42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 allows nominal damages for a proven procedural due process violation even when the plaintiff proves no actual injury.

Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea · filed 1996-01-04

In this case, the jury expressly found that Caban-Wheeler's procedural due process rights were violated, and so the District Court did not err in awarding nominal damages.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for deprivation of an absolute right even without actual injury.

Reyes v. City of Lynchburg · filed 2002-08-16

Nominal damages may be available in a § 1983 case if a plaintiff was deprived of an absolute right yet did not suffer an actual injury.

Damages in § 1983 actions follow common law tort principles, and recovery above nominal damages for a constitutional violation requires actual injury.

Mrs. Christine Keyes, Wife Of/and Thomas Keyes v. Ray Lauga, Office of Charity Hospital of Louisiana at New Orleans, Int · filed 1981-01-26

We are also guided by the recent decision in Carey v. Piphus, 1978, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252, which states that principles of common law torts govern the recovery of damages in § 1983 actions. Carey held that an invasion of a constitutional right must be accompanied by actual injury to be compensable by anything more than nominal damages.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a constitutional violation when the plaintiff fails to prove actual damages.

Briggs v. Marshall · filed 1995-02-23

Our review of the caselaw reveals at least three situations where courts may award nominal damages consistent with a finding of an underlying constitutional violation. ... In sum, a rational jury could have found that the Plaintiffs failed to prove any actual damages were caused by Officer Marshall’s unconstitutional conduct. We therefore deny Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial on the damages issue.

Section 1983 limits a due process plaintiff to nominal damages of no more than one dollar when the lack of a hearing caused no pecuniary harm.

Casna v. City of Loves Park · filed 2009-07-24

Casna also claims that Loves Park deprived her of her job without due process, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... If the lack of a hearing did not cause Casna any pecuniary harm — that is, if her termination was nonetheless justified on the merits (a matter we do not decide today) — Casna may recover for her constitutional injury only nominal damages not to exceed one dollar.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for proven selective enforcement even if officials never enforce the challenged order.

Kroll v. Steere, No. 98-545009 (May 2, 2002) · filed 2002-05-02

The court is just saying that as a general principle nominal damages should not be excluded as a legally acceptable possibility under § 1983 if selective enforcement is established as a reason why the order was issued in the first place.

Section 1983 allows damages for a constitutional violation but does not extend damages to later actions independently supported by probable cause.

Bernardi v. Klein · filed 2010-01-13

However, as defendants point out, in Whitwell v. Hoyt, No. 04-C-981-C, 2006 WL 469634 (W.D.Wis. Feb. 26, 2006) (Crabb, J.), this court joined many other courts in concluding that one violation under the Fourth Amendment does not taint all later actions for the purpose of a civil claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Because plaintiff cites no authority that would undermine the conclusion in Whitwell, I see no reason to depart from its holding.

Section 1983 does not support monetary damages where the plaintiff suffered no injury from enforcement and cannot show a municipal act, policy, or custom caused the claimed losses.

BANKSHOT BILLARDS, INC. v. City of Ocala · filed 2010-02-12

Similarly, Bankshot cannot sustain a claim for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Bankshot also lacks standing to bring its claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III of the Supplemental Complaint) because it has not yet suffered any harm by virtue of the enforcement of the Ordinance. ... Although the fact that Bankshot has not yet been prosecuted or even investigated for a violation of the Ordinance does not preclude a challenge to the Ordinance’s constitutionality (or the commensurate equitable relief requested), it does preclude a claim for monetary damages under § 1983. ... To the extent Bankshot points to its reduced monthly revenues, it is undisputed that Bankshot has suffered such financial losses solely due to its own voluntary election to exclude all persons under age 21 at all times. There has been no act, policy, or custom which directly caused Bankshot's losses.

Section 1983 permits an estate administrator to recover for the decedent’s loss of life through pecuniary damages analogous to those available under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act.

Pitzer v. City of East Peoria · filed 2010-04-21

The law of this case establishes that the estate is eligible to recover for decedent’s “loss of life” by collecting pecuniary damages analogous to those listed in the Wrongful Death Act.

Damages in a § 1983 action compensate injuries caused by the constitutional violation.

Guy v. City of San Diego · filed 2010-06-17

Such a reconciliation takes as one premise the general rule governing damages in a § 1983 action: “Whatever the constitutional basis for substantive liability, damages awarded in a § 1983 action must always be designed to compensate injuries caused by the constitutional deprivation.”

Section 1983 loss-of-life damages and Illinois wrongful-death damages address different injuries suffered by different parties, so awarding both does not create double recovery.

Cobige v. City of Chicago · filed 2010-10-25

Moreover, Section 1983 loss of life damages and Illinois Wrongful Death Act damages address different injuries suffered by different parties, and thus the verdict form was proper.

Section 1983 does not require a court to allow a plaintiff who has recovered compensatory damages from an officer to pursue only nominal damages against the municipality for the same injury.

Manzanares v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2010-12-16

If, as Lippoldt teaches, justice did not require allowing Mr. Manzanares to proceed with a claim of nominal damages against the City, then it was surely within the discretion of the district court not to vacate its prior judgment.

Section 1983 damages are unavailable when a plaintiff challenges a law based only on violations of other people’s constitutional rights.

Hunt v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2011-03-22

Where a plaintiff challenges an ordinance based on the violation of third parties’ rights, how- ever, § 1983 damages are not available because there has been no violation of the plaintiff’s own constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires nominal damages for a proven constitutional violation even without economic harm.

Crane-McNab v. County of Merced · filed 2011-04-28

Under federal law, the award of nominal damages in § 1983 cases is mandatory as “symbolic vindication” of a plaintiffs constitutional rights, whether or not he has suffered economic harm.

Section 1983 permits damages for pain and suffering and may permit punitive damages in certain circumstances.

Derrol Kirby, III v. Roth · filed 2011-05-02

Because a section 1983 plaintiff may be awarded damages for pain and suffering, see Jackson v. Crews, 873 F.2d 1105, 1109 (8th Cir. 1989), and may be awarded punitive damages in certain circumstances, see Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (outlining standard), we remand for the court to address these requests.

A plaintiff with an actionable § 1983 claim need not allege specific damages or injury to obtain relief.

Trask v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough · filed 2011-06-17

Trask has asserted an actionable § 1983 claim, and in order to obtain relief under § 1983, she does not have to allege any specific damages or injury.

Section 1983 permits damages.

Wilson v. BIRNBERG · filed 2011-09-16

This is a suit under Section 1983, and damages are permitted.

Section 1983 permits damages claims that remain live after a request for equitable relief becomes moot.

Wilson v. Birnberg · filed 2011-10-05

This is a suit under Section 1983, and damages are permitted. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There is no mootness to that claim.

