42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on a supervisor’s position.

Curtis v. Curtis · filed 2002-05-06

However, the theory of respondeat superior cannot provide the basis for liability in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a corrections director solely because of that position or negligent supervision or hiring of prison staff.

Mattatall v. A.T. Wall · filed 2002-05-10

Neither Appellee Wall’s status as correction’s director nor his alleged negligence in supervising and hiring prison staff suffices as a predicate for personal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor when the supervisor’s wrongful conduct has a sufficient causal connection to the constitutional violation.

Gallardo v. DiCarlo · filed 2002-05-13

Far from merely asserting vicarious liability, Gallardo claims DiCarlo, in her supervisory role, "encouraged” and "ratified” the illegal use of excessive force by subordinate state employees. Accepting the truth of Gallardo’s allegations, the court finds that Gallardo has alleged a sufficient causal connection between DiCar-lo’s wrongful conduct and a violation of Gal-lardo's rights under the Eighth Amendment.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an affirmative causal link between a supervisor’s inaction and a constitutional injury; without such an injury, the claim fails.

Tigrett v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia · filed 2002-05-14

Because the Appellants have failed to demonstrate a constitutional injury in connection with the UJC Trial, their supervisory liability claim fails on the third prong of the Shaw test, i.e., there is no affirma- tive causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and any constitu- tional injury suffered by the Appellants.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s conduct or inaction to cause the deprivation of rights; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Gonzalez-Mercado v. Municipality of Guaynabo · filed 2002-05-22

It is axiomatic that section 1983 imposes liability only upon those who actually cause a deprivation of rights. ... Supervisory liability may not be grounded upon a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor’s wrongful conduct has a sufficient causal connection to the constitutional violation.

Figueroa v. Gates · filed 2002-06-11

Liability may be imposed on supervisors under § 1983 if the plaintiff demonstrates “ ‘a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’ ” Red-man v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989)).

A § 1983 failure-to-supervise claim arising from an assault requires facts supporting an inference of deliberate indifference by the supervisors.

Cowart v. Scott · filed 2002-06-12

Cowart also asserts that the other defendants failed to supervise Autry, which led to the assault. Cowart has not asserted facts which support an inference of deliberate indifference on the part of those defendants.

Section 1983 does not permit a sheriff to be held liable solely for the conduct of jail staff.

Gulett v. Haines · filed 2002-06-14

Thus, even if the Plaintiff could show that his serious medical needs were left unattended, the only means to find the Sheriff liable under this set of facts would be on a respondeat superior theory, which, as stated, is not contemplated by § 1983.

Section 1983 requires evidence connecting a supervisor’s own acts to an alleged constitutional violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Munoz v. Kolender · filed 2002-06-14

To avoid the respondeat superior bar, Munoz must allege personal acts by Sheriff Kolender which have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation(s) at issue and provide evidence to support those allegations adequate to avoid summary judgment.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Jaques v. Londonderry, et al. · filed 2002-06-17

In any event, because there is no underlying constitutional violation, there can be no claim for supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a warden solely because of his supervisory position when he had no personal involvement in or knowledge of the challenged act.

Fisher v. Stewart · filed 2002-06-21

Further, because Fisher has failed to demonstrate that Hallahan was personally involved in, or had any knowledge of, Fisher’s transfer to Cimarron, and because, as described below, the transfer did not even constitute a constitutional deprivation, Hallahan cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 simply based on his supervisory position as Warden.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for employees’ misconduct unless they encouraged it.

Mack v. Carter · filed 2002-06-21

The district court correctly noted that supervisors cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the alleged misdeeds of their employees, unless they encouraged the subordinates’ misconduct.

A § 1983 claim against a district attorney must allege personal involvement, such as direct participation, failure to remedy a known wrong, an office policy or custom, or grossly negligent supervision.

Shmueli v. New York City Police Department · filed 2002-06-27

Plaintiffs claim against District Attorney Morgenthau predicated on 42 USC § 1983 was also properly dismissed, since plaintiff has failed to allege direct participation by him in the alleged wrongful acts, a failure by him to remedy a wrong after discovering it, a policy or custom in the District Attorney’s office which encouraged or permitted the alleged wrongful acts, or gross negligence in District Attorney Morgenthau’s supervision of his subordinates (see, McKeon v Daley, 101 F Supp 2d 79, 91, affd 8 Fed Appx 138 [2d Cir]).

Section 1983 permits liability for a subordinate’s conduct when a supervisor knows of and facilitates, approves, condones, or deliberately ignores it.

Robinson v. Gerritson · filed 2002-07-01

To be held liable under Section 1983 for the conduct of a subordinate, a supervisor must either “know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see” (Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir.1988)). ... Gerritson is also entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Robinson’s supervisory liability claim.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a supervisor’s own acts or omissions, but not solely for an employee’s conduct.

Vives v. Fajardo · filed 2002-07-10

Supervisors can only be held liable for their own acts or omissions, and not through the actions or omissions of their agents or employees.

A § 1983 plaintiff must allege that a supervisory official implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the challenged conduct.

Porter v. Ellis · filed 2002-07-10

To state a cognizable claim, a section 1983 plaintiff must allege that the supervisory official “implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced” in the unconstitutional or statutorily violative conduct that is the subject of his claim.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for mere negligence in supervising a person who violates someone’s constitutional rights.

Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Roseville · filed 2002-07-16

Negligence is not enough to impose section 1983 liability on a supervisor.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knew or should have known of misconduct and failed to prevent harm, but requires an affirmative link to the alleged deprivation.

