42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Anderson v. Stoddard County Jail · filed 2020-12-03

Instead, plaintiff's allegations sound in respondeat superior, which is not actionable in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; rejecting a later complaint about the misconduct does not establish that involvement.

White v. Brown · filed 2020-12-04

The fact that they did not credit White’s later claim of wrongdoing by police officers is not enough to conclude that they had personal involvement in the violation of White’s rights in the first place.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on authority over an employee or presence during the employee’s alleged misconduct.

Hudson v. Grady · filed 2020-12-04

Here, Bailey’s alleged supervisory authority and presence for one instance of Grady’s alleged misconduct does not reflect the type of “direct participation” necessary for liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability when the alleged conduct shows no underlying constitutional violation.

Townsend v. Lucas · filed 2020-12-07

And, because there is no underlying constitutional violation, the plaintiff fails to state a claim against the sheriff and captains who allegedly supervised the officers responsible for those conditions and/or incidents.

A § 1983 claim based on a supervisor’s failure to train an abusive employee needs facts plausibly showing the supervisor knew or had notice of the abuse and failed to train the employee adequately.

R.N. v. Travis Unified School District · filed 2020-12-08

These allegations alone do not make out a plausible claim that ... Mr. Mears had actual knowledge or notice of Ms. Gumapas’ abuse and failed to train her ... adequately.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisor to show personal involvement or a sufficient causal connection; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Hill v. Tyler · filed 2020-12-08

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s claim cannot proceed as pleaded because he has not directly linked Defendant Atchley to his allegations. The Court notes that Defendant Atchley is being sued by Plaintiff as a supervisory official, against whom liability is alleged solely in this Defendant’s respondent superior capacity, which is improper.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a sheriff based solely on vicarious liability for officers’ conduct.

Smith v. Staly · filed 2020-12-08

Plaintiffs claim against the Sheriff similarly fails, not only because Plaintiff does not state a plausible claim against the officers, but also because a civil rights action under § 1983 may not proceed on a theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a sheriff without personal involvement or a causal connection to the alleged deprivation.

Helmich v. Williams · filed 2020-12-08

Thus, his claim, premised on a theory of vicarious liability, fails as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory role; the defendant must be personally responsible for the deprivation of rights.

Berry v. Bustos · filed 2020-12-08

Furthermore, the mere fact that a defendant was a supervisor is insufficient to establish liability because the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisor liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 USC §1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely through respondeat superior.

Pratt v. Robbins · filed 2020-12-08

As such, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in actions brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement to hold supervisory officials individually liable.

Hollingsworth v. Henry County · filed 2020-12-08

The Court holds that the First Amended Complaint fails to state plausible § 1983 individual capacity claims against Belew, Dean, Page, and Powell. There is no allegation of personal involvement to connect any of these supervisory officials with Archie’s arrest, detention, or medical care during his incarceration at the jail.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional acts solely because of their supervisory roles; a claim requires personal involvement or a causal connection.

Fontaine v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2020-12-09

It is well settled that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of their supervisory role.

Crawley v. Harding · filed 2020-12-09

However, the mere fact that a defendant was a supervisor is insufficient to establish liability because the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisor liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 USC §1983.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ conduct.

Steels v. Watts · filed 2020-12-09

He appears to be claiming that these defendants should be held liable for failing to supervise subordinate jail employees adequately, but there is no general respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ misconduct.

Ware v. St. Louis City Justice Center · filed 2020-12-09

Vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of an administrative or supervisory position.

Stills v. Simpson · filed 2020-12-09

To the extent Plaintiff alleges Defendant Chase is liable to him because he held an administrative or supervisory position such an allegation does not state a claim that is cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation; a supervisory title alone does not establish liability.

Gray v. Nassau County Jail · filed 2020-12-09

Nor does Plaintiff include any factual allegations such that the Court could reasonably construe a plausible Section 1983 claim based on a supervisory liability theory.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations showing a supervisor’s personal involvement in a violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

PIZARRO v. WETZEL · filed 2020-12-09

Because there are no other supporting allegations to show that Mahally and Eyer either had knowledge of or acquiesced in a systematic practice of deprivation of constitutional rights, they cannot incur supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable merely for their employees’ actions; a plaintiff must allege a causal link between the supervisor and the claimed constitutional violation.

(PC) Crump v. O'Campo · filed 2020-12-11

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim when a supervisor’s failure to train, supervise, and review an officer’s conduct plausibly ratifies unlawful conduct.

McDonald v. County of Sonoma · filed 2020-12-11

Adm. Sgt. Kidder’s alleged failure to properly train, supervise, and review DS Perkins’s conduct effectively ratifies the unlawful conduct, which plausibly gives rise to supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Keavney v. O'Brian · filed 2020-12-11

In order to hold a supervisor liable under Section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate either the supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged violation of the constitution or a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Cummings v. Diaz · filed 2020-12-11

Moreover, supervisory officials may only be held liable under § 1983 if Plaintiff alleges their “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or . . . a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2018); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff’s Complaint offers no factual detail from which the Court might reasonably infer a plausible constitutional claim as to Secretary Diaz, Warden Paramo, Associate Warden Covel or Sergeant Keener because he does not allege that any of these Defendants personally committed any of the acts he alleges.

Section 1983 requires allegations that prison supervisors knew of a constitutional deprivation and ignored it to support a claim against them.

Howard v. Meli · filed 2020-12-14

Because the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendants knew about a constitutional deprivation and ignored it, he has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a supervisor’s own conduct and a subordinate’s constitutional violation for supervisory liability.

Solis v. City of Sunnyvale · filed 2020-12-14

Next, Solis does not adequately allege the required causal connection for supervisor liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Harvey v. Easton · filed 2020-12-14

The mere fact that a defendant was a supervisor is insufficient to establish liability because the doctrine of respondeat superior, or supervisor liability, does not apply to actions filed under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor denied a grievance or failed to act on information in it.

