42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to state tax administration when state remedies afford the taxpayer full and adequate relief.

Greenwich Township v. Murtagh · filed 1992-01-09

We join the consensus of other state courts that a Section 1983 challenge to state tax administration is not maintainable if state remedies afford the taxpayer an opportunity for full and adequate relief.

Section 1983 does not provide a state-court action to enjoin state tax collection when an adequate state remedy is available.

State Ex Rel. Hanson v. Quill Corp. · filed 1993-05-11

We hold that a § 1983 action seeking to enjoin the collection of state taxes is not cognizable in state court, and accordingly Quill is not entitled to recover its attorney’s fees under § 1988.

State courts should decline to grant § 1983 remedies for state tax challenges when an adequate state remedy exists and a federal court could not grant those remedies under the Tax Injunction Act.

Private Truck Council of America, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission · filed 1994-07-19

We now reconsider whether plaintiffs are entitled to assert federally created remedies under §§ 1983 and 1988 in this state court action. We hold, under the principles of comity and federalism, that plaintiffs are not entitled to relief under §§ 1983 and 1988.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging state tax policies may be remanded to state court under comity when the state provides a plain, adequate and complete remedy.

Balazik v. County of Dauphin · filed 1995-01-05

We therefore conclude that remand is an option open to the district court in McNary cases provided that there exists the same predicate to dismissal required by McNary, i.e. a "plain, adequate and complete" remedy at the state level. ... We hold that Pennsylvania provides a "plain, adequate and complete" remedy for Sec. 1983 plaintiffs challenging state taxation policies. Thus, remand was proper under McNary.

Section 1983 does not authorize federal or state courts to award injunctive or declaratory relief in state tax cases when an adequate legal remedy exists.

National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission · filed 1995-06-19

Given this principle, we hold that § 1983 does not call for either federal or state courts to award injunctive and declaratory relief in state tax cases when an adequate legal remedy exists.

Section 1983 claims challenging a state tax in federal court are barred by comity when the available state remedies are plain, adequate, and complete.

Moore v. Kamikawa · filed 1995-09-08

Here, therefore, Plaintiffs § 1983 claim against the validity of Hawaii’s general excise tax is barred unless the available state remedies are not “plain, adequate, and complete.” They are.

Section 1983 does not permit a state court to grant declaratory relief against a state tax when the taxpayer has an adequate remedy under state law.

Sharp v. Direct Resources for Print, Inc. · filed 1995-10-18

We thus hold that Direct Resources has received an adequate remedy under state law and that neither the trial court nor this Court can grant the declaratory relief Direct Resources requested pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 claims premised on the illegality of local property taxes are not actionable in federal court.

Babb v. Gipe · filed 1996-03-05

Moreover, their claims, which are premised on the illegality of local property taxes, are not actionable in federal court.

Section 1983 affords no relief in state court for challenges to state tax assessment or collection when an adequate state-law remedy exists.

Kerr v. Waddell · filed 1996-04-23

Where an adequate remedy exists under state law, no relief of any kind is available in a state court action brought under § 1983 challenging the assessment or collection of state taxes.

State courts lack jurisdiction over a § 1983 challenge to a state tax assessment when the taxpayer has an adequate legal remedy under state law.

Jade Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Crystal · filed 1996-04-23

Because the plaintiff had an opportunity to receive an adequate legal remedy, we conclude that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide injunctive, declaratory, or damages relief for a state tax challenge when adequate state remedies are available.

Buckley Powder Co. v. State · filed 1996-10-15

Therefore, while parties can pursue 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims based on a violation of the Commerce Clause, Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 111 S.Ct. 865, 112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991), they cannot seek injunctive or declaratory relief in state tax cases if there is a speedy and efficient state remedy. ... In its analysis, however, the Supreme Court cited Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 102 S.Ct. 177, 70 L.Ed.2d 271 (1981), in which it had previously held that federal courts could not entertain damages actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state tax cases when state law furnishes an adequate legal remedy. Therefore, by implication, state courts are similarly limited.

Section 1983 cannot support an attorney’s fee award in a state tax challenge when an adequate remedy under state law is available.

St. Ledger v. Commonwealth, Revenue Cabinet · filed 1997-04-24

The recent decision of the Supreme Court in National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 115 S.Ct. 2351, 132 L.Ed.2d 509 (1995), clearly precludes an award of attorney’s fees under 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1988 when an adequate remedy under state law is available.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction when that conviction has already been invalidated on administrative appeal.

Warren v. Irvin · filed 1997-12-02

Plaintiff's disciplinary hearing determinations have been invalidated on administrative appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Edwards v. Balisok, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997), does not apply to the instant action. In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that an inmate’s claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a judgment in favor of the inmate would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction or sentence, unless the inmate can demonstrate that his disciplinary conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.

Section 1983 requires a sufficiently alleged deprivation of constitutional rights to support a failure-to-train claim against a town or county.

Roddel v. Town of Flora · filed 1991-10-21

Because the facts alleged in Roddel's complaint were insufficient, as a matter of law, to impose liability under § 1983, we must conclude the trial court properly dismissed Roddel's complaint as to this claim. Similarly, as Roddel did not sufficiently allege a deprivation of his constitutional rights, his claim against the Town and the County for failing to train the deputy marshal and sheriffs was also properly dismissed.

Section 1983 makes a police department liable for constitutional wrongs only when they result from its official policy, custom, ordinance, regulation, or decision.

Kruppenbacher v. Mazzeo · filed 1990-09-11

To hold the police department liable, plaintiff must demonstrate that the constitutional wrongs complained of resulted from the department’s “official policy, custom, ordinance, regulation, or decision.”

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for inadequate police training when the finding rests on proof that the municipality itself was culpable rather than an inference drawn solely from one excessive-force incident.

Rymer v. Trooper H.A. Davis, City of Shepherdsville, Kentucky, and Ben Stillwell · filed 1985-10-28

Thus, the City of Shepherdsville was found liable based upon a finding by the jury that the City of Shepherdsville inadequately trained its police officers. No inference from a single incident of excessive force was involved.

A local government is not liable under Section 1983 when its police officers implement state policy rather than an official municipal policy.

MacLean v. City of Bellingham · filed 1985-09-03

The police captain and his officer, even if their conduct was wrongful, were not acting to implement a policy of the City of Bell-ingham, but rather were acting to implement state policy.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on conclusory allegations alone; a complaint must specifically allege facts showing that a policy, ordinance, regulation, or custom, or negligent or reckless training and supervision, caused the constitutional deprivation.

Bready v. Geist · filed 1979-08-24

Plaintiff’s amended complaint, however, does not contain the minimal amount of specific allegations against the Township required in a civil rights action. It contains no factual allegations that suggest that Officer Geist’s actions were implementing a policy, ordinance, regulation, or custom of Douglass Township. Nor does it specifically allege that the Township’s negligence or reckless training and supervision of Officer Geist caused the deprivation of plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 requires a complaint seeking municipal liability for failure of supervision or condonation to plead specific misconduct incidents in detail and connect them to the municipality's acts or omissions.

