42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 entitles a plaintiff who proves a constitutional violation to at least $1 in nominal damages.

Fyfe v. John Curlee, in His Official Capacity, and the Aberdeen Municipal Separate School District · filed 1990-06-05

Because we find a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Mrs. Fyfe is at minimum entitled to nominal damages of $1.

Section 1983 allows nominal damages for a due process violation even when the underlying disciplinary charge has been dismissed and expunged.

Davis v. Bayless · filed 1990-06-06

Nor can it be said that Davis's due process claim was mooted by the fact that the disciplinary charge against him was ultimately dismissed and expunged from his prison record. If Davis suffered a violation of his right to due process, he would still be entitled to nominal damages.

Section 1983 permits more than nominal damages for a due process violation only when the plaintiff proves injury caused by the violation itself.

Crump v. BD. OF ED. OF HICKORY AD. SU · filed 1990-06-13

The defendants and amicus correctly note that in order to recover more than nominal damages on his § 1983 due process claim, Crump must have been injured by the due process violation itself, and not merely by distress caused by a deprivation of his constitutionally-protected interest in his job.

Section 1983 allows nominal damages for an unlawful arrest even when the plaintiff suffered no actual damages.

Duvall v. Brian Sharp, A/K/A Smurf Garland County, Arkansas Sheriff Clay White · filed 1990-06-14

Although Duvall suffered no actual damages, he is entitled to nominal damages on these claims which the district court is instructed to determine on remand.

Section 1983 permits at most nominal damages for an unlawful search and seizure that caused only a temporary interference with property.

Hartzler v. Licking County Humane Society · filed 1990-06-29

If the jury’s finding of liability on plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for unlawful search and seizure were permitted to stand, he would be entitled to recover at most nominal damages for the unconstitutional trespass and temporary interference with his property right in his horses.

Section 1983 allows nominal damages for a constitutional violation even when the plaintiff proves no actual damages.

Bauer v. Kincaid · filed 1991-03-14

There was no evidence that plaintiff suffered any actual damages. However, a plaintiff whose constitutional rights have been violated is entitled to a finding of liability and nominal damages even if no actual damages have been shown.

A plaintiff who proves a constitutional violation under § 1983 is entitled to judgment and $1 in nominal damages even if the jury awards no actual damages.

Floyd v. Larry Laws, and City of Sherwood, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1991-04-30

If the jury finds a constitutional violation, an award of nominal damages is mandatory, not permissive.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a Fourth Amendment violation even if the plaintiff cannot recover damages for a resulting death.

Wayland v. City Of Springdale · filed 1991-05-17

Further, even if this issue is decided against appellant, the district court was wrong to grant summary judgment on the entire suit. Appellant is entitled to nominal damages if a Gerstein violation occurred.

A § 1983 plaintiff who proves a constitutional deprivation but no actual damages is entitled to nominal damages.

Dae Woo Kim v. City of New York · filed 1991-09-12

Having prevailed on a portion of his § 1983 claim, plaintiff is entitled to recover damages. ... At trial, however, plaintiff did not adduce any evidence of actual damages. The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff who suffers a deprivation of a constitutional right but who is unable to prove actual damages is entitled to recover nominal damages as a means of vindicating that right. ... Accordingly, the court awards plaintiff one dollar ($1) on this claim.

In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages when a jury finds cruel and unusual punishment but cannot assign a dollar amount to the injury.

Warren v. Judy Fanning Dr. Taca, Paul Warren v. Judy Fanning, Dr. Taca · filed 1991-11-21

We agree that the law would entitle Warren to nominal damages from Dr. Taca. “[T]he jury is required to award nominal damages once it has found cruel and unusual punishment if it has not been able to convert into dollars the injury and pain a plaintiff has suffered.”

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a proven constitutional violation without proof of actual injury.

Williams v. J.H. Griffin, Superintendent J.C. Harris, Jr., Area Administrator Aaron J. Johnson, Secretary of Corre · filed 1991-12-30

Moreover, in the absence of a showing of actual injury, Williams still would be entitled to nominal damages upon proof of a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a violation of constitutional procedural rights.

Laramie v. County of Santa Clara · filed 1992-03-05

In light of this teaching, the court orders that each of the eight successful plaintiffs recover from defendants nominal damages in the amount of $1.00. ... 2. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiffs Anthony Laramie, Rex O. Won-nell, Jr., Herb Mauldin, Ronald McNay, Christina McNay, Jane Jaeger, Sally Van-derford and Jerry Wood, and against defendants on the issue of liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A plaintiff whose procedural due-process rights were violated may receive only nominal damages under § 1983 if proper process would have led to the same discipline.

Shango v. Jurich · filed 1992-06-02

The district court then conducted a trial to determine the appropriate remedy, properly asking whether the outcome of the disciplinary hearing would have been the same even if Shango had been given Griffin's name and a copy of Edwards's polygraph-exam results. ... Judge Williams found Shango would have been disciplined anyway and, thus, was only entitled to nominal damages of $1.00.

Section 1983 entitles a plaintiff who proves a constitutional violation to nominal damages even if the violation caused no actual harm.

George v. City of Long Beach Robert Fowks Harry Kartinen · filed 1992-09-17

In light of the court’s finding that the officer’s warrantless entry of George’s house violated the Fourth Amendment, George was entitled to judgment and $1 in nominal damages on his section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a constitutional deprivation even when the plaintiff proves no actual damages.

Hatch v. Yamauchi · filed 1992-12-16

Plaintiff presented no evidence to support an award of actual damages herein. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff should recover nominal damages in the amount of ten dollars ($10.00) from defendant Jack Reynolds in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Human Services.

In the Second Circuit, § 1983 entitles a plaintiff to nominal damages for a constitutional violation without a privilege or immunity even if the plaintiff suffered no actual damage.

Emmett Wilks, Jr. v. Reyes · filed 1993-10-28

The law of this circuit entitles a plaintiff to an award of nominal damages if the defendant violated the plaintiffs constitutional right, without a privilege or immunity, even if the plaintiff suffered no actual damage.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a proven constitutional violation even when the plaintiff fails to show actual damages.

Simmons on Behalf of Simmons v. Hooks · filed 1994-01-31

Even though plaintiff has failed to show actual damages as a result of the defendants’ ability grouping practices, the Court finds that plaintiff is entitled to recover nominal damages.

Section 1983 requires nominal damages when a plaintiff proves a substantive constitutional violation but no compensable injury.

Gibeau v. Nellis · filed 1994-02-28

Because an award of nominal damages is not discretionary where a substantive constitutional right has been violated, the district court should have instructed the jury that it must award nominal damages if it were to find that Gibeau's Eighth Amendment rights were violated, and it should have provided a corresponding verdict form.

Section 1983 requires nominal damages when a plaintiff proves a substantive constitutional violation but no actual compensable injury.

Gibeau v. Nellis · filed 1994-02-28

In an action brought pursuant to Section 1983, “even when a litigant fails to prove actual compensable injury, he is entitled to an award of nominal damages upon proof of violation of a substantive constitutional right.” Smith v. Coughlin, 748 F.2d 783, 789 (2d Cir.1984) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 267, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)).

Section 1983 entitles a person whose constitutional rights were violated to one dollar in nominal damages even without proof of actual injury.

Washshukru Al-Jabbar A'la v. Lou H. Atwood Johnny Stephens Cecil Davidson Bill Wagner Herb Murphy · filed 1994-03-17

Notwithstanding the jury's finding that the evidence was sufficient to show no actual injury, this court has held that a person whose constitutional rights have been violated under Sec. 1983 is entitled to recover nominal damages of "not more than one dollar." Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d 1253, 1264 (6th Cir.1986). Because the jury found a violation of Al-Jabbar's Fourth Amendment rights, he is entitled to one dollar in nominal damages.