In California, a successor-in-interest cannot recover a decedent’s emotional distress damages under § 1983.

Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified School District · filed 2011-10-28

This Court finds all the above persuasive and concludes that Walsh may not recover Decedent’s emotional distress under § 1983 as a successor-in-interest.

Section 1983 provides no statutory entitlement to treble damages.

Sager v. Housing Commission · filed 2012-04-11

However, defendants are correct in asserting that treble damages are not available to plaintiff; there is no statutory entitlement to treble damages, per se, in a suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a constitutional violation without proof of actual injury.

Kane v. Lewis · filed 2012-06-18

Further, if this question is resolved in Kane’s favor, he will be able to recover nominal damages under § 1983 for the violation of Cornish’s constitutional rights.

In a § 1983 excessive force case, a plaintiff is entitled to a requested nominal damages instruction when the jury could find excessive force without a significant injury.

Arthur Taylor, Jr. v. Dormire · filed 2012-09-04

A nominal damages instruction is appropriate in excessive force cases where there is evidence that the force, despite being excessive, did not cause a significant injury. ... The district court abused its discretion in not submitting the requested nominal damages instruction to the jury.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a violation of constitutional rights even without proof of actual damages.

Santa Barbara Patients' Collective Health Cooperative v. City of Santa Barbara · filed 2012-11-29

Because Plaintiff is bringing a § 1983 suit, Plaintiff may be entitled to nominal damages for the violation of its constitutional rights even if it cannot show actual damages.

Section 1983 does not allow detention damages for time the plaintiff would have served on an unrelated conviction regardless of the challenged charge.

Ramos v. City of Chicago · filed 2013-05-24

The jail time was attributable entirely to the weapons charge and conviction, and therefore cannot form the basis for damages for his residential burglary claim because he would have served that time regardless of the burglary charge.

Section 1983 allows nominal damages for an equal protection violation even when the complaint alleges no injury compensable by monetary damages.

Small v. Wetzel · filed 2013-06-11

Small seeks compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages against the defendants for the alleged violation of his rights under the Equal Protection clause. Because the complaint pleads no injury compensable by monetary damages, we will affirm the dismissal of Small‘s claim for compensatory damages. ... Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court‘s order only as to Small‘s claim for nominal damages for the alleged violation of his equal protection rights.

Section 1983 permits general damages for pain and suffering and loss of dignity.

Aichele v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2013-08-26

General damages for pain and suffering and loss of dignity are available in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for time spent in custody that is credited toward a valid sentence.

Bridewell v. Eberle · filed 2013-08-27

What’s more, Bridewell cannot receive damages for time spent in custody on a valid sentence.

Section 1983 permits damages for monetary loss, physical pain and suffering, mental and emotional distress, harm to reputation, and personal humiliation.

Thompson v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2014-01-14

In an action pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff may recover damages for monetary loss, physical pain and suffering, mental and emotional distress, impairment of reputation, and personal humiliation.

Section 1983 permits at least nominal damages when a plaintiff proves a deprivation of federal constitutional rights.

Evans v. Utah · filed 2014-05-19

However, Plaintiffs have pleaded a cause of action for the deprivation of property and liberty interests in violation of the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A determination that the State has deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights eould, therefore, result in at least nominal damages at trial.

Section 1983 damages are available only for violations of the plaintiff’s own constitutional rights.

Nittany Outdoor Advertising, LLC v. College Township · filed 2014-05-20

As applied, the Township’s Ordinance did not violate Nittany’s First Amendment rights — each of its applications were processed in two weeks or less and it did not seek a variance — and “ § 1983 damages ... are available only for violations of a party’s own constitutional rights.”

A plaintiff seeking damages under § 1983 for wrongful confinement does not need expert testimony on causation if she proves the confinement deprived her of a liberty interest.

Pierce v. Pemiscot Memorial Health Systems · filed 2014-06-13

Plaintiff will not require expert testimony on causation to recover damages if she establishes that defendants wrongfully confined her and deprived her of a liberty interest.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a constitutional violation even without proof of actual harm.

Duran v. City of Porterville · filed 2014-09-19

“The Supreme Court has held that even when no actual damages are suffered as a result of a violation of section 1983, a plaintiff still may be entitled to nominal damages.” ... Thus, even minor constitutional injuries that justify only nominal damages may be sufficient to establish an injury-in-fact.

A plaintiff seeking compensatory damages under Section 1983 must provide evidence of injury caused by a constitutional deprivation.

Turner v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government · filed 2014-12-23

However, damages awarded in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim must be designed to compensate injuries caused by a Constitutional deprivation.

A § 1983 plaintiff may receive nominal damages despite an excessive-force finding if the plaintiff does not prove that the excessive force caused the claimed injuries.

Patterson v. City of Omaha · filed 2015-03-09

Here, Patterson did not establish the direct causal link showing that Hasiak's use of excessive force caused Patterson's injury. ... When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we agree with the district court that there is no inconsistency with the jury's award of nominal damages.

Section 1983 permits a property owner to seek monetary damages for development expenses and diminished property value caused by a town’s alleged violation of its rights.

ACQUEST WEHRLE, LLC v. TOWN OF AMHERST · filed 2015-06-19

Plaintiff sought monetary damages both for its expenses in attempting to develop the property and the diminished value of the property attributable to defendant’s actions, and we conclude that it appropriately sought that relief through the 42 USC § 1983 causes of action (see D & S Realty Dev. v Town of Huntington, 295 AD2d 306, 307; see generally Town of Orangetown v Magee, 88 NY2d 41, 48, 52).

Section 1983 permits nominal damages when a plaintiff’s rights are violated without monetary injury.

Six Star Holdings, LLC v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2016-04-13

And in civil rights cases, nominal damages are appropriate when a plaintiff’s rights are violated but there is no monetary injury.

Section 1983 permits plaintiffs to seek compensatory and punitive damages for their injuries.

Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2017-02-23

As the City Defendants note, plaintiffs in actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may seek recovery for emotional and mental harm, legal fees, and other compensatory and punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a proven Equal Access Act violation when the plaintiff diligently seeks them and has not waived the claim.

Carver Middle School Gay-Straight Alliance v. School Board of Lake County · filed 2017-04-12

The Court therefore holds that nominal damages are recoverable under the Equal Access Act through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when diligently sought by a plaintiff who successfully proves a violation of the Act and has not waived the claim by its conduct.

Section 1983 limits damages for an unlawful search to injuries directly related to the invasion of privacy when the plaintiff brings no separate false arrest or malicious prosecution claim.

Corrigan v. District of Columbia · filed 2017-06-08

The plaintiff, however, never brought a claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution, claiming only unlawful search and seizure. Accordingly, he can be compensated only for those damages “directly related to the invasion of [his] privacy.”

