42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a subordinate’s constitutional violation and a supervisor who knew of the violation but failed to prevent it.

Gillette v. Malheur County · filed 2018-06-08

Finally, as to supervisory liability, Plaintiffs must show (1) that the subordinates violated their constitutional rights and, (2) that the supervisor knew about the violations and failed to prevent them. See Preschooler II v. Clark Cty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs have not met either element.

Section 1983 liability for a sheriff’s failure to train or supervise requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Spann v. Strain · filed 2018-06-13

Without showing an underlying constitutional violation, Spann cannot show that the defendants are liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only for a supervisor’s own acts or omissions that are affirmatively linked to a constitutional violation.

Greene v. Cabral · filed 2018-06-15

Supervisory liability exists under § 1983, although only for an official's "own acts or omissions" and not under respondeat superior or other theories of vicarious liability. ... No affirmative link has been put forward connecting the supervisory Defendants to Greene's alleged constitutional deprivations. Summary judgment is therefore granted for all claims against Defendants Cabral, Tompkins, Horgan, and Smith.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only for an official’s own acts or omissions, with an affirmative link to the alleged constitutional violation.

Greene v. Suffolk County Sheriff Department · filed 2018-06-15

Supervisory liability exists under § 1983, although only for an official’s “own acts or omissions” and not under respondeat superior or other theories of vicarious liability. ... No affirmative link has been put forward connecting the supervisory Defendants to Greene’s alleged constitutional deprivations. Summary judgment is therefore granted for all claims against Defendants Cabral, Tompkins, Horgan, and Smith.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff liable solely because he supervises jail operations; personal involvement or direct responsibility is required.

Monaco v. Sheriff Helder · filed 2018-06-21

In fact, Plaintiff contends Sheriff Helder is liable due to his being “over the jail.” However, “general supervisory authority over [jail] operations does not make [Sheriff Helder] liable under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for subordinates’ conduct unless the supervisor was aware of and approved it.

Thomas v. Rahimi · filed 2018-06-22

However, because there is no evidence that Williams was aware that the searches were conducted in the manner alleged by Thomas, summary judgment is granted for Williams. See Sides v. City of Champaign, 496 F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[A] supervisor is not liable for the acts of her subordinates under § 1983 unless she was aware of and approved her employees’ conduct.”).

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely because the supervisor employs a person who allegedly violated constitutional rights.

Starr v. Bolin · filed 2018-06-25

A supervisor may not be held liable under § 1983 under a respondeat superior theory of liability; in other words, a supervisor may not be held liable because he employs the individual who is alleged to have violated the Plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because they employ someone who violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Brandon v. Helder · filed 2018-06-25

A supervisor may not be held liable under § 1983 under a respondeat superior theory of liability; in other words, a supervisor may not be held liable because he employs the individual who is alleged to have violated the Plaintiffs constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides no basis for corporate or supervisory liability when the record does not show a constitutional violation.

Coleman v. Hakala · filed 2018-06-26

We also agree with the district court that because the record did not demonstrate a constitutional violation, there was no basis for § 1983 corporate liability against Corizon Medical Services, see Smith v. Insley’s, Inc., 499 F.3d 875, 880 (8th Cir. 2007), or for supervisory liability against Dr. Elizabeth Conley or Phyllis Stanley, see Meloy v. Bachmeier, 302 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 2002).

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely because an employee violated someone’s rights.

Smith v. Finch · filed 2018-07-02

Defendant Garrison cannot be held liable under § 1983 merely based on the actions of his employee.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without an underlying constitutional injury caused by a subordinate officer.

Hupp v. Cook · filed 2018-07-03

As Hupp cannot establish unconstitutional actions by Cook, Hupp cannot establish a supervisory liability claim against Smithers.

Section 1983 requires personal liability; supervisory status alone does not make a defendant liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Larson v. Jesson · filed 2018-07-09

But liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is personal; there is no supervisor liability for violations of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on supervisory status.

Jerome McIntyre, Jr. v. Kellinger · filed 2018-07-16

Contrary to McIntyre’s belief, liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be based solely on a theory of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor's position; the supervisor must be personally involved in the violation.

Peltier v. Sacks · filed 2018-07-16

While Peltier has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that Church and Sacks participated in removing Peltier's paintings, Peltier offers no evidence that Inslee participated at all in selecting or removing the paintings. Peltier contends that Inslee must have had at least some part in removing the paintings because as Governor of Washington, Inslee is "the highest decision-maker in the state." Dkt. 1 at 13. But there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity liability against a supervisor when the supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional violation or the supervisor’s conduct had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Tyrone Rogers v. Giurbino · filed 2018-07-20

The district court properly dismissed Rogers’s individual-capacity claims against Giurbino, the director of the Division of Adult Operations for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, because Rogers failed to allege Giurbino’s personal involvement in any constitutional violation or a causal connection between his conduct and any such violation.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 requires a sufficiently alleged underlying constitutional violation.

Zitter v. Petruccelli · filed 2018-07-31

Because Zitter has not sufficiently alleged any constitutional violation, both his supervisory liability claim and his opposition to Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity fail.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because an official receives a grievance after an isolated incident.

Whitlow v. Willfong · filed 2018-08-06

Further, the mere receipt of a letter or grievance after an isolated incident has occurred is not sufficient to create a claim of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because the supervisor oversees employees who commit a constitutional violation.

Reid v. Spencer · filed 2018-08-07

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because an employee violated someone’s rights.

Ronda Marsh v. Phelps County · filed 2018-08-15

Accordingly, that harm occurred under Samuelson's and Gregg's watch is not the touchstone under § 1983. Any claims raised on a vicarious liability basis are not cognizable.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of their supervisory position.

