42 U.S.C. § 1983

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 when personally involved in a violation of a federally protected right or deliberately indifferent through corrective inaction.

Wagner v. Jones · filed 2014-07-15

Under such circumstances, a supervisor may incur liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of a federally protected right when the supervisor is personally involved in the violation or when the supervisor's corrective inaction constitutes deliberate indifference toward the violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position; liability requires personal participation or a causal connection to the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Howard v. Memnon · filed 2014-07-15

In this case, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Aviles because there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires specific facts connecting a supervisor’s action or inaction to the alleged constitutional violation.

Beagle v. Schwarzenegger · filed 2014-07-25

Simply put, Plaintiffs do not allege specific facts explaining how Defendant Schwarzenegger’s action or inaction led to the allegedly unconstitutional policies at issue here.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor is personally involved in a constitutional violation or the supervisor’s conduct has a sufficient causal connection to it.

Heilman v. Sanchez · filed 2014-07-28

The district court also properly dismissed Heilman’s claims against defendants Jackson and Beebe because Heilman failed to allege plausible facts to support a claim that either defendant was personally involved in any constitutional violation, that any causal connection existed between either defendant's conduct and any such violation, or that either defendant was motivated by retaliation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s policy causes a constitutional violation; supervision alone is insufficient.

Reid v. Pautler · filed 2014-07-31

Reid has not alleged that any of the Defendants acted pursuant to a policy, or that Muller promulgated, created, implemented, or possessed responsibility for a policy that caused the alleged constitutional harms. To the extent Reid’s claim against Muller is for supervisory liability, the Court will grant the MTD and dismiss the claims against her, because he has not alleged any facts that support supervisory liability.

A supervisor who forwards an inmate’s complaint to another official for handling is not personally involved on that basis and cannot be held liable under § 1983.

Lloyd v. City of New York · filed 2014-08-04

The fact that Defendant Schriro forwarded Plaintiff Lloyd’s letter of complaint to another official for handling means she cannot be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisor to allege personal involvement in the constitutional violation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and that violation.

McCurdy v. Alvarez · filed 2014-08-21

The district court properly dismissed McCurdy’s claim alleging that defendant Kirkegard failed to provide safe conditions and denied him medical care because McCurdy failed to allege Kirkegard’s personal involvement in any ... constitutional violation or a causal connection between his conduct and any such violation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged violation or a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the violation.

Samuels v. Ahlin · filed 2014-08-21

The district court properly dismissed Samuels’s medical care claim because Samuels failed to allege facts demonstrating that defendants were personally involved in the alleged violations, or that there was a causal connection between their conduct and the alleged violations.

Section 1983 permits liability for a supervisor who did not participate in the alleged wrongdoing only when the supervisor’s conduct is causally connected to the constitutional deprivation.

Johnson v. Singer · filed 2014-08-26

A supervising official who did not participate in the allegedly wrongful acts (as in this case) can only be held liable under a theory of supervisory liability if ... there is a causal connection between the supervising official’s conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. ... Third, we conclude that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment to Singer; Johnson failed to establish that Warden Singer personally was liable for Correctional Officer Rosier’s acts.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires personal involvement, causation, and a culpable state of mind.

Lewis v. Clark · filed 2014-08-26

“Rather, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements to establish a successful § 1983 claim against a defendant based on his or her supervisory responsibilities: (1) personal involvement; (2) causation; and (3) state of mind,” which “can be no less than the mens rea required of the subordinates to commit the underlying constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 requires factual allegations showing each defendant’s personal involvement; conclusory allegations that a supervisor adopted an unwritten policy are insufficient.

Lindsey v. Butler · filed 2014-08-29

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege the personal involvement of each defendant. ... Without more than the allegations related to the single incident in the station house, however, Plaintiffs pleadings are insufficient as against Commissioner Kelly.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s own conduct causes a constitutional violation; the required mental state depends on the underlying constitutional claim.

Barkes Ex Rel. Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, Inc. · filed 2014-09-05

We do not read Iqbal to have abolished supervisory liability in its entirety. Rather, we agree with those courts that have held that, under Iqbal, the level of intent necessary to establish supervisory liability will vary with the underlying constitutional tort alleged.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a supervisor’s personal involvement in, encouragement of, or knowing acquiescence in the officers’ misconduct before the supervisor can be held individually liable.

Baker v. Smiscik · filed 2014-09-24

The Court also agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts that give rise to an inference of any personal involvement of Chief Hawkins, the officers’ supervisor who was not present at the scene. ... "Supervisory officials are not liable in their individual capacities unless they either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” ... Plaintiff’s failure to plead any facts regarding Chief Hawkins provides another basis for granting the motion in Chief Hawkins’s favor.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; their own action or inaction must proximately cause a constitutional violation.

Rua v. Glodis · filed 2014-09-24

There is no vicarious liability under § 1983. Supervisors may be liable “when their own action or inaction, including a failure to supervise that amounts to gross negligence or deliberate indifference, is a proximate cause of the constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor directly participates in a constitutional violation or the supervisor’s actions are causally connected to it.

Oliver v. Officer Harden · filed 2014-10-01

To hold a supervisor liable for constitutional violations, a plaintiff must show that either the supervisor participated directly in the unconstitutional conduct or the supervisor’s actions were causally connected to the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a supervisor may be personally liable for their own deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.

Davis v. Bay County Jail, Sheriff, Frank McKeithen · filed 2014-10-12

Because of the knowledge requirement of the subjective component, individual liability cannot attach through vicarious liability, such as respondeat superior. Liability requires a showing that the supervisor themselves acted with “deliberate indifference.”

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to be personally responsible for a constitutional deprivation by knowing about and facilitating, approving, condoning, or ignoring it.

Newell v. Ngu · filed 2014-10-20

For a supervisor like Dr. Ngu to be liable under § 1983, he must be “personally responsible” for the constitutional deprivation, which means that he “must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye.”

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor liable must show that the supervisor at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Leech v. Mayer · filed 2014-10-22

Rather, “a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.” Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.1984)). This the plaintiffs cannot do.

Section 1983 does not make a medical director personally liable for other employees’ care without evidence that the director condoned an unconstitutional practice.