Arocho v. Department of Labor & Human Resources of Puerto Rico · filed 2002-07-24

A defendant supervisor may also be held liable under section 1983 whenever he or she knew, or should have known, of the alleged misconduct, and yet failed to take action to prevent future harm. ... That contact alone is not enough to establish an affirmative link between Arocho’s termination and González’s alleged misconduct.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only for a supervisor’s own actions or omissions.

Ayala v. VIVONI · filed 2002-07-29

A supervisor may be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only on the basis of his or her own actions or omissions.

Section 1983 claims against supervisors require a causal connection between their conduct and the alleged constitutional violation.

Beasley v. Mangrum · filed 2002-07-29

As for the supervisory defendants Assistant Warden Reagans and Regional Director Gomez, the district court properly concluded that Beasley’s allegations failed to establish any causal connection between their conduct and any Eighth Amendment violation.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; a position of authority alone does not establish liability for damages.

Hayut v. State University of New York · filed 2002-07-30

Considering that defendants were not personally involved in the violation, and considering that they cannot be held liable for damages under § 1983 simply because they occupied high position of authority, defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to a § 1983 equal protection claim is granted.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor and a subordinate’s alleged excessive force when the supervisor did not participate in the entry.

Ealum v. Schirard · filed 2002-07-30

Because they did not participate in the SWAT team’s initial entry into the residence, they are liable for the alleged use of excessive force only if there is an “affirmative link” showing they actively participated or acquiesced in the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because an official supervises the person who caused a deprivation of rights.

Sepulveda v. Rico · filed 2002-08-01

Supervisory liability may not be grounded upon a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Elliott v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development · filed 2002-08-01

The theory of respondeat superior cannot provide the basis for liability in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because they employ the alleged wrongdoer; the plaintiff must allege that they condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the misconduct.

Hayes v. City of Mt. Washington · filed 2002-08-06

However, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 actions to impute liability to supervisory personnel; rather, in order to find them hable, the plaintiff must allege that the supervisors condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged misconduct.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Coleman v. Department of Rehabilitation & Corrections · filed 2002-08-28

Respondeat superior claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

A plaintiff may establish supervisory liability under § 1983 by proving deliberate indifference, tacit authorization, or widespread and pervasive abuses.

Oliver v. Powell · filed 2002-09-04

Therefore, a plaintiff who is able to prove deliberate indifference, tacit authorization, or widespread and pervasive abuses may be able to establish supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. No such showing has been made in the instant action. Therefore, defendants Johnson, Harrison, and Gilmore must be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a subordinate’s constitutional violation when the supervisor’s action is affirmatively linked to it through encouragement, condonation, acquiescence, or gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference.

Viera-Marcano v. Ramirez-Sanchez · filed 2002-09-10

a state official may be held liable under § 1983 in either his official or personal capacity for the behavior of his subordinates if both (1) the behavior of the subordinates results in a constitutional violation, and (2) the official’s action was affirmatively linked to that behavior such that it could be characterized as “supervisory encouragement, condonation, or acquiescence” or “gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference.”

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for mere negligence in supervising a person who violates constitutional rights.

Doe v. City of Roseville · filed 2002-09-19

Negligence is not enough to impose section 1983 liability on a supervisor.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely through respondeat superior when the supervisors were neither personally involved nor policy makers.

Payton v. Hinds County, MS · filed 2002-09-24

With regard to Jones and Barlow, Payton has offered no evidence to dispute their averment that they were not present and are not policy makers; Payton’s only theory of Jones’s and Barlow’s liability is thus one of respondeat superior. Therefore, Jones and Barlow are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a due process claim when there is no underlying due process violation.

Wade v. Thomas · filed 2002-09-24

As there was no underlying due process violation, the supervisory defendants cannot be liable on that basis.

A § 1983 claim can establish a supervisor’s personal involvement by alleging that the supervisor promulgated the policy under which the claimed constitutional violation occurred.

Aiken v. Nixon · filed 2002-09-30

The complaint alleges that Nixon promulgated the strip search policy in issue here, and this is sufficient to establish his personal involvement through a theory of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Lavender v. Lampert · filed 2002-09-30

Liability under § 1983 cannot be premised upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a prison medical director liable for treatment delays solely because of the director’s position.

Rodriguez v. Ames · filed 2002-09-30

Alves is not responsible for delays or gaps in treatment solely because he is the Facility Health Services Director.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement; forwarding a prisoner’s complaint to staff does not establish it.

Livingston v. Goord · filed 2002-09-30

It is also clear that a supervisory official’s forwarding of inmate’s letters to his subordinates will not suffice to establish the official’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a mere failure to act; liability requires active unconstitutional behavior.

Stewart v. Taft · filed 2002-10-08

Thus, supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot attach where the allegation of liability is based on a mere failure to act. Instead, the liability must be based on active unconstitutional behavior.

Section 1983 allows a claim against a supervisor who knowingly implements a policy posing a substantial risk of harm to a class of people, even without knowledge of the risk to the particular plaintiff.

Young v. Martin · filed 2002-10-21

As in Taylor, it does not matter that Defendant Martin did not know of the substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff in particular; rather, the inquiry is whether he was aware that his conduct would result in a substantial risk of harm to a particular class of persons. Therefore, in accordance with our precedent, we hold that qualified immunity is not warranted here.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a state official solely through respondeat superior.

Dixon v. Goord · filed 2002-10-23

Personal liability cannot be imposed on a state official under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires knowledge of a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury, a deliberately indifferent or tacitly approving response, and a causal link to the injury.

