42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 claim against a supervisor for encouraging excessive force cannot succeed when the jury exonerates every subordinate who used force.

James v. Cartwright · filed 2016-07-22

The district court understood James to allege that Durham should have forced prison administrators to favorably address his grievances about the cell extraction, but in his reply brief James clarifies that he sued Durham for encouraging the members of the tactical team to beat him. Though that characterization puts the dismissal of the claim against Durham in a different light, a correct understanding of the claim ultimately would have been irrelevant, since the jury exonerated every one of Durham’s subordinates who used any degree of force against James.

Section 1983 permits a supervisor to be liable for a subordinate's constitutional violation when the supervisor knew of it and failed to prevent it.

Earnest Woods, II v. Carey · filed 2012-07-06

If Woods had presented the evidence in his possession that Carey was aware that Cervantes was improperly impeding access to the grievance process he might well have prevailed against Carey. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor . . . knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.”).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts showing that a supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional violation or caused it.

K'napp v. Arlitz · filed 2016-08-04

The district court properly dismissed K’napp’s supervisory liability claims because K’napp failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the supervisory defendants were personally involved in a constitutional violation or that their conduct caused any such violation.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors, but a sheriff may be personally liable for an injury caused by systemic failures he knew about and failed to address.

Daniel v. Cook County · filed 2016-08-12

He points out that there is no vicarious liability for supervisory officials under § 1983. This is correct but incomplete. The sheriff can be directly liable for Daniel’s injury.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because an official knows that subordinates are carrying out a policy the official lacks authority to change.

Parkell v. Danberg · filed 2016-08-17

And we do not believe that an official is “enforcing,” “maintaining,” or “acquiescing in” a policy merely because the official passively permits his subordinates to implement a policy that was set by someone else and is beyond the official’s authority to change.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires personal participation in a constitutional violation or a legally sufficient causal connection to it.

Estelle Smith v. Richard L. LePage, Jr. · filed 2016-08-25

Second, the plaintiffs’ § 1983 supervisory liability claim related to the shooting fails because Sgt. Gamble neither participated in the shooting nor had a legally sufficient causal connection to it.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence that the supervisor knew a subordinate was engaged in conduct posing a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury.

Daniels v. Benston · filed 2016-08-25

To the extent that Daniels sought to hold Benston liable in a supervisory capacity, the lack of any record evidence tending to suggest or show knowledge by Benston that any subordinate of his was engaged in conduct posing a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to Daniels is fatal to such a claim.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the supervisor is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or has a sufficient causal connection to it.

Allen v. Ryan · filed 2016-08-25

The district court properly dismissed Allen’s claims against defendants Ryan, Rider, Management Training Corporation, and “Capts, Sgts, and Lts of the first shift staff,” because Allen failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

A § 1983 supervisory-liability claim requires plausible allegations connecting a supervisor to the alleged misconduct.

Shaw v. Prindle · filed 2016-09-01

But Shaw did not allege that Larkin or Russo were aware of the alleged complaints against Prindle based on sexual misconduct, nor did he allege the dates when those complaints were made or that Larkin and Russo were employed in supervisory positions when those complaints were made.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a supervisor’s personal involvement or an unconstitutional policy or practice the supervisor instituted or condoned.

Tabatabaee v. Marshall · filed 2016-09-20

The district court properly dismissed Tabatabaee’s claims against defendants Marshall, Bradford, Richey, and Jane Does 1-2 because Tabatabaee failed to allege facts sufficient to show that these defendants were personally involved in Tabatabee’s medical care or that they instituted or condoned an unconstitutional policy or practice.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows facts plainly pointing to a subordinate’s sexual abuse, responds with deliberate indifference, and that failure to act causes a constitutional injury.

Brittney Terry v. Spring Indep School Distr · filed 2016-09-22

The defendants, as McCutchen’s supervisors during the relevant period, may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they “learned of facts or a pattern of inappropriate sexual behavior by [McCutchen] pointing plainly toward the conclusion that the subordinate was sexually abusing [Terry]” and “demonstrated deliberate indifference toward the constitutional rights” of Terry, if that failure to take action caused Terry a constitutional injury.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or sufficiently causally connected to it.

