42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Ortego v. Landry · filed 1999-08-11

Further, we note that punitive damages are recoverable under § 1983 “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

Municipalities are not liable for punitive damages under § 1983.

Cleaves v. City of Chicago · filed 1999-10-14

Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that municipalities are not liable for punitive damages in a 1983 action. ... The City’s motion to dismiss Mr. Cleaves’ Title VII sex discrimination and Equal Pay Act claims for failure to state a claim is GRANTED, as is its motion to strike Mr. Cleaves’ claim for punitive damages.

Municipalities are immune from punitive damages under § 1983.

Lee v. Wyandotte County, Kan. · filed 1984-01-27

We hold, therefore, that the defendant County is immune from punitive damages under §§ 1981 and 1985, as well as under § 1983.

Compensatory damages under § 1983 are governed by common law tort principles.

Maze v. Hargett · filed 1999-10-28

Compensatory damages awarded pursuant to § 1983 are governed by common law tort principles.

Section 1983 requires an award of nominal damages when a plaintiff proves a constitutional violation but no actual injury.

Padilla v. Miller · filed 1999-11-17

Where, as here, a plaintiff has failed to establish actual injury as a result of a constitutional violation, nominal damages must be awarded.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek punitive damages in a Nebraska state court equity action.

State Ex Rel. Cherry v. Burns · filed 1999-11-19

Accordingly, we acknowledge that punitive damages are recoverable in a suit filed in Nebraska state court pursuant to § 1983. Therefore, Russell may seek punitive damages in this § 1983 equity action brought in state court, and his federal substantial right to punitive damages is thereby protected.

Nominal damages in a Section 1983 procedural due process action are legal relief.

Hopkins v. Saunders · filed 1999-12-16

The propriety of the district court’s nominal damage award, and derivatively its fee award, rests upon one issue: Whether a nominal damage award in a section 1983 action for the violation of procedural due process rights is legal or equitable in nature. ... Under the Supreme Court’s framework in Terry, therefore, the district court’s nominal damage award was legal in nature.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against a municipal official whose conduct shows evil motive or reckless indifference to federally protected rights, but not against a municipal organization.

Vinyard v. King · filed 1984-02-16

Although punitive damages will not lie against a municipal organization itself, McKee v. Heggy, 703 F.2d 479 (10th Cir.1983), they will lie against a municipal official, based on his personal financial resources, if such official conduct was prompted by an "evil motive or intent, or when it [the conduct] involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983).

Section 1983 damages for a constitutional violation are limited to injuries directly related to the conduct that violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Skultin v. Bushnell · filed 2000-01-28

The damages to which plaintiffs are entitled for violation of their federal constitutional rights are those directly related to the conduct constituting a violation of the plaintiffs’ civil rights and not necessarily the common law tort damages that might otherwise arise from a state tort, although there may, to some degree, be a similar relationship.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

John v. County of Centre · filed 2000-02-01

According to the United States Supreme Court, a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 compensatory damages ordinarily require an actual present injury causally connected to the defendant’s deprivation of a constitutional right.

Henderson v. Michael F. Sheahan and J.W. Fairman · filed 2000-02-02

Ordinarily, to obtain an award of compensatory monetary damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate both that he has suffered an “actual” present injury and that there is a causal connection between that injury and the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right caused by a defendant.

Punitive damages in a § 1983 action may be reduced to an amount that reflects the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and is sufficient to punish and deter.

Maurer v. Patterson · filed 2000-02-04

Here, the Court holds that, in view of Defendant’s concern for prison order, the upper limit of punitive damages that would not shock the judicial conscience is $20,000. The Court believes that this amount adequately reflects the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct and is sufficient to punish and deter him and others from engaging in similar conduct in the future.

Section 1983 lost-wage damages may reflect what a plaintiff actually would have earned under a prison’s work practices, even if the work schedule violated state law.

Gaston v. Coughlin · filed 2000-02-22

This Court did not predicate its calculation of lost wages on the legality of a seven-day work week for state prison inmates. The award was to compensate Plaintiff for actual lost wages based on the actual inmate-employment practices of New York State.

Section 1983 does not allow a pro se plaintiff to recover the value of his own legal services in earlier state proceedings as compensatory damages.

BD v. DeBuono · filed 2000-02-28

The legislative intent underlying attorney fee awards to § 1983 plaintiffs— i.e., to encourage retention of competent counsel — would be no less thwarted by designating the recovery of expenses incurred by a pro se plaintiff in a state proceeding as an element of compensatory damages under § 1983, rather than “attorney’s fees” under § 1988. In either case, a pro se plaintiff would be deterred from hiring counsel, with the knowledge that he could enrich himself by recovering attorneys’ fees if he prevails on his § 1983 claim. Therefore, to the extent that the “unreimbursed expenses” that Mayerson seeks consist of his time charges or the value of the services he expended in self-representation at his administrative and Article 78 proceedings, I conclude that Mayerson may not recover them in this action.

Section 1983 permits damages for proven significant actual injuries caused by enforcement of an unconstitutional ordinance; punitive damages were unavailable on these claims.

Knoeffler v. Town of Mamakating · filed 2000-03-15

If plaintiff can prove that he has sustained significant actual injuries as a result of the enforcement of any of those ordinances against him he may seek damages therefor pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipal official sued in his official capacity.

Vazquez v. Diaz Colon · filed 2000-03-30

Thus, a municipal official sued in his official capacity can not be held liable for punitive damages.

Section 1983 requires nominal damages when a plaintiff proves a violation of the First Amendment right to free speech but no actual injury.

Risdal v. Halford · filed 2000-04-06

We therefore conclude that the rationale of Farrar requires an award of nominal damages upon proof of an infringement of the first amendment right to speak.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against a public official who violates a public employee’s equal protection rights with malice or reckless indifference.

