42 U.S.C. § 1983

A Section 1983 supervisory-liability claim can survive a motion to dismiss when the facts alleged could establish the supervisor’s personal involvement.

Evac, LlC v. Pataki · filed 2000-03-03

Although the Complaint does not explain how Defendants allegedly joined the boycott or whether Defendants had personal knowledge that New York State helicopters were used for medical transport, when developed, the facts could show that Defendants had sufficient personal involvement to create supervisory liability under Section 1983. Accordingly, the Complaint alleges sufficient personal involvement to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors for another person's conduct when that conduct did not violate the plaintiff's rights.

Jolly v. Knudsen · filed 2000-03-09

Mr. Jolly's theory of liability in the district court was that Mr. Jorgenson and the corporate defendants could be held liable, as supervisors, for acts by Dr. Knudsen. Because we have found that Dr. Knudsen did not violate Mr. Jolly's rights, however, no liability can attach to Mr. Jorgensen or to the other two defendants as a result of Dr. Knudsen's actions.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because of an employee’s conduct; the supervisor must have at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct.

Whitler v. McFaul, Unpublished Decision (3-9-2000) · filed 2000-03-09

Whitler, however, has failed to present a prima facie § 1983 claim against Sheriff McFaul. As we noted earlier in this opinion, supervisory personnel cannot be held liable under Section 1983 solely upon the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. In order to impose liability, the claimant must show more: the supervisory personnel must have at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability when a supervisor directly causes a constitutional violation or is deliberately indifferent to one.

Breaux v. City of Garland · filed 2000-03-15

Under this standard, a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if (1) his conduct directly causes a constitutional violation or (2) the plaintiffs can show that the supervisor was “deliberately indifferent” to a violation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between supervisory officials’ actions and an officer’s alleged constitutional violation; the mere right to control employees is insufficient.

Sewell v. Dever · filed 1984-03-01

Liability therefore must be based on more than the mere right to control employees; there must be a causal connection between these officials’ actions and Officer Miraldi’s alleged unconstitutional activity.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to know about and approve a subordinate’s misconduct; negligent failure to detect or prevent it is insufficient.

Chavez, Toby R. v. Cady, Gilbert · filed 2000-03-22

In order to be held liable a supervisor must know about the situation and approve of it. He cannot be liable if he is merely negligent in failing to detect and prevent his subordinates’ misconduct.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for inadequate training or supervision when the subordinate’s actions did not violate constitutional rights.

Ransom v. Wagoner County Board · filed 2000-03-21

However, because Deputy Chisum’s actions were not constitutionally excessive, there is no basis for a finding of liability under this alternate theory.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s acts or omissions; the supervisor must be personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or cause it through a custom or policy.

Roy v. Johnson · filed 2000-04-04

In a § 1983 action, however, a supervisory official cannot have liability imposed solely on the basis of his subordinate’s acts or omissions. A supervisory official can only have liability imposed if he was personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or if his custom or policy caused the constitutional deprivation.

Under § 1983, a supervisor’s direct role in allowing known constitutional deprivations to continue can create a factual issue about personal involvement.

Oladipupo v. Austin · filed 2000-04-24

Rather, Ramsukh’s claim is based on Thibodeaux’s and Belt’s direct role in allowing the alleged constitutional deprivations to occur and continue. We conclude that this is sufficient to create a material fact as to whether Thibodeaux and Belt were personally involved in the deprivations of which Ramsukh complains to the extent they were aware of such deprivations.

Section 1983 does not hold a supervisor liable solely for a subordinate’s conduct.

Oladipupo v. Austin · filed 2000-04-24

In a section 1983 action, a supervisor cannot be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; the supervisor’s conduct must be linked to the deprivation of a federal right.

Lewis v. New Mexico Department of Health · filed 2000-04-24

Governor Johnson correctly asserts that respondeat superior may not serve as the basis for imposing § 1983 liability. ... To establish § 1983 liability for a supervisory defendant, plaintiffs must show a link between the individual’s conduct and the constitutional liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because a supervisor controls employees; the supervisor must participate in, encourage, authorize, approve, or knowingly acquiesce in the unconstitutional conduct.

Bellamy v. Bradley · filed 1984-03-09

Section 1983 liability will not be imposed solely upon the basis of respondeat superior. There must be a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum, a Sec. 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Bey v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2000-05-31

Plaintiff has offered no evidence of record demonstrating that these individuals had any personal involvement other than that of a supervisor.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor fails to remedy a known violation or is grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who caused it.

Aupperlee v. Coughlin · filed 2000-05-31

The allegations in the plaintiffs complaint, if true, sufficiently set forth that Coughlin, Coombe and Goord: (1) failed to remedy the violation after learning of it through a report or appeal; and (2) were grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who caused the violation.

Section 1983 permits liability against school district officials for a teacher’s constitutional violations when the officials had notice of a pattern of violations, were deliberately indifferent, failed to take sufficient remedial action, and that failure caused the students’ injuries.

Doe v. Fort Smith School · filed 2000-06-02

The plaintiffs must show that the district officials received notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts, demonstrated deliberate indifference to the acts, failed to take sufficient remedial action, and that such failure proximately caused the injury to the students.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 for a constitutional deprivation only if the supervisor knew of the conduct and facilitated, approved, condoned, or deliberately ignored it.

Zentmyer, Brian v. Kendall County, IL · filed 2000-06-13

For liability, a supervisor “must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye,” so Hawkins can be liable as a supervisor only if Zentmyer demonstrates that constitutionally deficient medical care occurred at Hawkins’s direction or with his knowledge and consent.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors automatically liable for misconduct by officers under their command.