Thomas 734768 v. Doolittle · filed 2020-12-14

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations that a supervisor knew of and acquiesced in subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct; a failure-to-train claim requires deliberate indifference to the need to train.

Schlienz v. Pratt · filed 2020-12-15

The district court properly dismissed Schlienz’s action because Schlienz failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Flores v. County of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014) (to state a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must show that the official “was deliberately indifferent to the need to train subordinates”); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (supervisory liability under § 1983 requires “knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct” by subordinates); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely for their subordinates’ conduct; a supervisor must participate in, direct, or know of and fail to prevent a violation.

Stuckey v. California Departmnet of Corrections and Rehabilitation · filed 2020-12-15

Respondeat superior liability is not available under section 1983. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims against Defendants Diaz and Gipson are DISMISSED without prejudice.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor when the allegations plausibly show that the supervisor knew of ongoing constitutional violations and failed to remedy them.

Leniart v. Borchet · filed 2020-12-15

Construed broadly, Leniart’s allegations that he complained about defunct remedies and no available dental treatment due to COVID-19 permits the inference that Warden Buttricks was aware of but failed to remedy ongoing constitutional violations.

Section 1983 liability for a supervisor’s failure to adopt a policy requires a showing of deliberate indifference.

Nelson v. Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections · filed 2020-12-15

Holding Secretary LeBlanc liable for failing to have a policy for searches of transgender visitors requires a showing of deliberate indifference which, based on the Second Amended Complaint, Nelson has not adequately alleged.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor is personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or has a sufficient causal connection to it.

Maney v. Brown · filed 2020-12-15

To the extent Defendants argue that judgment should enter now because they cannot be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged each of the defendants’ direct involvement in the challenged actions here.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violation to show that the supervisor acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference.

McCullough v. Dept of Fam and Protc Services · filed 2020-12-16

In order to establish supervisor liability for constitutional violations by subordinate employees, a plaintiff must show that the supervisor acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to constitutional rights being violated against others by their subordinates. ... In short, as the district court correctly concluded, McCullough’s complaint failed to state a § 1983 claim against White or Jones.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional violation or committed wrongful acts causally connected to it.

Britton v. Klamath County · filed 2020-12-16

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Britton’s supervisory liability claims against defendants Rowley, Davidson, and Skrah because Britton failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these defendants were personally involved in any constitutional violations, or engaged in any wrongful acts causally connected to any constitutional violations.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory position; a supervisor must participate in or direct the violation, or know of it and fail to prevent it.

(PC) Garcia v. Diaz · filed 2020-12-16

Under § 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. ... Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat superior. ... Plaintiff’s allegations against Warden Sherman and CDCR Secretary Diaz appear to be based solely on their role as supervisory personnel. There is no indication that either personally participated in the alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s rights or knew of the violations and failed to act. Accordingly, any claim against these two defendants must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for mere negligence in training or supervising employees.

Davis-Bey v. Pooler · filed 2020-12-16

However, a supervisor is not liable under § 1983 for mere negligence in the training or supervision of his employees.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim when supervisors allegedly knew of a probation officer’s propensity for sexual misconduct and similar abuse by other officers but failed to act.

MILLER v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY SUPERVISION · filed 2020-12-16

In light of the clearly established law that probation officers may not sexually assault their probationers, no reasonable person in Nail or Ford’s position could have believed that doing nothing in light of the information they had was lawful.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a failure to train employees in limited circumstances.

JOHNSON v. GIBSON · filed 2020-12-16

The Court notes that in limited circumstances, a failure to train employees may also give rise to supervisory liability under § 1983.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for indifference to or tacit authorization of a subordinate’s misconduct, but an isolated incident does not establish the required pattern of abuse.

Collins v. Warden · filed 2020-12-16

Collins’s assertions do not demonstrate any pattern of widespread abuse necessary to establish supervisory action or inaction giving rise to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor denied a grievance or failed to act on information in one.

Brochu 945717 v. Godfrey · filed 2020-12-16

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts linking a supervisor’s inaction to a particular constitutional injury; inmates’ knowledge of an officer’s misconduct alone is insufficient.

Anselme v. Griffin · filed 2020-12-17

Other (unspecified) inmates’ knowledge as to Rumsey’s proclivity for sexual contact alone cannot impute supervisory liability to Aldridge—especially if there are no facts in the complaint alleging more than one discrete incident, and no facts further explaining the allegation that Rumsey was “well known” for such misconduct.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation or the supervisor’s actions had a causal connection to it.

Phillips v. May · filed 2020-12-17

A supervisor can be held liable under § 1983 if he personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation or there was a causal connection between his actions and the constitutional infirmity. ... Phillips provided only conclusory statements, and no evidence, showing that White personally participated in the alleged violations or that there was a causal connection between White’s actions and the alleged violations.

Section 1983 requires facts connecting supervisory officials or a department policy to an alleged constitutional violation to state a claim against those officials.

Daker v. Commissioner Homer Bryson · filed 2020-12-17

He did not allege any facts showing this incident arose as a result of GDC policy or that any of the GDC Defendants were involved in the decision to use MK-9. ... The district court’s dismissal of the MK-9 claim against the GDC Defendants, the GDC, and the State of Georgia for failure to state a claim was proper.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory role; the plaintiff must link the supervisor’s own conduct to the constitutional violation through personal involvement, causation, and state of mind.

Medina v. Samuels · filed 2020-12-17

For supervisory liability, it is not enough that a defendant was merely a supervisor for purposes of personal participation, as § 1983 does not “authorize liability under a theory of respondeat superior.” Perry v. Durborow, 892 F.3d 1116, 1121 (10th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, a plaintiff must establish an affirmative link between the supervisor and the constitutional violation, “which requires proof of three interrelated elements: (1) personal involvement; (2) causation; and (3) state of mind.” Keith v. Koerner, 843 F.3d 833, 838 (10th Cir. 2016).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without an underlying constitutional violation.