McWilliams v. Department of Cook County Jail · filed 2018-08-20

The mere fact that Dart holds a supervisory position is insufficient to establish liability, as the respondeat superior doctrine does not apply to § 1983 claims.

A § 1983 supervisory liability claim does not require the plaintiff to plead that the supervisor had final policymaking authority.

Casciaro v. Combs · filed 2018-08-23

Additionally, the court is unaware of a requirement that a plaintiff plead a defendant had “final policy making authority” in order to satisfy a pleading standard for a claim of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely for failing to supervise a subordinate.

Maday v. Dooley · filed 2018-08-24

To the extent Maday’s claim involves Adams’s failure to supervise Hamilton, there is no supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor implicitly authorizes, approves, or knowingly acquiesces in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Stillwagon v. City of Delaware · filed 2018-08-24

Based on the evidence detailed in the district court’s opinion and taking that evidence in the light most favorable to Stillwagon, we hold that Detective Sergeant Radabaugh at the very least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates, and he is not entitled to immunity from liability in his supervisory capacity.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between a supervisor’s actions and the alleged deprivation to hold the supervisor individually liable.

Perry v. Helder · filed 2018-08-27

Here, Plaintiff has alleged no causal link between the actions of Sheriff Helder and the alleged deprivation of rights. Plaintiff does not allege that Sheriff Helder was involved in any way in making decisions about his medical treatment or that Sheriff Helder was even aware of Plaintiff’s requests for medical treatment. There is simply no basis on which to hold Sheriff Helder liable in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability where the subordinates committed no constitutional violation.

McCauley v. UMass Correctional Health Care · filed 2018-08-29

For the reasons previously mentioned, the Court determines as a matter of law that Defendants Lubelczyk, Angeles, Atkins and Byron’s behavior has not resulted in violation of the Eighth Amendment and, as result, supervisory liability cannot be imputed to Defendants Groblewski or MPCH.

A supervisor’s failure to train supports Section 1983 liability only if it causes a violation of rights and shows deliberate indifference.

Zadeh v. Robinson · filed 2018-08-31

Even assuming that the plaintiffs could show that Robinson failed to train her subordinates and that failure resulted in a constitutional violation, Robinson was not deliberately indifferent in delegating her subpoena authority in light of the fact she was acting pursuant to the regulations in the same way as her predecessors and the numerous subpoenas issued each year.

Section 1983 requires sufficient allegations of an official policy or a supervisor’s direct involvement to hold a warden liable for inadequate inmate medical care.

Davis v. Buchanan County, Missouri · filed 2018-08-31

The Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to allege the minimal level of conduct that would allow for an action to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a supervisory official either on the basis of an official policy or based on the supervisor’s direct involvement in the failure to provide adequate medical care.

Section 1983 can make a supervisor liable for officers’ unlawful conduct if the supervisor caused it or knowingly failed to thwart it.

Deegan v. Homestead Police Department · filed 2018-09-14

Because Chief Rolle did not personally participate in the investigation or in preparing the affidavit, he could not be liable unless he caused the officers to act unlawfully or he knowingly failed to thwart their unlawful conduct.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor's personal involvement in a constitutional violation; reviewing an inmate's grievances alone does not establish liability.

Marsh v. Link · filed 2018-09-14

Accordingly, Marsh cannot maintain a claim against Superintendent Link based on her involvement in the grievance process.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a supervisor’s own conduct and a subordinate’s constitutional violation; statements made after the incident alone do not establish individual liability.

Hunt v. Clark · filed 2018-09-17

Such post-incident statements alone do not amount to a claim for individual liability by acquiescence.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a prison warden merely because she holds that position or supervises employees who allegedly violated a prisoner's rights.

Serio v. Rauner · filed 2018-09-17

Butler cannot be held personally liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 simply because she was the warden at Menard or because she supervises other prison employees who allegedly violated Plaintiff's rights.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Leisure v. Lancaster County Prison · filed 2018-09-18

Because we find no constitutional violation, it follows that any possible supervisory liability claim cannot stand.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts showing that a supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional violation or that the supervisor’s conduct caused it.

Towles v. Dzurenda · filed 2018-09-19

The district court properly dismissed Towles’s supervisory liability claims against defendants Dzurenda and Baca because Towles failed to allege facts sufficient to show that these defendants were personally involved in a constitutional violation or that their conduct caused any such violation.

Section 1983 requires facts connecting a supervisor to the injury through personal involvement, awareness of inadequate training, or a pattern of similar incidents.

Nguyen v. Elam · filed 2018-09-20

The district court properly dismissed Nguyen’s claims against defendant Elam because Nguyen failed to allege facts sufficient show that Elam was personally involved in causing his injury, was aware that any training program was inadequate, or that a pattern of similar incidents existed.

Section 1983 permits a claim against prison supervisors in their personal capacities when allegations of their own deliberate indifference plausibly show personal involvement in a constitutional violation.

Langley v. Lye · filed 2018-09-21

Therefore, for the reasons stated with respect to Defendant Warden, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims are sufficient to proceed against Defendants Ballard and Rubenstein in their personal capacities under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts plausibly connecting a supervisor to the alleged rights violation to support supervisory liability.

Lucero v. Evangelidis · filed 2018-09-21

Further, Plaintiff does not plead any facts that could lead to an inference that Defendant Turco was causally connected to his harms in any way. Instead, Plaintiff has merely "parroted" the standard for supervisory liability. Therefore, Defendant Turco is also not liable in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 requires facts connecting a supervisor’s own conduct to the alleged deprivation; repeating the supervisory liability standard does not state an individual-capacity claim.

Lucero v. Turco · filed 2018-09-21

Further, Plaintiff does not plead any facts that could lead to an inference that Defendant Turco was causally connected to his harms in any way. Instead, Plaintiff has merely “parroted” the standard for supervisory liability. Therefore, Defendant Turco is also not liable in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based on respondeat superior; a plaintiff must show an affirmative link between the supervisor and the constitutional violation.