Schramm v. Krischell · filed 1979-10-17

Therefore, this court finds that in order to bypass this motion to dismiss filed by the defendant governmental body, the complaint must make reference in detail to specific incidents of misconduct by government officials and must extrapolate from these incidents to indicate the particular manner in which the governmental body, by omission or commission, has placed its imprimatur upon the actions of its officers.

Section 1983 imposes liability on a governmental unit only when an official policy or custom is a proximate cause of the constitutional violation.

Rheuark v. Shaw · filed 1980-09-24

In order for a governmental unit to be liable under § 1983, the policy or custom must, however, by the very terms of the statute, be a proximate cause of the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits county liability when the county's policies or customs actually cause a constitutional injury.

Avery v. County of Burke · filed 1981-10-02

The county and the boards may be liable under § 1983 if their policies or customs actually caused Avery’s injuries.

Section 1983 treats municipalities and local governmental units as persons that may be sued for constitutional deprivations caused by official policy or custom.

De Bleecker v. Montgomery County · filed 1982-01-08

monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where ... the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires constitutional or federal-law wrongdoing by a municipal agent and a policy or custom that caused the challenged conduct.

Ekergren v. City of Chicago · filed 1982-04-30

It is now well settled that municipal liability under § 1983 requires an allegation of conduct by an agent of the City that is wrongful under the Constitution or federal law and the existence of a policy or custom that caused the challenged conduct.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability based on passive acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct to plead more than a single wrongful act and conclusory allegations of a custom or policy.

Rivera v. Farrell · filed 1982-04-28

Therefore, a section 1983 plaintiff must plead more than the existence of a single wrongful act allegedly perpetrated by governmental employees coupled with conclusory allegations of custom or policy in order to properly state a claim for relief against a municipality or governmental entity.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional injury caused by a specific policy or custom, and a plaintiff need not plead detailed supporting facts to state such a claim.

Hill v. Marinelli · filed 1982-07-23

This court agrees with Judge Shadur that the imposition of a requirement of factual specificity in Section 1983 cases is inconsistent with the provisions of Rules 8 and 9. A plaintiff is not required to enumerate a detailed factual basis in support of his policy allegations in order to state a claim against a municipality under Section 1983. All that is required are allegations of a specific policy or custom that can, under some set of facts, be causally linked to the injury claimed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a public corporation liable for discrimination to show an official policy or custom of discrimination.

Maudotha R. White, Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee v. Washington Public Power Supply System · filed 1982-11-23

Although WPPSS' status as a public corporation may bring it within the purview of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the plaintiff must adduce evidence of an official policy or custom of discrimination to support liability under that section.

Section 1983 permits a county department to be liable for employees’ unconstitutional acts only when those acts are carried out pursuant to department policy or custom.

Dick v. Watonwan County · filed 1982-12-01

The Watonwan County Welfare Department, as the employer of Schutt, Hunter, and Ruppert, is liable only if the acts of those defendants were done pursuant to department policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a municipality; the municipality is liable only when its policy or custom caused the constitutional deprivation.

Smith v. City Of Oklahoma City · filed 1983-01-05

Unless a municipality has a policy or custom that was the cause of a constitutional deprivation, the municipality will not be liable under section 1983 for the actions of its employees. A city is not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior in a section 1983 suit.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for constitutional deprivations undertaken pursuant to official policy or authorized custom, but an isolated failure to give notice does not satisfy the required systematic abuse.

Boihem v. Drainage & Sewerage Department of Jefferson Parish · filed 1983-03-11

While liability may be imposed on municipalities for deprivations of constitutional rights undertaken pursuant to municipal policy, whether officially promulgated or authorized by custom, the failure to give notice at best constitutes an isolated incident which does not indicate the kind of systematic abuse required for a 1983 cause of action.

A municipality is not liable under Section 1983 merely for failing to investigate, censor, or sanction officers for their alleged conduct.

Green v. Rahn · filed 1983-10-14

Plaintiff alleges no new facts, but merely alleges that the City and its police department are liable to plaintiff for failing to investigate, censor or sanction the police officers for their alleged actions. These charges, standing alone, do not state a cause of action since a municipality is immune from suit under § 1983.

A Section 1983 complaint adequately alleges a municipal de facto policy by asserting that police routinely file false charges to cover up misconduct and that high-level officials approve the practice.

Brown v. City of Chicago · filed 1983-10-19

The court holds that Count III does state a claim against all three named defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As to the City, Brown alleges that the filing of false charges, as a cover-up for police misconduct, is routine and is approved at high levels of the police department. This allegation presumably refers to an unwritten policy, and the most likely way for Brown to prove it up would be by evidence of other similar occurrences.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking municipal liability must identify a municipal policy, connect it to the city itself, and show that executing the policy caused the injury.

Henry J. Bennett, Jr. v. City of Slidell, Gerry Hinton, B.E. McDaniel Nunzio Giordano, and Patrick J. Berrigan · filed 1984-04-02

If a city may be liable only where the injury is inflicted in the execution of city policy, the complainant must identify the policy, connect the policy to the city itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy. Plaintiff must, of course, prove that his injury was caused by city policy.

Allegations that local government entities’ unconstitutional policies or customs directly caused the denial of constitutional rights are sufficient to state a civil-rights claim against those entities.

Preston Guillory, Frank Ritter, and Ty Ritter v. County of Orange · filed 1984-04-25

Here, appellants based liability directly on alleged unconstitutional policies or customs of the local governmental entities and not on the doctrine of ... respondeat ... superior. ... The allegations are sufficient to give rise to a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act against the governmental entities.

To state a Section 1983 municipal-liability claim against a local government for failure to train its police, a plaintiff must plead facts showing the particular manner in which the government adopted the impermissible policy, not merely allege the single incident involving the plaintiff.

Fecteau v. UNKNOWN OFFICERS & AGENTS OF CLINTON TP. · filed 1984-07-03

The Court believes that it is necessary that in addition to allegations concerning a single incident involving the plaintiff, the plaintiff must plead some facts which indicate the particular manner in which the government entity adopted an impermissible policy.

A municipality is liable under section 1983 only for deprivations inflicted pursuant to an official policy -- either a formally adopted policy, ordinance, or regulation, or a persistent and widespread practice so common and well settled that it constitutes a custom fairly representing municipal policy, of which the governing body or its delegated policymaker had actual or constructive knowledge -- and not merely because the municipality employed the officer who caused the injury.

John Russell Webster, Cross-Appellants v. The City of Houston, Cross-Appellee · filed 1984-08-09

A municipality is liable under § 1983 for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution or federal laws that is inflicted pursuant to official policy. Official policy is: ... 2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom that body had delegated policy-making authority. Actions of officers or employees of a municipality do not render the municipality liable under § 1983 unless they execute official policy as above defined.

A municipal "policy or custom" required for § 1983 municipal liability can be proven by the municipality's actual practice, even if that practice did not conform to its written rules.

Paul v. John Wanamakers, Inc. · filed 1984-08-27

However, the required "policy or custom" may be shown by actual practice, regardless of whether it conformed to written requirements.