Section 1983 requires nominal damages when a jury finds a constitutional violation but the resulting injuries have no monetary value or cannot support a larger award with reasonable certainty.

Howard v. C.O. II Barnett, C.C.O. I Johnson C.O. I Malone · filed 1994-04-22

If, after a new trial, a properly instructed jury finds that Barnett used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, then the jury must award nominal damages if it also finds that Howard’s injuries have no monetary value or are insufficient to justify with reasonable certainty a more substantial measure of damages.

In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff who proves a constitutional violation but no actual damages is entitled to $1 in nominal damages.

Ronald James Hendon, AKA Steven Michael Vann v. Samuel A. Lewis, Director · filed 1994-07-06

We agree that Hendon is entitled to an award of nominal damages. ... Accordingly, we reverse the district court's judgment and remand with instructions to award Hendon $1 in nominal damages.

Section 1983 permits a finding of liability and nominal damages for a constitutional violation even when the plaintiff proves no actual damages.

Hall v. Dalton · filed 1994-09-01

The City contends that Hall has failed to prove any actual damages. We remand for the purpose of determining, on the basis of the entire record, whether this is so. Even if it is, Hall is entitled to a finding of liability and nominal damages for the violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a deprivation of First Amendment rights even without proof of actual injury.

Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English · filed 1994-12-07

Thus, even without proof of actual injury, Yniguez is entitled to nominal damages for prevailing in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the deprivation of First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages upon a showing of liability even without proof of actual damages caused by the constitutional violation.

Hirschfeld v. Spanakos · filed 1994-12-20

Furthermore, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252, forecloses dismissal because it permits recovery of nominal damages in Section 1983 actions based solely on a showing of liability, even without any proof of actual damages proximately caused by the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a deprivation of First Amendment rights even without proof of actual injury.

Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English · filed 1995-01-17

Thus, even without proof of actual injury, Yniguez is entitled to nominal damages for prevailing in an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for the deprivation of First Amendment rights.

A plaintiff may recover only nominal damages under § 1983 for a defective name-clearing hearing if correcting the defect would not have cleared the plaintiff’s name.

DeFries v. Town of Washington, Okl. · filed 1995-01-31

Mr. DeFries may recover only nominal damages if it is determined that curing the defect would not have changed the result, that is, would not have cleared his name.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Ferreira v. Duval · filed 1995-05-12

As a threshold matter, plaintiff is seeking compensatory damages, not declaratory or injunctive relief, and may recover nominal damages for the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek nominal damages for a proven Fourth Amendment violation even without proof of actual damages.

DePugh v. Penning · filed 1995-05-26

Thus, even assuming that DePugh can show no actual damages as the result of a search and seizure violative of the Fourth Amendment, a proposition this court finds by no means certain, he is entitled to pursue his cause of action pursuant to § 1983 and, if a violation is shown, to obtain at least nominal damages and possibly punitive damages. Penning is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of an alleged lack of harm.

Section 1983 allows nominal damages of no more than one dollar when a constitutional violation is established but actual damages are not proven.

Al-Jabbar a'la v. Hamby · filed 1995-08-10

As the district court concluded that the defendants did violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights, however, he is entitled to recover nominal damages of not more than one dollar.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a deprivation of First Amendment rights even without proof of actual injury.

Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English · filed 1995-10-05

Thus, even without proof of actual injury, Yniguez is entitled to nominal damages for prevailing in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the deprivation of First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 requires proof of actual injury to recover more than nominal damages for an unconstitutional search.

Ricci v. Village of Arlington Heights · filed 1995-11-07

Even if Mr. Ricci establishes that a search occurred, in order to get more than nominal damages he must establish an actual injury.

Section 1983 entitles a plaintiff who proves a substantive constitutional violation to nominal damages even without proof of actual compensable injury.

Bernheim v. Litt · filed 1996-03-25

“In an action brought pursuant to Section 1983, ‘even when a litigant fails to prove actual compensable injury, he is entitled to an award of nominal damages upon proof of violation of a substantive constitutional right.’ ”

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for an excessive force violation when the plaintiff does not prove compensable injury caused by the excessive force.

Briggs v. Marshall · filed 1996-08-15

However, as the district court recognized in its order denying the plaintiffs’ motion for new trial, there are three situations where courts may award nominal damages to remedy the constitutional violation of excessive force.

Section 1983 may allow nominal damages for an alleged constitutional violation even when the plaintiff cannot show that the violation caused his failure to be hired.

Peacock v. County of Marin · filed 1997-01-23

Plaintiff has also alleged under 42 U.S.C.1983 that defendant’s policy and conduct constitute a violation of his constitutional rights. ... Since plaintiff cannot show that the alleged violation caused him not to be hired, he cannot obtain injunctive relief or recover compensatory or punitive damages. ... He may, however, still be able to recover nominal damages.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages when a plaintiff proves a violation of constitutional rights but receives no compensatory damages.

Zarate v. City of Brownsville · filed 1997-09-08

Zarate is correct, and appellees concede, that Zarate is entitled to an award of nominal damages based on the jury’s finding that his constitutional rights were violated.

Section 1983 does not require proof that a constitutional deprivation caused actual harm to establish a violation.

Estate of Macias v. Ihde · filed 2000-07-20

A plaintiff may prove a violation of § 1983 without demonstrating that the deprivation of his or her constitutional rights caused any actual harm.

A plaintiff seeking nominal damages for an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim under § 1983 can waive them by failing to request a jury instruction and failing to object when none is given.

Oliver v. Falla · filed 2001-07-27

The right to nominal damages is not automatic in an Eighth Amendment excessive force case. A plaintiff can waive this right by failing to request nominal damages in his jury instructions, and by failing to object to the absence of a jury instruction on nominal damages.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek damages and declaratory relief for violations of federally protected extradition rights when the claim would not necessarily invalidate the prisoner’s conviction or sentence.

Major Harden v. Pataki · filed 2003-02-10

We hold that a claim filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages and declaratory relief for the violation of a state prisoner’s federally protected extradition rights is not automatically barred by Heck. We also hold that such a claim is not barred by Heck, where the specific allegations are that law enforcement officials failed to provide an extradited prisoner with a pretransfer habeas corpus hearing or a signed warrant by the governor of the asylum state, or released him into the hands of a private extradition service instead of government agents.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for improper extradition that violates the Constitution's extradition clause and federal extradition statute.

Albert BROWN, Appellant v. NUTSCH · filed 1980-05-14

We hold that section 1983 provides a remedy for improper extradition in violation of the extradition clause and statute.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages action against officials who forcibly return an escaped felon across state lines without extradition proceedings.

Hines v. Guthrey · filed 1972-03-31

Similarly, it is the opinion of the court that the purpose of the federal extradition provisions requires the result that an escaped felon who is captured in another state, and removed to his home state for reconfinement and trial without extradition proceedings, may not maintain an action for damages under the Federal Civil Rights Act against those who allegedly forcibly removed him from another state without proper extradition proceedings.

A prisoner denied a pretransfer hearing may assert an improper-extradition claim under Section 1983, but officials of the demanding state have no duty to ensure a hearing in the asylum state.

Smith v. Lamm · filed 1986-03-12

A prisoner who contends that he has been denied a pretransfer hearing may assert a claim alleging improper extradition under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Officials of the demanding state, however, have no duty to ensure that a pre-extradition hearing is held in the asylum state.

An illegal-extradition Section 1983 claim does not require proof that the extradition denied a fair trial; it requires a violation of state extradition law that caused deprivation of a federal right.

Freeman v. Henry Hatfield, Lt., Chief Suffolk City Jailer · filed 1987-04-16

To state a Sec. 1983 claim for illegal extradition, an individual need not establish that he was thereby denied a fair trial. Rather, he must show that the violation of the state's extradition laws "cause[d] the deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution and statutes of the United States."

