42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; a supervisor must personally cause the constitutional deprivation through an act or a failure to perform a legal duty.

Washington v. Garcia · filed 1997-09-10

There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Thus, to avoid the respondeat superior bar, the plaintiff must allege personal acts by the defendants which have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation at issue.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor adopts a policy that results in a constitutional violation, even without knowledge of the specific incident.

Gibson v. Sain · filed 1997-09-15

On the contrary, Section 1983 liability may be imposed on a supervisor regardless of knowledge of the specific incident of misconduct, where the supervisor fails to discharge a duty or adopts a policy that results in a constitutional violation.

A supervisor is denied qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable person in the supervisor’s position would have known that the conduct infringed the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and the conduct was causally related to a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Gold v. City of Miami · filed 1997-09-17

A supervisor will be denied qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim where "a reasonable person in the supervisor's position would have known that his conduct infringed the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and his conduct was causally related to the constitutional violation committed by his subordinate." McKinney, 997 F.2d at 1443.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor for a subordinate’s conduct.

Lenart v. Connerly · filed 1997-09-18

We do not recognize vicarious liability for § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to be personally involved in the injury or responsible for an official policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Miracle ex rel. Miracle v. Spooner · filed 1997-09-26

To state a claim under section 1983, the Plaintiffs must show that Defendant Whitney was personally involved in the alleged injuries the Plaintiffs suffered or that she was responsible for the execution of some official policy or custom that resulted in the violation of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability under respondeat superior.

Adongo v. Williams · filed 1997-10-01

Individual liability under § 1983 may not be predicated on the vicarious-liability doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because a subordinate violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Gossmeyer v. McDonald · filed 1997-10-07

The doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be used to impose § 1983 liability on a supervisor for the conduct of a subordinate violating a plaintiffs constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a supervisory position; a plaintiff must allege personal acts directly causing the constitutional violation.

Buckley v. Gomez · filed 1997-10-08

Thus, to avoid section 1983's respondeat superior bar, the plaintiff must allege personal acts by the defendants which have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation at issue.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a failure to train, supervise, or investigate subordinates when the supervisor has a culpable state of mind and that failure causes a constitutional injury.

EARTHLY v. CITY OF BEVERLY HILLS · filed 1997-10-10

However, an official who has failed to prevent a constitutional violation, by inadequately training, supervising or investigating his subordinates, may be liable under § 1983 if the plaintiff shows 1) the supervisor possessed the requisite culpable state of mind, and 2) a causal connection between the supervisor's action or inaction and the infliction of the alleged constitutional harm.

Section 1983 requires a supervising prison official to have personally participated in an alleged deprivation; a complaint that does not adequately plead participation cannot impose personal liability on the supervisor.

Roberts v. Howard A. Peters, Iii, 1 · filed 1997-10-16

A brief perusal of the First Amended Complaint demonstrates that Judge Gilbert was also correct in finding that Roberts does not adequately plead any participation by defendants Peters or Welborn in his alleged deprivation of medical care. See Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 992-93 (7th Cir.1996) (to be personally liable under § 1983, a supervising prison official must have known about the conduct and facilitated, approved, or turned a blind eye to it).

A prison warden is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when there is no evidence that the warden personally participated in or knowingly acquiesced to the officer’s use of force.

Spann v. Janice Melton Michael J. Barby and Bill Johnson Correctional Centers · filed 1997-10-21

We also agree with the magistrate judge that, were there merit to Mr. Spann's claims, Warden Melton would be entitled to qualified immunity, as there is no evidence Warden Melton personally participated in or knowingly acquiesced to the alleged use of force by Officer Barby. See Rec. doc. 13, at 10 (citing Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 994-95 (10th Cir.1996)).

Section 1983 does not make supervisory officials vicariously liable solely because they supervise an alleged tortfeasor.

Darryl W. Bell v. Woodard · filed 1997-10-22

Supervisory officials cannot be held vicariously liable solely on the basis of their supervisory relationship with an alleged tort-feasor in an action brought pursuant to Section 1983.

Supervisors may face a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when alleged facts connect them to a discriminatory stop policy or a failure to train or monitor officers.

Reyes v. Sazan · filed 1997-10-27

They have plead with particularity that this was part of a policy to stop and search those of Hispanic origin, and/or that the supervisors failed to adequately train and/or monitor the Troopers. While the supervisors will be entitled to summary judgment unless plaintiffs submit evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact, they are not entitled to dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability, but a supervisor’s actual knowledge of unconstitutional prison conditions and failure to correct them can affirmatively link the supervisor to the violation.

Smith v. Merrill · filed 1997-11-05

Although respondeat superior liability is not available under § 1983, see Monell v . Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 6 5 8 , 691-94 (1978), plaintiffs assert that Brodeur and Cunningham actually know of the overcrowded conditions and yet continue to fail to correct the situation. This allegation affirmatively links them to the unconstitutional conditions at the NHSP for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 makes a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s civil rights violation only if the supervisor was personally involved in the unlawful act.

Reid v. Artus · filed 1997-11-13

Under section 1983, a supervisory official is not liable for civil rights violations committed by his subordinates absent personal involvement by the official in the unlawful act.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because the supervisor oversees officials who allegedly violated a person’s rights.

Lucien v. Howard A. Peters, George C. Welborn · filed 1997-11-20

Respondeat superior or supervisor liability does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires actual knowledge of subordinates’ constitutional violations to hold a supervisor liable for failing to act.

Barry v. Ratelle · filed 1997-12-03

Plaintiff must show that Ratelle actually knew of any constitutional violations committed by his subordinates in order to recover against him on a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison supervisor solely because of responsibility for the prison; personal involvement in the challenged conduct is required.

Keeper v. Fred King, Dr. Anthony Gammon · filed 1997-12-11

In particular, this Court has noted that “a general responsibility for supervising the operations of a prison is insufficient to establish the personal involvement required to support liability.”