Stone v. Worcester County Sherriffs Office · filed 2020-12-17

And there can be no supervisory liability for a § 1983 claim “in the absence of an anchoring constitutional violation.” Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 57 (1st Cir. 2001).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a deliberately indifferent policy that causes constitutional harm or personal involvement in the misconduct.

THOMPSON v. WETZEL · filed 2020-12-17

This is not sufficient to state plausible claims since there is no allegation that any Defendant maintained with deliberate indifference a policy, practice or custom which directly caused constitutional harm, or was personally involved or acquiesced in the destruction of Thompson’s legal material and other property.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct solely because of their supervisory positions.

Ashley v. Genovese · filed 2020-12-17

Under § 1983, however, “[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; a supervisory title alone does not establish liability.

Brown v. So · filed 2020-12-18

Brown cannot maintain a claim against Roeseler merely because he is the Sheriff of Sheboygan County. ... Brown instead must allege that Roeseler was personally involved in his delayed treatment or, at least, was aware of the delay in treatment and facilitated, approved, condoned, or knowingly ignored it.

Section 1983 does not impose liability merely because a defendant supervises others; the defendant must be personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Wright v. Jeffreys · filed 2020-12-18

Individuals will not be liable under § 1983 merely for their supervisory roles over others.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because a subordinate made an improper decision; the plaintiff must allege facts supporting supervisory liability.

Kline v. State of Maryland Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services · filed 2020-12-18

Though Plaintiff may have an argument that Graham’s subordinates made an improper determination, the Amended Complaint includes no allegations of widespread abuses by WC] staff that could make Graham liable for an erroneous decision based solely on his status as supervisor in charge.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for supervisory school officials who have actual notice of a teacher’s sexual abuse of a student and respond with deliberate indifference.

KC v. Mayo · filed 2020-12-21

Where, as here, the complaint involves allegations against school officials brought under both Title IX and § 1983, “our court has held that an official in these circumstances must have ‘actual notice’ of the alleged ‘sexual harassment’ or ‘sexual abuse’” to meet the standard for liability.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for subordinates’ actions solely because of their supervisory role.

Lowther v. Harrington · filed 2020-12-21

In general, supervisory personnel may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the actions of subordinate employees based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement or direct responsibility for a deprivation of rights; general supervisory duties alone do not suffice.

Smith v. Karr · filed 2020-12-22

Furthermore, Defendants’ general responsibilities as Warden and Jail Administrator are insufficient to establish direct responsibility for the deprivation of Plaintiff’s civil rights.

Section 1983 does not allow supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior; a claim must allege the supervisor’s personal role in the constitutional harm.

Trujillo v. Central New Mexico Correctional Facility · filed 2020-12-22

The complaint fails to state a claim against Warden Smith for supervisory liability under § 1983. As a result, the Court grants the motion to dismiss all claims against Warden Smith.

A § 1983 failure-to-train-or-supervise claim against a supervisor requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Braun v. Burke · filed 2020-12-23

Braun’s failure-to-train-or-supervise claim against Director Bryant requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the deprivation; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Stewart, Travis v. Syed, Salem · filed 2020-12-28

Since Stewart only speculates that Gohde knew about his HSRs, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that she had sufficient personal involvement to hold her liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove that a supervisory official personally committed the underlying constitutional violation; no separate test for supervisory liability applies.

Tangreti v. Bachmann · filed 2020-12-28

To hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official without relying on a special test for supervisory liability.

A § 1983 failure-to-supervise claim fails without an underlying constitutional violation.

Johns v. City of Florissant · filed 2020-12-28

“A failure to supervise claim brought under § 1983 will ‘automatically fail for lack of an underlying constitutional violation.’” ... Plaintiff has failed to show any underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires specific allegations of similar prior violations to support a failure-to-train claim; a conclusory allegation of a pattern is insufficient.

MALACOW v. THOMPSON · filed 2020-12-29

It is insufficient to allege a pattern or practice of similar constitutional violations in a conclusory fashion, Plaintiff must allege actual instances of similar violations.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for their subordinates; supervisory liability requires the supervisor’s own involvement or a policy or custom that caused the constitutional harm.

HARRIS v. PEER · filed 2020-12-29

Government officials are not vicariously liable under Section 1983 for the acts of their subordinates.

Section 1983 requires plausible allegations that a supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional violation or maintained a policy or custom that caused it; a bare claim of failure to train or supervise is insufficient.

COLEGROVE v. WETZEL · filed 2020-12-29

His bare allegations, without further explanation, do not plausibly allege the existence of a specific policy or custom regarding the destruction of inmate property that created an unreasonable risk of constitutional injury. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Mr. Colegrove’s claim for supervisory liability.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; naming an official without alleging conduct or inaction does not state a claim.

Jones v. Borbon · filed 2020-12-30

Here, as is readily apparent, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts from which the Court could reasonably construe a plausible supervisory liability theory.

A § 1983 claim against a supervisor requires facts showing that the supervisor knew of a constitutional violation and failed to prevent it.

(PC) Hernandez v. Ogboehi · filed 2021-01-04

While the undersigned agrees with the pending findings and recommendations that plaintiff has not yet pled sufficient facts indicating that defendant Onyeje knew of a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights and failed to prevent it, out of an abundance of caution the court will allow plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint as to his claims against defendant Onyeje.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for an employee’s actions; the complaint must allege a causal link between the supervisor and the claimed constitutional violation.

(PC) Blackwell v. Covello · filed 2021-01-04

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged.

Section 1983 requires more than speculative and conclusory allegations that a supervisor failed to supervise subordinates.