Section 1983 requires nominal damages when a plaintiff proves a constitutional violation but no actual injury.

Stoedter v. Gates · filed 2017-08-03

Thus, we agree with the district court that, under Searles, nominal damages are mandatory upon a finding of a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits compensatory and punitive damages for denial of access to courts when the relief does not imply that the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence is invalid.

Canales-Robles v. Peters · filed 2017-09-03

The court concludes Heck is not a categorical bar to compensatory and punitive damages, though he cannot seek relief for the fact of his incarceration prior to favorable termination of his collateral challenges to his sentence and conviction.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for denial of counsel without proof of prejudice to the criminal defense.

Bairefoot v. City of Beaufort · filed 2018-05-16

A structural error like denial of counsel does not require a showing of prejudice when reviewing a criminal conviction for legal error, but some actual harm must be shown to establish liability for compensatory damages. But the alleged deprivation of counsel certainly suffices to support a claim for nominal damages.

Section 1983 requires proof of damages for a constitutional tort claim.

Hurdsman v. Wise County Sheriff Deputies: James Mayo, Clint Caddell, Chad Lanier, Christopher Hodges, and High · filed 2018-06-21

Damages are an essential element of a constitutional tort action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and any other tort action.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a brief unlawful detention when the jury reasonably finds no actual injury.

Kovacic v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2018-07-17

Although Jared Kovacic was detained for 20 minutes, a jury could reasonably find that this brief deprivation of liberty does not amount to a per se actual injury, unlike the 100 days of incarceration that we deemed to be an actual injury in Hazle v. Crofoot, 727 F.3d 983, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2013).

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s deliberate indifference claim to proceed without proof of damages.

James v. Stateville Corr Center · filed 2018-08-22

But “[d]amages are not an element of liability in a deliberate indifference claim.”

Section 1983 does not directly address damages; in a survival action, applicable state remedies supply them unless inconsistent with federal law.

Silva v. City and County of Honolulu · filed 2019-05-29

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not “address directly the question of damages.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978). In survival actions, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) requires the application of state-law survival remedies in Section 1983 cases unless those remedies are inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 permits monetary damages.

Solomon v. Milwaukee County Sheriff Office · filed 2019-08-13

Monetary damages are acceptable in a Section 1983 lawsuit.

Section 1983 provides no nominal damages remedy against the State or its officials sued in their official capacities.

Espinosa v. Dzurenda · filed 2019-08-22

An action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates no [nominal damages] remedy against the State” and its official actors.

Section 1983 permits money damages for medical expenses and physical, emotional, and psychological harm.

Doucette v. Jacobs · filed 2019-08-26

As to redressability, here, the Doucettes request money damages for medical expenses arising from B.D.'s seizures and the physical, emotional, and psychological harm that B.D. experienced because of the school district's "severe, pervasive disregard for [the] safety and well-being [of] B.D." Section 1983 authorizes such forms of relief.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a constitutional violation even when the plaintiff cannot prove actual damages.

Nouri v. Manzella · filed 2019-09-10

Additionally, plaintiffs may recover nominal damages for claims asserting constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even where they fail to prove actual damages.

Section 1983 provides a means to seek monetary damages for a Fifth Amendment claim against a local government.

Petworth Holdings, LLC v. Bowser · filed 2019-10-03

Second, and equally significant, Plaintiffs’ addition of a Fifth Amendment challenge brought under § 1983 (rather than under the Constitution alone) merely provides a means by which they can seek monetary damages should they prevail.

Section 1983 permits recovery of hedonic damages for loss of enjoyment of life in the District of Arizona.

Daily v. Phoenix, City of · filed 2019-11-05

The Court finds that hedonic damages are recoverable in the District of Arizona for § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 authorizes monetary compensation for constitutional violations; seeking damages does not change whether the conduct violated the Constitution.

Nikita Smith v. City of Detroit, Mich. · filed 2018-10-15

Second, given the doctrine of qualified immunity, we see no basis to change our analysis of a constitutional violation based on the remedy sought. Indeed, § 1983 authorizes monetary compensation for constitutional violations.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages to recognize a violation of constitutional rights.

Luce, Gregory v. Town of Campbell, Wisconsin · filed 2020-01-09

Regardless, because the Town does not oppose this request and because an award of nominal damages is appropriate as recognition of a violation of constitutional rights, see Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2003), the court will grant that request.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a constitutional violation and the damages sought.

Investment Realty Services, LLC v. Park · filed 2020-01-15

To recover damages in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the constitutional violation and the damages it seeks.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek damages for injuries proximately caused by an unlawful entry even when officers have qualified immunity for the conduct that directly caused those injuries.

Bosworth v. City Of San Jose · filed 2020-01-30

Even though the officers here are entitled to qualified immunity on their deployment of the dog, Jesse is entitled to seek damages for the injuries proximately caused by the warrantless entry.

Section 1983 permits damages for a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.

Le Bourgeois v. Wolf · filed 2020-03-10

Damages are available under § 1983 for a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, but at this point it is unclear whether the Free Exercise Clause grants a prisoner a right to a religious accommodation.

Section 1983 permits money damages for a Fourteenth Amendment violation even after confiscated property is returned.

Nash v. Saint Joseph County Jail · filed 2020-04-23

Returning Mr. Nash’s wedding band may have rendered a request for injunctive or declaratory relief moot, see Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1996), but Mr. Nash remains entitled to money damages if he can demonstrate that the confiscation violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires proximate causation for consequential damages; a shareholder cannot recover financial losses suffered only indirectly through a corporation.

Pemberton v. City of New York · filed 2020-07-31

Pemberton may not recover consequential damages for NUC and Mepco’s financial losses because the causal connection between the Arrest and the alleged damages to Plaintiff as a shareholder of NUC and Mepco is too indirect; proximate cause is therefore lacking.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for excessive force when the jury can reasonably attribute the plaintiff’s quantifiable injuries to justified force.

Matthews v. Debus · filed 2020-09-06

Under the first Briggs situation, they would have been an appropriate basis for the jury to award only nominal damages. Therefore, the Court concludes that Matthews is not entitled to a new trial on the ground that the jury inappropriately awarded him nominal damages.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a proven constitutional violation even when a pro se plaintiff requests compensatory damages without expressly requesting nominal damages.

Furman v. Cherry · filed 2020-09-11

Because Furman proved that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights, Furman was eligible for an award of nominal damages despite the district court’s determination that Furman was unable to recover compensatory or punitive damages. Moreover, that the operative complaint in this case included no specific request for nominal damages does not foreclose their availability.

Section 1983 damages against individual officers are not offset by compensation under New York's unjust-conviction statute, whether that compensation follows settlement or trial.