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a subordinate’s constitutional violation when the supervisor participated in or directed the violation, or knew of it and failed to prevent it.

Price v. County of San Diego · filed 1998-01-08

To hold Defendant Roache liable for the constitutional violations of his subordinates, Plaintiffs must show that he either participated in or directed violations, or that he knew of violations and failed to act to prevent them.

Section 1983 permits individual supervisory liability for a subordinate’s misconduct when sufficiently widespread abuse puts the supervisor on notice of the need to act and the supervisor fails to do so.

Braddy v. Florida Dept. of Labor · filed 1998-01-21

The standard by which a supervisor is held liable in her individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous. The causal connection between Lynch’s offensive behavior and Davis’s liability as his supervisor for such behavior can only be established if the harassment was sufficiently widespread so as to put Davis on notice of the need to act and she failed to do so.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violation solely under respondeat superior.

Braddy v. Florida Department of Labor · filed 1998-01-21

For Davis, as Lynch's supervisor, to be liable under § 1983, her liability must be based on something more than the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative causal connection between a supervisor’s act or omission and an alleged constitutional deprivation when the supervisor did not personally participate.

Ludlam v. Coffee County · filed 1998-01-27

Where a plaintiff does not allege that a defendant personally participated in alleged constitutional deprivations, the plaintiff must establish an affirmative causal connection between the act or omission complained of and the alleged constitutional deprivations in order to sustain a § 1983 cause of action against the defendant.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability based solely on supervisory status; the supervisor must have personally participated in the violation or known of the subordinate’s alleged conduct.

Brown v. Sales · filed 1998-02-04

Here, plaintiff failed to allege any facts which would support a finding that defendant either personally participated in any unconstitutional act against plaintiff, or that he had the requisite knowledge of his supervisees’ alleged participation. Plaintiff cannot establish defendant’s personal responsibility for any constitutional violation simply by asserting defendant’s supervisory capacity. Therefore, defendant was properly granted summary judgment on this issue.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, responds with deliberate indifference or tacit authorization, and that inaction causes the injury.

Velasco v. Fairall · filed 1998-02-06

Supervisor liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be imposed when (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowl- edge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a perva- sive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response to the knowledge was so inad- equate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices, and (3) there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor's inaction and the particular con- stitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability under respondeat superior.

Williams v. Cearlock · filed 1998-02-10

The doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based on respondeat superior; a named defendant must have encouraged the specific misconduct or directly participated in it.

Nedea v. Voinovich · filed 1998-02-18

It is well established that liability under 42 U.S .C. § 1983 may be based only on allegations that the named defendant(s) “either encouraged the specific incident or misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it,” and not, for example, on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 makes a supervisor liable only when the supervisor encouraged, directly participated in, or at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct.

Luckett v. Turner · filed 1998-02-20

The failure of a supervisory official to supervise or control an alleged wrongdoer is not actionable absent a showing that the official either encouraged or in some way directly participated in the misconduct. The plaintiff must allege and demonstrate that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the employee.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a subordinate’s conduct only when the supervisor’s own act or omission is affirmatively linked to that conduct.

Sanchez v. Figueroa · filed 1998-02-23

Under § 1983, liability may attach to supervisors based on the actions of subordinates, but only where an act or omission of the supervisor himself can be affirmatively linked to the subordinate’s behavior.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged violation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Kirk v. Ryan · filed 1998-03-03

Kirk names only Sheriff Phil Ryan as a defendant. But, Kirk did not allege that Sheriff Ryan directly caused or contributed to the officers’ alleged actions. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing these claims against Sheriff Ryan as frivolous.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a plaintiff must show their direct or personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Spencer v. Doe · filed 1998-03-03

The court correctly ruled that § 1983 does not encompass vicarious liability and that "a plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant's direct or personal involvement in the actions which are alleged to have caused the constitutional deprivation." (Ruling and Order, at 4.)

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a police supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s misconduct.

Jarosiewicz v. Conlisk · filed 1973-06-29

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in civil rights cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 complaint alleging that a police chief failed to train subordinates may state a direct-liability claim despite uncertainty about respondeat superior liability.

Navarro v. Chief of Police, Des Moines, Iowa, and Sheriff of Polk County · filed 1975-09-04

However, whatever the standing of vicarious liability in the federal courts, plaintiff’s complaint can be read as seeking relief under a theory of direct liability, i. e., that defendant failed to provide proper training for his subordinates. ... We conclude that at this stage of the litigation plaintiff’s attempt to state a claim for relief is not necessarily frustrated by the arguable inapplicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s own decisions directly cause a constitutional violation; liability does not rest on respondeat superior.

Bursey v. Jack M. Weatherford, Individually and in His Official Capacity as an Agent of the South Carolina S · filed 1975-12-02

This is therefore not at all a case involving liability through the principle of respondeat superior. That concept applies only to an innocent master being held vicariously liable for the acts of his servant. Here Strom’s own decisions directly caused the violation of Bursey’s constitutional rights, and that is a separate basis for liability.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor who knew or should have known of misconduct and failed to act to prevent future harm.

McClelland v. Facteau · filed 1979-11-19

We agree with those courts that have found a cause of action under section 1983 when the defendant was in a position of responsibility, knew or should have known of the misconduct, and yet failed to act to prevent future harm.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only for a supervisor’s own acts or omissions.

Darul-Islam v. Dubois · filed 1998-03-10

Under Section 1983, a supervisor may only be found liable by his own acts or omissions.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ conduct solely because of their supervisory role.

Burke v. Powell, et al. · filed 1998-03-13

Supervisors, however, cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior (in other words, the conduct of prison employees is not automatically attributable to their supervisors).

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor solely because of that position; the plaintiff must allege the supervisor personally violated federal or constitutional rights.

