42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a defendant for another person’s conduct.

Pierce v. Smith · filed 2004-03-22

Liability may not be imposed on the basis of vicarious liability or the doctrine of respondeat superior in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Clumm v. Wilkinson · filed 2004-03-23

With respect to Wilkinson, the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because it was based upon a respondeat superior theory of liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because of their position; liability requires their participation in the alleged deprivation.

Ingram v. Jewell · filed 2004-03-24

The theory of respondeat superior cannot provide the basis for liability in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement; merely forwarding a prisoner’s complaint to staff is insufficient.

Liner v. Goord · filed 2004-03-25

Where a supervisor’s involvement in a prisoner’s complaint is limited to forwarding of correspondence to appropriate staff, the supervisor has insufficient personal involvement to sustain a § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 requires deliberate indifference to constitutional injuries to impose supervisory liability.

Clancy v. McCabe · filed 2004-03-26

In our view, as a matter of law, McCabe “simply did not exhibit the . . . ‘deliberate indifference’ to constitutional injuries” required to impose liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the challenged conduct; supervisory liability cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Clarke v. Sweeney · filed 2004-03-30

Yet because of § 1983’s requirement of “personal involvement,” supervisory liability cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of a strong likelihood of unconstitutional conduct, fails to prevent it, and thereby causes harm.

Lynn v. City of Detroit · filed 2004-04-05

Stated differently, supervisory liability will attach if the defendants possessed information revealing a “strong likelihood” of unconstitutional conduct by subordinate officers but did nothing to prevent the misconduct, thereby causing harm to the plaintiffs.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; holding a position of authority alone is insufficient for damages liability.

Elana Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School District, John J. Russell, Anne Brennan, Marilyn Wishnie · filed 2004-04-07

An individual cannot be held liable for damages under § 1983 “merely because he held a high position of authority,” but can be held liable if he was personally involved in the alleged deprivation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires liability by a subordinate and an affirmative link between the supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation.

Ousley v. TOWN OF LINCOLN THROUGH ITS FINANCE DIRECTOR · filed 2004-04-15

Thus, to establish supervisory liability a § 1983 plaintiff must establish (1) subordinate liability, and (2) that “the supervisor’s action or inaction was ‘affirmatively linked’ to the constitutional violation caused by the subordinate.”

Section 1983 requires more than mere negligence to hold a supervisor personally liable for a subordinate’s constitutional misconduct.

Ctr v. United States · filed 2004-04-16

That high degree of fault is not satisfied by a negligence standard; a showing of ‘‘mere negligence’’ is insufficient to state a claim of supervisory liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires more than mere negligence to hold a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

International Action Center v. United States · filed 2004-04-16

That high degree of fault is not satisfied by a negligence standard; a showing of “mere negligence” is insufficient to state a claim of supervisory liability under Section 1983.

A § 1983 claim against individual supervisors for workplace harassment cannot survive summary judgment on unsupported allegations that they allowed the harassment to continue.

Doerr v. Colorado Division of Youth Services · filed 2004-04-20

His conclusory allegations that the individual defendants allowed the harassment to continue are unsubstantiated and, thus, do not create an issue of fact sufficient to oppose summary judgment.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor and the constitutional deprivation to establish individual liability.

McDaniels v. McKinna · filed 2004-04-27

Rather, a § 1983 plaintiff must “show that an affirmative link exists between the constitutional deprivation and either the supervisor's personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise.”

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for simple negligence; the supervisor must have personal responsibility for the constitutional deprivation.

Garnett v. Kepner · filed 1982-05-17

You may not find Mr. Lightcap liable for a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights if you find that Gerald Lightcap’s actions or inactions rise to a level no higher than simple negligence. ... It was in accord with the Third Circuit’s standard for the liability of a superior officer.

Section 1983 does not make a corrections commissioner liable under respondeat superior.

Holmes v. Ward · filed 1983-07-07

Defendant Ward moves to dismiss the § 1983 claim as against him because he did not personally participate in the incident. It is true that Ward cannot be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor and a subordinate’s constitutional violation; copying a warden on complaints about medical care, without more, does not establish supervisory liability.

Davis v. Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility · filed 2004-05-20

Copying Hargett with correspondence outlining his complaints about medical care, without more, does not sufficiently implicate the warden under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prison warden to be held responsible for subordinates’ misconduct when Idaho law imposes liability on the warden.

Hansen v. May · filed 1974-08-15

Even if Hansen does not claim that May personally participated in the confiscation, if Idaho, by statute, imposed liability upon the warden for the misconduct of his subordinates, May could be responsible under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability for a supervisory jail officer who, while present, fails to intervene in an unconstitutional beating and fails to obtain medical care, because those acts can establish the required intent as a matter of law.

Harris v. Chanclor · filed 1976-08-19

Here the jury verdict against Chanclor establishes that the plaintiff was in fact viciously beaten in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Moore’s admission that this occurred in his presence, without objection or intervention, and that he thereafter made no effort to obtain medical assistance established as a matter of law the necessary intent under the rationale of these cases.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a jail official whose own deliberate indifference to a known pattern of inmate assaults deprives a prisoner of due-process protection.

Stevens v. County of Dutchess, NY · filed 1977-12-22

Similarly in the instant situation, if plaintiff can establish a series of prisoner assaults sufficient to indicate a pattern of deliberate indifference on the part of the sheriff to the personal safety of individual prisoners, he has made out a claim of constitutional dimension which is actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison supervisors for medical mistreatment absent their personal participation.

Parrilla v. Cuyler · filed 1978-03-16

This analysis discloses that claims may not be asserted against prison supervisory personnel unless those defendants participated personally in the medical mistreatment.

Section 1983 permits independent liability for prison supervisors who know of a pervasive and unreasonable risk of harm and fail to take reasonable remedial steps, but an isolated incident is ordinarily insufficient to establish that risk.

ORPIANO v. JOHNSON · filed 1980-09-17

There is no question about the legal principle that where prison supervisors with knowledge of "a pervasive and unreasonable risk of harm" to the prisoners, fail to take reasonable remedial steps to prevent such harm, their conduct may be properly characterized as "deliberate indifference" or as "tacit authorization of the offensive acts," for which they may be held independently liable under § 1983. ... However, "A pervasive risk of harm (under this principle) may not ordinarily be shown by pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents," Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d at 161, nor is a "(s)howing that individual officers violated a person's constitutional rights on an isolated occasion . . . sufficient to raise an issue of fact whether adequate training and procedures were provided," McClelland v. Facteau, (10th Cir. 1979) 610 F.2d 693, 697. Measured by these standards, we do not believe there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of liability on the part of the three officers in question.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison warden based solely on responsibility for overseeing a correctional unit.

