42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not make a prison supervisor liable for damages solely under respondeat superior, but a supervisor who is aware of unconstitutional activity by subordinates may bear responsibility for permitting it.

Duckett v. Ward · filed 1978-09-19

Rather, it must be demonstrated that defendant Ward was directly involved in the alleged unconstitutional activity for him to respond in damages. ... This is indeed a valid statement of the law. It is equally as true, however, that where a prison official is “aware” of the unconstitutional activities of those subject to his authority, the ultimate responsibility for permitting these actions is squarely his.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; the plaintiff must establish the supervisor's personal responsibility for the constitutional violation.

Drug Purchase, Inc. v. Dubroff · filed 1980-02-25

Since the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in Section 1983 cases, a plaintiff must establish the personal responsibility of supervisory personnel.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors under respondeat superior and does not provide a claim for negligence.

O'NEAL v. Evans · filed 1980-09-10

Respondeat superior is not a theory by which liability may be imposed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a constitutional tort. ... Further, even supposing Boyette reacted less promptly and correctly than the plaintiff’s own testimony shows him to have, this would state only a case for negligence, which is not a cognizable claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on higher officials; they may be liable for a subordinate’s acts only if they actually participate in or acquiesce in the alleged violation.

Parker v. Rockefeller · filed 1981-09-14

A higher official may only be liable for acts of a subordinate where he actually participates or acquiesces in the alleged violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely under the theory of respondeat superior.

Larry Junior Ward v. Gene M. Johnson, Warden, Sgt. Gardner, Chairman of Adjustment Committee · filed 1981-12-30

Since he cannot be held liable under § 1983 under the theory of respondeat superior, he must be exonerated.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisory officials, who may be liable for subordinates' acts when they participate or acquiesce, fail to supervise and control, or know of a pervasive risk of harm and fail to take reasonable remedial steps.

McCoy v. McCoy · filed 1981-12-28

Supervisory officials may be liable for the acts of their subordinates, however, if they actually participate or acquiesce in the alleged deprivation of civil rights, ... or if they fail to supervise and control subordinates, ... or if they have knowledge of a pervasive risk of harm and fail “to take reasonable remedial steps to prevent such harm.”

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on police supervisors; liability requires personal involvement and a causal connection, while officials are immune when they act in good faith with reasonable grounds.

Harris v. Pirch · filed 1982-05-14

A § 1983 action against police supervisory officers cannot be based upon the theory of respondeat superior. ... What is required is a causal connection between the misconduct complained of and the official sued. ... "Liability may be found only if there is personal involvement of the officer being sued." ... In § 1983 actions for damages defendants are entitled to a qualified immunity from liability based on a good faith belief in the propriety of their actions and reasonable grounds for that belief.

Section 1983 imposes liability on an official who directly participates in or directs subordinates to cause a constitutional deprivation, but does not impose respondeat superior liability.

Fletcher Altman Smith, and Marguerite Elizabeth Smith v. Don Heath, and Jack Rohtert · filed 1982-09-29

Here, however, the district judge specifically found that Rohtert was directly responsible for and personally participated in the deprivation of the Smiths’ constitutional rights. He both subjected and caused the appellees to be subjected to the deprivation of their civil rights and is thus liable under section 1983. ... We do not hold him liable under respondeat superior, which does not apply in section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not require a state-law notice of claim, incorporates absolute immunity for a witness's relevant affidavit in judicial proceedings, and does not impose liability on supervisors solely through respondeat superior.

Overman v. Klein · filed 1982-10-27

The notice of claim requirements of I.C. § 6-905 are inapplicable to a cause of action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We hold therefore that the affidavit filed by Neher in the temporary custody proceedings, being clearly relevant to the issue under inquiry, is privileged and Neher is absolutely immune from liability under the authorities cited. ... We hold further that the dismissal as to defendants-respondents, Klein, Caballero, Isom and Phillips is affirmed, since a supervisory official cannot be sued under a theory of pure vicarious liability or respondeat superior under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely through respondeat superior, but permits liability for the supervisor's own failure to act when the supervisor has responsibility over unconstitutional conditions.

Messimer v. Lockhart · filed 1983-03-25

While we agree with the District Court that a defendant cannot be held liable under Sec. 1983 on the basis of the doctrine of respondeat superior, we believe the complaint does allege Lockhart's direct involvement in the conditions about which the plaintiffs complain. ... Thus, Lockhart may be responsible for his own failure to act.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant solely under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Brown v. Ledbetter · filed 1983-03-29

Second, the court is in agreement with defendants that the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires conduct that causes a constitutional deprivation and cannot rest on respondeat superior.

DeGidio v. Perpich · filed 1985-06-12

imposes liability only for conduct which “subjects, or causes to be subjected” the complainant to a deprivation of a constitutional right. ... Liability under § 1983 may not be imposed on the theory of respondent superior.

Section 1983 supervisors are liable only for their own acts or omissions, not under respondeat superior.

Rosa Maria Cristobal Miranda v. Miguel Gimenez Munoz, Rosa Maria Cristobal Miranda v. Miguel Gimenez Munoz · filed 1985-08-27

supervisory officials may be found liable only on the basis of their own acts or omissions.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors.

McGriff v. Coughlin · filed 1986-07-16

Finally, insofar as the complaint seeks to impose liability on defendants in their supervisory capacities, it must be dismissed. There is no ... respondeat superior ... liability under § 1983, and plaintiff has made no showing that defendants were reckless or deliberately indifferent in their supervision, or otherwise culpable.

A supervisory official is not liable under § 1983 through respondeat superior; the plaintiff must plead and prove the supervisor’s personal involvement or deliberate indifference.