Municipal liability under section 1983 cannot rest on respondeat superior; it requires that the constitutional deprivation be caused by an official policy or custom that was the moving force behind the violation.

Milligan v. The City of Newport News · filed 1984-09-19

First, municipal liability under § 1983 may not be predicated solely upon a respondeat superior theory. Liability arises only where the constitutionally offensive acts of city employees are taken in furtherance of some municipal “policy or custom.”

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for isolated employee torts under respondeat superior, but a sheriff's office may be liable when its official customs or policies cause a constitutional deprivation.

Smith v. Stoner · filed 1984-09-26

We conclude, therefore, that a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983. ... Overwhelming evidence in the record supports the conclusion that the deprivation of liberty and due process rights suffered by Smith was caused by the customs, policies and usages of the Noble County Jail.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability under respondeat superior, but coordinated discriminatory conduct by city officials may establish an unofficial governmental custom supporting municipal liability.

Abasiekong v. City of Shelby · filed 1984-09-27

While the City may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 merely upon a theory of respondeat superior, the actions of Wilkison, Cole, and Humphries establish a "governmental 'custom' even though such custom has not received formal approval through [the City's] official decisionmaking channels." Thus, the municipality may be held liable.

A municipality is not liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory; the alleged deprivation must result from an official custom, policy, ordinance, regulation, or decision.

Fragmin v. Walker · filed 1984-10-03

It is clear that municipalities and other local governmental units are not liable under the theory of respondeat superior for unconstitutional acts committed by their employees. ... Further, plaintiff does not contend that his constitutional rights have been deprived due to official custom, policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision.

Section 1983 imposes governmental-entity liability only when an official policy, practice, or custom caused the rights deprivation, regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks damages or equitable relief.

Condos v. Conforte · filed 1984-10-05

For a governmental entity to be held liable under § 1983 it must be shown that official policy, practice or custom was responsible for the deprivation of the plaintiffs’ rights. ... This requirement applies regardless of whether monetary or equitable relief is sought.

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 when retaliation for protected First Amendment activity constitutes its informal custom or policy and causes the plaintiff's injury.

Dougherty v. Barry · filed 1985-03-07

Thus, in light of the evidence of past acts of retaliation and based on the Court’s finding that the exercise of plaintiff’s First Amendment rights was the “but for” cause of his non-promotion, the Court concludes that the District of Columbia is liable to plaintiff under Section 1983 for retaliating against him for exercising his First Amendment rights.

A county is liable under Section 1983 when racially and nationally discriminatory hiring practices are frequent and longstanding enough to constitute a custom known to county policymakers.

Garza v. Deaf Smith County · filed 1985-03-18

The Court finds that the hiring policies and practices at issue in this case were of sufficient frequency and duration as to warrant a finding that the Commissioner’s Court knew that these policies and practices were customary among County employees making hiring decisions. ... The Court finds that Defendant Deaf Smith County discriminated against the class on the basis of race and national origin in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 in hiring for the following departments: Sheriff’s, Social Services, Building Maintenance, and County Commissioner Precinct No. 3.

Municipal liability under section 1983 requires a constitutional deprivation caused by an official policy or municipal custom.

Reed v. Schneider · filed 1985-06-25

In order to bring a § 1983 suit against a municipality, the United States Supreme Court requires plaintiffs to allege (1) the deprivation of a constitutional right and (2) that the act that deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional right was either the result of an “official policy” of the municipality, or was the “custom” of such municipality, though not formally approved by the official decision making channels.

Section 1983 permits damages against a sheriff in his official capacity and the county when official failures to train, discipline, investigate, and punish officers amount to policy and ratification of custodial abuse.

Marchese v. William Lucas, Individually and as Sheriff of Wayne County, Michigan, and the County of Wayne, Joi · filed 1985-07-03

The first issue presented by this case is whether or not § 1983 creates an action for damages on the part of a prisoner lawfully arrested and in custody when, as this jury found on substantial evidence, he was twice beaten severely while in the custody and complete control of sheriffs officers. The second important question is, assuming an affirmative answer to the first, does such liability extend to the Sheriff, the commanding officer of the law enforcement unit involved here in his official capacity either because of the Sheriffs prior failure to train and discipline his force or because of ratification of the illegal acts found by the jury through failure to investigate and determine and punish the individual officers concerned, thus ratifying their acts. ... In this opinion we answer all three of the questions in the affirmative.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires proof of a municipal policy or custom and an affirmative causal link between that policy and the constitutional deprivation.

Vippolis v. Village Of Haverstraw · filed 1985-07-16

The plaintiff must first prove the existence of a municipal policy or custom in order to show that the municipality took some action that caused his injuries beyond merely employing the misbehaving officer. Second, the plaintiff must establish a causal connection--an "affirmative link"--between the policy and the deprivation of his constitutional rights.

A single incident of police misconduct does not establish a municipal policy or custom for section 1983 liability.

Ramie v. City of Hedwig Village, Texas · filed 1985-07-15

However, both opinions reject the contention that a single incident of police misbehavior can establish a municipal policy or custom. Any abusive aspect of the interrogation of Ramie would not, therefore, alone prove an objectionable city policy.

A municipality is not vicariously liable under Section 1983, but may be liable when an official custom or policy causes injury, including when officials know of constitutional violations and fail to perform their duty to correct them.

O'Quinn v. Manuel · filed 1985-08-05

Although municipalities cannot be held liable under section 1983 by virtue of the doctrine of respondeat superior, they are subject to such liability where official custom or policy is involved in the injury. ... The critical point for this case is that such liability may result if municipal officials have actual or constructive knowledge of constitutional violations and fail to carry out their duty to correct them.

A single incident, without other proof, does not establish that a city's negligent hiring, training, or supervision policy caused a constitutional deprivation for Section 1983 purposes.

Cook v. City of Minneapolis · filed 1985-08-16

Here, Cook relies on a single incident, Robinson's alleged sexual assault, in an attempt to establish a policy of grossly negligent hiring, training, and supervision practices. No other proof of this policy has been presented by plaintiff. ... Thus, proof of a single incident of sexual assault does not establish that the City’s purported policy of negligent hiring, training, and supervision caused plaintiff’s alleged deprivation of liberty without due process of law.

A municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 solely because it employs the person who committed the constitutional tort.

Brown v. Reardon · filed 1985-08-19

... a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor.

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the constitutional injury, not merely because its employee caused it.

Fisher v. District of Columbia · filed 1985-08-29

[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.

A sheriff's office is responsible under Section 1983 for acts of the sheriff who authors its official policy.

Lindahl v. Bartolomei · filed 1985-09-16

Bartolomei was the author of the “policy” of the sheriff’s office, however, so that it is responsible under § 1983 for his acts.

A municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 solely for an employee's conduct, but may be liable when its policy, custom, or continuing failure to remedy known unconstitutional conduct causes the injury.

City of Edgewater v. Montesano · filed 1985-10-24

This instruction was erroneous because it authorized the jury to find the city liable under section 1983 solely on the basis of its employee’s conduct. ... We note that a municipality may be liable under section 1983 for its continuing failure to remedy known unconstitutional conduct of its officers ... .