Kitchens v. Mims · filed 2016-09-22

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Mims because Kitchens failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Mims was personally involved in or caused a constitutional violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1449 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (summary judgment was proper where law enforcement officer was not responsible for developing or promulgating facility policies, or otherwise directly involved in the constitutional violation).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires personal participation in the alleged constitutional misconduct or a causal connection between the supervisor’s actions and that misconduct.

Cotton v. Ben Hill County · filed 2016-09-26

Plaintiff fails to establish supervisory liability under § 1983 because the record evidence does not show that Sheriff McLemore personally participated in the seizure and impoundment of Plaintiffs cattle or that a causal relationship exists between Sheriff McLemore’s actions and the constitutional violations Plaintiff alleges.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Lawrence v. Evans · filed 2016-09-27

Because there is no underlying constitutional violation, Lawrence’s supervisory liability claim also fails.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a supervisor who encouraged, directly participated in, or knowingly acquiesced in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Irvin v. Grand Rapids Pub. Sch. · filed 2016-09-27

To establish individual liability under § 1983, a Plaintiff must show that "the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it, or at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate."

A sheriff cannot be liable under § 1983 for inadequate supervision or training when the deputies’ actions violate no constitutional rights.

Clemons v. Knight · filed 2016-10-12

Because his deputies’ actions did not violate Mitchell’s and Gilmer’s constitutional rights, the Sheriff cannot be faulted for inadequate supervision or training.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for their subordinates’ misconduct; liability requires their own culpable involvement in a constitutional violation.

Hyatt v. Board of Regents of Oklahoma Colleges Ex Rel. Southwestern Oklahoma State University · filed 2016-10-13

Under § 1983, supervisors are not vicariously liable for the misconduct of their subordinates but may be held liable only “for their own culpable involvement in the violation of a person’s constitutional rights.” Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006).

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor and a subordinate’s constitutional violation, shown by the supervisor’s active participation or acquiescence.

Ortiz v. Dowis · filed 2016-10-21

To establish a § 1983 claim against a supervisor, the plaintiff must show (1) a constitutional violation by the supervisor’s subordinates, and (2) “an affirmative link between the supervisor and the violation, namely the active participation or acquiescence of the supervisor in the constitutional violation by the subordinates.” Serna, 455 F.3d at 1151 (internal quotation marks omitted). We agree with the district court that Ortiz failed to establish such a link.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability without an underlying constitutional violation by a state actor.

John Doe 4 v. Rosa · filed 2016-11-04

There can be no supervisory liability when there is no underlying violation of the Constitution. See Temkin v. Frederick County Comm’rs, 945 F.2d 716, 724 (4th Cir. 1991). Here, because ReVille was not a state actor, there was no underlying constitutional violation. This is fatal to Appellants’ supervisory liability claims.

A supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 for a challenged policy without evidence connecting the supervisor to its creation or enforcement.

Morceli v. Meyers · filed 2016-11-04

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Morceli failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant was responsible for the challenged headwear policy’s creation and enforcement.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor individually liable for an inmate’s injury to show that the supervisor caused it while deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s safety.

Durkee v. Minor · filed 2016-11-14

We suppose cases of supervisory liability under § 1983 are not necessarily limited to those two factual scenarios we have just outlined. But whether Plaintiff’s theory of causation is based on an improper or inadequate policy or something else such as failure to train or supervise, the fact remains that he must still present record evidence sufficient to permit a jury to find that Defendant Minor caused his injury while deliberately indifferent to his safety.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for subordinates’ conduct without personal involvement in the alleged harm.

Emperor Elder v. Dart · filed 2016-11-14

Sheriff Dart cannot be held liable for the actions of his subordinates, given that he lacked personal involvement in any of the harm Elder alleged.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Jones v. Davidson · filed 2016-11-15

Liability under § 1983 may not be based solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity liability for a supervisor who directly participates in a subordinate’s constitutional violation or whose acts are causally connected to it.

White v. Dekalb County · filed 2016-11-17

A supervisory official may be held liable in his individual capacity under § 1983 for the unconstitutional conduct of a subordinate if the supervisor directly participated in the unconstitutional conduct or if a causal connection existed between the supervisor’s acts and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits liability for a supervisor’s direct participation in a constitutional violation.