Crocker v. Glanz · filed 2018-09-24

But because § 1983 does not authorize liability under a theory of respondeat superior, “[a] plaintiff arguing for the imposition of supervisory liability . . . must show an affirmative link between the supervisor and the constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; liability must rest on their own deliberate indifference or tacit authorization.

Brakeall v. Stanwick-Klemik · filed 2018-09-28

A supervisor’s liability must be based on his or her own “deliberate indifference or tacit authorization.”

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor individually liable for an employee’s constitutional violation without the supervisor’s personal involvement or direct responsibility.

Arnold v. Washington County Sheriff's Department · filed 2018-09-30

In Arnold’s response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, he does not allege that Sheriff Helder was personally involved in the traffic stop or in the use of the Taser. Arnold does not even claim that Helder was aware of any of the events at issue in the case until after a lawsuit was filed. Accordingly, there is no reason to hold Helder liable based on his personal involvement, and he is entitled to summary judgment on the individual capacity claim against him.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability under respondeat superior.

Harbridge v. Schwarzeneggar · filed 2018-10-03

The district court properly dismissed Harbridge’s claim based on respondeat superior because there is no vicarious liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence that the supervisor was personally involved in the alleged retaliation.

Ruben Garcia, Jr. v. Blahnik · filed 2018-10-09

Additionally, the district court properly granted summary judgment as to Garcia’s claims of supervisory liability because Garcia failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether any supervisors were personally involved in any alleged retaliation.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity claim against a supervisor when the complaint alleges the supervisor's own culpable involvement in a constitutional violation.

Wyo. Guardianship Corp. v. Wyo. State Hosp. · filed 2018-10-11

Accepting all facts stated in the Complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we find that Ms. Gelok's assertion that Mr. Mullenax intentionally failed to provide her safe and humane living conditions is sufficient to allege Mr. Mullenax's own culpable involvement in violating her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires personal participation in the alleged violation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Brown v. State of Washington · filed 2018-10-15

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Brown’s claims against the supervisory defendants because Brown failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these defendants personally participated in the alleged violations or whether there was a causal connection between their conduct and the alleged violations.

Section 1983 supervisory liability for failure to supervise requires an underlying constitutional violation by a subordinate.

Jensen v. Garden · filed 2018-10-19

A necessary component of a failure-to-supervise claim, however, is an underlying constitutional violation. ... Therefore, Mr. Jensen’s supervisory-liability claim against Dr. Garden must fail.

A § 1983 supervisory liability claim requires evidence that the supervisor knew of and acquiesced to unconstitutional conduct by subordinates.

Robinson v. Sziebert · filed 2018-10-26

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Sziebert on Robinson’s claim of constitutionally inadequate medical care because Robinson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Sziebert’s conduct fell below the professional judgment standard, or whether Sziebert knew of and acquiesced to unconstitutional conduct by subordinates.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires allegations connecting the supervisor to the violation, such as direct involvement, a policy or custom, grossly negligent supervision, or deliberate indifference.

Beauvoir v. Falco · filed 2018-11-05

This does not satisfy even the first element for supervisory liability, which is direct involvement. Plaintiff certainly makes no mention of a policy or custom or anything that could color claims of deliberate indifference or a grossly negligent mindset. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed.

Section 1983 holds prison supervisors responsible for their own actions, not a treatment team's acts or omissions under respondeat superior.

Latson v. Clarke · filed 2018-11-06

Watson, Jarvis, and Clarke cannot be liable for the treatment team's acts or omissions under a respondeat superior theory. ... They can only be held responsible under § 1983 based on their own actions.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence that the supervisor had notice of inadequate training or supervision likely to cause a constitutional violation.

Barton v. Ledbetter · filed 2018-11-14

The plaintiff must show that the supervisor was “deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized the offending acts,” which requires evidence that “the supervisor had notice that the training procedures and supervision were inadequate and likely to result in a constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a First Amendment free speech violation when the supervisor knew of and acquiesced in the conduct.

Addison v. City of Baker City · filed 2018-11-16

To prove supervisory liability under § 1983, courts must look at the requisite mental state for the specific constitutional violation alleged. See OSU Student All. v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2012). For claims of free speech violations under the First Amendment, knowledge and acquiescence suffice for supervisor liability.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only when a direct causal link connects the supervisor to the subordinate's acts.

Smock v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Mich. · filed 2018-11-19

There is no suggestion on the record that either had any role in the discipline of Professor Smock. Section 1983 liability will attach to a supervisor only where is a "direct causal link" between the supervisor and the acts of subordinates giving rise to liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability where the complaint alleges no personal involvement or other basis for holding the supervisors responsible.

Cadle v. Rubenstein · filed 2018-11-20

Noting first that the Complaint alleged no personal involvement on the part of Plumley, Rubenstein, or Coleman, the R&R concluded that Cadle’s allegations failed to give rise to any claim for supervisory liability against those defendants. ... Upon review of the R&R and the record for clear error, the Court: 1. ADOPTS the R&R (Dkt. No. 57); ... 5. DISMISSES Cadle’s second amended complaint WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Dkt. No. 21).

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor to proceed when a genuine factual dispute remains about his responsibility for the alleged constitutional violations.

Malone v. Sziebert · filed 2018-11-30

On this record, Sziebert has not met his burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was not responsible for the alleged violations.

A § 1983 claim against supervisors requires factual allegations of their involvement in the alleged misconduct; bare conclusions are insufficient.

