1985). It provides for a one-year prescription (limitation) period. ... Therefore, the statute of limitations in this case expired either on January 21, 1987, or on September 1, 1987, and this suit, filed on October 5,1987, is time barred and is therefore DISMISSED.

A complaint under § 1983 may be dismissed when it is filed out of time.

Lawson v. State of Tennessee, Louis Holliday, Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, Tennessee Dept. Of Correct · filed 1989-01-06

Plaintiff filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claiming his first and sixth amendment rights were violated when his appellate attorney telephoned a prison guard and was informed plaintiff had a "hostile demeanor." ... We also agree the complaint was filed out of time.

A § 1983 complaint tendered to the district court with a request to proceed in forma pauperis is filed for limitations purposes when tendered.

Carter v. Larry Lack Harley Seimer Larry Woodlee Kevin Butler · filed 1989-02-13

For purposes of compliance with the statute of limitations, a complaint is deemed to have been filed when it is tendered in the district court with a request for pauper status.

A claim under § 1983 is barred if it is brought after the applicable limitations period.

Minto v. County of Suffolk · filed 1989-03-13

...violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, the claim is untimely (see, Giovannetti v Dormitory Auth., 115 AD2d 851, affd 69 NY2d 621).

In Mississippi, the later six-year limitations rule for Section 1983 claims does not retroactively revive claims already barred under the prior one-year rule.

Johnson v. Madison County, Miss. · filed 1989-05-17

Examination of these three Chevron Oil factors verifies the propriety of non-retroactive application of Owens under the circumstances of the case at bar. The Court therefore holds that the governing precedent of the Fifth Circuit as it existed at the time this action was begun is properly applied here. Accordingly, Johnson had until April 17, 1986, to file any Section 1983 claims for violation of his constitutional rights that he alleges to have occurred in January, February and March of 1985.

Section 1983 claims use state statutes of limitations to determine timeliness.

Howell v. Stephen Norris, Mike Dutton, Aileene Love · filed 1989-06-15

For the purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, state statutes of limitations apply to determine the timeliness of the claims.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Stengel v. City of Columbus · filed 1989-07-29

The statute of limitations in a § 1983 claim is two years.

A Section 1983 claim is barred when it is filed after the applicable limitations period.

Lett v. Officer Hale, Camp 16, Virginia Department of Corrections · filed 1989-08-14

Regarding claim (1), we note that the claim arose out of events allegedly occurring on April 10, 1985 and that Lett did not execute his Sec. 1983 complaint until April 28, 1988. This delay bars Lett's claim.

Section 1983 claims are barred when brought outside the applicable limitations period.

Dillman v. CCB, Dept. of Corrections · filed 1989-09-18

Dillman complains about events that occurred between 1975 and 1982. Consideration of these claims is time-barred.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a limitations period that can bar claims based on events too long before suit.

Holsey v. Cauffman · filed 1989-09-25

Aaron Holsey appeals the entry of judgment pursuant to a jury verdict in the trial of his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 actions. ... The district court correctly dismissed as time-barred, early in the course of this lawsuit, Holsey's allegation concerning an event in 1975.

A Section 1983 procedural due process claim is barred when the statute of limitations has run.

Gant v. Otie Jones, Warden Fowler, Lt. Sweat, Sgt. · filed 1989-10-20

Jonah L. Gant, a Tennessee prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the judgment of the district court dismissing his cause of action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Gant's complaint that he was denied procedural due process is barred by the statute of limitations.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim is not dismissed as time barred when the alleged conspiracy continues through pursuit of a pending lawsuit.

Nilsson v. Ruppert, Bronson & Chicarelli Co. · filed 1989-10-30

We decline to dismiss on these grounds because Nilsson, in his complaint, has alleged an on-going conspiracy involving the state suit brought by the defendants. Thus, the pursuit of the still-pending action is itself an act of furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.

A § 1983 claim dismissed as untimely under Higley must be reconsidered after Hardin rejected Higley’s limitations rule.

Owsley v. Sims · filed 1989-11-21

Plaintiffs James and Shirley Owsley filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983 and 1985 against the named defendants in connection with the alleged improper searches of plaintiffs' automobile and residence on or about March 23, 1984. The district court ultimately dismissed the action as time-barred and the instant appeal followed. ... The district court understandably relied on our decision in Higley v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 835 F.2d 623 (6th Cir.1987), in finding the case at bar to be out of time. Subsequent to the district court's decision, however, the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected Higley 's holding. Hardin v. Straub, 109 S.Ct. 1998 (1989). We must therefore remand the case, insofar as it relates to James Owsley, for further proceedings.

Section 1983 liability must rest on conduct within the applicable limitations period; earlier events may provide context.

Clark v. Township of Falls · filed 1989-11-22

The trial court did permit testimony concerning events prior to May 3, 1986 to be admitted into evidence in order to show context, motive, and pattern. In determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, however, we must focus on conduct that took place from May 3, 1986, the beginning of the applicable statute of limitations period.

A § 1983 claim alleging an on-going conspiracy involving a pending state suit can avoid dismissal on statute of limitations grounds.

Nilsson v. Ruppert, Bronson & Chicarelli Co. · filed 1989-12-01

We decline to dismiss on these grounds because Nilsson, in his complaint, has alleged an on-going conspiracy involving the state suit brought by the defendants.

A § 1983 claim added after the limitations period does not relate back when it rests on a different general set of facts from the original complaint.

Newton v. County of Napa · filed 1990-02-14

Although the question is close, we conclude that the cause of action under § 1983 is based on a different general set of facts from the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress and therefore is barred by the one-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.

A two-year statute of limitations applies to a Section 1983 claim.

Shrader v. Hopkins · filed 1990-04-09

The trial court properly applied a two-year statute of limitation to the 42 USC § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 complaint filed within the applicable two-year limitations period is timely.

Nichols v. McDonald · filed 1990-05-08

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint was timely filed on July 10, 1987, within the two year statute of limitations and overrules defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on that ground.

Section 1983 employment dismissal claims in Puerto Rico are subject to a one-year limitations period measured from notice of dismissal.

Merced v. Hernandez Colon · filed 1990-06-20

Because plaintiff Garcia did not file his action within a year of notification, his section 1983 action is untimely and is hereby DISMISSED.