Dubois v. Brown · filed 2016-11-22

A supervisor’s direct participation in the relevant events is an appropriate ground for assessing liability.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or sufficiently connected to it through the supervisor’s wrongful conduct.

Porter v. Wegman · filed 2016-11-23

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Castro on Porter’s First Amendment claim because Porter failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Castro personally participated in any constitutional deprivation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

A prison supervisor’s failure to enforce inmate safety policies may establish personal involvement under § 1983 when it allows sexual misconduct to occur.

Keith v. Koerner · filed 2016-12-09

Considering the evidence as a whole, a jury could reasonably infer that Warden Koerner was personally involved in failing to enforce policies in a way that allowed sexual misconduct to occur at TCF.

A damages claim for supervisory liability under § 1983 requires a cognizable underlying claim against an officer.

York v. City of Burlington · filed 2016-12-22

Plaintiffs’ failure to demonstrate a cognizable claim against the officer Defendants therefore precludes a damages claim for supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because subordinates knew of a constitutional violation.

Laban Pond v. Haas · filed 2016-12-30

Pond attempts to save his case by arguing that knowledge can be imputed to Haas under a respondeat superior theory because “other personnel were alleged to have been aware of Pond’s condition.” CA6 R. 11, at 19. Section 1983 liability cannot be imposed solely on this basis.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position of authority.

Garcia-Melendez v. Gonzalez · filed 2017-01-05

Section 1983 does not provide for liability on the basis of the tort theory of respondeat superior, nor can a supervisor’s liability rest only on his position of authority.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for excessive force when a police supervisor was present and directed the violation or failed to intervene to prevent it.

Diaz v. Devlin · filed 2017-01-10

However, even assuming that Det. Carlson was the supervisor of the officers who executed the raid, as to the excessive force claim, courts have extended section 1983 liability only to those police supervisors who were physically present and either directed their subordinates to violate others’ rights or failed to intervene to prevent their subordinates from violating others’ rights.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a subordinate’s alleged retaliation without evidence that the supervisor encouraged or participated in it or that deficient training caused it.

Garrett v. Stephens · filed 2017-01-12

There is no evidence that Stephens encouraged or was complicit in the filing of allegedly retaliatory actions by Moore against Garrett. Garrett also does not suggest that his own lack of training resulted in Moore’s filing of the contraband charges.

A supervisor cannot be liable under Section 1983 for a subordinate’s constitutional violation if the violated right was not clearly established at the time.

Treneshia Dukes v. Deaton · filed 2017-01-26

A supervisor cannot be liable for the constitutional violation of his subordinate if the constitutional violation was not then clearly established.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a supervisor to participate in, direct, or knowingly fail to prevent a constitutional violation.

Tag Althof v. Gower · filed 2017-01-26

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants Gower, Premo, and Yoder because Althof failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these defendants participated in, directed, or knowingly failed to prevent the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor is personally involved in a constitutional deprivation, has a sufficient causal connection to it, or implements a constitutionally deficient policy.

Daniel v. Richards · filed 2017-01-26

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Daniel’s excessive force claim against defendants Sheriff Freitas and Assistant Sheriff Walker ... because Daniel failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether those defendants were personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, there was a sufficient causal connection between those defendants’ conduct and the constitutional deprivation, or those defendants implemented a constitutionally deficient policy.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Stewart v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2017-01-31

The District Court properly dismissed Corizon Health Care and its CEO, Rich Hallsworth, for essentially the same reason – supervisory liability under § 1983 may exist only when there is an underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in unconstitutional conduct or is causally connected to a constitutional deprivation.

Patton v. Corrections Officer Rowell · filed 2017-02-02

As a supervisor, Brooks “is only liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of his subordinates if he personally participated in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct, or his actions were causally connected to the alleged constitutional deprivation.” ... As a result, Brooks’ actions could not be causally connected to a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official participates in acts causing a constitutional deprivation or implements an unconstitutional policy causally related to the plaintiff’s injury.

Alderson v. Concordia Parish Corrtl Facil, e · filed 2017-02-09

To hold any of these defendants liable as supervisory officials under § 1983, Alderson must allege either that they participated in acts that caused constitutional deprivation or that they implemented unconstitutional policies causally related to his injuries.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability based solely on a supervisory role; the plaintiff must show the supervisor’s involvement in the alleged violation.