Carmona v. Toledo · filed 2000-06-16

In an action brought under § 1983, supervisors are not automatically liable for the misconduct of those under their command.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a constitutional injury and knowing acquiescence in others’ misconduct.

Webb v. Scott · filed 2000-06-19

Because the actions of Sellers and Anderson did not rise to the level of constitutional injury, Webb has not shown that Pamela Williams, warden at the Hobby Unit of the TDCJ, or Wayne Scott, director of the TDCJ, knowingly acquiesced in the misconduct of others or that the magistrate judge erred in dismissing her claims against them.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a supervisory role; the supervisor must have participated in, known of, or acquiesced in the alleged violation.

Pearson v. Vaughn · filed 2000-06-26

Plaintiffs reliance on defendant Vaughn’s supervisory role is not an appropriate basis for liability in this case. Therefore, because plaintiff has failed to show any participation, knowledge or acquiescence in the alleged constitutional violation, I will grant summary judgment as to defendant Vaughn.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if an affirmative link connects the constitutional deprivation to the supervisor’s participation, control, direction, or failure to supervise.

Estate of Fuentes Ex Rel. Fuentes v. Thomas · filed 2000-06-27

Under § 1983, a supervisor is only liable if the plaintiffs show that “an ‘affirmative link’ exists between the [constitutional] deprivation and either the supervisor’s ‘personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise.’ ”

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor individually liable solely through vicarious liability when the supervisor was not personally involved.

Tejada v. Knee · filed 2000-07-20

As the plaintiffs did not allege that Chief Knee was personally involved in the incident in question and as supervisory personnel cannot be held liable in a § 1983 case under a vicarious-liability theory, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim against Chief Knee in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a jail standards commission or its director merely for failing to fulfill state-law duties that lack a causal connection to unconstitutional jail conditions.

Elena Chapa Balli, for Herself and Class Members v. Ernest Haynes, Sheriff of Tom Green County, Texas Commission on Jail · filed 1986-11-14

The decision of this court in Bush v. Vitema ... forecloses the claim that the Texas Commission on Jail Standards or its director may be held liable in damages for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis of their alleged failure to fulfill the duties imposed on the Commission by state law.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability under a theory of respondeat superior.

Worrell v. Henry · filed 2000-07-26

Under § 1983, a defendant may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for ignoring complaints about medical care when the providers were not deliberately indifferent.

Sisk v. Kubik · filed 2000-08-15

Nevertheless, because Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence that the nurses were ... deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, his claim that the sheriff and jail administrator were liable for ignoring his complaints about his medical care must also fail.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an individual merely for supervising others.

Zimmerman, William K v. Tribble, Margarita · filed 2000-08-16

However, sec.1983 does not allow actions against individuals merely for their supervisory role of others.

A supervisory official is personally responsible under § 1983 if she acts or fails to act with deliberate or reckless disregard of constitutional rights, or if the deprivation occurs at her direction or with her knowledge and consent.

McPhaul v. Board of Commissioners of Madison County · filed 2000-08-16

An official satisfies the personal responsibility requirement of section 1983 if she acts or fails to act with a deliberate or reckless disregard of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, or if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at her direction or with her knowledge and consent. ... Moreover, there is insufficient evidence to indicate that Horine deliberately or recklessly intended or allowed Shock’s alleged conduct, or that Horine failed to act because she was motivated by racial animus against McPhaul.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because of a supervisory role; the person must have caused or participated in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Zimmerman v. Margarita Tribble, Craig Hanks and Edward L. Cohn · filed 2000-08-16

However, § 1983 does not allow actions against individuals merely for their supervisory role of others.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official directs a constitutional deprivation or knows of and consents to the conduct causing it.

Lewis v. Washington · filed 2000-08-25

An official can be held liable “if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at [his] direction or with [his] knowledge and consent.”

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for subordinates’ acts without proof that the supervisor knew of and acquiesced in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

McChan v. Perry · filed 2000-08-31

A supervisor will not be held liable under § 1983 for the acts of subordinates absent proof of actual knowledge and acquiescence in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for deliberate indifference when she receives corroborated, serious allegations of a subordinate’s abuse and takes no action.

Baynard v. Lawson · filed 2000-09-12

Given the corroboration of Steven Lecki’s allegations by his mother, and the seriousness of the allegations, the jury could reasonably conclude that Malone showed deliberate indifference by failing to take any action whatsoever after receiving the Leekis’ information.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery against a supervisor based on vicarious liability.

Dickerson v. Johnson · filed 2000-09-14

Recovery is unavailable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for an employee’s conduct absent actual knowledge of and acquiescence in that conduct.

Daniels v. Delaware · filed 2000-09-29

Further, the Administrative Defendants cannot be held liable for Defendant Hawkins conduct, absent actual knowledge of and acquiescence in the conduct, because there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability can proceed when evidence raises genuine disputes about supervisors’ knowledge of misconduct, their indifference to it, and a causal link to the plaintiff’s injury.

Smith v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia · filed 2000-10-03

Smith has put forth sufficient evidence to create genuine issues with regard to defendants’ knowledge of problems with the UJC, defendants’ policy of indifference toward those problems, and the causal connection between the defendants’ failure to train the UJC properly and the injuries that he suffered.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a subordinate’s wrongful acts when the supervisor breaches a duty imposed by state or local law and that breach causes a constitutional injury.

Frank v. Larpenter · filed 2000-10-04

“A supervisory official may be held liable under section 1983 for the wrongful acts of a subordinate ‘when [the supervisory official] breaches a duty imposed by state or local law, and this breach causes plaintiff’s constitutional injury.’” ... Frank has not alleged that Larpenter violated any laws, and there was no constitutional injury. Frank therefore cannot state a claim against Larpenter.