Carter v. Spencer · filed 2018-12-05

With respect to the claims against Commissioners O’Brien and Spencer, and against Superintendent Gelb, the plaintiff has made no allegations as to their involvement in the alleged assault, threats or purported failure to train, supervise or discipline correctional staff as to those incidents. Because the plaintiff makes only bald legal conclusions with respect to the supervisors’ involvement in the incidents, he has not sufficiently pled facts to proceed against those defendants.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a causal connection between the supervisor’s personal conduct and the alleged constitutional violation, or ratification of the wrongdoing.

Bogle v. Roberts · filed 2018-12-10

The district court properly granted summary judgment for Roberts because Bogle failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to a causal connection between Roberts’s personal conduct and the alleged constitutional violations, or whether Roberts ratified any alleged wrongdoing by defendants.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of their position; the plaintiff must allege personal involvement or a sufficient causal connection to the constitutional violation.

Brown v. Taylor · filed 2018-12-12

“Section 1983 does not create supervisory or respondeat superior liability.” ... Beside Taylor’s role as the head of OVSOM, Brown has not adequately alleged that Taylor personally caused his plight at the Cold Springs Jail. Therefore, Brown has failed to state a claim against Taylor.

Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability for a supervisor who did not know of the danger posed by staff misconduct.

Miller v. Doctor Larson · filed 2018-12-14

Therefore, Miller’s allegations against her are tantamount to an assertion of respondeat-superior liability, which § 1983 does not permit.

Section 1983 holds supervisors responsible for their own acts, not for their subordinates’ acts merely because they supervise them.

Horshaw v. Casper · filed 2018-12-14

Liability under §1983 is direct rather than vicarious; supervisors are responsible for their own acts but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to ensure that subordinates carry out their tasks correctly.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Assyd v. Adoc · filed 2018-12-19

The district court properly dismissed Assyd’s claims against defendant Ryan because Assyd failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Ryan was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivations or that a sufficient causal connection exists between Ryan’s conduct and the alleged constitutional violations. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing the requirements for supervisory liability under § 1983).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a shortage of prison medical services on officials who lack authority to increase those services.

Alexander v. Richter · filed 2018-12-20

But Alexander has not identified a genuine fact question about the scope of Dr. Richter’s or Mashak’s responsibility because no evidence suggests that either defendant had the authority to increase optometrists’ hours at the prison.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely because they oversee officials who allegedly violated a person’s rights.

Hurlbut v. Helder · filed 2019-01-04

Supervisors are not liable under § 1983 based on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory official to personally cause or participate in a constitutional deprivation; supervision alone does not create liability.

Danneman v. Dart · filed 2019-01-04

Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability. There is no respondeat superior theory of liability in civil rights cases, and a supervisory official cannot be held strictly liable for the constitutional torts of subordinate officers. To be liable, the individual, him or herself, must have caused or participated in the constitutional deprivation in some way.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a warden solely because he holds that position or supervises employees who allegedly violated a prisoner’s rights.

Mims v. Medical Director · filed 2019-01-15

As Mims recognizes, Pfister cannot be held personally liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 simply because he was the warden at Stateville, or because he supervises other prison employees who allegedly violated Mims’s rights.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally knows of and approves unconstitutional conduct.

Dewar v. Felmon · filed 2019-01-16

In other words, he personally knew “about the conduct and facilitate[d] it, approve[d] it, condone[d] it,” which is good enough for supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory-liability claim when a policymaker’s deliberately indifferent practice of closing use-of-force investigations without required review plausibly caused a constitutional injury.

Murphy v. Middlesex Cnty. · filed 2019-01-17

I find that the Third Amended Complaint has sufficiently pleaded that, by creating a custom or policy whereby use-of-force investigations were routinely closed without complying with Directive 2006-5, Carey showed deliberate indifference to the fact that lack of enforcement would result in an increased use of unjustified force and that this effect could result in deaths, including Decedent's.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for a prison supervisor who knew of unconstitutional conditions through grievances and failed to act; an unidentified delegation of grievance review does not establish a lack of personal knowledge at summary judgment.

Williams v. Williams · filed 2019-01-18

These same evidentiary principles, however, should not be used to support a litigation practice that essentially eviscerates the protections under § 1983 by allowing prison officials to delegate their authority to unidentified (and perhaps unknown) individuals, thus completely inhibiting Plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference inquiry. ... Here, Williams’ claim of general lack of memory as to whether he reviewed Plaintiff’s grievances, coupled with his reliance on a general habit of designating his grievance review authority (as opposed to particularly identified designations), as well as his failure to identify the supposed-designee, is insufficient to satisfy the movant’s burden at the summary judgment stage.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires allegations that the supervisor had notice of a subordinate’s constitutional violations.

Penate v. Kaczmarek · filed 2019-01-24

Because Plaintiff has not adequately alleged notice, an essential element of a § 1983 supervisory liability claim, the § 1983 claims against Han and Nassif will be dismissed.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation by a subordinate.

Baptista v. Hodgson · filed 2019-01-24

In this case, the behavior or Sheriff Hodgson’s subordinates did not result in a constitutional violation, and therefore there is no supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a supervisor’s ratification of subordinates’ conduct.

M.C. Through Chudley v. Shawnee Mission Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512 · filed 2019-01-28

Although ratification may be a basis for municipal liability, ratification standing alone is insufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes individual liability on a supervisor who directly participates in a constitutional violation or fails to train or supervise the subordinate who causes it.

Yates v. Holloway · filed 2019-01-31

To hold a supervisor individually liable, the supervisor must have directly participated in the constitutional violation or failed to train or supervise the subordinate who caused the violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor who authorizes, approves, or knowingly acquiesces in a subordinate's unconstitutional conduct.