Moore v. Shelby County · filed 2017-02-09

Because Plaintiff offered no evidence that Defendant Rothenburger was in any way involved in Defendant Federle’s actions and seek only to impute liability by his role as supervisor, which is not permitted in a § 1983 action, summary judgment in granted in favor of Defendants as to supervisory liability according to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit liability for a constitutional violation based solely on a defendant’s supervisory role.

Eaton v. Coupe · filed 2017-02-14

This is inapposite as Monell v. Department of Soeial Services of New York and its progeny make clear that § 1983 may not be premised on respondeat superior liability for alleged violations of the Constitution.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for the actions of their subordinates.

Turner v. Driver · filed 2017-02-16

Supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when supervisors knowingly allow a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct to continue.

Adair v. Hunter · filed 2017-02-16

Notwithstanding Defendants’ protestations to the contrary, this is a textbook example of acquiescence to unconstitutional conduct. Accepting her allegations in the Complaint as true, as it must, the Court finds that Plaintiff Adair has properly alleged deliberate indifference to unconstitutional conduct such that supervisory liability .may attach.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor based on supervisory status alone.

Peterson v. Creany · filed 2017-02-27

Although a supervisor can sometimes incur liability under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of subordinate employees, supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to be personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or to have engaged in wrongful conduct causally connected to it.

Turner v. Driver · filed 2017-02-27

To be liable under § 1983, Driver must have been personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation or have engaged in wrongful conduct that is causally connected to the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, responds with deliberate indifference, and thereby causes the injury.

Antonya Herring v. Montgomery · filed 2017-03-03

Thus, Herring was required to demonstrate that (1) Montgomery had knowledge that her subordinates engaged in “conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury,” (2) Montgomery’s response to the knowledge was sufficiently inadequate to amount to deliberate indifference, and (3) there was a causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the constitutional injury.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires the supervisor’s personal involvement in the constitutional violation.

Gill v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2017-03-07

To succeed on a claim for supervisory liability, a plaintiff must show that the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional violation. ... There is, however, no allegation or plausible inference that Chief Flynn knew about or was personally involved in the specific conduct. Therefore, we agree with the district court that Gill cannot maintain a claim for supervisory liability.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying violation by a subordinate and an affirmative link between the supervisor’s action or inaction and the subordinate’s conduct.

Doe ex rel. Doe v. Town of Hopkinton · filed 2017-03-07

For there to be supervisory liability under section 1983, Plaintiffs must establish that (1) the subordinate (in this case Howard) is liable; and (2) the supervisor’s action or inaction was “affirmatively linked” to Howard’s behavior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior; officials are liable for their own unconstitutional conduct.

Slone v. Lincoln County · filed 2017-03-16

It is well-established that supervisory liability under § 1983 does not attach on the basis of respondeat superior. Instead, officials are personally liable for their own unconstitutional behavior.

Section 1983 permits claims against supervisory officials based on their own conduct, rather than their supervisory roles alone.

Adams v. Naphcare, Inc. · filed 2017-03-21

Importantly, the Magistrate Judge did not rely on these particular Defendants’ supervisory roles in .permitting the claims against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to survive the Motions to Dismiss, but rather, on their own conduct. See R & R at 25-29, 37-42, 46-54. The court agrees both with the Plaintiffs assertion and the Magistrate Judge’s analysis here.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisory entity based on an alleged failure to train or supervise its employees.

Orden v. Cornell University · filed 2017-03-22

Broadly construed, Orderis complaint alleges that Cornell is responsible for the acts of its employees based upon their failure to properly train or supervise those employees. Therefore, plaintiff has stated a cause of action against Cornell sufficient to overcome defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Under § 1983, a supervisor’s later review of grievances or appeals generally does not establish personal knowledge of a subordinate’s violation.

Rosa-Diaz v. Dow · filed 2017-03-23

The District Court properly dismissed his Eighth Amendment claims because he premised them solely on the Supervisor Defendants’ after-the-fact participation in reviewing grievances or appeals, generally an insufficient basis to establish “personal knowledge” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a supervisor’s actions and an employee’s unconstitutional conduct before the supervisor can be held liable.

