42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not authorize a civil rights action against a state administrative agency because the agency is not a person under the statute.

Sykes v. State of California (Department of Motor Vehicles) · filed 1974-05-01

The State of California Department of Motor Vehicles is not a “person” within the meaning of the Civil Rights Statutes and is thus also immune from suit under those statutes.

Section 1983 does not authorize a suit against a state agency because the agency is not a "person" under the statute.

10 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1092, 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,203 Mary Vick, Cross-Appellee v. Texas Employment Commission, Cross · filed 1975-06-12

The § 1983 suit was directed at an agency of the state. We do not think TEC a “person” under § 1983, Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 586, 587-88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868, 95 S.Ct. 126, 42 L.Ed.2d 107 (1974); therefore, the trial court was without jurisdiction over this head of Vick’s complaint. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973).

Section 1983 does not authorize equitable relief or damages against a state agency because the agency is not a statutory “person”.

Roe v. Arizona Board of Regents · filed 1975-06-24

However, neither equitable relief nor damages can be awarded under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Board of Regents, a state agency, since it is not a “person” within the meaning of said statute.

Section 1983 treats individual state officials as persons who may be sued for damages or injunctive relief for deprivations of federally secured rights under color of state law.

Beauchamp v. Jones · filed 1976-04-19

It is clear that a person who is alleged to have acted under color of state law to deprive another of a federally secured right may be sued for damages under Section 1983. ... It is equally clear that such a person may be sued for injunctive relief even though the relief requested will require him to exercise authority which he has solely by virtue of his official position and even though that' relief may entail the future expenditure of public funds. ... We conclude that the individual defendants are “persons” under Section 1983, that the complaint states a claim under that Section, and that jurisdiction is sound under Section 1343(3).

Section 1983 does not treat state agencies as “persons” that can be sued under the statute.

Edelberg v. The Illinois Racing Board · filed 1976-08-09

The trial court correctly noted that the Illinois Racing Board as an agency of the state cannot be made a party-defendant in a § 1983 action. State agencies are not “persons” for purposes of the Civil Rights Act.

State agencies are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Diaz v. Ward · filed 1977-09-26

Defendants challenge this Court’s jurisdiction over defendants State Board of Parole and Department of Correctional Services, on the ground that such entities are not “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The contention is clearly correct, and there can be no § 1983 jurisdiction over these defendants, whether the relief demanded be viewed as legal or equitable.

Section 1983 does not authorize suits against states or state agencies protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity, which are not persons within the statute's meaning.

United States v. State of South Carolina · filed 1978-01-16

We also dismiss the plaintiff-intervenors’ causes of action under Sections 1981 and 1983 against all defendants except the members and officers of the institutional defendants. ... States are immune from suit by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment on the basis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... None of these defendants are “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize a claim against a state because a state is not a “person” within the meaning of the statute.

Wayland v. Commonwealth · filed 1981-01-12

Plaintiff does not have a cause of action against the Commonwealth under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. The state is not a “person” within the meaning of sec. 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). This is true regardless of whether the action is for injunctive or monetary relief. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 701 n.66.(1978).

Section 1983 permits a state agency to be treated as a “person” in a state-court action seeking prospective injunctive relief, but requires conduct under color of law that actually deprives a claimant of federal rights, privileges, or immunities.

Gumbhir v. Kansas State Board of Pharmacy · filed 1982-06-11

We think the sounder view in a case such as this, where prospective injunctive relief is sought, is that a state agency should be considered a “person” under the statute. ... We conclude under the facts of this case the Kansas State Board of Pharmacy is a “person” as contemplated in § 1983. ... The conduct complained of must have been by some person acting under color of law. ... To come under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such conduct must have also subjected the complainant to the deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... We are convinced § 1988 is applicable only in instances where the conduct complained of is an actual deprivation of federal rights, privileges and immunities. ... We therefore conclude the state claim upon which Gumbhir prevailed below did not involve a common nucleus of operative facts with a substantial federal claim because the Kansas State Board of Pharmacy did not subject Gumbhir to a deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Thus, Gumbhir is not a prevailing party as required since there was no 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation upon which a civil rights attorney fee claim could be based.

Section 1983 does not treat a state agency functioning as an arm or alter ego of the state as a statutory person subject to suit.

Cribb v. Pelham · filed 1982-11-24

Additionally, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the defendant Patrol is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats state administrative agencies as persons subject to suit for violations of federally protected rights.

Rhode Island Affiliate, American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Rhode Island Lottery Commission · filed 1982-12-16

The Dictionary Act presumption that the term “person” includes all “bodies politic and corporate” applies to state administrative agencies and there is nothing in the language or legislative history of § 1983 to rebut this presumption. Indeed, interpreting § 1983 as encompassing administrative agencies furthers the broad remedial purposes of that statute by permitting plaintiffs who allege that state agencies have violated their federally protected rights to vindicate those rights.

A state agency that is the state's alter ego is both protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity and not a person under Section 1983.

Croatan Books, Inc. v. Com. of Va. · filed 1983-11-04

In summary, we can see the State Corporation Commission as immune from suit both because it partakes of the Commonwealth’s Eleventh Amendment immunity and because, like Virginia itself, it is not a “person” under Section 1983.

State agencies are not persons amenable to suit under § 1983.

Ingenito v. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF NJ · filed 1983-07-19

It is clearly accepted that state agencies are not amenable to suit under § 1983, because they are not "persons" within the meaning of the civil rights statutes.

State agencies are not persons amenable to suit under § 1983.

Ingenito v. Department of Corrections · filed 1983-07-19

It is clearly accepted that state agencies are not amenable to suit under § 1983, because they are not “persons” within the meaning of the civil rights statutes.