Wilson v. Kittoe · filed 2002-11-07

The test for supervisory liability requires three elements to be proven: (1) The supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate’s conduct posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor’s response was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference or tacit authorization; and (3) there is a causal link between the inaction and the constitutional injury.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for subordinates’ acts; a supervisor’s own conduct must be causally connected to the constitutional violation.

McCurry v. Moore · filed 2002-11-21

Supervisory personnel cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the acts of subordinates, but may be independently liable where a reasonable person in the supervisor’s position would have known that his conduct infringed the plaintiffs rights and the supervisor’s conduct was causally related to the subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for failure to train or supervise absent a constitutional violation.

Olenzak v. Alameda County Regional Auto Theft Task Force · filed 2002-11-26

Olenzak’s claim of failure to train and/or supervise also fails, because absent a constitutional violation, no supervisory liability exists.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor participates in or acquiesces in a constitutional deprivation.

Skinner v. Uphoff · filed 2002-11-27

To be held hable under § 1983, a supervisor “must have participated or acquiesced in the constitutional deprivations of which complaint is made.”

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires active unconstitutional behavior; a mere failure to act is insufficient.

Combs v. Wilkinson · filed 2002-11-27

Supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot be based upon a mere failure to act but must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires active unconstitutional behavior; a mere failure to act is insufficient.

Ronald Combs, Jason Robb, and George Skatzes v. Reginald Wilkinson, Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation an · filed 2002-11-27

Supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot be based upon a mere failure to act but must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for subordinates’ actions solely under vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Haskins v. Choate · filed 2002-12-05

Supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Section 1983 supervisory liability cannot be established when the plaintiff has not proven misconduct by subordinate officials.

Camp v. Brennan · filed 2002-12-05

Finally, because Camp has not proven misconduct by subordinate prison officials, he necessarily cannot establish supervisory liability on the part of those responsible for the policies under which he was detained in the observation cell.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory position.

Jennings v. Harvey · filed 2002-12-11

Section 1983, 42 U.S.C., ... does not afford relief for supervisory or respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable merely because they supervise the person who allegedly violated a right.

Lamb v. Bumpus · filed 2002-12-11

Further, the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs complaint with respect to the defendant sheriff because supervisory personnel are not hable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 merely under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious or respondeat superior liability on officials for constitutional injuries.

Neiberger v. Hawkins · filed 2002-12-13

Both individual Defendants correctly note that liability under § 1983 cannot be imposed vicariously or under traditional grounds of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because of their position; the supervisor must encourage or directly participate in the misconduct.

Sarr v. Martin · filed 2002-12-16

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 lawsuits to impute liability onto supervisory personnel, ... unless it is shown “that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.”

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; their acts must have a causal connection to a constitutional violation.

Mason v. Murray · filed 2002-12-17

The claims against the supervisory defendants were properly dismissed because there is no vicarious liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the appellants did not allege any causal connection between acts of the supervisory defendants and any constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; their acts must have a causal connection to a constitutional violation.

Jones v. Murray · filed 2002-12-17

The claims against the supervisory defendants were properly dismissed because there is no vicarious liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the appellants did not allege any causal connection between acts of the supervisory defendants and any constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a constitutional deprivation and a supervisor’s participation, control, direction, or failure to supervise.

Bafford v. Nelson · filed 2002-12-18

To establish a cognizable claim under § 1983 against a supervisor, the plaintiff must establish “that an affirmative link exists between the [constitutional] deprivation and either the supervisor’s personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise.”

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the supervisor personally caused or participated in the alleged violation.

Boyce, Chester v. Moore, Lieutenant · filed 2002-12-27

Moreover, a supervisor cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless the individual was personally involved in the wrongful conduct such that he or she caused or participated in the alleged violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for school officials who know of a teacher’s sexual abuse, respond with deliberate indifference, and thereby cause a student’s constitutional injury.

Doe v. Covington County School Board · filed 2003-01-02

The court finds no difficulty or hesitation in following the holding in Taylor as pronounced by the Fifth Circuit only last year. ... The plaintiffs have alleged that the board and its members, the principal and the superintendent had knowledge of the teacher’s continuous sexual contact with the plaintiffs and failed to remedy the problem. In addition, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants’ conduct constituted “a deliberate indifference” to the school children, see Pl.s’ Compl. at ¶ 19, resulting in a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In viewing the allegations of the complaint as true, the court finds that the facts will entitle the plaintiffs to relief.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or the supervisor’s wrongful conduct had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Estate of Perez v. Jacobo · filed 2003-01-07

Under § 1983, vicarious liability may not be imposed on supervisory officials unless “there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” committed by the subordinate. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) (internal citations omitted) (en banc).

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in a constitutional violation or has a causal connection to it.

Rudolph Ex Rel. Williams v. Lowndes County Board of Education · filed 2003-01-15

Supervisor liability under § 1983 occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation, or when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the alleged constitutional violation.

Sanchez v. Terhune · filed 2003-01-15

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Sanchez’ Eighth Amendment claim against the remaining defendants, who were all named solely in their supervisory capacities, because Sanchez did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether these defendants were personally involved or whether there was a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because a subordinate committed a constitutional violation.

Miller v. Bock · filed 2003-01-28

To the extent that Miller is suing these defendants in their supervisory capacity, the Supreme Court instructs that a person cannot be held hable under § 1983 upon a theory of respondeat superior.

A § 1983 claim against supervisory defendants must allege a basis for liability in their supervisory capacity.

Martinez v. Johnson · filed 2003-01-31

The remaining defendants were properly dismissed with prejudice for Martinez’s failure to allege a cause of action against them in their supervisory capacity.