Jones v. Dowdell · filed 2017-03-29

So even if employees under Dowdell’s or McLean’s supervision violated the Constitution, Dowdell and McLean would not be liable under § 1983 unless there was a causal connection between their actions and the unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; supervisory liability requires intentional participation in or knowing acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct.

Hill v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2017-04-14

Although Mr. Hill attempts to hold Dr. Cabiling liable as “captain of the ship,” Opening Br. at 16, “[s]ection 1983 does not authorize liability under a theory of respondeat superior.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 2011). “[A] plaintiff must establish supervisory liability . . . by demonstrating an intentional, conscious, and deliberate act by the defendant participating in, or knowingly acquiescing in, the unconstitutional behavior.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1196 n.4 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The concededly limited involvement of Dr. Cabiling in Mr. Hill’s medical care cannot meet this standard.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence linking the defendants’ policy or practice to the alleged injury.

Ploof v. Ryan · filed 2017-04-21

Summary judgment on Ploof’s deliberate indifference claim was proper because Ploof failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether delays in receiving treatment and medication caused further injury to his heart condition and could be attributed to defendants’ alleged failure to implement policies to ensure the timely provision of health care services.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor for a subordinate’s alleged violation of rights.

Skillings v. Knott · filed 2017-04-21

The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application to alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A supervisor is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when it was not clearly established that the supervised officials violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Supinger v. Virginia · filed 2017-04-26

The Court has already concluded that it was not clearly established that Defendants were violating Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Thus, the second prong cannot be met and Holcomb is entitled to qualified immunity as to the First Amendment portion of Count V.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because a subordinate committed a constitutional violation.

Johnson v. Sheriff R.L. Butch Conway · filed 2017-05-15

Supervisors cannot be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a prison medical director liable for other staff members’ conduct solely because of his position.

Diaz v. Godinez · filed 2017-05-15

That work, it appears, is handled by the infirmary staff, and Dr. Tilden cannot be accountable simply because of his position as the facility medical director.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires knowledge of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, deliberate indifference to that risk, and a causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the injury.

Foster v. Fisher · filed 2017-05-18

To establish a claim of supervisory liability under § 1983, Foster must show that (1) Hill had knowledge that Fisher engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) Hill’s response to this knowledge was sufficiently inadequate to amount to deliberate indifference; and (3) there was a causal link between Hill’s inaction and the constitutional injury.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor was informed of alleged civil rights violations.

Duncan v. Stevens · filed 2017-05-18

Duncan’s allegation that he informed Arnold about the alleged civil rights violations was insufficient to subject him to supervisory liability.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a jail supervisor who knows of and acquiesces in unconstitutional practices.

Villarreal v. County of Monterey · filed 2017-05-26

In short Plaintiffs have pled facts demonstrating that at the time of Gillis’s death, Bernal knew of and acquiesced in the allegedly unconstitutional procedures for providing medical care at the Monterey County Jail. Therefore, the Court DENIES the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claims 2, 3, and 4 against Bernal for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ misconduct under respondeat superior.

Perez v. Lorie Davis, Director · filed 2017-06-02

Perez’s contention that Director William Stephens and the MCU Warden should be liable for the misconduct of the other MCU defendants based on the doctrine of respondeat superior is without merit.

A § 1983 supervisory liability claim for failure to train or supervise fails when the subordinate committed no constitutional violation.

Brossart v. Janke · filed 2017-06-16

Plaintiffs allege Janke is nonetheless individually liable because he “failed to properly train, supervise, and control Deputy Braathen.” Our decision that Braathen did not use excessive force against either Rodney or Thomas forecloses this claim.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Clark v. Gardner · filed 2017-06-22

Because “vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, supervisory officials may not be held liable merely because they held a position of authority. ... In this case Clark has failed to adequately allege personal liability even under the Colon standards.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim when a supervisor’s failure to respond to repeated reports of a subordinate’s abuse amounts to deliberate indifference.

Alan Howard, Sr. v. Knox County, Tennessee · filed 2017-06-21

The complaint alleges that Wiegenstein made no efforts to investigate, report, train, or terminate Shoemaker upon receipt of numerous complaints from students, parents, and teachers. ... This alone is sufficient to establish a claim for deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s unconstitutional acts solely under respondeat superior.