Zeno v. Cropper · filed 1986-12-30

With respect to the personal liability under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, of a supervisory official such as defendant Cunningham, the rule is clear that plaintiff may not rely on the doctrine of a ... respondeat superior, ... but must plead and prove specific allegations of personal involvement or deliberate indifference.

Respondeat superior does not state a claim for relief under § 1983.

Delk v. Bd. of Com'rs of Delaware County · filed 1987-01-29

Furthermore, a claim of responsibility based upon respondeat superior does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; a supervisor's own action or inaction must amount to gross negligence or deliberate indifference and proximately cause the constitutional violation.

Guzman v. City of Cranston · filed 1987-02-25

They will be liable only “when their own action or inaction, including a failure to supervise that amounts to gross negligence or deliberate indifference, is a proximate cause of the constitutional violation.” ... In a like vein, this court has said, “the supervisor must demonstrate at least gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference, and ... his conduct must be causally linked to the subordinate's violation of plaintiff’s civil rights.”

A § 1983 supervisor-liability claim for failure to prevent a subordinate's conduct requires direct responsibility; respondeat superior and negligent supervision are insufficient.

Rubek v. Barnhart · filed 1987-04-03

Moreover, a section 1983 action will not lie against a supervisor for failure to prevent a subordinate's conduct, absent a showing of direct responsibility for the improper action. ... Alleging mere negligence in supervision is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a direct causal link between the supervisor's own acts and the constitutional injury; respondeat superior does not apply.

Caley v. Robert Brown William Hudson · filed 1987-08-27

To state a recoverable claim against a supervisor such as Brown, the plaintiff must at a minimum allege some direct causal link between his acts and the challenged constitutional acts of his employees. ... The doctrine of respondeat superior in which liability arises solely from the employer-employee relationship does not apply in Sec. 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on prison supervisors for their subordinates’ actions.

MacLin v. Billy W. Compton, Warden · filed 1988-03-03

The district court dismissed the action without serving the complaint because it determined that the individual supervisory defendants could not be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim "against any named and indentifiable defendant on whom service can be made...." ... Upon review, we conclude that dismissal of the complaint against the warden and assistant warden was proper for the reasons suggested by the district court.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisory officials solely under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Winters v. George Voinovich Reginald Turner William T. Hanton · filed 1988-03-14

Plaintiff therefore failed to state a claim against the named defendants because liability in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 suits may no longer be imputed against supervisory officials under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not allow liability against a supervisor solely under respondeat superior.

Clark v. Evans · filed 1988-03-25

We note in addition that Newsome's liability in any event would be derivative and that a Sec. 1983 action cannot be sustained solely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely through respondeat superior; a supervisor may be liable for failing to act after widespread abuses put him on notice of the need for better training or supervision.

Clark v. Evans · filed 1988-03-25

Of course, Evans cannot be liable on a respondeat superior theory. He might be liable if a history of widespread abuses put him on notice of the need for improved training or supervision, and he failed to take action.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability under respondeat superior; a supervisor must be personally involved in the alleged deprivation.

Mann v. James Adams, and Bruce Babbitt, Governor of Arizona · filed 1988-05-18

Finally, Mann alleges that the district court erred in dismissing Governor Babbitt from this action for lack of personal involvement. However, respondeat superior does not apply in federal civil rights actions.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely through respondeat superior; a plaintiff must allege a connection between the supervisor and the deprivation of rights.

Felton v. Nathan B. Rice, R.B. Seymour, Gene Cousins · filed 1988-08-22

The district court found that Felton's claim against Rice was based solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, which does not apply to suits arising under Sec. 1983. ... We agree with the district court that because Felton failed to allege any connection between Rice and a denial of Felton's constitutional rights, his claim against Rice should be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not allow supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Bonner v. Mr. Lewis, Director at Adoc Cpo Crowley Cpo Vega · filed 1988-09-13

The district court dismissed Samuel Lewis, the Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, from this action based on Monell v. New York Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), which prohibits the application of respondeat superior to claims made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The district court’s dismissal of Director Lewis regarding these § 1983 claims was correct.

Section 1983 does not permit relief against a sheriff solely through respondeat superior; supervisory liability requires evidence linking the sheriff to the alleged misconduct.

Williams v. Jerry Taylor R.W. Goodman, the Sheriff of Richmond County · filed 1988-12-20

We observe that Williams adduced no evidence linking the sheriff to these events in any fashion. Thus, Williams is not entitled to relief under respondeat superior, Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926 (4th Cir.1977), nor can he meet the heavy burden of proof required to establish supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based on imputed knowledge or respondeat superior.

Getch v. Rosenbach · filed 1988-12-29

Rafferty’s liability may not, however, be based on imputed knowledge nor on the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials through respondeat superior without evidence of their personal participation in the alleged violation.

Washington v. Richard L. Dugger, G.S. Fortner · filed 1989-01-05

Washington’s complaint against defendants Dugger, Fortner, Makant and Methe-ney is not supported on the record by any evidence which would permit a factfinder to find their participation in any deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Of course, these persons cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on the basis of respon-deat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a sheriff for a deputy’s actions, whether the sheriff is sued in a personal or official capacity.

Singleton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. · filed 1989-01-17

The court specifically holds that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in a section 1983 action regardless of whether the sheriff was sued in his personal or official capacity.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior or vicarious liability on a defendant for another person’s conduct.

Ford v. Lane · filed 1989-01-27

It is well settled that respondeat superior or vicarious liability has no place in a section 1983 case.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a governor under respondeat superior.

Shabazz v. Blanchard · filed 1989-02-10

The only named defendant in this action, the Governor of Michigan, cannot be held liable on the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based on respondeat superior.