Dukes v. City of Albany · filed 2020-10-06

As in Restivo, no amount of a jury's damages award to either plaintiff in these § 1983 actions "could even theoretically [be] attributable to the State of New York, whether or not the State of New York had previously settled, because the State of New York is not a proper party under Section 1983." 846 F.3d at 583. Thus, at the end of the day, it does not matter whether the New York Court of Claims actions are resolved by settlements (in which the ... State would not be likely to admit fault) or at a trial (in which the plaintiffs would not need to prove fault to recover). Accordingly, the thirty-second affirmative defense in the amended answer would also be dismissed as futile.

A recovery from New York for unjust conviction under Court of Claims Act § 8–b does not reduce damages against individual officials under § 1983, whether the state recovery follows a settlement or a trial.

Sakina Mitchell and Tadre Jones, Co-Administrators for the Estate of Lavelle R. Jones v. Albany · filed 2020-10-06

Thus, at the end of the day, it does not matter whether the New York Court of Claims actions are resolved by settlements (in which the ... State would not be likely to admit fault) or at a trial (in which the plaintiffs would not need to prove fault to recover). Accordingly, the thirty-second affirmative defense in the amended answer would also be dismissed as futile.

Section 1983 permits a deceased victim’s estate to recover hedonic damages even when state law would bar them.

Smart v. City of Wichita, Kansas · filed 2020-12-23

To the extent Kansas law is to the contrary, Berry makes clear it does not apply in this § 1983 death case. ... The court denies defendant’s motion to exclude evidence of hedonic damages.

Section 1983 recognizes the eggshell skull doctrine, under which a defendant takes the plaintiff as found when assessing damages.

(PC) Caruso v. Johnson · filed 2021-01-04

The eggshell skull doctrine, i.e. the defendant takes his victim as he finds him, is a recognized theory in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 permits recovery for mental and emotional distress caused by a wrongful deprivation of due process, but the injury must result directly from that deprivation.

Jacqueline M. Jones, Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Los Angeles Community College District, Defendant-Appellee/cr · filed 1983-03-25

While such harm is compensable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, she must still demonstrate that her injury resulted directly from the wrongful deprivation of due process.

Damages under § 1983 compensate injuries caused by deprivation of constitutional rights.

Joan W. v. City of Chicago, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1985-10-07

Damages are awarded in § 1983 actions to compensate individuals for injuries resulting from the deprivation of their constitutional rights.

Emotional-distress damages in a § 1983 action may not be presumed and require proof that the constitutional violation actually caused the injury.

Spence v. Board Of Education Of The Christina School District · filed 1986-12-29

Thus, since emotional distress damages may not be presumed, the district court properly ordered remittitur of those damages, finding that plaintiff did not submit sufficient evidence to prove that emotional injuries actually occurred or that they were caused by defendant's conduct.

A § 1983 plaintiff may recover damages even when the pleading requests only equitable relief because Rule 54(c) authorizes the court to grant any relief to which the successful party is entitled.

Home Indemnity Co. v. City of Marianna · filed 1987-04-13

It is settled that damages are recoverable under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(c) give the trial court the authority to grant full relief to which the successful party is entitled: Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.

Section 1983 bars damages against an absolutely immune judge and does not impose liability on other defendants absent personal involvement or a municipal policy or custom causing the wrong.

Williams v. Frank R. Brown Nash County Commissioners of Nash County, Defendants · filed 1988-02-26

Judge Brown is absolutely immune from liability for damages under Sec. 1983. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1983). The other defendants had no personal involvement in the wrong complained of nor was the wrong caused by a municipal policy or custom. Accordingly, they cannot be liable under Sec. 1983. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

Section 1983 provides damages for actual injuries caused by civil rights violations; damages already decided under it cannot be relitigated for the same injuries in a state tort action.

Virgo v. Lyons · filed 1988-12-27

Because § 1983 provides a remedy in the form of damages for actual injuries suffered by reason of a violation of a plaintiffs civil rights, it follows that the issue of damages for those same injuries cannot be relitigated in a state tort action if it has already been decided in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for a constitutional violation caused by delay in a criminal appeal when the conviction has been affirmed and habeas release is unavailable.

Simmons v. Reynolds · filed 1989-03-15

Petitioner’s appropriate remedy is to bring an action for damages under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 (1982).

In a § 1983 wrongful termination claim, lost employer retirement contributions may remain a damages issue for trial when vesting and causation cannot be resolved on summary judgment.

Gillette v. Duane Delmore Jerry Garriott and the City of Eugene, a Political Subdivision of the State of Oregon · filed 1989-10-05

Whether these damages are speculative is a question of fact to be determined at trial. There is insufficient evidence in the record to determine whether Gillette had any vested right in those funds, and whether there is a sufficient causal connection between his termination, his withdrawal of funds from the retirement plan, and the resulting loss of the City’s contributions. In addition, his entitlement to replace the funds in the retirement plan once he was reinstated may also affect this issue. On this record, summary judgment was inappropriate. We therefore reverse the partial summary judgment on this issue.

Section 1983 does not allow consequential damages for increased construction costs caused by a temporary zoning denial in an inverse condemnation case.

BURLINGTON ASSEM. OF GOD CHURCH v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, Tp. of Florence · filed 1990-11-28

Those costs are consequential in nature and not compensable under the Fifth Amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this inverse condemnation case.

Section 1983 damages require a causal link between the deprivation of federal rights and a compensable injury.

Coral Construction Company v. King County · filed 1991-08-08

Of particular import here is section 1983's causation requirement. ... Nonetheless, we cannot determine whether this violation entitles Coral Construction to an award of damages, as the record does not indicate whether Coral Construction lost its bid to a business which King County should not have considered.

A section 1983 defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law solely because the jury awarded no monetary damages when its liability verdict found injury and confusion over the damages instruction caused inconsistent findings.

Williams v. Armontrout · filed 1992-11-23

On the record before us, we cannot conclude that Downing was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law merely because the jury failed to award monetary damages to Williams. The jury followed the liability instruction and found that Williams was "damaged." Its failure to award monetary damages was appropriately explained in the magistrate judge's order--there were inconsistent findings because of the difference in the wording of the instructions.

Section 1983 damages for deliberate indifference require proof that the defendants’ actions actually and proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.

Ransom v. Dr. Osten Supervisor Jackson · filed 1993-05-21

To prevail and recover damages on his section 1983 claim under a deliberate indifference theory, Ransom must prove that the defendants' actions were the actual and proximate cause of his injuries.

Under Section 1983, the plaintiff normally bears the burden of proving causation and damages, but the causation burden shifts when the defendant prevents access to evidence and thereby makes proof impossible.