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires a policymaker's municipal policy that caused the plaintiff's constitutional deprivation.

Bibbo v. Mulhern · filed 1985-11-08

Thus, a plaintiff who seeks to hold a municipality liable under § 1983 must prove “(1) a policy (2) of the city’s policymaker (3) that caused (4) the plaintiff to be subjected to a deprivation of constitutional right.”

Repeated actions by high-level municipal policymakers may constitute official policy supporting municipal liability under § 1983.

Kuchka v. Kile · filed 1985-11-22

In this case, however, plaintiff alleges repeated action by high level officials of the County designed to wrongfully terminate his employment. Thus, the actions can be construed as general policy of the CCIDA, the CCBC and the County itself.

A § 1983 complaint against a municipality must allege specific facts showing a municipal policy or custom, and the plaintiffs’ single incident was insufficient.

Zwarton v. City of Chicago · filed 1985-11-26

Plaintiffs have alleged only a single specific incident, namely their own, and that is not enough to establish a custom or policy.

A municipal policy discouraging vigorous prosecution of violent crimes against women can support a Section 1983 claim against the city when sufficiently alleged.

Lowers v. City of Streator · filed 1985-12-06

Finally, although the parties have not presented the issue, the court notes that the complaint sufficiently alleges a policy of the defendant city, to discourage the vigorous prosecution of violent crimes against women, so as to state a § 1983 claim against it.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 for a single allegedly unlawful search merely because its police manual omitted search-and-seizure rules, absent evidence connecting that omission to the injury.

Caiani v. Town of Walpole · filed 1985-12-13

That proof is missing. Caiani advances no evidence concerning other allegations or incidents of similar conduct by Walpole police officers. Nor does he suggest that the detectives in fact never received training in proper search and seizure techniques. ... Accordingly, his efforts to connect this isolated incident with the fact that the town did not print certain things in its police manual are insufficient to impose municipal liability.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires the plaintiff to connect the challenged official policy to the governmental entity being sued.

Kime v. Wise · filed 1985-12-17

The Court holds that plaintiffs have failed to connect the official policy in question, if any indeed exists in this case, to defendant Lake County. The entire notion of holding a municipality or some other governmental entity liable under § 1983 rests upon the belief that that entity is somehow represented by the individual person who is specifically named as a defendant and who actually committed the alleged constitutional violation.

A Section 1983 municipal-liability complaint cannot rely on one incident and a general assertion of custom or policy; it must allege a specific pattern or series of supporting incidents.

Hossman v. Larry Blunk, Sheriff, Wayne County Jail of Richmond, Indiana · filed 1986-02-26

Alleging one specific incident in which the plaintiff suffered a deprivation and generally alleging a custom or policy will not be adequate; the plaintiff must allege a specific pattern or series of incidents that support the general allegation.

A county cannot be liable under Section 1983 without evidence that an established county policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Hontz v. State · filed 1986-02-27

The poorly developed record in this case is bereft of any evidence of a policy or custom established and maintained by King County and its agencies which resulted in the alleged constitutional deprivations.

A municipal department is liable under Section 1983 only for a federal-rights deprivation inflicted pursuant to official policy, not vicariously for employees' acts.

Hamilton v. Rodgers · filed 1986-03-07

Under Sec. 1983, the Fire Department cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees; "... the doctrine [of respondeat superior] has no application in an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983."

A municipal legislative body's acts are official policy for Section 1983 purposes.

Rateree v. Rockett · filed 1986-03-10

Council action is ipso facto City action.

A Section 1983 municipal-policy claim may survive the pleading stage when the plaintiff alleges a series of unlawful arrests involving similar illegality, even if every incident involved the same plaintiff.

Carr v. City of Chicago · filed 1986-03-14

With all reasonable inferences drawn in Carr’s favor, such allegations do call for further inquiry — or in the terms used by the Section 1983 cases, could be stretched into an inference of municipal “policy.” ... City’s Mem. 5 suggestion that Carr must point to a series of acts directed against persons other than Carr himself finds no support in ...

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 only when its policy or custom caused the deprivation, not for unauthorized employee acts under respondeat superior.

Ponton v. Newport News School Board · filed 1986-03-19

However, a municipality may only be held liable under § 1983 if the alleged deprivation was the result of a policy or custom of that body. A municipality is not liable for the unauthorized acts of its employees, for respondeat superior does not apply in actions brought under § 1983.

Municipal liability under Section 1983 may rest on supervisors' knowing acquiescence in subordinates' unconstitutional conduct.

Villante v. Department of Corrections of the City of New York, and Mens Queens House of Detention · filed 1986-03-19

Municipal liability under section 1983 may be predicated on municipal supervisors’ knowing acquiescence in the unconstitutional behavior of their subordinates.

A municipality is not liable under Section 1983 merely for employee misconduct; the plaintiff must show the alleged deprivation resulted from governmental policy or custom.

Vernon Beigay, Inc. v. Traxler · filed 1986-04-28

Governmental entities cannot be sued under section 1983 because of the misbehavior of their officers and employees.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when evidence of more than a single incident establishes a city policy that caused constitutional violations.

Lusby v. Stores, Inc. · filed 1986-07-16

We are satisfied that, viewing the record as a whole, there was sufficient evidence of more than a single incident to support the establishment of a city policy and hence liability.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires proof that a municipal custom or policy exists and caused the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Johnson v. McTigue · filed 1986-07-16

Plaintiff must prove that: 1) a custom or policy exists; and 2) that there is a causal connection between the policy and the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.

A city is liable under § 1983 when its final policymakers deliberately make the decision that forms the basis of the constitutional violation.

Wulf v. City of Wichita · filed 1986-07-24

Since Denton and LaMunyon, the City’s official policymakers, made a deliberate choice to terminate Wulf — a decision which formed the basis of the constitutional tort — the City is liable under section 1983.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires a civil-rights deprivation pursuant to an official policy, custom, or practice.

Cole v. Williams · filed 1986-08-04

Municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 must be predicated on a deprivation of a civil right pursuant to an official policy, custom, or practice.

A municipality is not liable under Section 1983 unless the alleged constitutional violation resulted from a municipal custom, practice, or policy.

Holmes v. Michigan Department of Corrections City of Saginaw Fire Department Young Men's Christian Associatio · filed 1986-10-01

Defendant City of Saginaw was correctly held not liable under Sec. 1983 because there was no evidence tendered that the alleged violation was a custom, practice or policy of the municipality.

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 when its established policies and widespread customs directly cause constitutional injuries, including practices that effectively permit and conceal repeated police violence.

Brandon v. Allen · filed 1986-10-07

The code of silence that prevailed among Memphis police officers is precisely the type of custom with which the framers of section 1983 were concerned. That code permitted and condoned police misconduct as surely as a written rule expressly immunizing officers from any inquiry into acts of violence.

A Section 1983 plaintiff seeking municipal liability must show both a constitutional violation and that the challenged conduct implemented a government-sanctioned policy or custom.