Glick v. Willis Sargent, Warden, and Officer Foote, Employee, Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 1983-01-10

The warden’s responsibility for overseeing the operations of the Cummins Unit is an insufficient basis for liability in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Prison administrators cannot be held vicariously liable for subordinates' acts under § 1983 without factual allegations of their personal participation, direction, or acquiescence.

Walker v. Missouri Board of Probation & Parole · filed 1984-04-16

Prison administrators cannot be held liable on a vicarious liability theory for the acts of their subordinates absent factual allegations of personal participation, direction, or acquiescence in those acts or omissions.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat-superior liability on a prison warden for subordinates' conduct.

King v. Jenkins · filed 1985-01-23

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in section 1983 actions, and, therefore, Jenkins could not be held liable even if there were an eighth amendment violation.

A prison warden cannot be held liable under § 1983 without allegations of personal involvement or knowledge of the challenged acts.

Sanders v. United States of America · filed 1985-04-22

None of the allegations refer to personal involvement by the Warden, nor does the complaint state that the Warden had knowledge of these acts.

A jail administrator may be liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations caused by institution-wide practices even without personally committing an isolated employee act.

Powell v. James L. Kelley and Benjamin Taylor · filed 1985-12-23

While appellee Kelley may not be responsible for the isolated, malicious act of an employee, he is accountable for Constitutional violations that occur in the jail that are the result of institution-wide practices.

A prison superintendent may be liable under Section 1983 when deliberate indifference to removing a known violent guard directly and proximately causes an inmate’s injuries.

Musgrove v. Broglin · filed 1986-12-16

This court must and does conclude that G. Michael Broglin was deliberately indifferent toward the need to remove Sales from the work force and that deliberate indifference was a direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. This conclusion is not in any way based upon any concept of negligence.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; a prison supervisor’s position alone does not establish it.

Harry Lawrence Williams, Sr. v. Faulkner · filed 1988-02-12

Williams alleged no personal involvement on their part, and their positions as Assistant Superintendent (Hanks), Superintendent of the Indiana State Reformatory (Cohn), and as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Corrections (Faulkner) do not justify any inference of personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of medical care.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for an inmate assault without a genuine factual issue that the supervisors were deliberately indifferent to or recklessly disregarded the inmate’s rights.

Gallegos v. State · filed 1988-06-30

We do not condone the violence that occurs within the penitentiary walls, but we cannot impose 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 liability on defendants, where no fact question exists as to defendants’ lack of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard of plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for merely negligent assignment of a correctional officer; the supervisor’s conduct must reach gross negligence.

Bellamy v. McMickens · filed 1988-07-15

At best, it could be contended that Simmons was negligent in placing an incompetent officer on the job. However, conduct must rise to the level of gross negligence before liability can be imposed. Conduct rising to this level has not been alleged.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on prison supervisors solely because of their positions.

Williams v. Willits · filed 1988-08-03

The district court dismissed appellant’s section 1983 complaint against the director and the warden because the pleading asserted only allegations of vicarious liability. The district court properly found that such claims are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a jail supervisor for a merely negligent failure to train subordinates.

Boyd v. Harper · filed 1988-12-22

The failure to train Deputy Branch constitutes “at most negligence” on the part of the Jail and Sheriff Harper, and therefore, under Daniels, is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a prison director vicariously liable for the conduct of prison personnel.

Cleolis Hunt v. Dental Department · filed 1989-01-06

Lewis cannot be held vicariously liable for the fault of personnel at Florence.

Supervisory officials may be liable under § 1983 when they know subordinates have failed to protect an inmate and disregard that failure.

Boone v. Elrod · filed 1989-02-27

Under these circumstances, Hardiman and Elrod cannot hide behind their underlings. They had notice that nothing was being done, yet closed their eyes to this fact and allowed plaintiff to remain unprotected while the gang members continued to hound him. That is enough to hold these two supervisory officials liable under § 1983, and to hold the county liable as well.

Section 1983 supervisory liability cannot rest solely on an inmate sending letters to senior officials describing his situation.

Gullet v. Wilt · filed 1989-04-05

In addition to the warden of BBCF and his classification team, Gullet seeks to establish liability on the part of Schaefer (the Governor of Maryland), Carven (the Governor's assistant), Hopkins (Commissioner of the DOC), Hornbaker (the Director of Operations of the DOC), Robbins (the Executive Director of the Inmate Grievance Commission) and Robinson (the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services), because he mailed letters to each of them, describing his plight. This lone allegation is insufficient to meet the heavy burden in supervisory liability cases.

Section 1983 permits direct liability against a prison official who fails to train, supervise, direct, or control a subordinate whose actions cause a constitutional injury.

Crooks v. Crispus C. Nix, Warden, Department of Corrections, Director, Iowa City Medical Center · filed 1989-04-10

On the other hand, as plaintiff points out, although the doctrine of respon-deat superior does not apply to § 1983 cases, a § 1983 claimant may maintain a theory of direct liability against a prison or other official if that official fails to properly train, supervise, direct or control the actions of a subordinate who causes the injury.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for jail conditions when an official personally knows of violations or participates in decisions causing them or foreseeably preventing their redress; rank alone does not create liability.

Johnson-El v. Schoemehl · filed 1989-05-22

Next, the mayor may be found liable for policy decisions only if he had personal knowledge of violations at the Jail, or he participated in decisions causing those violations, or in decisions foreseeably preventing their redress, or comparable omissions. He is not liable for any act occurring at the Jail merely because of his place in the City’s hierarchy.

Section 1983 permits liability for a sheriff who wrote the policy under which an officer violated an inmate’s constitutional rights.

Faulkner v. McLocklin · filed 1989-12-15

Sheriff McLocklin wrote the policy under which Officer Bryant acted, and (with the exception of a letter under a U.S. Senator’s frank) it appears that the mail was handled consistently with Sheriff McLocklin's interpretation of that policy. Accordingly, if the opening of the letters violated Mr. Faulkner’s constitutional rights, Sheriff McLocklin would be liable.

Section 1983 supervisory liability for inmate medical care requires more than a subordinate physician’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs.

Miltier v. Beorn · filed 1990-02-20

It is insufficient merely to show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need on the part of the subordinate physicians.

Section 1983 permits liability for a prison superintendent or warden with policy-making authority who operates a prison with unsanitary and inhumane conditions.

Kitt v. Ferguson · filed 1990-06-13

Moreover, Defendants’ claim that they are not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior is misplaced. While employees may be immune under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a superintendent or warden, with policy-making authority, can be held liable for operating a prison with unsanitary and inhumane conditions.