Miner v. City of Glens Falls · filed 1993-07-26

In this Circuit, the burden is normally on the plaintiff to prove each element of a § 1983 claim, including those elements relating to damages. ... We recognize a limited exception, under truly extraordinary circumstances: if the defendant prevents the plaintiff from obtaining access to evidence, and thereby makes it impossible for the plaintiff to carry the burden of proof, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the deprivation of plaintiffs liberty or property right would have occurred even if due process had been afforded.

Section 1983 damages require the alleged procedural defect to have caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Parham v. Suppa · filed 1994-02-08

In order to prevail, Par-ham must have been “subjected” or “caused ... to [have been] subjected” to a deprivation of a federal constitutional right. ... Thus Parham has not established that a deficiency in the affidavit, rather than his presence in, and previous driving of, the stolen car was the source of any damage incurred by Parham.

Section 1983 allows a claim for the constitutional violation itself even if the violation did not proximately cause a later physical injury.

Dragon v. Judith Hudson, Sheriff, and John Doe, Jailor · filed 1995-11-17

Dragon's claim survives regardless of whether Hudson's deliberate indifference proximately caused Weaver's attack. 10 Therefore, Dragon's failure to notify the IDOC himself of Weaver's threat does not defeat his claim. As noted above, all we need to consider is whether Dragon's complaint sufficiently alleges a constitutional violation. Harm to Dragon can arise from the constitutional violation itself.

Section 1983 allows recovery for aggravation of a preexisting injury caused by excessive force.

Ikerd v. Blair · filed 1996-12-12

In Dunn, 79 F.3d at 403, this court held that a § 1983 plaintiff can recover for "aggravation of a preexisting injury caused by the use of excessive force." Thus, although Laura's injuries were exacerbated by the fact that her arm had previously been broken, this circumstance does not preclude her from recovering damages for any excessive force used against her.

Damages sought under § 1983 may be denied when the plaintiff does not prove an appropriate amount.

Rural Water System 1 v. City of Sioux Center · filed 1998-11-12

The court would deem it appropriate, despite the lack of other authority directly supporting a money damages award for violation of § 1926(b), to award such damages pursuant to § 1983 to compensate RWS # 1 for the period in which it was wrongfully deprived of the opportunity to serve the specified customers. ... In light of this lacuna in the proof, and the lack of any authority directly supporting an award of money damages to remedy violations of § 1926(b), the court will award no money damages.

The burden of proof for punitive damages under § 1983 is a preponderance of the evidence.

Community Hospital v. Fail · filed 1998-11-30

The proper burden of proof for punitive damages under both §§ 1983 and 1981a is a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 1983 damages follow ordinary tort causation; the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not extend the chain of causation.

Townes v. City of New York · filed 1999-05-06

In a § 1983 suit, constitutionally invalid police conduct that by itself causes little or no harm is assessed on ordinary principles of tort causation and entails little or nominal damages. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is not available to elongate the chain of causation.

A § 1983 damages verdict may be set aside when the plaintiff fails to establish that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed injury.

Glass v. Mann · filed 1999-11-05

The Court, having found that the plaintiff has failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the conduct of Officer Mann and the tom rotator cuff, sets aside the judgment of the jury as to the assault and battery and the civil rights violation counts.

Section 1983 damages require the defendant’s actions to violate constitutional rights and cause compensable injury.

W.H. Scott Construction Co. v. City of Jackson · filed 2000-01-24

Scott sought damages from the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which requires the City’s actions to have been found “violative of...constitutional rights and [to] have caused compensable injury ....” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978)(quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975))(internal quotations omitted).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages to prove that the asserted constitutional violation caused those damages.

Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State · filed 2001-03-08

To prevail on its section 1983 claim, plaintiff must prove that the asserted constitutional violation caused the damages that plaintiff seeks to recover.

A § 1983 damages claim requires a causal connection between the alleged misconduct and the asserted damages.

Berman, Norman v. Young, Jackie · filed 2002-05-31

Accordingly, she has not established a causal connection between the alleged inadequate investigation by Young, Threatt, or Hall and the damages she is asserting in this sec. 1983 claim.

Section 1983 damages follow tort principles and require proof that the defendant’s wrongdoing factually and proximately caused the injury.

Webb v. Amato · filed 2002-07-15

A section 1983 claim sounds in tort, and the damages available to plaintiff are governed by the principles of tort law. ... In order to recover damages arising from an injury, plaintiff must show that the injury was factually and proximately caused by defendants’ wrongdoing.

A plaintiff seeking future lost profits under Section 1983 must prove that the constitutional violation caused the loss.

American Marine Rail NJ, LLC v. City of Bayonne · filed 2003-11-06

On the issue of future lost profits under its section 1983 claims, plaintiff bears the burden of proving first that a particular injury it sustained — its loss of future profits — was caused by defendants’ allegedly unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 permits recovery only for injuries proximately caused by a defendant’s wrongful act.

Kmetz v. State Historical Society · filed 2004-02-03

Plaintiff may recover only those damages caused by defendants’ wrongful acts. This is because § 1983 is a tort statute, Button v. Harden, 814 F.2d 382, 383 (7th Cir.1987), and a plaintiff may recover in tort for only those injuries that a defendants’ act proximately caused, Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir.1990).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the constitutional violation caused the claimed injury.

Rodriguez, Angel v. Woodall, Jon · filed 2006-07-11

In addition Rodriguez had to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence a causal link between the injuries resulting from his conviction and the Brady violation.

Section 1983 applies the eggshell-skull rule: a defendant is liable for harm caused even when the victim’s preexisting vulnerability makes the injury worse.

Richman v. Sheahan · filed 2008-01-07

That is the “eggshell skull” rule, see, e.g., Brackett v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78, 81 (7th Cir.1993); Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1192-93 (9th Cir.2002), which like most principles of the common law of torts is applicable to a constitutional tort case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows recovery for damages proximately caused by an officer’s conduct; arraignment does not cut off liability when withheld evidence prevents officials from making informed, independent decisions.

Burke v. McDonald · filed 2009-07-17

This approach to the issue is consistent with Supreme Court precedent emphasizing that liability under § 1983 flows against the defendant for all damages that are the "natural consequences of his actions." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 n.7 (1986) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A § 1983 plaintiff must show that a state actor’s violation of constitutional rights caused injury or damages.

Roe v. Elyea · filed 2011-01-28

A successful § 1983 plaintiff therefore must establish not only that a state actor violated his constitutional rights, but also that the violation caused the plaintiff injury or damages.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must prove the elements of the claim and resulting damages; a due-process violation alone does not entitle the plaintiff to damages.

Town Creek Master Water Management District of Lee v. Webb · filed 2012-07-26

Violation of due process does not ipso facto entitle one to damages.

Once liability is established, § 1983 damages turn on whether the unlawful search and seizure proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.