Martinez v. Wolferseder · filed 1998-03-17

The plaintiffs have not alleged that Roddy personally violated their federal or constitutional rights, therefore, they have not stated a § 1983 claim against him in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for an employee’s actions.

Zimmerman v. Hoard · filed 1998-03-25

The doctrine of respondeat superior, under which a supervisor may be held liable for an employee’s actions, has no application to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to be personally involved in the conduct underlying a claim.

Neal v. City of Harvey, Ill. · filed 1998-03-30

Mr. Neal must show the supervisors were personally involved in the conduct that led to his arrest for possession of a controlled substance.

Section 1983 requires a supervising defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; supervisory rank alone does not establish liability.

Ramsey v. Coughlin · filed 1998-03-31

A defendant’s personal involvement in an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights is a necessary element of a Section 1983 complaint. ... Where, as here, a plaintiff cannot show that a supervising individual had any personal involvement in the asserted constitutional violations, nor can he establish that the individual promulgated or was otherwise aware of any unconstitutional customs or policies, the claim against that individual must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor based solely on his title.

Shovlin v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey · filed 1998-04-03

With regard to President Bergen, his mere title alone is insufficient to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a plaintiff to identify a policy attributable to the supervisor and show that carrying it out caused the injury.

Carter v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1998-04-20

Rather, to hold Roe liable under a theory, of supervisory liability, Carter must identify a particular policy, attribute that policy to Roe himself, and then establish a causal link between the execution of that policy and the injury he allegedly suffered.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely through respondeat superior.

Novosad v. New Mexico, State Of · filed 1998-04-24

This charge is in essence an assertion that the Attorney General is liable on the basis of respondeat superior, a doctrine that cannot support liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a subordinate’s conduct only when the supervisor encouraged the specific conduct or directly participated in it.

Jones v. Beatty · filed 1998-04-30

Additionally, the Sixth Circuit does not allow a supervisor to be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of his or her subordinates without a showing that the supervisor either encouraged the specific conduct at issue or in some way directly participated in it.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor is aware of a specific risk of harm, and a school official cannot claim qualified immunity for failing to respond to known harassment that violates clearly established rights.

Oona, R.-S.-, a Minor, by Kate S., Her Guardian, Kate S. And Ken R. v. Patricia McCaffrey Gerald Hill Ronald Lundy · filed 1998-05-05

A supervisor may be found liable under § 1983 if the supervisor is “aware of a specific risk of harm to the plaintiff.” ... Thus, after Franklin, a school official in a supervisory position cannot claim immunity for the failure to respond to complaints of harassment and discrimination.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for officials who, with deliberate indifference, establish and maintain a policy or custom that directly causes constitutional harm.

Owens v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1998-05-13

This species of individual liability is clearly available under § 1983. Individual defendants can be found liable if it can be shown that the individual defendants, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.”

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a supervisor who participates in the deprivation of a person’s constitutional rights.

Watkins v. City of Oakland · filed 1998-05-29

As Officer Chew’s superior, Chief Samuels can be held liable in his individual capacity if he participated in the deprivation of Watkins’ constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a police supervisor who ratifies a subordinate’s excessive force; qualified immunity does not shield that conduct when the liability rule was clearly established.

Watkins v. City of Oakland · filed 1998-05-29

Since it was clearly established in Larez that a jury could hold Chief Samuels liable for ratifying Officer Chew's use of excessive force (if the jury finds it to be such), we affirm the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Chief Samuels on summary judgment.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for an Eighth Amendment violation when the supervisor is personally involved or when the supervisor’s corrective inaction amounts to deliberate indifference or tacit authorization.

Russell v. Sargent · filed 1998-06-01

We conclude the district court&s judgment was correct because Mr. Russell offered no evidence that Warden Sargent was aware by February 1, 1995 (the date of Russell&s complaint) that Russell was being denied medical care or otherwise mistreated. See Choate v. Lockhart, 7 F.3d 1370, 1376 (8th Cir. 1993) (supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for Eighth Amendment violation only when supervisor is personally involved or where supervisor&s corrective inaction amounts to deliberate indifference toward or tacit authorization of violation).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory or respondeat superior liability.

Geder v. Godinez · filed 1998-06-11

There is no supervisor liability or respondeat superior liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for prison guards’ misconduct.

Benglen v. Zavaras · filed 1998-06-11

While it is clear that prison guards may not use excessive force against-, prisoners, it is equally clear that their superiors cannot be held vicariously liable for such conduct under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor directly participates in the violation or a failure to train or supervise directly causes the deprivation.

Ayers v. Sargent · filed 1998-07-09

Because Ayers provided no evidence from which an inference could be made that Sargent actually knew of the threats against Ayers prior to the assault, or that Sargent somehow failed to train or supervise Spadoni, we conclude Ayers did not establish a basis for imposing liability against Sargent. See Otey v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1150, 1155 (8th Cir. 1997) (liability under § 1983 cannot attach to supervisor merely because subordinate violated someone&s constitutional rights; rather, supervisor can be liable only if he directly participated in constitutional violation, or if his failure to train or supervise offending actor directly caused deprivation).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a warden based solely on vicarious liability.

Carter v. Caskey · filed 1998-07-21

Carter’s claim against Warden Caskey is based on a theory of vicarious liability and is insufficient to state a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because a subordinate violated the Constitution; liability requires the supervisor’s own wrongful conduct.

Ross v. State of Alabama · filed 1998-07-22

A supervisor may not be held liable pursuant to § 1983 for a constitutional violation on the basis of respondeat superior, but only on the basis of his or her wrongful behavior.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor affirmatively participates in a constitutional deprivation or creates an unconstitutional policy that causes the injury.