Section 1983 requires more than a conclusory assertion that an official was responsible for alleged constitutional violations.

Crowell v. Sollie · filed 2003-02-04

Moreover, Crowell’s conclusional assertion that Sollie was responsible for alleged constitutional violations does not provide a basis for a civil rights action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s conduct.

Edwards v. Oberndorf · filed 2003-02-06

Furthermore, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not exist under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison warden solely under respondeat superior without direct involvement.

Williams v. Johnson · filed 2003-02-06

However, there is no indication that the warden was directly involved, and he cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 supervisory liability based on correctional training does not extend to lieutenants who were not delegated responsibility for that training.

Wiseman v. Armstrong, No. Cv02-0821661 S (Feb. 27, 2003) · filed 2003-02-27

This overlooks CGS § 18-81 which gives the Commissioner of Correction the ultimate responsibility for training, which he can delegate and which he has delegated, but not to either of these two lieutenants. Therefore, the claims that the lieutenants were in a supervisory capacity are not valid.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely for their subordinates’ acts; the complaint must allege their participation or a causal connection to the alleged deprivation.

Smith v. Siegelman · filed 2003-02-28

Nor does the complaint allege any causal connection between the deprivation of Smith's right to due process and these six defendants. Rather, Smith appears to sue these six individuals solely on the basis of their supervisory authority over the other three defendants — Gallman, Shadwrick, and Mintz. See Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir.1999) ("It is well established in this circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Since Smith has failed to provide any facts indicating that these six defendants participated in, or even were aware of, the DHR investigation of Smith or the placing of Smith's name on the Registry, there obviously is no constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor through respondeat superior; a supervisor is liable only for his own acts or omissions.

Tejada-Batista v. Fuentes-Agostini · filed 2003-03-10

In addition, under section 1983 the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to impose supervisors liability. ... Therefore, a supervisor can only be found liable for his own acts or omissions.

Section 1983 holds supervisors liable only for their own acts or omissions, and only for subordinate conduct occurring during their supervision.

Neris v. Vivoni · filed 2003-03-11

The Court will only take into account Vazquez’s allegedly unlawful acts after Torres and Carrasquillo became supervisors for the Humacao precinct, since Torres and Carrasquillo cannot be held liable for acts that occurred before they began working in the Humacao precinct. Supervisors can only be found liable for their own acts or omissions.

Section 1983 applies a deliberate indifference standard to supervisory liability claims, including excessive force claims.

McGrath v. Scott · filed 2003-03-12

Therefore, the Court finds that the deliberately indifferent standard adopted in L.W. applies generally to all supervisory liability claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a prison policy that did not cause the alleged injury.

Hurley v. Buentello · filed 2003-03-20

The implementation of a policy of using male or multiple guards would not have protected Hurley from the risk of what occurred here, being shot by a dart through a food slot. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the supervisory defendants.

Section 1983 requires allegations sufficient to state a cognizable claim against a corrections supervisor.

Ragan v. Martin · filed 2003-03-28

Moreover, plaintiff did not adequately allege a cognizable cause of action against Sergeant Garcia in any event.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing before the supervisor can be held liable.

Miller v. McBride · filed 2003-04-17

And Superintendent McBride cannot be hable for Mr. Miller’s injuries from the fight because he lacked personal involvement in the incident; he was not involved in either the decision to transfer Mr. Miller to that dorm in May or the day-to-day operations of the unit.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a sheriff for the acts of subordinates.

Daniel v. Bexar Cty Adt Deten · filed 2003-04-21

Sheriff Lopez cannot be vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor’s act or omission and the alleged constitutional violation to establish supervisory liability.

Bonilla v. Vivoni · filed 2003-04-23

Plaintiff has not connected any act or omission of Vivoni or Haddock to the complained-of conduct, the affirmative link necessary in this case.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery against a warden based solely on respondeat superior or vicarious liability without personal involvement.

Blaylock v. Revell · filed 2003-04-23

Blaylock has not alleged facts which show that Warden Price was personally involved in any of his medical decisions; recovery pursuant to a respondeat-superior or vicarious-liability theory is not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; supervisory liability requires deliberate indifference to a known or obvious consequence of the supervisor’s conduct.

Evett v. DETNTFF · filed 2003-05-12

Section 1983 does not create vicarious or respondeat superior liability. ... A supervisory official is held to a standard of "deliberate indifference," which requires proof that the supervisor "disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." ... As a result, we find that Mendiola did not act with deliberate indifference by ultimately giving his approval of Evett's arrest.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a subordinate’s actions without the supervisor’s personal involvement.

Craft v. Mann · filed 2003-05-21

The doctrine of respondeat superior, under which a supervisor may be held liable for an employee’s actions, has no application to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for condoning officers’ conduct or departmental policies when no constitutional violation occurred.

Syfu v. Cooke · filed 2003-05-27

Neither Syfu nor the appellant suffered a constitutional injury. In the absence of a constitutional violation, Cooke cannot be liable for condoning the officers’ conduct or any allegedly unconstitutional policies the police department maintained.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires factual allegations showing that the supervisor had notice of the violation and a causal connection to the subordinate officers’ actions.

Esteras v. Diaz · filed 2003-05-29

Plaintiff has not factually alleged that Defendant Toledo had notice of the purported violation or factually identified the causal connection tying Defendant Toledo to the officers’ actions.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff liable for implementing an unconstitutional policy when the evidence shows only one failure and does not show that the sheriff knew the policy posed a substantial risk.