Section 1983 does not authorize a suit against a state agency because a state agency is not a person within the statute.

Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad Co. v. Illinois · filed 1984-09-26

We hold that the federal courts lack jurisdiction over this matter as a section 1983 suit because a state agency is not a “person” within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act.

States and state agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Holbrook v. Tennessee Department of Employment Security · filed 1984-10-12

Section 1983 permits a cause of action against any person who under color of law deprives any citizen of rights secured under the Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. States and agencies of the states are not persons for the purposes of Section 1983. ... Inasmuch as the State of Tennessee and the Department have not waived their immunity, the Court hereby DISMISSES those parties.

A state and its agencies are not persons subject to § 1983 damages claims, while a state executive official sued individually has only qualified immunity.

Hambley v. STATE, DEPT. OF NAT. RESOURCES · filed 1984-11-14

The court did not err in dismissing the count as to the department. ... Section 1983 only provides for suits against “persons.” Florida is not a person within the meaning of § 1983 and, therefore, is not subject to a § 1983 claim for damages by way of a suit against ... an arm of state government ... [citations omitted]. ... However, Shields, acting as a state official in his executive capacity to enforce the law, enjoys only a qualified immunity.

A state is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Merritt for Merritt v. State · filed 1985-02-05

Thus we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Count IX of respondent’s Amended Complaint on the grounds that the State of Idaho is not a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize private parties or state agencies to sue a state directly in federal court.

Board of School Directors of Milwaukee v. Wisconsin · filed 1985-04-29

The decisional law contains no exceptions allowing private parties or state agencies to sue a state directly in federal court unless such authority is granted by federal statute or the state has waived its immunity. The court finds no indication of waiver by the State of Wisconsin in this case, and the Supreme Court has decided that a civil rights statute such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contains no grant of authority to sue a state directly.

A state is a person under section 1983, but Congress did not override traditional state sovereign immunity, so the state remains immune from damages in its own courts unless it consents to suit.

Karchefske v. Department of Mental Health · filed 1985-05-20

Thus far, we are persuaded that the state is a § 1983 person and that the question of immunity requires separate analysis. ... Although Congress declined to subject the states to § 1983 actions, a state may waive its immunity and consent to suit.

A state and its agencies are not persons under § 1983 and cannot be sued absent the state’s waiver of sovereign immunity.

Spurrell v. Block · filed 1985-06-10

While a state may waive its sovereign immunity and consent to suit under § 1983 in a state court, our State has not done so. ... State agencies, such as the Department of Social and Health Services, are likewise not considered "persons" within the meaning of the act, being in legal effect the same as the State.

A state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Begay v. State · filed 1985-12-10

The State of New Mexico is not a person within the meaning of the federal civil rights statutes.

A state is not a person subject to liability under Section 1983.

St. Mary's Hospital & Health Center v. State · filed 1986-03-19

The state is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not create a cognizable claim against a state or one of its departments.

Davis v. State · filed 1986-10-30

And insofar as claimant urges that his notice of claim sets forth a compensable cause of action for an alleged violation of 42 USC § 1983, the law is unequivocal that this section does not give rise to a cognizable claim against the State or a department thereof ... .

Kansas treated the state as a person for Section 1983 actions seeking prospective injunctive relief but held that sovereign immunity barred Section 1983 damages suits against state agencies absent waiver.

Beck v. Kansas Adult Authority · filed 1987-03-27

We have carefully considered the issue, and hold that, while the State of Kansas is a person for the purposes of Section 1983 actions wherein injunctive relief is sought, the State has not waived its sovereign immunity from suits seeking damages under that section. The trial court was correct in dismissing the Section 1983 claims as against these defendants.

A state is not a person subject to a damages suit under § 1983.

Smith v. Department of Public Health · filed 1987-08-07

The state is not a "person” for purposes of a damage suit under § 1983.

A state is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Garcia v. State · filed 1988-04-05

We find ourselves in agreement with Division Two’s conclusion and hold that a state is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against states in state or federal court because states are not persons under the statute.

Vest v. Schafer · filed 1988-06-17

Therefore, it follows from Quern that states are not subject to suit under section 1983 in federal or state court.

A state agency such as the Minnesota Highway Patrol is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Brotzler v. County of Scott · filed 1988-07-19

Finally, Minnesota Highway Patrol correctly points out that it is an agency of the state and is therefore not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not give rise to a claim against a state.

Zagarella v. State · filed 1989-04-10

We further note that so much of the claim as alleged a violation of the claimant’s civil rights pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 did not state a cause of action since that section does not give rise to a claim against the State (see, Davis v State of New York, 124 AD2d 420; Matter of Thomas v New York Temporary State Commn. on Regulation of Lobbying, 83 AD2d 723, affd 56 NY2d 656).

Section 1983 treats state agencies as persons when injunctive relief is involved.

Darling v. Kansas Water Office · filed 1989-05-26

State agencies, therefore, are considered “persons” under § 1983 where injunctive relief is involved. In the case before us, no injunctive relief was obtained.

State officials sued in their official capacities are persons under § 1983 when the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief rather than monetary damages.

American Civil Liberties Union of Mississippi, Inc. v. Mabus · filed 1989-07-27

For this purpose state officials are "persons" under the Civil Rights Act and the case is properly brought.

A state is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Robison v. Francis · filed 1989-07-28

The trial court ruled that it was bound by State v. Green, 633 P.2d 1381 (Alaska 1981), where this court held that the state was not a “person” within the meaning of section 1983. ... The Vest decision clearly applies to the instant case. The trial court’s decision dismissing the section 1983 action is affirmed.