Section 1983 permits liability against a prison supervisor who had sufficient notice of or involvement in an unconstitutional practice, even if the supervisor did not personally carry it out.

LeMaire v. Maass · filed 1990-08-31

Plaintiff is not required to show that defendant personally stripped him, to establish a basis for liability. He must show that defendant had sufficient notice of or involvement in the practice.

Section 1983 permits supervisory prison officials to be liable for failing to develop adequate security policies when that failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the risk of inmate assaults.

Rick Moore v. John T. Wigginton Dewey Sowders Captain R. Bottoms · filed 1990-10-17

Upon consideration of the scant record in this case, this court is unable to conclude that Moore's claim lacks any arguable basis in law or fact and was thus subject to dismissal as frivolous. See Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831 (1989). This court has previously held that supervisory prison officials may be liable for failure to develop adequate security policies which amounts to a deliberate indifference to the risk of inmate assaults.

Section 1983 can impose liability on prison supervisors whose indifference in reviewing a disciplinary conviction permits a due process violation.

Gaston v. John B. Taylor, Warden Samuel Pruett, Assistant Warden Toni v. Bair, Regional Administrator · filed 1991-01-04

If plaintiff was reasonable in not recognizing his conduct as prohibited, a matter to be determined on remand, then if there was indifference on the part of the supervisors in reviewing his conviction, such indifference could support a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make prison officials liable solely on the basis of supervisory liability.

O'Brien v. Brown · filed 1991-02-06

We agree that defendants Brown and Koehler could not be held responsible on the basis of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a prison administrator ratifies or condones a policy that causes a constitutional deprivation.

Horne v. Coughlin · filed 1991-10-15

Since Commissioner Coughlin, by his own admission, ratified or condoned the challenged counsel substitute policy in effect at Eastern in 1984-85, he was therefore sufficiently “personally involved” to be held liable to the plaintiff under section 1983 for deprivations cause by the policy.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on a corrections commissioner or warden when the facts do not support extending liability to those supervisors.

Simkus v. Granger · filed 1991-10-23

We affirm the dismissal of the Commissioner and Warden Rollins. Under Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, the case does not present facts warranting the extension of supervisory liability to either of these defendants.

Section 1983 requires evidence that supervisory prison officials were aware, or should have been aware, of the alleged constitutional violations before they can be held liable for them.

Griffin-Bey v. Michael Bowersox Larry Rhodes Ronda Pash · filed 1992-11-03

Griffin-Bey has also failed to present any evidence that Bowersox and Rhodes should have been aware of any alleged due process violations.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on prison officials, but permits direct supervisory liability when failure to train, supervise, direct or control subordinates amounts to deliberate indifference to inmates' serious medical needs.

Moyers v. Buescher · filed 1992-11-09

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to claimed violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Crooks v. Nix, 872 F.2d 800, 804 (8th Cir.1989). A plaintiff may, however, under a theory of direct liability, maintain a section 1983 claim against a prison official whose failure to train, supervise, direct or control the actions of a subordinate is such that it constitutes deliberate indifference to the inmates' serious medical needs.

A prison supervisor is not liable under § 1983 for inadequate medical care without a causal link between the procedures he controlled and the denial of care.

Rosen v. Chang · filed 1993-01-12

Taking this allegation as completely true, it still leaves the plaintiff’s allegations wanting. It is undisputed that doctors were available only once a week and that nurses limited inmates’ access to those doctors. Nowhere, though, has plaintiff alleged the causal link between these procedures and the denial of care to the plaintiff.

A prison supervisor can face personal liability under § 1983 when the supervisor's deliberate indifference causes a guard's violation of a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights.

Burgo v. Shimoda · filed 1993-03-17

Leer made no such distinction, however, and when Leer was decided, we had previously held that prison officials would be personally liable under section 1983 for a deprivation of a prisoner's eighth amendment rights resulting from an assault by a prison guard if the officials' conduct "caused the deprivation." McRorie, 795 F.2d at 783 (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166). Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that Burgo's right not to be subjected to excessive force by prison personnel was clearly established, as was the responsibility of supervisory prison personnel not to act with deliberate indifference to that right.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against prison officials based on respondeat superior.

Thomas v. Armontrout · filed 1993-06-08

Thomas cannot pursue a § 1983 claim against the prison officials based on respondeat superior.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 for a prisoner's medical care requires showing that supervisors failed to provide needed care or deliberately interfered with prison doctors, and supervisors may rely on prison physicians' medical judgments.

Shanton v. Detrick · filed 1993-07-12

With regard to Defendants Rudloff and Detrick, supervisory liability requires showing that supervisory officials failed to provide prisoner with needed medical care or deliberately interfered with prison doctors’ performance. ... Supervisory officials are entitled to rely on medical judgments made by prison physicians.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison supervisory personnel who had no direct role in the circumstances complained of.

Muhammad v. Rowland · filed 1993-07-23

The district court correctly dismissed Muhammad's action against prison supervisory personnel who had no direct role in any of the circumstances of which Muhammad complains.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials solely because of their supervisory positions.

Jennings v. Samuel A. Lewis, Director · filed 1993-12-15

However, his complaint shows that Lewis and Hood responded to his letter. Further, Lewis and Hood are not liable under section 1983 in their supervising capacities.

A prison superintendent’s actions or inaction within his responsibilities can support § 1983 liability when they show deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs, and supported causation is for the jury.

Howell v. Burden · filed 1994-01-21

If a fact finder concludes that any or all of these matters are within the scope of Burden's responsibilities and that his actions or inactions with respect to them constituted deliberate indifference to Howell's health, proximate cause (sole or contributing) is a jury issue.

Section 1983 places a heavy burden on a plaintiff seeking to hold supervisors liable for the unconstitutional actions of correctional officers.

Finch v. Mason Waters Kenneth Horning George Baker, Major Roger Hecker, Captain Other Unknown Correctional Off · filed 1994-03-01

Appellant failed to carry his heavy burden of showing supervisory liability of these Defendants for the alleged unconstitutional actions of the unknown correctional officers.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on prison officials for the acts of their subordinates.

Smith v. Reginald Wilkerson William H. Dallman R.D. Gardner, Inspector Lci · filed 1994-05-04

Moreover, respondeat superior liability is not applicable to Sec. 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not make a prison warden liable for medical treatment decisions in which he was not personally involved merely because he supervises prison staff.