Fenlon v. Thomas · filed 2003-05-29

Thus, assuming arguendo that Fenlon did not receive constitutionally adequate medical care, Thomas still “cannot be held liable on the theory that he implemented an unconstitutional policy when the record below indicates no more than that the system may have failed in the one particular instance of [Fenlon’s eye] injury.” Id. (footnote omitted).

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor who knows of a constitutional violation and fails to act to prevent it.

Lara v. County of San Mateo · filed 2001-08-13

These allegations are sufficient to state a claim under § 1983 based the inaction of a supervisor with knowledge of the alleged violation.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious or respondeat superior liability on supervisors.

Evett v. DETNTFF · filed 2003-06-03

Section 1983 does not create vicarious or respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 does not require a prison medical supervisor to have a doctor-patient relationship with an inmate to be liable for deliberate indifference to the inmate’s medical needs.

Sulton v. Wright · filed 2003-06-06

Liability for deliberate indifference by supervisors does not require that they have an individual doctor-patient relationship with the plaintiff.

A prison supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for personal involvement in an inmate’s care or for facilitating, condoning, or ignoring a known Eighth Amendment violation by medical staff.

McCoy v. Mobley · filed 2003-06-06

He offered nothing showing that Mobley was personally involved in his care, or that he facilitated, condoned, or ignored a known Eighth Amendment violation by prison medical staff.

Section 1983 does not impose liability merely because a defendant supervises someone who allegedly violated a federal right.

Loukas v. Gundy · filed 2003-06-23

Liability under § 1983 cannot be imposed merely because of the supervisory position which this particular defendant held.

Section 1983 permits liability against a supervisor only for the supervisor’s own acts or omissions, not through respondeat superior.

Carico v. Benton, Ireland, & Stovall · filed 2003-06-26

However, respondeat superior or supervisory liability is not a theory of liability in a § 1983 action. ... A supervisor may be liable only on the basis of her own acts or omissions.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts supporting an inference of a supervisor’s involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; a supervisory position alone is insufficient.

Campagna v. Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2003-07-03

To the extent Campagna relies on these defendants' positions within the DEP as a basis for supervisory liability, he has failed to allege facts sufficient to allow such an inference.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a supervisor’s knowledge of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, an inadequate response amounting to deliberate indifference or tacit authorization, and a causal link to the plaintiff’s injury.

Clancy v. McCabe · filed 2003-07-08

In order for a plaintiff to succeed on a § 1983 supervisory liability claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a “pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate that it amounted to “deliberate indifference” or “tacit authorization” of the subordinate’s behavior; and (3) there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s action or inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely for a subordinate’s acts or inaction.

Loughridge v. Rowley · filed 2003-07-17

The district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants insofar as his claims were based upon acts or inaction by the defendants’ subordinates.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability under respondeat superior; a supervisor must play an affirmative part in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Graves v. City Of Coeur D'alene · filed 2003-08-01

In any event, under our law section 1983 suits do not impose liability on supervising officers under a respondeat superior theory of liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a subordinate’s conduct; the supervisor must have at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in it.

Henderson v. Martin · filed 2003-08-04

This Court has held that § 1983 liability cannot be based upon a theory of respondeat superior: “At a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.” ... Henderson has made no showing that defendant Martin had any knowledge of his difficulties with ETS and what may have been the practice of the prison staff at LCF to disregard or fail to enforce the no-smoking policies.

Section 1983 requires evidence supporting direct or supervisory liability against a named defendant.

McGraw v. Marshall Reed · filed 2003-08-06

Upon our de novo review of the record, we agree with the district court that McGraw’s evidence, viewed most favorably to him, did not support a finding of direct or supervisory liability against any of the named defendants.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability based solely on a supervisory role.

Galdikas, James v. Fagan, Stuart I. · filed 2003-08-15

Section 1983 “does not allow actions against indi- viduals merely for their supervisory role of others.”

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only for a supervisor’s own actions or omissions.

Whitfield v. Municipality of Fajardo · filed 2003-08-19

A supervisor may be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only on the basis of his or her own actions or omissions.

Section 1983 makes a supervisor liable for the supervisor’s own acts or omissions, not merely for a subordinate’s conduct.

Skinner v. Cunningham et al. · filed 2003-08-20

Instead, Cunningham can only be liable as a supervisor under § 1983 based on his own acts or omissions.

Section 1983 requires personal responsibility for supervisory liability; a supervisor cannot be liable solely because of a subordinate's conduct.

Hernandez v. Keane · filed 2003-08-20

Dr. Kapoor was responsible for overseeing Sing Sing's medical staff, including Williams, Kathy Greiner, and Dr. Halko; but supervisor liability in a § 1983 action depends on a showing of some personal responsibility, and cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a sheriff personally participated in, facilitated, or approved unconstitutional conduct to hold the sheriff liable.

Searcy v. Roberts · filed 2003-08-28

Moving on to the merits, Sheriff Sutterfield was properly dismissed because there was no evidence before the District Court of his personal involvement in, or facilitation or approval of, any unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory defendant’s personal involvement; supervisory status alone is insufficient to state a claim.

Porter v. Selsky · filed 2003-08-29

Plaintiff alleges only generally that the defendants conspired to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights, and the claims against Branning are based solely on his supervisory status. As discussed above, this is insufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor when the complaint sufficiently alleges the supervisor’s personal involvement in the violation.

Danielle Ex Rel. Komando v. Adriazola · filed 2003-09-04

The Court expresses no opinion on whether proof of these allegations will be forthcoming, but, at this point, the Plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to state a claim of personal involvement and to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory official to be personally responsible for the alleged unconstitutional conduct; supervisory position alone is insufficient.