Section 1983 claims against supervisory prison officials may be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Hurley v. Polunsky · filed 2000-09-29

Hurley’s claims ... against supervisory defendants Polunsky, Scott, and Johnson were properly dismissed.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of a subordinate’s unreasonable risk of constitutional injury, responds with deliberate indifference, and that inaction causes the injury.

Goodreau v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia · filed 2000-10-10

As this Court recently explained in Smith, the Fourth Circuit has articulated the elements of a § 1983 supervisory liability claim as follows: “(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a ‘persuasive and unreasonable risk’ of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices’; and (3) that there was an ‘affirmative causal link’ between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.” ... Thus, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the claim of supervisory liability leading to violations of due process is denied.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based on respondeat superior.

Smith v. Department of Human · filed 2000-10-06

That doctrine, however, cannot support liability under § 1983.

A prisoner can state a § 1983 retaliation claim against a supervisor by alleging her involvement in the challenged treatment and awareness of harassment over his protests.

Tyler v. Carnahan · filed 2000-10-18

He also claimed that Schriro was “fully aware that [he was] being harassed . . . over his protest.” On the basis of these allegations, we conclude that Bailey has stated a retaliation claim against Schriro.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a direct causal link between a subordinate’s acts and the supervisor; the supervisor’s authority over the subordinate alone is insufficient.

Risbridger v. Connelly · filed 2000-10-31

To state a claim under § 1983 against a defendant for supervisory liability, a plaintiff must allege a direct causal link between the acts of the subordinate and the supervisory defendant.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an affirmative link between the subordinate officer and the supervisor.

Perez-Tirado v. Figueroa-Torres · filed 2000-11-21

In order to establish supervisory liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show an "affirmative link" between the subordinate officer and the supervisor.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a subordinate officer and a supervisor to establish supervisory liability.

Figueroa-Torres v. Pedro Toledo-Davila, Julio Peréz-Tirado · filed 2000-11-21

In order to establish supervisory liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show an “affirmative link” between the subordinate officer and the supervisor.

Section 1983 requires a deliberate, intentional act to hold a supervisor liable; the supervisor may personally direct a violation or know of it and acquiesce in its continuation.

Quintero v. Encarnacion · filed 2000-11-29

In addition, because Getz and Lee were supervisors, to state a claim against them under § 1983, plaintiff must “establish ‘a deliberate, intentional act by the supervisor to violate constitutional rights.’ A plaintiff may satisfy this standard by showing the defendant-supervisor personally directed the violation or had actual knowledge of the violation and acquiesced in its continuance.”

Section 1983 liability requires the defendant’s personal involvement or a sufficient causal connection between a supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Stevens v. Perry · filed 2000-12-12

Furthermore, liability under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the defendant, or on a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because the supervisor oversees officers who violate a person’s rights; the supervisor must be personally involved in the alleged wrong.

Concepcion v. Morton · filed 2000-12-21

Supervisory administrators are not liable for violations of § 1983 solely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor vicariously liable for a subordinate’s actions.

Wood County v. Rivers · filed 2000-12-29

It is well settled that supervisory officials, such as Skinner, cannot be held vicariously liable for their subordinates’ actions under § 1983 under a respondent superior theory.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability when a supervisor personally directs or acquiesces in the alleged misconduct.

Ayers v. Uphoff · filed 2001-01-08

To establish supervisory liability under § 1983, plaintiff must prove that the prison supervisors personally directed or acquiesced in the alleged failures of the kitchen staff to provide him with substitute food items.

Section 1983 does not hold a supervisor vicariously liable for the actions of subordinates.

Garvin, Raymond v. Armstrong, David · filed 2001-01-12

As we repeatedly say, a supervisor cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of others.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor vicariously liable for the actions of others.

Garvin v. David Armstrong, Dr. John H. Oberhelman, and Flora Pinnell · filed 2001-01-12

As we repeatedly say, a supervisor cannot be held vicariously hable for the actions of others.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Ed Williams v. Halford · filed 2001-01-25

Thus, his claims against Halford rested on respondeat superior, which is not a proper basis for section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s acts; liability must rest on the supervisor’s own acts or omissions.

Pastorek v. Trail · filed 2001-01-29

Since Trail’s liability is predicated upon the doctrine of respondeat superior rather than upon his own acts or omissions, Trail is not liable under section 1983.

Supervisors’ personal involvement under § 1983 may be established by grossly negligent supervision or deliberate indifference to information that unconstitutional acts are occurring.

Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged School District · filed 2001-01-31

If these factual allegations are borne out, a jury could find the Supervisors personally involved in the unconstitutional deprivation on the basis that they were either grossly negligent in supervising Bucci or that they exhibited deliberate indifference to the students’ rights by failing to act on information that unconstitutional acts were occurring. As a result, we cannot say at this stage of the case that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs are incapable of establishing the Supervisors’ liability for the assault on T.J. Accordingly, we conclude that qualified immunity based on the Supervisors’ lack of personal involvement was, at the pleadings stage, appropriately denied by the district court.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors for subordinates’ acts without the supervisors’ personal participation in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Sena v. Corporatio · filed 2001-02-06

We have held supervisors are not liable under § 1983 for the acts of their subordinates, absent personal participation by those supervisors in the alleged constitutional deprivation. ... Given Mr. Sena makes only conclusory allegations Mr. Williams and Wackenhut are responsible for his injury based in part on their hiring of Mr. Travis, Mr. Sena has not shown the requisite proof of their participation in the alleged deprivation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires the defendant supervisor’s personal involvement.

