42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Ray v. City of Edmond · filed 1981-10-29

Under the authority of City of Newport v. Fact Concerts Inc., --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981), we are compelled to reverse summarily the judgment entered by the district court. ... (i)n sum, we find that considerations of history and policy do not support exposing a municipality to punitive damages for the bad faith actions of its officials. Because absolute immunity from such damages obtained at common law and was undisturbed by the 42d Congress, and because that immunity is compatible with both the purposes of § 1983 and general principles of public policy, we hold that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 immunizes municipalities from punitive damages.

Heritage Homes of Attleboro, Inc. v. The Seekonk Water District, Heritage Homes of Attleboro, Inc. v. The Seekonk Water · filed 1982-01-25

Although the finding of the district court that there was “overwhelming” evidence that the Water District was motivated by racial considerations seems to us well supported by its account of the blatantly racial discussions that took place preceding the vote to exclude Heritage Homes from the District, we conclude that the facts of this case do not fit into any exception that the Court is likely to carve out of its broad holding that “a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not abrogate a state's sovereign immunity, and it does not subject state agencies or legislators acting within legitimate legislative activity to suit.

Lokey v. Richardson · filed 1982-02-16

In accordance with the above findings we hold that the State of California, the California Adult Authority and its members, and State Senator H. L. Richardson have absolute immunity from this action, and defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as it pertains to these defendants.

In a § 1983 damages action, a State cannot be made to pay a retroactive monetary award when the Eleventh Amendment bars that relief.

Owen v. Lash · filed 1982-06-28

The District Court's decision to award damages against the State violates the Eleventh Amendment and must be reversed. The case is remanded to the District Court to consider whether defendant Lash, in his individual capacity, is protected from personal liability by the doctrine of "qualified immunity."

A witness who testifies at a prison disciplinary hearing, like a witness in a judicial proceeding, is entitled to absolute immunity from a damages action under section 1983 even if the testimony was allegedly false.

Gibson v. Roush · filed 1984-07-09

Likewise, even assuming that officer Roush testified falsely at the disciplinary hearing, as plaintiff now claims, the officer, as a witness, is entitled to absolute immunity from an action for damages under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not abrogate common-law absolute judicial immunity, so a judge sued for damages remains immune for judicial acts performed within his jurisdiction even if done in error or with malice.

Adams v. McIlhany · filed 1984-09-07

Therefore, the Defendant may successfully claim the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity to the suit in damages under § 1983 despite the highly questionable nature of his actions.

A Commonwealth government with sovereign immunity cannot be sued under § 1983.

Saipan Secretarial/Employment Services, Inc. v. Commonwealth · filed 1986-06-12

The Commonwealth Government has sovereign immunity against suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Compensatory damages under § 1983 may not be based on the abstract value or importance of constitutional rights.

Bailey v. Andrews · filed 1987-05-22

“damages based on the abstract ‘value’ or ‘importance’ of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in [§ 1983] cases.” ... The district court’s Instruction 31A, allowing the jury to consider the inherent value of Bailey’s constitutional rights, thus gave the jury an impermissible measure by which to assess damages.

A public housing authority that follows an unrepealed regulation without adequate reason to know its conduct violates civil rights is immune from § 1983 damages.

Skinner v. Boston Housing Authority · filed 1988-07-05

First, while the Court infers that the waiver of administrative hearing sought to be imposed on Skinner here was, in fact, a policy of the Authority itself, see City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 915, 923, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988), the Authority is immune to a damage claim here since it acted pursuant to a regulation not expressly repealed, 24 C.F.R. sec. 966.51(a), and without adequate reason to know that its conduct contravened Skinner’s civil rights.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against defendants who are immune from that relief.

Wright v. Jefferson County Police Dept. · filed 1989-03-29

The defendants were either immune from monetary damages or were not said to have committed a cognizable constitutional tort.

In a Section 1983 suit seeking both an injunction and damages, officers’ immunity from damages does not require dismissal of the suit.

Al-Amin Hunafa v. James P. Murphy, John Bell, Raymond Poff, and Evelyn Fox · filed 1990-07-10

Since Hunafa is seeking an injunction as well as damages, a finding that the defendants were immune would not entitle them to be dismissed from the suit.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against defendants who are immune from suit.

Perry v. State of Michigan Wayne County Department of Social Services Phyllis Shepherd · filed 1990-09-19

Simply, all named defendants are immune from suit for monetary damages filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims arising from judicial and prosecutorial functions in a criminal trial are barred by absolute immunity, as are claims based on a witness’s trial testimony.

Newman v. Cleveland Police Department · filed 1993-10-21

However, judges and prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit on claims arising out of the performance of their duties. ... Witnesses in judicial proceedings are immune from civil liability.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred by states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, judges’ immunity for judicial acts, and prosecutors’ immunity for actions undertaken in their prosecutorial capacity.

Townsend v. State of Maryland · filed 1993-10-25

First, none of the Defendants named by Townsend in his supplemental complaint were amenable to damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (state immune under Eleventh Amendment); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (judges absolutely immune); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors immune for actions undertaken in prosecutorial capacity).

State defendants are immune from monetary damages under § 1983.

Cully v. Grace Hosp. · filed 1994-03-11

The state defendants are entitled to immunity from monetary damages.

Absolute or qualified immunity can bar damages liability for defendants in a § 1983 action.

Malek v. Haun · filed 1994-06-10

We also agree that the defendants are immune from damages liability based on their entitlement to either absolute or qualified immunity.

Immunity from suit under § 1983 extends to public servants only when sued in their individual capacities.

Board of Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr · filed 1996-06-28

Because only claims against the Board members in their official capacities are before us, and because immunity from suit under § 1983 extends to public servants only in their individual capacities, see, e. g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U. S. 163, 166 (1993), the legislative immunity claim is moot.

A state board immune from § 1983 damages cannot be held liable for monetary damages, including nominal damages.

Wooden v. Board of Regents of the University System · filed 1999-01-06

The Board is immune from liability for monetary (including nominal) damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1981.

Individual defendants may be immune from damages under § 1983 through absolute quasi-judicial or qualified immunity.

Young v. City of St. Charles · filed 2001-03-23

Furthermore, as the district court concluded, the individual defendants here are entitled to either absolute quasi-judicial immunity or qualified immunity from Young's claims for damages.

A municipality’s immunity from punitive damages under § 1983 can be waived.

Saldana-Sanchez v. Lopez-Gerena · filed 2001-07-12

In view of the foregoing, we conclude that, on the present record, the district court could not have found that Humacao's City of Newport immunity was nonwaivable.