Buchanan v. John T. Wigginton, Secretary Corrections Cabinet, Vertner L. Taylor, Commissioner Corrections Cabinet · filed 1989-02-24

Section 1983 liability may not be premised on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability under respondeat superior; a plaintiff must allege the supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged wrong.

Snyder v. Baumecker · filed 1989-03-28

Because both the officials and their subordinates are employees of the same governmental unit, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not available in § 1983 actions, however, and to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff must allege that the defendant was personally involved or participated in the alleged wrongs.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; liability requires an affirmative link between the supervisor and the acts complained of.

Hampton ex rel. Bowling v. Tinder · filed 1989-04-06

The Court in its Order entered January 18, 1989, recognized that liability under § 1983 cannot be established upon a theory of respondeat superior. Supervisors can be found liable under § 1983, however, if some affirmative link is shown between the acts complained of and the superiors.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisory prison officials solely under respondeat superior when they did not participate in the alleged misconduct.

McMurray v. Johnson · filed 1989-04-18

The Director of the Department of Corrections and the wardens were not participants in the alleged misconduct, and they cannot be held liable under Sec. 1983 solely on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not allow recovery against a supervisor solely under respondeat superior.

Bolin v. Black · filed 1989-05-26

It is well settled that the doctrine of respondeat superior is insufficient to allow recovery in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Bolin v. Black · filed 1989-07-10

It is well settled that the doctrine of respondeat superior is insufficient to allow recovery in a Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison warden solely through respondeat superior.

Wooden v. Young · filed 1989-07-26

The district court thereafter dismissed Warden Dutton from the action as liability could not be based on respondeat superior and also dismissed plaintiff's claims alleging failure to record adequate evidence or recite reasons for the disciplinary board's decision as being frivolous. ... Furthermore, we find no error with the district court's dismissal of defendant Dutton for the reasons set forth in the district court's memorandum opinion dated December 30, 1987.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Branham v. Seiter · filed 1989-08-03

Moreover, Branham's claim against defendant Seiter is meritless, as liability under Sec. 1983 may not be based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based on respondeat superior; a plaintiff must identify defendants personally at fault.

Mayberry v. Brad Settlis Judy Cotton John Doe Marjorie Van Ochten · filed 1989-10-27

Furthermore, Mayberry should be permitted on remand to amend his pleadings to name the specific defendants who are allegedly at fault, Berndt v. Tennessee, 746 F.2d 879, 882 (6th Cir.1986), as his suit cannot proceed against certain defendants under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on a governor solely under the theory of respondeat superior.

Gallagher v. Jill Goldhart, Adm. Deborah Stewart Richard Celeste, Governor · filed 1989-11-15

The district court correctly noted that Governor Celeste could not be held liable on the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Merton E. Bond v. Wallace Wilkinson, Governor of Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 1989-11-16

Bond can also not seek to hold the defendant liable on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on prison wardens solely under a theory of respondeat superior.

Dyer v. Cavanal · filed 1989-11-16

In addition, the wardens cannot be held personally liable under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s indifference or tacit authorization of a subordinate’s constitutional misconduct directly causes injury; respondeat superior alone is insufficient.

Miltier v. Beorn · filed 1990-02-20

Supervisory liability based upon constitutional violations inflicted by subordinates is based, not upon notions of respondeat superior, but upon a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinate misconduct may be a direct cause of constitutional injury.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely through respondeat superior.

Smith v. Maschner · filed 1990-03-29

We agree with the district court that in these claims, Smith has alleged liability solely under a theory of respondeat superior, which will not support section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Givens v. Jimmy Jones, Terry Morris, Zak A. Ajans, M.D., Frederick Stephenson, Jr., Georgia Slater, and Denn · filed 1990-04-09

It is well settled that respondeat superior cannot be the basis of liability in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely under a theory of respondeat superior.

Moore v. Willie Angel Pat Kosh · filed 1990-04-10

First, plaintiff's claims against defendants Norris and the state of Tennessee are improperly grounded upon the theory of respondeat superior and are barred by the eleventh amendment.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on prison supervisors for their subordinates’ conduct.

Newson v. L. Sandborn Janes C. Yarborough Robert Brown, Jr. · filed 1990-04-16

A civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 cannot be premised on respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a prison superintendent, but allegations that prison policies subjected a prisoner to unconstitutional conditions can support the superintendent’s liability.

Williams v. White · filed 1990-04-30

There are sufficient factual allegations to allow the inference that the policies of the Alpha Correction Center carried out by Superintendent White subjected the petitioner to this type of treatment. White is not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior without a showing that the supervisor condoned, encouraged, or participated in the alleged misconduct.

Godfrey v. Jeff Reynolds, Commissioner · filed 1990-05-02

Finally, Reynolds cannot be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, as Godfrey did not establish that he condoned, encouraged, or participated in the alleged misconduct.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based on respondeat superior; a supervisor must have condoned, encouraged, or participated in the alleged misconduct.

Mulazim v. Michigan Department of Corrections Perry Johnson Robert A. Berles Robert E. Weiss, Gen. Cnty, Pros. · filed 1990-05-02

Liability may not be predicated on the doctrine of respondeat superior, and Mulazim has failed to allege that Johnson condoned, encouraged, or participated in the alleged misconduct.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on a prison warden for a guard’s conduct through agency or respondeat superior.

Bailey v. Frank Wood, John Doe · filed 1990-07-31

However, he was not joined as a defendant and liability cannot be imputed to Warden Wood, who maintained overall supervision of the prison, under principles of agency and the doctrine of respondeat superior. This is well settled law under section 1983 and is based upon principles governing constitutional claims under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor for inadequate treatment by other personnel solely through respondeat superior.