Kulow v. Crispus Nix Charles Harper · filed 1994-07-06

Nix is not the proper defendant for this deliberate indifference claim. “[R]espondeat superior is not a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 permits independent liability for prison supervisors who know of a pervasive risk of harm and fail to take reasonable steps to prevent it.

Griffin v. Bishop L. Robinson Elmanus Herndon James Rollins Bernard Smith James C. Saunders · filed 1994-08-03

If prison supervisors know of a pervasive risk of harm and fail to take reasonable steps to prevent such harm, their conduct may be characterized as deliberate indifference toward, or tacit authorization of, offensive acts, for which they independently may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a prison warden liable solely because a subordinate violated someone’s rights.

Burton v. Kuchel · filed 1994-09-14

Prison wardens (like other state actors) cannot be liable under Section 1983 on the basis of any respondeat superior theory (Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1047 (7th Cir.1994), citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) and numerous Seventh Circuit cases).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a prison supervisor liable to allege the supervisor’s personal knowledge or involvement in the misconduct.

Gavin v. McGinnis · filed 1994-10-24

For liability to attach to prison supervisors under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the personal knowledge or involvement of those superiors.

Section 1983 permits classwide injunctive relief against prison administrators without findings that individual prison staff are liable for particular uses of force.

Madrid v. Gomez · filed 1995-01-10

Rather, class members are seeking only injunctive relief against top-ranking prison administrators; as such, the Court is not required to make findings of liability with respect to individual prison staff.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity liability for a jail supervisor whose failure to correct an unconstitutional policy and train or supervise employees shows deliberate indifference to a detainee’s constitutional rights.

Pulliam v. Shelby County · filed 1995-06-15

Thus, the failure by Gilless to correct the unconstitutional policy of placing pre- and post-trial detainees together at the Shelby County Jail, and his failure to train and/or supervise his employees about this unconstitutional condition is sufficient evidence from which the jury could have determined that Sheriff Gil-less, in his individual capacity as policy maker and/or supervisor of the Shelby County Jail, was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of plaintiff. Accordingly, the jury could have reasonably determined that defendant Gilless was liable in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore, assignment of error number 1 is without merit.

Section 1983 does not make a prison warden liable for a subordinate’s alleged constitutional violation solely under respondeat superior.

Pearly L. Wilson v. Melody Turner, Warden · filed 1995-09-27

The district court properly found that the warden was not liable under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison warden for subordinates’ conduct solely under respondeat superior; the warden must be personally involved.

Lucien v. Howard A. Peters, Iii, and Salvador A. Godinez · filed 1995-10-23

Because respondeat superior does not apply to section 1983 proceedings, an inference of retaliation against Godinez cannot be sustained.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison supervisors solely because of their supervisory positions; respondeat superior does not apply.

Willie B. Hadley, Jr. v. Howard A. Peters, III · filed 1995-11-09

The mere fact that those individuals hold supervisory positions within the Graham Correctional Center and the D.O.C. is insufficient to establish liability, as the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not make prison supervisors without medical expertise liable for medical staff’s diagnostic decision not to refer an inmate to a doctor.

Camberos v. Branstad · filed 1995-12-26

Moreover, because Burt and Ault lacked medical expertise, they cannot be liable for the medical staff’s diagnostic decision not to refer Camberos to a doctor to treat his shoulder injury.

Section 1983 does not make prison officials without medical expertise liable for medical staff’s diagnostic decisions.

No. 95-1498 · filed 1995-12-26

Moreover, because Burt and Ault lacked medical expertise, they cannot be liable for the medical staff's diagnostic decision not to refer Camberos to a doctor to treat his shoulder injury.

A prison supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for failing to remedy alleged misconduct learned through the facility’s grievance appeals process.

Amaker v. Hakes · filed 1996-01-12

However, under Second Circuit caselaw, supervisory liability may be found where the prison official learned of the alleged misconduct through the facility’s appeals process and “failed to remedy the wrong.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison warden for inmate discipline without evidence linking the warden to that discipline.

Russell v. Hopkins · filed 1996-02-07

Finally, we find the district court properly granted Hopkins summary judgment because there was no evidence linking Hopkins, as the warden, to the discipline Russell received.

Section 1983 requires proof that a prison supervisor’s policy caused the alleged injury to impose liability on the supervisor.

Jacobs v. Fisher · filed 1996-08-12

Thus, summary judgment was properly awarded to the warden and the director because Jacobs did not show that their policies caused his alleged injury.

Section 1983 does not make a warden liable solely through respondeat superior when he did not participate in the challenged detention.

Birdo v. Ernest D. Smith, Senior Captain, Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex · filed 1996-08-13

It is well settled that respondeat superior cannot serve as the sole basis for liability. Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984). Further, Warden O'Dea was properly dismissed as a Defendant because he did not participate in Birdo's detention and upon his return, he released Birdo.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a prison warden based on respondeat superior where the claims against the warden’s subordinates are frivolous.

Eelbode v. Michigan Department of Corrections Dr. Baker Dr. Pramstaller Dr. Kallis Dr. Barth · filed 1996-08-23

Eelbode argues that the court should have allowed him to join the warden of one prison as a party. The court did not abuse its discretion in this regard, as Eelbode's claim against the warden was based on a theory of respondeat superior and his claims against the warden's subordinates were frivolous.

Section 1983 does not presume that prison supervisors are liable for harms to inmates merely because they are in the chain of command; the plaintiff must establish the supervisor’s personal involvement or knowledge.

Richardson v. McGinnis · filed 1996-09-09

He argues instead that all persons in the prison chain of command are presumptively liable for harms that befall their charges, unless they can establish that they lacked information and knowledge under the standards of Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.Ct. 1979 (1994). Richardson does not cite any authority for this proposition, and there is none. In civil litigation the plaintiff must establish all essential elements of each claim by a preponderance of the evidence; a defendant need not come forward with evidence until the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. Richardson lacks evidence of McGinnis's personal involvement or knowledge.

A prisoner’s letters may establish a prison supervisor’s personal liability under § 1983, but sending a communication does not automatically give the supervisor notice of an Eighth Amendment violation.

Vance v. Howard Peters, Iii, Director, Jane E. Higgins, Warden, and James Roy, Correctional Officer · filed 1996-12-18

Gentry thus allows the possibility that an inmate’s letters to prison administrators may establish a basis for § 1983 liability. However, we do not read Gentry as establishing an ironclad rule that any prisoner communication to a prison official anywhere in the corrections hierarchy constitutes adequate notice to the official of a violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor liable for denial of medical care to allege the supervisor’s personal connection to the denial.

Ramirez v. Colon · filed 1997-05-06

A supervisor cannot be found liable on a medical treatment claim absent an allegation that he was personally connected with the denial.