Tate v. Lowery · filed 2003-09-08

In order to establish liability pursuant to § 1983, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant, as a supervisory official, was personally responsible for the alleged unconstitutional actions that caused his injury.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for employees’ misconduct based only on awareness of allegations and failure to act; they must have encouraged the misconduct.

McCurtis v. Wood · filed 2003-09-11

In addition, the district court correctly noted that defendants Bruce Wood, Hofbauer, and Powell cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the alleged misdeeds of their employees, unless they encouraged the subordinates’ misconduct. ... A supervisor’s awareness of allegations of unconstitutional conduct and failure to act are not a basis for liability.

Section 1983 allows an individual-capacity claim against a supervisor when the complaint alleges that he knew of the misconduct and facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye to it.

McNeal v. Cook County Sheriff's Department · filed 2003-09-12

Mr. McNeal’s conclusory allegation that Sheriff Sheahan knew about the beating and facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye to it is sufficient to state a claim against Sheriff Sheahan in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence that the supervisor’s failure to supervise resulted in a constitutional violation.

McClure v. Cook · filed 2003-09-16

Summary judgment was proper on McClure’s claims against Catherine Knox in her supervisory capacity because McClure presented no evidence that Knox’s alleged failure to supervise medical personnel resulted in a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Gallagher v. Lane · filed 2003-09-16

Even if Lane and Park were sued because of the supervisory positions that they held, Gallagher’s complaint failed to state a claim against them because the theory of respondeat superior cannot provide the basis for liability in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional tort by an officer.

Santana v. City of Hartford · filed 2003-09-19

However, in order for Rudewicz to be liable as a supervisor, plaintiffs must first establish that one of the officers committed a constitutional tort.

Section 1983 can impose liability on a supervisor for a subordinate’s constitutional violation, and disputed facts about supervisory liability can preclude qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Hill v. Taconic Developmental Disabilities Services Office · filed 2003-09-22

It was well established at the time of the alleged violation that plaintiff had a right to be free from racial discrimination in the work place, and it was well established that, under certain conditions, a violation of that right could support a claim against a supervisor under Section 1983. It is a question of fact, and not a matter of law, whether the circumstances in this case support findings of an underlying violation and of supervisor liability against Sucato. So Sucato is not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation for supervisory liability.

Morris v. Eversley · filed 2003-09-23

Because no reasonable jury could conclude that Dixon and Porter were personally involved in the assault on Morris, summary judgment is granted as to the supervisory liability claim under § 1983 for lack of personal involvement.

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability only when the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or the supervisor’s wrongful conduct was sufficiently connected to it.

Abreu v. Ramirez · filed 2003-09-25

Under section 1983, a supervisor may be liable only if there exists either “(1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.”

A supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 for an inmate’s medical care without evidence of the supervisor’s relevant knowledge and involvement.

Ortiz v. Laboy · filed 2003-09-26

Without any particular instances that establish that Laboy, Guzman or Marrero had the requisite knowledge and involvement in the medical care provided to Oca-sio, there can be no § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor based solely on a supervisory relationship; the complaint must allege personal involvement.

Horstman v. County of DuPage · filed 2003-09-29

The mere existence of a supervisory relationship to an alleged wrongdoer does not support a cause of action against a supervisor under § 1983, and Mr. Horstman has not pleaded that Sheriff Zaruba had any direct involvement in or even knowledge of the allegedly unconstitutional experiences suffered by Mr. Horstman. He has not pled an individual claim against Sheriff Zaruba.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on prison supervisors for a subordinate’s constitutional violations.

Smith v. Yarrow · filed 2003-10-20

We therefore conclude that Defendants Rose and Crouthers cannot be held vicariously hable for the alleged behavior of Yarrow and others and affirm the district court’s dismissal on this issue.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show a supervisory defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Richardson v. Glenn S. Goord, C. Coyne, Dr. Mathew, Auburn Correctional Facility, Dick Hunter, Auburn Correctiona · filed 2003-10-22

To establish the liability of a supervisory official under § 1983, a plaintiff must show the defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors merely because of their positions; they must have encouraged or directly participated in the misconduct.

Simpson v. Overton · filed 2003-10-23

Moreover, to the extent that Simpson sued defendants Epp and Over-ton based on their supervisory positions, he has not stated a claim because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 lawsuits to impute liability onto supervisory personnel, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-95, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), unless it is shown that the defendant “encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.1984).

Section 1983 requires deliberate indifference to hold corrections officials liable for a contractor’s treatment of inmates; their supervisory relationship with the contractor alone is insufficient.

Stack v. McCotter · filed 2003-10-24

The relationship between DOC and Dove is a necessary one for imposition of § 1983 liability on DOC officials, because it establishes DOC’s indirect responsibility for the treatment Utah inmates received at Dove. It is not, however, a sufficient one, because under Farmer , liability may only be imposed based on deliberate indifference. Stack must show more to hold Bartlett and McCotter liable.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to have actual knowledge of the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights before the supervisor can be held liable.

Ferencich v. Merritt · filed 2003-10-27

Liability under § 1983 required that Merritt have actual knowledge that Ferguson was violating plaintiff’s constitutional rights, in order to establish a “deliberate, intentional act by the supervisor.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant supervises someone who violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Truss-El v. Bradley · filed 2003-10-30

As for Lee, Trierweiler, Bauman, Bouchard, Bergh, and Pinkerton, Truss-El did not allege that they were involved in the alleged assault or had actual knowledge that the attack would occur. Section 1983 liability will not be imposed solely upon the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in an alleged constitutional deprivation; supervisory rank alone does not establish liability.