Schulkers v. Kammer · filed 2019-02-08

Therefore, because the allegations indicate that Campbell "authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct" of her subordinates, the Schulkers have stated a claim under § 1983 against Campbell for violations of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on prison supervisors; liability requires their own deliberately indifferent conduct.

Lowe v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2019-02-14

The PF&R accurately explains, and Plaintiff does not refute, that respondeat superior is not an acceptable basis for liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires specific facts showing a supervisor’s personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation to state an individual capacity claim.

Brown v. Helder · filed 2019-02-14

“To establish personal liability of [a] supervisory defendant[], the plaintiff must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his constitutional rights.” Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal punctuation marks and citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff has made no such allegations. No individual capacity claim is stated against Sheriff Helder.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to be personally involved in or directly responsible for the events at issue.

Smith v. Orsi · filed 2019-02-20

For a supervisor to be held liable under § 1983, he must be personally involved in or be directly responsible for the events at issue.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely on a theory of respondeat superior; the supervisor must be personally involved in the alleged violation.

R.S. Shick v. M.R. Clark, Superintendent · filed 2019-02-21

Courts cannot impose supervisory liability in Section 1983 cases solely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 claims against jail supervisors require personal involvement; alleged awareness of systemic jail conditions can support a claim, while claims about individual incidents require a basis to infer their involvement or knowledge.

Dodson v. Cook County Jail · filed 2019-02-21

Accordingly, defendants Dart and Currie’s motion to dismiss on personal involvement grounds is denied. The court dismisses Dodson’s claims against Dart and Currie to the extent she seeks to hold them liable based on the mace incident and the medical care she received.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knew about, condoned, facilitated, approved, or turned a blind eye to constitutional violations.

Wrice v. Byrne · filed 2019-02-26

While it is true that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not support liability under § 1983, evidence that a supervisor knew about, condoned, facilitated, approved, or turned a “blind eye” to constitutional violations is sufficient to establish personal involvement in the unconstitutional conduct. Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988).

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in a constitutional violation to hold a supervisor liable in an individual capacity.

Jones v. Karas · filed 2019-03-05

Because the Plaintiff has failed to include any allegations of personal involvement by Sheriff Helder, he has failed to assert a claim against Sheriff Helder in his individual capacity based on the denial of pain medication.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 if she knows of unconstitutional conduct and facilitates it, approves it, or turns a blind eye to it.

Lee v. Engleson · filed 2019-03-05

Because Engleson is a supervisor and is sued as such, to be liable under § 1983, she must have “know[n] about the [unconstitutional] conduct and facilitate[d] it, approve[d] it, or turn[ed] a blind eye.” Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995).

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor implicitly authorizes or approves a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Powell v. Fugate · filed 2019-03-08

The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Powell, could reasonably demonstrate Fugate's implicit authorization and approval of Smith's use of excessive force.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a supervisor based solely on vicarious liability.

Fowler v. Michael Zenk, N.H. State Prison Warden, and Stephen O’Rourke, N.H. Department of Corrections Hearin · filed 2019-03-11

To the extent plaintiff has joined Zenk based on a claim of vicarious liability, the law is settled that respondeat superior is unavailable in the context of claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim when the complaint sufficiently alleges that a supervisor knew of repeated misconduct and failed to address it.

Cottrell v. Stepp · filed 2019-03-12

Taken together, these facts are sufficient to allege a § 1983 supervisory liability claim against Starsick.

Section 1983 supervisory liability cannot rest on a retaliation claim that fails against the subordinate officer.

Brown v. Belt · filed 2019-03-21

As noted above, the plaintiff has not adequately pled a § 1983 retaliation claim against Trooper McFeeley, and the corresponding claim for supervisory liability and training against Colonel Smithers is dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for deliberate indifference without the supervisor’s personal involvement.

Blake v. Warner · filed 2019-03-22

But Warner was not personally involved or even aware of any of the decisions that delayed his medications. A theory of liability “by the deliberate-indifference route” cannot be based on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 can impose supervisory liability based on statutory duties when officials administer the challenged program.

Benson v. Harpstead · filed 2019-03-22

The Magistrate Judge correctly stated that “statutory duties may be sufficient to give rise to § 1983 liability when the state actors are those who truly administer the challenged programs.” ... While discovery may show that Defendants Piper Johnson and Richardson lack specific oversight of the creation or implementation of the policies related to Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s determination that there is sufficient statutory authority to sustain the claims against them at this point in the proceeding.

To defeat qualified immunity on a § 1983 supervisory liability claim, a plaintiff must show that the supervisor’s potential liability was clearly established, the supervisor knew the force used was unconstitutional, and a reasonable supervisor would have known their actions were unlawful.

McCourt v. Delgado · filed 2019-03-25

To defeat qualified immunity on a claim of supervisory liability, a plaintiff must show that it was clearly established at the time of the subordinate’s conduct that the supervisor could be held liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations committed by the subordinate; that the supervisor knew that the degree of force being used was unconstitutional; and that a reasonable person in the supervisor’s position would have known that his actions were unlawful.

Section 1983 does not make government supervisors liable solely because they supervise someone who violates it.

Self v. City of Mansfield · filed 2019-03-26

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisory government officials solely because of a supervisory relationship with a person violating § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors merely for their employees’ actions, but a supervisor may be liable for knowingly acquiescing in unconstitutional conduct.

Love v. Franklin Cnty. · filed 2019-03-27

The doctrine of respondeat superior is not available in § 1983 actions, and a supervisory defendant is only legally responsible for his or her own behavior. ... At the very least, a Plaintiff must show that the supervisory-defendant "at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers." ... Love has adequately pleaded this claim, and Defendants' motion is denied as to count three of the complaint.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; responding to and denying a prison grievance alone is insufficient.