Lambert v. Fulton County, Ga. · filed 2000-05-30

This argument ignores 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which, in itself, put the Defendants on notice of the possible consequences of violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. ... It is well settled that a public official will face punitive damages if that person violates a public employee’s right to equal protection under the laws with either malice or reckless indifference to federally protected rights.

Section 1983 entitles a plaintiff who proves an excessive-force violation to nominal damages even without evidence of compensable injury.

Howard v. Slicker, Jr. v. Jackson · filed 2000-06-21

Although we have never addressed the appropriateness of nominal damages in the context of an excessive force claim, we agree with the reasoning of our sister circuits which have held that a § 1983 plaintiff alleging excessive use of force is entitled to nominal damages even if he fails to present evidence of compensable injury.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against government officials only when they are sued in their individual capacities.

Adams v. Franklin · filed 2000-07-31

In § 1983 actions, punitive damages are only available from government officials when sued in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 permits recovery of lost retirement contributions from an individually liable defendant as compensatory damages when the plaintiff presents evidence of the loss.

Welton v. Osborn · filed 2000-08-15

In short, the Court concludes that the proper method for Welton to have obtained payment for the lost STRS contributions from Osborn, who has been found liable under § 1983 in his individual capacity, was to present evidence on the issue, and to seek recovery in the form of compensatory damages.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities.

Marchese v. Umstead · filed 2000-08-24

Punitive damages may not be awarded against municipalities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 compensatory damages are governed by general tort-law compensation principles.

Michael Malik Allah, Minister Khalil Wali Muhammad Michael Malik Allah v. Humza Al-Hafeez William W. Ennis, Rev. United · filed 2000-09-06

It is well settled that compensatory damages under § 1983 are governed by general tort-law compensation theory.

Section 1983 permits a prevailing plaintiff to recover actual damages, including back wages.

McDaniel v. Princeton City School District Board of Education · filed 2000-09-12

A prevailing plaintiff in an action brought pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may recover actual damages, including back wages.

Section 1983 permits damages for mental anguish or emotional distress caused by a violation of rights.

McDonald v. Hewitt · filed 2000-09-28

Mental anguish or emotional distress can be the basis of a proper damage award under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages without proof of actual injury, but no damages are available when the defendant establishes that the adverse action would have occurred without the protected conduct.

Diesel v. Town of Lewisboro · filed 2000-11-09

Plaintiffs may recover nominal damages under § 1983 “in the absence of proof of actual injury.” ... But where (as here) the defendants have met their burden under Mount Healthy of proving that the adverse action would have occurred in the absence of the protected conduct, there is no liability. ... Absent liability, damages—nominal, compensatory or punitive—are unavailable.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages without proof of actual injury, but no damages are available when the defendant proves it would have taken the same adverse action without the plaintiff’s protected conduct.

Diesel v. Town Of Lewisboro · filed 2000-11-13

Plaintiffs may recover nominal damages under § 1983 "in the absence of proof of actual injury." Atkins v. New York City, 143 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1998). But where (as here) the defendants have met their burden under Mount Healthy of proving that the adverse action would have occurred in the absence of the protected conduct, there is no liability. ... Absent liability, damages--nominal, compensatory or punitive--are unavailable.

A § 1983 plaintiff who objects to a nominal-damages instruction waives the right to seek nominal damages after the jury finds liability.

Salazaar v. City of Raton · filed 2000-12-15

By objecting to the very instruction he now seeks to benefit from, plaintiff waived any right he had to a nominal damage award.

Section 1983 plaintiffs bear the burden of proving compensatory damages, including the extent of their injuries.

Choate v. County of Orange · filed 2001-01-17

Plaintiffs have the burden of proving compensatory damages in section 1983 cases, and the amount of damages depends “largely upon the credibility of the plaintiffs’ testimony concerning their injuries.”

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil intent or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Dimarco-Zappa v. Cabanillas · filed 2001-01-19

The extent of federal statutory and constitutional law preventing discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or race suggests that defendants had to know that such discrimination was illegal, and that in misgrading DiMarco’s test they exhibited “reckless and callous indifference” to her federal rights, if not evil intent.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

DiMarco-Zappa v. Cabanillas · filed 2001-01-19

Punitive damages may be awarded under § 1983 "when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1982).

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when the defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Moskowitz v. Coscette · filed 2001-01-22

“Punitive damages are available in a section 1983 case when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against an individual defendant whose conduct shows evil motive or intent or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Glaspy v. Malicoat · filed 2001-02-12

In addition, the Court will award Glaspy punitive damages of $5,000 against Malicoat because Malicoat’s actions demonstrate evil motive or intent or callous indifference to Glaspy’s federally protected rights.

Section 1983 permits a nominal-damages instruction when the extent or cause of the plaintiff’s injury is disputed.

Foote v. State of Utah · filed 2001-02-16

We hold that under the evidence adduced at trial, there was a legitimate dispute between the parties as to the extent of any injury suffered by Foote and the cause thereof which justified the giving of an instruction on nominal damages.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a procedural due process violation without proof of actual injury.

Mark Weinberg Randy Powers Elizabeth Powers v. Whatcom County Nathan W. Brown · filed 2001-02-27

Given the availability of nominal damages, Weinberg need not prove actual damages to have an actionable procedural due process claim. Consequently, the district court erred in granting the County’s motion for summary judgment on this claim premised on Weinberg’s failure to prove damages.

Section 1983 makes monetary damages available for a federal constitutional claim.

Bezy v. Floyd County Plan Commission · filed 2001-03-08

Monetary damages are available to Bezy only under § 1983 and not Indiana Code § 36-7-4-1009.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for humiliation and intangible loss caused by a constitutional violation, even without proof of tangible loss.