Ivanovich v. Doe · filed 1986-11-13

To invoke the protection of § 1983 against a municipality, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a violation of his constitutional rights occurred and that the violative conduct implements some policy or custom sanctioned by the governmental body.

A Section 1983 complaint does not adequately plead municipal liability by alleging one constitutional violation and adding only a general assertion that it resulted from a policy or custom.

Weimann v. County of Kane · filed 1986-12-16

Factual allegations concerning a single incident in which a plaintiff suffered a constitutional violation, joined with the general claim that the injury resulted from a custom or policy, are not sufficient.

A city cannot be held liable under § 1983 through respondeat superior and requires an alleged municipal policy or custom causing the constitutional violation.

James P. Davis, Jr. v. City of Chattanooga, Tennessee · filed 1987-02-13

Furthermore, plaintiff fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 because he has not alleged any policy or custom on the part of defendant to violate his constitutional rights. Defendant cannot be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior solely because, as plaintiff alleges, it employs a tortfeasor.

Allegations that challenged conduct implemented an official ordinance and contract, together with a specific pattern of police enforcement, adequately plead a municipal policy or custom under Section 1983.

Mustfov v. Rice · filed 1987-03-30

Plaintiffs have alleged that the actions complained of in this case were all taken in order to implement and execute the Public Passenger Vehicle Ordinance and pursuant to a city contract with Continental and Airways Rental. We find this sufficient under ... Monell. ... To the extent that plaintiffs also challenge actions by the police in enforcing the ordinances, actions which plaintiffs allege effectively bar them from picking up legitimate prearranged fares, we find plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient pattern that supports an inference of a policy or custom on the part of the police to enforce the ordinances in such a way as to prevent drivers from picking up prearranged passengers.

A pro se Section 1983 complaint adequately pleads municipal liability by alleging repeated improper police methods from which a policy or custom of grossly negligent supervision may be inferred.

Kelley v. City of New York · filed 1987-04-22

It is still the rule in this Circuit, however, that a policy or custom may be “inferred from acts or omissions of a municipality’s supervisory officials serious enough to amount to gross negligence or deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the plaintiff.” ... In addition, drawing upon plaintiff’s personal asserted observation of alleged repeated instances of improper police methods in city public assistance centers, the complaint adequately pleads the existence of a municipal policy or custom of nonsupervision.

A Section 1983 municipal-liability complaint must allege a constitutional deprivation caused by a government official acting according to a municipal policy or custom.

Carr v. City of Chicago · filed 1987-05-18

Several requirements must be met to state a claim for municipal liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, the complaint must allege that the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right. Second, the plaintiff must plead that the constitutional deprivation was caused by a government official acting in accordance with a municipal policy or custom.

A municipality is subject to Section 1983 but cannot be held liable merely for employing a tortfeasor; the municipal entity itself must cause the constitutional violation.

Danese v. Asman · filed 1987-05-22

Municipal bodies are not immune from section 1983 actions. ... Nevertheless, under ... a local government entity may not be sued under section 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. ... Municipal liability under section 1983 can be imposed only where the municipal entity itself causes the constitutional violation.

Municipal liability for an otherwise constitutional failure-to-train policy requires deliberate indifference to constitutional rights and a causal link to the deprivation.

Thomas v. City of Zion · filed 1987-06-02

for a city to be liable for a policy which is not itself unconstitutional, such as the city’s failure to promulgate procedures or properly train personnel, there must be an extremely high degree of municipal culpability. ... Specifically, the city’s failure to act must be the product of its “deliberate indifference” to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

A Section 1983 municipal policy-or-custom claim cannot rest on a single alleged act.

Johnson v. City of Richmond · filed 1987-06-12

To sufficiently allege a § 1983 violation against a governmental body by a policy or custom more than a single act need be alleged.

A supervisor may be individually liable under § 1983 for deliberate indifference in training or supervising officers who use excessive force.

Anderson v. Roberts · filed 1987-07-09

there is no question that a supervisor is liable for failing to adequately train his officers or for doing so in a grossly negligent manner. ... It is clear that regardless of the officers' initial training on the use of excessive force, Sheriff Bolin could nonetheless be liable for breach of duty if, once his officers were certified, he showed deliberate indifference in his supervision and control of their actions.

A municipality may be liable under Section 1983 when officials deliberately ignore a known, repeated pattern of police sexual misconduct, establishing a municipal custom that causes injury.

Harris v. City of Pagedale, Michael Hayles · filed 1987-07-28

We conclude this amounts to deliberate indifference to police abuses. Thus, we hold that Harris has proved the existence of a municipal custom sufficient to support municipal liability under § 1983.

A § 1983 plaintiff may plead a municipal policy by alleging facts indicating that the challenged conduct was more than isolated incidents.

Maloney v. City of Chicago · filed 1987-10-13

Plaintiff need only plead some facts which indicate that these actions were more than isolated incidents and were part of a municipal policy.

A governmental defendant is liable under Section 1983 for an employee's tortious conduct only when the conduct executed an official policy or custom attributable to lawmakers or final policymakers.

Bouvia v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1987-10-29

In order to successfully maintain an action under 42 United States Code section 1983 against governmental defendants for the tortious conduct of employees under federal law, it is necessary to establish that the conduct occurred in execution of a government’s policy or custom promulgated either by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.

A Section 1983 plaintiff opposing summary judgment on municipal liability must produce a fact from which a jury could find a municipal custom or policy; mere allegations suffice only at the dismissal stage.

Thornburg v. Dora · filed 1988-01-21

While mere allegations of a municipal custom or policy may withstand a motion to dismiss a section 1983 action, in order to prevail on the defendants’ summary judgment motion, the plaintiff must adduce a fact which would enable a jury to find a custom or policy on the part of the City of Columbus.

Actions taken by municipal trustees with policymaking authority can sufficiently allege official policy and support municipal liability under Section 1983.

Wilson v. The Civil Town of Clayton, Indiana · filed 1988-02-03

Read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint lists sufficient actions by the Trustees to allege “official policy” and impose liability on the Town under § 1983.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires proof that employees acted under an officially adopted policy or a persistent, widespread, well-settled practice constituting municipal custom.

Wells v. City of Carrollton · filed 1988-02-04

To recover under this cause of action, Plaintiff must plead and prove that Defendants’ employees acted (1) in conformity with an official policy adopted by Defendants’ lawmaking or policymaking officials, or (2) pursuant to a persistent, widespread practice that is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom which represents municipal policy attributable to Defendants' policymaking authority.

For Section 1983 municipal liability, conduct may constitute official policy when officials with final authority perform it or senior officials acquiesce in subordinates’ conduct.

Grossman v. Schwarz · filed 1988-02-08

However, if officials with final authority perform the activity or if senior officials acquiesce in the actions of their subordinates, the activity may constitute official policy.

A county is liable under § 1983 when its admitted blanket jail policy causes unconstitutional strip and body-cavity searches.

O'BRIEN v. Borough of Woodbury Heights · filed 1988-02-11

Therefore, the County is liable under Section 1983 for the unlawful strip/body cavity searches to which plaintiffs were subjected.