A defendant in a § 1983 action may raise a statute-of-limitations defense on remand when no answer has yet been filed and the case has reached only the dismissal stage.

Amanda Meador, Serah Meador, and Tabetha Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, Marian McKinney and John Hoyle · filed 1990-06-21

Kentucky law specifies that actions involving personal injury be filed within one year of the accrual of the cause of action. Because the complaint here was filed over two years later, the defendants could argue that the complaint is time-barred. We hold that the statute of limitations remains available as an affirmative defense upon remand because an answer had not yet been filed by the Cabinet; the case had only reached the dismissal stage.

Section 1983 claims in Washington are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Douchette v. Bethel School District No. 403 · filed 1990-08-14

... the 3-year statute of limitations applies to "Section 1983" (42 U.S.C. § 1983) claims in Washington.

Section 1983 actions filed in Puerto Rico are subject to the one-year statute of limitations for intentional torts.

Navedo v. Acevedo · filed 1990-11-30

In Puerto Rico the proper statute of limitations to be applied to a section 1983 action is the one-year statute for intentional torts.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Transport Workers Union v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1991-03-15

The applicable limitations period for plaintiffs § 1983 claims is two years.

A prisoner seeking § 1983 damages for miscalculated sentence credits must file within the limitations period even if the damages action must await habeas proceedings.

Neal v. Hargrave · filed 1991-04-17

To preserve his rights against a defense of the statute of limitations, a plaintiff in the situation of Mr. Neal must timely file his action for damages notwithstanding the fact that he will not be able to proceed with the action for damages until he has litigated the habeas corpus claim in all the necessary courts.

The limitations period for a § 1983 action is determined by borrowing the state law governing an analogous cause of action.

DePoel v. City of New York · filed 1991-08-07

The statute of limitations in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is determined by borrowing the state law governing an analogous cause of action.

For a Section 1983 takings claim challenging an ordinance, the limitations period begins when the ordinance is enacted.

Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1991-11-01

The limitations period for takings claims brought under section 1983 begins to run the date the challenged ordinance is enacted.

Section 1983 actions use the applicable state statute of limitations.

Clements v. Airport Authority · filed 1991-12-11

The federal court relies on the applicable state law statute of limitations in § 1983 actions.

A § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim is subject to the two-year statute of limitations for tort claims.

Dove v. Boseman · filed 1991-12-30

Although the Fourth Amendment claim is not barred by res judicata, it is barred by the two-year statute of limitations for tort claims.

The limitations period for a Section 1983 claim challenging forfeiture of good time credits runs after the prisoner learns of the forfeiture.

Adair v. Lewis · filed 1992-01-13

The district court correctly found that Adair learned of both forfeitures shortly after they occurred and the statute of limitations had run for both forfeitures.

Section 1983 claims filed in Puerto Rico use the one-year limitations period for tort claims.

Coreano v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority · filed 1992-03-30

In Puerto Rico, the appropriate statute of limitations to apply to Section 1983 actions is the one-year prescription for tort claims contained in Article 1868, 31 L.P.R.A. § 5298(2).

An unexplained assertion of fraud does not toll the limitations period for a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff gives no rational account of how the fraud prevented discovery of the alleged constitutional violations.

Ledoux v. Steven J. Davies, Secretary of Corrections Raymond Roberts, Warden Robert D. Hannigan, Warden, Hutchinso · filed 1992-04-24

On the limitations issue, Plaintiff contends on appeal that he did not discover the fraud until April 1991; therefore, the statute of limitations is tolled until this time. However, Plaintiff offers no rational argument as to the nature of the fraud and how it inhibited him from discovering the constitutional violations he now alleges.

Section 1983 does not require states to toll the limitations period for prisoners’ suits until they are released from custody.

Johnson v. Michael P. Lane, Marjorie Donahue and Lyle Ahrens · filed 1992-05-11

Johnson argues that Hardin mandates the tolling of a statute of limitations for suits brought by prisoners until they are released from custody. We disagree with this characterization. Instead, the Supreme Court's decision allows the individual states to determine the appropriate tolling provisions. While the Court upheld Michigan's statute, it explicitly recognized that state legislatures may choose not to enact tolling provisions affecting prisoners.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico borrow the one-year limitations period for personal tort actions.

Del Torro v. United States · filed 1992-05-21

Since § 1983 and Bivens actions are devoid of a specific limitations period, courts must borrow the state limitations period for personal tort actions — in this case, a period of one year as provided by Article 1868 of the Civil Code.

Section 1983 actions use the statute of limitations of the state where the claim arises.

Smith v. Alameda County Sheriff Dept. Hayward Police Chief Hayward Police Dept. Hoover Charles B. Plumme · filed 1992-06-18

Federal courts apply the statute of limitations of the state in which the claim arises for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.

A § 1983 wrongful discharge claim accrues when the employee receives notice of dismissal, and Puerto Rico’s one-year limitations period expires on the anniversary of accrual.

Conde v. Beltrán Peña · filed 1992-06-23

Plaintiffs claims accrued on July 30, 1990, when he was notified of his dismissal, contrary to his contention that his claims accrued on July 31, 1990, the day his dismissal became effective. ... Conde’s section 1983 claims accrued on July 30, 1990. Excluding the first day of the accrual of Conde’s claims pursuant to either section 388 of the Political Code of Puerto Rico or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a), plaintiff had until July 30, 1991, to file the complaint.

A Section 1983 claim challenging the adequacy of a postrecoupment hearing is not tolled by an optional state administrative hearing; the claim can be brought when the plaintiff receives notice of the recoupment.

Williams v. King · filed 1992-07-15

Here, the plaintiff’s application to DSS for a fair hearing was by no means a “jurisdictional prerequisite” to his challenge under Section 1983 of the due process adequacy of a postrecoupment hearing; indeed, he could have brought this claim the day he received notice from the HRA that part of his SSI award had been withheld. Accordingly, the claim against the defendants Vesely and Presser as to the constitutionality of post-recoupment hearings was untimely filed and is now barred.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state statute of limitations and its corresponding tolling rules because the section supplies no federal limitations period.

Carr v. Aubuchon · filed 1992-07-15

Because no federal statute of limitations governs actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the timeliness of such a suit is to be determined by the "state statute of limitations and the coordinate tolling rules." Board of Regents, University of New York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980); see also Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 109 S.Ct. 1998, 104 L.Ed.2d 582 (1989) (the tolling rules federal courts are required to apply include those which suspend limitations periods for prisoners and other persons with legal disabilities).