Eclophia Smith, Jr. v. James Marcantonio, Bill Armontrout, Donald Cline, Orolee Brady, Dick Moore, Dr. Richard K. Bowers · filed 1990-08-06

Further, Dr. Bowers cannot be held liable for Smith’s claims of inadequate treatment by other medical personnel because respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a director’s own policy decision without relying on respondeat superior for employees’ acts.

Jackson v. Rapps · filed 1990-08-13

Liability in the case at bar is not based on the acts of the employees of Defendants Rapps, but is based on the decision made by the Director not to use a formula for the calculation of the “state debt.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position of authority; respondeat superior does not apply.

Williams v. Luna · filed 1990-08-15

As the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 actions, see Bush v. Viterna, 795 F.2d 1203, 1206 (5th Cir.1986), and as no other basis of liability for these defendants is mentioned, this suit was properly dismissed against them because the claims against them have no arguable basis in law.

Section 1983 liability cannot be premised on respondeat superior.

Gallagher v. Henry E. Shaw, Jr. · filed 1990-08-20

Upon consideration, we find the district court correctly held that the civil rights action could not be premised on respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials through respondeat superior when they had no personal involvement in the alleged violations.

Mowatt v. Deputy Elkins, A.D.W. Myers, Sergeant Parker, Babik, Corrections Officer, Foster, Corrections Officer · filed 1990-08-31

The magistrate recommended the motions be granted, finding that defendants Elkins and Myers had no personal involvement in the matters, and thus, could not be liable on the basis of respondeat superior. ... Upon review, we affirm the district court's judgment for the reasons stated in the magistrate's report dated October 26, 1989, as adopted by the district court on January 18, 1990.

Section 1983 requires a government official’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; liability cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Jordan v. Jones · filed 1990-10-23

Finally, the district court correctly held that plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant was personally involved in the deprivation of Jordan's property and privileges or the denial of Jordan's access to the courts. Therefore, plaintiff's claim fails because government officials cannot be held liable for such deprivations on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Dekoven v. Brown · filed 1990-11-26

Further, to the extent defendant Brown was named in his supervisory capacity, the complaint fails because defendant Brown may not be sued under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a prison warden for correctional officers’ conduct.

King v. E.C. Thompson, John Doe, Employee, Mecklenburg Correctional Center, John Doe, Ii, Employee, Mecklenburg Cor · filed 1991-02-05

It is clear from the record that the alleged delay cannot be attributed to the warden under a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely through respondeat superior.

Nunn v. Darren Bracey, Fate Thomas, Joan Miller, and Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County · filed 1991-02-11

As to Miller, the director of the CJC medical unit, the Magistrate properly declared that respondeat superior cannot be a basis for liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages liability against supervisors based solely on respondeat superior.

Brown v. Coughlin · filed 1991-03-08

Brown apparently sues these persons on a theory of respondeat superior which is not applicable in an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely through respondeat superior, but a supervisor’s own failure to act can create liability if it shows deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of a violation.

Holt v. Paul Caspari Major J.P. Smith · filed 1991-03-11

Assuming the complaint states a claim, the claim against Caspari may be interpreted as based on a theory of respondeat superior, which will not support a section 1983 action. ... Caspari will thus be liable if any failure to take action amounted to deliberate indifference or a tacit authorization of a violative process.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors under a respondeat superior theory when they are not alleged to have personally violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Na'im v. W. Jeff Reynolds, Jack Morgan, E. McIntosh · filed 1991-05-02

Na'im fails to allege specific acts in violation of his constitutional rights taken by defendants Reynolds and Morgan. They may not be held liable under a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Harding v. Jones · filed 1991-07-17

The allegations against Jones, based as they are upon the theory of respondeat superior liability, do not state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on defendants under a theory of respondeat superior.

Flagner v. Virgil Brown, Cuyahoga County Commissioner, John T. Corrigan, Prosecuting Attorney, Cuyahoga Coun · filed 1991-08-01

The district court also correctly held that the defendants could not be held legally responsible under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits direct liability against a prison supervisor who fails to train, supervise, direct, or control a subordinate whose actions cause constitutional injury, although respondeat superior does not apply.

Johnson v. Lockhart · filed 1991-08-12

We recognize that "although the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 cases, a § 1983 claimant may maintain a theory of direct liability against a prison or other official if that official fails to properly train, supervise, direct or control the actions of a subordinate who causes the injury." Crooks v. Nix, 872 F.2d 800, 804 (8th Cir.1989) (citing Hahn v. McLey, 737 F.2d 771, 773 (8th Cir.1984); Pearl v. Dobbs, 649 F.2d 608, 609 (8th Cir.1981)).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior, but a supervisor may be liable if he implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in unconstitutional conduct.

Pinter v. George C. Young, Bernard B. Hurst, State of Ohio, Department of Transportation · filed 1991-08-27

Although a section 1983 action may not be premised upon respondeat superior, Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978), the record also reflects that even if Hurst did not encourage the denial of due process or directly participate in it, he at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in its unconstitutional conduct. Birrell v. Brown, 867 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir.1989); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a subordinate’s acts based solely on respondeat superior.

Eubanks v. Gerwens · filed 1991-09-11

It is well settled that supervisors cannot be held liable for the acts of subordinates based solely on the theory of respondeat superior, and that a Section 1983 claim cannot be based on vicarious supervisory liability.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation and does not impose respondeat superior liability.

Bermudez v. Ada · filed 1991-09-24

Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal involvement by the defendant in the alleged constitutional violations; there is no respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability through respondeat superior; a defendant who did not personally participate must have a causal connection to the alleged injury.