Carroll v. Ragaglia · filed 2003-11-10

Supervisor liability in a § 1983 action depends on a showing of some personal involvement, and cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for an officer’s constitutional violation solely because of the supervisory role.

Morfin, Manuel R. v. City of East Chicago · filed 2003-11-18

Chief Alcala cannot be liable for any constitutional vio- lations committed by his officers simply by virtue of his supervisory role.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a sheriff solely because deputies acted under his supervision; the sheriff must have participated in or supervised the conduct at issue.

Guenthenspberger v. Carter · filed 2003-11-18

However, because “the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 actions,” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir.2001), and Guenthenspberger has not alleged that the Sheriff participated in or supervised the questioning, Guenthenspberger cannot bring this claim against the Sheriff in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability based on a supervisor’s own acts or omissions, including tacit approval of a policy underlying the alleged violation.

Barrett v. Warden, NHSP · filed 2003-11-20

“Supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated on a respondeat theory, but only on the basis of the supervisor’s own acts or omissions.” ... To the extent that Barrett alleges that the defendants in this case were acting in accordance with a policy that prohibited any and all hormone or surgical treatment for inmates suffering from GID, regardless of their medical condition, I find that she has alleged a policy sweeping enough that it is reasonable to assume, for purposes of preliminary review, that the Commissioner of Corrections has at least tacitly approved the policy.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity claim against a supervisor when the allegations support a reasonable inference that the supervisor tacitly approved the policy behind the alleged violation.

Barrett v. Coplan · filed 2003-11-20

To the extent that Barrett alleges that the defendants in this case were acting in accordance with a policy that prohibited any and all hormone or surgical treatment for inmates suffering from GID, regardless of their medical condition, I find that she has alleged a policy sweeping enough that it is reasonable to assume, for purposes of preliminary review, that the Commissioner of Corrections has at least tacitly approved the policy. Accordingly, I will allow the action to proceed against Stanley in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 can hold a supervisor liable for failing to bring subordinates under control during a constitutional violation.

Lolli v. County Of Orange · filed 2003-11-21

Despite the presence of Sergeant Toledo, the evidence of Sergeant Meyer's failure to bring his subordinates under control could support liability under § 1983, and he is therefore not entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 permits damages against a supervisor only when the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, such as by directing or consenting to the challenged conduct.

Higgin v. Johnson · filed 2003-12-01

Moreover, in order to recover damages against a state actor under § 1983, a plaintiff must show the actor was "personally responsible for the constitutional deprivation." Doyle v. Camelot Care Ctrs., Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 614 (7th Cir.2002) (citing Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir.2001)). This limitation mandates that a supervisor can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she "had some personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, essentially directing or consenting to the challenged conduct." Doyle, 305 F.3d at 614 (citing Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir.2001)).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisor in an individual capacity to show the supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Houghton v. Cardone · filed 2003-12-02

A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a supervisory official in his individual capacity must show that the supervisor was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor and the constitutional deprivation through personal participation, control, direction, or failure to supervise.

Rose v. Beckham · filed 2003-12-09

Because Rose fails to demonstrate that “an affirmative link exists between the constitutional deprivation and either the supervisor’s personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise,” Green v. Branson , 108 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1997), we conclude that his allegations concerning the delay in medical care do not establish an Eighth Amendment violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s conduct.

Pearson v. Simms · filed 2003-12-11

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant supervised the person who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Roden v. Sowders · filed 2003-12-15

Liability under § 1983 cannot be imposed merely because of the supervisory position which this particular defendant held.

Section 1983 permits liability for supervisory officials only if they participated in the acts causing the constitutional deprivation.

Ruiz v. Price · filed 2003-12-16

Therefore, the supervisory officials, Janie Cockrell, John Gilbert, Jay Lowe, Joseph Price, Steven Rich, Brian Rodeen, and John Doe, may be held liable only if they participated in the acts causing the constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a warden who played no role in a prisoner’s treatment.

Williams v. Nickleson · filed 2003-12-16

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir.2001), and Niekleson played no role in treating Williams or in deciding a course of treatment for him.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison superintendent for an officer’s harassment without facts connecting him to the conduct.

Rashad v. Hall · filed 2003-12-17

If Pina conducted herself toward the plaintiff as he claims in retaliation for his request for religious accommodation, a factfinder could reasonably conclude that she deprived him of rights protected by both state and federal law, and that she did so by means of threats, intimidation, and coercion, in violation of both the federal and state civil rights acts, 42 U.S.C. §1983 and G.L.c. 12, §§11H, 11I. ... The complaint alleges no harassing conduct by Hall, nor does it allege any facts on which Hall could be held liable for Pina’s conduct. It does not allege that Hall directed or encouraged such conduct, or even that he was ever informed of it and failed to act in response.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor liable to connect the supervisor’s own acts or omissions to the alleged constitutional violation.

Irizarry v. Aponte · filed 2003-12-23

Plaintiffs failed to explain specifically how Defendant Muñiz’s acts or omissions caused the alleged constitutional violations or that the police training was in fact inefficient. Lacking from Plaintiffs’ complaint is the required “affirmative link” between Defendant Muñiz’s acts or omissions and the resulting alleged violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position; the supervisor must be personally involved in the alleged deprivation.

Benjamin v. Schwartz · filed 2004-01-08

Respondeat superior liability may not be imposed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability for a supervising principal who is deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorizes a teacher’s deprivation of a constitutional right.