A § 1983 claim based on a continuing constitutional violation accrues anew each day the violation continues.

Gonzales v. North Tp. of Lake County · filed 1992-07-28

Appleman is correct that his action is not barred by the Indiana statute of limitations. Appleman alleges a continuing violation of the First Amendment, and as each day there is a violation, each day his cause of action accrues.

A Section 1983 claim based on an employment transfer is time-barred when later, separated acts do not make the transfer part of a continuing violation.

Selan v. Kiley · filed 1992-08-04

Even if each of the acts alleged was discriminatory or retaliatory, they were not part of a continuing violation. Thus, the district court was correct to grant the defendants partial summary judgment; the claims stemming from the May 1985 transfer/demotion were timebarred.

In a § 1983 conspiracy suit, acts outside the limitations period may serve as evidence of timely overt acts, but damages cannot be recovered for the earlier acts.

Mary Turner A/K/A Mary Turner Hind v. Upton County, Texas and Glenn Willeford, Individually, Etc. · filed 1992-09-02

Turner cannot recover for damages arising from any acts Sheriff Willeford committed before that date, but the statute of limitations does not preclude the jury from considering those events as evidence in support of its verdict that Sheriff Willeford committed overt acts in furtherance of the scheme after December 8, 1986, thereby violating Turner’s due process rights.

A Section 1983 false arrest claim arising in Illinois is barred if filed more than two years after the arrest.

Albright v. Oliver · filed 1992-09-14

But Kevin Albright filed his suit more than two years after his arrest, so his constitutional claim of false arrest was barred by the statute of limitations.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Emory v. Logan · filed 1992-09-18

The statute of limitations begins to run on a § 1983 action when plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.”

A Section 1983 claim may be tolled under California law when the plaintiff was imprisoned when the cause of action accrued, and dismissal as time barred is improper if the pleadings may establish that tolling.

Joseph v. Joseph Asencio Leonard Myers · filed 1992-09-18

Under Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 352(a)(3), the statute of limitations is tolled if the plaintiff is in prison when the cause of action accrues. ... These allegations may permit Joseph to amend his complaint to show that the statute of limitations was tolled during the term of his incarceration. See Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 352(a)(3); Venegas, 704 F.2d at 1146. Thus, the district court erred in dismissing Joseph's action as time barred.

Section 1983 claims brought in the federal district court of Puerto Rico have a one-year statute of limitations.

Rosario v. Lebron · filed 1992-09-24

The statute of limitations for section 1983 cases brought in the federal district court of Puerto Rico is one year.

Section 1983 wrongful-termination claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period, and pursuing state remedies does not toll that period without an applicable tolling basis.

Coleman v. O'GRADY · filed 1992-10-06

As mentioned, the applicable statute of limitations period for § 1983 wrongful termination actions is two years. ... No federal rule or policy prohibited Coleman from instituting the present action within the applicable two-year limitation period, and Coleman has not presented any state laws or overriding federal interests in support for his tolling theory.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

Shafford v. Chicago Board of Education · filed 1992-10-08

Three of the claims, those under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, are governed by Illinois' two-year statute of limitations, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, § 13-202.

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Anderson v. City of Chicago · filed 1992-10-13

Farrell v. McDonough, 966 F.2d 279 (7th Cir.1992) has once again reconfirmed that Section 1983 cases arising in Illinois are subject to the two-year limitations period contained in Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, ¶ 13-202. ... Because Anderson cannot take advantage of the Illinois fraudulent concealment doctrine, his claim remains time-barred.

An assignment of underlying rights does not revive a § 1983 claim that was already barred by the statute of limitations.

Baker v. Associates · filed 1992-10-26

Because CIT could not assign to plaintiff greater rights in the leasehold than it had itself, plaintiffs § 1983 and RPAPL § 853 claims are time-barred.

Section 1983 claims arising in California are governed by California’s one-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Nuno v. City of Calexico · filed 1992-11-03

California's one year statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985.

Section 1983 claims use the state general or residual personal injury limitations period, which was one year in California.

Jeunehomme v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1992-12-01

Section 1983 actions are to be characterized as personal injury actions for statute of limitations purposes and the state's general or residual personal injury statute of limitations applies. ... In California, the applicable statute of limitations is Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340(3), which provides for a limitations period of one year from the date the cause of action accrues.

For § 1983 claims in Washington, imprisonment tolling ends upon release and is not reinstated by later reincarceration.

Beagle v. State of Wash., Dept. of Corrections · filed 1992-12-14

A plaintiff's disability of imprisonment ceases when he is released, see Bagley, 923 F.2d at 762, and is not reinstated by subsequent reincarceration, cf. Boag v. Chief of Police, City of Portland, 669 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir.) (construing similar Oregon statute), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982).

Section 1983 borrows the personal injury limitations period of the state where the claim arises; in California, that period is one year.

Erwin v. City of Angels Camp, City Council & Planning Commission · filed 1992-12-14

Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations. McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir.1991). Consequently, we apply the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state in which the claim arises. Id. The California statute of limitations for a personal injury action is one year. Id.

A Section 1983 complaint in New Hampshire is subject to a three-year limitations period unless there is a basis for tolling.

Solomon v. Labbe · filed 1992-12-29

We have reviewed the record and the appellant's briefs on appeal and are persuaded that this action is indeed time-barred and that there is no basis for tolling the applicable three-year limitation period.

Section 1983 claims in Colorado are subject to the six-year statute of limitations when the applicable state limitations periods include two and six years.

Brogan v. Wiggins School District · filed 1978-12-13

Section 1983, however, is somewhat broader. Nevertheless, since it seeks to protect fundamental rights and inasmuch as there would appear to be a choice between the two-year and six-year statute, the latter would seem proper, and, therefore, we approve the use of the six-year statute by the trial court here.

Section 1983 claims in Colorado are governed by the state’s two year residual limitations period.

Arvia v. Black · filed 1989-10-12

I conclude therefore that § 13-80-102(1)(i), Colorado’s two year residual statute, is best suited to govern actions that confer a general remedy for injuries to personal rights. I further conclude that this section applies to civil rights actions predicated on § 1983.