Kaszuba v. Ghosh · filed 2014-10-22

Also, to the extent Kaszuba thinks that Ghosh in his capacity as medical director should be personally responsible for patient care, the evidence does not support an inference that Ghosh condoned any unconstitutional practice by other prison employees.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of supervisory authority over the person who allegedly caused a constitutional injury.

Averhart v. Warden · filed 2014-10-24

Because respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 actions, Averhart fails to state a claim simply by alleging that Davenport, Headley, Thomas, and Mason had supervisory authority over Kendrick.

A § 1983 claim against a supervisor requires evidence sufficient to raise a triable dispute about supervisory liability.

Dennison v. Ryan · filed 2014-10-28

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Dennison’s access-to-court claim against Ryan because Dennison failed to raise a triable dispute as to Ryan’s supervisory liability.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 requires unconstitutional conduct by a subordinate.

Campbell v. Bastin · filed 2014-10-29

This Court has consistently held that “a prerequisite of supervisory liability under § 1983 is unconstitutional conduct by a subordinate of the supervisor.” McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Schs., 433 F.3d 460, 470 (6th Cir.2006). Because Smith and Wallace did not violate Campbell’s constitutional rights, the claim against Chief Bastin must necessarily fail and we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the failure-to-train claim.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a supervisor’s own actions or inactions, but not solely for a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Walker v. Jackson · filed 2014-10-31

While supervisors cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the constitutional violations of their subordinates based on a theory of respondeat superior, they may be held liable for their own actions or inactions.

Section 1983 does not make officials vicariously liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates.

Eberhard v. California Highway Patrol · filed 2014-11-06

As Eberhard conceded at oral argument, Lott and Fielder are not alleged to have been personally responsible for Eber-hard’s arrest, and Section 1983 does not allow recovery based on a theory of re-spondeat superior (that is, officials are not vicariously liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires unconstitutional conduct by a subordinate.

S.L. Ex Rel. K.L. v. Pierce Township Board of Trustees · filed 2014-11-17

But because Bartley did not violate S.L.’s constitutional rights, supervisory liability does not attach to DelGrande under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; liability requires their personal involvement in the alleged misconduct.

Chatman v. Pierce · filed 2014-11-18

But § 1983 does not provide for vicarious liability, see Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 593–94 (7th Cir. 2009), and Chatman has not provided evidence that Taylor and Pierce deliberately ignored Heath’s actions toward him.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a supervisor whose failure to supervise and train causes a deprivation of constitutional rights, if the supervisor was deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized the offending acts.

Laganiere v. The County of Olmsted · filed 2014-11-24

A supervisor may be held individually liable under § 1983 "if a failure to properly supervise and train the offending employee caused a deprivation of constitutional rights." Wever v. Lincoln Cnty., 388 F.3d 601, 606 (8th Cir. 2004). The trustee must show that Sinner "was deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized the offending acts." Id. Considering the facts before us, the trustee fails to make this showing.

A supervisor cannot be liable under § 1983 without an underlying constitutional violation.

Thomas v. James Banks · filed 2014-11-25

Thomas also failed to establish supervisory liability against Warden James Banks, see Williams v. Davis, 200 F.3d 538, 538-39 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (absent constitutional violation, there is no basis for § 1983 liability against supervisors); and his allegation that Banks improperly investigated his grievance failed to state a claim, see Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (prison officials’ failure to process or investigate grievances, without more, is not actionable under § 1983).

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for an officer’s conduct.

Cardoso v. City of Brockton · filed 2014-11-26

A supervisory official cannot be held vicariously liable under section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable merely because protective policies and procedures failed in a particular case.

Dave Taft, Jr. v. Palmer · filed 2014-12-05

Though unfortunate, that the policies and procedures failed in this particular case—without more—does not mean that the officials are liable under § 1983 for any deliberate indifference of their staff.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a police chief for alleged constitutional violations in which the chief had no direct involvement.

Bolden v. City of Euclid · filed 2014-12-08

The district court correctly recognized that the record is devoid of any direct involvement by Chief Brickman in the alleged constitutional violations asserted by Plaintiffs. Therefore, Chief Brick-man is not liable in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a constitutional deprivation and a supervisor’s conduct; supervisory status or denial of a grievance alone does not establish liability.

Montez v. Lampert · filed 2014-12-15

“Supervisory status alone does not create § 1983 liability. Rather, there must be an affirmative link between the constitutional deprivation and either the supervisor’s personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise.” Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009) (citations and quotations omitted). Montez can only affirmatively link Lampert to his injuries through a letter denying his grievance appeal, and we have concluded that denials of grievances alone do not link prison officials to constitutional deprivations.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisory official when the complaint sufficiently alleges that the official learned of an attack and failed to remedy it.

Balkum v. Leonard · filed 2014-12-15

Either way, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges Defendant Ri-chir’s personal involvement to survive a motion to dismiss by claiming that Defendant Richir learned of the alleged attack but “failed to correct the wrong acts.”

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for their subordinates’ actions.

Curran v. Aleshire · filed 2014-12-16

Supervisors cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of their subordinates under a theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a sufficient causal connection exists between a supervisor’s wrongful conduct and a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Club Level, Inc. v. Wa State Liquor Control Board · filed 2014-12-30

Constitutional deprivations by a subordinate may subject a supervisor to liability under section 1983 if "a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor' s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation" exists.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation; an unsupported allegation of failure to supervise does not state a claim.

Brooks v. Prack · filed 2014-12-31

It is well-settled that a supervisory defendant must have been personally involved in a constitutional deprivation to be held liable under § 1983. ... Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for supervisory liability.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only when the supervisor personally participated in the constitutional deprivation or the supervisor’s actions were causally connected to it.

Sturdivant v. The City of Atlanta · filed 2015-01-06

As there is no respondeat superior theory of liability under § 1983, to hold an individual supervisor liable, the plaintiff must show either that the supervisor personally participated in the constitutional deprivation or that there was a causal connection between the supervisor’s actions and the constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional acts solely because of their supervisory role.

Charriez v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2015-01-09

“It is well established in this circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of and acquiesces in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct; knowledge and inaction can suffice at the pleading stage.

Aspinall v. Thomas · filed 2015-01-12

This inaction coupled with Mr. Masco and Mr. Bishop’s actual knowledge of the complaints sufficiently establishes knowledge and acquiescence, as required to satisfy the second method of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without an underlying constitutional violation.