Cobb v. City of Columbus · filed 2001-04-20

“ ‘The basic purpose’ of § 1983 is ‘to compensate persons for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.’ ” ... Under these circumstances, the Court finds that damages in the amount of $500.00 will reasonably compensate plaintiff for the “humiliation, mental suffering and the intangible loss” of his Fourth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a civil rights violation even when no injury is shown; a finding of liability does not itself entitle the plaintiff to actual damages.

Holmes v. Stalder · filed 2001-04-27

To the extent that Holmes avers that the award of nominal damages is inconsistent with the jury’s finding that excessive force was used, a plaintiff is entitled to an award of nominal damages for the violation of his civil rights, even when no injury was shown, and such a verdict is not inconsistent and does not entitle the plaintiff to an award of actual damages.

Section 1983 does not allow compensatory damages based solely on the abstract value of a constitutional right.

Turner v. Bolden · filed 2001-04-30

The district court properly found that defendants were entitled to judgment on Turner’s claim for compensatory damages, because the abstract value of a constitutional right is not a basis for compensatory damages, see Memphis Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, All U.S. 299, 307-08 & n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986), and because Turner had not suffered any physical injury, as required before compensatory damages can be awarded, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).

Section 1983 permits nominal damages only in the absence of proof of actual injury.

Pryer v. Slavic · filed 2001-05-30

But nominal damages may only be awarded in the absence of proof of actual injury.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when officials intentionally discriminate on the basis of race while knowing that conduct is unlawful.

Chester L. Lambert, III v. Fulton County · filed 2001-06-06

Where, as here, (1) there is no argument or evidence that Cooper or Regus genuinely believed that racial discrimination in the context of this case was permissible, and (2) there is ample evidence that both Regus and Cooper intentionally discriminated against Appellants because of their race, nothing more is required to support an award of punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with an evil motive or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Gonzalez v. Bratton · filed 2001-06-13

Punitive damages may be awarded in an action under § 1983 “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983); Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 808 (2d Cir.1996). The jury so found in this case as to Gonzalez’s claims against Kissik, Edelman and Witkowich.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against prison officials who recklessly disregard a prisoner’s rights.

Reilly v. Grayson · filed 2001-06-22

Here, Grayson, Daniels, and Cross were clearly reckless in their disregard of Reilly’s rights, particularly in light of the notice they had with the filing of the complaint and the two Reports And Recommendations by the magistrate judge. Grayson, Daniels, and Cross each clearly ignored his supervisory obligations and, as a consequence, should suffer the opprobrium of punitive damages, not so much to deter each of them in the future, but to deter other officials in like positions of ignoring their responsibility.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for emotional distress upon proper proof.

Williams v. Lara · filed 2001-06-28

Upon proper proof a plaintiff may recover compensatory damages for emotional distress under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff who adequately alleges unequal treatment based on race to seek nominal damages.

Comfort v. Lynn School Committee · filed 2001-06-29

Here, I find that the plaintiffs assert adequate proof of unequal treatment based on race, and therefore, under § 1983, have standing to seek nominal damages.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a proven violation of a substantive constitutional right even without actual compensable injury.

Jessamy v. Ehren · filed 2001-07-16

In cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "a litigant is entitled to an award of nominal damages upon proof of a violation of a substantive constitutional right even in the absence of actual compensable injury.”

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for an Eighth Amendment excessive force violation even when the injury has no more than nominal monetary value.

Foulk v. Ronald Charrier, Lieutenant Charrier Individually and in His Official Capacity, United States of America · filed 2001-08-17

Stated differently, it is possible for a use of force to be excessive and in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and yet result in injury having no or only nominal monetary value. ... We therefore hold that the district court did not err in permitting the jury to award nominal damages in the present case.

Section 1983 liability does not entitle a plaintiff to a damages amount prescribed by a state statute.

Learnard v. Inhabitants of Town of Van Buren · filed 2001-08-24

Section 1983 plaintiffs who prevail on their procedural due process claims can receive damages, see, e.g., Maldonado Santiago v. Velazquez Garcia, 821 F.2d 822, 829 (1st Cir.1987), but if a plaintiff establishes liability under section 1983, that does not mean that the plaintiff is entitled to an amount of damages established by state statute.

Section 1983 permits successful plaintiffs to recover compensatory damages.

Brett v. Goshen Community School Corp. · filed 2001-09-06

Claims under the Rehabilitation Act, § 1983, and the ADA all permit successful plaintiffs to collect compensatory damages.

Punitive damages in a § 1983 action require evidence of evil motive or intent, or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Nichols v. Jose Chacon, etc. · filed 2001-09-27

Having reviewed de novo the district court’s grant of Chacon’s motion, see Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 875 (8th Cir. 2000) (standard of review), we agree that Nichols did not adduce any evidence that Chacon’s conduct was “motivated by evil motive or intent, or . . . involve[d] reckless or callous indifference to [Nichols’s] federally protected rights,” see Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (standard for punitive damages in § 1983 actions).

Section 1983 damages compensate people for deprivations of constitutional rights.

SMD, L.L.P. v. City of Roswell · filed 2001-10-24

One of the basic purposes of a damages award under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to compensate persons wronged by the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against municipalities or municipal officials sued in their official capacities.

Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig · filed 2001-10-25

Punitive damages for constitutional rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be awarded against municipalities. ... Therefore, the law extends a municipality’s immunity from punitive damages, to actions against officers when they are sued in their official capacities.

Section 1983 punitive damages depend on the defendant’s conduct, not the plaintiff’s reason for suing.

Finney v. Metzger · filed 2001-11-16

The standard for obtaining punitive damages is based upon the conduct of the defendants, not upon the motivation of the plaintiffs.

Compensatory damages under § 1983 require an actual injury proximately caused by the defendants.