Guzman v. Bonnstetter · filed 2012-08-02

The jury was consistently asked to assess whether the defendants’ personal conduct (Bonnstetter in leading the entry team and supervising the search, and Rojas in serving guard duty) caused Guzman’s injuries. But the question should have been whether Guzman’s injuries were proximately caused by the unlawful search and seizure.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for losses caused by unforeseeable risks unrelated to the defendant’s conduct.

Guth v. Tazewell County · filed 2012-10-17

Generally a tortfeasor (the plaintiff is accusing the Board of federal constitutional torts, for which 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a federal remedy) is not liable for creating unforeseeable risks.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the constitutional violation proximately caused the claimed damages; an independent basis for a lawful search can break that causal chain.

Smith v. City of Oak Hill, Florida · filed 2014-09-17

While defendants in § 1983 cases “are, as in common law tort disputes, responsible for the natural and foreseeable consequences of their actions,” the § 1983 plaintiff must show causation. ... Thus, the smell of marijuana, which provided independent probable cause supporting the search that led to the discovery of the drugs, firearms, and ammunition, broke the chain of proximate causation linking the unlawful traffic stop with Smith’s subsequent lawful arrest and prosecution, and he cannot recover for the resulting expenses.

Section 1983 damages require the defendant’s breach of duty to be both a factual and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.

Mendez v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2018-07-27

A § 1983 claim creates a species of tort liability, with damages determined “according to principles derived from the common law of torts.” Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 (1986). Such damages are measured in terms of “compensation for the injury caused to plaintiff by defendant’s breach of duty.” Id. Under this analysis, we must first determine what act or omission constituted the breach of duty, and then ask whether that act or omission was the but-for and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages to show a causal connection between the constitutional violation and the claimed loss.

MS Rentals, LLC v. City of Detroit · filed 2019-02-27

To recover damages under section 1983, the plaintiffs must bring out facts that establish a causal connection between the constitutional violation and the damages they seek.

Section 1983 damages require a causal connection between the constitutional violation and the loss claimed.

Halpern 2012, LLC v. Centerline, City of · filed 2019-07-31

To recover damages under § 1983, the plaintiff must bring out facts that establish a causal connection between the constitutional violation and the damages they seek.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a constitutional violation and the damages sought.

Halpern 2012, LLC v. City of Center Line, Mich. · filed 2020-03-16

As the district court correctly explained, a § 1983 plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the constitutional violation and the relief sought.

Section 1983 permits a damages action for denial of procedural due process and allows compensatory recovery for resulting mental or emotional distress even without financial or physical injury.

James v. Bd. of Sch. Com'rs of Mobile County, Ala. · filed 1979-12-28

This court holds that the lack of any financial injury does not deprive the plaintiff of her right to maintain this action for damages because of the denial of the procedural due process in her suspension from teaching duties. ... The Supreme Court has held that such mental distress caused by a denial of procedural due process is compensable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The injury may be purely mental or emotional; concurrent physical injury need not occur.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for humiliation, mental suffering, and intangible loss of civil rights.

Green v. Francis · filed 1983-04-22

In light of this proof of tangible losses, and the fact that humiliation, mental suffering and the intangible loss of civil rights may also be compensated under Sec. 1983, we conclude that the award of $3,000 to Willie Green, $30,000 to Calvin Green, and $30,000 to Mrs. Eula Green was reasonable.

Compensatory damages are available under § 1983 for violations of substantive constitutional rights.

Lewis v. Harrison School District No. 1 · filed 1985-11-01

It is well-settled that compensatory damages are properly recoverable in an action brought under section 1983 for an alleged violation of a plaintiff’s substantive constitutional rights.

Compensatory damages under § 1983 may not be based on the abstract value or importance of the constitutional right violated.

Memphis Community School District v. Stachura · filed 1986-06-25

We therefore hold that damages based on the abstract “value” or “importance” of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in such cases.

A § 1983 plaintiff may recover compensatory damages for proven injuries but may not receive an additional damages award merely for the constitutional violation itself.

Zueck v. City of Nokomis · filed 1987-08-24

We perceive no authority or justification for including damages for violation of constitutional rights as an additional element in the judgment.

Section 1983 permits presumed compensatory damages for an unwarranted disclosure of a person’s HIV status when injury is likely but difficult to prove.

Nolley v. County of Erie · filed 1992-08-20

Based on the above, the court concludes that presumed damages are appropriate in a cause of action founded on the unwarranted disclosure of a person’s HIV status.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for an injury only when the statutory or constitutional violation caused those damages.

Scott v. Bd · filed 1997-08-12

Under her federal law claims, to the extent that causation of injury is not an element required to establish liability, a plaintiff seeking compensatory damages for an injury must show that the damages were caused by the statutory or constitutional violation in order to obtain relief.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages in suits predicated on violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

Emma C. v. Eastin · filed 1997-10-17

Accordingly, the Court concludes that compensatory damages are available not only in direct IDEA actions, but also in § 1983 suits predicated on IDEA violations.

Section 1983 does not support a damages claim based only on a remote or speculative possibility of future injury.

Burns v. Head Jailor of LaSalle County Jail · filed 1984-01-05

But the mere possibility of remote or speculative future injury will not support a Section 1983 claim for damages.

Section 1983 allows damages for pain and suffering when deliberate indifference to a prisoner's medical needs causes injury.

McNally v. Prison Health Services · filed 1999-06-02

In light of this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude that the refusal to give Plaintiff his HIV medication entitled him to damages for pain and suffering.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for proven monetary loss, physical pain, or emotional distress from excessive force, and nominal damages when a constitutional violation causes no compensable injury.

Howard v. Slicker, Jr. v. Jackson · filed 2000-06-21

In sum, if the jury were to find that the officers did indeed use excessive force, Slicker may be entitled to compensatory damages based on any injuries he incurred as a result of their misconduct, including damages based on monetary loss, physical pain and suffering, or demonstrable mental and emotional distress. Moreover, if the jury were to find excessive force but that Slicker suffered no compensable damages, Slicker still would be entitled to an award of nominal damages.

Section 1983 permits compensation for mental and emotional harm.

Butler v. Northern Neck Regional Jail · filed 2020-03-20

Plaintiff does allege, though, that defendants’ use of force led to mental and emotional harm. See Dkt. No. 1 111. This type of injury is cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages for constitutional-rights violations, including nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages when appropriate, recoverable from the responsible officers individually rather than the government.

Schuster v. Thraen · filed 1981-01-26

Thus, it is clear that should plaintiffs succeed in their constitutional claims they would be entitled to nominal damages, compensatory damages if proven and punitive damages if appropriate. These awards would be assessed against Thraen and Millin individually and could not be assessed against the government.