Lipschitz v. Price · filed 1998-07-30

Under § 1983, a supervisory official such as Price cannot be held vicariously liable for his subordinates’ actions unless (1) the supervisor affirmatively participated in acts that caused constitutional deprivations or (2) the supervisor created unconstitutional policies that causally resulted in Plaintiff’s injury.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of that role; the supervisor must be personally involved in the conduct that caused the alleged violation.

Dowdell v. Fairman · filed 1998-08-11

There is no supervisor liability or respondeat superior liability under Section 1983. ... Thus, to succeed with his claim, Mr. Dowdell must show Mr. Fairman was personally involved in the conduct that led to his alleged beating.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a prison warden for subordinates’ conduct; personal liability requires the warden’s own act or omission.

Steidl v. Gramley · filed 1998-08-11

The plaintiff never comes to grips with the central issue in this case — the absence of vicarious liability in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisory officials for their subordinates’ conduct.

Monroe v. Scott · filed 1998-08-20

They cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 as supervisory officials.

A supervisor cannot face an inadequate supervision claim under § 1983 unless a person supervised committed a constitutional violation.

Ramsey v. Busch · filed 1998-08-25

It is well settled that no claim of inadequate supervision under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be made against a supervisor unless a constitutional violation by the persons supervised is found.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability under respondeat superior.

Burrell v. Datta · filed 1998-08-26

The doctrine of responde-at superior (supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; officials may be liable for their own deliberate indifference.

Simmons v. Cook · filed 1998-09-01

Although we agree that respondeat superior liability is an improper basis to find an Eighth Amendment violation under section 1983, see Choate v. Lockhart, 7 F.3d 1370, 1376 (8th Cir.1993), we emphasize that we find that O'Neal and Cook themselves violated the Eighth Amendment because "their corrective inaction amount[ed] to 'deliberate indifference'."

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires knowledge of unconstitutional conduct, tacit approval or deliberate indifference, and a causal link between the supervisor’s failure to act and the injury.

Jinks v. McCauley · filed 1998-09-01

To be subject to supervisory liability under§ 1983, it must be shown that: (1) McCauley had actual or constructive knowledge of the allegedly unconstitutional actions; (2) McCauley tacitly approved of or was deliberately indifferent to those actions; and (3) that there was an affirmative causal link between McCauley's failure to correct the situation and the injury alleged.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an individual official solely through respondeat superior; the plaintiff must show personal involvement or a policy causing the deprivation of rights.

Williams v. Lehigh County Dept. of Corrections · filed 1998-09-15

As indicated in the previous order of this court, the plaintiff may not sue individual officials under a respondeat superi- or theory. Rather, the plaintiff must show either personal involvement in the deprivation of rights or the existence of a policy causing a deprivation of rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officials solely because they supervise others; a claim must link them to the alleged wrongdoing.

Griffin v. DeTella · filed 1998-09-18

Finally, Griffin has not stated a claim against any of the three persons he holds responsible. He does not allege that Officer Ritehe himself took the papers and seeks to hold Defendants DeTella and Johnson responsible only in their supervisory capacities.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a pervasive pattern of violations and the supervisor’s own actions establish a sufficient link between a failure to supervise and subordinates’ constitutional violations.

Wolf-Lillie v. Kenosha County Sheriff · filed 1980-12-15

Because of the pervasive pattern of such violations and the defendant’s own action, the Court finds that there is a sufficient link between the defendant’s failure to supervise the process division and prohibit the execution of stale writs and the unconstitutional acts of his deputies.

A supervisor can face a § 1983 claim when the complaint alleges sufficient personal responsibility and authorization for subordinates’ conduct.

Carter v. Newburgh Police Dept. · filed 1980-12-19

Unlike the plaintiff in Johnson, the plaintiff in the action before this court alleges sufficient personal responsibility and authorization on the part of the defendant Sherwood in his supervisory capacity at the Orange County Jail to state a claim against Sherwood himself.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor.

Ressler v. Scheipe · filed 1981-01-14

Liability under Section 1983 cannot be imposed vicariously or under traditional grounds of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits a jury to find a supervising agency deliberately indifferent to a child's protection from abuse even when the agency provided other care and services.

Doe v. New York City Department Of Social Services · filed 1983-06-02

The fact that the agency may have been attentive to Anna's general care and provided Anna with general services did not preclude a jury finding of deliberate indifference respecting one very significant aspect of her welfare, the protection from abuse. ... In any event, entry of judgment n.o.v. was erroneous because there was sufficient evidence for a jury finding of liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor personally participates in a constitutional violation or when a causal connection links the supervisor’s actions to it.

Buzzi v. Gomez · filed 1998-09-28

Supervisory liability can occur under § 1983 in two ways: (1) when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation; or (2) when there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor acts with deliberate, reckless indifference to evidence of a subordinate’s constitutional misconduct.

Doe v. Board of Education of Consolidated School District 230 · filed 1998-09-29

In the instant case, there is no evidence clearly demonstrating that any of the individual defendants had actual knowledge of the sexual relationships between plaintiffs and Vasquez, or that they condoned or directly facilitated Vasquez’s conduct. Therefore, they can be liable only if there are facts to support an inference that they acted with deliberate, reckless indifference, i.e., that they turned a blind eye to the evidence before them.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrong; supervisory liability cannot rest solely on respondeat superior.

White v. Fauver · filed 1998-09-29

This is a correct statement of the law. “A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superi- or.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor based solely on supervisory status; the plaintiff must show personal involvement in the violation or an affirmative policy that led to it.

Mabine v. Vaughn · filed 1998-10-27

Section 1983 does not permit the finding of liability based on any respondeat superior theory; rather, when suing individuals in supervisory capacities, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating either the supervisor’s personal involvement in the violation or the supervisor’s affirmative promulgation of a policy leading to the violation.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of the supervisor’s position; liability requires personal involvement or corrective inaction amounting to deliberate indifference.