Bennings v. Kearney · filed 2001-02-08

A viable § 1983 suit based on supervisory liability requires personal involvement by the defendant-supervisor.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official affirmatively participates in a constitutional deprivation or implements policies that are its moving force.

Jacobs v. Scott · filed 2001-02-13

A supervisory official may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if he affirmatively participates in acts that cause the constitutional deprivation or implements policies that are the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability only for the supervisor’s own acts or omissions.

Reid v. Brodeur, et al. · filed 2001-02-14

In a § 1983 action, a supervisor may only be held liable "on the basis of his own acts or omissions."

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ actions.

Jeffers v. Gomez · filed 2001-02-20

Generally, supervisory officials are not hable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison medical contractor or health care administrator when the inmate has not shown deliberate indifference by medical personnel.

Sims v. Correctional Medical · filed 2001-02-28

Because Mr. Sims did not show deliberate indifference by medical personnel, we also conclude that CMS and the defendant health care administrator cannot be liable.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for supervisors when allegations show their knowledge of, acquiescence in, and participation in the challenged conduct.

Neiberger v. Hawkins · filed 2001-03-08

The complaint contains sufficient facts for establishment of defendants’ personal liability. There are several allegations relating to defendants’ knowledge of the improper treatment at CMHI-P, their acquiescence in such treatment, and their supervisory roles over the implementation and administration of care at CMHI-P.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of a subordinate’s conduct.

Alsaifullah v. Travis · filed 2001-03-12

It is well-settled that supervisory personnel cannot be held liable for violations of § 1983 under the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor knew of alleged constitutional violations and failed to stop them.

Grooms v. Marshall · filed 2001-03-20

Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs had established that Defendants Marshall, Freeman, May, Rucker, Reitz, Brink, Gibson and Vander Wissel were aware of the alleged constitutional violations — which in itself would be quite a stretch for the Court to find, given the state of the record — and did nothing to stop them, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the supervisory Defendants still would not survive summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violation solely because of the supervisory relationship.

Tlamka v. Serrell · filed 2001-03-23

A supervisor may not be held liable under § 1983 for the constitutional violations of a subordinate on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a supervisory defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged violation.

Moore v. Goord · filed 2001-03-23

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the complaint as to supervisory employees Goord, Keane, and Greiner, because the plaintiff did not allege their personal involvement in the incident.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s actions solely because of their supervisory relationship.

Bryant v. Noether, et al. · filed 2001-03-30

Although Hodges is Batstone’s superior officer, he cannot be held responsible for Batstone’s actions (if they were unlawful) because there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a sheriff who did not personally participate in a rights violation when a failure to train or supervise caused the violation and reflected deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s rights.

Thompson v. Upshur County TX · filed 2001-03-30

A sheriff not personally involved in the acts that deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional rights is liable under section 1983 if: 1) the sheriff failed to train or supervise the officers involved; 2) there is a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and 3) the failure to train or supervise constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires actual or constructive knowledge of a risk of constitutional injury, deliberate indifference to that risk, and a causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the injury.

Ramsey v. Schauble · filed 2001-04-02

To' establish supervisory liability under § 1983, “a plaintiff must show actual or constructive knowledge of a risk of constitutional injury, deliberate indifference to that risk, and an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because a subordinate violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Tlamka v. Serrell · filed 2001-04-02

A supervisor may not be held liable under § 1983 for the constitutional violations of a subordinate on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not make supervisory officials liable for subordinates’ acts solely on a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Palermo v. Correctional Medical Services Inc. · filed 2001-04-03

Supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of an employment relationship with the person who caused the injury.

Craw v. Gray · filed 2001-04-04

Vicarious liability is not imposed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “solely on the basis of an employment relationship between a governmental agency and a tortfeasor.”

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor is deliberately indifferent to violations of constitutional rights.

Classroom Teachers of Dallas v. Dallas Independent School District · filed 2001-04-06

Deliberate indifference to violations of constitutional rights is sufficient for supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages liability based solely on a supervisor’s position or vicarious liability.

Curry v. Kerik · filed 2001-04-10

Liability for damages in a Section 1983 action may not be based on the respondeat superior or vicarious liability doctrines.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor personally participated in the deprivation or implemented a policy that itself deprived constitutional rights.

Nowell v. Acadian Ambulance Service · filed 2001-04-13

Rather, to be liable under § 1983, a supervisory official must be personally involved in the act causing the alleged constitutional deprivation, or must have implemented a policy so deficient that the policy itself acts as a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor and the alleged constitutional violation; supervising the person who committed the act is insufficient by itself.

Berger v. White · filed 2001-04-27

In spite of the district court’s specific instructions, Berger’s amended complaint failed to allege an affirmative link between the alleged constitutional violations and these defendants. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the claims against Sullivan and Bay. See Mitchell v. Maynard , 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir.1996) (stating that supervisors are not liable under § 1983 for the acts of their subordinates, absent personal participation, control or direction, or failure to supervise).

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely for their supervisory roles when no underlying misconduct is established.

Jones v. Martin · filed 2001-05-08

As explained below, Jones did not establish any misconduct. Thus, Martin and DeVoss cannot be liable to Jones for their supervisory roles.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisory officials.

Cole v. Dallas Cty Cmsnr Ct · filed 2001-05-09

A supervisory official may not be held liable on any theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant supervised the person who violated a federally protected right.

Ostrander v. Horn · filed 2001-05-11

In addition, relief cannot be granted against a defendant in a civil rights action based solely on a theory of respondeat superior or the fact that the defendant was the supervisor or superior of the person whose conduct actually deprived the plaintiff of one of his federally protected rights under color of state law. ... Thus, to the extent that the plaintiff is attempting to hold either defendant Martin F. Horn, Secretary of the Department of Corrections, or Joseph Chesney, Warden of the State Correctional Institute at Frackville, liable on a theory of respondeat superior, the defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability based on a supervisor’s own actions or omissions.