Crawford v. Beard · filed 2021-01-04

The Court has reviewed the magistrate judge’s report recommending that: defendant Hall be dismissed due to plaintiff’s speculative and conclusory allegations that Hall failed to properly supervise his subordinates; defendants Williams, Love and Bell be dismissed due to plaintiff’s failure to plead specific facts demonstrating that the defendants conspired against him; and that defendant Gongora be dismissed due to plaintiff’s failure to specify what constitutional right Gongora violated and how he violated that right. ... Plaintiff’s objections are overruled, and the Court adopts the report.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or if the supervisor’s wrongful conduct has a sufficient causal connection to it.

Cooper v. Allison · filed 2021-01-04

A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. ... However, Plaintiff makes no allegation that Defendant Broomfield was personally involved in the incident or that Defendant engaged in any specific wrongful conduct that is causally connected with the alleged failure to protect claim.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s indifference or tacit authorization of a subordinate’s misconduct caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Morris v. Taylor · filed 2021-01-05

A supervisory official cannot be held liable for the acts of a subordinate unless the supervisor’s “indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct” can be deemed to have caused the injury to the plaintiff.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires the official’s personal involvement in the alleged misconduct.

BOOKER v. BOROUGH OF NORTH BRADDOCK · filed 2021-01-05

To establish supervisory liability, as is the case here with respect to Daniele, a plaintiff must also demonstrate that the official was personally involved in the conduct alleged. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged Daniele’s personal involvement in Plaintiff’s initial arrest and detention to establish supervisory liability with respect to that portion of Count V.

Section 1983 does not make a warden liable for other prison officials’ actions merely because of his position; liability requires his own conduct.

Jones v. Thompson · filed 2021-01-08

Additionally, Meisner cannot be liable for the actions of other prison officials simply because he is the warden. Rather, he is responsible only for his own conduct.

Section 1983 requires facts showing supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of a subordinate’s misconduct to hold a supervisor liable.

Collins v. Warden · filed 2021-01-08

Collins’s assertions do not demonstrate any pattern of widespread abuse necessary to establish supervisory action or inaction giving rise to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to have at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Mayes v. Rodela · filed 2021-01-08

At a minimum, a Section 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinates.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of that position; the claim must connect the supervisor to the alleged violation.

McKinstry v. Jefferson County Board of Education · filed 2021-01-11

It is unnecessary to do so, because there is no supervisory liability under § 1983, see Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003), and McKinstry admits she is only speculating as to Pouncey’s personal involvement in employment decisions against her.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ conduct solely because of their supervisory position; the plaintiff must allege personal involvement or a sufficient causal connection.

(PC)Watkins v. Klein · filed 2021-01-11

Under § 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. ... Accordingly, plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim against defendant Lynch.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts plausibly connecting the supervisor’s actions or omissions to the alleged constitutional violation.

Cavitt v. Massachusetts Department of Corrections · filed 2021-01-11

Absent such factual allegations, the Court finds no causal connection between any action or omission of the individual defendants and Cavitt’s confinement conditions in Virginia. For those reasons, the Court will dismiss the § 1983 claims asserted against defendants Mici, Nelligan and Gallant in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, responds with deliberate indifference or tacit approval, and the inaction causes the injury; allegations satisfying those elements can survive a motion to dismiss.

Poling v. Foxwell · filed 2021-01-11

To establish supervisory liability against a warden or other supervisor under § 1983, Mr. Poling must show “(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his [or her] subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed ‘a pervasive and unreasonable risk’ of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices,’; and (3) that there was an ‘affirmative causal link’ between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.” ... Because I find Mr. Poling has sufficiently alleged a cause of action as to each element of Shaw, I find the motion to dismiss must be denied.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Cook v. DuBois · filed 2021-01-11

Thus, Plaintiff appears to be suing Dubois based merely on his supervisory position, which even before Tangreti would not suffice to show personal involvement for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without an underlying constitutional violation.

Crisano v. Grimes · filed 2021-01-12

There can be no supervisory liability, however, when there is no underlying violation of the Constitution.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation; approval of reports after the violation does not alone establish that connection.

Tabayoyon v. City of Vacaville · filed 2021-01-12

Rather, plaintiff must also plead facts demonstrating the supervisor had knowledge of similar constitutional violations prior to the constitutional violations at issue in the case, and yet failed to act. Plaintiff has not provided such allegations here.

Section 1983 does not make an official liable solely for holding a supervisory position; liability requires the official’s own conduct.

McGinnis v. Halawa Correctional Facility · filed 2021-01-12

McGinnis’ claims against any official based solely on his or her supervisory position are DISMISSED with prejudice.

Section 1983 imposes direct liability on supervisors for their own acts, not vicarious liability for their subordinates’ acts.

Feliciano v. Dennyson · filed 2021-01-12

These allegations based on Dennyson’s position are insufficient to state a claim because “[l]iability under § 1983 is direct rather than vicarious; supervisors are responsible for their own acts but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to ensure that subordinates carry out their tasks correctly.” Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of their position; individual liability requires personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation.

BAILEY v. WEXFORD HEALTH IND. LLC. · filed 2021-01-12

Moreover, there is no respondeat superior liability in § 1983 cases. ... Moreover, Mr. Brown's mere position as Warden is not sufficient to invoke liability.

Section 1983 does not make a prison supervisor liable for an ongoing constitutional violation merely because the supervisor affirms a grievance denial.

Brown v. Correction · filed 2021-01-13

This pro forma denial of a grievance - which is all that is argued, without more, does not create an issue of personal involvement in an ongoing Constitutional violation to survive summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in one.

LaPine 305535 v. Lincoln · filed 2021-01-14

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory official sued for an Eighth Amendment violation to have personally known of and disregarded an excessive risk to the plaintiff’s health or safety.