Freeman v. Everson · filed 2001-12-03

Moreover, because the jury specifically found that Ever-son and Shaver did not proximately cause any harm to Freeman and, therefore, awarded $0 damages, the district court properly found that Freeman had failed to establish the defendants’ liability in his § 1983 claim. The Supreme Court has noted that compensatory damages are available in a § 1983 action only where the defendants proximately caused an actual, as opposed to an abstract, injury.

In a § 1983 claim, a defendant who wants the jury to consider his ability to pay punitive damages must present evidence of his financial means.

Johnson v. Howard · filed 2001-12-12

The majority of our fellow circuit courts to address the issue have held that it is the defendant’s burden to present evidence of his ability to pay when he would like that information to be considered by the jury. ... We agree. Howard chose not to present evidence of his inability to pay a large punitive award, so he may not now be heard to complain that the jury did not consider such evidence.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages only when there is a judgment of liability under that section.

Woodruff v. Ohman · filed 2002-02-06

Although punitive damages are permissible under § 1983, they cannot be awarded independent of a judgment of liability under that section.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality or defendants sued in their official capacities.

HOMIER DISTRIBUTING CO. v. City of New Bedford · filed 2002-02-13

Punitive damages cannot be assessed under § 1983 against the City or the named defendants in their official capacities.

A jury may award punitive damages under § 1983 when defendants acted with evil intent or callous indifference to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights.

Marshall, Jeffrey v. Teske, Daniel · filed 2002-03-27

A jury may award punitive damages in a sec.1983 case if it finds that the defendants’ conduct was motivated by evil intent or callous indifference to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Naucke v. City of Park Hills · filed 2002-03-27

Punitive damages are appropriate in a § 1983 case "'when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.'" Walters v. Grossheim, 990 F.2d 381, 385 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Smith, 461 U.S. at 56). ... The jury could have reasonably concluded these actions were motivated by an evil intent or taken in reckless or callous disregard of the Plaintiffs' federally protected rights.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil intent or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Jeffrey O'Neal Marshall, a Minor by His Guardian Ad Litem Paul J. Gossens v. Daniel Teske, Alfonzo Morales, and David Ko · filed 2002-03-27

A jury may award punitive damages in a § 1983 case if it finds that the defendants’ conduct was motivated by evil intent or callous indifference to the plaintiffs federally protected rights. ... Under these circumstances, the jury had sufficient evidence to find that the officers demonstrated a callous disregard for Marshall’s rights, especially considering his age and the fact that his parents were at the scene of the arrest pleading for his return to their custody.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages when a plaintiff proves a civil rights violation but receives no compensatory damages.

Bennett v. Rhodes · filed 2002-04-01

Nevertheless, since the jury found that Bennett’s civil rights were violated, she was at least entitled to an award of nominal damages.

Section 1983 permits a claim for nominal damages for an alleged constitutional violation.

Sugarman v. Village of Chester · filed 2002-04-05

Plaintiff has asserted a proper claim for nominal damages under § 1983 for the alleged constitutional violation.

Punitive damages under § 1983 require an evil motive or intent, or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Milliken v. Town of Cornwall · filed 2002-04-15

Punitive damages are available in a case brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others” ... The evidence regarding Helen Bunt’s conduct was legally insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages against her.

Section 1983 allows lost wages for a procedural due process violation only if the plaintiff proves the violation caused the employment loss.

Warren v. City of Junction City, Kansas · filed 2002-04-22

A plaintiff wishing to recover such damages must overcome the second hurdle in the due process analysis and prove that the constitutional violation actually caused plaintiff to be unable to find employment.

Damages awarded for a Section 1983 violation may be reduced when excessive.

McLaughlin v. City of New York · filed 2002-05-07

We find the award for violation of plaintiff injured party’s federal civil rights excessive to the extent indicated.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a local governmental district.

Spina v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County · filed 2002-05-31

The Court directed a verdict on liability for Plaintiff against the District on her discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Section 1983. The Court then instructed the jury assigned to decide the case against the District (“Jury A”) — outside of the presence of the other jury — that the Court had already determined that the District had engaged in acts of sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation against Plaintiff. The Court explained that Jury A’s function was to determine whether those acts were the proximate cause of injuries to Plaintiff, and, if so, to determine the amount of damages to award to Plaintiff. The Court further explained that the law prevented Jury A from assessing punitive damages against the District, and that Plaintiff was entitled to receive only compensatory damages, as established at trial.

A plaintiff seeking damages under § 1983 must show actual injury causally connected to the alleged due process violation.

Berman v. Jackie Young · filed 2002-06-26

To have survived summary judgment on her claim for damages resulting from her placement with the Boes, Amanda was required to produce evidence that she sustained actual injury and that her injuries had a causal connection with the alleged due process violation.

Section 1983 may provide nominal damages when a plaintiff is deprived of an absolute right but suffers no actual injury.

Reyes v. City of Lynchburg · filed 2002-08-06

Nominal damages may be available in a § 1983 case if a plaintiff was deprived of an absolute right yet did not suffer an actual injury.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a municipality or defendants sued in their official capacities.

Emilio Colón v. Hernández-Torres · filed 2002-08-19

The Court must also dismiss plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim against the municipality of Juana Díaz and defendants in their official capacity as such damages are clearly not available against such governmental entity.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for an IDEA violation when those damages are unavailable under the IDEA.

Bradley v. Arkansas Department of Education · filed 2002-08-30

Because the Bradleys cannot recover damages against the state officials in their individual capacities under the IDEA, they also cannot recover those damages in a § 1983 suit for violations of the IDEA.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Brown v. Brown · filed 2002-09-16

Punitive damages are available in a § 1983 action when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of the plaintiff. ... Brown has not shown that the defendants’ conduct was the result of an improper motive or was recklessly indifferent to his due process rights.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a proven denial of access to the courts when actual damages have not been shown.