Gilliam v. Morgan · filed 1998-10-29

Gilliam offered no evidence for holding certain of the named defendants liable other than on a respondeat superior basis. See Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995) (supervisor cannot be held liable on respondeat superior theory; to be liable supervisor must be personally involved in violation or his corrective inaction amounts to deliberate indifference toward violation).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires more than a passive role or tacit approval of an alleged constitutional violation.

Salehpour v. University of Tennessee · filed 1998-10-29

As stated above, in order for liability to attach to Rice and Johnson for the alleged § 1983 violations, Plaintiff had to prove that they did more than play a passive role in the alleged violation or showed mere tacit approval of the events.

Section 1983 permits liability for a subordinate’s wrongful acts when a supervisor breaches a duty imposed by state or local law and that breach causes a constitutional injury.

Smith v. Steve Brenoettsy, Lieutenant, John P. Whitley, Warden · filed 1998-11-05

A supervisory official may be held liable under section 1983 for the wrongful acts of a subordinate “when [the supervisory official] breaches a duty imposed by state or local law, and this breach causes plaintiffs constitutional injury.”

Section 1983 does not impose strict supervisory liability; a supervisor must have directed the misconduct or known of it and acquiesced in its continuance.

Houck v. City of Prairie · filed 1998-11-13

Because § 1983 does not encompass a concept of strict supervisor liability, plaintiff must show that Vernon either directed the sexual harassment or had actual knowledge of the misconduct and acquiesced in its continuance.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely through respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Cherry v. Jorling · filed 1998-11-15

It is well established that respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not establish liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor breaches a duty imposed by state or local law and that breach causes a constitutional injury.

Smith v. Brenoettsy · filed 1998-11-16

A supervisory official may be held liable under section 1983 for the wrongful acts of a subordinate “when [the supervisory official] breaches a duty imposed by state or local law, and this breach causes plaintiff’s constitutional injury.” Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1976).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on responsibility for training and supervising the officials who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Sasa v. Zavaras · filed 1998-12-09

Sasa alleged Zavaras was responsible for training and supervising the other defendants. Such allegations are insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment violation. ... Thus, Sasa’s claim against Zavaras was properly dismissed.

A supervisor is not liable under § 1983 for inadequately investigating alleged misconduct afterward without personal involvement in the wrongdoing.

Jones v. Culinary Manager II · filed 1998-12-09

Plaintiffs claims against Davies are that, after the alleged discriminatory conduct took place, Davies failed to adequately investigate Plaintiffs grievances. ... Plaintiff has not alleged any way in which Davies had knowledge of and/or acquiesced in the alleged discriminatory conduct. Therefore, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a civil rights action against Defendant Davies, and summary judgment will be granted on all counts of Plaintiffs complaint against Davies.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior when the named defendants were not personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations.

Black v. Delbello · filed 1983-06-06

With respect to his remaining two claims against these defendants, plaintiff does not allege any personal involvement by the named defendants. At oral argument on these motions, plaintiff stated that none of the named defendants was personally involved in the remaining claims. Accordingly, since plaintiff is seeking to hold defendants liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, these claims are barred by Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York City, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for damages solely because of their subordinates’ conduct.

Ross v. Reed · filed 1983-10-12

Because respondeat superior liability has no place in § 1983 jurisprudence, ... these two defendants cannot be liable in damages to Ross on account of the conditions of the cell.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on prison administrators.

Green v. Thoryk · filed 1998-12-16

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, see Monell v. Dep’t. of Social Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-95, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), and a defendant may recover only if there is official involvement or acquiescence in an unconstitutional policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in an alleged constitutional violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Wright v. Coughlin · filed 1998-12-17

The liability of supervisory officials under § 1983 cannot be premised on respondent superior. ... In the present ease, Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to Defendant Kelly’s personal involvement based on any of the foregoing theories of liability.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor; liability requires personal involvement in the alleged violation.

Olender v. Township of Bensalem · filed 1999-01-05

Liability under § 1983 cannot be imposed vicariously or under the grounds of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for another person's conduct solely on a respondeat-superior basis.

Lester v. Byus · filed 1999-01-08

Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude dismissal was proper because Lester failed to offer evidence for holding defendant liable for the medical care he received other than on a respondeat-superior basis.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; the plaintiff must allege an affirmative link between a supervisor’s conduct and an employee’s constitutional misconduct.

Melvin v. Brodeur, Comm'r · filed 1999-01-19

Although plaintiff does allege that counselor Aquizap failed to provide him with sufficient mental health care, plaintiff's pleadings do not contain a single factual allegation that shows or suggests an "affirmative link" between the acts or omissions of Cunningham, Brodeur, and Sokolow and those of the prison's mental health care staff.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a supervisor solely through respondeat superior; the supervisor must be personally responsible for the constitutional deprivation.

Nelson v. Michalko · filed 1999-01-20

In an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where money damages are sought, the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable; the defendant must be personally responsible for the constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor who was not personally involved in the alleged civil rights violation.

Wells v. Wade · filed 1999-01-28

Miller correctly argues the claim against him should be dismissed because § 1983 does not impose liability upon a supervisor who was not personally involved in the alleged civil rights violation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a subordinate’s violation of federal rights and an affirmative link between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation, including deliberate indifference to the danger of that conduct.

Elliot Brown v. Fall Mtn. School · filed 1999-02-01

In order to establish a claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a supervisor the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) a subordinate has violated the plaintiff's rights under federal law; and (2) the supervisor's conduct is affirmatively linked to the subordinate' illegal conduct in the sense that the supervisor failed to act o acted with deliberate indifference to the danger that the subordinate would engaged in the illegal conduct.

Section 1983 permits liability for a supervisor who recklessly disregards a constitutional violation or fails to train or supervise subordinate officers.

Feist v. Simonson · filed 1999-02-08

A supervising officer may be held liable for the actions of his subordinates under section 1983 if he exhibits “reckless disregard [for a constitutional violation]” or “fail[s] to train or supervise his officers.”