A § 1983 political-discharge claim may be dismissed on immunity grounds even if the discharge was unconstitutional.

Hernandez v. Pulido · filed 2001-08-03

Even if Hernandez’s discharge for political affiliation reasons was not constitutionally permissible, both Hidalgo County and Pulido were immune from suit on this claim.

Section 1983 does not give a private athletic association immunity from suits brought on behalf of its member public schools merely because the association is a state actor.

Hlad Ex Rel. Shipley v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n · filed 2004-02-27

The TSSAA is not a body politic of the State of Tennessee that is cloaked with immunity from § 1983 lawsuits brought on behalf of its member public schools.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against municipal legislators only within the limits of applicable immunity, including absolute legislative immunity.

Robinson v. City of Raytown · filed 1980-10-01

In summation, neither Count II nor Count III of plaintiffs’ petition stated a § 1983 claim for damages against defendant aldermen because the unconstitutional conduct attributed to them in connection with the passage of Ordinance No. 1654-78 fell within the perimeter of absolute legislative immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives another of a federally protected right, while absolute immunity can bar damages claims against persons integral to the judicial process.

In Re Scott County Master Docket · filed 1985-10-02

The guardian defendants argue that because they are court appointed officials, absolute judicial immunity shields them from all of plaintiffs’ allegations. The Court agrees. Persons, governmental or otherwise, who are integral parts of the judicial process are entitled to absolute immunity from damage liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims are subject to immunity defenses.

Storman v. California Department of Health Services · filed 2009-01-23

The district court properly determined that defendants are immune from claims for damages.

Section 1983 does not authorize punitive damages against municipalities.

Brown v. Baldwin Union Free School District · filed 2009-03-20

this Court concurs with the many district courts that have all reached a single conclusion on the question — school districts and boards of education are municipal entities immune from punitive damages under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law, subject to applicable immunities.

Morneau v. Connecticut · filed 2009-03-30

To the contrary, only an individual acting under color of law can assert immunity from suit, and the Court has determined that these are the type of state actor defendants to whom quasi-judicial immunity should apply, in light of the doctrine’s derivation from absolute judicial immunity, which protects judges acting within their judicial jurisdiction from suit under § 1983.

Municipalities are immune from punitive damages under § 1983, and an appellate court may set aside an award despite an untimely objection when the error warrants relief.

Chestnut v. Coyle · filed 2002-03-29

The main hitch with the plain error doctrine is that City of Newport described the protection against punitive damages as an "immunity," rather than as a "rule" forbidding punitive damages. ... The judgment insofar as it awards punitive damages against the City is vacated and the matter is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Section 1983 claims for damages against parole board officials are barred by absolute immunity for actions taken while processing parole applications.

Price v. Schwarzenegger · filed 2009-09-01

The district court properly dismissed Price’s due process claims against defendant Roos because he is immune from suit.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief claims against state officials and individual capacity claims when qualified immunity does not protect clearly established rights violations.

Griffin v. Webb · filed 2009-09-03

Although Griffin’s § 1983 claims against AHC and DHS are dismissed, Griffin successfully argues that her claims against Selig and Webb should not be dismissed on immunity grounds. The Eleventh Amendment bars suit pursuant to § 1983 against agencies of the State of Arkansas, but state officials may be sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief. ... Griffin’s § 1983 claim against Webb in her individual capacity survives qualified immunity analysis. Although “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages,” that protection ends if their alleged conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.” ... Thus, summary judgment is denied as to Griffin’s § 1983 claim against Webb in her individual capacity.

Section 1983 treats states and officials acting in their official capacities as nonpersons and bars injunctive relief against judicial officers for judicial acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

SKS & ASSOCIATES, INC. v. Dart · filed 2009-09-08

As already suggested, in 1996 Congress responded with a critical amendment that added to Section 1983 this flat-out prohibition: [I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred by absolute immunity for judges acting in their judicial capacities and prosecutors acting within the scope of their duties.

Arsad v. Means · filed 2010-02-16

Any challenge Arsad sought to assert with respect to the actions of a state court judge was properly disposed of with little discussion as judges are entitled to absolute immunity in § 1983 actions seeking monetary damages for acts performed in their judicial capacities.

Section 1983 bars Carney’s claim for injunctive relief against the judge.

Carney v. Christiansen · filed 2010-04-26

Alternatively, the court correctly dismissed Carney’s claim for monetary relief under the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978), and barred his claim for injunctive relief pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not waive a state's sovereign immunity.

Lewis v. University of Texas Medical Branch · filed 2011-12-20

Nor has Congress expressly waived sovereign immunity for § 1983 suits. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-45 (1979). Accordingly, UTMB is immune from Lewis’s suit.

Section 1983 permits claims against public officials and municipalities subject to personal-capacity, official-capacity, immunity, and municipal-liability rules.

Swain v. Corporal Jason Hutson · filed 2011-12-22

Therefore, these judges’ rulings were judicial acts that were entitled to absolute immunity from Swain’s section 1983 suit. ... Because a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory, this allegation affirmatively negated the existence of jurisdiction, and the trial court properly dismissed this portion of Swain’s claim.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of federal rights but does not itself create substantive rights.

Toth v. California University of Pennsylvania · filed 2012-01-09

This statutory provision does not create substantive rights. ... A plaintiff cannot obtain redress under § 1983 without establishing an underlying violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.

Section 1983 creates a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of federal rights.

Marable v. Marion Military Institute · filed 2012-11-05

Tate is entitled to qualified immunity on Marable’s § 1983 Equal Protection claim. ... Therefore, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of Tate on Marable’s § 1983 Equal Protection claim (Count IV).

Section 1983 claims are barred when defendants are absolutely immune from suit for the conduct alleged.

Modelist v. Hernandez · filed 2012-11-12

Modelist’s claims are frivolous because the defendants are absolutely immune from suit under federal law.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against a state bar association, state bar prosecutor, or hearing officer when they are immune from liability.

Grundstein v. Washington State Bar Associati · filed 2014-05-29

The district court properly dismissed Grundstein’s request for damages because the Washington State Bar Association, the state bar prosecutor and the hearing officer are immune from liability.

Section 1983 allows claims against public officials for constitutional violations committed under color of state law, subject to applicable immunity doctrines.

Elfers v. Varnau · filed 2015-03-31

Therefore, the Court finds that the Var-naus are not entitled to absolute immunity from Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity, which bars damages claims against California school districts.