Section 1983 actions in Colorado are governed by the state’s residual statute of limitations.

Riel v. Reed · filed 1991-03-26

Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by Colorado’s residual statute of limitations, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13—80—102(l)(i) (1987).

Section 1983 claims brought in Colorado are governed by the state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations.

Jesusdaughter v. Mesa County Department of Social Services Mesa County Sheriff's Department Mesa County Police · filed 1992-10-16

The applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Colorado, which has multiple statutory provisions governing various personal injury actions, is the residuary statute of limitations now codified at Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(i) (1987) (formerly § 13-80-108(1)(b) (1973)).

Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period and accrue when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the rights violation.

Herbert v. Reinstein · filed 1997-08-22

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years. ... A § 1983 cause of action accrues on the date when a plaintiff knew or should have known his or her rights had been violated.

In Indiana, a § 1983 claim for improper arrest has a two-year limitations period and accrues at the time of arrest.

Kelley v. Mark Myler, Gene Patrick, Ralph Bell and Hurricane Foods, Inc. · filed 1998-07-13

This Court has held that the two-year Indiana statute of limitations for personal injuries applies to § 1983 claims, and that a cause of action under § 1983 for improper arrest accrues at the time of the arrest. ... Because Kelley’s arrest occurred on April 4,1994, and Kelley did not file her complaint until September 20, 1996, more than five months after the expiration of the statute of limitations, her claim is time barred, and summary judgment was properly entered against her.

Federal law determines when a § 1983 claim accrues, while state law supplies the limitations period and tolling rules.

Hatch v. Jerry D. Gilmore and Marlene Guthrie · filed 1998-08-10

Federal law determines when a § 1983 claim accrues; state law determines the period of limitations and governs if questions of tolling arise.

An EEOC charge asserting only ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims does not toll the limitations period for a § 1983 First Amendment claim.

Sifre v. Department of Health · filed 1999-03-31

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ filing of charges with the EEOC cannot serve to toll the limitations period of their § 1983 claims, and therefore, the § 1983 claims are time-barred.

Section 1983 claims use state limitations and tolling rules; in Louisiana, the limitations period is tolled while a prisoner exhausts required administrative remedies.

Harris v. Hegmann · filed 1999-12-08

Federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations to govern claims brought under section 1983. ... While Harris pursued his administrative remedies from October 24, 1996, to July 14, 1997, the prescriptive period was tolled.

The limitations period for a Section 1983 false arrest claim begins on the date of arrest, rather than the date of a later state court adjudication.

Perry, Rixson M. v. Sullivan, John · filed 2000-03-14

The statute of limitations on a sec. 1983 complaint begins to run on the date of the arrest, rather than the date of the subsequent state court adjudication.

For a § 1983 claim filed in Iowa, the limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the allegedly wrongful act.

Richmond v. Clinton County, Iowa · filed 2003-08-01

This accrual rule applies to Richmond’s inverse condemnation and emotional distress claims, both of which are state law claims, as well as to his equal protection claim that he filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).

Section 1983 claims accrue when plaintiffs know or have reason to know of their injury; a defendant’s departure from office starts the limitations period only if plaintiffs had that knowledge then.

Hughlett v. Romer-Sensky · filed 2004-03-04

There is no dispute either that the § 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, or that a claim accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis for the lawsuit. ... We agree with plaintiffs that it was not the departure of Tompkins that commenced the limitations period unless at that point plaintiffs knew or had reason to know of the injuries that were the basis of their claims.

For Section 1983 actions arising in Oregon, the applicable limitations period is six years under Oregon's statute of limitations for liabilities created by statute.

Clark v. Musick · filed 1980-07-10

We believe this approach is proper under Oregon law as well and conclude that the applicable period of limitations for these Section 1983 actions is six years under O.R.S. 12.080(2).

Section 1983 claims are subject to the state limitations scheme specifically enacted for them, even if the state treats § 1981 claims differently.

Kosikowski v. Bourne · filed 1981-09-28

... The earlier cases, however, did not deal with Or.Rev.Stat. § 30.265(1). Accordingly, the earlier “common law” treatment of the problem of borrowing state statutes of limitations is irrelevant when the state has enacted a specific statute expressly dealing with the limitations question before this court. Accordingly, Plummer v. Western Inter. Hotels Co., Inc., 656 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1981), which deals with actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, does not control a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Even though both logic and legislative symmetry would seem to commend to the Oregon State Legislative Assembly a limitations scheme treating both kinds of cases equally, we are not at liberty to make that choice for the State of Oregon. The state legislative expressed its intent with reference to § 1983 actions and did not express its intent with reference to § 1981 actions. This court, under its duty to follow its own precedents until contrary legislative signals appear, must treat the two statutes differently in those states which have chosen to treat them differently for limitation purposes.

Section 1983 actions in Oregon are subject to the two-year statute of limitations in Or.Rev.Stat. § 30.275(3).

Holly Hall Kosikowski v. Bourne · filed 1981-12-02

The Oregon Tort Claims Act two-year statute of limitations, Or.Rev.Stat. § 30.275(3), applies to § 1983 actions, and therefore both complaints were time-barred.

Section 1983 actions in Oregon borrow the state's two-year personal-injury limitations period.

Allen v. Gresham Police Department · filed 1993-11-08

Section 1983 actions are governed by the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). Thus, Oregon's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to Allen's action.

Section 1983 actions borrow the state limitations period applicable to the analogous cause of action because federal law supplies no limitations period.

Billy J. Leggett and Geraldine Leggett, Parents of Kenneth Wayne Leggett, Deceased v. Strickland · filed 1981-03-27

Federal law does not supply a federal Statute of Limitations for Section 1983 claims. ... Thus, in a Section 1983 action, a federal court will borrow the state Statute of Limitations applicable to an analogous cause of action. In this case, the analogous cause of action is an action for wrongful death, and the applicable Statute of Limitations is Georgia Code § 3-1004.

Section 1983 supplies no limitations period, so courts borrow the forum state's limitations period that applies to analogous claims.

McMillian v. City of Rockmart, Buddy Cagle and Lee Hayes · filed 1981-08-06

It is well established that when Congress has provided no period of limitation, as here for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal court must use the applicable statute of limitations from the state in which it sits. ... The court must first determine the essential nature of the federal claim before it, and then look to state law in order to determine which state statute is applicable to claims similar to the one before the court. ... Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not fall within the Georgia statutory language providing for enforcement of rights accruing under statutes, then, the district court was correct in applying Georgia’s two-year period of limitations covering actions based on personal injury.