Section 1983 requires active unconstitutional behavior for supervisory liability; a mere failure to act is insufficient.

Jerry Lorenzo Bass, A/K/A Afif Abdul R. Karriem v. Kevin Robinson James Lashbrook · filed 1999-02-12

Supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot attach where the allegation of liability is based upon a mere failure to act. ... Instead, the liability must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a supervisor’s own acts or omissions, but not merely for a subordinate’s conduct.

Alton v. Texas A&M University · filed 1999-02-22

Only the direct acts or omissions of government officials, not the acts of subordinates, will give rise to individual liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Telepo v. Palmer Township · filed 1999-02-26

The fact that a defendant is in a supervisory position is insufficient to establish liability as there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability cannot rest solely on an allegation that supervisors failed to investigate a subordinate’s misconduct.

Anthony v. Vaccaro · filed 1999-03-16

Therefore, this Court concludes that Plaintiff cannot establish supervisory liability based on the allegation of the “failure to investigate.”

Section 1983 requires a claim against a supervisor to allege personal involvement or a policy that caused or failed to prevent the alleged harm.

Howard v. Kennedy · filed 1999-03-22

The district court did not err in dismissing Riggs and Schultz from the suit. These individuals were sued only in their supervisory capacities, but Howard did not allege that they acted personally in his assault or that a Brazos County Jail policy caused or failed to prevent his assault.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s conduct; the plaintiff must allege the supervisor’s personal involvement.

Mack v. State · filed 1999-03-24

Liability cannot be established under a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires deliberate indifference by the supervisor; mere negligence is insufficient.

Sinnett v. Simmons · filed 1999-03-31

With respect to these claims, the above named defendants either played supervisory roles within the DOC or had no responsibility in making decisions affecting plaintiff. “Liability of a supervisor under § 1983 must be predicated on the supervisor’s deliberate indifference, rather than mere negligence.”

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Snell v. DeMello · filed 1999-03-31

Supervisory liability under § 1983 may not be predicated only on the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisory officials for their subordinates’ actions.

Travis Alton, Travis Alton v. Texas A&m University, Thomas Darling Malon Southerland Robert H. Dalton M.T. "Ted" Hopgood · filed 1999-04-08

Supervisory officers, like the defendant officials, cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of subordinates, like the cadets, on any theory of vicarious liability.

Under § 1983, a supervisor’s knowledge of a subordinate’s dangerous conduct is central to supervisory liability and qualified immunity.

Camilo-Robles v. Jose R. Zapata, A/K/A Jose R. Zapata-Rivera · filed 1999-04-20

We agree with Zapata’s main premise: the extent of a superior’s knowledge of his subordinate’s proclivities is a central datum in determining whether the former ought to be liable (or immune from suit) for the latter’s unconstitutional acts.

Section 1983 does not permit liability against a prison warden when the plaintiff suffered no constitutional violation.

Walter J.D. Moffett v. Roland E. McCauley John R. Gagnon, and Ronald L. Paul · filed 1984-01-05

Gagnon cannot be held liable if Moffett’s constitutional rights were not violated. Since the jury found that they were not, and since we find no prejudicial error with the way the district court handled the trial, the issue of whether the court should have allowed Mof-fett’s case against Gagnon to go to the jury is moot.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a claim concerns the training and supervision of multiple employees rather than isolated acts by individual employees.

Allman v. Coughlin · filed 1984-01-10

However, he can be held liable under a theory of supervisory liability where the training and supervision of a number of employees, and not just the isolated acts of one or two of them, are the subject of the claim.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor solely because the supervisor is responsible for running an institution; an affirmative link to the alleged deprivation is required.

Gilchrist v. Kane County Correctional Center · filed 1999-05-04

There is no affirmative link between the action complained about and Sheriff Ramsey other than the undisputed evidence that Sheriff Ramsey was charged with the administration of the KCCC and responsible for all persons at the KCCC. This is not sufficient personal involvement for the imposition of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal responsibility for a constitutional violation; a subordinate’s conduct alone does not establish liability.

Anton v. Sheriff of DuPage County, Ill. · filed 1999-05-05

An official is not liable under § 1983 merely because his subordinates violated a plaintiffs constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a subordinate’s constitutional violation only when the supervisor participated in or directed the violation, or knew of it and failed to prevent it.

Tesoro v. Zavaras · filed 1999-05-06

A supervisory employee is liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates only if he participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff liable for deputies’ conduct solely because he supervises them.

Chuffo v. Ramsey · filed 1999-05-28

Plaintiffs cannot recover against Sheriff Ramsey under § 1983 for his deputies’ conduct.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of and acquiesces in the misconduct.

McLaughlin v. Rose Tree Media School District · filed 1999-06-16

Such evidence is sufficient to qualify as “acquiescence” to support a claim for supervisor liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against supervisors for inadequate training or supervision when the inadequacy results from deliberate indifference; negligence or respondeat superior does not suffice.

Petrichko v. Kurtz · filed 1999-06-23

This does not mean, however, that no claim based upon .the training or supervision of Rizzardi by Kurtz or Berdinere is possible. Quite the contrary, a cognizable claim could certainly sound in such, provided the lack or inadequacy of training is the product of deliberate indifference as opposed to mere negligence or respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor for an investigation in which the supervisor had no personal involvement.

Mobley v. City of Atlantic City Police Department · filed 1999-06-24

On the contrary, under the circumstances of this case, Rifice’s non-involvement in the investigation of Mobley’s internal complaint of sexual harassment insulates him from liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation or wrongful conduct that caused it.