Section 1983 does not permit recovery for violations of extradition rights that a fugitive knowingly waived.

Bradley v. Extradition Corp. of America · filed 1991-03-18

Where the fugitive knowingly waives any rights he may have that are inherent in the extradition process, he may not recover under section 1983 where those rights are deprived.

Section 1983 provides no claim for failure to follow formal extradition procedures because those procedures do not protect a fugitive’s individual federal rights.

Barton v. Mark Norrod and Randy Pack, Individually · filed 1997-03-31

Although a number of courts allow a § 1983 claim when officers fail to comply with extradition procedures established by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (“UCEA”), we believe that the constitutional and statutory extradition provisions are not designed to protect fugitives. Rather, they are designed to facilitate the administration of justice between states. Thus, failure to comply with established procedures does not deprive the fugitive of any protected right.

Section 1983 can provide a damages claim for an alleged denial of procedural rights during extradition.

Bey v. Keating · filed 2000-05-17

In all of the pleadings filed with the district court, Bey consistently requested monetary damages arising out of the defendants’ alleged failure to afford him the process due under Oklahoma law. Based upon our past cases, this appears to be a claim cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an agent of a demanding state for deprivation of extradition rights only if the agent caused or participated in the deprivation.

Buchanan v. City of Kenosha · filed 2000-03-20

Taken together, the two McBride decisions stand for the proposition that a plaintiff may prevail in a § 1983 action based on the deprivation of extradition rights against an agent of a demanding state only if the agent caused or participated in the deprivation of plaintiffs rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy when a state agency’s nondiscriminatory refusal to offer a surgical service violates no federal constitutional right.

Hathaway v. Worcester City Hospital · filed 1972-04-06

It is transparent that plaintiff’s substantive federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is without merit. ... The so-called federal substantive claim is nothing but an assertion that it is a deprivation of plaintiff's federal constitutional rights for a state agency to refuse to establish a practice of performing a particular kind of surgical operation for which it has the necessary physical and medical resources but which it does not choose to perform. ... If we assume that a state has adequate financial, physical, and human resources to perform an operation of a particular type, but a state agency on a non-discriminatory basis chooses not to perform any operation of such a type, an aggrieved person has no Constitutional right to compel it so to perform.

A prisoner bringing a Section 1983 civil rights suit has no right to appear personally at a hearing.

Potter v. Tom McCall Governor of the State of Oregon · filed 1970-11-04

When a plaintiff in a civil rights suit is confined in a state prison at the time of a hearing, he has no right to appear personally.

An incarcerated plaintiff in a § 1983 action has no right to appear personally at a hearing.

Armstrong v. Dewie Rushing · filed 1965-11-15

If plaintiff is presently incarcerated in a state prison he is not entitled, as a matter of right, to appear personally at a hearing in this Civil Rights action.

Section 1983 does not require a court to hold a hearing in every instance when a prisoner files a civil-rights petition.

Lámar v. Coffield · filed 1972-05-05

As this Court reads the applicable authorities, the law clearly does not compel a hearing to be held in each and every instance in which a prisoner’s petition is filed under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not let a state prisoner obtain release from custody without first exhausting available state remedies, and a damages action based on a search upheld in the criminal case cannot proceed while the conviction remains undisturbed.

Curley v. Bryan · filed 1973-08-09

Insofar as plaintiffs’ Complaint seeks their release from custody, their sole federal remedy is the writ of habeas corpus, with its attendant requirement of exhaustion of state remedies, and an action under the Civil Rights Act will not lie. ... Although exhaustion is not required for the presentation of a valid claim under § 1983, nevertheless the Civil Rights Act cannot be used by a state prisoner to circumvent the requirement that he must exhaust all available state remedies before petitioning the federal court for habeas corpus relief where, as here, plaintiffs seek their release from custody. ... In this context we think a broad rule of estoppel is appropriate: that a § 1983 civil action based on a search and seizure held valid in a criminal trial cannot be maintained so long as the criminal judgment of conviction remains undisturbed. Federalism, we think, requires such a result. It is difficult to conceive of a more abrasive example of indifference to state judicial process than to allow a civil action to proceed in a federal court on a fact hypothesis finally adjudicated and rejected in a presumably valid state criminal proceeding.”

Pretrial evidentiary hearings on a pro se inmate’s nonfrivolous § 1983 damages claims must preserve the right to a jury trial by applying the judgment-as-a-matter-of-law standard, crediting the inmate’s evidence, and avoiding credibility determinations.

Johnson v. Bi-State Justice Center/Arkansas Dept. of Corrections · filed 1993-12-27

We have approved the use of a pretrial 'evidentiary hearing to determine whether a pro se inmate’s nonfrivolous § 1983 damage claims warrant a jury trial. ... However, we have stressed that such a hearing must be consistent with the plaintiffs right to a jury trial. Therefore, if only the plaintiff presents evidence, the standard is whether his case would survive a Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law at trial (the former motion for directed verdict). ... In either case, the court must apply the proper standard of proof, avoid credibility determinations, believe the inmate’s evidence, and draw all justifiable inferences in the inmate’s favor.

Section 1983 claims appended to an essentially equitable Title VII employment-discrimination action do not convert the action into a legal one requiring a jury trial.

Baker v. City of Detroit · filed 1978-07-31

This Court agrees with the Fifth Circuit. Congress’ determination that no jury trial be afforded in Title VII cases ... cannot be evaded by appending additional claims under §§ 1981 or 1983 or other related statutes.

Section 1983 permits redress through an action at law, a suit in equity, or another proper proceeding, and a legal claim remains jury-triable even when sought alongside equitable relief.

Devore v. Edgefield County School District · filed 1975-06-30

In Civil Action No. 75-226, plaintiff has alleged that a cause of action exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which serves as a predicate for a suit for damages and/or for injunctive relief. Mizell v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 427 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1970). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, by its own terms, for “an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” Merely because the legal claim is “incidental” or “secondary” to the equitable relief sought is not sufficient to abridge the right to trial by jury. Back pay, “incidental” to the major relief requested, is nothing other than a method available to assist in measuring damages. Determination of such matters must in this instance be by jury.

Section 1983 damages actions seeking compensatory and punitive relief for common-law-like injuries carry a right to jury trial upon demand.

Burch v. Carmody · filed 1974-05-29

... This court finds no difficulty in applying the Curtis rationale to the case at bar. The acts alleged in this action are quite analogous to various common law torts. ... Instead, compensatory and punitive damages are sought to redress such acts as, under the civil rights laws, would seem to come squarely within the reach of the Curtis case. ... Pre- Curtis cases brought directly under § 1983 and raising primarily legal claims generally support this view. ... The court must therefore conclude that the plaintiff may properly demand a jury trial.

Section 1983 civil-rights actions do not carry a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, including on a remaining damages issue.

Lawton v. Nightingale · filed 1972-06-27

This Court, however, has no difficulty in so holding, not only because the constitutional language is too clear to permit any other conclusion, but also because a contrary holding would, in many instances, totally defeat the purposes of § 1983. If a jury could be resorted to in actions brought under this statute, the very evil the statute is designed to prevent would often be attained.

Denial of a jury trial in a state proceeding cannot support a § 1983 claim because the federal Seventh Amendment jury guarantee does not apply to state proceedings.

Ruley v. Nevada Board of Prison Commissioners · filed 1986-02-04

The upshot is that a denial of the right to trial by jury in a state proceeding will not serve as the basis for a § 1983 civil rights action in federal court.

Filing a state-court mandamus action diligently pursuing the same claim interrupts the limitations period for a § 1983 action.

Del Valle v. Santa Aponte · filed 1977-03-16

We held therein that the period of limitations of a Section 1983 action was interrupted by the filing of a mandamus in the local courts, which filing constituted a diligent pursuance of the same claim and rights eventually sought under the Civil Rights Act. The same holding is applicable herein; accordingly, we hold that the present action has been timely filed.