Van Poyck v. Dugger · filed 1991-10-08

Respondeat superior has clearly been rejected as a theory of recovery under section 1983. ... Although personal participation is not specifically required for liability under section 1983, there must be some causal connection between the defendant named and the injury allegedly sustained.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely on a respondeat superior theory.

Bullock v. Raymond J. Sabbatine, Jr., Frederic Cowan, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 1991-11-21

Respondeat superior is not an appropriate basis for § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity liability for supervisors based on official acts only when their own acts or omissions show at least reckless or callous indifference to constitutional rights; respondeat superior alone is insufficient.

Robinson v. Commonwealth · filed 1992-01-17

While liability can be imposed upon the defendants- in their individual capacities under § 1983 based on their official acts, Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358, 364 (1991), it must be based on their own acts or omissions amounting at the least to reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others and not on acts or omissions of others under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Dean v. David Barber, Mel Bailey, Jefferson County's Sheriff's Department · filed 1992-01-27

Dean’s allegations amount to no more than an attempt to hold the Commissioners liable under the respondeat superior theory, which is unavailable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff for his officers’ actions solely under respondeat superior when he did not personally deprive the plaintiff of rights.

Clayton J. Charbonnet, Jr. v. Sheriff Harry Lee · filed 1992-01-28

He did not allege that Sheriff Lee did anything personally to deprive him of his rights, and Sheriff Lee cannot be liable under a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of his officers.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior, but a supervisor may be liable for condoning unconstitutional practices by failing to respond to complaints.

Northington v. Sherrard · filed 1992-02-20

The district court dismissed defendant Burns, because he is not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. While this is true, Northington has alleged that defendant Burns failed to respond to his complaints of inadequate exercise. As Burns may be liable for having condoned unconstitutional practices, he is not properly dismissed from the suit at this time. See Birrell v. Brown, 867 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir.1989).

Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability for a detention-center director based solely on responsibility for the facility.

Sindram v. Samuel F. Saxton Prince George's County, Maryland, Michael Sindram v. Samuel F. Saxton Prince George' · filed 1992-02-21

As the district court correctly held, absent an official policy or custom the director of the detention center cannot be held liable; a respondeat superior theory may not be applied to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; a supervisor is liable only for the supervisor’s own acts or omissions linked to the constitutional violation.

Dias v. Vose · filed 1992-03-03

In addition, we note that supervisory liability under § 1983 may not be predicated upon a theory of respondeat superior. ... Supervisory officials may be found liable only on the basis of their own acts or omissions. ... With regard to such supervisors, there must be shown some affirmative link between the purported constitutional violation and their own action or inaction.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; a supervisor must personally participate in or direct a constitutional violation, or be deliberately indifferent to constitutional rights by failing to train or supervise those who participate.

Mayer v. Taylor · filed 1992-04-13

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983; a supervisor is liable only if he personally participated in or directed the constitutional violations, Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045, or was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's constitutional rights by failing to train or supervise those who did participate, Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 331 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2887 (1991).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on prison officials under respondeat superior when their own conduct is not alleged to have caused the interference with a prisoner’s mail.

Martin v. Beverly Williams Dana Hartman Robert Brown Ray Toombs Pete Vidor Ray Palmer Donald Mason Mycheal D. Eva · filed 1992-04-13

Martin failed to allege conduct of the prison officials that resulted in the interference with his mail. These supervisory officials are not subject to liability under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory position under respondeat superior.

Gross v. Buescher · filed 1992-05-29

Plaintiff attempts to impose liability on these defendants due to their supervisory and administrative positions. An action based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be maintained under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation and does not impose respondeat superior liability.

Wright v. Jim Evans Chris Edwardson William Woodley Michael T. Williams · filed 1992-06-02

Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal involvement by the defendant in the alleged constitutional violations; there is no respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior for a subordinate’s constitutional tort.

Linley v. Demoss · filed 1992-07-28

Under the facts of this case, the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable as a basis for constitutional tort liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor under a theory of respondeat superior.

Sullivan v. Ms. Hill, Mail Room Supervisor, Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 1992-08-11

Sullivan cannot hold Hill liable on a theory of respondeat superior under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based on respondeat superior.

Faulkner v. Nick J. Sanborn Security Transport of Ohio, Inc. Union County Sheriff · filed 1992-08-20

Liability will not be imputed in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on respondeat superior principles.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Kolacek v. Lewis · filed 1992-09-01

Here, however, Kolacek does not state a damages claim against Lewis because respondeat superior liability does not form the basis for supervisory liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely through respondeat superior.

Olson v. Coleman · filed 1992-09-08

Further, plaintiff’s claims against this defendant are based on respondeat superior, a doctrine not recognized in an action brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires personal responsibility and does not impose liability through respondeat superior.

Laverpool v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1993-10-31

In addition, with respect to the Section 1983 claims, even if it were asserted that Robert F. Kiley’s liability is predicated upon respondeat superior, the Second Circuit has stated that “[t]he doctrine of respondeat superior is unavailable as a basis for imposing liability under § 1983; there must be some showing of personal responsibility ” (Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 830 [2d Cir.1977] [emphasis added]).

Section 1983 requires a supervisor's personal involvement in a deprivation of rights, including direction or knowledge and consent, and does not impose liability solely through respondeat superior.

Dwayne Walker v. Ahitow · filed 1993-11-15

The plaintiff has alleged no facts establishing Ahitow's direct, personal involvement, as required by Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653, 655 (7th Cir.1981). Nor has the plaintiff shown that the alleged violation of his constitutional rights occurred at Ahitow's direction or with his knowledge and consent. See Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1005 (7th Cir.1982). The mere fact that Ahitow was the warden at IRCC is insufficient to establish liability, as the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not itself address attorneys’ fees, but its silence does not prevent a court from awarding fees under equitable principles.