A state commission is not a person that can be sued for damages under § 1983.

Pride Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Rhode Island Motor Vehicle Dealers' License Commission · filed 1989-09-06

The Commission is not liable in damages to plaintiffs for several reasons. First, the Commission is not a “person” which may be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat state officials acting in their official capacities as persons; the capacity in which they acted controls over how they were sued.

Rice v. Ohio Department of Transportation · filed 1989-10-13

Although the complaint filed by Mr. Rice alleges at one point that the individual defendants were acting both “in their official and personal capacities,” the record does not suggest in any way that the defendants’ actions were somehow unofficial. The capacity in which the individual defendants were in fact acting is what matters, not the capacity in which they were sued; congressional intent is not to be circumvented, Will says, “by a mere pleading device.”

Section 1983 does not treat state agencies that are part of the state as persons who can be sued.

Grabow v. Southern State Correctional Facility · filed 1989-10-16

Therefore, the defendants are part of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment. Accordingly, defendants are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a state official as a person when sued for injunctive relief.

Wiegers & Greenwald Design & Construction, Inc. v. Guffey · filed 1989-10-25

Neither states nor state officials are "persons" under Section 1983 for the purpose of a suit for damages. A state official is a "person" under § 1983 when sued for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a State because a State is not a “person” under the statute.

McNamara v. Honeyman · filed 1989-11-13

As the trial judge correctly ruled, the Commonwealth is not a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state agency, even if the state has waived Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Bellamy v. Lt. R.C. Borders · filed 1989-11-22

Consequently, the present § 1983 claim is not cognizable against the defendant state agencies regardless of whether they have waived their immunity to suit under the eleventh amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities, but it permits claims for injunctive relief against them.

Aldabbagh v. Arizona Department of Liquor Licenses & Control · filed 1989-12-14

In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45, 58 (1989), the Supreme Court held that in a state court action for damages, states and state officials acting within their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. Will, however, does not bar an action against the state or state officials for injunctive relief. Claim 10 may proceed as to injunctive relief only.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against states or state highway patrol agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Simmons v. City of Georgetown, S.C. · filed 1990-03-07

The judgments in favor of the State of Florida and the Florida Highway Patrol are affirmed because these entities are not "persons" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state department of social services as a “person” in a noninjunctive action.

Weaver v. Colorado Department of Social Services · filed 1990-03-22

The department is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), and this was not an injunctive action allowing the award of such fees.

Section 1983 does not treat state agencies as “persons,” so a claim against a state agency is unavailable under it.

Santiago v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 1990-04-12

A Section 1983 claim against the State is unavailable here because the intention of Congress in enacting Section 1983 was not to include State agencies within the term “person.”

States and their agencies are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983, including suits seeking injunctive relief.

McCabe v. Caleel · filed 1990-04-30

As for the State of Illinois and its agencies, it has already been said that Will defines the potential defendants in Section 1983 cases (the “persons” that are suable under that statute) to exclude all such entities. That means they cannot be named as direct defendants in McCabe’s effort to obtain injunctive relief either.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against PREPA or its officials in their official capacities, but permits prospective relief against those officials.

Perez v. Autoridad de Energia Electrica de P.R. · filed 1990-06-27

Therefore, in this case, both PREPA and the named PREPA officials cannot be sued as "persons” within the meaning of section 1983. Even though the named PREPA officials cannot be sued in their official capacities for money damages, they can be sued for prospective relief.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a state agency because a state is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Rodenbeck v. Indiana, Leaking Underground Storage Tank Division of the Department of Environmental Management · filed 1990-07-19

As the plaintiffs have sued the Indiana Department of Environmental Management, Underground Storage Tank Division, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, their complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 treats state officials sued in their official capacities for prospective relief as persons who may be sued.

Henne v. Wright · filed 1990-08-01

In an action for prospective relief such as this, however, state officials sued in their official capacity are treated as "persons" under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat state agencies or state officials sued exclusively in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Faust v. Commonwealth · filed 1990-09-11

Since plaintiffs’ complaint makes allegations against the department, a state agency, and the other defendants exclusively in their official capacities, the section 1983. claim cannot prevail.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state agency because it is not a person amenable to suit under the statute.

Manning v. South Carolina Department Of Highway And Public Transportation · filed 1990-09-12

Manning briefed this theory at length, resting his claim primarily on 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, but at oral argument acknowledged (as he apparently had before the district court) that his Sec. 1983 claim against the Highway Department has been precluded by the Supreme Court's decision in Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that neither a state agency nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" amenable to suit under Sec. 1983). We agree that Will prohibits a Sec. 1983 action against the Highway Department.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state agency because it is not a person amenable to suit under the statute.

Manning v. South Carolina Department of Highway & Public Transportation · filed 1990-09-12

Manning briefed this theory at length, resting his claim primarily on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but at oral argument acknowledged (as he apparently had before the district court) that his § 1983 claim against the Highway Department has been precluded by the Supreme Court’s decision in Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that neither a state agency nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983). We agree that Will prohibits a § 1983 action against the Highway Department.

State officials sued for damages in their personal capacities are persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Melo v. Hafer · filed 1990-09-21

Although the Will Court did not have occasion to consider the status of personal capacity suits against state officials under section 1983, we conclude, borrowing the same Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence that the Will Court looked to, that because personal capacity suits against state officials are actions against the individual and not the state, state officials sued for damages in their personal capacities are "persons" under section 1983 and therefore subject to suit.

State agencies are not persons subject to liability under Section 1983.

Reiger v. Kansas Public Employees Retirement System · filed 1990-12-11

Lastly, the court also finds defendant’s second argument in favor of dismissal persuasive, i.e., that defendant KPERS is not, as a state agency, considered a “person” for purposes of Section 1983 liability.