Davis v. Milwaukee County · filed 2002-09-30

Having proven a deprivation of his constitutional rights, plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages. ... Nominal damages are the appropriate means of vindicating rights whose deprivation has not been shown to have caused actual damages.

Section 1983 permits money damages for an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison officials’ deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of inmate harm.

Krein v. Norris · filed 2002-10-16

A violation of the Eighth Amendment right recognized in Farmer v. Brennan may be the basis for an award of money damages as well as injunctive relief.

A plaintiff seeking general damages on a Section 1983 excessive-force claim cannot rely on a Louisiana damages rule without showing that it governs the federal claim.

Oyefodun v. City of New Orleans · filed 2002-12-03

In any event, as discussed above, the jury did not find liability as to any of Oyefodun’s state law claims, and Oyefodun has not shown that the holding of Pagan governs the award of damages on his excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against municipalities or local officials acting in their official capacities.

Petrone v. Pike County Probation Department · filed 2002-12-27

At the outset, we note that plaintiffs concede and we agree that the punitive damages claims against the Pike County defendants must be dismissed. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616(1981)(holding that punitive damages are unavailable under § 1983 against municipalities or against local officials acting in their official capacity); see also Agresta v. Goode, 797 F.Supp. 399, 410(E.D.Pa.1992). Our order will reflect this determination.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Jackson v. Austin · filed 2003-01-17

In a Section 1983 action, a finding of punitive damages requires that defendants’ conduct “is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent,” or “involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

Punitive damages on a Section 1983 claim may be sustained when the defendant’s indifference to whether he was justified in retaining the plaintiff’s property supports the award.

Brilla v. Pettit · filed 2003-01-31

His indifference to the issue of whether he was justified in keeping such property gave rise to the award of punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for constitutional violations without a showing of compensable injury.

Sanders v. Yeager · filed 2003-02-03

However, “punitive damages may be recovered for constitutional violations without a showing of compensable injury.” Searles , 251 F.3d at 880.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities.

Carroccia v. Anderson · filed 2003-03-11

As for the § 1983 claims, it is clear that Carroccia may not recover punitive damages against the Village of Hampshire or Kane County.

Section 1983 provides no damages for a challenged hiring decision when the government would have made the same decision without considering race.

Cotter v. City of Boston · filed 2003-03-25

In Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18 (1999), the Supreme Court held that "where a plaintiff challenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on an impermissible criterion and it is undisputed that the government would have made the same decision regardless, there is no cognizable injury warranting relief under § 1983." Id. at 21. ... Because appellants only scored eighty-four, they cannot show standing for damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Whittaker v. Fayette County · filed 2003-04-09

We fail to see how the District Court’s definition of “reckless and callous” deviates in any meaningful way from the definitions provided by the Supreme Court and this Court. Because the District Court’s instruction was correct, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Whittaker’s motion for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Iris Mena v. City Of Simi Valley · filed 2003-06-23

A jury may assess punitive damages in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983).

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for excessive force when an injury may have resulted from justified force rather than excessive force.

Bedenfield v. Shultz · filed 2003-07-18

There are, however, three situations in which nominal damages may be awarded to remedy the constitutional violation of excessive force. First, during an altercation between a police officer and an arrestee/detainee, the officer might use both justifiable and excessive force, but any injury might have resulted from the justifiable force, thereby supporting the denial of compensatory damages.

Section 1983 permits monetary damages when they are proven, but a plaintiff cannot recover damages without evidence to support them.

E.D. Ex Rel. Dukes v. Enterprise City Board of Education · filed 2003-07-28

The issue of relief under § 1983 is really not an issue of whether damages can be awarded for a violation of § 1983, as they clearly can when damages are proven. ... Without any proof of damages, the court must conclude that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to monetary damages in this case.

Section 1983 compensatory damages may include both front and back pay.

Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig · filed 2003-08-21

We agree with plaintiffs that both front and back pay are valid elements of a compensatory damage award under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

DiSorbo v. Hoy · filed 2003-08-29

A jury may “assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983).

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when the defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Youren v. Tintic School District · filed 2003-09-10

Unquestionably, “[p]unitive damages are available in § 1983 actions [and] are to be awarded only when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

Section 1983 bars punitive damages against municipalities but permits them against defendants sued in their individual capacities.

Bunyon v. Burke County · filed 2003-09-30

As a result of the foregoing, Bunyon’s claims for punitive damages against the City of Midville is DISMISSED. However, Bunyon may still seek punitive damages against any defendant in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 punitive damages require evidence that the defendant acted with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.

Ehrlich v. Town of Glastonbury, Joel White, James Kenny · filed 2003-10-17

Her punitive damages request fails because she has offered no evidence, as required to obtain such damages in § 1983 actions, that defendant’s conduct was driven “by evil motive or intent” or by “reckless or callous indifference” to the rights of others.

Section 1983 permits both front pay and back pay as compensatory damages.

Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig · filed 2003-12-05

We agree with plaintiffs that both front and back pay are valid elements of a compensatory damage award under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages only when defendants act with evil intent or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Smith v. Cooper · filed 2003-12-22

Punitive damages are appropriate only when the jury finds that the defendants were motivated by evil intent or were callously indifferent to the plaintiffs federally protected rights.

A claim for damages alone will not support a civil rights action under § 1983 and § 1343(3).

Heumann v. Board of Education · filed 1970-12-07

Aside from the fact that a claim for damages, standing alone, will not support a civil rights action under § 1983 and § 1343(3), see Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), damages for the period during which plaintiff’s appeal was pending — i. e., April through August 1970 — were not specifically claimed in the complaint, which appears to make all damages contingent upon plaintiff’s inability to obtain a teaching post beginning September 1970.

Section 1983 permits damages for pain suffered during delays in medical treatment.