C. W. v. Usd · filed 2015-04-09

It is well-established that a school district cannot be sued for damages under § 1983. Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 254 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that in California, school districts are state agencies for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity, and concluding that school districts cannot be liable for damages under § 1983).

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its agencies in federal court without the state's consent.

Marino v. New York · filed 1986-02-11

The attached Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate A. Simon Chrein is hereby adopted as the Opinion of this Court. ... The plaintiffs’ charges against the State of New York and the Office of Court Administration (“OCA”), as an arm of the state, should be dismissed since the state is immune from suit in federal court unless it expressly consents to be sued.

Section 1983 claims are subject to absolute immunity, but non-testimonial, out-of-court fabrication of evidence is not protected by that immunity.

Peck v. Hinchey · filed 2016-06-16

After the charges against them were dismissed, they filed suit against the internal investigator, Paula Veach, and the state investigator, Margaret Hinchey, for various claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arizona state law relating to fabrication of evidence and malicious prosecution. ... This alleged conduct is not protected by absolute immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Ransom v. Evans · filed 2020-10-07

As to a municipality’s immunity from punitive damages in a § 1983 claim, the answer is clear: “[A] municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Based on this binding precedent, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claim against Louisville Metro for punitive damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not excuse a landowner challenging a zoning designation as arbitrary and capricious from obtaining a final local agency decision before suing.

Celentano v. City of West Haven · filed 1993-03-15

It is settled law, that a civil rights challenge to a zoning designation premised on a theory of arbitrary and capricious government conduct and brought pursuant to § 1983 does not obviate the need for a final, definitive decision by a local agency in issue.

Section 1983 damages claims for an alleged taking require a definitive governmental decision and an unavailable or inadequate state inverse condemnation procedure to be ripe.

Fields v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority · filed 1991-01-14

Williamson sets forth two requirements for ripeness of a Section 1983 claim for money damages resulting from a taking of property in violation of constitutional rights: 1) “the initial decision-maker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury;” Williamson, 473 U.S. at 193, 105 S.Ct. at 3120, and 2) “plaintiff must show that the inverse condemnation procedure is unavailable or inadequate, and until it has utilized that procedure, its taking claim is premature.” Williamson, 473 U.S. at 196-97, 105 S.Ct. at 3121-22.

A § 1983 regulatory takings claim may proceed once the taking is final and no adequate state compensation remedy is available.

Lake Lucerne Civic Association, Inc. v. Dolphin Stadium Corp. · filed 1989-08-03

Accordingly, we hold that the second prong of Williamson County has been satisfied and that appellants, on remand, may pursue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, their taking claim in this case.

A § 1983 claim alleging a taking is not ripe until the property owner has unsuccessfully sought compensation through state procedures.

Wilhelmsen v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF TETON COUNTY, WYO. · filed 1988-08-17

The court agrees that under Williamson County a § 1983 claim for an alleged taking is not ripe until a property owner has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain just compensation through the procedures provided by the state for obtaining such compensation.

A property owner’s § 1983 just-compensation claim is premature until the owner uses available state procedures for obtaining compensation and compensation is denied.

Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City · filed 1985-06-28

The nature of the constitutional right therefore requires that a property owner utilize procedures for obtaining compensation before bringing a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 actions remain subject to ripeness requirements even though plaintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies.

Shell Petroleum, N v. v. Graves · filed 1983-08-01

But the requirement that a controversy be ripe for adjudication applies to actions brought under § 1983, even though the exhaustion requirement does not.

Section 1983 permits a federal court to consider a claim only after the challenged deprivation is complete and final.

Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Mississippi · filed 1972-03-27

We reiterate what we have previously said — that before any ease can be considered by a federal court under Section 1983 the forbidden deprivation must be complete and final.

A Section 1983 challenge to land-use restrictions is unripe when a required state permit has not been granted and may never be granted.

Bob's Home Service, Inc. v. Warren County · filed 1983-08-25

In the absence of a state permit there is not sufficient immediacy or reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

A section 1983 due process claim fails where the plaintiff has not suffered a final deprivation because legal process remains available to him.

In Re Application of Cook County Treas. and Ex-Officio Cty. Collector · filed 1984-07-05

Accordingly, having already found the order in the 1969 application nonfinal, we agree that the taxpayer has not suffered a final deprivation and therefore does not have a cause of action under section 1983.

A § 1983 takings claim is unripe while adequate state condemnation procedures remain available to decide whether the taking is for public or private use.

HMK Corp. v. County of Chesterfield · filed 1985-08-26

Accordingly, until such time as the State court determines through the available condemnation procedures the public/private use issue, the matter is not ripe in this Court for a determination of § 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires an actual deprivation of federal rights, so a prison religious-recognition claim is unripe before the inmate makes the reasonably required formal request.

Murphy v. Missouri Dep't Of Corrections · filed 1987-05-08

Only an actual deprivation of federal rights states a claim for Sec. 1983 relief. ... The prison's requirement of a written request for formal recognition is a reasonable rule and we are not persuaded that it is a foregone conclusion that prison officials will deny such a request from Aryan Nations or treat the request differently than a similar request from other religious groups.

A regulatory-takings § 1983 claim is ripe after a final land-use decision when the state provides no adequate alternative remedy for the property owner’s injury.

Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes · filed 1987-05-14

Since the subject ordinances called for a complete moratorium on Corn’s development of his property, any request for a variance would plainly have been futile. ... Accordingly, given the lack of any alternative remedy recognized by Florida courts, we hold Corn’s action passes the two-pronged test of ... and is ripe for review on the merits.

A regulatory-takings claim brought under § 1983 ordinarily is not ripe until the government rejects a development plan and denies a variance.

Margaret Kinzli Evelyn Goossen Philip Kinzli Ernest Kinzli, Plaintiffs v. City of Santa Cruz · filed 1987-08-07

Therefore, the “final decision” which inflicts a concrete injury on the plaintiff and is ripe for adjudication as a claim of a regulatory taking, even if the claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, requires at least two decisions against the Kinzlis: (1) a rejected development plan, and (2) a denial of a variance.

A regulatory-takings claim under § 1983 is not ripe until the claimant completes available and adequate state inverse-condemnation proceedings and is denied just compensation.

Orion Corporation v. State · filed 1987-12-17

At minimum, we read ... as requiring Orion to complete the available and adequate Washington inverse condemnation proceedings before filing a § 1983 action ... alleging an unconstitutional taking by excessive regulation. ... Consequently, the trial court correctly dismissed Orion's § 1983 claim as not yet ripe.