Kentucky counties are persons subject to suit under § 1983 because they are not part of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes.

Smallwood v. Jefferson County Government · filed 1991-01-10

Consequently, under the rule of Monell and Will, Kentucky counties must be considered persons for purposes of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state official sued for damages as a person when the plaintiff has not indicated an individual-capacity suit.

Rodgers v. Robert Brown, Jr., Director, Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 1991-02-11

A state official sued for damages is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Rodgers did not indicate that he intended to sue the defendant in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit a money damages claim against a state agency.

Northern Nevada Ass'n of Injured Workers v. Nevada State Industrial Insurance System · filed 1991-03-07

To the extent appellants seek to recover money damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 from SIIS, the complaint fails to state an actionable claim.

A state court administrator sued in an action primarily for declaratory and injunctive relief is a person under § 1983.

Deutsch v. Crosson · filed 1991-03-25

Since the action at bar was primarily one for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, the defendant Matthew T. Crosson, as Chief Administrator of the Courts of the State of New York, and as the representative of the Administrative Board of the State of New York, is deemed a "person” within the meaning of 42 USC § 1983 (see, Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58).

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state because a state is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Pontarelli v. Stone · filed 1991-04-18

State correctly asserts that it is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for the deprivation of a civil right under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a person subject to suit.

Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological · filed 1991-04-22

The district court correctly dismissed the section 1983 action against the state of Arizona because a state is not a "person" for purposes of section 1983.

State judicial entities are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Pokrandt v. Shields · filed 1991-04-17

It is well established that state judicial entities are not “persons” within the meaning of section 1983 and, therefore, cannot be sued under section 1983.

A state official sued in an official capacity for injunctive relief is a person under § 1983.

Stevens Ex Rel. Stevens v. Indiana Department of Public Welfare · filed 1991-04-25

We agree with Connie's assertion that, although in a damage case a state official or the state itself cannot be considered "persons" under § 1983 ( See Will v. Michigan Department of State Police (1989), 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45), a state official when sued for injunctive relief in his or her official capacity, is a "person" under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state agency because a state agency is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Conrod v. Missouri State Highway Patrol · filed 1991-05-06

A state is not a ‘person’ under the Civil Rights Act and may not be sued directly under § 1983. ... Nor are agencies, such as the Department of Social Services and the Department of Revenue— which are but arms of the state government—any more amenable to suit under that section. ... The plaintiff was not entitled to recover against the Missouri State Highway Patrol on the basis of an alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

An interstate agency characterized as a branch of the state is immune from liability under § 1983.

Walker v. Bi-State Development Agency of the Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District · filed 1991-05-08

After reviewing the factors as they apply to this particular agency, the Court finds that Bi-State should be characterized as a branch of the state, rather than as a local or municipal agency. In making this determination, the Court finds significant the amount of control which the state wields over the composition of the commission and the plans developed by it. As an adjunct of the state, Bi-State is immune from liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or its officials acting in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Faust v. Com., Dept. of Revenue · filed 1991-06-07

In Will the United States Supreme Court unequivocally held “that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under § 1983.” 109 S.Ct. at 2311. Although Faust cites in her brief to Justice Brennan’s dissent in Will, the majority opinion is obviously controlling.

State officials sued in their representative capacity are persons under § 1983 when the action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.

Burke v. Crosson · filed 1991-08-09

Since this action is primarily one for declaratory and injunctive relief, both defendant Regan and defendant Crosson are considered "persons” for purposes of 42 USC § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities because the state is not a person under the statute.

Manchester v. Rzewnicki · filed 1991-10-30

A State is not a “person” under § 1983 and a suit against state officials in their official capacities is a suit against their offices and, thus, is no different from a suit against the State itself.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against a state or its National Guard because neither is a person under the statute.

CJ v. Vuinovich · filed 1991-11-22

We conclude that neither the State of New Jersey nor the Guard can be sued for damages in a § 1983 action as the Guard is an alter ego of the State and both must be deemed not to be "persons" within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit an action against a state agency because a state agency is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Chrissy F. Ex Rel. Medley v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare · filed 1991-12-06

The Court therefore finds that a section 1983 action cannot be maintained against the Mississippi Department of Public Welfare.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state agency because the state is not a person under the statute.

Anderson v. Department of Revenue · filed 1992-03-26

Moreover, a claim against an agency of the state is a claim against the state, and the state is not a person under 42 USC § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support an action directly against the state in the Ohio Court of Claims, although an action to stop a state officer from acting illegally under color of office may be brought in a court of common pleas.

Szydlowski v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction · filed 1992-04-21

The issue is not whether plaintiffs may bring a Section 1983 action for recovery but, rather, whether such action may be asserted directly against the state, as opposed to an action asserted against a state officer so as to prevent his or her acting illegally under the color of his or her office, which action is not an action against the state in the broad sense and is maintainable in a court of common pleas. ... Nevertheless, we follow Burkey, and find neither the second nor third assignment of error to be well taken.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages claims against states, state agencies, or state officials sued in their official capacity because they are not persons under the statute.

Fredyma v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts · filed 1992-05-12

Neither states, nor state officials acting in their official capacity, or government entities that are "arms of the State" are "persons" under § 1983 for Eleventh Amendment purposes; they cannot be sued for monetary damages.

A state agency is not a person subject to a damages claim under § 1983.

Bellus v. State · filed 1992-08-13

Initially, we observe that, to the extent that plaintiff’s third claim for relief may set forth requests for monetary damages, a state agency is not a person against whom a cognizable claim can be asserted under § 1983.

State officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

McGinty v. Rue · filed 1992-09-24

Moreover, state officials acting in their official capacities are not "persons" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Warren v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 1992-10-07

Therefore, we hold that the Department and Frackville are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state licensing board or its members sued in their official capacities as persons.

Zar v. South Dakota Board Of Examiners Of Psychologists · filed 1992-10-09

To the extent that the individual defendants were sued in their official capacities and that the Board itself was sued, the defendants are not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or a state agency as a person subject to liability.

Cronen v. Texas Dept. of Human Services · filed 1992-11-18

The state and the agency properly argue that they are not "persons" for purposes of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state or a state official acting in her official capacity because neither is a person under the section.

Oregon State v. Allen · filed 1992-11-20

Neither a state nor a state official acting in her official capacity are "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Leyva v. Aristud · filed 1993-01-19

Los Estados no son considerados “persona” al amparo de la see. 1983 de la Ley federal de Derechos Civiles, supra, y no procede demandar en su contra según este estatuto.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state treasury department because the department is not a “person” under the statute.

Thiokol Corp. v. Department of Treasury · filed 1993-03-05

The proposed claim for refund of taxes paid would not be able to withstand a motion to dismiss by the Department of Treasury since as part of the state it is immune under the Eleventh Amendment, and it is not a “person” within the meaning of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a state agency because a state agency is not a person under the statute.

Emmis Publishing Corp. v. Indiana Department of State Revenue · filed 1993-04-08

State agencies are not "persons" within the meaning § 1983, and Emmis, therefore, has no claim against the Department.

Section 1983 does not treat a state treasury department as a person subject to suit.

Thiokol Corporation v. Department Of Treasury · filed 1993-05-03

The proposed claim for refund of taxes paid would not be able to withstand a motion to dismiss by the Department of Treasury since as part of the state it is immune under the Eleventh Amendment, and it is not a "person" within the meaning of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state agency because the agency is treated as the state, which is not a person under the statute.

Dunn v. STATE EX REL. TAX. & REV. DEPT. · filed 1993-05-04

A claim against an agency of the state constitutes a suit against the state; the state is not a "person" within the contemplation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state or its agency because neither is a person within the meaning of the statute.

Dunn ex rel. Estate of Cortez v. State ex rel. Taxation & Revenue Department · filed 1993-05-04

A claim against an agency of the state constitutes a suit against the state; the state is not a “person” within the contemplation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state agency because a state agency is not a “person” under the statute.

Rawlings v. Iowa Department of Human Services · filed 1993-05-07

For the reasons set forth below, the court is compelled to conclude that the Iowa Department of Human Services is not a “person” within the meaning of that phrase in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State agencies are not persons subject to suits for monetary damages under § 1983.

Adams v. State of Michigan Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 1993-05-18

The defendants, as state agencies of Michigan, are not considered persons for purposes of a § 1983 action, because Adams is suing them only for monetary damages.

Section 1983 excludes state agencies that are arms of the state and state officials sued for damages in their official capacities, but permits damages suits against state officials in their individual capacities.

Roach v. Burke · filed 1993-06-28

State officials sued in their individual capacities are “persons” subject to suits for damages under § 1983, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits in federal courts, even if the action was taken in the defendant’s official capacity; thus, these individuals may still be sued in their individual capacity even if the alleged wrongdoing was conducted while in performance of their official capacity. ... After careful review of the record and the law addressing these’ issues, the Court believes that the Authority and therefore, defendants Burke and Painter, in their official capacity, are in effect the State and, thus, are not persons suable under § 1983.

A state is not a person within the meaning of Section 1983 and cannot be sued under that section.

Brown v. Osier · filed 1993-07-09

We must first note that Brown’s section 1983 claim against the State in the present case must fail because “a state is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.”

States and their arms, including Pennsylvania courts of common pleas, are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Reiff v. Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas · filed 1993-07-15

The Court of Common Pleas is not subject to suit at all under § 1983, because states or “governmental entities that are considered ‘arms of the state’' for Eleventh Amendment purposes” are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and consequently are not among those liable for violations of the civil rights statute.

Section 1983 does not authorize suits against state agencies because they are not persons within the statute.

Hall v. Dworkin · filed 1993-07-28

Clearly, the NYSDEC is a state agency and therefore immune from suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against the Chester County Court of Common Pleas.

Williams v. Frame · filed 1993-08-17

This issue has already been previously heard by this Court, and the Chester County Court of Common Pleas is not amenable to suit under § 1983.

A state and its agencies are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Neff v. STATE, THROUGH TAX & REV. DEPT. · filed 1993-09-08

Taxpayers do not allege that their action was taken pursuant to Section 1983. Nor can we construe their action as coming under that statute; a state and its agencies are not "persons" within the meaning of Section 1983.

A state and its agencies are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Neff v. State ex rel. Taxation & Revenue Department · filed 1993-09-08

Nor can we construe their action as coming under that statute; a state and its agencies are not “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a cause of action against a state agency.

Grimes by and Through Grimes v. Sobol · filed 1993-09-14

NYSED is correct in arguing that, as a state agency, no cause of action can be brought against it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state agency is not a person subject to suit under section 1983.

Lieder v. New York State Comptroller's Office of Unclaimed Funds · filed 1993-11-03

Plaintiff has not adequately stated the first element of a § 1983 claim because she has not alleged that a “person” deprived her of her property. The Supreme Court has held that a State (and by implication, a State agency) is not a “person” within the meaning of section 1983. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2307, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Thus, since plaintiff cannot state a cause of action under § 1983 against the Comptroller’s Office, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her suit.