Hanna v. Corrections Corp. · filed 2004-01-28

He may, however, recover damages for the pain he suffered during the delays.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages in appropriate cases even without actual damages, and a refusal to award them receives deferential review.

Stolberg v. Members of the Board of Trustees for the State Colleges of the State of Connecticut · filed 1973-01-29

While punitive damages may, in an appropriate case, be awarded for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even in the absence of actual damages, ... failure to award such relief will not be lightly overturned.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against an individual defendant whose conduct is motivated by evil intent or shows reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Bradley v. Ramsey · filed 2004-03-25

In fact, punitive damages are available against an individual defendant in a § 1983 action “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Thomas v. Luzerne County Correctional Facility · filed 2004-03-25

In a § 1983 action, a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for constitutional violations that cause compensable injury.

Bryant v. McGinnis · filed 1978-11-22

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that damages are available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for actions found to have been violative of constitutional rights and to have caused compensable injury. ... Plaintiffs Willis X. Bryant, Lionel X. Jones, and Arthur Johnson are each awarded $3,000.00 in compensatory damages.

Section 1983 can support punitive damages for a public employee’s First Amendment retaliation claim.

Settlegoode v. Portland Public Schools, Multnomah School District No.1 Susan Winthrop Robert Crebo Larry Whit · filed 2004-04-05

The section 1983 claim, moreover, is the only one supporting punitive damages and we must therefore address it at some point, regardless of the other claims.

Section 1983 permits a procedural due process claim to proceed for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.

Hughes v. Rowe · filed 1980-11-10

Finally, even if the subsequent hearing accorded petitioner minimized or eliminated any compensable harm resulting from the initial denial of procedural safeguards, his constitutional claim is nonetheless actionable.

Section 1983 damages require sufficient evidence in the record to justify an award.

Scheele v. Village District of Eidelweiss · filed 1982-12-10

The plaintiffs argued that they should have been awarded damages in their section 1983 action. The trial judge was correct in refusing to award damages because there was insufficient evidence in the record to justify an award.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for malicious, wanton, or oppressive conduct without requiring proof of intent.

Stokes v. Euda Delcambre, as Sheriff of Vermillion Parish · filed 1983-08-01

The standard imposed by the trial court of malicious or wanton or oppressive acts here was well within the boundaries of traditional tort standards for assessing punitive damages. It was therefore proper.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for conduct motivated by evil intent or showing reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights; allegations of retaliation can provide notice that such damages may be sought.

Porter v. City of Manchester · filed 2004-05-14

These allegations, in conjunction with the well-established principle that punitive damages may be assessed in a section 1983 action when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others, were sufficient to put Lafond on notice that punitive damages could be requested and assessed.

Section 1983 does not allow compensation for injuries that did not result from the constitutional violation.

Walsh v. Lou v. Brewer · filed 1984-05-03

He also is not entitled to compensation for injuries from Lee’s attack, because the district court found that the attack did not result from any defects in Stateville’s inmate assignment procedures.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for deprivation of property when a vehicle was unjustifiably towed.

Goichman v. City of Aspen · filed 1984-08-20

If a towing was not justified, a plaintiff could claim compensatory damages under § 1983 for the deprivation of his property.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a proven deprivation of rights even without proof of actual damages.

Smartt v. Lusk · filed 1973-02-02

Even without proof of actual damages resulting proximately from this incident, Mr. Smartt is entitled to nominal damages by virtue of the proof of the deprivation by Mr. Stalcup of his right to due process of law.

Section 1983 allows nominal damages for a Fourth Amendment violation when the record does not justify a greater damages award.

Hunter v. Auger · filed 1982-03-11

After carefully studying the record evidence, we find that there is no showing of facts justifying an award of more than nominal damages. ... Accordingly, we direct the district court, on remand, to allow nominal damages.

Section 1983 allows a finding of liability without a monetary damage award.

Ledford v. Gibson · filed 1986-11-10

Accordingly the court holds, as did the court in Ganey, that “a finding of liability on a § 1983 claim need not be supported by a monetary damage award.”

Section 1983 does not permit compensatory damages based on the intrinsic value or importance of a constitutional right.

Ratliff v. Wellington Exempted Village Schools Board Of Education · filed 1987-06-10

Because the district court instructed the jury to consider, as a partial measure of compensatory damages, the intrinsic value and importance of the first amendment, the instruction constitutes an error "so obvious and prejudicial as to affect the fairness" of the trial.

Section 1983 permits presumed general damages as compensatory relief when an injury from a constitutional violation is likely to have occurred but is difficult to establish.

Walje v. City of Winchester · filed 1987-09-02

The Stachura Court admonished us that the proper focus of damage awards for constitutional torts should be compensatory and that it is proper to look to common law tort principles in granting presumed damages in cases where specific damages are difficult to establish. This is precisely the focus of general damage awards and is exactly what the prior decision of the Court in this case held.

Section 1983 allows compensatory damages without proof of physical injury.

Schall v. Vazquez · filed 2004-06-16

To recover compensatory damages, a plaintiff in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not prove physical injuries.

Section 1983 entitles a plaintiff to compensatory damages when a constitutional violation caused an undisputed injury, including loss of liberty from unlawful detention.

Kerman v. The City Of New York · filed 2004-06-28

In contrast, where the jury has found a constitutional violation and there is no genuine dispute that the violation resulted in some injury to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages as a matter of law.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a constitutional rights violation even without proof of actual injury.

Cowles v. Peterson · filed 2004-10-21

Regardless, even if Plaintiff were unable to show any actual injuries, Plaintiff is entitled to at least nominal damages under § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 allows compensation under common-law tort principles, rather than damages based on the abstract value of a constitutional right.

Meade v. Plummer · filed 2004-11-02

Rather, Section 1983 created a “species of tort liability” that allowed compensation “according to principles derived from the common law of torts.”