Section 1983 claims borrow the state limitations period for analogous state tort actions.

Ka-Haar, Inc. v. Huck · filed 1972-06-29

While § 1983 actions are limited by state limitations on analogous state tort actions, Antieau, Federal Civil Rights Acts § 85, the statutes cited by defendants— Wis.Stats. §§ 227.15, 227.16, and 895.43 —are not applicable.

Section 1983 actions use the state statute of limitations applicable to analogous actions.

Klein v. Springborn · filed 1971-06-09

In actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, federal courts apply the state statute of limitations for analogous actions.

Section 1983 civil-rights claims borrow the statute of limitations for the analogous state-law action.

Hughes v. Swinehart · filed 1974-05-10

The statute of limitations in federal civil rights actions is determined by looking to the analogous state statute of limitations.

Section 1983 contains no statute of limitations, so the court applies the relevant state limitations period.

Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks · filed 1974-08-02

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pursuant to which plaintiff sues on this count, does not contain a statute of limitations, we must look to the State law.

Because § 1983 contains no limitations period of its own, the limitations period supplied by the state where the claim arose applies.

Cox v. Stanton · filed 1974-08-22

It is well settled that where a federal statute, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has no provision limiting the time within which an action may be brought, the applicable period of limitation is that provided by the state in which the action arose. See Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1972), citing O’Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 34 S.Ct. 596, 58 L.Ed. 980 (1914); Thomas v. Howard, 455 F.2d 228 (3rd Cir. 1972); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962).

When § 1983 contains no express limitations period, the forum state’s limitations period for an analogous action applies; a damages-type injury remains subject to that period even when reinstatement is also sought.

Wilkinson v. Hamel · filed 1974-09-07

Neither 42 U.S.C. § 1983 nor § 1985 contains an express statute of limitations. It is well settled doctrine, however, that where Congress has not legislated a statute of limitations governing a federal cause of action, a court shall apply the forum’s statute of limitations for analogous types of action. ... The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and this court have indicated that Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries contained in Va.Code Ann., § 8-24 (1974 Supp.) will be applied in all civil rights actions that may be redressed by recovery of damages. ... That plaintiff has requested the equitable relief of reinstatement as well as monetary damages cannot under the facts of this case negate the applicability of this statute of limitations. Plaintiff’s alleged injury is of the type normally compensated with a monetary award.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, so the federal court applies the limitations period that the forum state would apply to an analogous state-law action.

Polite v. Diehl · filed 1974-12-31

Since the Civil Rights Acts contain no statute of limitations, the limitation to be applied is that which would be applicable in the courts of the state in which the federal court is sitting had an action seeking similar relief been brought under state law.

Section 1983 has no federal statute of limitations, so federal courts apply the limitations period the forum state would use for an analogous action.

Hooper v. Guthrie · filed 1975-03-13

The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq., contains no statute of limitation. The limitation to be applied is that which would be applicable in the courts of the state in which the federal court is sitting had the action been brought in the state.

Section 1983 actions use the limitations period for the closest analogous state tort, and the civil-rights vehicle does not change the nature of the underlying injury.

Margoles v. Ross · filed 1975-07-25

No federal limitation having been established, it is clear that actions brought pursuant to Section 1983 of Title 42, United States Code, are limited by the state limitations on the closest analogous state tort action. ... It is just not possible to make plaintiff’s first cause of action anything but an action for damages arising from false and derogatory statements, which is classic libel or slander. The federal action made possible by the civil rights statute doesn’t change the nature of the alleged injury in any way. Accordingly, it must be held that plaintiff will be limited in his proof at trial, on his first cause of action, to communications by defendants Dalton and Tormey, which occurred on or after June 11, 1968, two years before this action was filed.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, so the federal court borrows the limitations period for the most closely analogous state action.

Schofield v. Gilland · filed 1975-07-31

“ * * * Because neither [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 nor § 1985 contains a statute of limitations a ‘federal district court must apply the statute of limitations of the state where it sits which would be applicable in the most closely analogous state action to determine the time within which the cause of action must be commenced.’ * * * ” ... The most closely analogous Tennessee action to this federal action brought under the federal civil rights statutes is a suit in the Tennessee courts brought under the federal civil rights statutes. Such state actions must be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Section 1983 claims use the statute of limitations that the state where the federal court sits would apply to the analogous claim.

Getz v. Bruch · filed 1975-08-18

There is no federal statute of limitations applicable to the Civil Rights Act, therefore the courts must apply the limitation “which the state where federal court is sitting would apply if the action had been brought in a court of that state,” to redress the wrongs arising from the complained of conduct.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, so courts apply the limitation period governing the most analogous state-law claim.

Holden v. Boston Housing Authority · filed 1975-09-30

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, the court is required to apply the statute of limitations which governs the most analogous claim under state law.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations, so federal courts use state law to select and construe the applicable limitations period.

Deitz v. Bowman · filed 1975-11-20

Since 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which this action was brought, has no statute of limitations, federal courts must turn to state law both for determinating the applicable limitations statute and construction of that statute.

Section 1983 claims without an express federal limitations period are subject to the forum state’s limitations period for analogous actions.

Ervin v. Lanier · filed 1975-11-24

Defendant, Pan Am, also indicates that plaintiff may, in addition, be seeking relief under Title 42, Section 1983, which provides as follows: ... Said defendant concedes that no express limitation period is provided under Title 42 with respect to Sections 1983 and 1985 of such Title, and that Section 1988 of such Title requires the courts to refer to the “statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held”. ... In addition, the courts have repeatedly held that where Congress has not enacted a statute of limitations governing a federal cause of action, a court should apply the forum’s statute of limitations with respect to analogous types of actions. ... Again in view of the fact that the last acts charged against Pan Am in support of the claimed conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s civil rights occurred in September of 1969, it is clear that plaintiff’s claims with respect thereto became time-barred in September of 1972. ... Accordingly, insofar as plaintiff’s allegations against Pan Am are based on alleged violations of his civil rights under the Federal Civil Rights laws, the same are barred by the applicable Statutes of Limitations and must be dismissed.

A § 1983 claim may be barred by the applicable statute of limitations and by res judicata or collateral estoppel when the underlying constitutional issue was already litigated.

Montagna v. O'HAGAN · filed 1975-10-23

If, as it appears, plaintiff’s action is grounded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, then it is barred by the three-year ... statute of limitations. ... It also appears that a claim under § 1983 is barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel as well as by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 has no federal statute of limitations, so courts apply the forum state's limitations period.

Cage v. Bitoy · filed 1976-01-13

Congress has made no provision for a period of limitations for Sections 1983 and 1985(3) actions. A federal court is to follow the limitation period fixed by the law of the forum state.

For a § 1983 claim alleging deprivation of the opportunity to secure a fair trial, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the criminal trial is complete.

Martin v. Mario Merola, District Attorney, Bronx County · filed 1976-02-05

As a corollary to today’s decision that plaintiffs’ complaint is presently premature, we hold that the statute of limitations should not begin to run until the completion of their criminal trial.

Because § 1983 supplies no limitations period, the limitations period for a similar action under forum-state law governs.

Cartolano v. Tyrrell · filed 1976-10-21

Since Congress has made no provision for a period of limitations for § 1983 actions, we are directed to follow the limitations period fixed by the law of the forum state.

Because § 1983 contains no limitations period, the court applies the most appropriate state limitations provision to the federal claim.

Savage v. Kibbee · filed 1976-11-11

There is no Federal statute limiting the time to bring an action under either section. Thus, the time period to be employed must be determined by reference to the most appropriate provision of New York State law.

Section 1983 has no federal limitations period, so federal courts use the applicable state limitations period.

Feilder v. Moore · filed 1976-11-12

There is no federal statute of limitations for actions commenced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Federal courts look to state statutes to select the limitation period.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations, and courts may use common-law analogues to apply borrowed state-law concepts while adapting them to the facts of the federal claim.