Land-use due-process and equal-protection claims are ripe after a final rejection when further application or a variance would be futile, and they need not satisfy the takings doctrine's reapplication requirement when no inverse-condemnation claim is alleged.

Herrington v. County of Sonoma · filed 1987-12-24

To sum up, the Herringtons’ claims meet the final decision requirement enunciated in ... . The ... reapplication requirement is inapplicable to this case because no taking by inverse condemnation has been alleged. The Herringtons’ claims are ripe for adjudication.

A Section 1983 claim for a taking without just compensation becomes ripe after the claimant seeks just compensation through available state procedures.

Allingham v. City of Seattle · filed 1988-07-15

Had the plaintiffs sought compensation for the taking of their property even as an alternative remedy in the present action, they would have exhausted the procedures available under Washington law for obtaining just compensation. In such a case a section 1983 action would have been ripe and may have supported a claim for attorney fees and costs. Since plaintiffs made no such claim for compensation, we must deny their request for attorney fees and costs under section 1988.

A § 1983 regulatory takings claim is ripe when the zoning authority has made a final decision and state law provides no adequate remedy for just compensation.

A.A. Profiles, Inc. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale · filed 1988-08-01

A plaintiff also must establish that “no adequate state remedy, such as inverse condemnation, is available to redress the injury occasioned by the final decision.” ... The rezoning ordinance undeniably constituted a final, definitive position. ... Accordingly, absent the ability to recover money damages under Florida law, appellant’s action is ripe for our review.

A Section 1983 challenge to the application of a zoning plan to particular property is generally unripe until the landowner submits a development plan and the local authority reaches a final decision.

Eide v. Sarasota County, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida · filed 1990-03-08

As a general rule, the challenging of the application of a zoning plan or ordinance to a particular property is not ripe until the landowner has submitted a plan for development of his or her property.

A § 1983 claim challenging a governmental taking is not ripe for judicial review until the government reaches a final decision to take the property.

Langley Land Co. v. Monroe County · filed 1990-06-06

Even though the § 1983 claim in Williamson County involved a just compensation claim for a regulatory taking, the finality requirement would also apply to a governmental taking. The court thus reaches the same result: Langley cannot meet the finality requirement.

A § 1983 taking claim is not ripe until the property owner first pursues inverse condemnation or an equivalent state remedy.

Bakken v. City of Council Bluffs · filed 1991-05-15

Bakken’s claim for a taking under section 1983 is not ripe for adjudication in this action until the remedy of inverse condemnation, or an equivalent state remedy, is first pursued.

A Section 1983 equal protection challenge to a zoning decision may proceed when the city has reached a final position and further administrative action would be futile; exhaustion of remedies is not required.

Bannum, Inc. v. City of Louisville, Kentucky · filed 1992-05-12

We believe that finality, not the requirement of exhaustion of remedies, is the appropriate determinant of when litigation may begin.

Section 1983 requires a challenged administrative decision to be final and ripe for judicial review.

Aegis of Arizona, L.L.C. v. Town of Marana · filed 2003-12-22

If a decision does not “conclusively determine” an issue but, rather, “leaves open the possibility” that the decision is subject to change, then it is not final or ripe for review and cannot support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims against state and local officials for constitutional violations under color of state law are premature until final decisions have been rendered about applying zoning ordinances to the claimant's property.

Loomis Enterprises, Inc. v. Boone County, Ky. · filed 1987-01-13

In its opinion, the district court noted that the Supreme Court in Hamilton Bank held that claims brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against state and local officials for violations of rights secured under the Constitution, under the color of zoning ordinances, are premature until final decisions have been rendered as to how the zoning ordinances will be applied to claimants' property. ... Because it properly applied the holding of Hamilton Bank to the circumstances of this case, we affirm the district court, adopting the rationale utilized in its opinion.

A § 1983 challenge to an administrative taking is final once the owner has notice of the initial decisionmaker’s action; state-court review is unnecessary.

R & J Holding Co. v. Redevelopment Authority · filed 2006-01-31

Its decision became final for § 1983 purposes once Appellants had notice of the filing of the Declaration of Taking in 1996.

Section 1983 does not provide relief to a prisoner who lacks a protected interest in a particular job.

Ellison v. Charles Ellis, Gary Stutler, Al Cross, Dale E. Flotz, Elton Scott, Chris Daniels, Larry Brugger, an · filed 1987-02-03

Those facts standing alone, however, are insufficient to give rise to a civil rights action as a prisoner does not have protected interest in a particular job so as to entitle him to relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits a decedent’s estate to recover damages for loss of enjoyment of life when a constitutional violation causes death, even if state law disallows those damages.

Collado v. The City of New York · filed 2019-08-23

Thold that damages for the loss of enjoyment of life are recoverable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 allows a federal court to award compensation for a violation without relying on state law.

Pund v. City of Bedford · filed 2018-09-10

To be clear, a federal district court need not resort to state law to conclude that aggrieved parties are entitled to compensation for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages for denial of a fair trial even when the plaintiff suffered no wrongful imprisonment.

Westerfield v. United States · filed 2012-06-08

The fact that Westerfield has not suffered wrongful imprisonment does not necessarily preclude a showing that defendants’ suppression of Brady material resulted in a denial of Westerfield’s constitutional right to a fair trial compensable in ... damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for such injury as he is able to prove—e.g., impairment of reputation, personal humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress, and including potentially punitive damages.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for threatened future harm.

DA Mortgage, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach · filed 2007-05-18

Plaintiffs cannot bring prospective damage claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however.

Section 1983 damages are available only for violations of the plaintiff’s own constitutional rights, so a facial challenge alone does not support them.

MAVERICK MEDIA GROUP v. Hillsborough County, Fla. · filed 2007-05-16

Thus, while Plaintiff is barred from collecting § 1983 damages on its facial challenges as such are available only for violations of a party's own constitutional rights, ... an award of nominal damages may be appropriate in a First Amendment overbreadth case.

Section 1983 permits separate punitive damages awards for distinct misconduct if the court considers the risk of an excessive award.

Ishay v. City of New York · filed 2001-08-13

Although the Second Circuit has “expressed some preference for an aggregate [punitive damages] award in civil rights cases,” King v. Maori, 993 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir.1993) (citing Gagnon v. Ball, 696 F.2d 17, 19 n. 2 (2d Cir.1982)), district courts retain discretion to permit juries to make separate punitive damages awards for each component of a defendant’s misconduct provided that the court bears in mind the risk of an excessive award.