Sims v. Amos · filed 1972-03-17

It is of no consequence that the statute under which plaintiffs filed this suit, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is silent on the availability of attorneys’ fees.

Section 1983's silence about attorney-fee awards does not bar a court from awarding fees in a qualifying suit.

NAACP v. Allen · filed 1972-03-24

With regard to an award of attorneys’ fees, it is of no consequence that 42 U.S. C. § 1983, the statute under which plaintiffs filed this suit, is silent on the availability of such an award. See Long v. Georgia Kraft Co., 455 F.'2d 331 (5th Cir., 1972), and the many cases cited therein; Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972).

Section 1983 does not provide detailed remedies, so its lack of an express attorneys'-fees provision does not imply congressional intent to limit a court's otherwise broad equitable power to award fees.

Ross v. Goshi · filed 1972-12-20

Section 1983, on the other hand, is not a statute providing-detailed remedies and there is thus no reason to infer any congressional intent to limit the otherwise broad equitable powers of this court.

Section 1983 permits a federal court to award attorneys’ fees in appropriate cases under its equitable power, even though the statute does not expressly authorize fees.

Brandenburger v. Thompson · filed 1974-03-25

Thus, even though § 1983 does not explicitly authorize an award of attorneys’ fees, the coui't’s equitable power may be invoked to make such an award in appropriate cases.

Section 1983 permits equitable attorney's-fee awards only in exceptional civil-rights cases, such as class actions benefiting many citizens or cases involving obdurate obstinacy.

Wright v. Southeast Alabama Gas District · filed 1974-06-07

This civil action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking legal and equitable relief for the alleged illegal firing of the Plaintiff due to his involvement in labor union activities. ... Certainly, a fee should not be granted the winning plaintiff’s attorney in every suit brought pursuant to a federal statute simply to effectuate a congressional policy. ... Accordingly, this Court finds, not only that the Defendant was not obdurately obstinate in refusing to continue Wright in its employment prior to this Court’s order, but also that no equitable principle justifies this Court’s imposing Wright’s attorney’s fees on the Defendant. This proceeding is not a class action and is not likely to involve the interest of a large number of people. It was brought purely for Wright’s benefit, and the jury awarded him substantial damages under the circumstances. It having been keenly contested on what appears to this Court to have been a rational and proper defense which, under the evidence, the jury might have adopted, the principles of equity require that each party pay his own attorney and an order will enter accordingly.

Section 1983 does not permit a federal court to award attorneys’ fees against a state or its officials acting in their official capacities when the award would be paid from the state treasury.

Jordon v. Gilligan · filed 1974-07-18

Stripped of distracting shadow questions, the case before us presents a singular, although by no means simple, issue: Does a federal court have the power to award attorneys’ fees against a state or its officials acting in their official capacities in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate constitutional rights? To this inquiry we must respond in the negative.

Section 1983 does not expressly authorize attorney-fee awards, but in an appropriate case a federal court may award fees under its equitable power.

Taylor v. E. P. Perini, Superintendent · filed 1974-10-03

Thus, in an appropriate case, attorneys’ fees may be awarded in a § 1983 case, even though that statute does not expressly authorize such an award.

Section 1983 does not itself entitle plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees as a matter of course.

Jones v. New York City Human Resources Administration · filed 1976-01-26

The argument is ingenious, but it is clear from ... that this circuit has not accepted the view that attorneys’ fees are routinely available in section 1983 suits.

Section 1983 contains no authorization for an award of attorneys’ fees.

North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. v. Jones · filed 1976-03-15

contains no section authorizing the award of attorneys’ fees to counsel.

Section 1983 did not entitle the plaintiff to damages for his costs and attorneys’ fees.

Mihos v. Swift · filed 2002-12-17

Also, I decide, as matters of law are decided, that Mihos is not entitled to an award of damages by this court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for costs and attorneys’ fees.

Section 1983 entitles a plaintiff who obtains relief to attorneys’ fees.

Henderson v. Stalder · filed 2003-07-08

In addition, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees.

Section 1983 permits a school district to be sued as a municipality.

Rivera v. Lebanon School District · filed 2011-11-16

Thus, municipalities maybe sued under § 1983, with some limitations. A school district is a municipality for the purposes of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 allows suits against school boards for constitutional violations, but a school placement procedure supports no due-process claim when it neither impairs a protected property interest nor denies adequate notice and a hearing.

Smith v. DALLAS CTY. BD. OF ED. · filed 1979-12-10

3. This argument, as the plaintiffs correctly point out, is not supported by the case law. In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the Court held that municipal corporations, which include municipalities and school boards—both of which were recognized by the Court as "instrumentalit[ies] of state administration" id. at 696, 98 S.Ct. 2018— are subject to suit under section 1983. Id. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Section 1983 "creat[ed] . . . a civil remedy against state municipal corporations that infringed federal rights." Id. at 669, 98 S.Ct. at 2025. Therefore, the Dallas County School Board is properly named as a defendant in this suit. ... 10. Therefore, this Court holds that even if the administration of the placement tests did infringe the property rights of the plaintiffs no violation of due process occurred because the procedure for grievances which the school board uses affords both adequate notice and an opportunity for a hearing to aggrieved students. Since there was no constitutional violation of any right afforded these plaintiffs, a fortiori, the plaintiffs' claim under section 1983 must fail. Accordingly, it is the opinion of the Court that the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the 1983 claim is due to be granted.