Section 1983 permits liability for a police supervisor’s own negligent failure to perform an affirmative duty when that omission proximately causes constitutional injuries.

Moon v. Winfield · filed 1973-12-07

Plaintiffs have raised a genuine factual issue as to Conlisk’s possible negligence in his failure to act. ... For purposes of this motion, however, it is possible that a jury might find that Conlisk unreasonably failed to fulfill his affirmative duties with respect to Michael Winfield, and that Conlisk’s failure was a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the Moons. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a sheriff when liability is based only on vicarious liability.

Duncan v. Frank E. Edwards, Sheriff, Tangipahoa Parish · filed 1979-07-31

If the basis of liability is vicarious only, however, the Sheriff cannot be held for punitive damages under Louisiana law or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).

Section 1983 does not make a Tennessee sheriff liable for a deputy’s misconduct solely because of supervisory status; liability requires the sheriff’s personal involvement or direct responsibility in the unconstitutional conduct.

Madewell v. Garmon · filed 1980-02-13

In order for a Tennessee sheriff to be liable in a civil rights action, he must have been involved personally in the unconstitutional conduct. ... An action brought under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “ * * * will not lie against police supervisory officers for failure to prevent police misconduct, absent a showing of direct responsibility for the improper action. * * *”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a police chief liable for an officer’s unconstitutional conduct to establish a causal connection between the chief’s actions and that conduct.

Black, Elwood W., Sr. And Black, Joyce v. Stephens, Wayne and City of Allentown and Gable, Carson · filed 1981-11-03

To hold a police chief liable under section 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of one of his officers, a plaintiff is required to establish a causal connection between the police chief’s actions and the officer’s unconstitutional activity.

A sheriff is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the acts of deputy sheriffs.

Nagle v. Harry Lee, Sheriff of Jefferson Parish State of Louisiana, Lt. Clifford Montecino, Detective Patricia L · filed 1987-01-08

This argument however must fail since we would hold that Sheriff Lee is not vicariously liable under section 1983 for the acts of his deputies.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a sheriff for the actions of deputies.

Hatley v. Lewis · filed 1989-02-15

Liability cannot be imposed on such a supervisory official such as a sheriff under vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff for personnel negligence alone without official sanction, decision, or policy.

Green v. Inman · filed 1989-03-22

With respect to the section 1983 claim, we need not consider whether the sheriff would be immune, as a state officer, from a suit for damages under the Federal Civil Rights Act pursuant to Hill v. Department of Corrections, State of Florida, 513 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1987), because negligent conduct by personnel, alone, is not sufficient to impose liability under the Act in the absence of official sanction, decision, or policy.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff vicariously liable for the violations of his subordinates.

Harris v. Mapp · filed 1989-08-11

In addition, the Sheriff would not be vicariously liable for the Section 1983 violations of his subordinates.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a sheriff liable without direct misconduct to show that the sheriff had an unconstitutional policy.

Williams v. Eugene Barksdale, Sheriff, Curtis Shumpert, Sergeant, Frank Cook, Deputy Jailer · filed 1989-12-29

And there is no claim of any direct misconduct by Sheriff Barksdale, so to recover against him the plaintiff must show some unconstitutional policy of Mr. Barksdale's.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on a sheriff when the complaint alleges neither his personal involvement in the deprivation of rights nor that the officer acted under a policy the sheriff established.

Saunders v. McFaul · filed 1990-12-31

However, in the absence of any alleged personal involvement of the deprivation of Saunders' rights or any allegation that Hartman was carrying out a policy established by Sheriff McFaul, we find that the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Sheriff McFaul was appropriate with respect to the ... civil rights claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff solely because a deputy committed a constitutional violation.

Williams v. Divittoria · filed 1991-03-21

It is well established that § 1983 liability cannot be imposed under traditional principles of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff personally liable for subordinates’ constitutional torts in which the sheriff was not directly involved.

McDonald v. Dunning · filed 1991-03-25

The sheriff in his individual capacity may not be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of subordinates in which he was not directly involved.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on a sheriff for subordinates’ actions without the sheriff’s personal involvement.

Los v. Wardell · filed 1991-08-15

The Sheriff cannot be held liable for the actions of his subordinates, as the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability of a police chief for a constitutional violation when the chief was personally involved or the chief’s conduct was causally connected to the violation.

Lewis v. Goodie · filed 1992-07-16

To be liable under Section 1983, a chief of police must be either personally involved in the acts causing the deprivation of a person’s constitutional rights, or there must be a causal connection between an act of the police chief and the constitutional violation sought to be addressed.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a sheriff observes subordinates beating a prisoner and fails to stop them, showing deliberate indifference or tacit authorization.

McNeal v. Shelby County Sheriff · filed 1993-04-26

In the instant case, the sheriff's failure to supervise and control his subordinates' actions in striking the plaintiff inmate in his presence demonstrates a deliberate indifference, almost a tacit authorization, of the beating sufficient to incur 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a sheriff for a jailer’s acts.

Bledsaw v. Simpson · filed 1994-05-03

Because Simpson cannot be held liable under Sec. 1983 on a respondeat superior theory, Choate v. Lockhart, 7 F.3d 1370, 1376 (8th Cir. 1993), the district court properly dismissed Simpson.

A sheriff cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the acts or omissions of employees.

Sanford v. Brookshire · filed 1994-06-24

Under § 1983 vicarious liability may not be imposed on a sheriff for the acts or omissions of his employees.

Section 1983 makes a sheriff liable for a deputy’s constitutional violation only if the sheriff was personally involved or causally connected to the violation.

Edwards v. Harris County Sheriff's Department · filed 1994-10-13

Thus, in order to hold a sheriff liable under § 1983, the sheriff must be personally involved in the acts which caused the injury or there must be a causal connection between the act of the sheriff and the constitutional violation to be redressed.

Section 1983 permits personal damages against a sheriff for a deputy’s unlawful search if the sheriff knew about or ordered the search.

Aspinwall v. Herrin · filed 1994-12-27

Sheriff Herrin may be personally liable for damages to Leger under § 1983 if he knew about or ordered the search of Leger’s apartment.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff liable for deputies’ constitutional violations based solely on the sheriff’s responsibility for their actions.

Levinson-Roth v. Parries · filed 1995-01-05

The complaint merely alleges that Sheriff Eight “is responsible for the actions of his deputies.” (Amended Compl. ¶ 38.) This allegation, by itself, fails to support a charge of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of his guards.