J. C. Snell, Inmate v. Herman Short, Police Chief, Houston Police Department · filed 1977-01-10

We do not doubt that, in applying the sweeping mandate of § 1983 to the great variety of human conduct, a district court may seek the aid of common law analogues to the federal claim, but here we believe the grafting should be done anew to take account of the application of the state law concepts to the peculiar facts of this case.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, so courts apply the limitations period governing the most analogous state-law claim.

MacMurray v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College · filed 1977-04-04

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, the Court is required to apply the statute of limitations which governs the most analogous claim under state law.

When § 1983 supplies no limitations period, the claim uses the forum state's period for the most closely analogous state action.

Carmicle v. Weddle · filed 1977-05-20

Because neither § 1983 nor § 1985 contains a statute of limitations a "federal district court must apply the statute of limitations of the state where it sits which would be applicable in the most closely analogous state action to determine the time within which the cause of action must be commenced." Mason v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 517 F.2d 520, 521 (6th Cir. 1975). ... Similarly, here we find the allegations in plaintiffs' complaint to be most analogous to the Kentucky actions of malicious prosecution and false arrest. The applicable statute of limitations then is K.R.S. § 413.140(1)(c).

Section 1983 claims borrow the most analogous state statute of limitations, and a time-barred legal remedy also bars concurrent equitable reinstatement.

Williams v. Walsh · filed 1977-06-27

Many § 1983 cases have recited the well-established rule that "(i)n the absence of a federal statute of limitations federal courts borrow the state statute of limitations applicable to the most similar state cause of action." ... We therefore hold that as to each of the various constitutional tort causes of action the complaint sets forth, the plaintiff is barred from seeking the equitable remedy of reinstatement because his concurrent legal remedy is barred by the applicable state statute of limitations.

When § 1983 has no federal limitations period, the most clearly analogous state statute of limitations applies.

Wood v. Worachek · filed 1977-09-16

Since there is no federal statute of limitations for civil rights actions, the most clearly analogous state statute of limitations applies to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the forum state's five-year limitations period for statutory claims when that is the applicable state rule.

Beard v. Robinson · filed 1977-09-28

We thus hold that the Illinois five-year statute of limitations applies to statutory claims brought under the Civil Rights Acts.

Section 1983 actions borrow state statutes of limitations governing analogous claims when no federal limitations period applies.

Lopez v. White · filed 1977-10-19

Plaintiffs ask relief against the policemen under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under the common law tort theories of false arrest, assault and battery, and civil conspiracy. ... Since there is no federal statute of limitations governing the actions brought here, the state statutes of limitations governing analogous actions must be applied. ... Plaintiffs’ actions for false arrest or false imprisonment stemming from the December 24, 1973 arrests are therefore barred. ... The actions for assault and battery and civil conspiracy are governed by § 34 and are not barred.

Section 1983 requires courts to apply the forum state's limitations period for similar tort claims because the subchapter contains no limitations provision.

Sassi v. Breier · filed 1977-11-03

In an action alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a state’s statute of limitations must be applied, since this subchapter contains no- limitations provision. ... To determine which state statute of limitations to apply to the action brought under this section, the federal court should apply the limitations period used by the forum state for similar torts. ... This Court holds that this section governs the cause of action in this case.

Section 1983 claims borrow the applicable state statute of limitations because Congress did not set a limitations period in the statute.

Walden III, Inc. v. State of Rhode Island · filed 1977-12-22

In all actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the appropriate time for filing a complaint is controlled by the applicable state Statute of Limitations. Congress has not fixed a Statute of Limitations within the Statute itself.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so the court borrows the limitation period prescribed by the state where the litigation arose.

Prince v. George C. Wallace, Governor · filed 1978-03-03

Since Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitation, reference must be made to the limitation periods prescribed by the state in which the litigation arose. ... Therefore, the applicable statute of limitation is one year.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private person who merely complains to a state prosecutor based only on alleged concert with the prosecutor, and claims under the statute are governed by the most analogous state statute of limitations.

Gowin v. Altmiller · filed 1978-05-31

Plaintiffs allege that defendants Finke violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “by virtue of the coordination of their efforts and other considerations . . . .” The Court disagrees and finds no facts to support the allegation. A private person, complaining to a state prosecutor, is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 merely upon the basis of allegations that acts were “committed in concert” with the prosecutor. ... Any action against the Finkes pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is barred by the statute of limitations. In determining the statute of limitations applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is necessary to look to state law to determine what state statute of limitations is applicable. ... Liability for a civil rights violation is created by the federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and thus is governed by Idaho Code § 5-218 which provides a three-year statute of limitations for “an action upon a liability created by statute.” ... Therefore, defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the civil rights violation claim. ... Any alleged causes of action arising under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against either defendant is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. ... Since there is no applicable federal statute of limitations the Court is obligated to apply the most analogous state statute of limitations to civil rights actions. ... The Court finds that either provision of Idaho Code § 5-219(5) or § 5-219(1) is applicable to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleged by plaintiffs and such action being brought more than two years from its accrual on July 16, 1974, is barred.

Section 1983 claims are governed by the forum state's limitations period for an analogous state-law action.

Kuecey v. Powers · filed 1978-07-12

The controlling statute of limitations for an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the state limitations period which would govern an analogous action brought in a court of the forum state.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state limitations period, and liability requires purposeful discrimination rather than disparate impact alone.

1978-12-13 · filed 1978-12-13

Section 1983, however, is somewhat broader. Nevertheless, since it seeks to protect fundamental rights and inasmuch as there would appear to be a choice between the two-year and six-year statute, the latter would seem proper, and, therefore, we approve the use of the six-year statute by the trial court here. ... The Supreme Court has in recent times ruled that purposefulness is an essential element in civil rights actions of the kind that we have here. ... That being so, the trial court cannot be held to have erred in finding that a violation of § 1983 was not established in connection with the denial of the Type D certificate in 1973.

For a § 1983 claim with no specific federal limitations period, the applicable period comes from the most analogous state-law limitations provision, selected by the interests served.

Pringle v. Herman · filed 1979-02-20

Since there is no specifically stated or otherwise relevant federal statute of limitations for a cause of action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the controlling period is the most appropriate period provided by New York State law. ... Where there is more than one analogous state statute, the choice among them should be based upon which statute deals with the same interests as does the federal statute. ... This court finds that Section 8589 is too narrow in its purposes to set the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim. It is more appropriate to apply New York CPLR Section 217 which sets a four month limitations period for proceedings brought against a body or officer.

Section 1983 actions borrow the most appropriate state-law limitations period because § 1983 supplies no limitations period.

Gipson v. Township of Bass River · filed 1979-04-05

The controlling limitations period for civil rights actions, since the Civil Rights Act doesn’t provide one, is “the most appropriate one provided by state law.” ... Therefore, this court will apply the express limitation found in N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 to the action against the defendant Township of Bass River. ... Consequently, this court holds that N.J. S.A. 59:8-8 is the most appropriate statute of limitations governing this action against the defendant Township of Bass River. Since the cause of action accrued on July 17, 1973, and the two-year period thus ended in July of 1975, this action against the Township is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 provides no limitations period, so claims under it borrow the applicable state-law period and may proceed for discriminatory acts occurring within that period even when the original layoff is time-barred.

Hansbury v. The Regents of the University of California · filed 1979-04-18

We note that unlike Title VII, Section 1983, if applicable at all, was applicable on the date of plaintiff's termination in 1970 as well as at subsequent times. However, the trial court's conclusion that the four year limit of N.M.Stat.Ann. § 23-1-4 (1953) was the applicable statute of limitations is correct. ... It follows that if plaintiff is able to show there was a recall system at LASL and that defendant Agnew refused to implement the system in favor of plaintiff because of her sex, she will have established a claim under Section 1983 if Agnew so acted within the four-year period preceding the filing of her complaint in the district court.