Zielinski v. Annucci · filed 2021-01-14

Thus, in the context of an Eighth Amendment claim against a supervisory official, a plaintiff must establish that the supervisory official himself acted with deliberate indifference—meaning that [the official] personally knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to [the plaintiff's] health or safety." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). ... Thus, plaintiff failed to establish a clear likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that he has suffered a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights as a result of a "policy" implemented by defendant Annucci.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely for their subordinates’ acts or omissions.

(PC) Roberts v. Lynch · filed 2021-01-15

Under § 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor automatically liable for a subordinate’s conduct; liability must rest on the supervisor’s own acts or omissions.

Justiniano v. Walker · filed 2021-01-19

Generally, a supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory -- a "supervisor's liability must be premised on his [or her] own acts or omissions" and does not attach automatically even if a subordinate is found liable.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor accused of deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs to have known of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm.

Weis v. Lamont · filed 2021-01-19

To the extent that Weis’s claim is essentially a supervisory liability claim, Weis must plead and prove that the defendants had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to Weis and disregarded it. Weis has not alleged that any of these defendants were even aware of Weis’s serious medical condition, let alone that they disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to Weis. Accordingly, I will dismiss Weis’s claim against defendants Governor Lamont, former DOC Commissioner Cook, current DOC Commissioner Quiros, Warden Rodriguez, and Warden Guadarrama.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on a supervisor for a subordinate’s conduct without the supervisor’s personal participation in the constitutional violation.

Poynter Eager Jr. v. Thomas · filed 2021-01-20

In a suit arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the doctrine of respondeat superior generally does not apply and liability attaches only upon a defendant’s personal participation in the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on prison officials whose only involvement is denying a prisoner's grievances.

Hendrix v. Hudson · filed 2021-01-20

But Holcomb, Steece, Warren, and Russell were not responsible for Plaintiff's injuries; their only involvement in the case appears to be their denial of Plaintiff's grievances. ... Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to show that defendants Holcomb, Steece, P. Warren, and Richard D. Russell are liable for the misconduct alleged.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability when a supervisor participates in or directs a violation, or knows of it and fails to prevent it.

Fowler v. Simmons · filed 2021-01-20

A supervisor is liable for the constitutional violation of his or her employee if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.

Section 1983 generally does not make supervisors liable for their employees’ actions; a plaintiff must specifically allege a causal link between the supervisor and the constitutional violation.

(PC) Davis v. Burton · filed 2021-01-21

Additionally, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. ... Therefore, to the extent plaintiff is making claims of supervisory liability against warden Burton, those claims are not cognizable here.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between a supervisor and the alleged deprivation; a supervisor is not liable solely because of an employee’s conduct.

(PC) Wilbanks v. Tappen · filed 2021-01-21

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. ... Plaintiff fails to include any charging allegations as to defendants Lynch or Sanchez.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim against a sheriff who directs deputies to use excessive force, even if the sheriff is absent when they do so.

Tilman v. Clarke County · filed 2021-01-21

Therefore, although Plaintiff admits that Kemp was not present at the time of the alleged beating, id., Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against Sheriff Kemp for excessive force under a theory of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors; a plaintiff must show that the supervisor personally violated her constitutional rights.

Doe v. Chee · filed 2021-01-21

Because there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, Doe must show that Lucero-Ortega “personally violated her constitutional rights.” Perry v. Durborow, 892 F.3d 1116, 1121 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing Keith v. Koerner, 843 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 2016) (Keith II)).

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor when the supervisor’s conduct has a sufficient causal connection to a subordinate’s constitutional violation; conclusory allegations do not establish that connection.

Alvarado v. Medical · filed 2021-01-21

A supervisor may also be liable under § 1983 for the acts of her subordinates “if there exists . . . a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” ... Those conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a causal connection between these defendants’ conduct and plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a subordinate’s conduct; the supervisor must be personally involved in the alleged violation.

Dabney 572988 v. Washington · filed 2021-01-22

Because Plaintiff’s § 1983 action is premised on nothing more than respondeat superior liability, his action fails to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory liability claim to identify the supervisor’s personal involvement or a policy, practice, or custom the supervisor established that caused the alleged injury.

PERRY v. WELL-PATH · filed 2021-01-22

Perry conclusory allegations that Wetzel controlled policies at the DOC and was responsible for ensuring humane conditions at SCI-Phoenix are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983 on a supervisory liability theory. Conclusory allegations are insufficient, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678, and Perry identifies no actual policy, practice or custom that Wetzel established that caused his alleged injuries.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation.

Pratt v. Litz · filed 2021-01-22

Plaintiff’s allegations against Deputy Warden Litz fail to establish the personal involvement necessary to create § 1983 liability against her.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the wrongful conduct; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Lewis v. Harry · filed 2021-01-22

Liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is personal in nature, and to be liable, a defendant must have been personally involved in the wrongful conduct.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement; failing to take corrective action after an inmate grievance does not establish it.

Taylor v. Bordon · filed 2021-01-22

In addition, a failure to take corrective action in response to an inmate grievance or complaint does not supply the necessary personal involvement for § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for a subordinate’s conduct solely because of their supervisory position.

Weger v. Correct Care Solutions LLC · filed 2021-01-25

They did not have direct contact with Mr. Weger and cannot be held responsible under § 1983 for any harm done to him by a subordinate employee on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because of their supervisory role.

Graham v. McMaster · filed 2021-01-25

In his Report, the magistrate judge recommends that the court dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice for the following reasons: ... (3) the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior generally do not apply in § 1983 actions; ... (ECF No. 47 at 3–8). ... The court, therefore, adopts the magistrate judge’s Report, id., and incorporates it herein.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely because employees under their supervision allegedly violated someone’s rights.

Perez v. Lawrence · filed 2021-01-26

Lawrence cannot be held liable merely because he may have been the supervisor of other Defendants who allegedly committed constitutional violations. See Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (no supervisory liability in § 1983 actions).