A Section 1983 racial-employment-discrimination claim against a Georgia state official is governed by a 180-day limitations period.

Champion v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation · filed 1983-08-10

Under this 180 day limitations period, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim expired in January, 1981.

Georgia’s two-year personal-injury limitations period governs all Section 1983 claims and applies retroactively where prior precedent did not clearly establish a longer limitations period for an analogous claim.

Homer Williams and Mrs. Faye Williams v. City of Atlanta · filed 1986-08-15

the proper limitations period for all section 1983 claims in Georgia is the two year period set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 for personal injuries. ... Because of the lack of precedential case law, any reliance on prior doctrine was unreasonable; thus it is not unfair to apply the new doctrine retroactively.

Section 1983 claims brought in Georgia are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Banks v. Commander of Detachment 1, First Battalion (M) of the 121st Infantry · filed 1992-09-09

Plaintiffs’ claim was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a two-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims brought in Georgia.

Section 1983 claims in Georgia are subject to the two-year personal injury limitations period, regardless of the type of underlying claim.

Day v. Brown · filed 1993-01-19

Thus, whether the 42 USC § 1983 action is based on a personal injury claim, a claim of conversion, or any other type of claim, the applicable limitation period is the two-year period for personal injury set out in OCGA § 9-3-33.

A Section 1983 action is timely when the court clerk receives the complaint within the borrowed state personal-injury limitations period, even if formal filing occurs later.

Wendell A. Martin and Vanessa Faciane v. Demma · filed 1987-10-28

Because Martin and Faciane assert a claim under section 1983 of Title 42, United States Code, the Louisiana statute of limitations governing personal injury actions applies. ... In federal cases, filing a complaint with the court commences an action and tolls the applicable statute of limitations. ... Receipt of the complaint by the court clerk, rather than formal filing, determines the time of filing.

When § 1983 has no federal limitations period, the court applies Louisiana's limitations period for the most analogous state-law claim.

Humble v. Percy Foreman, Attorney-At-Law · filed 1977-11-23

Even if there initially were a claim, it has been lost via expiration of time. Because Congress has not provided a statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, the applicable statute of limitations is that which the Louisiana courts would apply if suit for similar relief had been brought in state court.

Section 1983 claims borrow the applicable state-law limitations period; here, Louisiana's one-year period governed the procedural due process claim.

Jones v. Orleans Parish School Board · filed 1982-10-04

Reconsideration of our holding with respect to the applicable prescription period of the § 1983 claim under the Louisiana statutes convinces us that the one-year prescriptive period of art. 3536 is applicable to the 1983 due process claim as well.

A § 1983 claim in Louisiana borrows the state's one-year limitations period for personal-injury actions.

Vanderwall v. Horner · filed 1986-05-23

He correctly points out that the time for filing a federal civil rights claim is governed by the local statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... In Louisiana, the local statute provides for a limitations period of one year.

Section 1983 claims in Louisiana are subject to the state’s one-year tort limitations period; a prior suit dismissed for failure to prosecute does not interrupt that period under Louisiana law.

Nagle v. Lee · filed 1988-05-16

This suit involves a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a result of an alleged arrest and beating occurring on February 15,1983. ... There is no dispute that Nagle’s cause of action accrued on February 15, 1983 and that the applicable statute of limitations is Louisiana’s one-year period for tort suits. ... Therefore, under Article 3463, interruption is considered never to have occurred so that when Nagle’s original suit was dismissed, his claims against Laura and Montecino prescribed.

Louisiana's limitations period for a § 1983 damages claim based on withheld exculpatory evidence is tolled while required exhaustion of state habeas remedies legally prevents prosecution of the claim.

Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany · filed 1993-07-26

Louisiana's liberative prescription period was tolled because Burge faced a legal impediment which precluded him from prosecuting his federal civil rights action. His § 1983 and 1985 claims were, therefore, timely filed.

The limitations period for a § 1983 damages claim governed by Louisiana law is tolled while exhaustion of state habeas remedies legally prevents prosecution of the claim.

Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany · filed 1993-09-22

Louisiana’s liberative prescription period was tolled because Burge faced a legal impediment which precluded him from prosecuting his federal civil rights action. His § 1983 and 1985 claims were, therefore, timely filed.

A § 1983 claim challenging a license suspension accrues upon notice of the suspension, is subject in Louisiana to a one-year limitations period, and is neither renewed by each day of suspension nor tolled by state-court appeals.

Brossette v. City of Baton Rouge · filed 1993-10-14

The limitations period applicable to Brossette’s § 1983 claim is the one-year prescriptive period set forth in Article 3492 of the Louisiana Civil Code. ... Brossette’s cause of action arose on June 2, 1989, the date he received notice of the suspension of his license. ... Each day of the suspension ordered by the Board does not constitute a “separate act.” Thus, Brossette’s cause of action accrued on June 2, 1989. ... The prescriptive period was neither interrupted nor tolled by Brossette’s appeals to the state courts for a review of the ABCB’s decision.

Section 1983 does not specify a limitations period, so courts borrow the most analogous state statute of limitations; for this Arkansas remedial statutory action, the applicable period was three years.

Otis H. Reed, Jr. v. Terrell Don Hutto, Commissioner of Correction, State of Arkansas, A. L. Lockhart, Superintendent, Etc. · filed 1973-10-23

Since the statute under which this action was brought, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, does not provide for any period of limitation for the bringing of an action, we must look to the most analogous state statute of limitations. ... Accordingly, we hold the action barred by the applicable Arkansas three-year statute of limitations and affirm the district court.

Section 1983 provides no federally specified limitations period, so the most analogous limitations period from the relevant state's law applies; here, the court held that Arkansas's three-year period governs because § 1983 enforces a liability created by statute.

17 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1790, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 7811 Irma Clark v. Mann · filed 1977-08-31

Federal law does not provide a specified limitations period for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The timeliness of such actions is determined by applying the most analogous limitations provision of the law of the relevant state, which, in the instant case, is Arkansas. ... Since a § 1983 action is one to enforce a liability created by statute, we do find an analogy between the instant case and actions governed by § 37-206. ... We hold that the appropriate period of limitations is three years.