Fergason v. Smith · filed 1999-07-07

Fergason has failed to allege that Sheriff Smith was personally involved in the alleged denial of medical care, and he has not demonstrated that Sheriff Smith participated in any wrongful conduct which caused the alleged denial of care.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a failure to train and supervise shows deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs, a reasonable supervisor would recognize that indifference, and the failure is causally related to a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Howard v. City of Columbus · filed 1999-07-15

We apply a three-prong test to determine a supervisor's liability: (1) whether the supervisor's failure to adequately train and supervise subordinates constituted deliberate indifference to an inmate's medical needs; (2) whether a reasonable person in the supervisor's position would understand that the failure to train and supervise constituted deliberate indifference; and (3) whether the supervisor's conduct was causally related to the subordinate's constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct; failure to act after subordinates’ conduct does not establish that involvement.

Wellington v. Ledford · filed 1999-07-16

Insofar as Mr. Wellington’s claim refers to the warden’s failure to act after the alleged unconstitutional conduct by his subordinates, it fails to establish a sufficient basis for believing that the warden was personally involved in those events themselves.

Section 1983 permits a claim against supervisors when the allegations support a causal connection between their actions and the injury; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Maggio v. Florida, Department of Labor & Employment Security · filed 1999-07-19

It can be inferred from these allegations that the individual Defendants themselves caused or were responsible for the acts of retaliation against Plaintiff, and that their liability is not merely on a respondeat superior basis. Read in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the complaint in this case states a claim.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s own act or omission to proximately cause the constitutional deprivation; a subordinate’s misconduct alone does not establish supervisory liability.

Blyden v. Mancusi · filed 1999-08-03

Given the lack of respondeat superior liability under Section 1983, a supervisor’s liability is not for the use of excessive force — here, “reprisals” — but for distinct acts or omissions that are a proximate cause of the use of that force.

Under § 1983, a supervisor may be liable for a search that the supervisor personally directed.

Timothy T. Ryan, Jr. And Garrett Wainwright v. Mary Immaculate Queen Center · filed 1999-08-17

But the complaint alleges that Doria had personally directed the search and that is enough to affix liability to a supervisor.

A supervisory § 1983 claim based on a detainee’s medical care requires a finding that a specific employee acted with deliberate indifference.

Sibley v. Lemaire · filed 1999-08-24

Instead, the court first had to determine that, based on the record before it, a specific employee had acted with deliberate indifference to Sibley’s medical condition. We therefore find no error in the district’s court’s conclusion that this error required a new trial on the § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability when the subordinate was not acting under color of state law.

Doe v. School Administrative District No. 19 · filed 1999-08-31

Rather, Plaintiffs’ claim under 1983 must fail because the Court cannot impose supervisory liability when it finds the subordinate was not acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

MacDonald v. Angelone · filed 1999-09-02

Moreover, plaintiff may not avail himself of the doctrine of respondeat superior, as this doctrine is inapplicable to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor when the complaint specifically alleges that the supervisor directly authorized the challenged conduct.

Cooper v. Schriro · filed 1999-09-09

Related to this claim, we conclude Cooper’s allegation that DOC director Dora Schriro authorized the denial of printed materials to inmates is sufficiently specific to state a section 1983 claim for actions allegedly taken directly by her.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely under a respondeat superior theory.

Orum v. Haines · filed 1999-09-21

Liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires active unconstitutional conduct; a mere failure to act on grievances is insufficient.

Shehee v. Luttrell · filed 1999-10-01

Thus, liability under § 1983 must be based on active unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based upon “a mere failure to act.”

Section 1983 does not make a prison director personally liable to an inmate merely because two earlier lawsuits alleged inadequate medical care at the prison.

Estate of Eklund v. Hardiman · filed 1984-02-01

Instead he relies on the wholly untenable premise that the filing of two lawsuits alleging inadequate medical care for inmates in Department’s custody imposes on Hardiman a duty to Eklund personally to protect him from inadequate medical care. No such duty exists.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement; liability cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Jordan v. Garcia · filed 1999-10-21

Jordan failed to allege Garcia’s personal involvement, and there is no respondeat superior under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for an officer’s conduct when the officer committed no underlying misconduct.

Tapp v. Banks · filed 1999-10-21

On the other hand, Defendant Webb is liable for any civil rights violation caused by Defendant Banks if Defendant Webb “encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” ... As there was no misconduct by Defendant Banks, Defendant Webb cannot be held liable for the damages alleged by Plaintiff.

A § 1983 claim against a supervisor in an individual capacity requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Taylor v. Evans · filed 1999-10-25

None of the ways in which a supervisory official may be personally involved has been pleaded here and the supervisors therefore are entitled to summary judgment as to the claims made against them in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional acts solely because of their supervisory position.

Hartley Ex Rel. Hartley v. Parnell · filed 1999-10-28

It is well established in this circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates “on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in a constitutional violation or the supervisor’s actions have a causal connection to it.

Hartley v. Washington Cty. School · filed 1999-10-28

“Supervisory liability [under § 1983] occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

A supervisor’s knowledge of a subordinate’s sexual harassment followed by inaction can establish supervisory liability under § 1983.

Johnson, et.al. v. Williamson · filed 1999-11-01

Such knowledge and subsequent inaction is sufficient to establish supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official creates or allows a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occur.

James v. Tilghman · filed 1999-11-04

It was appropriate to have given this charge, because a reasonable jury could have found that defendants created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed such a policy or custom to continue.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on a sheriff without an actionable deficiency in the sheriff's policies, customs, or training.

Grayson v. Peed · filed 1999-11-05

Even if there were constitutional violations committed by one of his employees, Sheriff Peed still could not be held liable as appellant has not pointed to any actionable deficiency in Sheriff Peed's policies, customs, or training.

Section 1983 permits liability for a police chief only when the chief’s own conduct is connected to a constitutional violation.

Perez v. City of Harlingen · filed 1999-11-17

A police chief can be held liable under § 1983, but a plaintiff must show a connection between the chief’s own conduct and any constitutional violation.