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s failure to use a specific practice creates an unreasonable risk the supervisor knows about and disregards, and that failure causes a subordinate’s violation.

LOVE v. THOMPSON · filed 2021-01-26

A prison official may be responsible under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the plaintiff identifies the following elements: (1) a specific supervisory practice or procedure that the supervisor failed to employ, and show that (2) the existing custom and practice without the identified, absent custom or procedure created an unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury, (3) the supervisor was aware that this unreasonable risk existed, (4) the supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5) the underling's violation resulted from the supervisor's failure to employ that supervisory practice or procedure.

Section 1983 requires deliberate indifference to a student’s constitutional rights for a school official’s personal supervisory liability for a subordinate’s sexual abuse.

Doe v. Taylor Independent School Dist. · filed 1994-03-03

We therefore hold that a school official's liability arises only at the point when the student shows that the official, by action or inaction, demonstrates a deliberate indifference to his or her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits an inadequate-hiring claim against school officials when the hiring procedures were inadequate, the officials were deliberately indifferent in adopting them, and the policy directly caused a constitutional injury.

Doe v. ISD · filed 1996-04-24

To prove that a hiring policy violated her rights under § 1983, Jane must show that (1) the hiring procedures were inadequate; (2) the school officials were deliberately indifferent in adopting the hiring policy; and (3) the inadequate hiring policy directly caused the plaintiff's injury.

Section 1983 makes supervisory school officials liable for a subordinate’s constitutional misconduct only when they had notice of a pattern of misconduct, were deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized it, failed to take sufficient remedial action, and thereby caused injury.

Kinman v. Omaha Public School District · filed 1996-08-26

The individual defendants are liable under section 1983 only if Kinman can prove the following: 1) that they received notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by subordinates; 2) that they demonstrated deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the offensive acts; 3) that they failed to take sufficient remedial action; and 4) that such failure proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor for a subordinate’s statements.

Oren Gene Gamble, Sr. v. Mike Kemna Tony Gammon Ellis McSwain Dean Minor Darrin Morgan · filed 1997-02-05

As for Prudden's memorandum stating that Gamble was fond of filing grievances, Prudden was not a defendant in this action, and Kemna cannot be held vicariously liable for his statements.

Section 1983 requires actual or constructive notice that an officer poses a danger to constitutional rights before a supervisor’s failure to control that officer can amount to reckless indifference.

Muñoz v. Dávila · filed 1997-02-05

Unless eodefendant Toledo-Dávila was on notice that Luis Sotomayor presented a danger to the public, no reasonable jury could find that his failure to control Sotomayor amounts to reckless indifference.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor based solely on a subordinate's actions.

Bloodworth v. James Gomez, Warden, Vacaville Correctional Facility California Department of Corrections · filed 1997-02-06

Because there is no evidence of personal participation or knowledge on the part of Gomez, and because there is no vicarious liability under § 1983, summary judgment was appropriate.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor through respondeat superior; the supervisor must have condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the misconduct.

Walker v. James Russell Jerry Hofbauer S. Lay Kaurf, Sgt. · filed 1997-02-06

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 lawsuits to impute liability to supervisory personnel and Walker has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact showing that Hofbauer condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged misconduct.

Section 1983 does not make supervisory officials liable for damages merely because a plaintiff notified them of alleged unconstitutional conduct; liability requires personal responsibility for or direction of the conduct.

Robinson v. George C. Welborn, Alan L. Frentzel, and Boniface Gross · filed 1997-02-06

These correspondences, whereby Robinson notified the defendants of his situation, do not bring Welborn and Frentzel into the zone of liability. That they were informed of the situation (and that Welborn took some action on Robinson's behalf) does not establish that Welborn and Frentzel had personal responsibility for the complained of conduct or that it occurred at either's direction.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts showing that the supervisor authorized, approved of, or knowingly acquiesced to unconstitutional conduct.

McVeigh v. Opicka · filed 1997-02-07

Finally, with regard to defendant Opicka, McVeigh failed to allege any facts showing that defendant Opicka authorized, approved of, or knowingly acquiesced to any unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 requires allegations connecting a supervisory defendant to the constitutional violation through personal conduct or a policy or custom; a supervisory title alone is insufficient.

Taylor v. City of New York · filed 1997-02-11

Even when viewed in the aforementioned favorable light, plaintiff has failed to allege any specific conduct by which the moving defendants can be held liable under Section 1983. Plaintiff has not alleged that Sielaff or DeRosa were even tangentially involved in the events underlying plaintiffs Section 1983 action. Moreover, while it is undisputed that Sielaff and DeRosa occupied supervisory positions, plaintiffs Complaint fails to allege the existence of a policy or custom which led to plaintiffs injuries, much less- that these defendants created, acquiesced in, or even had knowledge of such a policy or custom.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires deliberate indifference by the supervisor and a close affirmative link between the supervisor’s conduct and a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Jones v. Wellham · filed 1997-02-11

While a municipal liability claim based upon a particular official's attributed conduct and a supervisory liability claim against that offi- cial based upon the same conduct are not perfectly congruent, see Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994), each requires proof both of the official's deliberate indifference and of a close affirmative link between his conduct and a resulting constitutional violation by a subordinate. See id.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a particularized failure showing deliberate indifference and a close causal link between that failure and the injury.

Carrigan v. State of Del. · filed 1997-02-18

In determining whether to hold a supervisory official liable, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adheres to a two part standard. First, the plaintiff must identify with particularity what the supervisory officials failed to do that demonstrates deliberate indifference. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate a close causal link between the alleged failure and the alleged injury.

A supervisory official who learns of alleged constitutional misconduct and fails to remedy it may face a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage.