Section 1983 does not allow a separate damages award for denial of a bid hearing when the resulting injury is compensated by recovery of reasonable bid preparation costs.

City of Atlanta v. J. A. Jones Construction Co. · filed 1990-12-05

The basis for appellees’ § 1983 claim was that appellant failed to afford them a hearing at which they could contest the award of the contract to another bidder. The damage from that failure was that appellees were not themselves awarded the contract. As we have held above, the permissible recovery for that wrong is the reasonable expense of bid preparation. Accordingly, we hold that the award for damages on the § 1983 claim must also be reversed.

For damages claims under § 1983, liability is judged by the legal standards in existence when the alleged constitutional violation occurred, not by later-developed precedent.

Slate v. McFetridge · filed 1973-09-28

With these policies in mind, federal courts have reached a general consensus that liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be determined by the legal standards in existence at the time of an alleged violation of constitutional rights. ... Retroactive application of fresh precedent has no place in fixing the standard of conduct for damage suits under Section 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes a wrongful-arrest damages action when officers act under color of state law and deprive a plaintiff of a constitutional right, and lack of actual damages does not defeat the action.

Lamb v. Cartwright · filed 1975-02-28

To recover damages under the Civil Rights Act for wrongful arrest it must be shown that the officers were acting under color of state law and that they deprived the Plaintiff of a constitutional right. ... An individual’s right to be free from unlawful arrest is clearly such a constitutionally protected right which, if violated, may be the basis for a suit such as this. ... Absence of actual damages does not in and of itself defeat an action under Section 1983 or 1985. ... nominal damages may be presumed, Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1965).

Section 1983 does not provide a damages remedy for defamation unless the defamation deprives the person of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Ellingburg v. A. G. Lucas, Correctional Employee, Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 1975-06-25

Damages for defamation are not recoverable under § 1983 because a defamed person has not been deprived of any right, privilege or immunity secured to him by the Federal Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 permits recovery of money damages only when the defendant acted with wrongful intention or culpable negligence.

Owens-El v. Robinson · filed 1978-01-04

In order to recover money damages under the Civil Rights Act of" 1871, 42 'U.S.C: § 1983, the plaintiff must show wrongful intention or culpable negligence on the part of the defendant.

Section 1983 does not necessarily provide a right to money damages in every action; in these circumstances, injunctive and declaratory relief are adequate remedies.

Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency · filed 1979-08-09

The specific issue, as we see it, is whether a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 necessarily implies a right to recover money damages in all circumstances. The statute itself (sec. 1983) states only that the person “shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” ... These precedents show that in a variety of situations the remedy of damages should be denied and that a ruling by the Supreme Court that federal jurisdiction of a claim for relief lies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 does not imply that damages is an appropriate remedy. Injunctive and declaratory relief are adequate. ... We are firmly of the belief that under the circumstances of this case damages is an inappropriate remedy and only injunctive and declaratory relief are available.

Section 1983 permits a prevailing plaintiff to recover out-of-pocket expenses and emotional distress only when sufficient evidence supports those damages.

Pierce v. Stinson · filed 1980-05-23

While a prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights action is entitled to recover for his out-of-pocket expenses and emotional distress, “ * * * there must be sufficient evidence to support such a finding. * * * ”

Section 1983 does not make monetary damages available for an alleged taking resulting from local land-use regulation when such damages are an inappropriate remedy under governing law.

Gilliland v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1981-11-25

In view of that decision, the remedy of monetary damages would be unavailable in any event, whether the action were brought in inverse condemnation or under the federal Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 generally permits damages, but not when the plaintiff alleges only a deprivation of rights secured by a Spending Clause statute.

Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York City · filed 1983-07-01

Damages indeed are usually available in a § 1983 action, but such is not the case when the plaintiff alleges only a deprivation of rights secured by a Spending Clause statute.

Section 1983 permits recovery only by a party who suffered injury from the alleged constitutional violation.

Brown v. Bowden · filed 1986-07-03

As Brown has suffered no injury, he is, at least for this reason, not entitled to recover on his § 1983 claim.

A procedural-due-process plaintiff may recover actual damages only by proving actual injury from the denial of process.

Hogue v. Clinton · filed 1986-07-15

Unless Hogue can establish that he suffered actual injury due to the failure to hold a pretermination name clearing hearing, we think an award of anything but nominal damages would be a windfall, not compensation.

A discharged public employee has no § 1983 property-right damages claim after receiving full compensation for the contract term and proving no reasonable expectation of continued employment or other personal damages.

Robinson v. Boyer · filed 1987-08-21

Once it is established that he had no reasonable expectation of continuing employment, and he had been fully compensated for his employment until his contract expired, he is left with no claim for damages under § 1983 for violation of his property rights.

Section 1983 permits money damages for a proven constitutional violation by a city, and a later court-ordered hearing does not erase liability for that violation.

Daulton v. The City of Winston-Salem, Inc., Joseph Masten and Bryson A. Stuart · filed 1988-05-24

Appellant's suit was based on an alleged constitutional violation committed by the city and sought money damages, relief he was entitled to receive under section 1983 if he proved his allegations. We would, in effect, be immunizing the city from liability for those damages if we were to allow the court-ordered hearing to cure any shortcomings in the city's hearings. Therefore, the court's statement that the third hearing repaired any constitutional violation that the city committed was erroneous.

Section 1983 plaintiffs must use reasonably available opportunities to mitigate their damages.

Richard Gladden, Cross-Appellee v. Randy W. Roach (Officer), and City of Denton, Cross-Appellant · filed 1989-02-08

The instruction made it clear to the jury that the duty to mitigate was not absolute, and that Gladden was only required to avail himself of reasonable opportunities to mitigate his damages.

Section 1983 permits damages for a federal statutory violation only if the underlying statute explicitly or implicitly permits damages in a private action.

Marilyn W. v. Children & Youth Services · filed 1989-04-07

No damage claim may be maintained under section 1983 based on federal legislation that does not either explicitly or implicitly permit the award of damages in a private action.

Section 1983 claims adjudicated in federal court cannot receive delay damages under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238.

Costello v. Daddario · filed 1989-04-12

Rule 238 does not apply to federal claims, such as the section 1983 count in this case, that are adjudicated in federal courts.

Section 1983 damages may be mitigated only through steps taken after injury, not by an arrestee avoiding the conduct that led to arrest.