Section 1983 requires at least nominal damages when a court finds a constitutional violation in an action seeking monetary relief.

People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Gittens · filed 2005-01-28

We recognize the principle that when a court finds a constitutional violation in an action seeking monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court (or jury) must at least award nominal damages.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for class members whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated by unlawful strip searches.

Smith v. Montgomery County, Md. · filed 1986-09-08

For all members of the class whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated, the Court will enter an award of nominal damages in the amount of $200.

Section 1983 damages for IDEA violations require an injury beyond de minimis harm.

C.M. v. Board of Education of Union County Regional High School District · filed 2005-04-19

The absence of injury similarly precludes any damages award with respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims based on alleged IDEA violations.

Section 1983 entitles each class member whose constitutional rights were violated to an individual award of nominal damages.

Cummings v. Connell · filed 2005-05-16

Once a class has been certified, there is no justification for awarding nominal damages to only the named class representatives.

Damages awarded under Section 1983 are governed by common law tort principles.

Combs v. Kennedy · filed 2005-06-01

Damages awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by common law tort principles.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a violation of the Establishment Clause.

O'Connor v. Washburn University · filed 2005-07-28

An award of nominal damages is an appropriate remedy for a violation of the Establishment Clause.

Section 1983 permits a claim for nominal damages for a prior alleged constitutional violation, keeping the controversy live.

Lusk v. Village of Cold Spring · filed 2005-08-19

Second, plaintiff has asserted a proper claim for nominal damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the prior alleged violation.

Section 1983 permits general damages for First Amendment injuries when the harm is likely to have occurred but is difficult to prove.

Walje v. The City Of Winchester · filed 1987-09-02

Moreover, in a decision affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit has also held that general damages remain an appropriate remedy under Sec. 1983 for First Amendment violations after Stachura. ... On remand, the District Court held that Mr. Walje was entitled to $5,000 general damages compensation for injuries to his exercise of his First Amendment rights. We agree with the District Court.

Section 1983 allows a landowner to recover damages for a temporary regulatory taking that violates Fourteenth Amendment due process, measured by the lost income producing potential.

Wheeler v. City Of Pleasant Grove · filed 1987-12-01

Accordingly, the landowner should be awarded the market rate return computed over the period of the temporary taking on the difference between the property's fair market value without the regulatory restriction and its fair market value with the restriction.

Section 1983 damages are primarily compensatory, and nominal damages may be awarded for any violation.

Piver v. Pender County Board of Education · filed 1987-12-22

The basic purpose of damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is compensatory.

Section 1983 permits only damages that compensate injuries caused by a constitutional deprivation and allows nominal damages when no actual, provable injury occurred.

Corpus v. Bennett · filed 2005-12-07

Because the jury unambiguously found that Bennett’s use of excessive force caused no direct injury to Corpus, an award of substantial damages cannot be permitted in this case. Instead, nominal damages are the appropriate means “to vindicate constitutional rights whose deprivation has not caused an actual, provable injury.”

Section 1983 permits damages, including nominal damages, to vindicate federal constitutional rights even without actual injury.

Doctor John's, Inc. v. City of Sioux City, IA · filed 2006-07-21

Rather, damages for a federal constitutional violation are those damages, including nominal damages, necessary to vindicate the federal constitutional rights of the claimant, even in the absence of actual injury.

Section 1983 damages are available only for violations of the plaintiff’s own constitutional rights.

Advantage Media, LLC v. City of Eden Prairie · filed 2006-08-01

On an overbreadth challenge Advantage would also be barred from collecting § 1983 damages which are available only for violations of a party's own constitutional rights.

In a § 1983 action, nominal damages must be a token amount when the plaintiff has shown no compensable injury.

Magnett v. Joseph Pelletier, William Rhodes, Jr. · filed 1973-11-26

If a compensable injury has been shown, compensatory damages must be given; if not, nominal damages should not be used to compensate plaintiff in any substantial manner, since he has shown no right to such compensation.

A § 1983 claim subject to Heck requires an actual, compensable injury beyond the conviction itself.

Jones v. White · filed 2006-09-13

Nevertheless, Jones does not allege an actual, compensable injury under Heck for purposes of § 1983 other than the injury of conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit compensatory damages stemming from a termination for a procedural due process violation when a proper hearing would not have changed the termination.

Montgomery v. City of Ardmore · filed 2006-10-05

Therefore, the City was required to terminate his employment and no pre-termination hearing would have changed the outcome.

A plaintiff who establishes no constitutional violation cannot recover nominal damages on that § 1983 claim.

Dail v. Dretke · filed 2006-10-24

Because Dail failed to establish that his constitutional rights had been violated, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Dail’s claims that sought nominal damages.

Section 1983 permits the costs of litigation cut short by a defendant’s wrongful conduct as a measure of damages for denial of access to the courts.

Phillips v. Hust · filed 2007-02-12

Accordingly, we hold that the costs of the litigation that was prematurely cut short by a defendant’s wrongful conduct is a proper measure of damages in a § 1983 suit for violation of the right of access to the courts.

In a § 1983 claim for denial of a hearing before dismissal, damages for the dismissal require a showing that the dismissal lacked just cause; otherwise, recovery is limited to proven injury from the denied hearing or nominal damages.

County of Dallas v. Wiland · filed 2007-02-16

If there was just cause to dismiss the deputies, the deputies can recover only damages directly resulting from the denial of a hearing, if any can be proved, or, absent such proof, nominal damages. Only if there was no just cause to dismiss the deputies can they recover the damages resulting from the dismissal.

Section 1983 allows nominal damages for an Establishment Clause violation without proof of actual injury.

Bats v. Cobb County, Ga. · filed 2007-07-06

Thus, a plaintiff who vindicates a right under the Establishment Clause, but does not demonstrate actual injury, is entitled to an award of nominal damages.