CRUZ v. Municipality of San Juan · filed 2001-05-17

A supervisor may be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only on the basis of his or her own actions or omissions. ... After carefully examining the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged a theory of supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory defendant’s personal involvement in the deprivation of rights; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Harris v. City of Virginia Beach · filed 2001-05-22

The district court noted that in claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, supervisory "[l]iability will only lie where it is affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs’ rights." ... Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court’s careful opinion in this case.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because a subordinate violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Chavez, Peso v. IL State Police · filed 2001-05-23

The doctrine of respondeat superior can not be used to hold a supervisor liable for conduct of a subordinate that violates a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor directs the conduct causing a constitutional violation or knows of or consents to it.

Chavez v. Illinois State Police · filed 2001-05-23

Snyders could still be liable if he was personally responsible for the deprivation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. He will be deemed to have sufficient personal responsibility if he directed the conduct causing the constitutional violation, or if it occurred with his knowledge or consent.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence that the supervisor participated in or directed a constitutional violation.

Racuya v. Department of Public Safety · filed 2001-05-30

Because Racuya failed to produce evidence that defendant Clayton Frank participated in or directed a constitutional violation, the district court properly granted summary judgment on Racuya’s claim of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a defendant solely for supervising someone who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Valdez v. Corrections Corp Am · filed 2001-06-07

A defendant cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because of the supervisor’s position of authority.

Martin v. Harvey · filed 2001-06-07

To the extent that defendant McGinnis is sued because of his past position of authority, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 lawsuits to impute liability onto supervisory personnel.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a failure-to-supervise claim requires knowledge of the incident or a similar pattern and inaction that communicates approval.

Doe v. Division of Youth and Family Services · filed 2001-06-25

A state official may be held liable under § 1983 in a supervisory capacity only if they have exercised or failed to exercise supervisory authority; thus, a plaintiff asserting a failure to supervise claim must also allege “both (1) contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents, and (2) circumstances under which the supervisor’s inaction could be found to have communicated a message of approval.”

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for failing to remedy a discrete, completed violation.

Jackson v. Burke · filed 2001-07-11

As to Burke, however, the claim must be dismissed; for even though plaintiff seeks to characterize the incompleteness of Burke’s investigation as a “failure to remedy” the destruction of the documents, a “failure to remedy” theory of liability is not available with respect to discrete and completed violations such as the destruction of documents here alleged.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Cox v. Dupnik · filed 2001-07-20

With respect to defendants Dupnik and Carmona, the district court properly granted summary judgment because Cox attempted to base their liability on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only when an affirmative link connects the constitutional deprivation to the supervisor’s conduct or knowledge.

Whitley v. New Mexico Children, Youth & Families Department · filed 2001-07-26

Supervisors are not liable under § 1983 for the acts of their subordinates unless the plaintiff shows an affirmative link between the constitutional deprivation and the supervisor’s personal participation, exercise of control or direction, failure to supervise, or actual knowledge and acquiescence.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because they oversee an employee; the complaint must allege their own involvement in the deprivation.

Donaldson v. Purkett · filed 2001-08-03

Further, plaintiff's complaint does not allege any personal involvement by the remaining defendants in plaintiff's alleged constitutional deprivation. Even in response to defendants' motion to dismiss, plaintiff does not set forth how they participated in the alleged deprivation so that the court might consider whether there are any possible grounds for relief. There is no allegation that these defendants personally calculated and extended his release date or even knew of plaintiff's alleged constitutional deprivation and failed to investigate or rectify the situation. It is elementary that a defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Scarborough v. Morgan · filed 2001-08-08

While Scarborough argued that the warden was liable because he supervised the remaining defendants, a defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior or vicarious liability basis.

A supervisor’s liability under § 1983 requires more than a passive role in a subordinate’s violation or mere tacit approval of it.

Vaughn v. City of Lebanon · filed 2001-08-16

To hold a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s conduct, Vaughn must “prove that [the supervising officer] did more than play a passive role in the alleged violation or showed mere tacit approval of the goings on.”

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity supervisory liability when a supervisor learns of a constitutional violation through a report or appeal and fails to remedy it.

Herrera v. Safir · filed 2001-08-21

We find that the district court erred, however, in dismissing the monetary claims against defendants Safir and Anemone. As the district court noted in its opinion, one of the grounds for holding a supervisor hable in his or her individual capacity under Section 1983 is when it can be established that the supervisor “after being informed of the [constitutional] violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong.” Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir.1995).

Section 1983 requires facts linking a supervisor’s own conduct to a subordinate’s misconduct; general allegations of inadequate training or supervision do not establish supervisory liability.

Rodriguez-Vazquez v. Cintron-Rodriguez · filed 2001-08-23

Quite the contrary, Plaintiff has alleged the existence of only one isolated event where he was the victim, and attempts to attach liability upon Toledo based on general, non-specific, conclusory and bald assertions. The element of causality is lacking throughout. Therefore the Court finds that these allegations are not sufficient to state a claim against Toledo for supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a supervisor to be supported by the supervisor’s knowledge, direction, personal participation, or a policy that caused the alleged rights violation.

Gieck v. Arpaio · filed 2001-08-28

Because Gieck failed to establish that Arpaio knew of, directed or personally participated in the alleged violations of his rights or that the policies which Arpaio promulgated were the cause of the alleged violations of his rights, the district court properly granted summary judgment for Arpaio.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity liability for a supervisor who knowingly fails to stop acts he knows or reasonably should know will cause a constitutional injury.