Norman v. Randolph · filed 2015-01-16

And because Ms. Norman failed to produce evidence showing a constitutional violation, Sheriff Randolph cannot be held liable as a supervisor.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability when the supervised officials committed no underlying constitutional violation.

Willis v. Skip Shiver · filed 2015-01-27

Here, Deputies Brannon and Cook did not violate Willis’s constitutional rights. So Willis’s § 1983 claim against Sheriff Mock fails.

Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability; supervisors are liable only for their own unconstitutional conduct.

Dinote v. Danberg · filed 2015-02-04

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state actors are “liable only for their own unconstitutional conduct” and respondeat superior liability is not permitted.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation and a supervisor’s authorization, approval, or knowing acquiescence in it.

Smith v. Erie County Sheriff's Dep't · filed 2015-02-26

In order to prevail, “[a]t a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.” ... Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing this claim because no evidence establishes that Individual Defendants violated the Constitution.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor oversees someone who violated a constitutional right; the supervisor must have a causal role in the violation.

Montez v. Hampton · filed 2015-03-02

To the extent that he alleges that Baggett is responsible for Hampton’s conduct based on a theory of respondeat superior or supervisory liability, he has not asserted that Baggett was involved in implementing a policy or custom that violated his constitutional rights and was the moving force of a constitutional violation; thus, he has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Baggett violated a constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knowingly disregards a subordinate’s risk of a constitutional violation or creates a policy or environment that leads to violations.

Niemic v. UMass Correrctional Health · filed 2015-03-02

In order to satisfy the second prong of the test, a supervisor must knowingly disregard a subordinate’s risk of a constitutional violation, or create a policy or environment that leads to violations.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability for a subordinate’s conduct solely through respondeat superior.

Anderson v. Sheriff Joe Chapman · filed 2015-03-11

That is, individual liability under § 1983 cannot arise vicariously through a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires allegations identifying each supervisor’s own act and state of mind connecting that supervisor to a constitutional violation; collective allegations are insufficient.

Jemaneh v. University of Wyoming · filed 2015-03-11

As previously discussed, Plaintiff must sufficiently allege that “each [supervisor] defendant took some act with the constitutionally applicable state of mind that caused the alleged constitutional violation.” ... In this case, Plaintiff has failed to do so. Instead, as with his other allegations concerning the Supervisory Defendants, Plaintiff fails to identify who did what, relying on collective allegations. Accordingly, Plaintiffs allegations against the Supervisory Defendants are insufficient to state a claim.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a sufficient causal connection links the supervisor’s wrongful conduct to the constitutional violation.

Olivier v. Scribner · filed 2015-03-17

Olivier’s complaint also alleges “a sufficient causal connection between [McEwan’s] wrongful conduct”—i.e., failing to remedy noncompliance with a medically-necessary transfer—“and the constitutional violation”—i.e., depriving Olivier of outdoor exercise time for months—to hold McEwan liable as a supervisor. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989).

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to hold a supervisor liable solely on a theory of vicarious liability.

Romero v. Kail · filed 2015-03-17

To the extent that Romero sought to hold Sgt. McDonold vicariously liable, his claim is not cognizable.

Section 1983 permits claims against supervisors and municipalities only when their own conduct or policy causes a constitutional violation, and it does not impose respondeat superior liability.

Saldivar v. Pridgen · filed 2015-03-17

A supervisor may be liable under Section 1983 if (1) the behavior of his subordinates results in a constitutional violation, and (2) the supervisor’s action or inaction was affirmatively linked to that behavior in the sense that it could be characterized as supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference. ... Plaintiff has failed to state a sufficient claim for supervisory liability. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss Count IV of the second amended complaint will be allowed.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional violation or had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Fields v. Moreno · filed 2015-03-20

The district court properly dismissed Fields’ claims against Mims, Moreno, and Hill in their individual capacities because he failed to allege facts sufficient to show that these defendants were personally involved in the jail’s denial of dental care, or that their alleged misconduct caused his injuries. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he or she is personally involved in the constitutional violation or if there is “a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on officials for subordinates' actions through vicarious liability.

Osborne v. Harris County · filed 2015-03-31

“Under section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.”

Section 1983 provides a remedy against persons who violate civil rights and permits supervisory liability only for a supervisor’s own acts or omissions, not respondeat superior.

Jah v. Naphcare, Inc. · filed 2015-03-31

Indeed, section 1983 only offers a remedy against “person[s]” who violate a claimant’s civil rights. 42 U.S.C. §1983. ... Respondeat superior is not an available theory of supervisory liability under section 1983; instead, liability must be based on the supervisor’s own acts or omissions. ... Accordingly, Mr. Jah’s section 1983 claims against the Sheriffs Department, the Commonwealth, and Sheriff Cabral in her official and personal capacity must be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits supervisory prison officials to be held liable only when they personally participated in the constitutional deprivation or had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Fortune v. McGee · filed 2015-04-01

Supervisory prison officials may be held liable for a Section 1983 violation only if there was “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or . . . a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional ... violation.” Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisory officials for subordinates’ actions.

Booke v. County of Fresno · filed 2015-04-02

For purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “supervisory officials are not liable for actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking supervisory liability to show personal involvement, causation, and a culpable state of mind linking the supervisor to the constitutional violation.

Lemmons v. Clymer · filed 2015-04-06

In the context of § 1983 liability based on a defendant’s supervisory role, the plaintiff must show an “affirmative link between the supervisor and the constitutional violation,” by demonstrating (1) the supervisor’s personal involvement, (2) causation, and (3) a culpable state of mind.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors and requires personal participation or a causal connection to the constitutional violation.

John Elmore, Jr. v. Fulton County School District · filed 2015-04-08

Supervisors cannot be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on government officials for unconstitutional conduct by their subordinates.

Victory v. Pataki · filed 2015-04-17

As an initial matter, the undisputed involvement of two high-ranking members of Pataki’s staff in the events preceding the rescission hearing is insufficient to establish Pataki’s liability “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits.”

Section 1983 bars vicarious liability against supervisors and requires evidence of their own misconduct or direct participation.

Salem v. Millicent Warren · filed 2015-04-23

The Supreme Court has made it clear that a § 1983 plaintiff may not rely on vicarious liability to recover against a supervisor; instead, “each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only when the supervisor was personally responsible for or actively participated in the unconstitutional conduct that caused the injury.