Section 1983 does not treat a West Virginia county board of education as a person subject to suit under the statute.

Burkey v. Marshall County Board of Education · filed 1981-05-20

The Defendant Marshall County Board of Education is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability against a school board for its own decision to deny a hearing before terminating a protected employment contract.

Kirschling v. Lake Forest School District · filed 1988-06-03

Denial of a hearing by the Board is a decision for which it incurs liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits viable claims against school districts.

Independent School District No. 283 v. S.D. Ex Rel. J.D. · filed 1995-05-16

We have no doubt that viable claims can be asserted against a School District under Section 1983, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.

Section 1983 treats a school district as a local governmental entity for purposes of liability.

Rogan v. Lewis · filed 1997-05-15

For purposes of § 1983, a school district is a local governmental entity.

Section 1983 permits suits against school districts and their governing boards as persons under the statute.

Mazanec v. North Judson-San Pierre School Corp. · filed 1982-12-14

This Court directs defendants’ attention to Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), wherein the Supreme Court expressly overruled Monroe v. Pape, supra, in holding that municipalities and other local governing bodies are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. ... Subsequent decisions of other Courts have expressly declared school districts and their governing boards to be subject to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A school district is a person subject to liability under Section 1983.

Wooten v. Pleasant Hope R-VI School District · filed 2000-11-28

A school district is considered a “person” for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits a school board to be held liable as a person.

Myers v. Loudoun County School Board · filed 2003-02-21

A school board is a “person” who may be held liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity, while qualified immunity may also defeat damages claims when the officials acted in good faith.

Eckl v. City of Boston · filed 1981-02-25

The §1983 and Fourteenth Amendment claim for damages against state officials fails first on the ground of sovereign immunity. ... Additionally, I rule that the state defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the damage claim on the basis of a qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against litigants for resort to civil courts or courtroom conduct unless the conduct would support a malicious-prosecution cause of action.

Lucsik v. Board of Education of the Brunswick City School District · filed 1980-05-22

In reviewing claims arising out of injunctive proceedings, federal courts are guided by the principle that “no action lies against a party for resort to civil courts.” ... The courts, of course, will entertain damages claims for allegedly-wrongful litigative conduct that would support a cause of action for malicious prosecution. ... Absent a claim of malice, however, the instances in which federal courts have heard or granted non-bond-related damages claims for the wrongful issuance of an injunction are extremely rare. ... There is no reason to hold the courtroom conduct of school boards to a higher or lower standard than the conduct of other litigants. ... The ordinary standard of constitutional liability of school board members thus is inapplicable to this case.

Section 1983 does not authorize federal courts to award money damages payable from a state's treasury.

Trotman v. The Palisades Interstate Park Commission · filed 1977-05-27

The Court held later in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976), that when Congress, acting under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, authorizes federal courts to award money damages in favor of a private individual against a state guilty of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Eleventh Amendment is no bar. This action is brought, however, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1988 which contain no such authorization for the award of money damages against the states. The Supreme Court noted in Edelman that there is no remedial power in a federal court to require the payment of funds from a state treasury in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a county Public Defender whose office is created under Pennsylvania statute because the court held that the defender enjoys immunity from liability.

Joseph Carl Brown, Jr. v. Richard P. Joseph, Esquire · filed 1972-06-22

We hold, therefore, that a county Public Defender, whose office is created under the Pennsylvania statute, enjoys immunity from liability under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages action against peace officers who confine someone under a facially valid judicial order, in good faith, and without reason to believe the order violates the Constitution or state law.

Fowler v. Alexander · filed 1972-03-22

Confinement by an officer of the peace, acting upon the basis of a judicial order, good on its face, executed in good faith, concerning which the officer has no cause to believe to be contrary to the Constitution of the United States or to the laws of North Carolina, is not and must not be grounds for an action for monetary damages under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Steinpreis v. Shook, 377 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1967); Francis v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1954); Bauers v. Heisel, supra. There is no allegation that the defendants Lancaster or Wood acted maliciously, without good faith, or without a judicial order valid on its face.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against a district attorney for acts performed in the discharge of official duties.

United States v. Deutsch · filed 1972-05-04

Further, we agree with the order of the district court that Deutsch, as District Attorney, was immune from suits under the Civil Rights Act while performing his official duties.

Section 1983 permits a damages action against a state hospital director and medical staff members who are not entitled to the generally recognized official immunity.

Ferenc v. McGuire · filed 1972-12-29

I agree with the rulings in Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633, 637-638 (CA2, 1971), and Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 134 (CA2, 1966), that a state hospital director and members of the medical staff are not so immune.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a judge for acts performed in the exercise of his judicial function.

Staud v. Stewart · filed 1973-08-30

In the exercise of his judicial function, a judge is immune from damage claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law that deprives a person of federal rights, and it does not permit damages suits against jurors for acts in a civil case.

McIntosh v. Garofalo · filed 1973-11-16

In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there must be a demonstration that (1) the conduct complained of was done by a person acting under color of state law and (2) that such conduct deprived plaintiff of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... A juror in a civil action is immune from subsequent suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Hence, that portion of plaintiff’s suit brought under 42 U. S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

Section 1983 provides immunity from damages for judicial defendants and similar immunity for elected prosecutors or their subordinates.

Kremer v. Stewart · filed 1974-05-29

There is no question that the judicial defendants are immune from damages under Section 1983, and it is generally recognized that elected prosecutors (or their subordinates) enjoy a similar type of immunity.

Section 1983 provides no damages remedy against an official who had reasonable grounds and a good-faith belief that the challenged acts were constitutional.