A school district may be liable under Section 1983 when its officials deliberately permit unconstitutional conduct through a custom or policy, even without formal board action.

Steele v. Van Buren Public School District · filed 1988-05-06

The Supreme Court has made clear that municipal liability under section 1983 is conditioned upon a finding that "action pursuant to official ... policy of some nature caused the constitutional tort." ... These communications, coupled with the Board's refusal to act, support the court's conclusion that when faced with alternative ways of addressing Steele's concerns, the School Board chose to permit Jones' prayers to continue. The court's finding that this constituted a custom or policy is not clearly erroneous.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a policymaker’s policy that causes a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Cullen v. Mattaliano · filed 1988-06-02

This Court has stated that “a plaintiff who seeks to hold a municipality liable under sec. 1983 must prove ‘(1) a policy (2) of the city’s policymaker (3) that caused (4) the plaintiff to be subjected to a deprivation of constitutional right.’ ”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when allegations of repeated unconstitutional conduct and official ratification support an inference of an official policy or custom.

Diem v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 1988-06-08

These allegations are sufficient to support an inference that the conduct complained of was part of an official policy or custom, and that the municipality may be liable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 claims against a police officer or city fail without evidence that the officer violated a federal civil right or that the city maintained an unlawful policy or failed to train its officers.

Donahey v. Wellman · filed 1988-06-14

There is no rebuttal to the evidence supplied by Wellman and Titusville, there is no evidence to support the claim of harassment by Wellman or a policy of harassment by Titusville; there is no evidence to support the claim of improper training; there is no evidence that Officer Wellman, in the course of his duty, violated any civil right of Donahey.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires an official policy or established custom; an isolated jail practice of unknown origin that supervisors ended upon inquiry does not suffice.

Moenius v. Stevens · filed 1988-06-20

These factual allegations fail to support a claim for municipal liability under § 1983. The facts, at most, reveal a half-baked idea of unknown origin which terminated at the first inquiry by supervising officials in the police department.

Section 1983 imposes municipal liability only when the plaintiff alleges that a governmental policy or custom caused the injury.

Garcia v. Jefferson County · filed 1988-07-11

Plaintiff cannot impose municipal liability under section 1983 unless he alleges that his injuries were inflicted pursuant to a governmental policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an officer’s unconstitutional shooting only when the municipality officially sanctioned or ordered the conduct through its policy or custom.

Joseph Todd Eric Brown v. City of Clewiston and Luis Perez · filed 1988-07-13

To impose liability on the City of Clewiston for the acts of Officer Perez, Brown must show that the City “officially sanctioned or ordered” the shooting.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action based on simple negligence in hiring or training government employees.

Francis v. Pike County, Ohio · filed 1988-07-13

Plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants were reckless or grossly negligent in hiring and training their employees. Plaintiff has also not submitted any evidence that any officials of Pike County or the City of Piketon encouraged or ignored wrongful acts committed by their employees. Plaintiff's claim is based on simple negligence and does not state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege that constitutional violations occurred under a municipal policy or established practice.

Cheryll GRAY, F/K/A Cheryll Lengyel, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF DANE, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1988-07-28

We do not rule out the possibility that a section 1983 plaintiff in some future case might show that a municipality’s formal procedures for redressing grievances served only to disguise entrenched practices of violating employees’ rights. Gray’s complaint, however, alleges no facts in support of such a claim against Dane County. Viewed in its entirety, the complaint alleges constitutional violations by individual supervisory employees, but it fails to allege that these violations took place under a policy or established practice.

Section 1983 does not impose county liability for a detainee’s suicide based on an isolated employee omission without proof of a county policy or custom causing a constitutional deprivation.

Vega v. Parsley · filed 1988-08-12

Perhaps one can argue that Vega should not have been left alone; however, such argument more correctly sounds in tort than § 1983. The summary judgment evidence fails to indicate any policy or custom of leaving juveniles alone in the dark.

Section 1983 permits county liability only when a county policy or custom causes the injury; proof of officers’ unconstitutional assaults alone is insufficient.

Meehan v. County Of Los Angeles · filed 1988-09-07

Proof of unconstitutional assaults by SEB agents on December 21 and March 10, standing alone, does not support a finding of liability against the County.

Section 1983 requires grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent acts underlying municipal liability to be traceable to an official policy or custom.

Parker v. Williams · filed 1988-09-20

Grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent acts serving as a basis for section 1983 liability must be traceable to a policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires an official county policy or custom causing a constitutional deprivation for an official-capacity damages claim against county officers.

Hunziker v. German-American State Bank · filed 1988-10-03

Since plaintiffs have never set forth facts indicating the existence of an official county policy or custom creating the possibility of government liability, their official capacity claims against the defendants must fall.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional deprivation.

Michelin v. Jenkins · filed 1989-01-06

In order to establish a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a policy of the municipality is the cause of his constitutional deprivation. A municipality may only be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental custom as well as deprivations pursuant to a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the body’s officers.

A municipality’s refusal to carry out a stated policy can be evidence of an actionable custom or practice under § 1983.

Turley v. School Dist. of Kansas City, Mo. · filed 1989-05-03

In other words, a municipality’s refusal to carry out a stated policy can be evidence of the type of custom or practice that is actionable under section 1983.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for an unconstitutional arrest made pursuant to its policy or custom.

Clipper v. Takoma Park · filed 1989-05-30

Similarly, sufficient evidence exists from which the jury reasonably could have concluded that Clipper’s arrest was made pursuant to a policy or a custom of Takoma Park, and the jury was properly instructed on the law governing its consideration of that issue.

A city may be liable under § 1983 when its officials follow or establish a city policy or custom in terminating an employee.

Ness v. Glasscock · filed 1989-06-01

Thus, the City would be liable under § 1983 if city officials were either following or possibly establishing a City policy or custom in terminating Ness.

A county is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the constitutional deprivation; an allegedly unlawful arrest by a policymaking officer alone is insufficient.

Mann v. Purcell · filed 1989-07-26

This argument ignores, however, Monell’s requirement that in order for liability to attach, there must be a county “policy or custom" which caused the plaintiffs’ constitutional deprivation. Thus, even if Mann was arrested without probable cause by a policymaking official, plaintiff has failed to point the court to any facts which would suggest that the county had an “official policy or custom” of permitting officers to make arrests without probable cause.

A municipality may be liable under Section 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation, but an isolated incident or unforeseeable breakdown in procedure does not establish municipal liability.

Pennington v. Hobson · filed 1989-08-04

If the structure of this chain of communication was pursuant to a municipal policy or custom, and if that policy or custom was the cause of the alleged unreasonable delay in plaintiff’s release, plaintiff may be entitled to recover damages from the city. If, however, the delay was an isolated incident or was due to an unforeseeable breakdown in the established procedure, the city could not be held liable to plaintiff.

A city may be liable under § 1983 for an unconstitutional policy or custom, but a claimed municipal practice requires sufficient evidence of that custom or practice.