Meeks v. Schofield · filed 2015-06-02

In order to establish supervisory liability under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant, as a supervisory official, was personálly responsible for or actively participated in the alleged unconstitutional actions that caused his injury.

Under § 1983, a supervisor sued for sex discrimination must have intended to discriminate; a jury may infer that intent from a failure to protect against harassment combined with a threat of retaliation.

Locke v. Haessig · filed 2015-06-05

For discrimination claims like those at issue in Iqbal and here, where the state of mind of purposeful discrimination is an element of the violation, a supervisor is liable only if she had the specific intent to discriminate.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor through respondeat superior; liability requires personal involvement in the alleged actions.

Jordan v. Cicchi · filed 2015-06-22

With respect to Jordan’s access to the courts claim, we note as a threshold matter that liability in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be imposed on a supervisor on the basis of respondeat superior, Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988), and liability cannot be imposed absent personal involvement in the alleged actions, see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-77 (1976); Chincello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133-34 (3d Cir. 1986).

Section 1983 supervisory liability for failure to train or supervise requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Bailey v. Arthur Lawson, Jr. · filed 2015-06-23

Because Appellants have not adduced evidence that Officer Vinson violated Ms. Bullock’s constitutional rights, there is not an underlying constitutional violation and therefore supervisory liability cannot exist.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; a supervisor must at least implicitly authorize, approve, or knowingly acquiesce in the unconstitutional conduct.

Stevens v. Gooch · filed 2015-06-24

To the extent that Stevens argues that Gooch is liable for the actions of Nurse Brown and other employees, “[r]espondeat superior is not a proper basis for liability under § 1983,” and Stevens would have to show at a minimum, that the supervisor “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 470 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Stevens has set forth no evidence establishing that Gooch implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in decisions made by his staff about Stevens’s medical treatment.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires personal involvement in a constitutional violation or a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the violation.

Campbell v. Portillo · filed 2015-07-01

The district court properly granted summary judgment as to defendants Baca and Lindsay because Campbell failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Baca and Lindsay were personally involved in any constitutional violation or whether there was a causal connection between their conduct and any such violation.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for failure to train or supervise when there is no underlying constitutional violation.

Thompson v. Beasley · filed 2015-07-13

For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff cannot show a predicate constitutional violation and that, therefore, summary judgment in favor of Jones must be granted on the § 1983 claims brought against him in his individual capacity.

A supervisor is personally liable under § 1983 only if the supervisor participated in the unconstitutional conduct or authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in it.

D.M. v. State · filed 2015-07-14

The plaintiff must establish that the supervisor personally participated in the unconstitutional conduct or was otherwise the moving force of the viola- tion by authorizing, approving, or knowingly acquiescing in the unconstitutional conduct. Id. D.M. has alleged no facts in his complaint sufficient to establish Houston’s personal liability under § 1983, and therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing D.M.’s constitutional claims against Houston individually.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely because they have authority over subordinates; liability requires personal participation or a causal connection to the constitutional violation.

Braja Pandit Smith v. Owens · filed 2015-07-16

Finally, because respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 actions, Plaintiff did not state a claim simply by alleging that Defendants Owens, Toole, Paul, and Fowler had supervisory authority over their subordinates.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when officials know of a serious risk to prisoners and fail to adopt adequate protective policies.

Togonidze v. Livingston · filed 2015-07-17

Contrary to Appellants’ suggestion, Appellees’ allegations that Appellants failed to promulgate adequate policies despite knowing the effect of extreme heat on heat-sensitive prisoners like the decedents, if true, could support the imposition of supervisory liability.

A supervisory liability claim under § 1983 fails without a sufficiently alleged underlying constitutional violation.

Smith v. Israel · filed 2015-07-22

Because Smith did not sufficiently allege an underlying constitutional violation by any defendant, his claims for failure to intervene and supervisory liability must also fail.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a police chief without facts showing that he was actively engaged in unconstitutional behavior.

Huffman v. Village of Newburgh Heights · filed 2015-07-27

The plaintiffs’ constitutional claim against Chief Barone also fails as a matter of law, since the plaintiffs fail to set forth facts showing that he was actively engaged in unconstitutional behavior.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Swearington v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation · filed 2015-07-30

Dismissal of Swearington’s supervisory liability claims against defendants Wisneski, McDaniel, and Grooves was proper because Swearington failed to allege facts sufficient to show that those defendants were personally involved in any constitutional violation, or that there was a causal connection between their conduct and any such violation.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between deficient supervision and a constitutional violation to hold a supervisor liable.

Martin v. City of Reading · filed 2015-07-31

As with municipal liability § 1983 claims, a plaintiff may prevail on a supervisory liability claim only if the plaintiff can establish a causal link between the allegedly defective supervision and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors, but a supervisor may be liable for enforcing a policy or practice that deprives someone of federally protected rights.

Cherry v. Mainous · filed 2015-07-31

Though, under § 1983, supervisors are not liable based on a theory of vicarious liability, they “can be held liable when the enforcement of a policy or practice results in a deprivation of federally protected rights.”

A § 1983 supervisory liability claim cannot survive summary judgment without a genuine dispute of material fact about the supervisor’s liability.

Herbert v. Lovell · filed 2015-08-03

Summary judgment was proper for defendant Dumas because Herbert failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to Dumas’s supervisory liability.

Supervisory liability under Section 1983 requires personal involvement in a constitutional violation or conduct that caused one.

Herbert v. Vertucci · filed 2015-08-03

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant Dumas because Herbert failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Dumas was personally involved in any constitutional violation or whether his conduct caused any such violation.

Section 1983 requires factual support linking a supervisor to an alleged rights violation; speculation about misconduct higher in the chain of command is insufficient.

Deady v. Koutoujian · filed 2015-08-05

Speculation that misconduct may have occurred high in the chain of command, without any real factual support, is insufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability under §1983.

Under Section 1983, a supervisor’s personal involvement may be shown by direct participation in an alleged constitutional violation, creating a policy or custom under which it occurs, or allowing the practice to continue.

Betances v. Fischer · filed 2015-08-06

A supervisor has sufficient personal involvement when she participates directly in the alleged constitutional violation, creates a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occur, or allows such practices to continue.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because of their position; a plaintiff must plausibly allege their personal involvement or deliberate indifference.