Cockerham Ex Rel. Cockerham v. Stokes County Board of Education · filed 2004-02-03

Additionally, both teachers and their supervising principals can be liable under § 1983 for causing, being indifferent to, or tacitly authorizing the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires more than a supervisor’s right to control subordinates; the supervisor must be personally involved in or acquiesce in the alleged misconduct.

Jackson v. Gill · filed 2004-02-03

This court has repeatedly held that liability of supervisory personnel under § 1983 must be based on something more than the right to control the actions and conduct of subordinate employees.

A § 1983 negligent supervision claim fails when the supervised officer caused no constitutional injury.

Warboys v. Proulx · filed 2004-02-04

Because the court concludes that Warboys has suffered no constitutional injury as a result of Proulx’s actions, his federal negligent supervision claim under Count Six must fail.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim when a supervisor knows of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, responds with deliberate indifference or tacit approval, and that response causes the injury.

Alston v. North Carolina a & T State University · filed 2004-02-06

To state a claim for supervisory liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;” (3) there was an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor’s inaction and the constitutional injury the plaintiff suffered.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for an employee’s acts; liability requires personal involvement or responsibility for an official policy or custom.

Jackson v. Wiley · filed 2004-02-10

Section 1983 liability is personal in nature. The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to hold an employer or supervisor liable for the acts of his employee.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a supervisor for inadequate training, supervision, or policies without a constitutional violation by the person supervised.

Dexter v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2004-02-12

This claim fails, however, because “[a] claim of inadequate training, supervision, and policies under § 1983 cannot be made out against a supervisory authority absent a finding of a constitutional violation by the person supervised.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s conduct; the supervisor must be personally involved.

Schumate v. People of State of New York · filed 1974-04-12

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in Civil Rights proceedings, and there are no allegations of personal complicity by the Commissioner.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on sheriffs or prison officials, but permits liability for their own gross negligence when it deprives a prisoner of life through cruel and unusual punishment.

James v. Murphy · filed 1975-06-25

While the Defendants, the sheriff and the prison officials, are not liable respondeat superior, they are liable for their own personal “gross negligence” if it deprived the Plaintiff’s intestate of his life as an element of cruel and unusual punishment.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on supervisors who were neither personally involved in a constitutional violation nor caused it.

Doe v. State of Hawaii Dept. of Educ. · filed 2004-02-23

Viewing the asserted facts and allegations in the best light to Plaintiffs, the Court determines that Plaintiffs cannot establish that Defendants Murakami or Yamakawa were personally involved in either the Zane incident or the Keala incident, or that Defendants Murakami or Yamakawa set into motion the alleged constitutional violations committed by Defendants Zane and Keala. Neither Defendant Murakami nor Defendant Yamakawa was present at the scene of either of the two incidents. Furthermore, Plaintiffs produce no evidence that would establish that either Defendant Murakami or Yamakawa induced the actions of either Defendant Zane or Defendant Keala. The Court thus finds that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that Defendants Murakami and Yamakawa are entitled to judgment as a matter of law that they are not liable under § 1983 in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors.

Aviles v. Huang · filed 2004-02-24

The district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs claims based on supervisory liability because there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between an alleged constitutional violation and a supervisor’s personal participation, control or direction, or failure to supervise.

Roark v. Hollenbeck · filed 2000-02-04

To state such a claim, plaintiff must establish an affirmative link between the alleged constitutional violation and Mr. Griego’s “personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise.”

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability when a supervisor directs a subordinate to commit an alleged constitutional violation.

Willis v. Siegelman · filed 2004-03-03

By so directing his subordinates, Siegelman may be subject to supervisor liability for his subordinates’ actions. There exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Siegelman is liable for Callahan’s actions.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for officers whom a defendant neither employs, supervises, nor controls.

Dimmitt v. Ockenfels · filed 2004-03-09

Since none of the police officers were employees of Knox County and none of them were supervised or in any manner controlled by any of the Knox defendants, this paragraph states no claim against them.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a supervisor for a subordinate’s conduct.

Lawrence v. Virginia Department of Corrections · filed 2004-03-12

Moreover, to the extent that plaintiff is attempting to claim under a theory of respondeat superior liability, it is well-established that no such liability exists under § 1983.

Section 1983 applies a deliberate indifference standard to supervisory liability.

Rosenberg v. Vangelo · filed 2004-03-12

Deliberate indifference continues to be the applicable standard for supervisory liability.

Section 1983 liability for a prison supervisor’s deliberate indifference depends on the supervisor’s own awareness and response to a substantial risk; a verdict absolving subordinates does not preclude that claim.

Greene v. Gayle Bowles, Anthony J. Brigano · filed 2004-03-16

Finally, we reject Warden Briga-no’s assertion that the jury’s verdict below finding that his subordinates were not liable to Greene precludes Warden Brigano’s own liability to her. In order to prevail on her claim of deliberate indifference, Greene must show that Warden Brigano himself was aware of a substantial risk to her safety and did not take reasonable steps to guard against that risk. Neither of those elements was before the jury below, and its verdict can therefore have no preclusive effect on Greene’s claim against Warden Brigano.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely under respondeat superior.

Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials. Appeal of Richard Burk · filed 1976-12-28

Moreover, in § 1983 suits liability may not be imposed on the traditional standards of respondeat superior.

A § 1983 supervisory liability claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence supporting the supervisor’s liability.

Pellegrino v. Janklow · filed 2004-03-17

Finally, the evidence failed to support his claims of emotional distress and supervisory liability.