Horton v. Bowles · filed 1995-08-29

As a supervisory official, Sheriff Bowles may not be liable for the unconstitutional acts of his guards on a theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 permits individual liability against a sheriff for a subordinate’s constitutional deprivation when the sheriff affirmatively participated in the acts or implemented an unconstitutional policy that caused it.

Clark v. McMillin · filed 1996-03-28

Rather, to prevail on her claim against the sheriff in his individual capacity, she must show that he affirmatively participated in acts that resulted in the alleged constitutional deprivation, or that he implemented unconstitutional policies that causally resulted in Donald Strong’s death.

Section 1983 requires a police commissioner’s personal involvement to impose individual liability; official position alone is insufficient.

DiJoseph v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1996-10-22

As a matter of law, however, it is insufficient to subject Commissioner Neal to liability in his individual capacity without first demonstrating Neal’s personal involvement with the case át hand.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff solely for the acts of subordinates under respondeat superior.

Mayfield v. Elliott · filed 1996-11-08

Section 1983, of course, does not support respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a defendant personally participated in unlawful conduct or actually knew of and acquiesced in it.

Roach v. Kligman · filed 1976-04-30

To make out a case under § 1983, the plaintiff must show actual participation in the unlawful conduct, or actual knowledge of and acquiescence in that conduct.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on municipal officers for subordinates’ constitutional violations; liability requires their participation, or knowledge (or reason to know) followed by acquiescence.

Preston v. City of York · filed 1978-05-22

The law in this Circuit has been, and still is, that municipal officers cannot be held vicariously liable for the constitutional misdeeds of their subordinates. Liability can only be imposed oh these officers if they participated in the wrongful acts, or knew or should have known that the wrongful acts were taking place and acquiesced therein.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison supervisors unless they were directly involved in, or knew of and acquiesced in, constitutional violations.

Hodgin v. Roth · filed 1982-03-30

It is well settled in this Circuit that prison supervisory personnel cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless there has been some showing that they were either directly involved in, or had knowledge of and acquiesced in, the constitutional violations.

Section 1983 permits liability for an official who knowingly acquiesces in the misconduct of others, but mere presence alone is insufficient, although it may evidence actual knowledge and acquiescence.

King v. Cuyler · filed 1982-06-18

As to defendant’s second contention, liability under § 1983 may be imposed upon an official who knowingly acquiesces in the misconduct of others. Although the defendant is correct that mere presence is an insufficient basis on which to impose liability for an unconstitutional act, it nevertheless may be evidence of actual knowledge of and acquiescence in the improper behavior.

A Section 1983 failure-to-supervise claim requires deliberate indifference or tacit authorization shown by a failure to take remedial steps after notice of a pattern of subordinate misconduct.

Wilson v. City of North Little Rock · filed 1986-09-12

A cause of action predicated on such a theory may be maintained only if Younts demonstrated deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the offensive acts by failing to take remedial steps following notice of a pattern of such acts by his subordinates.

Section 1983 makes state officials liable for subordinates’ acts only when they bear direct responsibility, such as through personal direction, actual knowledge, or acquiescence.

John A. Leonard, and Michael R. Jacobs Michael M. Katz v. Edward Murray Raymond M. Muncy · filed 1988-04-06

The district court correctly instructed the jury that in an action brought under Sec. 1983 state officials acting in their official capacities cannot be held liable for actions of their subordinates absent a showing of direct responsibility for those actions, such as personal direction, actual knowledge or acquiescence in the subordinates' acts, and that an official cannot be charged with his subordinates' acts when he in fact knew nothing about them.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 when awareness of conflicting evidence and failure to act permit a jury to infer approval of a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Forney v. Purvis · filed 1989-01-13

Where a superior officer is cognizant of conflicts and discrepancies in evidence, but ignores them or fails to act on the information, then a jury may infer the officer implicitly approved or authorized the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officer.

A police supervisor may be liable under § 1983 when he knew or should have known of officers' misconduct and failed to prevent the resulting violation of constitutional rights.

O'Rourke v. City of Norman · filed 1989-05-23

In addition, we hold Lt. Cain liable under Sec. 1983. As supervisor in a position of responsibility, he knew or should have known of the misconduct, and failed to prevent the violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of the plaintiffs.

Section 1983 holds a supervisor liable for subordinates’ constitutional violations only if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of them and failed to prevent them.

Taylor v. List · filed 1989-07-17

A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a basis for holding supervisors responsible for their subordinates’ conduct, such as knowledge and acquiescence or inadequate training.

Feigley v. Fulcomer · filed 1989-07-27

Nowhere in Feigley’s declaration does he assert that either Defendant Fulcomer or Defendant Owens had knowledge of and acquiesced in behavior by any of their subordinates which failed to prevent, or tacitly condoned and allowed, homosexual conduct among inmates or intravenous drug use by inmates. Nowhere in Feigley’s amended complaint does he allege that either Defendant Fulcomer or Defendant Owens failed adequately to train their subordinates so as to prevent, and not tacitly condone and allow, homosexual conduct among inmates and intravenous drug use by inmates. ... It is our view that Feigley’s declaration is insufficient to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact with regard to the liability of both Defendant Fulcomer and Defendant Owens for failing to take appropriate steps to prevent, or tacitly condoning and allowing, homosexual conduct among inmates or intravenous drug use by inmates.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement by each defendant; a supervisor with actual or constructive knowledge of subordinates’ previous constitutional violations who fails to curb them may be liable for negligent training and supervision.

Gittens v. Sullivan · filed 1989-09-19

While an action under section 1983 requires some showing of personal involvement by each defendant, ... if the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of previous constitutional violations by his subordinates and failed to curb them, plaintiff is entitled to bring a claim under section 1983 for negligent training and supervision.

Section 1983 requires allegations of a supervisor’s personal involvement in or knowledge of unconstitutional conduct; a failure to remedy a continuing injury after learning of the misconduct can establish personal involvement.

Young v. Kihl · filed 1989-09-22

A section 1983 complaint must allege such involvement or such knowledge. ... The serving of the sentence imposed at the hearing — and the loss of liberty such occasioned — was a necessary element of any due process violation, and Coughlin’s alleged failure to vacate the sentence upon appeal operated to further any such violation. Accordingly, the pleadings suffice to implicate Coughlin personally in any wrongdoing.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official with actual or constructive notice of unconstitutional practices responds with gross negligence or deliberate indifference.

Satchell v. Clark · filed 1989-11-30

Supervisory liability may be imposed when an official has “actual or constructive notice of unconstitutional practices and demonstrates gross negligence or deliberate indifference by failing to act.” Al-Jundi, 885 F.2d at 1066; Meriwether, 879 F.2d at 1048. ... In all events, under these circumstances the Court can not find that Clark was grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent to Satchell’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when evidence supports that a supervisor knew of and acquiesced in subordinates’ unconstitutional dismissals.