Evans v. City of Chicago, Bertha Balark v. City of Chicago, Curtis Collum, Cross-Appellants v. City of Chicago, C · filed 1989-08-25

The district court found that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the City had a custom or practice sufficient to trigger 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and we will not disturb that finding.

A county is liable under § 1983 for an alleged constitutional injury only if the injury was inflicted pursuant to the county’s policy or custom.

Prieto v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1989-08-29

Rather, the County can be held liable in this case only if Prieto’s alleged injury was inflicted pursuant to the “policy or custom” of the County.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when the challenged action was taken pursuant to the municipality’s policy or custom.

Herhold v. City of Chicago · filed 1989-09-28

Thus the City is entitled to summary judgment on the alternative ground that plaintiffs have not alleged or argued that the challenged actions were performed pursuant to City policy or custom under the framework adopted by the Praprotnik plurality.

Section 1983 holds a municipality liable for an employee’s constitutional violation only if a municipal custom or policy caused the injury.

Powell v. Gardner · filed 1989-12-13

In contrast, we conclude that, though the court similarly stated that the preponderance of the evidence favored the County, a directed verdict in favor of the County on Powell’s claim under § 1983 was proper. We reach this conclusion because the record is devoid of evidence from which the jury could have found that Powell was injured as the result of a municipal custom or policy, and because we are unpersuaded that Powell was unfairly denied the opportunity to present such evidence.

Section 1983 municipal and official-capacity claims require a municipal policy or custom that caused the deprivation of rights.

Jacobs v. Paynter · filed 1989-12-19

For these reasons, we conclude that Jacobs has failed to identify a municipal policy that caused the deprivation of her rights. Accordingly, we dismiss the claims against the City of Chicago and the individual defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable for a rights violation only when a policymaker is responsible for the policy or has acquiesced in the custom that caused it.

Andrews v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1990-02-08

In either of these cases, it is incumbent upon a plaintiff to show that a policymaker is responsible either for the policy or, through acquiescence, for the custom.

Section 1983 permits a court to infer that police officers knew of a well known and pervasive departmental policy when assessing municipal liability.

Gentile v. County of Suffolk · filed 1990-02-15

It is an appropriate and permissible inference that individual police officers are aware of a well known and pervasive policy of the department affecting important aspects of their work.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a local government only when a violation of federal rights occurred pursuant to its policy or custom.

Jasper Love v. Kent County Road Commission and Bruce Bigelow, Jointly and Severally · filed 1990-03-28

Love may maintain a section 1983 action against the Commission only if he demonstrates that Bigelow violated his federal rights pursuant to Commission policy or custom.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 for inadequate employee training or supervision only when the failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of people the employees encounter.

Schepp v. Fremont County · filed 1990-03-30

The Supreme Court has held that a municipality may be held responsible under Sec. 1983 for inadequate supervision and training of its employees "only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [employees] come in contact." ... We cannot conclude that Fremont County showed "deliberate indifference" in failing to correctly anticipate the Wyoming Supreme Court's interpretation of the procedural rule at issue here.

Section 1983 does not require proof of a municipal policy or custom to hold an individual officer liable, but does require it to hold a county liable.

Patrick v. Jasper County and Sheriff Terry Gilliland · filed 1990-04-12

Although “[s]ummary judgment is proper against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case,” ... establishing the existence of a municipal policy or custom is not an essential element of Patrick’s case against Sheriff Gilliland. Rather, establishing an official policy or custom of Jasper County was an essential element in Patrick’s case against Jasper County itself.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Tedesco v. City of Stamford · filed 1990-06-26

Therefore, the Appellate Court properly held that to state a valid cause of action under § 1983, the plaintiff’s complaint must allege a policy or custom that resulted in a deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires an official policy or custom for official-capacity liability, but not for individual-capacity liability.

Maillett v. Phinney · filed 1990-07-18

First, the Court holds that the “policy or custom” requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies only to a defendant who is sued in his official capacity, thus making the action essentially one against an agency of the government.

Section 1983 makes a county welfare department liable for a rights violation only when the violation results from its official policy or custom.

Millspaugh v. Wabash County Department of Public Welfare · filed 1990-07-31

To establish their claims under § 1983 then, plaintiffs must show that their rights were violated through those official policies or some other conduct shown to be official policy of the Department.

A municipality’s mere acquiescence in an official’s alleged discrimination, through failure to take corrective action, does not by itself establish a policy or custom under § 1983.

Maldonado v. Metra · filed 1990-08-01

However, Metra’s mere “acquiescence” in the acts of Cole, through its failure to take corrective action against alleged discrimination is insufficient, in and of itself, to establish a policy or custom under § 1983.

Section 1983 municipal liability cannot rest on a single incident of unconstitutional conduct without proof of an existing unconstitutional policy attributable to a municipal policymaker.

Culpepper v. Biggers · filed 1990-08-14

Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability on a municipality without concomitant proof of an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker.

Section 1983 requires an injury caused by an official municipal custom or policy to impose liability on a municipality.

Mastroianni v. Inc. Village of Hempstead · filed 1990-10-15

He is thus barred by the doctrine of res judicata from seeking relief here pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (cf., O’Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357), especially since, as with the Federal action, there is nothing to suggest and no claim is made that Gregory’s conduct constituted infliction of injury pursuant to an official village custom or policy (see, Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., supra; see also, Privitera v Town of Phelps, 79 AD2d 1, 7).

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must plead an official policy or custom that causes a denial of a constitutional right.

Willinger v. Town of Greenburgh · filed 1991-01-14

To properly plead a claim against a municipality under 42 USC § 1983, the following three elements are required: "(1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right” (Batista v Rodriguez, 702 F2d 393, 397). The failure to adequately plead these elements renders the civil rights claim deficient.

In a § 1983 municipal-liability claim, later incidents involving third parties may help prove a policy when they are similar and close in time, the policy has independent support, and their probative value outweighs prejudice.

Chalmers v. Petty · filed 1991-02-13

Subsequent acts or conduct may be used to establish municipal liability in actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... If allowed, the post-incident evidence relating to third parties should be the same or similar to the incident in question and very close in time to it. Further, in order to prove a pattern for the policy, the plaintiff must first establish the policy by independent, direct evidence, much like the rules governing evidence of a conspiracy. ... And, the benefit of its relevance must be balanced against the harm of its prejudice.

Section 1983 permits county or municipal liability only when a policy or custom caused the constitutional deprivation, rather than on a theory of respondeat superior.

Callins v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Greer, Okl. · filed 1991-04-08

It is well established that a county or municipality may be held liable under section 1983 only when the constitutional deprivation at issue was undertaken pursuant to a "custom" or "policy" of a county or municipality and not simply on the basis of respondeat superior.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 for employees’ discrimination only when an official policy or a widespread custom or practice supports municipal liability.

Garza v. City of Inglewood · filed 1991-04-12

There is no evidence of any widespread custom or practice of City employees to discriminate against Hispanics because of their national origin in any respect so as to establish a customary practice sufficient to impose liability on the defendant.

Section 1983 reaches a district’s persistent, pervasive practice of depriving children of federal statutory rights under the Adoption Assistance Act.