Dubner v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2001-09-04

Chief Lau could be held liable in his individual capacity if he knowingly refused to terminate a series of acts by others, which he knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.

Section 1983 imposes individual supervisory liability for a supervisor’s own unconstitutional conduct, including participation in or knowing approval of subordinates’ misconduct.

Davenport v. Simmons · filed 2001-09-13

Supervisory liability under § 1983 attaches to an official in his individual capacity as a consequence of his own unconstitutional behavior. ... He has made no showing that Simmons encouraged or participated in unconstitutional activities or that he implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in such conduct.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior; a defendant must be personally involved in the misconduct.

Bittner v. Wilkinson · filed 2001-09-14

The defendants did not encourage the specific incidents of misconduct or in any other way directly participate in them, and they cannot be held hable solely upon the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s affirmative involvement in a constitutional violation for liability based on a policy, practice, or custom.

Kepner v. Houstoun · filed 2001-09-26

Public officials or supervisors cannot be held liable on such a theory unless they have engaged in "some affirmative conduct ... that played a role” in the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a corrections director without allegations that the director condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged misconduct.

Fleming v. Martin · filed 2001-09-26

Additionally, we note that although Fleming named MDOC Director Martin as a defendant he did not allege that Martin condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged misconduct. Thus, Martin cannot be held hable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor participates in or condones a constitutional violation.

Buthelezi v. Dept. of Corrections · filed 2001-09-27

To the extent that these officers were alleged to be acting in their supervisory capacity, he has stated a claim sufficient to render them so liable, as it is clear from the complaint that the supervisors’ presence and support at the scene of the abuse constituted both primary participation in as well as condonation of the abuses.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a subordinate’s actions.

Jeffers v. Gomez · filed 2001-10-03

Generally, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 when his supervision supplies an affirmative link to a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Holland Ex Rel. Overdorff v. Harrington · filed 2001-10-19

Davis’ supervision of the SWAT deputies during the raid furnishes the affirmative link between this violation and Davis’ conduct; it appears uncontroverted that the SWAT deputies continued to point their weapons at the persons found on the Heflin property until Davis directed them to stop doing so at the conclusion of the search.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor when the supervisor was personally involved or a government policy or custom caused the injury.

Young v. Martin · filed 2001-10-25

In order for a municipality or a supervisor to be liable under section 1983 there must be some personal involvement or evidence that “execution of [the] government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.”

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors; a defendant must be personally involved in the alleged violation.

Amaro v. Taylor · filed 2001-10-25

As to the liability of defendants Taylor, Williams and Brady in their individual capacities, it is an established principle that, as a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not acceptable. ... Plaintiffs complaint states no facts to suggest any personal involvement in, or knowledge of, the alleged incident by defendants Taylor, Williams or Brady. Thus, defendants Taylor, Williams and Brady are dismissed as defendants in this action.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; a plaintiff must allege that the supervisor condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the misconduct.

Lozano v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2001-10-26

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 lawsuits to impute liability upon supervisory personnel; rather, in order to find a supervisor liable, a plaintiff must allege that he condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged misconduct.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on officials who were not personally involved in the challenged medical decisions.

Grundy v. Norris · filed 2001-11-02

Further, he presented no evidence that the ADC defendants were doctors or were personally involved in making medical decisions about his treatment, and respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not support supervisory liability based on respondeat superior without facts connecting the supervisors’ actions to the alleged constitutional violations.

Sanchez v. Johnson · filed 2001-11-06

As the district court correctly held, Sanchez was attempting to hold Johnson and Gilbert vicariously liable under the theory of respondeat superior and did not allege facts which connected actions by Johnson or Gilbert to the alleged constitutional violations, which does not support a § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a supervisor’s personal involvement to state a claim against that supervisor.

Palmer v. Lane · filed 2001-11-06

With respect to the defendant sheriff, plaintiff alleged no personal involvement required to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983 against supervisory personnel.

Section 1983 supervisory liability for failure to train requires deliberate indifference to the rights of people who encounter the police.

Glair v. Butts · filed 2001-11-14

Glair’s contention that Butts is Hable based on his failure to train Cabrera fails because Glair did not estabHsh that Butts’s aUeged failure to train amounted to “deHberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the pohce come into contact.”

Section 1983 requires allegations that supervisory defendants personally participated in or knew of the alleged constitutional violations.

Sanderson v. Friedman · filed 2001-11-15

We also conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing defendants Ter-hune and Lindsay because Sanderson failed to allege that these supervisory defendants personally participated in, or knew of, the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for failure to supervise only when the failure amounts to deliberate indifference to others’ legal rights; a supervisor is not liable merely for a subordinate’s acts.

Gionis v. Headwest, Inc. · filed 2001-11-16

Where a § 1983 claim is based upon allegations of a government official’s failure to properly supervise his employees, liability can be found only upon a showing that such failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the legal rights of the persons with whom the employees came in contact because supervisory personnel cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the acts of their subordinates under the doctrine of respon-deat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely through respondeat superior when the supervisor did not participate in the alleged violation.

Wrubel v. Bouchard · filed 2001-11-21

There is no evidence that Sheriff Bou-chard in any way participated in the investigation or arrest of the plaintiff. He cannot be held liable under a theory of re-spondeat superior.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence of a supervisor’s direct involvement, notice that training procedures were likely to cause a constitutional violation, or reason to believe an officer posed a danger to the plaintiff.