Section 1983 claims use the statute of limitations that the state courts would apply to an analogous state action.

Leigh v. McGuire · filed 1979-04-06

This action, brought under the federal Civil Rights Act, “is subject to the statute of limitations the state courts would apply in an analogous state action.”

Section 1983 has no limitations period, so courts generally borrow the limitations period for the most analogous state action, and it does not require a plaintiff to initiate state proceedings before filing federally when none is pending.

Spiegel v. School District No. 1, Laramie County, Wyoming · filed 1979-06-14

We hold that the trial court applied the proper statute of limitations. Section 1983 contains no limitations provision. In such a circumstance, a federal court will generally apply the state statute of limitations which would be applicable to the most analogous state action. ... When no state judicial proceeding is pending, Huffman does not require a civil plaintiff to initiate such proceedings before bringing a section 1983 action. ... That statute now bars his section 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims ordinarily borrow the forum state’s analogous statute of limitations; here, a five-year period applied to claims against public officers acting under color of authority.

Bottos v. Avakian · filed 1979-09-25

Case law establishes, however, that the appropriate statute for both types of actions will ordinarily be that which would be applied to an analogous action in a court of the forum state. ... In Ind.Stat.Ann. § 34 — 1—2—2 Second (Burns 1973) a five year limitations period is provided for “[a]ll actions against a . public officer . . . growing out of a liability incurred by doing an act in an official capacity.” ... The five year statute of limitations provided by § 34-1-2-2 Second is the appropriate period to apply here.

Section 1983 actions borrow the limitations period applicable to an analogous action under state law, but a state notice-of-claim requirement is invalid when it substantially interferes with the federal right.

Davis v. Krauss · filed 1979-10-24

First the court must determine what statute of limitations period is applicable. Since Congress has not provided a limitations period for § 1983 actions, the applicable period is that which would have been applied had an action seeking similar relief been brought in state court. ... Although this court holds that the limitations period of § 50-i is applicable, the ninety day notice of claim provision also contained in § 50-i is not valid in a civil rights action. If applied, such a notice of claim provision would substantially interfere with the exercise of an important federal right.

Section 1983 constitutional claims use the appropriate state limitations period when no federal limitations period applies.

John T. WRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant v. STATE OF TENNESSEE · filed 1980-01-24

With respect to the equal protection claim, the District Court correctly held that it is time-barred. There is no applicable federal statute imposing a limitations period on constitutional claims. Therefore, the appropriate state statute is used. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976); Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 97 S.Ct. 441, 50 L.Ed.2d 427 (1976); Warner v. Perrino, 585 F.2d 171 (6th Cir. 1978). This court has held that Tennessee's one-year statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-304, provides the applicable limitations period for the type of constitutional claim asserted here. See Harrison v. Wright, 457 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1972). Since plaintiff's claim arose more than a year before suit was brought, the claim is barred.

Section 1983 claims borrow the most appropriate state statute of limitations through § 1988 unless applying state law would be inconsistent with federal law.

Chappelle v. Chase · filed 1980-02-04

Since there are no specifically stated federal statutes of limitations governing actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 instructs that the controlling provision is the most appropriate limitations period provided by state law, “so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” ... Thus, since application of the non-revival provision is not inconsistent with federal law, this court is obliged to give the provision effect in determining the timeliness of plaintiff’s claims.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so federal courts apply the state limitations period that best effectuates federal policy and would govern a similar state-law civil-rights action.

Smith v. Stamps · filed 1980-04-03

Because these statutes do not provide any period of limitation, the federal courts must apply that state limitation period which seems best to effectuate the federal policy underpinning the claims asserted, so as to apply the same limitation to the federal action as would be applied if similar civil rights actions could be brought under state law in the state courts.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for an equal-protection claim based on sex discrimination that is not legally cognizable because it falls outside the three-year statute of limitations.

Mewshaw v. Police Department · filed 1980-06-02

His proposed claim under § 1983 that defendants’ actions deprived him of equal protection under the law is similarly without merit since plaintiff has failed to set forth a legally cognizable claim of sex discrimination which occurred prior to the running of the three year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions in the Virgin Islands are subject to a six-year statute of limitations.

Webster v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 1980-06-09

Finally, we hold that the six-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action that is characterized as an action created by statute when selecting a borrowed state limitations period.

Clark v. Musick · filed 1980-07-10

Section 1983 claims in this circuit have continually been characterized as actions created by statute, and, wherever possible, the statute of limitations for actions founded on a liability created by statute has been borrowed.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so federal courts use the most nearly analogous state limitations statute.

Burgess v. Bryant · filed 1980-08-06

As 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a period of limitations for the cause of action created thereby, federal courts must look to the most nearly analogous state statute of limitations to determine the time within which a cause of action may be commenced.

Section 1983 claims use the most appropriate state statute of limitations.

Stinson v. SHERIFF'S DEPT. OF SULLIVAN CTY. · filed 1980-09-08

In actions under section 1983, the “most appropriate” state statute of limitations is applied.

Section 1983 actions in federal court borrow the state statute of limitations most appropriate to those actions.

Singleton v. City of New York, Ronald Salzer and Anthony Dellaventura · filed 1980-09-25

Since Congress has not established a federal statute of limitations for actions brought in federal court under § 1983, we are instructed to apply the state statute of limitations most appropriate to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 actions in state court are subject to a borrowed state limitations period, and a one-year period is not too short.

Ganther V. Board of Regents of University & State Colleges · filed 1980-10-02

Appellant contends that the one-year limitation of A.R.S. Sec. 12-541(3) is not sufficiently generous to preserve the remedial spirit of federal civil rights actions. We do not agree. Had the limitation period been 30 days or 60 days, the question would be arguable. However, we do not believe that a one-year period of limitations is too short.

Section 1983 has no federal limitations period of its own, so courts apply the period for the most nearly analogous state cause of action unless that period is inconsistent with § 1983’s underlying policies.

Gunther v. Miller · filed 1980-10-16

Both sides agree that, in the absence of a federal statute of limitations governing § 1983 claims, the statute of limitations for the most nearly analogous state cause of action should be applied. ... A state statute of limitations will not be applied to a § 1983 claim when it is “inconsistent with the underlying policies of the ... statute giving rise to the cause of action.” ... It is concluded that the general limitations periods established by New Mexico law should apply to this case, and the motion of the defendants will therefore be denied.

Section 1983 has no federal statute of limitations, so federal courts borrow the most analogous state statute of limitations.

Harriett Duet Kirk, Widow of Dalta Ray Kirk v. Alwynn J. Cronvich, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff · filed 1980-10-27

There is no federal statute of limitations for actions under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Consequently federal courts look to the most analogous state statute of limitations.

Section 1983 has no congressionally enacted limitations period, so courts apply the appropriate state limitations period, including the state's period for a continuing civil-conspiracy claim.

Benjamin Harrison Williams, Jr. v. Charlie Rhoden, Charles Tompkins, J. S. Padgett · filed 1980-11-06

As the district court realized, there is no congressionally enacted statute of limitations for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Federal courts must apply the appropriate state limitations period. ... Thus, this conspiracy claim is clearly not barred by the Florida statute of limitations. Under Florida law, the statute of limitations for a civil conspiracy action is four years. ... Williams is still incarcerated and as stated his complaint is properly read to contend that the conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights is continuing. The complaint alleges as one of the conspiracy’s latest acts the parole commission members’ decision to deny parole to Williams in 1976. The complaint was filed in 1978.

A Section 1983 claim alleging racial discrimination in public employment is subject to the state statute of limitations specifically governing that discrimination when the state has provided such a remedy.