Miller v. Lovett · filed 1989-07-17

If a plaintiffs duty to mitigate damages were to include the duty to avoid the underlying injury, few arrestees could recover damages under § 1983 since most could have “avoided” engaging in the conduct that precipitated the arrest.

Section 1983 permits presumed general damages for a First Amendment violation without proof of specific injury.

Jackson v. Stephen H. Norris Michael Dutton, Warden Michael Kendrick · filed 1989-08-16

Concerning the need for specific evidence of actual injury, the rule in this circuit is that general damages will be presumed from a first amendment violation.

Section 1983 permits damages for mental anguish and other nonphysical injuries when actual injury is proved.

Bertold J. Pembaur, M.D., Cross-Appellee v. City of Cincinnati, Hamilton County, Ohio, Cross-Appellants · filed 1989-08-18

Further, the injury need not have been a physical one. Damages for pain and suffering, mental anguish, and the like are available to the extent that actual injury has been proved.

Section 1983 provides the damages remedy against state officials for federal constitutional violations; an Eighth Amendment claim has no independent damages remedy.

Wilkie v. State · filed 1989-08-22

Based on the reasoning in these authorities, we conclude that a plaintiff who seeks monetary damages against state officials must do so under § 1983, and has no independent cause of action for damages derived directly from the eighth amendment, as applied to the state through the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1983 does not provide damages solely for the same Education Act and Rehabilitation Act § 504 violations when those violations do not support damages.

Barnett v. Fairfax County School Board · filed 1989-08-28

Finally, this court believes that plaintiffs cannot predicate a claim for damages under § 1983 solely upon the same violations of the Education Act and § 504 which do not afford damages in this particular case.

Section 1983 does not require a minimum amount of damages for a claim.

HILL v. McINTYRE · filed 1989-10-23

The defendants' citation of Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 is entirely off point, and Sec. 1983 does not state a minimum jurisdictional amount of damages.

Section 1983 provides a tort-based claim for monetary relief for constitutional injury, even when the plaintiff has no contractual claim.

Main Line Paving Co. v. Board of Education · filed 1989-11-29

Main Line’s amended complaint asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... When the plaintiffs’ claims are properly viewed as alleging tortious, rather than contractual injuries, it becomes clear that monetary relief is available and an actual controversy exists between the parties.

Section 1983 does not allow damages for the intrinsic value of a constitutional right; damages must reflect actual loss.

Hay v. City Of Irving · filed 1990-02-08

Special verdict questions 11a and 14a which followed the damages instruction allowed the jury to compensate Hay for the intrinsic value of the deprivation of his right not to be subjected to excessive force. 1 This was error. We correct it by eliminating the award from the judgment.

In assessing damages in a § 1983 action, courts may consider analogous personal injury awards and need not limit comparisons to federal § 1983 cases.

Ismail v. Cohen · filed 1990-03-27

The district court here, however, improperly limited its frame of reference to federal § 1983 cases.

In a § 1983 challenge to unconstitutional union fee collections, plaintiffs may recover the nonchargeable portion of collected fees but not the full amount.

William Lowary and Sara Wyatt v. Lexington Local Board of Education, Ohio Education Association, Lexington Teachers Asso · filed 1990-05-17

Balancing the interests of plaintiffs with the interests of defendants, we conclude that plaintiffs are entitled to recover only the nonchargeable portion of the unconstitutionally collected fees. If lawful collection procedures had been used, plaintiffs would have had to pay a fair share fee based on the union’s chargeable expenditures. To allow plaintiffs to recover for both chargeable and nonchargeable expenditures would constitute a windfall to plaintiffs.

Section 1983 damages for an unconstitutional search are analyzed under the common law damage rules for the analogous tort of trespass.

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati · filed 1990-08-23

Plaintiffs action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 charges defendant with a Fourth Amendment violation analogous to the common law tort of trespass. Damages flowing from the constitutional deprivation must be analyzed according to the principles of common law applied by Ohio courts to redress this type of tortious conduct.

Section 1983 permits a damages action for prejudice from a constitutionally delayed criminal appeal when the appeal has been resolved and habeas relief is unavailable.

Yourdon v. Kelly · filed 1991-07-26

Because granting a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus has been determined to be inappropriate, this Court must find— following Cody, Simmons, and Diaz — that relief for the prejudice suffered by this petitioner is best obtained through a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages.

Section 1983 does not allow a separate false arrest damages recovery when an overlapping state false imprisonment verdict compensates the same injury.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit · filed 1991-08-01

Objecting to our consolidating damages for the federal claim entitled false arrest, and the state claim entitled false imprisonment, plaintiff says that the two $1,000 findings against the police officers might have been for different injuries, and thus be cumulative. This overlooks the fact that the court instructed the jury that false arrest was false imprisonment, and that the federal and state causes coincided. This was legally correct. See Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920, 926 (1st Cir.1987) (state claim for false imprisonment and § 1983 claim for false arrest "completely overlapping"). We repeat that the $2,000 judgment, joint and several, was error.

A § 1983 damages claim against a prison official fails for lack of compensable injury where discipline amounted only to a verbal reprimand later removed from the prisoner’s records and no retaliation was shown.

Piatt v. James Adams Jay Adkins, and Cpo Delagarza · filed 1991-10-30

Without regard to the issue of qualified immunity, Piatt nevertheless received only a verbal reprimand for the alleged rule violation, all reference to the disciplinary action was stricken from Piatt's records, and Piatt did not show that Adams's actions were retaliatory in nature. In light of these facts, Piatt suffered no compensable injury. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978). Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the claim against Adams.

Section 1983 does not provide an inmate’s heirs with damages for their non-economic loss from his death or with the funeral transportation costs, telephone costs, and lost wages sought here.

Coleman v. Craig · filed 1991-12-20

We agree with the district court that the federal remedy fashioned in Berry does not include the heirs' non-economic losses resulting from the death of a parent, nor does it include the costs and lost wages sought by Ms. Coleman.

Section 1983 permits damages that can be proved for an equal protection violation.

Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County · filed 1992-06-15

While it is true that the Eide decision held that the remedy for an equal protection violation in a case of this sort would be an injunction against enforcement of the invalid regulation, 908 F.2d at 722, damages as may be proven are also allowable for a violation of equal protection brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires proof of injury for damages and does not allow presumed damages.

Eddie Lee Turner and Mozella Donner, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. Chicago Housing Author · filed 1992-07-29

Injury must be proved; “presumed” damages are not available in litigation under § 1983.