Henderson v. Fisher · filed 2019-04-08

The only connection Henderson has offered between an alleged violation of his constitutional rights and Defendants Atkinson, Braggs, and Honaker is their participation in the administrative grievance and appeal process. That’s not enough. The “mere response and denial of [an inmate’s] grievance are insufficient to establish the requisite personal participation under § 1983.” Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1216 (10th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, Defendants Atkinson, Braggs, and Honaker are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Eighth Amendment claim against them.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in or direct responsibility for the alleged deprivation of rights; supervising the staff alone does not establish liability.

Crumley v. Jail Nurse Jody Woods · filed 2019-04-09

Plaintiff has established no causal link or direct responsibility of Sheriff Moore to the alleged deprivation of rights. Based on the allegations of the Amended Complaint, Sheriff Moore is not liable in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity claim against a police chief when evidence could show that policies he made caused constitutional violations.

Klein v. Madison · filed 2019-04-10

The plaintiff may proceed on this claim because she has sufficiently produced record evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could determine that the police department's policies caused her constitutional violations and that Chief Morris was a policymaker. ... Consequently, the court denies summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff's section 1983 claim against Chief Morris in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability, but a claim based on failure to train or supervise requires evidence of that failure.

Brown v. Belt · filed 2019-04-15

Supervisory liability may be established against a defendant for § 1983 claims. ... As noted above, however, the plaintiff has offered no evidence that Sheriff Samples failed to train or supervise Deputy Belt or Deputy Caruthers.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when a subordinate is liable and the supervisor’s conduct is affirmatively linked to the constitutional violation.

Doe v. City of Elizabeth · filed 2019-04-16

Likewise, supervisory officials, such as the school officials here, cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983. Supervisory liability exists only where "(1) there is subordinate liability, and (2) the supervisor's action or inaction was 'affirmatively linked' to the constitutional violation caused by the subordinate."

Section 1983 permits liability for a warden only when the alleged problems occurred at the warden’s direction or with the warden’s knowledge and consent.

Rankin v. Baker · filed 2019-04-23

But as warden Korte is liable only if the problems with Rankin’s medical care occurred at Korte’s direction or with his knowledge and consent to those problems.

A supervisor can be denied qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim when supervisory liability was clearly established, the supervisor knew the force was unconstitutional, and a reasonable supervisor would have known his actions were unlawful.

McCourt v. Delgado · filed 2019-04-24

To defeat qualified immunity on a claim of supervisory liability, a plaintiff must show that it was clearly established at the time of the subordinate's conduct that the supervisor could be held liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations committed by the subordinate; that the supervisor knew that the degree of force being used was unconstitutional; and that a reasonable person in the supervisor's position would have known that his actions were unlawful.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence that the supervisor knew of or acquiesced in subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct.

Mitchell v. State of Washington · filed 2019-04-25

The district court properly granted summary judgment for Sziebert on Mitchell’s claim of constitutionally inadequate medical care because Mitchell failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Sziebert had knowledge of or acquiesced in any unconstitutional conduct by subordinates.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging a supervisor’s invidious racial discrimination to plead purposeful discrimination by that supervisor; knowing acquiescence or deliberate indifference alone does not suffice.

Cross v. City of S.F. · filed 2019-05-02

For the invidious discrimination claim, Plaintiffs must allege purposeful discrimination by the supervisory defendants, and not just knowing acquiescence or deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 does not allow supervisory liability based solely on a supervisor’s position; a complaint must identify each defendant’s own conduct.

Dodson v. Reed · filed 2019-05-08

Section 1983 does not authorize liability under a theory of respondeat superior. ... Plaintiff’s Complaint lumps defendants Reed, Shrum, Murray and eight unidentified “John Does” together without identifying the specific actions each defendant took or failed to take during the incident giving rise to this action. As a result, it must be dismissed for failure to adequately allege a claim for supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a subordinate’s unconstitutional acts based solely on respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Nyreekis Jarnell Hunter v. Hale · filed 2019-05-09

Supervisory officials cannot be held liable under § 1983 for unconstitutional acts by their subordinates based on respondeat-superior or vicarious-liability principles.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates' unconstitutional acts solely because of their supervisory role.

Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty. · filed 2019-05-09

Supervisory officials cannot be held liable under § 1983 for unconstitutional acts by their subordinates based on respondeat-superior or vicarious-liability principles.

A § 1983 claim against a supervisor must allege the supervisor’s personal involvement in the deprivation of rights.

Spradlin v. Woods · filed 2019-05-10

For an official to be liable under § 1983, it must be “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.” ... In light of this governing principle, Plaintiff must amend his complaint to set forth factual allegations explaining how Superintendent Wood personally violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because a defendant was responsible for others’ conduct.

Cruz v. Williams · filed 2019-05-14

The court clarifies that, to the extent that Cruz is attempting to hold Dr. Obaisi liable because he “was ultimately responsible for all medical care at Stateville Correctional Center,” (Pl.'s Resp. Memorandum [94] at 9), such a claim may not proceed as there is no respondeat superior (i.e., supervisory) liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s alleged misconduct based solely on supervisory status.

Dziedzic v. Thompson · filed 2019-05-17

Next, to the extent Dziedzic argues that Defendant Thompson, a DHS supervisor, should be held liable for alleged supervisory neglect of her subordinates, such a claim is not cognizable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a government official liable solely because the official supervised someone who allegedly violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Powell v. Shaw · filed 2019-05-22

A plaintiff proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot establish that a government official violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights simply by virtue of the official’s role as a supervisor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisor to allege facts showing the supervisor participated in the violation.

Womble v. Chrisman · filed 2019-05-23

To establish a prima facie § 1983 case against a supervisor, such as a warden, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that the defendants participated in the violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisor to allege the supervisor’s personal involvement in the constitutional violation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Jossy v. State of Hawaii · filed 2019-05-29

To state a claim against a supervisor under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that each “[g]overnment-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors under respondeat superior; their own actions or omissions must lead to the plaintiff’s injury.