Sundquist v. Nebraska · filed 2015-08-10

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 cases. ... Sundquist has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Bruning or Acierno were personally involved in the alleged violations of his constitutional rights, or that they were deliberately indifferent to those violations.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory position or respondeat superior.

Jackson v. Russel · filed 2015-08-17

It is well established that claims based solely on the theory of respondeat superior or supervisor liability are facially deficient.

Section 1983 requires a failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise claim to plausibly allege the supervisor’s personal involvement in the underlying constitutional violation.

Grega v. Pettengill · filed 2015-08-18

Because Grega has not sufficiently pled facts demonstrating Detective Cutting’s personal involvement in the alleged evidence fabrication, he has failed to state claims of failure to train and failure to supervise against Cutting.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts showing the supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; a bare allegation of approval is insufficient.

Evans v. Gloucester Township · filed 2015-08-20

However, this bare allegation is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for supervisory liability. The Amended Complaint is similarly devoid of allegations supporting an inference that Mayer was personally involved or even aware of Plaintiffs arrest on November 8, 2012.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for a supervisor who implicitly authorizes, approves, or knowingly acquiesces in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Coley v. Lucas County, Ohio · filed 2015-08-21

These allegations are sufficient to show that Plaintiffs have established a valid claim under § 1983, insofar as they have shown that Telb “at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate” when he helped Schmeltz and Gray to cover up their unconstitutional actions.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because they oversee the person who allegedly violated a federal right.

Gibbons v. McBride · filed 2015-08-21

It is well-established that supervisors are not subject to § 1983 liability under theories of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s own action or inaction to proximately cause an underlying constitutional violation; a policy that does not show deliberate indifference does not establish supervisory liability.

Perry v. Dickhaut · filed 2015-08-27

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 “when their own action or inaction, including a failure to supervise that ‘amounts to gross negligence or deliberate indifference, is a proximate cause of the constitutional violation.” ... Because thére is no underlying conduct that was “itself violative of a plaintiffs constitutional rights,” the assertion that 'the supervisors are also liable fails.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; denying a grievance after being informed of the violation may suffice.

Nichols v. LaPlante · filed 2015-09-03

Section 1983 does not hold supervisors vicariously liable for the conduct of the employees that they oversee, however. ... Instead, a plaintiff must establish that the supervisor had some “personal involvement” in the alleged constitutional deprivations. ... Among other things, supervisory personnel may be considered “personally involved” if they failed to remedy the wrong after being informed of the violation through a report or an appeal. ... Accordingly, Defendant has stated a claim against the supervisory officials.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Stephens v. Livingston · filed 2015-09-18

Because Stephens has not demonstrated an underlying constitutional violation, he has not alleged a basis for supervisory liability.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a sheriff to have a high degree of knowledge of the risk that caused the injury, and a causal connection between the sheriff’s conduct and that injury.

Franklin v. Kimbrel · filed 2015-09-21

Our precedent makes clear that supervisory liability under § 1983 requires sheriffs to possess a high degree of knowledge about the risk that materialized.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a subordinate committed a violation.

Bloom v. Toliver · filed 2015-09-22

As with municipal liability, supervisory liability under § 1983 may not be premised upon a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a supervisor personally participated in the alleged deprivation or caused it through an unconstitutional policy or inadequate supervision or training.

Tuskan v. Jackson County · filed 2015-09-25

Tuskan has not submitted any competent summary judgment evidence indicating that Byrd affirmatively participated in the acts that caused Tuskan’s alleged constitutional deprivations, or that Byrd implemented any unconstitutional policies that causally resulted in the purported constitutional injuries. Nor has sufficient proof been submitted that Byrd failed to adequately supervise or train Thornton.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement or responsibility for an alleged constitutional violation.

Guillory v. Cuomo · filed 2015-09-29

Supervisor liability under § 1983 requires some personal involvement or responsibility and “can be shown in one or more of the following ways: (1) actual direct participation in the constitutional violation, (2) failure to remedy a wrong after being informed through a report or appeal, (3) creation of a policy or custom that sanctioned conduct amounting to a constitutional violation, or allowing such a policy or custom to continue, (4) grossly negligent supervision of subordinates who committed a violation, or (5) failure to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.” Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir.2003).

Supervisory liability under § 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Bastuk v. County of Monroe · filed 2015-10-06

Because there has been no constitutional violation, Bastuk has also failed to state a claim against Sheriff Patrick O’Flynn on a theory of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose official-capacity liability on a sheriff for inadequate training without proof of a pattern of similar violations.

Washington v. Gusman · filed 2015-10-14

Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred by finding Sheriff Gusman liable in his official capacity pursuant to § 1983 because Mrs. Washington failed to prove a pattern of similar violations, and reverse.

Section 1983 allows supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of a constitutional violation and fails to prevent it or implements a policy that causes one.

Kilgore v. Kelly · filed 2015-10-22

Kilgore raised no genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant Kelly either knew of a constitutional violation and failed to prevent it, see Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989), or implemented a policy that was “the moving force” behind a constitutional violation, Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987)).

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of constitutional misconduct and facilitates, approves, condones, or turns a blind eye to it.

Smith v. City of Chicago · filed 2015-11-09

A supervisor, such as Defendant McCarthy, can be liable under § 1983 if he knows about the misconduct and either facilitates it, approves it, condones it, or turn a blind eye. ... Under the circumstances, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a plausible claim for supervisory liability pursuant to the federal pleading standards.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for constitutional violations by supervisors who participated in, directed, knew of and acquiesced in, or tolerated subordinates’ misconduct.

Jacobs v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 2015-11-12

To render Emerick, Rustin, or Pofi personally liable for constitutional violations under § 1983, plaintiff will be required to prove they: (1) participated in violating plaintiffs constitutional rights; (2) directed others to violate plaintiffs constitutional rights; (3) knew of and acquiesced in their subordinates’ violation of plaintiffs rights; or (4) knew of and tolerated past or ongoing misbehavior.

Section 1983 permits liability for a supervisory official’s own implementation of unconstitutional policies that causally cause constitutional injury, but does not permit vicarious liability for subordinates’ actions.