A section 1983 liability verdict is not defeated solely by a failure to award monetary damages when the liability finding necessarily included a finding of injury and the damages verdict reflects confusion over actual damages.

Williams v. Armontrout · filed 1992-10-13

Downing’s argument that the jury found no damages and, accordingly, he is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict, simply cannot stand in light of the instructions given and the verdict rendered. It is evident that this argument is based solely on the jury’s failure to find “actual damages” by awarding monetary damages to Williams, but this overlooks the fact that the jury was required to find and did find that Williams was “damaged” when it returned its verdict in favor of Williams on liability.

Section 1983 does not require proof of damages to prevail on a claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable search and seizure.

Kjorlie ex rel. Kjorlie v. Lundin · filed 1993-09-13

As the Supreme Court has held, a violation of one’s Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure is complete when the wrongful action is taken, and it was therefore unnecessary for the plaintiffs to prove they incurred damages in order to prevail in their § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit duplicate compensation for a single injury already compensated under state law.

Bragado v. City of Zion/Police Department · filed 1993-12-07

Plaintiffs motion for new trial on the federal claim damages is no more than a request for double recovery on the basis that plaintiff asserted two theories of liability. A plaintiff may pursue any and all viable theories of liability to recover compensation for an injury; however, the multiplicity of theories do not warrant multiple damages for a single injury.

Section 1983 damages for delay in processing a development application may account for the probability of approval, and full compensation on that basis precludes an additional demand to have the application processed.

John S. HERRINGTON; David S. Herrington; Quail Hill Ranch, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. COUNTY OF SONOMA · filed 1993-12-28

There was no way for the court to determine whether, absent the erroneous ground for denial, the proposed subdivision would have been denied on other grounds. Accordingly, the district court utilized a probability factor and took testimony to assess what that probability was. In doing so, the court determined the amount of damages that then existed as the result of the County's failure to process the Herringtons' application. Having been awarded full damages for the failure to process their application, the Herringtons were not entitled to have that application processed. The probabilities for success were assessed and the full measure of damages was awarded on that basis.

Damages under § 1983 for an Eighth Amendment violation must be established by the plaintiff and are not presumed.

Erby v. Kendall Apelgren, C/o Bryan Holman Rodney Bonevelle Becky Sadler, Nurse Sandra Monroe, Nurse · filed 1994-08-12

Damages will not be assumed from an Eighth Amendment violation, but must be established by the plaintiff.

Section 1983 gives juries discretion to calculate damages in light of the evidence of injury.

Toby Nephew & Cathel Bacon v. City of Rock Island · filed 1994-12-23

Similarly, the mildness of Nephew's injuries and the discretion afforded the jury in the calculation of damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 provide an adequate basis for the jury's award of $530.26 damages to Nephew.

Section 1983 permits consequential damages that the trier of fact reasonably finds supported by the evidence.

Schaefer v. Tannian · filed 1995-08-07

Section 1983 allows for an award of consequential damages which the trier of fact may reasonably find based on the evidence.

A Section 1983 plaintiff’s failure to mitigate damages does not, by itself, defeat an otherwise properly pleaded claim.

Dandino v. Tieri · filed 1995-12-13

Dandino’s failure to mitigate does not by itself render his otherwise properly pled claim inadequate.

Section 1983 permits damages for lost future profits when the profits can be estimated on a reasonable basis rather than through guesswork.

Malloy v. Monahan · filed 1996-01-05

However, awards for lost profits are acceptable so long as the lost profits can be estimated on a reasonable basis.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for violations of federal constitutional rights.

McLaughlin v. Town of Front Royal · filed 1996-02-28

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the means for the McLaughlins to obtain redress for the damages incurred by them as a result of the violation of their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits exemplary damages against individual officials when the evidence supports a finding that they acted with malice or reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiffs’ rights.

Jan Forsyth, Richard Kirks v. City of Dallas, Tx, City of Dallas, Tx, Willard Rollins, Richard Hatler, Cross-Appellee · filed 1996-08-16

Fifth, Rollins and Hatler contend the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s award of $125,000 in exemplary damages against each of them. We disagree; Forsyth and Kirks presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Rollins and Hatler acted with malice or a reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiffs-appellees’ rights.

Section 1983 claims adjudicated in federal court are not eligible for delay damages under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238.

In Re City of Philadelphia Litigation · filed 1996-08-27

However, it is settled that “Rule 238 does not apply to federal claims, such as the section 1983 count in this case, that are adjudicated in federal courts.”

Section 1983 permits full recovery for due process violations when a state tort damages cap makes postdeprivation relief inadequate.

L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of the Town of Cumberland · filed 1997-07-17

We are of the opinion that because the statutory limitation on damages under the Governmental Tort Liability Act clearly rendered inadequate the postdeprivation relief available to remedy the due process violations in this ease, plaintiffs may recover the full amount of their damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A plaintiff seeking monetary damages under § 1983 must present evidence supporting an award.

Chalifoux Ex Rel. Chalifoux v. New Caney Independent School District · filed 1997-09-03

Although Plaintiffs requested monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the infringement of their First Amendment rights, Plaintiffs failed to cite a specific damage amount in their request. Additionally, no evidence was presented at trial by Plaintiffs to support an award of monetary damages. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are not entitled to monetary damages.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a municipal or county government.

Pearson v. Miller · filed 1997-12-31

Punitive damages are not recoverable against a municipal or county government.

Before the PLRA, Section 1983 allowed compensation for mental and emotional stress resulting from a constitutional violation.

Bolton v. Goord · filed 1998-01-23

Prior to the PLRA, mental and emotional stress resulting from a constitutional violation was compensable under 42 U .S.C. § 1983.

Municipalities are immune from punitive damages under Section 1983.

Cellco Partnership v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission of Farmington · filed 1998-04-13

We also deny plaintiffs request for punitive damages for the Commission’s violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the Supreme Court has held that municipalities are immune from punitive damage awards in section 1983 cases.

Section 1983 damages claims for alleged substantive and procedural due process violations are not equitable actions.

Ammons v. Okeechobee County · filed 1998-04-15

With respect to counts III and IV, the appellants alleged causes of action for violation of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, asserting deprivations of substantive due process and procedural due process rights. Unlike counts I and II, these counts are not equitable actions.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a municipality.

Hill v. Borough of Swarthmore · filed 1998-04-21

Any claim for punitive damages alleged in connection with the § 1983 claims is DISMISSED as to the Borough of Swarthmore and the police department.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a constitutional violation even without proof of actual injury.