Francis J. BURNS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James Leo SULLIVAN Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1980-12-06

Where, as here, the state has provided a specific remedy, complete with statute of limitations, for racial discrimination in public employment and promotion, actions under the federal Civil Rights Acts alleging racial discrimination by the state must be governed by that statute of limitations. In our view, although this rule shortens considerably the time in which an aggrieved person may bring a Section 1983 action for racial discrimination in public employment, it conflicts with no federal policy and enhances the ability of the state to resolve its own personnel problems.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations, so federal courts borrow the limitations period applicable to a similar state-law action in the forum state.

Carpenter v. Dizio · filed 1981-01-09

Initially, as defendants correctly assert, because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, “the limitation to be ... applied is that whieh would be applicable in the courts of the state in which the federal court is sitting had an action seeking similar relief been brought under state law.”

Section 1983 claims borrow the most nearly analogous state statute of limitations because the statute specifies none.

Skrocki v. Caltabiano · filed 1981-01-14

Section 1983 does not specify a statute of limitations; therefore, the most nearly analogous state statute of limitations must be used.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's limitations period for an analogous state claim, and the analogous claim for a constitutional-rights deprivation sounds in tort rather than contract.

Braden v. Texas a & M University System, Etc. · filed 1981-02-02

Because Congress did not establish a statute of limitations applicable to actions brought in federal court under Section 1983, federal courts apply the state law of limitations governing an analogous state cause of action. ... Section 1983 is to be interpreted against a “background of tort liability....” ... Liability is imposed for subjecting a person to the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, not for breach of contract. Therefore, the cause of action is in essence delictual. ... The analogous state law claim for purposes of selecting the state statute of limitations should sound in tort, not contract.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so courts apply state law; in Washington, its three-year catch-all limitations period for injury to a person or another's rights governs when selecting the applicable period.

Rose v. Rinaldi · filed 1981-07-01

The Civil Rights Act of 1871 does not contain a provision limiting the time within which a claim under the Act may be brought. Thus, the federal courts will apply the applicable period of limitations under state law for the jurisdiction in which the claim arose. ... This circuit has continually characterized Section 1983 claims , as actions created by statute, and, wherever possible, the state limitations period governing actions founded on a liability created by statute has been applied. ... That choice is unavailable here because Washington has no such statute. Therefore, we must examine Washington’s other statutes of limitations and determine which limitations period best serves the interests which Section 1983 was designed to protect. ... Washington has two catch-all statutes that are suitable for application to a Section 1983 action: (1) Revised Code of Washington (R.C.W.) 4.16.080(2), which restricts to three years an action “for any injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated,” and (2) R.C.W. 4.16.130, which limits to two years “an action for relief not hereinbefore provided for.” In Section 1983 actions the United States has an interest in a limitations period “sufficiently generous ... to preserve the remedial spirit of federal civil rights actions.” ... The catch-all three-year limitations period “for any other injury to the person or rights of another” contained in R.C.W. 4.16.080(2) furthers this interest. Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court has stated that in situations where there is uncertainty as to which limitations statute governs, the longer statute will generally be used. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the applicable period of limitations for Rose’s Section 1983 action is three years under R.C.W. 4.16.080(2).

Section 1983 claims borrow the state statute of limitations for the most analogous state-law cause of action.

Haefner v. Lancaster County, Pa. · filed 1981-08-11

Congress did not establish a federal statute of limitations for actions brought in federal court under Section 1983, and, therefore, the state statute of limitations for the cause of aetion most nearly analogous thereto must be “borrowed”.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, so courts apply the analogous state limitations period.

Mazur v. Department of Revenue, Com. of Pa. · filed 1981-08-25

Since § 1983 contains no statute of limitations of its own, the courts must apply the analogous state statute of limitations.

Section 1983 uses the statute of limitations applicable to the most similar state-law cause of action.

Barrett v. Hoffman · filed 1981-08-27

In a § 1983 action federal courts must apply the statute of limitations applicable to the most similar State cause of action.

A § 1983 claim uses the most appropriate state-law limitations period when no federal period governs, unless the state rule is inconsistent with federal law.

DeVargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico Department of Corrections · filed 1981-10-01

The parties agree that there is no federal statute of limitation governing claims under § 1983; thus, the controlling limitation period is the most appropriate one provided by state law. ... Liability under § 1983 and § 41-4-12, supra, is consistent, not inconsistent. ... In our opinion, the two-year period is the applicable limitation period to plaintiff’s claims against Malley under § 1983.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state's applicable statute of limitations.

Sell v. Price · filed 1981-10-16

In a § 1983 action, a Federal Court must apply the applicable statute of limitations from the forum state.

Section 1983 actions use the state statute of limitations for analogous state-law actions because § 1983 supplies no federal limitations period.

Smith v. Avance · filed 1982-01-08

Since there is no federal statute of limitations for civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the state’s statute of limitations for analogous Texas actions applies.

Section 1983 has no federal limitations period; courts ordinarily borrow an applicable state limitations period.

Harvey v. Pomroy · filed 1982-02-08

Federal statutes do not provide for a period of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, federal courts ordinarily look to a period applicable under state law for these causes of action.

Section 1983 contains no statute of limitations, so the limitations period applicable in the forum state's courts to a similar action applies.

Clyde v. Thornburgh · filed 1982-02-18

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “contains no statute of limitations, the limitation to ... be applied is that which would be applicable in the courts of the state in which the federal court is sitting had an action seeking similar relief been brought under state law.”

Section 1983 has no federal statute of limitations, so courts borrow the analogous limitations period of the forum state.

Lewis v. Clark · filed 1982-03-23

There is no federal statute of limitations applicable to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985. Therefore, the courts must apply the analogous statute of limitations of the state where the federal court sits.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to state tort-claim procedures and limitation periods that are inconsistent with the federal civil-rights statutes’ remedial purposes.

Childers v. Independent School District No. 1 Of Bryan County · filed 1982-04-26

Because Congress provided no statute of limitations for suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the courts adopt the most appropriate one provided by state law. ... In sum, we hold that the procedures and limitation periods set out in the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act are not applicable to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they are inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes of the federal civil rights acts.

Section 1983 borrows the most analogous state statute of limitations; for employment-discrimination claims, the applicable period depends on whether the conduct was a failure to promote or a refusal to hire, and the state Tort Claims Act period does not apply.

Erdmann v. BD. OF EDUC. UNION CTY. REG. HIGH SCH. · filed 1982-06-03

Because Congress has not supplied § 1983 with its own statute of limitations, state limitations governing analogous actions are borrowed. ... Accordingly, this Court must examine the nature of the conduct involved and match it to the most nearly analogous New Jersey statute of limitations. ... Accordingly, the two year limitation will not be applied to plaintiff's claim under § 1983. ... Accordingly, the 180 day limit will apply in the event that later proofs demonstrate defendants' actions to be refusals to hire.

Section 1983 actions based solely on facts supporting only specified state-law claims are subject to the state’s shorter limitations period for those claims.

Miller v. City of Overland Park · filed 1982-06-11

We hold that when a § 1983 civil rights action is based upon facts which would support under state law only an action for libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment or an action upon a statutory penalty or forfeiture, ... K.S.A. 60-514 is the correct statute of limitations to be applied and that such an action is barred after one year.

Section 1983 borrows the statute of limitations from the state law governing the action most analogous to the civil-rights claim because Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own.

Weston v. Bachman · filed 1982-07-07

Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations. Therefore, in determining the proper limitations period in a section 1983 action, the state statute governing actions most analogous to the civil rights claim is applied.

Section 1983 claims in this case were subject to the two-year limitations period borrowed from the most analogous state false-imprisonment law.

McKay v. Hammock · filed 1982-07-15

Since § 1983, § 1981 and the 14th Amendment are silent on the question of statute of limitations, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 authorizes the incorporation of state statutes of limitations where state law is not inconsistent with federal law. ... I find that the state one-year limitations period, applicable to false imprisonment actions, is the most analogous state limitations period and that such period is extended to two years by § 13-80-106. Accordingly, the two-year limitations period is applicable to the federal statutory and constitutional claims and the one-year period is applicable to the common law claim.