Section 1983 uses the state limitations period most analogous to the claim, including applicable state-law saving-statute rules.

Whittle v. Delter Wiseman, Individually and in His Official Capacity and Mary Lawhorne, Individually and i · filed 1982-04-16

However, we have not heretofore held, as we now do, that in applying § 37-206 to civil rights actions, we recognize decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court regarding the applicability of the saving statute to claims subject to the three-year limitation as we have in contexts other than civil rights litigation.

Section 1983 actions brought in Arkansas are governed by the three-year general personal-injury statute of limitations.

No. 91-3234 · filed 1992-09-02

In Arkansas, the general personal-injury statute of limitations is three years, and this period therefore governs § 1983 actions brought in that state.

Section 1983 claims arising in Arkansas are governed by the state’s three-year general personal-injury statute of limitations.

Ketchum v. City of West Memphis · filed 1992-09-02

In Arkansas, the general personal-injury statute of limitations is three years, and this period therefore governs § 1983 actions brought in that state.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so courts borrow the applicable state limitations period; here, Alabama's one-year period governed.

Williams v. City of Montgomery · filed 1982-10-19

Since these sections do not contain any limitations period for filing claims, a court, in considering limitations challenges under these sections, must look to applicable state law; and, further, the Alabama limitations statute applicable to claims brought under these sections is, as the defendants contend, § 6-2-39, Code of Alabama 1975, which contains a one-year limitations period.

A § 1983 wrongful death claim in Alabama is subject to the two-year period in Alabama’s Wrongful Death Act.

Long v. Hodges · filed 1989-01-13

The 2-year period allowed by § 6-5-410 is not so short as to frustrate the claimant’s exercise of a § 1983 right of action.

Section 1983 actions seeking remedies for constitutional deprivations connected with admission to the Alabama State Bar must be brought within two years of the deprivation; this limit applies prospectively.

Ex Parte Grubbs · filed 1989-03-03

In Alabama, the general or residual statute of limitations for personal injury is two years. Therefore, all actions for money damages or other remedies for the deprivation of a constitutional right in connection with admission to the State Bar must be commenced within two years from the deprivation of such right. The United States Supreme Court had not released Owens v. Okure, supra, and this Court had not set this time-bar prior to the commencement of this proceeding; therefore, we will not hold that Grubbs's action is time-barred by this two-year statute of limitations, which shall, in cases of this kind, have prospective application only.

Section 1983 claims filed against municipalities in Alabama state court are not subject to Alabama’s municipal nonclaim provision.

Morrow v. Town of Littleville · filed 1991-02-15

In light of the United States Supreme Court's holdings in Wilson v. Garcia, supra , and Owens v. Okure, supra , we hereby overrule Stewart v. City of Northport, supra , to the extent that it stands for the proposition that § 11-47-23 is applicable to a § 1983 claim filed in a state court in Alabama against a municipality.

A newly announced two-year limitations period for Alabama § 1983 actions does not retroactively bar a claim filed while the circuit applied a six-year period.

Anna Kendrick, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Cross-Appellee v. Jefferson County Board of · filed 1991-06-06

Moreover, applying the test for retroactivity announced in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355-56, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), we conclude that Owens should not be applied retroactively in this case to create a shorter limitations period which would bar Kendrick’s claim.

For an Alabama Section 1983 claim, the later two-year limitations rule does not apply retroactively when doing so would unfairly bar a claim filed in reliance on the earlier six-year rule.

McKissick v. Donald Busby City of Millbrook, Alabama James Owens Arvil Minor Walter Hubbard · filed 1991-07-22

Because Owens’s two-year statute of limitations was in effect at the time McKis-sick filed his complaint, McKissick’s claim is timely only if the holding in Owens is not applied retroactively to his case, and the Jones I six-year limitation period is applied instead. ... We conclude that Owens does not retroactively bar McKissick’s claim.

In Alabama, a § 1983 action is subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Holland v. Barton · filed 1992-05-29

The statute of limitations for an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is two years.

Section 1983 actions commenced in Alabama are subject to the two-year limitations period in Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l).

Woods v. Reeves · filed 1993-10-29

Reeves contends that such claims are subject to the two-year limitations period set forth in Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-38( l ), and, he insists, because more than two years elapsed between the time of the seizure of the currency and the filing of this action, the damages claims are barred. We agree. See Morrow v. Town of Littleville, 576 So.2d 210, 215 (Ala.1991) (all § 1983 actions commenced in Alabama are subject to the two-year limitations period set forth in § 6-2-38( l )). Therefore, the judgment of the trial court, to the extent that it precludes damages, is affirmed.

For a § 1983 claim based on unlawful arrest and imprisonment in Minnesota, the state’s two-year statute of limitations for false imprisonment governs.

Zaun v. Halpern · filed 1974-10-22

In the instant action, plaintiff’s allegation that he was deprived of his civil rights by an unlawful arrest and imprisonment most closely resembles an action under state law for false imprisonment. Therefore, it is the Minnesota statute which governs the timeliness of false imprisonment actions which “best speaks to the general type of wrong and conduct sought to be prevented and deterred by” § 1983. Savage v. United States, supra 450 F.2d at 451. An action for false imprisonment in Minnesota must be commenced within two years of the accrual of the claim. Minn.Stat.Ann. § 541.07(1). Here, plaintiff’s cause of action accrued no later than May 19, 1970, the date of his release from custody; plaintiff filed his complaint on May 21, 1973. Accordingly, the action is barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

For a § 1983 claim alleging conduct that may also constitute a state tort, the limitations period for the underlying state tort does not apply; the applicable state period is instead the one for statutory liabilities.

Occhino v. United States of America · filed 1982-08-25

Under the rationale of Garmon, the federal cause of action should not be foreclosed by a limitations period directed at the alleged underlying tortious conduct. ... Minnesota's six-year statute of limitations clearly would apply, were appellant today to file his § 1983 action based on a cause that accrued subsequent to our decision in Garmon. ... Applying Garmon retroactively, we hold that appellant's claim is not time barred.

The two-year Minnesota personal-injury limitations period may apply retroactively to a section 1983 plaintiff who failed to sue within a reasonable time after Wilson v. Garcia.