Ferrer v. Carmen Sonia Zayas, Etc. · filed 1990-09-17

We cannot say that the jury was irrational in inferring from all the circumstances that Zayas, who by law held ultimate responsibility for employment decisions in the D.S.S., knew about and acquiesced in the decision to dismiss the plaintiffs due to their political affiliation.

A supervisor may be individually liable under § 1983 for setting in motion, or knowingly failing to stop, acts the supervisor knew or reasonably should have known would cause a constitutional injury.

Larez v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1991-09-27

The district court correctly instructed the jury that it could find Chief Gates liable in his individual capacity if he “set[ ] in motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refused to terminate a series of acts by others, which he kn[e]w or reasonably should [have] know[n], would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.”

Section 1983 imposes liability on prison supervisors for their employees’ conduct only when the supervisors had personal knowledge of or involvement in the misconduct; negligent failure to detect it is insufficient.

Benford v. Wright · filed 1991-12-20

To allow liability to pass to prison supervisors for conduct of their employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must allege the personal knowledge or involvement of those superiors; negligence in detection of misconduct will not suffice.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 requires actual knowledge of subordinates’ constitutional deprivations and deliberate indifference or tacit authorization shown by a failure to remedy them.

Sanders v. Brewer · filed 1992-08-13

"To hold supervisors liable under section 1983, a plaintiff must show that a superior had actual knowledge that his [or her] subordinates caused deprivations of constitutional rights and that he [or she] demonstrated deliberate indifference or 'tacit authorization' of the offensive acts by failing to take steps to remedy them."

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; a supervisor is liable only if he participated in or directed constitutional violations, or knew of them and failed to prevent them.

Dansby v. United States · filed 1992-10-20

Moreover, there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983; a supervisor will be found liable only if he "participated in or directed the [constitutional] violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989).

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation; a supervisor is liable only if the supervisor participated in or directed a violation, or knew of it and failed to prevent it with deliberate indifference, and respondeat superior does not apply.

Admiral v. Arizona Department of Corrections James McFadden Warden Officer Long, 4728 Officer Federico, 328 · filed 1992-10-29

Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and with deliberate indifference, failed to act to prevent them. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2326-27 (1991); Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires personal direction of the violation or actual knowledge and acquiescence by the supervisor.

Woodward v. City of Worland · filed 1992-12-15

We are persuaded that the proper articulation of the test for supervisory liability under section 1983 is that set forth by the Third Circuit in Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3rd Cir.1990), where it was stated that supervisor liability requires "allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence."

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability for a subordinate’s constitutional violation only when the supervisor participated in or directed the violation, or knew of it and deliberately failed to prevent it.

Reihley v. Joseph McGill Dr. · filed 1993-03-04

A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and with deliberate indifference, failed to act to prevent them.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal participation in a constitutional deprivation or awareness of widespread abuses followed by a deliberately indifferent failure to prevent further misconduct.

Casey v. Lewis · filed 1993-03-19

Generally, supervisory officials cannot be held liable under the theory of respondeat superior. ... Rather, plaintiff must establish that the official personally participated in the constitutional deprivation or that a state supervisory official was aware of the widespread abuses and with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s constitutional rights failed to take action to prevent further misconduct.

Under § 1983, a prison supervisor may be liable for failing to counteract a constitutional violation despite having notice of it and authority to remedy it.

Klinger v. Nebraska Department of Correctional Services · filed 1993-06-21

A prison official is responsible for his or her own acts or failures to act where the official is on notice of a constitutional violation and despite having the authority to counteract the violation, fails to do so.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 requires actual knowledge of subordinates' constitutional deprivations and deliberate indifference or tacit authorization through failure to remedy them.

Davis v. Sancegraw · filed 1993-08-26

To whatever extent plaintiff may be seeking to hold Nixon liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a supervisor, plaintiff must demonstrate "that a superior had actual knowledge that his subordinates caused deprivations of constitutional rights and that he demonstrated deliberate indifference or `tacit authorization'" of the offensive acts by failing to take steps to remedy them. Pool v. Missouri Dep't of Corrections and Human Resources, 883 F.2d 640, 645 (8th Cir.1989) citing, Wilson v. City of North Little Rock, 801 F.2d 316, 322 (8th Cir.1986). In addition, in order to hold a supervisor liable for his failure to supervise or control his subordinates, a plaintiff must also demonstrate a deliberate indifference to or a tacit authorization of the offensive acts. Bolin v. Black, 875 F.2d 1343, 1347 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993, 110 S.Ct. 542, 107 L.Ed.2d 539 (1989). In the absence of any such allegations, as is the case here, there is no basis upon which to hold defendant Nixon liable on a theory of supervisory liability.

Supervisors are liable under § 1983 only if they personally participated in a constitutional violation, directed others in it, or knew or should have known about it and failed to prevent further harm.

Rodriguez v. Fred Pearce Frank Hall Manfred Maass · filed 1993-09-10

Supervisors are liable under Sec. 1983 only if they personally participated in a constitutional violation, directed others in the violation, or knew or should have known about it and failed to act to prevent further harm. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). ... As the district court held, Maass's denial of Rodriguez's appeal does not establish that Maass knew about, and therefore was liable for, any constitutional violation regarding Thomason's failure to fill an envelope order.

A prison supervisor is not personally liable under § 1983 for delayed medical care where there is no evidence of his knowledge, personal involvement, responsibility for the delay, or deliberate indifference.

Perry v. Reed · filed 1993-10-19

There is no evidence that DuBois had actual knowledge of Perry’s condition, was personally involved in Perry’s receiving care or that DuBois was responsible for the conditions which led to the delay experienced by Perry. Assuming, arguendo, that the doctors may have negligently treated Perry’s condition, that fact is not probative of “purposeful indifference” on the part of DuBois.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts showing that inadequate training or supervision caused the constitutional deprivation, that the deprivation resulted from a policy or custom for which the supervisor was responsible, or that the supervisor knew of misconduct and failed to prevent future misconduct.

Zatko v. Rowland · filed 1993-10-22

To implicate a defendant in a supervisory position, plaintiff must offer facts showing that defendant's failure to properly train or supervise personnel resulted in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, that the alleged deprivation resulted from official policy or custom for which defendant was responsible, or that defendant knew of the alleged misconduct and failed to act to prevent future misconduct.

A claim under § 1983 against a state official requires allegations of personal participation in the constitutional deprivation or supervisory awareness of abuses and deliberate indifference in failing to prevent further misconduct.