For a § 1983 claim, the court borrows the limitations period prescribed for the most analogous state cause of action.

Small v. Inhabitants of the City of Belfast · filed 1982-09-23

Since section 1983 does not itself prescribe a limitations period, the court must determine the most analogous state cause of action and borrow the limitations period prescribed by state law.

Section 1983 has no federally mandated statute of limitations, so federal courts apply the limitations period for the most comparable state-law cause of action.

MacKo v. Byron · filed 1982-10-01

There is no federally mandated statute of limitations for general civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Federal courts thus apply the statute of limitations for the most comparable state law cause of action.

Section 1983 contains no statute of limitations, so the court applies the limitation period that would govern a similar action under the law of the forum state.

Kelly v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1982-10-19

Addressing first the question of the statute of limitations, this court cites the well-settled rule that because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, “the limitation to be applied is that which would be applicable in the courts of the state in which the federal court is sitting had an action seeking similar relief been brought under state law.”

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so federal courts apply the state limitations period appropriate to the claim.

Rosenbaum v. Larson · filed 1982-11-02

The appropriate period of limitations for legal actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has been the subject of considerable debate, due to the absence of any limitation in the statute itself. Generally, federal courts apply the period of limitations that would be appropriate to plaintiff’s claim if it had been filed in the court of the state in which the federal court sits.

Because § 1983 specifies no limitations period, the forum state's limitations period applies; for claims against state police officers acting in their official capacities, the five-year period for actions against public officers applies.

Blake v. Roderic H. Katter and Steven R. King · filed 1982-11-22

In contrast, in this case, we need not resort to analogies to determine which is the most appropriate statute of limitations. Section 34-1-2-2 Second applies to “[a]ll actions against a sheriff, or other public officer ... growing out of a liability incurred by doing an act in an official capacity, or by the omission of an official duty.” Thus, this subsection applies to Blake’s claims if appellees are public officers and the acts Blake complains of were performed in their official capacities. ... Accordingly, we hold that for the purposes of the claims here appellees are public officers within the meaning of § 34-1-2-2 Second and were acting in their official capacities. Thus, a five-year, rather than a two-year statute of limitations, applies and Blake's claims are not time barred.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, so courts apply the most analogous state statute of limitations.

Toteff v. Village of Oxford · filed 1983-01-14

Since Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, this Court is bound to follow the most analogous state statute of limitations in its determination of whether or not plaintiffs’ claim is time-barred.

When § 1983 provides the federal cause of action but Congress has not prescribed a limitations period, courts apply the most closely analogous state limitations period.

Clulow v. State Of Oklahoma · filed 1983-02-22

Congress did not prescribe limitations periods for the Civil Rights Acts. In the absence of such Congressional direction the federal courts apply the most closely analogous state period of limitation.

Section 1983 actions use the state limitations period for the state cause of action most analogous to the federal civil-rights claim; here, the court applied Maine’s two-year period for defamation or false-light invasion of privacy.

Abdollah Gashgai, M.D. v. Leibowitz · filed 1983-03-24

Congress has not enacted a statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Instead, federal courts are to “look to the state statute or remedy ‘most analogous’ to the particular civil rights cause of action to determine the time limitation under the Civil Rights Acts.” ... In the absence of any indications from the Maine courts to the contrary, therefore, we hold that they would apply a two-year statute of limitations to “false light” actions. ... For the reasons stated above, appellant’s action is time barred and the decision of the district court is affirmed.

For a § 1983 claim, the limitations period is borrowed from the state statute or remedy most analogous to the civil rights claim.

Vanlaarhoven v. Newman · filed 1983-04-20

In divining the statute of limitations applicable to a § 1983 claim, federal courts are to look to the state statute or remedy most analogous to the civil rights claim.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the state statute of limitations applicable to the conduct alleged to violate the plaintiff's civil rights because § 1983 has no federal statute of limitations.

Moore v. McComsey · filed 1983-05-06

His contention is clearly incorrect. There is no federal statute of limitations applicable to civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The applicable statute of limitations is the state statute which is applicable to the conduct alleged to have violated the plaintiff’s civil rights.

Section 1983 actions are subject to the applicable state statute of limitations; here, section 1983 creates a new statutory liability subject to a one-year limitations period.

Lai v. City of Honolulu · filed 1983-05-18

The court held that a section 1983 action is most accurately characterized as an action created by statute, and that section 1983 imposes a “new” liability by creating a cause of action which did not exist at common law. The court is now satisfied that the statute of limitations for all actions under section 1983 is one year, and that the previous ruling in the present case was in error.

Because § 1983 supplies no limitations period, courts borrow an analogous state limitations statute unless doing so conflicts with federal policy.

V.L. Cross v. Lucius · filed 1983-09-02

Because sections 1983 and 1985 contain no limitation provisions, we look to analogous state statutes to determine whether the action is time-barred, as long as application of the statutes is not inconsistent with federal policies.

For limitations purposes, a § 1983 First Amendment retaliatory-discharge claim is characterized according to its employment-discharge gravamen.

Burney v. Polk Community College · filed 1984-03-30

We agree that plaintiff’s First Amendment rights exist outside of any employment relationship with the PCC defendants; we find, however, that the clear gravamen of plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is a claim that he was discharged by the PCC defendants in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights.

A § 1983 plaintiff may not use the continuing-violation theory to challenge a discrete act outside the limitations period merely because its effects continue.

Pike v. City of Mission · filed 1984-03-30

However, a plaintiff may not use the continuing violation theory to challenge discrete actions that occurred outside the limitations period even though the impact of the acts continues to be felt.

A § 1983 claim that was timely under controlling law when filed should not be barred through retroactive application of a new limitations rule when doing so would be substantially inequitable.

Earnest Edmond Abbitt v. Carl Franklin, John Riley, and Two Unknown Policemen, Designated Herein as Richard Roe and John · filed 1984-03-30

It cannot be said that Abbitt slept on his rights when his action was timely under the law in effect at the time.

Because Section 1983 contains no statute of limitations, a court must characterize the essential nature of the particular Section 1983 claim and apply the state limitations period governing the most analogous state-law cause of action.

Fitzgerald v. Larson · filed 1984-08-20

In accordance with this court's focus on ascertaining the state analog to the specific facts underlying the claim, we find that Fitzgerald's claim is essentially economic in nature. Consequently, we conclude that a Pennsylvania court would not apply a statute of limitations applicable to personal injuries. Because there is "[no Pennsylvania limitation] provision expressly applicable to claims for the torts of wrongful discharge or interference with contractual or economic rights." Knoll, 699 F.2d at 141, we hold that the appropriate limitations period is that found in 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. Sec. 5527(6) ... which provides for a six-year limitation for civil actions not subject to another specified limitation.

Because Section 1983 contains no limitations period of its own, federal courts must borrow the most analogous state statute of limitations for the claim asserted.

Fitzgerald v. Larson · filed 1984-08-20

Congress has not prescribed a limitations period for actions brought under §§ 1983,1985, and 1988. Because it is “now settled that federal courts will turn to state law for statutes of limitations in actions brought under [the Reconstruction-era Civil Rights Acts].” ... we look to Pennsylvania’s law of limitations.

Because state courts have concurrent Section 1983 jurisdiction, filing only state-law claims and orally reserving a future federal action does not interrupt the limitations period for the federal claim.

Ford v. Stone · filed 1984-12-06

Federal jurisdiction of § 1983 claims is concurrent with that of the state courts, rather than exclusively federal. State courts may hear and decide claims raised under the civil rights statutes. ... This court holds that neither plaintiff’s petition nor his state court presentation raised federal claims in a manner sufficient to interrupt prescription.