A § 1983 damages award may include emotional and mental distress, and punitive damages require proof by a preponderance of wanton and malicious disregard for constitutional rights.

Cerjan v. Fasula · filed 1981-02-19

The compensable elements of a § 1983 damage award are not limited to out-of-pocket expenses but may also include emotional and mental distress. ... In order to recover punitive damages under § 1983 the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant acted with a wanton and malicious disregard for his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for humiliation, emotional distress, and pain and suffering caused by deprivation of civil rights, and punitive damages in an appropriate case when the defendant acted wilfully and in gross disregard of the claimant's rights.

Shillingford v. Holmes · filed 1981-03-16

Plaintiff, in addition, is entitled to compensatory damages for humiliation, emotional distress and pain and suffering for the deprivation of his civil rights protected by Section 1983. Although such compensatory damages are inherently incapable of exact measurement, they clearly are recoverable. ... Punitive damages are recoverable under Section 1983 in an appropriate case. ... “[Pjunitive damages .. . may be imposed if a defendant has acted wilfully and in gross disregard for the rights of the complaining party.” [Citations omitted].

Punitive damages may be awarded under § 1983 when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Thomas v. Booker · filed 1985-05-16

And “a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

Punitive damages may be awarded in a § 1983 action without proof of actual loss when the plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated.

Stella Jackson Baltezore, Wife of Donald Baltezore v. Concordia Parish Sheriff's Department · filed 1985-08-05

Moreover, it is settled that punitive damages may be awarded in a section 1983 action even without a showing of actual loss by the plaintiff if the plaintiffs constitutional rights have been violated.

Compensatory or punitive damages under § 1983 require proof of a constitutional violation.

Bohen v. City of East Chicago, Ind. · filed 1985-09-11

To recover compensatory or punitive damages under § 1983, however, Bohen must establish á violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.

Punitive damages under § 1983 require evil motive or intent, or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., Inc. · filed 1985-10-21

punitive damages may be assessed when the defendant’s conduct “is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

Reckless or callous disregard of federal rights permits consideration of § 1983 punitive damages but does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to them.

Fairley v. Jones · filed 1987-08-19

Thus, to trigger an inquiry into punitive damages a party must establish reckless or callous disregard for his rights. But the fact that such a showing is made does not automatically entitle one to recover punitive damages.

In a § 1983 excessive-force action, a properly instructed jury may award $1 in compensatory damages and no punitive damages.

Taylor v. Simmons · filed 1992-02-18

Curtis Leon Taylor claimed in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) action that a prison guard used excessive force against him. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in Taylor's favor and awarded Taylor compensatory damages of $1.00 and no punitive damages. On appeal, Taylor challenges the jury's verdict. Our review of the record reveals that the jury was properly instructed on damages and that this appeal is without merit. The entry of judgment in accordance with the verdict is accordingly affirmed.

A plaintiff who disclaims monetary relief at trial waives entitlement to compensatory and punitive damages under § 1983.

Nichols v. Nix · filed 1993-01-11

The court determines that Nichols is not entitled to either compensatory or punitive damages. At the trial, Nichols testified the only relief he is now seeking is access to the CJCC religious materials. He specifically testified that he did not want any monetary relief. ... Under these circumstances, the court determines that Nichols has waived any entitlement to monetary damages.

Federal standards govern punitive damages under § 1983 in state court, and a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to prove entitlement to those damages.

Nelson v. Emerald People's Utility District · filed 1993-12-09

On the second issue, we conclude that federal standards govern an award of punitive damages under section 1983. ... The trial court properly instructed the jury that the preponderance of evidence standard was to be applied in determining whether punitive damages should be awarded.

Section 1983 does not require actual or punitive damages merely because a plaintiff establishes Eighth Amendment liability.

Brown v. Delo · filed 1996-06-14

Contrary to Brown's view, a finding of Eighth Amendment liability does not require an award of actual or punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for intentional conduct or reckless or careless indifference to federally protected rights; evil intent is unnecessary.

Wilson v. Philadelphia Detention Center · filed 1997-10-09

A court can award punitive damages in a § 1983 case in order to punish defendants and deter others from committing similar conduct in the future. ... Punitive damages are appropriate if the defendants acted in an intentional manner or were motivated by an evil intent, see id. at 56, 103 S.Ct. at 1640, but evil intent is not required; courts also can award punitive damages if the defendants acted with “reckless or careless indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Williams v. Larry Brimeyer, Sued as Larry Brimyer John Sissel and Erma Heiken, Sued as Irma Heiken · filed 1997-10-15

Punitive damages may be awarded when a defendant’s conduct is motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.

A § 1983 plaintiff needs evidence of sufficiently culpable conduct to obtain a punitive damages instruction; proof that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s rights alone is insufficient.

Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Jonathan Haddad, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant · filed 1997-11-21

In order to justify an award of punitive damages, the defendant’s unlawful conduct must surpass a certain threshold. ... Consequently, a plaintiff is not entitled to an instruction allowing the jury to award punitive damages unless there is evidence that the defendant’s conduct could be so characterized. ... We conclude that the district court properly ruled that the evidence as to Haddad’s conduct could not justify an award of punitive damages.

A punitive damages award in a § 1983 action is subject to excessiveness review; a 40-to-1 ratio to compensatory damages can be permissible.

Blackledge v. Carlone · filed 2001-01-25

The court concludes that a 40-to-l ratio is not excessive in this civil rights case.

Section 1983 permits recovery of compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages for constitutional violations, with nominal damages available even without actual compensatory damage and punitive damages reserved for malicious or outrageous conduct.

United States Ex Rel. Motley v. Rundle · filed 1972-03-29

This Circuit has recognized three types of damages which may be recovered under appropriate circumstances for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Besides actual compensatory damages, the successful plaintiff may recover nominal damages which flow from the deprivation of valuable constitutional rights, as well as punitive damages. ... Whether or not actual compensatory damage is present, a plaintiff in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may also recover nominal damages because the constitutional rights of a citizen are so valuable to him that an injury is presumed to flow from the deprivation itself. ... On the other hand, the court recognizes that punitive damages are to be awarded only in cases of malicious actions in gross disregard of a plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages when a plaintiff proves a due-process violation even without proving actual injury.

Bradley v. Coughlin · filed 1982-01-27

In addition, nominal damages are available in a § 1983 action if a plaintiff can show he was denied due process, even "without proof of actual injury." Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1053, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978).

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a proven procedural due-process violation without proof of actual injury.

Fast v. School Dist. of City of Ladue · filed 1982-06-29

The Supreme Court has made it clear that "the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury." ... Since this Court found a denial by defendants of plaintiff's due process in that "due process requires that the teacher have a fair opportunity to respond to her selection as the least meritorious, but not prior to the initial decision," the award of One Dollar ($1.00) in nominal damages is proper and appropriate.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for deprivation of property without due process even when the plaintiff cannot demonstrate a loss of benefits.