Section 1983 failure-to-train or supervise liability requires a causal connection to a constitutional violation.

Johnson v. Thaler · filed 1999-11-17

Because the appellants’ allegations concerning the excessive noise do not state an Eighth Amendment violation, they cannot show a causal connection between the alleged failure to train or supervise prison employees and a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for failure to train when the failure causes a constitutional injury, but the complaint must plead facts showing the causal link.

SIMS EX REL. SIMS v. Glover · filed 1999-12-09

However, a supervisory official can be held liable under § 1983 for an injury resulting from his or her failure to train subordinates. ... Specifically, the court finds that Sims has not pleaded in specific factual terms the requisite causal link between the alleged failure to train and the constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability claims are premature when the underlying constitutional violation is not ripe for adjudication.

Goldfine v. Kelly · filed 2000-01-03

Here, plaintiffs § 1983 claims are not ripe. Because this Court cannot determine whether plaintiff has adequately alleged constitutional violations, plaintiffs supervisory liability claims against Lloyd and Polesi are premature.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisory defendants absent a constitutional violation.

Williams v. Davis · filed 2000-01-03

Absent a constitutional violation, there was no basis for section 1983 liability on the part of the other defendants.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison supervisors based solely on their supervisory role when the allegations do not connect them to the challenged medical care.

Bias v. Woods · filed 2000-01-06

A review of the record reveals that Bias’s claims against the three wardens (Leslie Woods, Earl Fox, and Ray Castro) involved allegations of supervisory liability and not that they were directly involved with the medical treatment, or lack thereof, Bias received at the Allred Unit. See Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1987). The district court’s dismissal as frivolous Bias’s claims against these three defendants was not an abuse of discretion, and the district court’s judgment with respect to these claims is AFFIRMED.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because a subordinate violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Owl v. Robertson · filed 2000-01-12

Section 1983 liability cannot attach to a supervisor merely because a subordinate violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison supervisor for medical indifference based solely on general oversight when the supervisor made no treatment decisions and referred complaints to medical staff outside his direct control.

Riley v. Knox · filed 2000-01-14

The summary judgment record, viewed most favorably to Riley, shows that Gammon, the prison superintendent, made no dental treatment decisions, and that he referred complaints related to Riley’s treatment to the medical unit, over which he had no direct control. See Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d 1309, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997) (general responsibility for supervising operations of prison insufficient to support liability for medical-indifference claim).

Section 1983 permits personal liability for a supervisor who directs a constitutional violation or knows of and acquiesces in a subordinate’s violation.

Hill v. Algor · filed 2000-01-18

A supervisory official may be personally liable under § 1983, however, where the official either “directed others to violate [plaintiffs constitutional rights] or had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.”

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ conduct.

Seale v. Riordan · filed 2000-01-19

It is well established that respondeat superior liability is not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for damages; a supervisor may be personally involved through grossly negligent management of subordinates who caused a constitutional deprivation.

Rivers v. O'BRIEN · filed 2000-01-21

A defendant may be personally involved in a constitutional deprivation within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “if he or she was grossly negligent in managing subordinates who caused the unlawful condition or event.” ... Plaintiffs’ claim of grossly negligent supervision.is therefore dismissed in its entirety against all Defendants.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability under a theory of respondeat superior.

Williams v. Choate · filed 2000-01-28

The magistrate judge correctly determined that Choate could not be held liable to Williams under a theory of respondeat superior and dismissed his claims under § 1915.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement to impose damages liability on a supervisor for a subordinate’s misconduct; supervisory position alone is insufficient.

Miller v. Kupchunos · filed 2000-02-07

Applying the test outlined above, the Court finds that Kupchunos bears no supervisory liability. ... On the present record before the Court, there is no evidence that Kupchunos’ actions demonstrated “gross negligence” or “deliberate indifference.” Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Kupchunos had prior notice of Viera’s propensities or that Kup-chunos authorized, permitted, or ratified Viera’s misconduct. ... Therefore, the Court grants Kupchunos’ motion for summary judgment as to the, § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 plaintiff may obtain limited discovery to develop a supervisory liability claim when specific allegations, taken as true, establish a violation of clearly established law.

Delph v. Trent · filed 2000-02-08

First, the Court finds that plaintiff has made sufficiently specific factual allegations and defendants have not moved for a more definite statement. Second, the Court finds that, taking plaintiffs allegations as true, plaintiff has stated a violation of clearly established law. ... Following this analysis, the Court finds that plaintiff is entitled to limited discovery to further develop his claim of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not make supervisory officers vicariously liable for the actions of their subordinates.

Grundy v. Morgan · filed 2000-02-11

Grundy has failed to state a claim against Sheriff Choate and Warden Scott because supervisory officers cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of subordinates on a theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 requires a basis for a supervisor’s personal involvement before damages liability can be imposed.

Santiago v. Meinsen · filed 2000-02-25

Plaintiff fails to set forth any allegations that would support a finding of supervisory liability. Again, there is no allegation that Meinsen, Maly or Whitney knew of any substantial risk of harm to plaintiff or of plaintiffs circumstances. Nor is there any allegation that Meinsen, Maly or Whitney created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or that they were grossly negligent in supervising their subordinates, namely Rivera. Put simply, plaintiff does not allege a single basis upon which to find that these supervisor defendants were personally involved.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that a supervisory official personally participated in the alleged injury to hold that official liable.

Tafoya v. Romer · filed 2000-03-01

The district court was correct that these defendants cannot be held liable under section 1983 absent an allegation of their personal participation in the alleged injury.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a supervisor’s personal participation in a constitutional violation or an unconstitutional policy that caused the injury; conclusory allegations of supervisory involvement are insufficient.

Moore v. Louisiana State · filed 2000-03-02

Moore’s conclusional allegations of supervisory involvement in the use of excessive force on Joshua are insufficient to state any claim against Stalder and Harris under § 1983.