Hayes v. Clark · filed 2001-11-23

After considering Hayes’s response, the district court correctly concluded that Hayes had failed to produce any evidence showing that Harmon was directly involved in the incident, had notice that training procedures were likely to result in a constitutional violation, or had reason to believe that the correction officer involved in the incident posed any danger to Hayes.

A § 1983 supervisory liability claim requires allegations that the supervisor personally directed, or actually knew of and acquiesced in, the constitutional violation.

Sanders v. BD. OF CTY. COM'RS/JEFFERSON CTY., CO · filed 2001-11-27

The test for supervisory liability under § 1983 requires "allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence" in conduct alleged to have violated the constitutional rights of a citizen. ... Thus, Plaintiff has set out the essential elements of a supervisory liability claim.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally directs a constitutional violation or knows of and acquiesces in it.

Sanders v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2001-11-27

The test for supervisory liability under § 1983 requires “allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence” in conduct alleged to have violated the constitutional rights of a citizen. ... Thus, Plaintiff has set out the essential elements of a supervisory liability claim.

Section 1983 does not allow recovery based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Raspberry v. Johnson · filed 2001-11-30

Recovery pursuant to a respondeat-superior or vicarious-liability theory is not available under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s alleged policy leads to a constitutional violation.

Sanders v. Foti · filed 2001-11-30

Her allegations that Stalder was a decision maker for the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, that he shut down the division that calculated good-time credits during an office move, and that he failed to establish a policy for continuing to calculate accumulated good-time credits during the shutdown adequately alleges a policy leading to the constitutional violation, which is sufficient to allege supervisory liability.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a supervisor personally participated in or knowingly permitted the challenged conduct to state a claim against the supervisor in an individual capacity.

Dickerson v. Cohn · filed 2001-12-06

Dickerson also fails to state a claim against the superintendent, Cohn, in his individual capacity, because he does not allege that Cohn personally participated in or knowingly permitted the alleged incident.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor has the right to control an employee.

Comstock v. Norris McCrary v. S. Thyagarajan and David Howell · filed 2001-12-12

“This court has held that § 1983 liability must be based on more than respondeat superior, or the right to control employees.”

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s delay in medical care without the supervisor’s personal involvement.

Resel v. Fox · filed 2001-12-20

Absent such involvement, a supervisor who is not personally responsible for the delay cannot be accountable for the conduct of his subordinates.

A § 1983 claim based on a supervisor’s failure to supervise requires proof that the supervisor failed to supervise the officers involved in the alleged deprivation.

Blackwell v. Selig · filed 2001-12-26

First, Blackwell did not show defendant Carl Lacey failed to supervise the deputies (who are not defendants) who allegedly denied Blackwell due process during a disciplinary action.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires acquiescence or participation in a constitutional violation, or an affirmative link between the supervisor’s conduct and the employee’s conduct.

Seaver v. Manduco · filed 2002-01-04

The court must also determine whether Supervisor Bissonnette can be held liable in his individual capacity for the actions of his subordinate employees. In order to hold Superintendent Bissonnette liable, the court would have to find acquiescence or participation in a constitutional violation, or an affirmative link between the conduct of the supervisor and the employee.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a district attorney solely for supervising others.

Cooper v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2002-01-10

Although Cooper names the District Attorney individually, he fails to allege individual misconduct. Vicarious liability is not available under § 1983 against the District Attorney as a supervisor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Tramble-Bey v. Ed Skiba · filed 2002-01-16

Additionally, respondeat superior cannot apply to a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor for an employee’s conduct.

Mallery v. Taylor · filed 2002-01-22

In Section 1983 actions, vicarious liability cannot be imputed to other defendants under the doctrine of respondeat superior, even if Nurse Lucas was found to be liable.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Shelton v. Angelone · filed 2002-01-23

Seeking to impose liability based upon a respondeat superior theory is barred under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when an official affirmatively participates in acts causing a constitutional deprivation or implements an unconstitutional policy that causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Johnson v. Scott · filed 2002-01-23

Supervisory officials may be held liable for the conduct of a subordinate only if they “affirmatively participate in acts that cause constitutional deprivation” or “implement unconstitutional policies that causally result in plaintiff’s injury.” Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 199 (5th Cir. 1996). ... A review of Johnson’s entire complaint does not reveal any allegations of Director Wayne Scott’s personal involvement in the alleged violations of Johnson’s constitutional rights. Thus, the district court’s dismissal of the complaint against Scott for failure to state a claim is AFFIRMED.

Section 1983 requires evidence supporting a supervisor’s personal liability for an alleged rights violation.

Johnson v. Stinson · filed 2002-01-25

We have reviewed the record and agree with the district court that it does not contain any evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Stinson bears liability for the alleged mail interference in his capacity as a supervisory official.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on respondeat superior or a defendant’s involvement in the grievance process.

Rumsey v. Martin · filed 2002-01-31

The district court properly dismissed Rumsey’s claims against defendants Martin, McGinnis, DeVoss and Naylor, as they were based on a theory of respondeat superior or on the involvement of these defendants in the grievance process.

Section 1983 requires liability to rest on personal conduct, not solely on a supervisor’s position over a subordinate.

Nichols v. Maryland Correctional Institution—Jessup · filed 2002-02-01

It is axiomatic that liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be premised on personal conduct and cannot rest on re-spondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely on the basis of respondeat superior.

Smith-El v. Steward · filed 2002-02-06

Section 1983 liability will not be imposed solely upon the basis of respondeat superior.

A supervisor who did not know of a subordinate’s conduct when it occurred cannot be liable under § 1983 for implicitly acquiescing in it.

Moor v. Madison County Sheriff's Department · filed 2002-02-15

In fact, Moor’s facts reveal that Cochran did not know of the incident and therefore could not have implicitly acquiesced in it.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor approves of, facilitates, or condones medical personnel’s deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.