United States Ex Rel. Lewis v. Johnson · filed 1974-09-28

It is our opinion that the proper test of immunity for an official such as defendant is whether reasonable grounds existed at the time of his allegedly unconstitutional acts for believing that those acts were constitutional and whether he held such a belief in good faith. ... Where, as here, it has been factually established that there were reasonable grounds for believing his actions constitutional and that his belief was in good faith, the official is immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 immunizes state prosecutors from monetary damages for quasi-judicial prosecutorial acts but does not immunize them from claims for injunctive relief.

Boyd v. Adams · filed 1975-03-27

We agree that the then State’s Attorney and his assistant are immune from monetary liability for damages under Section 1983 because dismissing the charges in exchange for the release was within the “quasi-judicial” function of the prosecutor and not among the “investigatory activities normally performed by laymen, such as police officers.” ... In light of the lack of any directly contrary precedent and the inapplicability of the policy considerations which underlie the granting of immunity from damages, we hold that defendant prosecutors are not immune from that part of plaintiff’s claim that seeks injunctive relief.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officials who are immune from suit for acts within quasi-judicial or discretionary duties vested in them by law.

Fitzgerald v. Procunier · filed 1975-05-07

The actions of which [plaintiff] complains fall squarely within the quasi-judicial or discretionary duties and functions vested in them by law.” ... Accordingly, they are immune from suit as to such actions.

A school superintendent is immune from damages under § 1983 when the complaint does not allege that he acted in bad faith.

Roberts Ex Rel. Roberts v. Way · filed 1975-07-16

They do not allege that Chesley acted in bad faith, therefore he is immune from the plaintiffs’ § 1983 damage claim.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a prison warden for acts within a quasi-judicial disciplinary-review function performed under established procedures, but immunity does not extend to non-adjudicatory acts.

Fitchette v. Collins · filed 1975-10-13

Hence, the warden is immune from liability for damages under section 1983 for his actions pursuant to his quasi-judicial function in the Maryland adjustment process reviewing the decisions of the adjustment team at the penitentiary. ... Further, the warden will not enjoy absolute immunity for acts in his non-adjudicatory capacity and will be subject to liability for such acts as any other state official.

Section 1983 claims for monetary damages are barred by qualified immunity when public defenders act within the scope of their official duties.

Beaver v. Carey · filed 1977-01-18

Public defenders, however, enjoy a qualified immunity for acts performed within the scope of their official duty.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against Parole Board members when they perform quasi-judicial functions.

Franklin v. Shields · filed 1977-09-19

We affirm the district court’s conclusion that the members of the Parole Board, who perform a quasi-judicial function, are immune from suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose personal damages liability on parole board members or parole officers who are immune, or on prison officials acting in reasonable good-faith reliance on standard operating procedures.

Douglas v. Muncy · filed 1978-01-20

With respect to the § 1983 claims, the district court was correct in its conclusion that the members of the Parole Board were immune from damages, Pope v. Chew, 521 F.2d 400 (4 Cir. 1975), and Moorefield, in his capacity as a parole officer, was also immune from such liability. See Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9 Cir. 1970). ... Since the defendants were "acting in a reasonable good faith reliance on what was standard operating procedure in the Virginia prisons, (they) should not have to respond personally for damages." Skinner v. Spellman, 480 F.2d 539, 540 (4 Cir. 1973).

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a judge for acts taken in the exercise of judicial authority.

Kelsey v. Fitzgerald · filed 1978-04-20

Judge Fitzgerald is therefore immune from damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on parole board members for actions taken in their quasi-judicial function.

Franklin v. Pleasant C. Shields · filed 1978-04-24

We affirm the district court's conclusion that the members of the Parole Board, who perform a quasi-judicial function, are immune from suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims remain live despite mootness of prospective relief, but a defendant may prevail by proving qualified good-faith immunity at trial.

United States ex rel. Ratchford v. Jeffes · filed 1978-05-23

The request for damages under section 1983 is still “live,” however, subject to Jeffes’ showing at trial that he is entitled to qualified, “good-faith” immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when the officials acted in good faith and could not reasonably have known their conduct was unconstitutional.

The Princeton Community Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate · filed 1978-06-23

Specifically, we hold that the claim for injunctive and declaratory relief is not moot, that Opinion 290 is unconstitutional, that the defendants are immune from a § 1983 damage action under the qualified immunity standard, and that the Sherman Act claim is barred by the Parker v. Brown 4 state action exemption.

Section 1983 does not abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from liability imposed directly on the States.

Quern v. Jordan · filed 1979-03-05

By contrast, § 1983 does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States; nor does it have a history which focuses directly on the question of state liability and which shows that Congress considered and firmly decided to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred by absolute immunity for legislators and prosecutors acting in furtherance of their duties, while executive officials receive qualified immunity based on good faith.

Universal Amusement Co., Inc. v. Hofheinz · filed 1980-05-01

There is absolute immunity for legislators and prosecutors in the furtherance of their duties. ... Qualified immunity, based upon the good faith of their conduct, is granted to executive officials.

Section 1983 does not permit damages actions against judges, prosecutors, or public defenders for conduct within their judicial, prosecutorial, or official functions.

Lewis v. County of Lehigh · filed 1981-06-17

Thus the judges are absolutely immune from liability for damages for the cause of action alleged in the complaint. ... Clearly these defendants are absolutely immune from liability for damages for the cause of action alleged in the complaint. ... Thus the public defenders are absolutely immune from liability for damages for the cause of action alleged in the complaint.

Section 1983 claims for damages remain within the court's jurisdiction even when the defendant asserts absolute or qualified immunity.

Mason v. Melendez · filed 1981-10-14

I conclude that a claim to immunity from damages, whether absolute or qualified, is not a claim that jurisdiction is absent.