LaShawn A. v. Dixon · filed 1991-04-18

Based on the overwhelming evidence, the Court can conclude nothing less than that the District’s failures amount to a “persistent, pervasive practice, attributable to a course deliberately pursued by official policy-makers.” ... Accordingly, the Court holds that the District has been and continues to be depriving plaintiffs of federal statutory rights in violation of § 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality ordinarily requires an allegation that the challenged actions were taken pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.

Davis v. Dahmm · filed 1991-04-25

At the outset the court notes that plaintiff has failed to allege that any of the actions of which she complains were undertaken pursuant to a policy or custom of the City of Elkins. This omission is normally fatal in itself.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a school district policy or a widespread, persistent custom before the district can be held liable for a teacher’s abusive discipline.

Gonzales v. Brown · filed 1991-05-23

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence showing that HISD had such a policy. ... There is no evidence that HISD’s treatment of Brown reflected a widespread or persistent practice within the District.

Section 1983 permits a claim against school officials based on a custom or policy that deprives a student of constitutional rights.

Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools · filed 1991-06-11

Thus, plaintiff could have properly asserted a Section 1983 cause of action at the time she filed the federal court action based on the establishment of a custom or policy by defendants that deprived plaintiff of certain constitutionally protected rights.

Section 1983 requires sufficient factual allegations of a municipal policy or custom to state a claim against a city.

Brimage v. Willis, No. Cv90-0438572 (Jun. 18, 1991) · filed 1991-06-18

Therefore, the second count should be stricken because the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts from which it can be inferred that the City had a policy or custom of affording inadequate police protection.

Section 1983 holds a private corporation providing jail medical care liable for an employee’s unconstitutional act only when the act constitutes the corporation’s policy or custom.

Williams v. Jack Owens, Shelby County Health Care Corporation, D/B/A Regional Medical Center at Memphis, and as · filed 1991-07-16

Thus an employer will not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 unless the allegedly unconstitutional act constitutes a governmental "policy" or "custom." Beddingfield, 861 F.2d at 971; Molton v. City of Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240, 146 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1068 (1989). The Med, even though a private corporation, is clearly subject to these principles.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 for a discriminatory custom only when the challenged conduct amounts to an established practice; isolated employment decisions do not suffice.

Limes-Miller v. City of Chicago · filed 1991-09-16

None of the acts claimed by Limes-Miller to have deprived her of equal protection amounts to a “custom” within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an alleged constitutional violation results from a municipal policy or custom.

Shanahan v. City of Chicago · filed 1991-11-13

Finally, the court finds that Shana-han has sufficiently pled a municipal liability claim under § 1983 against the city and the individual defendants in their official capacities. Municipal liability under § 1983 requires the alleged constitutional violation to have resulted from a municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a deprivation of rights resulted from an official policy or custom to establish municipal liability.

Carattini v. Grinker · filed 1991-12-19

A cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 exists where the evidence demonstrates that an individual has suffered a deprivation of rights as a result of an official policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality only when the injury results from implementation of a municipal policy or custom.

Brown v. Smythe · filed 1992-01-07

A cause of action against a municipality lies only where the plaintiff has alleged that the injury resulted from the implementation of a policy or custom of the municipality.

Section 1983 imposes municipal liability for a discriminatory policy or custom only when the relevant final policymaker consciously adopts the policy or acquiesces in the custom.

Sorlucco v. New York City Police Department · filed 1992-01-07

Thus, whether a plaintiff claims to have been injured by an explicit policy or by a more general practice or custom, that plaintiff must prove a conscious act of discrimination by the relevant policy maker. In other words, plaintiff must prove active adoption of the discriminatory policy, or passive but nonetheless conscious acquiescence in the discriminatory practice or custom.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a sheriff’s unconstitutional policy or deliberately indifferent failure to train caused the alleged injury.

Schmelz v. Monroe County · filed 1992-02-19

Schmelz has not shown that their failure to do more resulted from inadequate training amounting to deliberate indifference to the needs of the jail’s inmates. ... Therefore, we agree with the district court that there existed no evidence that Defoor promulgated an unconstitutional policy or custom that led to Schmelz’s injuries.

A city’s lack of a written police policy and its officials’ inability to explain the law do not establish that it delegated policymaking authority to an officer for purposes of municipal liability under § 1983.

Morgan v. City of Marmaduke · filed 1992-02-27

The City’s lack of an official or written policy and the inability of the City officials to articulate the law does not establish that the City delegated its policy-making power to Jetton.

Section 1983 requires proof of a policy or custom for municipal liability; a single incident of objectionable conduct is insufficient.

Dillon v. Perales · filed 1992-03-26

Proof of a single incident of objectionable conduct by a municipality is insufficient to establish the existence of policy or custom for section 1983 purposes (supra).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a governmental entity to show that its policy or custom caused the alleged violation of constitutional rights.

Mumford v. Zieba · filed 1992-03-31

Furthermore, in order to prove his § 1983 claim against a governmental entity like the Domestic Relations Court, Mumford must demonstrate that the alleged violation of his constitutional rights was caused by a policy or custom of the Court.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to plead a municipal policy or custom that directly caused the deprivation of a federal right.

Caldwell v. City of Elwood, Indiana · filed 1992-04-01

Since "a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory," Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), a section 1983 complaint against a municipality must plead the existence of a custom or policy that was the direct cause of the deprivation of a federal right.

Section 1983 does not impose school district liability for a policy or custom of failing to prevent abuse when private students commit the underlying acts.

Elliott v. New Miami Board of Education · filed 1992-04-30

However, for a court to impose § 1983 liability for the state’s policy, custom, or practice, the underlying violative acts must have been committed by state officials.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality requires factual allegations supporting an official policy or custom; a conclusory assertion of policy is insufficient.

Ellis v. City of Indianapolis · filed 1992-07-24

The legal conclusion that Wynalda’s conduct was pursuant to an official policy or custom was “wholly devoid of facts,” which is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim against a municipal entity.

A city may be liable under § 1983 when officers act pursuant to a persistent, widespread practice constituting municipal policy, and the city has actual or constructive knowledge of that practice.

Nobby Lobby, Inc. v. City of Dallas · filed 1992-08-27

Therefore, this two-year course of seizing video and ot her equipment under § 16.01 represents a persistent, widespread practice sufficient to constitute municipal policy. Moreover, the City's involvement at various levels in the seizures demonstrates that it must have had actual or constructive knowledge of the seizures. Consequently, the court did not err in finding that the officers made their § 16.01 seizures pursuant to an official city policy or custom.

Under § 1983, allegations that a sheriff in his official capacity failed to investigate excessive force and discipline his deputies suffice to state a claim of governmental liability.

Searer v. Wells · filed 1993-11-18

Although Plaintiff may later be required to show other occurrences of the activity alleged to be the policy of the governmental unit, the allegations within Count I that Defendant Charles Wells, in his official capacity, failed to investigate the alleged use of excessive force and failed to discipline his deputies are sufficient to state a cause of action under § 1983.