Reed v. Indiana Department of Corrections · filed 2002-02-15

Even though Miller and Meloy are not directly responsible for providing medical care, supervisors may be held responsible for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs if they approve of, facilitate, or condone deliberately indifferent conduct by medical personnel.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 only if both the law violated by the subordinate and the supervisory liability doctrine were clearly established.

Poe v. John Leonard, Defendant-Third Party-Plaintiff-Appellant, Douglas Pearl, State of Connecticut, Third-Party-D · filed 2002-02-19

We hold that in order for a supervisor to be held liable under section 1983, both the law allegedly violated by the subordinate and the supervisory liability doctrine under which the plaintiff seeks to hold the supervisor liable must be clearly established.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for the acts of their subordinates.

Williams v. McGinnis · filed 2002-02-26

The main basis for Plaintiffs claims against these two Defendants was their supervisory capacity over Baerwalde and Duggan, but vicarious liability is not a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Young v. Gundy · filed 2002-03-07

Liability under § 1983 cannot be imposed merely because of the supervisory position which this particular defendant held.

Section 1983 permits a prison warden to be held liable for a subordinate’s violation if the warden was deliberately indifferent or tacitly authorized the acts.

Riley v. Olk-Long · filed 2002-03-08

As prison warden, Olk-Long may be held responsible for a § 1983 violation if she was deliberately indifferent or tacitly authorized the offending acts.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position; personal involvement is required.

Moore v. Gardner · filed 2002-03-12

However, apart from mere speculation, plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence that McGinnis or Morse had anything to do with the alleged tampering with his FOIL request, and his claim against Gardner appears to rest solely on a theory of respondeat superior liability, which as noted, is insufficient under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors who neither directly participated in nor condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged misconduct.

McCallum v. Gilless · filed 2002-03-21

McCallum did not allege, however, that Sheriff Gilless, Mayor Rout, or Chief Jailer Hopkins were directly involved in his medical care or condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged misconduct. Thus, he has no § 1983 claim against them either directly or through respondeat superior.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires personal direction of a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct or actual knowledge of and acquiescence in it.

Ireland v. Jefferson County Sheriff's Department · filed 2002-03-26

The proper test for holding a supervisor liable for the unconstitutional conduct of subordinates under § 1983 requires allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence in conduct alleged to have violated the constitutional rights of a citizen.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position; the supervisor’s own conduct must cause the deprivation of rights.

Ribot-Carino v. Laboy · filed 2002-03-28

The doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be used to establish liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely through respondeat superior.

Hayes v. Berghuis · filed 2002-03-28

The theory of respondeat superior cannot provide the basis for liability in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor vicariously liable for the actions of subordinates.

Vinson v. Cornyn · filed 2002-04-01

Cornyn is not vicariously liable for the actions of his subordinates.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff liable under respondeat superior for a jail employee’s knowledge of a threat.

Butera v. Jack L. Cottey, Sherriff of Marion County · filed 2002-04-04

If she spoke with a mere employee as opposed to a policymaker, Butera’s claim against the Sheriff fails because, as discussed above, the Sheriff cannot be held liable under a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 supervisory liability claims tied to failed underlying constitutional claims are properly dismissed.

Simpson v. Hvass · filed 2002-04-05

Accordingly, Simpson’s related claims regarding a conspiracy and supervisory liability were properly dismissed as well.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal participation in an alleged constitutional violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Mosley v. Jablonsky · filed 2002-04-08

Supervisors cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation under a theory of respondeat superior, but rather must have participated personally in the alleged violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability without overt personal participation when a deficient policy is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Hughery v. Panola Cty Shrf Dept · filed 2002-04-10

Supervisory liability may exist without “overt personal participation" in the offensive act; however, in order for his claim to be successful, Hughery must have shown that Sheriff Briant implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation."

Section 1983 does not impose derivative supervisory liability where supervisors took no deliberate action and had no actual knowledge of a constitutional violation.

Williams v. Valencia County Sheriff's Office · filed 2002-04-10

The district court correctly dismissed claims against Mr. Mallory’s supervisors, Wes Mallory, D.C. Jackson, and Juan Julian, because there was no basis for any derivative supervisory liability against these individuals and no competent summary judgment evidence supported a claim that any of these defendants took any deliberate action or had any actual knowledge of any constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits liability against supervisory officials who personally participate in a constitutional violation or know of it and fail to prevent it.

Henderson v. Hamren · filed 2002-04-15

The district court properly dismissed defendants Carey, Vaughn and Sullivan because Henderson failed to allege that these supervisory defendants personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations or had knowledge of the violations and failed to prevent them.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an affirmative connection between a supervisor and a subordinate’s misconduct.

Pelletier v. Magnusson · filed 2002-04-16

Magnusson and Merrill cannot be affirmatively connected to Lipman, Stewart, and Bartlett in terms of their misconduct (if any) regarding Ronald. ... To suggest that Zubrod’s conduct in this regard, however unprofessional or improper it may be seen to be by experts in the field, amounts to the constitutional violation of deliberate indifference to Ronald Pelletier’s serious medical needs, turns the law of § 1983 supervisory liability as articulated by First Circuit precedent on its head.

Section 1983 supervisory liability for a school employee’s sexual abuse requires knowledge of facts or a pattern of inappropriate sexual behavior plainly indicating abuse.

Doe v. Benicia Unified School District · filed 2002-04-22

In the present case, plaintiff has not established “facts or a pattern of inappropriate sexual behavior by a subordinate pointing plainly toward the conclusion that the subordinate was sexually abusing the student.”