Moore v. Corpening · filed 2019-05-31

As to Defendants Corpening and Watkins, there is no liability under § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior. See Monnell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). As such, to hold these Defendants responsible, Plaintiff must allege facts that tend to show that these Defendants’ actions, or omissions, led to his injury.

Section 1983 supervisory liability based on knowledge and acquiescence requires actual, personal knowledge of the violation; constructive knowledge is insufficient.

A.B.v. VINELAND BOARD OF EDUCATION · filed 2019-06-04

The Third Circuit’s “knowledge and acquiescence” caselaw requires a defendant to have actual, personal knowledge of the violation—constructive knowledge does not suffice.

Section 1983 does not impose liability under respondeat superior; a plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s own acts or omissions led to the injury.

Moore v. Corpening · filed 2019-06-06

As to Defendant Boysworth, there is no liability under § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior. See Monnell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). As such, to hold Defendant Boysworth responsible, Plaintiff must allege facts that tend to show that Defendant Boysworth’s actions, or omissions, led to Plaintiff’s injury.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for employing or supervising someone who violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Birkett v. N.Y.C.D.O.C. Comm. John/Jane Doe · filed 2019-06-10

A defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s actions.

Kimble v. Lassiter · filed 2019-06-11

Nor can Plaintiff rely on a theory of respondeat superior because there is no such liability in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on a sheriff based solely on the sheriff’s position; the plaintiff must plausibly allege personal involvement in the deprivation.

Bell v. Kay · filed 2019-06-13

However, Bell does not assert any plausible facts that Sheriff Zaruba was aware of or facilitated any serious risk of danger. His role as Sheriff, alone, does not automatically attach supervisory liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant supervises someone who violates another person’s rights.

Orr v. Sevier · filed 2019-06-13

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Nurse Lewis cannot be held liable simply because she oversees other medical staff.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of a supervisory role; liability is personal.

Murray v. Beaver · filed 2019-06-17

As to Defendant Guice, identified as the Secretary of the NCDPS, it is well established that he cannot be held liable merely by virtue of his supervisory based on respondeat superior. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (stating that under § 1983, liability is personal in nature, and the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply).

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct without personal involvement.

Walton v. Tennessee Department of Correction · filed 2019-06-17

Under § 1983, “[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” ... Lacking any allegations of personal involvement, the claims against Defendants Lebo and Tony Parker fail to state a cause of action.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional acts solely because of their supervisory roles.

Washington v. McKenzie · filed 2019-06-21

“It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” ... The Plaintiff has not alleged that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the actions of McKenzie or any other member of the CERT.

Section 1983 makes a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct only if the supervisor directly participated or a causal connection links the supervisor’s actions to the violation.

Stallworth v. Hurst · filed 2019-06-25

Instead, for a supervisor to be liable for the acts of his or her subordinate, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that “the supervisor either directly participated in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 does not permit liability based on respondeat superior.

Roberts v. Perry · filed 2019-06-25

To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to rely on respondeat superior this is unavailing because there is no such liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for an agent’s conduct solely because of the supervisory relationship.

Bethel v. Karas · filed 2019-06-26

A supervisor is only liable for his own misdeeds and not for those of his agents under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Williams v. Shawley · filed 2019-06-27

Because Inmate’s retaliation claims are meritless, his associated conspiracy and supervisory liability claims are likewise without merit.

Section 1983 requires allegations of a supervisor’s own conduct to state an individual liability claim; vicarious liability alone is insufficient.

Estate of Mendez v. City of Ceres · filed 2019-06-28

The Court finds that, as alleged, Plaintiffs' complaint attempts to state a § 1983 claim against Smith by relying on the same allegations Plaintiffs use to articulate their Monell claim, never moving explicitly past a vicarious liability theory. Smith's conduct is not differentiated in any way from that of the City or the Police Department, and as such, it fails to plead individual liability for Smith.

Section 1983 allows a failure-to-supervise claim against a jail supervisor in his official and individual capacities to proceed when it is based on alleged misconduct by subordinate officers.

Senay v. Hopkins County Jail · filed 2019-06-28

The Court will also allow a claim based upon Defendant Graham’s alleged failure to supervise, train, and/or control Defendants Griffith, Helton, and Bowers with regard to the above incidents to proceed against Defendant Graham in both his official and individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because of a subordinate’s conduct; supervisory liability requires knowledge of a pervasive risk, an inadequate response, and a causal link to the injury.

Hollis v. Hawk · filed 2019-07-01

Liability of supervisory officials under § 1983 “is not based on ordinary principles of respondeat superior, but rather is premised on ‘a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.’” Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984)).

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely for their subordinates’ conduct; liability requires facts connecting the supervisors to the alleged violation.

Yelizarov v. Moyer · filed 2019-07-01

As noted, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

A supervisor is not liable under Section 1983 for failure to train without deliberate indifference; delegating authority under existing regulations and established practice did not show deliberate indifference.

Zadeh v. Robinson · filed 2019-07-02

Even assuming that the plaintiffs could show that Robinson failed to train her subordinates and that failure resulted in a ... constitutional violation, Robinson was not deliberately indifferent in delegating her subpoena authority in light of the fact she was acting pursuant to the regulations in the same way as her predecessors and the numerous subpoenas issued each year.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct for individual liability.

Martinez v. Woosley · filed 2019-07-02

Thus, for a supervisor such as Defendant Woosley to be held liable under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that Defendant Woosley was personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional conduct. Plaintiff does not do so, and, therefore, fails to state a claim against Defendant Woosley in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on supervisors.