Hinojosa v. Livingston · filed 2015-11-18

But Defendants misread the complaint. The complaint does not seek to hold Defendants vicariously liable for the actions of their subordinates. Rather, it seeks to hold them liable for their own actions in promulgating — and failing to correct — intake and housing policies that exposed Hinojosa and other inmates like him to extreme temperatures without adequate remedial measures. “A supervisory official may be held liable ... if ... he implements unconstitutional policies that causally result in the constitutional injury.” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent that Defendants appear to argue they had no hand in the formation of the intake and housing policies described in the complaint, they raise a factual dispute inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory claim against a public entity only when an official policy or custom caused a constitutional injury.

Robinson v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority · filed 2015-11-23

Robinson’s claim that MARTA is liable under 42 USC §1983 for its negligent training and supervision of the officers is also meritless. ... “There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983; rather, a plaintiff must point to some official policy or custom which resulted in the injury. . . . [Robinson] must prove that [MARTA] deprived him of a constitutional right pursuant to an impermissible or corrupt policy which is intentional and deliberate.”

Section 1983 permits liability for constitutional deprivations caused by a person acting under color of state law, including a supervisor with personal involvement or a sufficient causal connection.

Mann v. County of San Diego · filed 2015-11-23

Personal participation is not the only predicate for § 1983 liability. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1978). Anyone who “causes” any citizen to be subjected to a constitutional deprivation is also liable. Id. In order to be held liable, a “supervisor need, not be ‘directly and personally involved in the same way as are the individual officers who are on the scene inflicting constitutional injury.’ ” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir.2011) (quotation omitted). A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 “if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989). “[A] plaintiff must show the supervisor breached a duty to plaintiff which was the proximate cause of the injury.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207. “The requisite causal connection can be established ... by setting in motion a series of acts by others, or by knowingly refusing to terminate a series of acts by others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely through respondeat superior.

Bowen v. Taft · filed 2003-05-02

However, he fails to explain how the district court’s conclusion that these defendants could not be held liable under the theory of respondeat superior was erroneous. Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 727-28 (6th Cir.1996).

Section 1983 requires supervisory liability plaintiffs to show knowledge of a pervasive risk, deliberate indifference, and an affirmative causal link to the constitutional injury.

Bell v. Board of Educ. of County of Fayette · filed 2003-11-10

To establish supervisory liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices[ ]; and (3) that there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Larochelle v. NH DOC · filed 2015-12-02

It is, however, well-established that supervisory liability under section 1983 cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior and requires deliberate indifference for a failure-to-train or supervise claim.

Randle v. Tregre · filed 2015-12-02

Supervisors cannot be found liable under § 1983 through respondeat superior. ... Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence supporting his assertion that Sheriff Tregre .made any type of “deliberate” or “conscious” choice that “directly caused” plaintiffs injuries. ... Because, even viewing the record evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, his allegations are based on mere speculation and are without a factual basis, the Court concludes that plaintiffs deliberate indifference claim against Sheriff Tregre must be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the supervisor had notice of unconstitutional conduct and acted with deliberate indifference or authorized it.

S.M. v. Krigbaum · filed 2015-12-09

When a supervising official who had no direct participation in an alleged constitutional violation is sued for failure to train or supervise the offending actor, the supervisor is entitled to qualified immunity unless plaintiff proves that the supervisor (1) received notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by a subordinate, and (2) was deliberately indifferent to or authorized those acts.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement; supervisory status alone is insufficient for liability.

Moore v. Diggins · filed 2015-12-10

For Moore’s § 1983 claim to succeed against any defendant, he “must show personal involvement or participation in the incident.” Grimsley v. MacKay, 93 F.3d 676, 679 (10th Cir. 1996). Although Moore alleges that Kassety and Diggins failed to supervise their employees and departments, he does not point to any personal involvement beyond the mere fact that they were supervisors. This is insufficient to state a claim based on supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of his management position or an employee’s conduct.

Brown v. Brock · filed 2015-12-16

As the principles of respondeat superior do not apply in § 1983 cases, Brown’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim against Brock.

Section 1983 permits a detainee to hold a prison official liable for a constitutional violation caused by failure to train or supervise when the official was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm.

Kahle v. Deputy Tim Malone · filed 2007-02-12

A prison official may be held liable to a detainee if he directly participated in the violation of her constitutional rights or if his failure to train or supervise the offending actor caused the violation. ... A failure-to-supervise claim may be maintained only if the official “demonstrated deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the offensive acts.” ... The deliberate-indifference standard is a subjective one: “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” ... The official need not believe that serious harm will actually befall an inmate; it is sufficient that the official knows of a substantial risk that the inmate will suffer serious harm. ... Thus, if there was a substantial risk that Kahle would suffer that harm, and if Malone was deliberately indifferent to that risk, then Malone can be held liable under § 1983 for violating Kahle’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (unless Malone enjoys qualified immunity).

Section 1983 permits liability for a supervisor who is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm caused by an offending actor.

Kahle v. Leonard · filed 2007-02-12

A prison official may be held liable to a detainee if he directly participated in the violation of her constitutional rights or if his failure to train or supervise the offending actor caused the violation. See Tilson v. Forrest City Police Dep't, 28 F.3d 802, 806-07 (8th Cir.1994). A failure-to-supervise claim may be maintained only if the official "demonstrated deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the offensive acts." Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574, 579 (8th Cir.1998) (citation and quotations omitted). The deliberate-indifference standard is a subjective one: "[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing supervisory officials to allege their personal involvement in the violation or a causal connection between their conduct and the violation.

Gordon v. Cate · filed 2016-01-28

Dismissal of Gordon’s fraudulent confiscation receipt claim against defendants Cate and Grounds was proper because Gordon failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate their personal involvement in the alleged violation or a causal connection between their conduct and the alleged violation.

Section 1983 holds medical supervisors liable when they personally violate a plaintiff’s rights or are responsible for a systematic condition that violates the Constitution.

Saylor v. Randy Kohl, M.D. · filed 2016-01-29

Rather, to be liable under § 1983 the medical defendants had to personally violate Saylor's rights or be responsible for a systematic condition that violates the Constitution.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because a defendant oversees employees who allegedly violated constitutional rights.

Sepulveda v. UMass Correctional Health Care · filed 2016-02-05

In the context of a Section 1983 claim, “supervisory liability cannot be predicated on a respondeat superior theory.”