Richard H. v. Clay County, Minn. · filed 1986-07-02

Because plaintiff did not file within a reasonable period after ... Wilson, ... the court finds that it is not harsh or unjust to apply the two-year statute retroactively.

Section 1983 actions in Virginia were subject to a two-year statute of limitations because the one-year special limitation was an unconstitutional burden on a federally created right.

Brady v. Sowers · filed 1978-06-12

Since Section 8-24 has been held to be an unconstitutional burden on the assertion of a federally created right, this court finds that at the time that plaintiff’s cause of action arose, the two-year statute of limitations was applicable.

A § 1983 complaint received with an in forma pauperis request within Virginia’s two-year limitations period is not barred by that period.

Freeman v. R.A. Wright, Thomas G. Meador, Karl W. Gunther · filed 1988-11-02

The district court held, as an alternate ground for dismissing the complaint, that Freeman's complaint was barred by Virginia's two year statute of limitations, since the arrest and search complained of took place on November 2, 1985 and the complaint was not filed until December 14, 1987. However, we note that Freeman's complaint, together with his request to proceed in forma pauperis, was actually received by the district court on October 30, 1987. Consequently, this ruling was in error.

A § 1983 claim for overlong confinement brought in Virginia is subject to a two-year limitations period that begins no later than the plaintiff’s release.

Golson v. Department of Corrections · filed 1990-11-09

We agree that Virginia's two-year statute of limitations began to run at the latest at the time of Golson's release. The amended complaint was not filed until September 25, 1989, outside the two-year period.

Section 1983 claims borrow state limitations periods; in Virginia, the period is two years.

Houghton v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 1991-11-07

Statutes of limitations for section 1983 suits are borrowed from state law. Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir.1975). In Virginia, the limitations period is two years. See Cramer v. Crutchfield, 648 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.1981).

Section 1983 claims in Virginia are subject to Virginia's two-year statute of limitations.

Roosevelt Taylor, Jr. v. Edna Barber Warren F. Haynie R. N. Southworth David A. Williams Dixon L. Foster · filed 1992-07-14

We note that Taylor's claim against Officer Southworth is time-barred by Virginia's two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Virginia have a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury, even if she does not yet know the injury may be redressed under Section 1983.

Richards v. Fairfax County School Board · filed 1992-09-02

The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations under Section 1983 is two years. They also agree that a claim under Section 1983 accrues when the plaintiff knows or should have known of the alleged injury, not when she becomes aware that such injury might be redressable under Section 1983. Thus, because the Court holds that their cause of action accrued on June 15, 1989, when Amanda’s parents were informed that their daughter would no longer receive special education at public expense, the plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim is time barred, as well.

Section 1983 claims borrow the state personal injury limitations period, which is two years in Virginia.

Gilreath v. Manager of Virginia Correctional Enterprises, and Supreme Court of Virginia Commonwealth of Vir · filed 1992-10-16

Because complaints filed pursuant to § 1983 are subject to state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985), and because Virginia's statute of limitations is two years for such claims, Va. Code. Ann.s 8.01-243(A) (Michie 1992), Gilreath's delay in filing bars his claim.

Section 1983 claims in Virginia have a two-year limitations period and accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Reynolds v. Fairfax County School Board · filed 1993-01-27

A two-year statute of limitations applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... A cause of action for a § 1983 claim accrues when a plaintiff "knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action."

Section 1983 actions filed in Virginia have a two-year statute of limitations.

Clay v. LaPorta · filed 1993-03-18

The statute of limitations in Virginia for actions brought pursuant to § 1983 is two years.

Section 1983 claims in Virginia are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Richards v. Fairfax County · filed 1993-09-15

Likewise, the appellants's 1983 claim is time-barred under the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action for deprivation of federal constitutional rights, and Maryland's general three-year statute of limitations applies by analogy to claims under the statute.

Davidson v. Koerber · filed 1978-07-12

This court concludes that a § 1983 cause of action is more analogous to a cause of action in Maryland under Article 23 than one for a common law tort. By analogy, therefore, the general three year statute of limitations under § 5-101 applies generally to claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims asserting constitutional rights are subject to Maryland’s general three-year statute of limitations, even when arising from the same facts as Title VII claims.

Hall v. Board of County Com'rs of Frederick County · filed 1981-02-24

In this case, however, Count III of plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges a violation of the First Amendment. Further, plaintiff’s counsel stated in open court that plaintiff seeks redress of constitutional rights only under that count. Although the alleged First Amendment violation may have arisen in the same setting as plaintiff’s Title VII claims, this fact does not operate to divest plaintiff of any other claims she might have. ... Accordingly, the court concludes that Maryland’s general three year statute of limitations applies to plaintiff’s section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims in Maryland are subject to the state’s general three-year limitations period.

Jones v. Frederick County Board of Education · filed 1988-06-20

Maryland’s general three-year limitation for civil actions applies to claims under both § 1983 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Section 1983 claims in Massachusetts are subject to the three-year tort statute of limitations, including claims challenging prison disciplinary proceedings.

Duffy v. Massachusetts Department of Corrections · filed 1990-09-11

As Duffy’s claim is well within the Massachusetts’ three year statute of limitations for tort actions, Mass.Gen.Laws c. 260, sec. 2A (1973), the motion of the defendants as to the first claim, characterized as a motion for summary judgment, is denied as frivolous.

Section 1983 damages claims in Massachusetts state court cannot be subjected to the sixty-day certiorari deadline; the three-year personal-injury limitations period appears applicable.

Pidge v. SUPERINTENDENT, MASS CORRECTIONAL INST · filed 1992-01-21

Count 2 additionally stated a cause of action for damages under the Federal civil rights act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). On this record that claim should not have been dismissed. The three-year State statute of limitations for torts resulting in personal injury, G.L.c. 260, § 2A, appears applicable to that claim. Although the Supreme Judicial Court has not yet ruled on this issue, we are persuaded that a State cannot apply a shorter time limit, such as the sixty-day period of G.L.c. 249, § 4, to a substantive Federal right properly asserted in a State court.

Section 1983 claims filed in Massachusetts after September 30, 1987 are subject to the amended state tolling rule, under which imprisonment no longer tolls the limitations period.

Gonsalves v. Flynn · filed 1992-12-11

To sum up, then, imprisonment no longer tolls the statute of limitations with respect to federal civil rights actions filed in Massachusetts after the effective date of the tolling amendment (September 30, 1987).