Section 1983 damages are not subject to a state municipal liability cap, but a plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same injury.

Snelling v. City of Claremont · filed 2007-07-18

Applying these general principles, we conclude that when a suit against a governmental unit involves both claims under § 1983 and claims under state law, the claims under § 1983 are not subject to the cap in RSA 507-B :4, and that a plaintiff is not entitled to a double recovery.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a proven constitutional violation without proof of actual injury.

Morrison v. Boyd Cnty Bd Ed · filed 2007-10-26

We have similarly recognized that nominal damages are appropriate when a plaintiff proves a constitutional violation but lacks proof of an actual injury.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a proven due-process violation even when the plaintiff cannot prove compensable loss.

Hamilton v. Town of Holland · filed 2007-12-21

Because landowner did prove a deprivation of due process and a violation of his property rights in the removal of trees located in the Town’s adjacent right-of-way, the superior court awarded him nominal damages of $1.00. Because the Town cut down the trees without holding a tree-warden hearing, landowner’s due-process rights were violated regardless of his inability to prove loss or damage. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978). We find no error in the court’s award of nominal damages.

Section 1983 applies the eggshell skull rule: a defendant is liable for harm caused by a constitutional tort even when the victim’s condition makes the harm unusually severe.

Richman, Marcella v. Burgeson, Brian · filed 2008-01-07

The tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him. That is the “eggshell skull” rule, see, e.g., Brackett v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78, 81 (7th Cir. 1993); Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 2002), which like most principles of the common law of torts is applicable to a constitutional tort case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against a governmental entity for unconstitutional enforcement of a sign ordinance.

Coffey v. Fayette County · filed 2008-01-09

The enforcement of an unconstitutional sign ordinance may give rise to a claim for damages against a governmental entity. See SMD, L.L.P. v. City of Roswell, 252 Ga. App. 438, 440-441 (2) (555 SE2d 813) (2001) (42 USC § 1983 authorizes damages claim for deprivation of constitutional rights as well as injuries that are “the natural consequence of the deprivation” arising from enforcement of sign ordinance).

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a constitutional violation even when the plaintiff suffered no actual damage.

Hathcock v. Cohen · filed 2008-02-29

Because Plaintiff would have been arrested in any event if Defendants had not violated his constitutional right, Plaintiff did not suffer any actual damage. Plaintiff is entitled, however, to a nominal damage award of $1.00.

Section 1983 provides no damages, including nominal damages, when no constitutional right has been deprived.

Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Roswell · filed 2008-03-10

Relief under that provision is for the purpose of compensating those who have been harmed by the deprivation of their constitutional rights. ... Because Granite State has not been deprived of any constitutional right, it is not entitled to any damages, nominal or otherwise.

Section 1983 damages claims require actual damages and a claimant with standing to pursue them.

Howeth Investments, Inc. v. City of Hedwig Village · filed 2008-04-17

A claim for damages based on violations of substantive due process or due course of law under section 42 U.S.C. section 1983 obviously requires that damages have occurred and that the claimant have standing to pursue those damages.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for mental and emotional distress caused by a deprivation of procedural due process when the plaintiff proves that the injury was actually caused.

Blessum v. Howard County Board of Supervisors · filed 1980-08-27

We believe there was substantial support for the verdict awarding actual damages under plaintiff’s claim of defendants’ denial of a hearing.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims for rights created by Section 504 when that statute provides only equitable relief.

Manecke v. SCH. BD. OF PINELLAS COUNTY, FLA. · filed 1982-12-21

Therefore, the Court holds that the plaintiffs can not assert a claim for damage under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for harassment and related mental and emotional distress caused by a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Behlar v. Smith · filed 1983-10-27

We need not tarry long on this issue as in this case plaintiff sought recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The evidence of the particularly egregious conduct of Dr. Cornelius fully justifies an award of damages for harassment which is closely related to the mental and emotional distress recognized in other decisions.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages even when plaintiffs have no actual damages.

Nakao v. Rushen · filed 1986-05-27

However, they would be entitled to nominal damages, which are recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for an alleged violation of the Adoption Assistance Act.

Leslie A. Scrivner and Ashley Scrivner, by Her Next Friend and Mother, Leslie A. Scrivner v. Katherine Andrews, Saundra · filed 1987-04-20

Moreover, as this circuit noted in Lesher v. Lavrich, 784 F.2d 193, 197-98 (6th Cir.1986), damages are not available in a § 1983 action alleging a violation of the Adoption Assistance Act.

Federal common law governs damages based on Section 1983 liability.

Tardiff v. Knox County · filed 2009-02-05

The Supreme Court and the First Circuit are clear that federal common law controls damages premised on § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages only for actual injury caused by a constitutional violation, and nominal damages require a timely request.

Scott v. Mahlmeister · filed 2009-03-18

Compensatory damages, however, are only recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to compensate “for actual injury suffered as a result of the violation of a constitutional right” because the “abstract value of a constitutional right . . . may not form the basis for 1983 damages.”

Section 1983 permits nominal damages when a constitutional right is violated without actual, provable injury.

Schock v. Robert G. Redman, Warden, Thayer, Officer · filed 1991-02-05

See also Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986) ("[T]he abstract value of a constitutional right may not form the basis for Sec. 1983 damages.") Simply stated, "nominal damages, and not damages based on some undefinable 'value' of infringed rights, are the appropriate means of 'vindicating' rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury."

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for prejudice caused by an unconstitutional appellate delay when habeas relief is unavailable.

Snyder v. Kelly · filed 1991-07-25

Because granting a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus has been determined to be inappropriate, this Court must find— following Cody, Simmons, and Diaz — that relief for any prejudice suffered by this petitioner is best obtained through a suit for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.