Irish Lesbian & Gay Organization v. Giuliani · filed 1998-04-23

Finally, ILGO also has standing to assert a claim for nominal damages. Nominal damages are available in actions alleging a violation of constitutionally protected rights, even without proof of any actual injury.

A § 1983 plaintiff must prove actual injury caused by the constitutional violation to recover compensatory damages; nominal damages are available when actual injury is unproved.

Atkins v. New York City · filed 1998-05-05

A § 1983 plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages only in the absence of proof of actual injury. ... Therefore, at least some of Atkins’s actual injuries must have been caused by Justice’s use of excessive force and are compensable as a matter of law.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages even when no compensatory damages are awarded.

Robinson v. Cattaraugus County · filed 1998-06-10

We have long recognized in § 1983 cases that punitive damages may be awarded even in the absence of a compensatory award.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Castle v. Clymer · filed 1998-06-30

Punitive damages are appropriate under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “when defendants’] conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the ... federally protected rights of others.” ... The Court concludes that defendants’ conduct in this case did not involve “callous indifference” or “evil motive” which would warrant the award of punitive damages.

Section 1983 compensatory damages for destroyed property are measured by its market value at the time of destruction.

Raishevich v. Foster · filed 1998-07-17

The basic measure of Raishevich’s damages is the market value of the transparencies at the time they were destroyed.

A claim for monetary damages under § 1983 fails when the plaintiffs produce no evidence of monetary harm.

Pete's Brewing Co. v. Whitehead · filed 1998-09-10

To the extent that Plaintiffs seek any damages under § 1983, Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence at trial that they have suffered any monetary damages, apart from attorneys’ fees and costs, because of § 311.360.2’s enactment. In fact, the record clearly shows that § 311.360.2 was never enforced against the Plaintiffs and that they did not suffer any economic harm in the market as a result of this statute.

Section 1983 allows nominal damages for unconstitutional treatment that caused no actual damages.

Petit v. City of Chicago · filed 1998-09-11

Under § 1983, plaintiffs are entitled to nominal damages where they suffered unconstitutional treatment that caused no actual damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Arroyo Lopez v. Nuttall · filed 1998-11-04

Punitive damages may be awarded in a section 1983 action when the defendant’s conduct is motivated by evil motive or intent, or when the defendant’s conduct involves reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiffs federally protected rights.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil intent or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Zappa v. Cruz · filed 1998-11-23

In an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, punitive damages are available where a “defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others” ... The Court finds that Defendants’ repeated violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected rights warrants an award of $50,000.00 in punitive damages.

Section 1983 allows punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Yeager v. Hurt · filed 1983-06-03

Punitive damages are also available in § 1983 actions when the defendant's conduct is shown to have been motivated by evil motive, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.

Section 1983 permits a punitive damages award alongside a state-law punitive award for the same act when the awards do not duplicate recovery.

Fall v. Indiana University Board of Trustees · filed 1998-12-30

While courts have held that the traditional rule against double recoveries applies to punitive damage awards, the recovery of punitive damages on both a state law and a § 1983 claim stemming from the same act is not per se prohibited.

A plaintiff seeking punitive damages under § 1983 may discover a defendant’s financial condition, with limits on disclosure and use at trial.

Schoepfer v. UNH · filed 1999-01-04

This court believes the better approach to be to permit discovery now, cabined by restriction of dissemination of the information and the subsequent utilization of bifurcation and special verdicts to prevent the jury from misusing the evidence of defendant's solvency when addressing the initial issues of liability and/or compensatory damages.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a constitutional violation even when compensatory and punitive damages are denied.

Norwood v. Bain · filed 1999-01-08

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the district court for entry of a judgment in accordance with this opinion that includes an award of nominal damages to the plaintiff class against Bain and the City not exceeding $1.00 for the constitutional violation found by the district court.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages only for actual harm caused by the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Ford v. Nassau County Executive · filed 1999-03-31

The Supreme Court has been very clear that § 1983 provides compensatory damages only for actual harms that result from the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages even when the jury awards no compensatory damages.

Beckford v. Irvin · filed 1999-04-13

However, punitive damages can be awarded in § 1983 cases absent a finding of compensatory damages.

Section 1983 compensatory damages for unconstitutional retaliatory segregation must adequately compensate the resulting injury.

Trobaugh v. Sergeant Hall · filed 1999-05-13

In our opinion, the $1 compensatory damage award was patently insufficient to compensate Trobaugh for the injury he suffered by being placed in segregation in retaliation for exercising a constitutional right.

Section 1983 damage awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion and remanded for recalculation if arbitrary.

Trobaugh v. Sergeant Hall, Sued as Sargeant Hall, Linn Co. Deputy Michael Carr, Sued as Mr. Carr, Jail Admini · filed 1999-05-13

We review a District Court’s damage award in a section 1983 action for abuse of discretion, and if the award is arbitrary, we will remand for recalculation.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages only for conduct motivated by evil motive or intent, or involving reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Flanery v. Wagner · filed 1999-05-19

Although Plaintiff also sought punitive damages against Defendant, and although claims for such damages are not necessarily barred by section 1997e(e), see Perkins, 165 F.3d at 808 n.6, punitive damages are available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only for conduct which is “shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent[] or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Plaintiff has made no showing that Defendant’s alleged conduct rose to that level in this case.

Section 1983 plaintiffs may plead punitive damages in Florida state court without first obtaining leave under Florida Statutes section 768.72.

Sanchez v. Degoria · filed 1999-05-19

Based upon the foregoing, we determine that the trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of law in concluding that Degoria did not have to comply with section 768.72 before pleading a punitive damages claim for the alleged section 1983 violation.

Section 1983 compensatory damages must be based on actual injury, not the abstract value of a constitutional right.

Makin v. Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 1999-07-12

In doing so, the court incorrectly based its award on the abstract value of the constitutional right rather than on the actual injuries Mr. Makin suffered from the denial of that right, and we must vacate its award.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for an IDEA violation when those damages are unavailable under the IDEA.

Wayne County Regional Educational Service Agency v. Pappas · filed 1999-07-14

Crocker specifically stands for the proposition that § 1983 will not provide a right to damages where none is allowed under the substantive statute, in this case, the IDEA.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking punitive damages need not present evidence of the defendant’s financial condition.

Mason v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority · filed 1999-07-15

Defendant insists that in establishing the propriety and amount of punitive damages, plaintiff was obligated to present evidence of defendant’s financial condition. This is clearly not the law with respect to the federal claim.