Section 1983 civil rights complaints in Massachusetts are subject to the three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Brison v. Marsolais · filed 1993-07-07

We agree with the district court's conclusion that appellant's complaint is barred by Massachusetts' three-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 260, § 2A, which is applicable to civil rights complaints, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims in Massachusetts are governed by the three-year limitations period for general personal injury actions under G.L.c. 260, §2A.

Dumais v. Westport Community Schools · filed 1993-10-28

The issue here is which Massachusetts statute fits the Supreme Court’s criteria so as to provide the appropriate limitations period. The general orresid-ualpersonalinjurystatuteoflimitationsinMassachu-setts is G.L.c. 260, §2A. The three-year limitations period contained in that statute permits Dumais to maintain her civil rights claim.

Section 1983 claims borrow the Pennsylvania statute of limitations governing the most closely analogous state causes of action; here, the applicable period was two years for malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment.

Henderson v. Fisher · filed 1981-01-28

The substantive acts complained of are, therefore, clearly analogous to state actions for malicious prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment. Under Pennsylvania law these actions are governed by a two year statute of limitations. ... Therefore, applying the appropriate Pennsylvania statute of limitations, we conclude that this action was not timely filed and falls under the bar of the statute. ... Accordingly, we will grant the defendants’ motions to dismiss on the ground that the statute of limitations bars the plaintiff’s claim.

Section 1983 claims for discriminatory employment termination are subject to Pennsylvania’s six-year limitations period, and a state-action challenge should not be resolved on dismissal before the record is fully developed.

Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College · filed 1981-09-30

Defendants next contend that plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983 are time-barred by the relevant statute of limitations. We disagree. ... On the other hand, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5527, which establishes a 6-year statute of limitations, is significantly broader in scope. ... Thus even if an action for discriminatory termination of a written employment contract did not fall squarely within the language of § 5527(2), relating to written contracts, it would be governed by the saving clause of § 5527(6). In either case, the 6-year limitation period is applicable. ... Defendants assert that Al-Khazraji’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate state action. ... We therefore conclude that it is premature to dispose of the state action issue at this juncture, until a complete record is established.

Section 1983 claims in this action are subject to the applicable six-year Pennsylvania limitations period.

Ulloa v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1982-07-30

This is also the limitation period for plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 actions borrow the limitations period for the most analogous state-law claim; here, that was Pennsylvania’s six-year period for intentional interference with a contractual relationship.

Krynicky v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1983-04-05

Because Congress has not provided a limitation period for Section 1983 actions, the court must apply the statute of limitations which governs the most analogous state claim. ... We conclude that plaintiff’s claim is most analogous to the state action for intentional interference with a contractual relationship and will be governed by the six year limitation period.

Section 1983 claims arising from the alleged discriminatory hiring practices are subject to Pennsylvania's six-year limitations period.

Alvarez v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1983-05-10

This is also the limitation period for plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Pennsylvania’s two-year personal-injury limitations period applies to § 1983 actions.

Johnson v. Officer Swyka, Capt. L.G. Tohey, Robert Maroney, Deputy Supt., George Petsock, Superintendent · filed 1985-06-19

We held that Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period for personal injuries now should be applied to actions brought under § 1983.

Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions governs section 1983 claims.

Braderman v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency · filed 1985-06-25

The plaintiff’s federal claims, all pursued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are barred by Pennsylvania’s two year statute of limitations on personal injury actions.

Pennsylvania’s two-year personal-injury limitations period governs every § 1983 action brought in Pennsylvania.

Fitzgerald v. Larson · filed 1985-08-05

We have recently held in applying Wilson v. Garcia, that the two-year Pennsylvania limitation for personal injury actions of 42 Pa.Const.Stat.Ann. Sec. 5524 governs all Sec. 1983 actions brought in Pennsylvania.

Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations applies to civil-rights actions under § 1983.

Fleming v. Rockwell · filed 1985-11-21

... in Pennsylvania, a two-year statute of limitations applies to civil rights actions brought under Section 1983.

Pennsylvania's two-year personal-injury limitations period applies to § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 1987-01-23

The appropriate limitation period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania is the two-year limitation period provided by 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 5524.

Section 1983 claims arising from an arrest are subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations.

Lingle v. Coll · filed 1991-02-07

Because this Court finds that plaintiffs alleged deprivations arose out of his arrest on September 8, 1982, plaintiffs § 1983 action against defendants Robert J. Coll, Jr., and the City of Pittsburgh is time barred by Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period beginning when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury, and ignorance of the claim’s legal implications does not toll that period.

Hall v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1993-08-12

Therefore, Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims is applied here. ... Plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury that is the basis of his complaint on or about December 17, 1990. At that time, the two-year statute of limitations began to run. Drug-induced incapacity, injured fingers, imprisonment or lack of knowledge of the legal implications of his claim do not stop the statute from running.

Section 1983 civil-rights actions filed in Kansas are governed by the three-year limitations period for liabilities created by statute.

Sullivan v. LaMunyon · filed 1983-10-05

These three areas of significant substantive difference between the cause of action created by § 1983 and the common law causes of action for state wrongs are sufficient to demonstrate that the § 1983 cause of action simply did not exist at common law when § 1983 was adopted, and that the § 1983 cause of action is, therefore, one “created by a statute” within the meaning of K.S.A. § 60-512(2).

Section 1983 actions arising in Kansas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations under Kansas law.

Johnson v. Johnson County Commission Board · filed 1991-02-19

The district court correctly relied upon this court's ruling in Hamilton v. City of Overland Park, 730 F.2d 613 (10th Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1052, 105 S.Ct. 2111, 85 L.Ed.2d 476 (1985), that the appropriate statute of limitations for Sec. 1983 actions arising in Kansas is two years, under Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 60-513(a)(4).

Section 1983 claims in Kansas are subject to a two-year limitations period borrowed from K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4).

Baker v. Board of Regents of State of Kan. · filed 1991-06-13

We continue to believe that a two-year statute of limitations period should be applied to the federal law claims plaintiff has asserted under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000d. The same period would apply to the federal law claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 29 U.S.C. § 794 plaintiff has moved to add to the complaint. This limitations period is borrowed from K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4).