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 when he directs officers to make an unconstitutional arrest.

Wilcox v. City of Detroit · filed 2016-02-16

Graves’ supervisory role is not a defense. ... A reasonable jury would therefore necessarily conclude that Graves “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct.”

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim to proceed when the complaint alleges supporting facts, even if it does not expressly list the claim.

Cabassa v. Ostheimer · filed 2016-02-22

Although not specifically referenced in the section of his complaint entitled “Claims for Relief,” plaintiff has alleged facts to support a claim for supervisory liability against defendants Semple, Erfe, Cindy, and Brown.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor and a subordinate’s unconstitutional acts for supervisor liability.

Gandy v. Barber · filed 2016-02-23

To establish a § 1983 claim based on supervisor liability, a plaintiff must show an “affirmative link” between the supervisor and the unconstitutional acts of his or her subordinates.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors based only on respondeat superior or a failure to act.

Browning v. Pennerton · filed 2009-06-22

The case of Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (1999), holds that officials whose only action involve[s] the denial of administrative grievances, or the failure to act, are not liable under § 1983. ... “Liability under § 1983 must be based on more than respondeat superior, or the right to control employees”. It must be based on active constitutional behavior, not a “mere failure to act.”

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability when supervisors lacked knowledge of a subordinate’s conduct or the risk it posed and therefore could not have been deliberately indifferent to it or tacitly authorized it.

Wilkins v. Lieutenant Upton · filed 2016-03-02

The lack of record evidence establishing that Upton and Branker had any knowledge regarding Thompson’s actions or any risk he may have posed to Wilkins prior to his resignation also is fatal to Wilkins’ claim for supervisory liability under the Eighth Amendment. In the absence of any knowledge of Thompson’s conduct prior to his resignation, Branker and Upton could not have been deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized the same.

Section 1983 does not make an officer liable for another officer’s conduct solely because the first officer is a supervisor.

Surratt v. McClaran · filed 2016-03-03

An officer cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on the basis of respon-deat superior.

Under § 1983, a supervisor’s direct participation in a probable cause decision and authorization of a warrantless home arrest can satisfy the personal involvement and causation elements of supervisory liability.

Derosier v. Balltrip · filed 2016-03-08

Because Plaintiff has alleged that Commander Sanchez participated directly in the probable cause determination and directly authorized the war-rantless arrest of Plaintiff inside his home, I find that the first two elements of supervisory liability are satisfied.

Section 1983 does not allow claims based on negligence or solely on supervisory liability.

Elizondo v. Livingston · filed 2016-03-10

Additionally, neither claims based on negligence nor those based solely on the theory of supervisory liability are cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s gross negligence, deliberate indifference, or direct participation connects the supervisor to a constitutional violation.

Randle v. Alexander · filed 2016-03-16

In citing these specific examples, and presenting testimony and documents to support them, Randle has raised a material question of fact as to whether Sergeant Alexander’s conduct constituted the sort of gross negligence, deliberate indifference, or direct participation that is required to sustain a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 applies the same state-of-mind standard to supervisors as to other defendants; for Fourth Amendment claims, that standard is objective reasonableness.

Webb v. Thompson · filed 2016-03-22

We did not engage the question of which mens rea standard applies in Wilson, and thus did not contradict the conclusions that we apply an objective reasonableness test to Fourth Amendment claims under § 1983, Stuart, 547 U.S. at 404, 126 S.Ct. 1943, and that the same standard applies to § 1983 claims against supervisors, see Porro, 624 F.3d at 1327-28.

A police supervisor is liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s conduct only if the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge of a grave risk of harm and failed to take readily available measures to address it.

Saldivar v. Racine · filed 2016-03-25

In order for a police supervisor to be deemed "deliberately indifferent," the supervisor must have "actual or constructive knowledge" of a "grave risk of harm" posed by the subordinate and fail to take "easily available measures to address the risk." ... And, here, we do not believe the facts that have been set forth suffice to make it plausible that the supervisor -- Racine -- is liable under § 1983 for the horrific conduct by Officer Pridgen that is alleged.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official’s conduct in performing their duties causes a constitutional injury.

Peatross v. City of Memphis · filed 2016-03-29

Accordingly, where an official’s execution of his or her job function causes injury to the plaintiff, the official may be liable under the supervisory-liability theory.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because the supervisor controlled employees.

Lawrence v. Madison County · filed 2016-03-31

Further, to the extent that Lawrence alleges inadequate training or supervision on the part of Thomas, the mere fact that he exercised supervisory control over MCDC employees cannot support an inference of liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a subordinate’s conduct; the plaintiff must show the supervisor’s direct participation or a causal connection to the violation.

Gray v. Royal · filed 2016-03-31

A supervisor may be held liable, however, if the plaintiff shows that the supervisor either directly participated in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation. ... In light of the above, Plaintiffs failed to create an issue of material fact regarding the matter of Royal’s alleged involvement with the placement of the audio recording device, nor was evidence produced which would support an allegation of a custom or policy.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Shuford v. Conway · filed 2016-04-01

As determined in the next section of this Order, the Court finds the absence of a constitutional violation of Plaintiffs’ rights; accordingly, there can be no supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a subordinate’s isolated constitutional violation without the supervisor’s direct participation or a causal connection to the violation.

Alabama State University v. Danley · filed 2016-04-08

Rather, the evidence supports the conclusion that the withdrawal of Danley’s December 2012 pay from his bank account, though unfortunate, was nothing more than the type of “ ‘isolated occurrence[ ],’ ” ... that is insufficient to hold a supervisor liable under a plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.

A supervisory official must be personally involved in causing a constitutional deprivation to be liable for a subordinate’s conduct under § 1983.

Balkum v. Leonard · filed 2016-04-11

Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant Richir’s motion for summary judgment, and even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has not established a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Defendant Richir’s personal involvement in the underlying incident.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisor to show the supervisor’s own discriminatory intent rather than rely on vicarious liability.

C.C. v. Monroe County Board of Education · filed 2011-05-25

Recognizing that vicarious liability is inapplicable to both Bivens and § 1983 claims, the Court established “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own ... individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” ... Thus, a plaintiff must show a supervisor possessed discriminatory intent in order to adequately state a claim for a violation of her equal protection rights.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Palmer v. Warden · filed 2012-03-05

Further, it appears from the face of the complaint that the claims were either unexhausted, barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), or based upon impermissible respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability based on a supervisor's own acts or omissions, but not solely on respondeat superior or positional authority.