Littrell v. Crist · filed 1993-11-08

To state a claim against a state official, a civil rights complainant must allege that the official personally participated in the constitutional deprivation or that a state supervisory official was aware of the abuses and with deliberate indifference to the inmate's constitutional rights failed to take action to prevent further misconduct.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knew or should have known of a subordinate’s pervasive risk of constitutional injury, responded with deliberate indifference or tacit authorization, and that inaction caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Simmons v. Baker · filed 1994-02-03

To establish supervisory liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a subordinate’s conduct only when the supervisor knew of and facilitated, approved, condoned, or deliberately ignored it.

Hines v. Sheahan · filed 1994-03-11

A supervisor may be held liable under § 1983 for the conduct of subordinates only if the supervisor knew about the conduct and facilitated it, approved it, condoned it, or purposefully turned a blind eye to it.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely because they oversee a wrongdoer; liability requires participation, direction, or knowledge of the violation and failure to prevent it.

Burgess v. Deputy A. Cruz · filed 1994-06-07

In his original complaint, Burgess did not allege nor can the facts be construed to allege that either Jordan or Hennessey as supervisors participated in or directed Cruz's alleged constitutional violations, or knew of the alleged violations and failed to act to prevent them. ... Respondeat superior alone is not a sufficient basis for the liability of these officials under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the supervisor knew of, participated in, or acquiesced in the constitutional deprivation.

Bieros v. Nicola · filed 1994-08-17

Thus, one must know of the deprivation, participate in the deprivation or acquiesce in such conduct to be liable in a supervisory capacity.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a supervisor’s knowledge of a prisoner’s grievance and failure to respond to or remedy it.

Henry v. Pogats · filed 1994-08-25

A combination of knowledge of a prisoner's grievance and failure to respond or remedy the complaint is insufficient to impose liability upon supervisory personnel under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence of the supervisor’s personal direction, actual knowledge, acquiescence, recklessness, or deliberate indifference in the alleged misconduct.

Kaul v. Stephan · filed 1994-11-08

On the basis of this authority and because the evidence does not establish defendant’s personal direction, actual knowledge, acquiescence, recklessness or deliberate indifference, we believe defendant is entitled to summary judgment against any claim of misconduct in applying for or receiving the search warrants in this case.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability under respondeat superior; supervisory liability requires particularized allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence.

Youse v. Carlucci · filed 1994-11-15

There can be no vicarious liability for a § 1983 action under a respondeat superior theory and “allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence ... must be made with appropriate particularity.”

Section 1983 makes a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violation if the supervisor participated in or directed it, or knew of it and failed to prevent it.

Whitbeck v. Lewis · filed 1995-04-07

"Liability under section 1983 only arises upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant. A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them."

Section 1983 permits personal liability for an official who directs others to deprive someone of constitutional rights or has actual knowledge of or acquiesces in the deprivation.

Jacobsen v. Lambers · filed 1995-05-09

He is therefore subject to personal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 not only if he directed third parties to deny plaintiffs constitutional rights, but also if he had actual knowledge of or acquiesced in such deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on prison officials; an inmate must show the official participated in or directed the violation, or knew of it and failed to prevent it.

White v. Gomez · filed 1995-05-22

"There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983." Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. Therefore, to establish a prison official's liability for the actions of subordinates under section 1983, an inmate must demonstrate that the official "participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Section 1983 permits personal liability for supervisors who receive notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts by subordinates, show deliberate indifference or tacit approval, fail to remedy the acts, and thereby cause injury.

Larson v. Miller · filed 1995-05-31

The individual defendants are subject to personal liability under Sec. 1983 for failure to adequately respond to the known risk of physical and emotional harm presented by Szynskie if it can be proven that they: (1) received notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by subordinates; (2) demonstrated deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the offensive acts; (3) failed to take sufficient remedial action; and (4) that such failure proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires the supervisor to have actual knowledge of and acquiesce in the unconstitutional treatment by those under the supervisor’s authority.

Harrington v. Lauer · filed 1995-07-17

To invoke liability under § 1983, the Third Circuit requires the plaintiff to establish that the supervisor had actual knowledge of and acquiesced in the unconstitutional treatment rendered by those under his supervision.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on officials merely because they failed to correct subordinates’ misconduct after receiving complaints.

Phillips v. Harris · filed 2019-08-13

At most, he alleges that they refused to correct their subordinates’ actions after Plaintiff wrote or spoke to them about his conditions. Those allegations are not enough to hold the supervisory Defendants responsible under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on police supervisors solely because of their supervisory hierarchy under respondeat superior.

Santiago-Rodriguez v. Torres-Massa · filed 1972-05-16

There was evidence as to the hierarchy in the Police Department and the supervisory duties of the Superintendent, but that evidence would be directed to the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior to the police force in civil rights cases. That doctrine has expressly been rejected, in its application to the police, in the Caballero v. Ferré case, supra.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisory officials for constitutional violations committed by subordinate officers.

Seals v. Nicholl · filed 1973-10-30

Since the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable in actions brought under Section 1983, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), defendants Conlisk and Nicholl are not proper parties to this aspect of plaintiff’s claim.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim against a police chief to proceed at the pleading stage when the complaint alleges that his deliberate departmental policy caused a constitutional violation, rather than relying solely on respondeat superior.

Ford v. Breier · filed 1974-11-15

Defendant Breier characterizes plaintiff’s approach as being in contradiction to the prevailing notions of what constitutes conduct under color of state law for liability under the Civil Rights Act. ... This is not what the plaintiff claims in this case. Here the plaintiff claims that there is a deliberate policy under the direction of the chief not to seek search and arrest warrants. ... The plaintiff has stated a colorable claim, and without countervailing affidavits which might well clear up the matter, this court is unable to dismiss the complaint or grant summary judgment for the defendant Breier.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege the defendant’s direct and personal responsibility for the unlawful conduct of subordinates; respondeat superior does not suffice.

R. L. Black v. United States of America · filed 1976-04-23

In an effort to limit vexatious litigation and to minimize interference with the orderly workings of government, it is required in suits against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the plaintiff allege the defendant’s direct and personal responsibility for the purportedly unlawful conduct of his subordinates.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisory personnel; a supervisor may be liable upon a finding of direct responsibility or personal involvement.

Joseph v. Brierton · filed 1976-08-19

Supervisory personnel have been held liable under Section 1983 upon a finding of direct responsibility for guards’ actions. However, this complaint alleges only that defendants Sielaff and Brierton were responsible in their official capacities without alleging direct responsibility or personal involvement.