Hosea Simmons and Andrea Williams v. William Ryan Drew and the Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee · filed 1983-09-12

The PHA’s argument assumes that there can be no constitutional deprivation if there is no demonstrable loss of benefits. However logical that assumption may seem, the Supreme Court squarely rejected it in Carey v. ... 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252, when it held that persons deprived of property without due process could sue under Section 1983 for nominal damages.

A § 1983 plaintiff who proves a violation but no actual injury is limited to nominal damages.

Duffy v. Quattrocchi · filed 1983-12-05

But, these plaintiffs have come forward with no evidence of actual damage arising from the purported § 1983 violation, and have conceded, both by the waiver and in their briefs, that no such damage can be proven. Consequently, if they were to prevail on the merits, and if the waiver was to be ignored, they would at most be entitled to nominal damages.

After a jury finds § 1983 liability but no actual injury, it may award zero rather than a mandatory one-dollar nominal-damages award.

Ganey v. Ralph D. Edwards Walter L. Kautzky, Sam P. Garrison Charles E. Smith Daniel G. Durham · filed 1985-04-02

We conclude that once the issue is presented to the jury, it may decide to award a zero sum or some other small amount as nominal damages.

A prisoner's section 1983 damages claim survives mootness of the claim for injunctive relief, but nominal damages for the constitutional violation may not exceed one dollar.

Wiggins v. Ruth Rushen, Director of the California Department of Corrections, Main Classification Committee at So · filed 1985-05-17

Even if Wiggins’ transfer to Deuel prevented him from receiving injunctive relief, hip claim for damages survived. ... Nominal damages should not exceed $1.00.

Nominal damages are available in a § 1983 action when a constitutional right was violated but consequential damages cannot be ascertained from the evidence.

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati · filed 1987-10-22

Consequential damages for the separate stress incurred by Dr. Pembaur as a result of the events of May 19, 1977 are not ascertainable from evidence before this Court. This is not to suggest that such damages are the only ones obtainable in a § 1983 action. ... Dr. Pembaur is entitled to a vindication of the violation of his constitutional rights and under the circumstances of this litigation the Court determines that he is entitled to nominal damages in the sum of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00).

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a proven deprivation of rights when the evidence does not establish the amount of actual damages.

Schneider v. Colegio De Abogados De Puerto Rico · filed 1988-03-03

There is no question but that the Colegio’s actions have caused these Plaintiffs damages and that the Colegio’s bad faith qualifies these damages for recovery pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The problem, however, lies with a determination as to the amount to which said Plaintiffs are entitled. The evidence is too vague for the Court to establish through anything other than speculation, the amount of damages suffered by these Plaintiffs. Such conjecture would be contrary to good legal practice and is thus rejected. In view thereof, Plaintiffs are awarded nominal damages in the amount of $1.00 each against the Colegio.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for an unconstitutional denial of a land use permit when actual injury is not proven.

Marks v. City Council of City of Chesapeake, Va. · filed 1988-05-31

Plaintiff, Steven John Marks, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after the defendant, the City of Chesapeake, Virginia, denied his request for a conditional use permit to operate a fortune telling and palmistry business (a business permitted with a license specified under the Chesapeake City Code) on property he was attempting to purchase. ... The Supreme Court recently clarified that nominal damages are the appropriate remedy for a constitutional deprivation which has not caused provable, actual injury. ... Accordingly, this Court AWARDS to plaintiff nominal damages of One Dollar ($1.00).

Section 1983 limits a plaintiff who proves a rights violation but no actual injury to nominal damages.

Eaddy-Bey v. Scott Gosselin, Guard Frederick, and M. Smith · filed 1988-10-13

It is well established that a plaintiff who demonstrates a violation of his rights but fails to demonstrate actual injury is limited to recovering nominal damages.

Section 1983 allows nominal damages for a constitutional violation without proof of further injury and compensatory damages for further injury that is proved.

Blake v. Commissioner of Correction · filed 1989-01-11

A deprivation of constitutional rights, even without proof of any further actual injury, entitles a plaintiff to nominal damages. ... If further injury is proved — for example, the “anguish and frustration . . . flow[ing] from the patent unfairness of the hearings and the fear that such unfair treatment would continue in the future” — it is compensable beyond nominal damages.

Section 1983 provides at most one dollar in nominal damages for a procedural violation alone; actual damages require proof that the defective procedure caused the loss.

Snyder v. City of Minneapolis · filed 1989-06-09

Under § 1983, the violation of a claimant’s absolute right to a procedure by itself, gives rise only to nominal damages, not to exceed one dollar. ... Thus, a plaintiff must prove the “unfair hearings” he received caused his damages.

Section 1983 allows nominal damages for a constitutional violation when the plaintiffs show no particularized injury directly resulting from it.

Nelson v. Moline School District No. 40 · filed 1989-10-25

Because these Plaintiffs have demonstrated no particularized injury directly resulting from the constitutional violation, they are entitled only to nominal damages.

Section 1983 allows nominal damages for unconstitutional fair share fee procedures even when the plaintiffs have not shown that the fees themselves were inaccurate.

Hohe v. Casey · filed 1989-12-11

Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to an award of nominal damages of $1.00 apiece because they have established that constitutionally inadequate procedures were used in imposing the fair share fee.

Section 1983 allows nominal damages without proof of actual injury when a constitutional right has been violated.

O'Connor v. City & County of Denver · filed 1990-01-29

Thus, Stachura indicates that nominal damages are recoverable without proof of actual injury, and therefore does not support the City’s argument.

A Section 1983 claim for nominal damages for past harm is not mooted by repeal or amendment of the challenged ordinance.

O'Connor v. City and County of Denver · filed 1990-03-12

We hold that repeal and amendment of the Code did not moot plaintiffs' claim for nominal damages.

Section 1983 plaintiffs who prove a constitutional violation but no actual injury are entitled only to nominal damages of no more than one dollar.

Young v. Lane · filed 1990-03-26

Section 1983 plaintiffs must, therefore, prove “real” injury in the denial of their constitutional rights. The Court went on to state in Carey that if plaintiffs cannot prove actual injury, they are only entitled to nominal damages not to exceed one dollar.

Section 1983 limits a plaintiff to nominal damages for a due process violation unless the violation caused the resulting deprivation.

Patterson v. Thomas A. Coughlin, III Charles P. Hemandy Harold J. Smith N. Desantos · filed 1990-05-16

Nonetheless, Carey also made it clear that even where a denial of due process has been followed by a liberty deprivation, unless the deprivation was caused by the violation the plaintiff is limited to nominal damages.