Interboro Institute, Inc. v. Maurer · filed 1997-02-18

As to the defendant McCall, the Complaint states that after being informed of the wrongful conduct of the defendants Attmore, his subordinates, and the defendant Nolan, McCall failed to remedy the wrong. ... These allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim as against the defendant McCall.

A supervisor who actively participates in the alleged deprivation may remain a defendant in a Section 1983 action.

Bullock v. Barham · filed 1997-03-12

The defendants argue that some of them are not the proper targets of this suit. Specifically, they claim that Mr. Bullock has not stated a claim against Keith Cooper, the warden at Joliet, because he acted only in a supervisory capacity. Mr. Bullock, however, alleges that Mr. Cooper “acted upon the decision of William Barham and ordered the plaintiff into the general population on April 16, 1994.” Compl. ¶ 17. This statement clearly identifies Mr. Cooper as an active participant and not merely as a supervisor. Therefore, he will not be dismissed from the case.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if an affirmative link connects the constitutional deprivation to the supervisor’s control, direction, personal participation, or failure to supervise.

Kiesling v. Troughton · filed 1997-03-13

This court has held that a supervisor is not liable under § 1983 unless there is an affirmative link between the constitutional deprivation and the supervisor’s exercise of control or direction, his personal participation, or his failure to supervise. See Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1527 (10th Cir. 1988). The record before us contains no evidence indicating that appellant suffered a constitutional deprivation, nor is there evidence the Lincoln County Commissioners could be liable under the Meade standard.

Section 1983 requires deliberate indifference, rather than mere negligence, to hold a supervisor liable.

Green v. Branson · filed 1997-03-14

Liability of a supervisor under § 1983 must be predicated on the supervisor's deliberate indifference, rather than mere negligence.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for a prison official’s own approval and maintenance of regulations that could be found arbitrary, without relying on respondeat superior.

Weiler v. James Purkett Leah Embly · filed 1997-03-14

He is not potentially liable for the acts of others, but for his own acts in approving and maintaining regulations that could be found to be arbitrary. Therefore, Weiler’s claim against him does not depend on re-spondeat superior principles.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a constitutional deprivation and a supervisor’s personal participation, control or direction, or failure to supervise.

Green v. Branson · filed 1997-03-14

To establish a supervisor's liability under § 1983 Green must show that "an 'affirmative link' exists between the [constitutional] deprivation and either the supervisor's 'personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise.' " Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1527 (10th Cir.1988).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability unless a subordinate violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Robinson v. Metts · filed 1997-03-17

However, there can be no supervisory liability against defendant Metts under § 1983 without a violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights by one of the other defendants.

A supervisory official is liable under § 1983 only if she was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Brown v. Mary Hardy-Hall and Cheri Laurent · filed 1997-03-18

However, a supervisory official cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless she had a direct, personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not allow a defendant to be held liable solely under a theory of respondeat superior.

Jones v. Hannigan · filed 1997-03-26

Defendants may not be sued in a § 1983 action based on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires specific facts showing that a supervisor directed a constitutional violation or actually knew of it; conclusory allegations and constructive knowledge do not suffice.

JAMES BY AND THROUGH JAMES v. Unified School Dist. No. 512 · filed 1997-03-28

James presents no specific factual allegations that either defendant directed the violation or had actual knowledge of the violation. The plaintiff’s allegation that both defendants had constructive knowledge does not satisfy the standard.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a sheriff for deputies’ misconduct merely because state law makes the sheriff answerable for it.

Wyatt v. Fowler · filed 1997-04-21

The last sentence states: “The sheriff shall in all cases be answerable for neglect of duty or misconduct in office of any deputy.” Wyatt contends this state statute renders Sheriff vicariously liable under § 1983. We disagree.

A police supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if the supervisor knew or should have known that failure to discipline, supervise, and control an officer was very likely to lead to excessive force.

Rivera v. Medina · filed 1997-04-29

If codefendant Toledo Dávila’s knew or should have known that the failure to discipline, supervise and control Officer Medina Vargas was very likely to lead to his.alleged excessive use of force, Toledo Dávila may be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability for prison supervisors only when their wrongful conduct has a sufficient causal connection to the constitutional violation.

Gary v. Jernigan v. Robert Borg J. Valencia D.J. Evans E. Lewis R. Harikian R. Brown J. Franz G.W. Shepherd · filed 1997-04-29

As supervisory officials, Harikian and Brown may be liable under section 1983 if Jernigan proved "a sufficient causal connection between [their] wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation." ... Our review of the record reflects that Jernigan offered no evidence of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not make a mayor liable for a police officer’s actions solely under respondeat superior.

Newton v. Town of Columbia · filed 1997-05-16

Moreover, the mayor, as a matter of both state and federal law, is not subject to liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior based upon Armstrong's actions.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for an officer’s unreasonable search if the supervisor personally directed it or actually knew of and acquiesced in it.

Lewis v. Nelson · filed 1997-06-02

We have determined that a supervisor of officers who conduct an unreasonable search may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where there are “‘allegation of personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence,’” Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1213 n. 3 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1400 (10th Cir. 1992)). However, in this case, Lewis has failed to allege that Sergeant Woolley acted as a supervisor to Officer Hylton during the search and seizure, and there are no allegations of personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence.

A supervisory official is liable under § 1983 only if the official had direct responsibility for the improper action.

Spiegel v. Cortese · filed 1997-06-03

Consequently, for a supervisory official to be liable under § 1983, that official must have had direct responsibility for the improper action.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts showing that the supervisor participated in or directed the violation, or knew of it and failed to prevent it.

Swan v. George A. Smith R. Banks, Correctional Officer M.A. MacIel Correctional Officer · filed 1997-06-09

Although the district court correctly determined that Swan's complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that Smith participated in or directed the alleged violations, or knew of the alleged violations and failed to act to prevent them, see Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989), the district court failed to provide Swan with a statement of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend, see Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir.1987).