A state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

The Aquarian Foundation, a Washington Not-For-Profit Corporation and Reverend Keith Milton Rhinehart, a Single Person v. · filed 1994-02-15

Will' § conclusion that a state is not a "person" within the meaning of Sec. 1983 bars Aquarian's claims.

States and state officials acting in their official capacity are not persons subject to liability under § 1983.

Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n v. Idaho Public Utilities ComMission · filed 1994-03-16

The United States Supreme Court also held that the states and state officials acting in their official capacity are not “persons” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In this instance the drivers filed suit against the Idaho Public Utilities Commission, the Department of Law Enforcement, the State Treasurer, and the State of Idaho. None of these parties are “persons” subject to liability within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988; thus, OOIDA is not entitled to consideration of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

A state agency and state officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Sapp v. Cunningham · filed 1994-03-23

As noted above, DeShaney disposes of this claim on the merits; however, the Court concludes that the official capacity defendants would also be entitled to summary judgment for the separate reason that the state is not a “person” under § 1983 and thus cannot be sued.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or its Department of Public Safety as a person subject to suit.

Grafft v. State of Arizona · filed 1994-04-25

We agree with the district court that neither the state nor its Department of Public Safety are "persons" within the purview of section 1983.

A State and its officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to a damages claim under § 1983.

Tully v. State · filed 1994-08-25

The U.S. Supreme Court has held in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police (1989), 109 S. Ct. 2304 that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under §1983.” As Claimant fails to state a claim under section 1983, count III must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a person subject to suit.

Novak v. Department of Environmental Protection · filed 1994-11-03

The state is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983.

A state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Tremblay v. Webster, No. 530898 (Feb. 23, 1995) · filed 1995-02-23

In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 , 64 , 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989), the Supreme Court held that a state is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . In this suit, the State of Connecticut is a named defendant. Under the reasoning of Will, the State of Connecticut is an improper defendant.

Section 1983 does not allow retrospective monetary damages against a state agency because a state agency is not a person subject to suit under the section.

AMERICARE PROPERTIES, INC. v. Whiteman · filed 1995-03-10

The real question asserted by SRS is whether a state agency qualifies as a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes only suits against “persons,” if a state agency does not qualify as a person, a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be maintained. ... After MS-87-03 was rescinded in August of 1987, any judgment the court could have entered under this section would have been for retrospective monetary damages only, and these forms of relief are barred by the holding in Will.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state institutional defendants because a state is not a person under the section.

McCaslin v. Bozarth · filed 1995-04-04

We agree with the district court's section 1915(d) dismissal of those claims against the state institutional defendants. See Aubuchon v. Missouri, 631 F.2d 581, 582 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (state not a "person" within section 1983), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 915 (1981).

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a person that may be sued.

Hinds v. State of Tenn. · filed 1995-05-31

Furthermore, a state is not a person within the meaning of section 1983.

A state is not a "person" subject to suit under section 1983.

Bear v. State of Washington · filed 1995-09-08

We also reject Bear's contention that the district court erred by dismissing his claim against the State of Washington because the State of Washington is not a "person" within the meaning of section 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state agency because a state agency is not a “person” under the statute.

Griswold v. Alabama Department of Industrial Relations · filed 1995-10-10

The court agrees with the Defendants that the supervisors have qualified immunity, and ADIR is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state agency or state officials acting in their official capacity.

Professional Practices Commission v. Brewer · filed 1995-12-21

Section 1983 is not applicable to the remanded claims as they only concern a state agency and state officials acting in their official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a State or its agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Quartararo v. Catterson · filed 1996-01-25

The Court also notes, as an alternative ground for dismissal, that the plaintiff’s claims against DOCS, the Division of Parole, and the New York State Commission of Correction fail to state a cause of action because neither a State, nor its agencies, is a "person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state agency because the agency is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Hockaday v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Pardons & Paroles Division · filed 1996-01-31

TDCJ asserts, and Hockaday concedes, that individual states, their departments and agencies, and their officials acting in their official capacities are not deemed “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Because it is part of a state agency, TDCJ cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Section 1983 treats state officials as persons when sued individually for damages or in their official capacities for injunctive relief.

Fernandez v. Wolff · filed 1996-02-22

However, to the extent Fernandez seeks injunctive relief from the official acts of the defendants, and damages against them individually, Wolff and Allen are considered “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or its officials sued in their official capacities for damages as persons subject to suit.

Lilley v. State of Mo. · filed 1996-02-27

It is well established that states and state officials acting in their official capacities are not "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Therefore, plaintiffs' claim in Count III will be dismissed against the State of Missouri, the Board, and the individual defendants in their official capacities.

A state department of social services is not a proper defendant under § 1983.

Steele v. California Dept. of Social Services · filed 1996-03-18

We agree with the district court that DSS is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and is not a proper defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Kersey v. Tennessee Board of Paroles Charles Traughber Gayle Barbee Ansel McDuffy Bob Gower Randall Chester · filed 1996-04-17

In addition, the defendant state officials are not "persons" subject to suit for money damages under § 1983 in their official capacities.

A state or state agency may not be sued as a defendant under § 1983.

Moss v. J.B. Williams, Correctional Lt. · filed 1996-04-26

A state or state agency may not be named as a defendant in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state or one of its departments because the state is not a person subject to suit under the statute.

Ferrer v. State · filed 1996-08-15

Further, because the State is not a "person” amenable to suit under 42 USC § 1983 (Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58), "the law is unequivocal that this section does not give rise to a cognizable claim against the State or a department thereof’ (Davis v State of New York, 124 AD2d 420, 423).

Section 1983 does not allow monetary relief against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute for that relief.

Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation · filed 1996-09-12

Because neither a state nor state officials sued in their official capacity are "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 when the relief sought is monetary, the plaintiffs cannot recover their claim for reimbursement from the defendants.

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a person and does not abrogate its Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Mullin v. P & R Educational Services, Inc. · filed 1996-09-30

Moreover, because a State is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, this provision of the Civil Rights Act has not abrogated the sovereign immunity of the States pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not subject states or their agencies to money damages because states are not persons under the statute.

Board of Education of Community High School District No. 218 v. Illinois State Board of Education · filed 1996-10-07

Thus, states are not “persons” subject to money damages under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state agency because the agency is not a person under the statute.

Walsh v. City of Auburn · filed 1996-10-15

In addition, DHR is not a person within the meaning of Section 1983.

States and state agencies are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Office of Hawai'ian Affairs v. Department of Education · filed 1996-10-23

Because the DOE and BOE are state agencies, Plaintiffs’ claims against them are barred in federal court by the Eleventh Amendment. The Court dismisses the § 1983 claims against these Defendants because under § 1983 states and state agencies are not “persons”.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state agency because the agency is not a person under the statute.

Laubinger v. Department of Revenue · filed 1996-11-14

Joyce’s claims against the department may not be maintained because an agency of the Commonwealth is not a “person” subject to suit for monetary damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against state agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Bushey v. Derboven · filed 1996-11-26

BMHI’s Motion to Dismiss is granted because BMHI is a state agency and may not be sued for damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state agency because the agency is not a person within the meaning of the statute.

Taormina v. California Department of Corrections · filed 1996-11-27

Since the CDC is not a “person” within the meaning of section 1983, the CDC’s motion to dismiss the first cause of action is GRANTED.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a state agency because it is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Varnado v. Department of Employment and Training · filed 1996-12-30

As such, the Workers' Compensation Office cannot be held liable for § 1983 damages, and the trial court erred in holding the Workers' Compensation Office liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit retrospective relief against a state agency or a state official in an official capacity because a state is not a person under the statute.

Torres v. Dubois · filed 1997-02-15

Although the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits brought in State courts, a state agency or a state official in an official capacity may not be sued for retrospective relief under § 1983 because a State is not a “person” under that statute.

Section 1983 does not apply to a state board of medical examiners.

Brown v. Composite State Board of Medical Examiners · filed 1997-03-27

This ruling does not interfere with the decision as to whether violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 occurred because these statutes do not apply to the State Board.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against a State.

Yanicki v. State · filed 1997-04-14

While it is doubtful that there is a Federal right to privacy in a case such as this, 42 USC § 1983 does not ...provide a remedy against the State.

Section 1983 does not treat state agencies as persons subject to suit.

Cornwell v. California Board of Barbering & Cosmetology · filed 1997-05-02

State agencies enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity, and are not considered “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages suits against state agencies in state court.

Wright v. White · filed 1997-05-08

The state civil service statute and system of administrative appeal or judicial review is not unconstitutional or contrary to the federal "Supremacy Clause" because, as a matter of federal law, state agencies cannot be sued for damages in state court under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state corrections department or its commissioner in an official capacity.

Bontwell v. Department of Corrections · filed 1997-05-22

“Regarding [plaintiffs’] claim for relief under 42 USC § 1983 we conclude, based on Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, [491] U. S. [58] (109 SC 2304, 105 LE2d 45) (1989), that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to [DOC] and its commissioned, defendant David C. Evans]. [Cit.]”

Section 1983 does not permit suit against state agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Ning v. Oklahoma Dept. Envt. · filed 1997-05-30

Even if plaintiff had brought a due process claim, defendants would have been entitled to summary judgment, both because they are not “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and because Congress has not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity for civil rights actions.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Ning v. Oklahoma Department of Environment Quality Oklahoma State Department of Health, Both Agencies of the State · filed 1997-05-30

Even if plaintiff had brought a due process claim, defendants would have been entitled to summary judgment, both because they are not "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and because Congress has not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity for civil rights actions.

Section 1983 gives federal courts jurisdiction to examine conditions at state prisons when allegations of unconstitutional deprivations are made.

Clutchette v. Procunier · filed 1971-06-21

In short, it is now well settled that federal courts have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to examine into conditions at state prisons when allegations of unconstitutional deprivations are made.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner to pursue damages claims in federal court even when claims seeking a speedier release must be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies.

Kelsey v. State Of Minnesota · filed 1977-11-08

Although those claims seeking a speedier release must be dismissed because state remedies were not exhausted, the District Court retains jurisdiction over the damage claims raised in the complaint and brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits federal courts to hear claims that state judicial proceedings deprived a person of federal constitutional rights when the claims are otherwise properly before them.

Peterson v. Sheran · filed 1980-12-05

Federal courts have jurisdiction over claims that state judicial proceedings have resulted in deprivations of federal constitutional rights as long as the claims are otherwise properly before the federal courts.

Section 1983 does not give a federal district court jurisdiction to use an original § 1983 action to review an adverse state-court decision on an individual's bar-admission claim.

Dasher v. The Supreme Court of Texas, Etc. · filed 1981-07-16

Such a suit, although couched in terms of a § 1983 complaint, is essentially an effort to appeal the adverse determination of the state court; a federal district court has no jurisdiction over such a proceeding.

Comity bars a federal § 1983 damages action challenging a state tax when adequate state remedies exist.

Hutcherson v. Board Of Supervisors Of Franklin County · filed 1984-10-01

The principles of comity bar federal courts from considering suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 challenging a state tax, providing adequate state remedies exist.

A § 1983 challenge to state or local tax collection is barred when state remedies are plain, speedy, efficient, adequate, and complete.