Orr v. Sevier · filed 2019-07-05

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors merely because they control employees.

Cissell v. Myers · filed 2019-07-08

Moreover, the doctrine of respondeat superior, or the right to control employees, does not apply in § 1983 actions to impute liability onto supervisors.

Section 1983 requires deliberate indifference for a supervisory failure-to-train claim; negligence alone is insufficient.

Fetty v. The Louisiana State Board of Private Security Examiners · filed 2019-07-08

As to LeBlanc, Plaintiffs argue that he was negligent in failing to train the Board, but, as amply demonstrated above, a failure-to-train claim involves deliberate indifference, which requires more than mere negligence.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement or a sufficient basis for supervisory liability; general allegations about a supervisor’s role do not state a claim.

Hispanic National Law Enforcement Association NCR v. Prince George's County · filed 2019-07-08

A state official may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless it is “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.” ... Under these circumstances, the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief against Murtha.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Byrd v. Lee · filed 2019-07-08

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant O’Neil liable under a theory of respondeat superior, such a claim is not cognizable under §1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on another official’s conduct; the supervisor must know of or participate in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

Williams v. Indiana Department of Child Services · filed 2019-07-09

As the Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendant Dumas knew of or participated in the alleged unconstitutional conduct as a result of some alleged failure to supervise or train, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Count IV against Defendant Dumas.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisory officials.

Hallcy v. Ken Paxton · filed 2019-07-11

First, a defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of vicarious liability, including respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for the conduct of others.

McDonald v. City of Houston Police Dept. · filed 2019-07-11

Supervisors cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the conduct of others.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of misconduct by subordinates.

Jiggetts v. Spring Grove Hospital Center · filed 2019-07-11

It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct solely because they supervise them.

Glenn v. Brown · filed 2019-07-12

Supervisory officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires allegations connecting a supervisor’s training or supervision to the claimed constitutional injury; a cursory assertion of responsibility is insufficient.

Novo v. Danbury · filed 2019-07-12

While Ms. Novo has alleged that the officers involved failed to do a number of things, even things allegedly required by the Danbury Police Department, she has failed to allege, other than in the most cursory way, how Chief Ridenhour’s role in their training and supervision specifically resulted in the constitutional injuries alleged here.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely because they oversee a prison or supervise the officers involved.

Deck v. Griffin · filed 2019-07-12

I have already told Deck (ECF 31) that there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Thus, neither Kathy Griffin nor Governor Holcomb are liable to Deck simply because the oversee operations at the prison or supervises other correctional officers.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely because of their positions.

McBride v. Warden · filed 2019-07-12

To the extent Plaintiff intended to hold the named Defendants liable based on their supervisor positions, it is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s direct involvement in the alleged misconduct; a supervisor cannot be liable solely for a subordinate’s acts.

Pace v. Massachusetts Department of Correction · filed 2019-07-15

In other words, a commissioner, superintendent, or other supervisory employer cannot be held liable under § 1983 based solely on the misconduct of a subordinate; the supervisor must have had some form of direct involvement in the alleged misconduct. ... Accordingly, the court will dismiss without prejudice the § 1983 claims against Mici, Turco, Kenneway, and Silva.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Burke v. Erwin · filed 2019-07-16

Thus, for a supervisor such as Defendant Erwin to be held liable under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that Defendant Erwin was personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional conduct. Plaintiff does not do so and, therefore, fails to state a claim against Defendant Erwin.

Section 1983 does not make an official liable solely because of a supervisory role.

Davidson v. Outlaw · filed 2019-07-16

A plaintiff proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot establish that a government official violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights simply by virtue of the official’s role as a supervisor.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; a supervisor must be personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.

Sanchez v. Tilden · filed 2019-07-17

There is, however, no respondeat superior liability in a § 1983 case and this claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires culpable conduct by the individual supervisor; a supervisory position alone is insufficient.

Sweat v. Sanders · filed 2019-07-17

As discussed more fully in the immunity section, § 1983 supervisor liability requires culpable conduct by the individual supervisor.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a supervisor whose failure to supervise or train an employee causes a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Moser v. Helton · filed 2019-07-17

“A supervisor may be held individually liable under § 1983 ‘if a failure to properly supervise and train the offending employee caused a deprivation of constitutional rights.’” ... She has, therefore, failed to allege a plausible Eighth Amendment claim against Frakes and Hansen based on a failure to supervise or train an employee.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to be personally involved in the constitutional violation to be liable.

Mays v. Johnson · filed 2019-07-18

“To succeed on a claim for supervisory liability, a plaintiff must show that the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional violation.” ... The plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support a claim that Dewitt knew of Johnson’s conduct and approved it, condoned it or turned a blind eye to it.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for a prison physician’s actions.

Brennan v. Thomas · filed 2019-07-18

Even if the named defendants have supervisory authority over Dr. Lampley-Copeland’s medical decisions, they cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for her actions.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence of supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of misconduct; unsupported assertions of widespread abuse are insufficient.

Mondowney v. Baltimore County Detention Center · filed 2019-07-18

Plaintiff’s assertions do not demonstrate any pattern of widespread abuse necessary to establish supervisory action or inaction giving rise to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 claims for official or supervisory liability use a different standard from municipal liability claims.

Disability Rights Montana, Inc v. Batista · filed 2019-07-19

Moreover, cases like this one for official or supervisory liability must meet a different standard than cases for municipal liability. The DOC defendants’ numerous citations to the municipal liability standard are therefore unhelpful.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement; general allegations of supervision and encouragement do not suffice.

Wongus v. Corr. Emergency Response Team · filed 2019-07-19

These general allegations do not provide a basis for determining that Superintendent Ferguson was personally involved in the deprivation of Plaintiff's property, and provide a separate basis for dismissal.