Section 1983 makes a supervisor liable for a constitutional violation when the supervisor directly participates, fails to remedy a violation learned of through a report or appeal, creates or knowingly maintains a policy fostering it, or is grossly negligent in supervising those who caused it.

Sealey v. Giltner · filed 1997-06-16

A supervisory official is liable for constitutional violations if he or she (1) directly participated in the violation; (2) failed to remedy the violation after learning of it through a report or appeal; (3) created a custom or policy fostering the violation or allowed the custom or policy to continue after learning of it; or (4) was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who caused the violation.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a prison supervisor knew of a pervasive risk of harm to an inmate and failed to address it before the supervisor can be held liable for that risk.

Rorie v. Freeman · filed 1997-06-19

We find, however, that the claim against Secretary Franklin Free- man was properly dismissed because there is nothing in the record to suggest that Freeman knew of a pervasive risk of harm to Appellant and failed to address the problem.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for a subordinate’s acts; the supervisor must encourage the misconduct or otherwise directly participate in it.

Reed v. Knox County Dept. of Human Services · filed 1997-06-23

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983 and as director of KCDHS, he cannot be held liable for the acts of his subordinates absent proof that he encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.

Section 1983 claims against supervisors require personal involvement in the rights deprivation or a causal connection between their actions and the deprivation.

Jones v. Kirkland · filed 1997-06-25

Accordingly, dismissal of the section 1983 claims against appellees could not be supported by any failure of appellant to plead appellees were personally involved in the deprivation of his rights, or at least that there was a causal connection between appellees' actions and the deprivation of his rights.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between a supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional injury; a post-incident investigation of a completed use of excessive force does not itself establish that link.

Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs · filed 1997-07-14

Hence, King’s “misconduct” in the post-incident investigation cannot have caused, or even contributed to, the deprivation of plaintiffs right to be free from the use of excessive force, since that deprivation had already occurred.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on an official for failing to stop another official’s constitutional misconduct when the first official lacks actual supervisory control over the wrongdoer.

Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 1997-07-14

Regardless of whether the evidence presented by Robinson would be adequate if Edwards had actual supervisory authority over Dickerson, we do not believe that Edwards can be held liable under § 1983 for failing to take action to correct the behavior of an individual over whom he had no actual control.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on prison supervisors solely because they supervise staff who allegedly violated constitutional rights.

Malsh v. Garcia · filed 1997-07-15

The fact that Coombe and Hanslmaier had supervisory authority over the prison staff is insufficient to hold them personally liable for damages arising from constitutional violations alleged under § 1983.

A prison supervisor can face a § 1983 claim for failing to act after receiving letters alleging unconstitutional treatment.

Silvey v. Schriro · filed 1997-07-16

The dismissal of this claim as to Schriro also must be reversed, as Silvey’s pro se allegation that he sent Schriro letters complaining about his unconstitutional treatment, liberally construed, states a claim that Schriro, as a supervisor, is liable for failing to act.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of constitutional violations and then fails to act to prevent them.

Flournoy v. Pacheo · filed 1997-07-18

Supervisory liability may be based on a supervisor's knowledge of constitutional violations and subsequent lack of action in preventing the violations.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Whisman Ex Rel. Whisman v. Rinehart · filed 1997-07-23

Clearly, claims based upon respondeat superior are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior, but permits claims based on failure to train or supervise and on a supervisor’s role in an unconstitutional custom or practice.

Whisman v. Rinehart · filed 1997-07-23

Defendants contend the supervisory officials, Jines, Cox and Blair, are immune from liability. Clearly, claims based upon respondeat superior are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Frey v. City of Herculaneum, 44 F.3d at 672. The claims against the supervisory officials, however, are based upon failure to properly train and supervise as well as creating, encouraging and following the unconstitutional custom and practice of detaining children for thirty days without a due process hearing. Both these claims are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors merely because they oversee officials who commit the challenged acts.

Hicks v. Cassilly · filed 1997-07-24

As an initial matter, the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Captain Bane and Sheriff Mele ... on all counts, because a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be predicated on the doctrine of respondeat superior, ... and because there is no evidence that these officers either participated in the procurement of the warrants at issue here or assisted in the execution of those warrants.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity supervisory liability when the supervisor was personally involved in the incident causing the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Kubik v. Brown · filed 1997-07-29

A plaintiff may seek to impose liability against a supervisor in his individual capacity where it is found that the supervisor had personal involvement in the incidents which caused the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because a subordinate violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Otey v. Marshall · filed 1997-07-30

Section 1983 liability cannot attach to a supervisor merely because a subordinate violated someone's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a subordinate’s denial of medical care based only on conclusory inadequate-training allegations and unsupported claims of inadequate supervision.

Hutto v. Davis · filed 1997-08-01

Neither plaintiffs conclusory complaint about inadequate training of Wood nor her unsubstantiated claim of inadequate supervision provides a proper basis for imposing liability on Wood’s and Farmer’s supervisors under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides no claim against a sheriff for a death when the officers involved did not deprive the decedent of a constitutional right.

Tauke v. Stine · filed 1997-08-01

Whether it is construed as a respondeat superior claim, as the court below construed it, or as an independent claim for abandoning a duty imposed by state law, it fails because the other defendants did not deprive Mr. Tauke of any constitutional right, and therefore no claim under § 1983 can lie against anyone for Mr. Tauke's death.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged wrong and does not impose liability on supervisors solely for their subordinates’ conduct.

Baron v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey · filed 1997-09-04

The court therefore grants defendants’ partial summary judgment on the § 1983 claims asserted against the Commissioners in their official capacity due to the inapplicability of the respondeat superior doctrine and the lack of personal involvement in the firing of plaintiffs.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on public officials for the acts of their subordinates.

Arnold v. Moore · filed 1997-09-08

Respondeat superior cannot form the basis for liability for a § 1983 claim.