Guadalupe-Baez v. Police Officers A-Z · filed 2016-04-20

Supervisory liability is sui generis. Thus, a supervisor may not be held liable under section 1983 on the tort theory of respondeat superior, nor can a supervisor's section 1983 liability rest solely on his position of authority. ... Even so, the supervisor's liability must be premised on his own acts or omissions. ... Mere negligence will not suffice: the supervisor's conduct must evince "reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others."

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor for violations committed by subordinates.

Fleet Hamby v. Hammond · filed 2016-05-02

We note that Secretary Warner cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for any violations committed by prison medical personnel.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in a constitutional violation or has a causal connection to it.

McNeeley v. Wilson · filed 2016-05-02

“[S]upervisors are liable under § 1983 either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 bars supervisory liability based solely on vicarious liability and requires personal participation, a causal connection, and an underlying constitutional or statutory violation.

Taylor v. Taylor · filed 2016-05-03

Supervisors cannot be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of vicarious liability. ... Rather, to be liable under § 1983, the supervisor must have personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation or have a “causal connection” with it. ... For a supervisor to be liable, there must be an underlying “constitutional or statutory violation.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because the supervisor is in charge of an institution’s overall operations.

Hendrix v. DeKalb County Board of Education · filed 2016-05-05

The fact that Defendant Willoughby, is in charge of the “overall operations” of the school system is insufficient to impose liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a plausible allegation that a subordinate violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Olisky v. Town of East Longmeadow · filed 2016-05-12

But because (as we've said) the judge correctly concluded that Olisky's constitutional-violation allegations failed to cross the plausibility threshold, any supervisory-liability theory is a no-go too.

Section 1983 liability for failing to stop another person’s misconduct requires a supervisory relationship or a state law duty to control that person’s actions.

Jankowski v. Lellock · filed 2016-05-20

Section 1983 liability attaches only if there is either a supervisor-subordinate relationship or a state law duty to control the actions of the primary actor.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s decisions unless the supervisor’s own actions violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Doe ex rel. Doe v. Berkeley County School District · filed 2016-05-31

To the extent Father seeks to hold Spencer liable for a subordinate’s supervision decisions, that theory lacks merit. See Rosa, 795 F.3d at 442 n. 7 (noting that ”[b]ecause principles of respon-deat' superior do not apply in imposing liability under § 1983,” college president’s supervisory authority over his subordinates could not malee him liable for those subordinates' purported violations of plaintiffs’ rights; rather, to impose § 1983 liability, president's "own individual actions” had to violate plaintiffs’ rights (citations and quotation marks omitted)).

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor acquiesces in a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Bazinet v. Thorpe · filed 2016-06-03

Thus, a reasonable jury could find that Desrosiers was involved in-the genesis of Thorpe’s report and acquiesced in Thorpe’s violation of Bruce’s rights, Desro-siers is not entitled to summary judgment on count V.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ actions solely because they supervise them.

Kandi Torres, Keisha Collins, and Oliver Bell v. McCann · filed 2016-06-09

Under section 1983, supervisory officials such as Bell and Collins are not liable for the actions of subordinates on a theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; a supervisor is liable only for personal participation or a causal connection to the constitutional deprivation.

Magwood v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2016-06-15

“Supervisory officials are not liable under section 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” ... “Under § 1983, liability attaches to a supervisor only if the supervisor personally participated in the events, or if there is a causal connection between the action of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”

Section 1983 does not make a police chief liable for a subordinate officer’s unconstitutional conduct solely because the chief supervises the officer.

Miller-Evans v. Williams · filed 2016-06-15

Even if the failure of an MPD officer to arrest the plaintiff for the videotaped incident could be construed as a constitutional violation, the Chief of Police cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional action of her subordinate.

Section 1983 does not allow officials to be sued solely because they supervise others; liability requires personal involvement.

Solazzo v. Bynes · filed 2016-06-24

But his proposed amendments—to add management and supervisory officials as defendants—were futile, because he apparently wanted to sue them not for their personal involvement, but simply because they were supervisors.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a supervisor to allege personal involvement in the deprivation of rights or a policy that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Marroquin v. Grady · filed 2016-06-24

Likewise, Marroquin failed to allege that Warden Evans either was personally involved in the alleged deprivation of Marroquin’s rights or implemented a policy that was the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege each defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional violation; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Holland v. City of New York · filed 2016-06-24

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege the personal involvement of each defendant.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires unconstitutional conduct by a subordinate, so the claim fails when the underlying constitutional claim fails.

Miller v. Davis · filed 2016-06-24

As an initial matter, “a prerequisite of supervisory liability under § 1983 is unconstitutional conduct by a subordinate of the supervisor.” ... Because the Millers’ Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim cannot withstand the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, that obviates the supervisory liability claim for that allegation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead a supervisor’s personal involvement; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Hardwick v. Senato · filed 2016-06-28

Plaintiff fails to pleád Senate’s personal involvement outside of his official capacity as a food services supervisor. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (noting it is well established that supervisory liability cannot be imposed under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the unconstitutional conduct or a policy, practice, or custom that directly caused the constitutional harm.

Ledcke v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2016-07-06

The District Court also properly dismissed his claims of supervisory liability because he failed to demonstrate that any of the supervisory Defendants were actually involved in the alleged unconstitutional conduct, or that they “established and maintained a policy, practice or ... custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.”

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s action or inaction, including a grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent failure to supervise, proximately causes a constitutional violation.

Abernathy v. Dewey · filed 2016-07-07

Supervisors may be hable under § 1983 “when their own action or inaction, including a failure to supervise that amounts to gross negligence or deliberate indifference, is a proximate cause of the constitutional violation.” Guzman v. City of Cranston, 812 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir.1987) (quoting Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir.1983)).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires plausible allegations connecting the supervisor to the constitutional violation; a single email, without allegations of a pattern of abuse, was insufficient here.

Avilés v. Figueroa · filed 2016-07-16

Considering these rules as applied to this case, Plaintiffs supervisory liability claim fails to reach the plausibility standard. ... In this case, the pleadings make no attempt to cite to any pattern of abuse within the CFSE.