Bucci v. Applied Business Controls, Inc. · filed 1984-12-28

Since plaintiff has raised no genuine issue of fact contesting that the state remedies are both “plain, speedy, and efficient” and “plain, adequate and complete,” plaintiff’s damages claim is barred by ... and her plea for injunctive and declaratory relief is barred by the Tax Injunction Act.

Comity bars a federal § 1983 challenge to a state or local tax assessment when state remedies provide a full hearing and judicial determination of the taxpayer's federal constitutional objections.

Milton A. Miller and Mandel M. Miller v. The City of Los Angeles, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1985-03-22

Taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from asserting section 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal court. ... The state remedies are plain, adequate, and complete if they provide the taxpayer with a full hearing and judicial determination at which the taxpayer may raise any federal constitutional objections to the tax.

A taxpayer may not use section 1983 to challenge state tax collection when state law provides a plain, adequate, and complete refund remedy.

Stufflebaum v. Panethiere · filed 1985-05-29

In our view, § 139.031 provides a plain, adequate and complete remedy for the redress of appellants’ grievances. ... The judgment is affirmed.

Comity bars a taxpayer's Section 1983 damages or declaratory action challenging a state tax when a plain, adequate, and complete state remedy is available.

Fromm v. Rosewell · filed 1985-08-29

Principles of comity bar a taxpayer from contesting the validity of a state tax in a § 1983 damage or declaratory judgment action if there is a “plain, adequate and complete” state remedy available.

Comity bars federal district courts from granting § 1983 damages challenging state taxation when plain, adequate, and complete state remedies exist.

Coleman v. McLaren · filed 1985-10-07

But McNary’s comity doctrine bars federal district courts from granting damages under Section 1983 as well, wherever available state remedies are “plain, adequate and complete”.

The Tax Injunction Act and principles of comity bar a federal-court Section 1983 action challenging state tax administration when state courts provide a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy, including adjudication of the Section 1983 claim.

Brooks v. Nance · filed 1986-09-26

We agree with the courts that have held the Tax Injunction Act bars a civil rights action. ... Moreover, section 1983 claims may be brought in the state court system. ... Having already concluded that Oklahoma provides adequate remedies for the Brooks brothers, we conclude that the principle of comity bars their action in federal court to redress the alleged unconstitutional administration of Oklahoma's tax system.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for counsel fees in an action challenging retaliatory interstate motor-carrier taxes under the Commerce Clause.

Private Truck Council of Am., Inc. v. State · filed 1987-03-31

As to the counsel fees, it is sufficient to note that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was not intended to apply to this type of action.

Comity bars a federal § 1983 damages action challenging unconstitutional administration of a state tax system when plain, adequate, and complete state remedies exist.

Campbell v. Sales Tax District 3 of St. Tammany Parish · filed 1987-11-16

A damages action brought under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 to address allegedly unconstitutional administration of a state tax system is barred by principles of comity.

Section 1983 does not give a federal district court jurisdiction over a claim that effectively seeks to reverse a state court child custody determination.

Staley v. James G. Ledbetter, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of Dept. Of Human Re · filed 1988-02-17

The district court in this case lacked jurisdiction to hear a sec. 1983 claim that in essence sought to reverse a state court’s child custody determination.

Comity bars federal relief under § 1983 for a state tax challenge when state courts provide an adequate remedy.

Long Island Lighting Co. v. Town of Brookhaven · filed 1989-11-08

However, we rest our decision not only on the Tax Injunction Act, which bars federal courts from granting injunctive or declaratory relief when adequate state remedies exist, but also on the principle of comity, which bars damage relief and, indeed, any relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 challenges to retaliatory local property tax assessments are adjudicable only in state court when state remedies are plain, adequate, and complete.

Maurer v. Steele · filed 1989-12-05

For the reasons stated by the district court, this court concludes that appellants' civil rights action was not adjudicable in federal court. ... Appellants in the instant case have not alleged or demonstrated that the remedies available to them either from the Michigan Tax Tribunal or from Michigan State court are not "plain, adequate, and complete." Thus, the district court was correct in dismissing the case for the reasons stated in its order dated October 14, 1988, and its order of dismissal is hereby affirmed.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging state tax assessments are barred by comity in federal court when state courts provide a plain, adequate, and complete remedy.

Sunderland Properties, Inc. v. County of Berks, Pa. · filed 1990-10-19

Thus, it would seem that the principle of comity would bar the plaintiffs’ action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the instant case, as long as Pennsylvania’s remedy is found to be “plain, adequate and complete.” ... For the above reasons, we believe that the courts of Pennsylvania will afford the plaintiffs a plain, adequate, and complete remedy.

Section 1983 does not override the Tax Injunction Act’s restriction on federal jurisdiction over challenges to state tax assessment when a plain, speedy, and efficient state court remedy is available.

Berry v. Alameda Board of Supervisors · filed 1990-11-28

However, this circuit has held that where jurisdiction over a section 1983 action conflicts with the Act, “the latter controls].” ... Basing a complaint upon alleged violations of civil rights will not avoid the prohibitions of the Act.

Section 1983 does not provide a Tennessee state-court forum for a state tax challenge when an adequate exclusive state tax remedy is available and the claim would be barred in federal court.

L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Bracey · filed 1991-09-09

As did the high courts of North Dakota and Connecticut, we decline to recognize § 1983 jurisdiction in state court over a matter that would not be cognizable in federal court on the basis of § 1983. To do otherwise would undermine the exclusive authority provided in T.C.A. § 67-1-1804 for determining liability with respect to taxes collected or administered by the Department of Revenue.