Holmes v. Officer Daniel Billings · filed 2017-06-28

Because Holmes’ failure to supervise claim against Hale rests only on the basis of respondeat superior, and because “supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 . . . on the basis of respondeat superior,” id. at 1047, Holmes’ failure to supervise claim against Hale fails.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity liability for a supervisor based on a subordinate’s conduct only if the conduct meets the test for supervisory liability.

Pratt-Miller v. Sheriff Beth Arthur · filed 2017-07-03

Here, as the only remaining § 1983 claims pending against Arthur at the time the court granted summary judgment were against Arthur in her individual capacity, she could only be held liable for Patterson’s conduct if that conduct met the test for supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not make an official liable for a predecessor’s deliberate indifference based solely on allegations against the predecessor.

Polk v. Godina · filed 2017-07-03

Contrary to Polk’s contention, her allegations of deliberate indifference by defendant Cate were insufficient to support her claim of deliberate indifference by Cate’s successor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold supervisors liable for a hiring decision to show that the applicant’s background made the alleged constitutional injury a plainly obvious consequence of hiring.

Rivera v. Manuel Fierros, Jr. · filed 2017-07-06

Because the information available to Appellees was vague and inconclusive, a jury could not find that a plainly obvious consequence of hiring Fierros was that he would sexually assault a detainee. We hold that Rivera has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Appellees were deliberately indifferent to known or obvious risks associated with hiring Fierros.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory defendant to be personally involved in the constitutional violation or causally connected to it.

Anthony v. Swanson · filed 2017-07-14

A supervisory defendant must be either personally involved in the constitutional violation or there must be a causal connection between a supervisor’s act and the alleged constitutional violation. Doe v. City of Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 440 (6th Cir. 2002). Because it is undisputed that Dr. Cherry did not participate directly in Anthony’s medical care nor has any causal connection been alleged, the claim against him is ordered dismissed.

A supervisor can be liable under § 1983 for personally participating in a constitutional violation or when there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Hank Zabala v. Haley · filed 2017-07-17

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Zabala’s claims against Sheriff Haley because Zabala failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Sheriff Haley personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations or whether there was a sufficient causal connection between Sheriff Haley’s conduct and the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 does not make supervisory officials liable for subordinates’ actions solely because of their supervisory authority.

Ivory Simon v. LeBlanc · filed 2017-07-21

“Under section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.” ... Accordingly, Simon’s argument that the appellees are responsible for the wrongs perpetrated upon him because they had supervisory authority is unavailing.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s constitutional violation when the supervisor had notice of a pattern of misconduct and was deliberately indifferent to it.

Johnson v. City of Ferguson · filed 2017-07-25

These allegations sufficiently state a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officials under respondeat superior when the complaint alleges no personal involvement.

Ronald C. Hood, Jr. v. Department of Children and Families · filed 2017-07-28

The district court dismissed the claims against Wilkins and Montaldi in their individual capacities because it found that Hood failed to allege any personal refusals to treat gender dysphoria and because the defendants cannot be held liable under respondeat superior under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the context of the complaint that the district court was considering at the time, we find no reversible error in the dismissal of the officials.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Terranova v. New York State Department of Corrections & Community Supervision · filed 2017-08-03

A supervisory defendant must have been personally involved in a constitutional deprivation to be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ acts merely because they denied grievances; liability requires direct participation or a causal connection to the constitutional violation.

Hoever v. Belleis · filed 2017-08-10

Hoever also failed to state a claim against Colonel Belleis and Deputy Chief Hall. “[I]t is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” ... Hoever failed to identify a policy that resulted in a constitutional violation, and his allegation that the supervisors denied grievances against their subordinates was insufficient to establish that the supervisors instigated or encouraged unlawful conduct.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Chaparro v. Ducart · filed 2017-08-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Ducart because Chaparro failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Ducart personally participated in any constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s active participation in unconstitutional conduct for supervisory liability.

Stillwagon v. City of Delaware · filed 2017-08-15

A government official may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of a subordinate under a respondeat superior- or vicarious liability theory. ... Based on this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude that Radabaugh directly participated in his subordinates’ alleged unconstitutional behavior.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a supervisory defendant personally violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Garraway v. Griffin · filed 2017-08-31

Nor does he adduce any evidence that Sheahan, Evans, or supervisor defendant Griffin had any knowledge that he was sleeping on a feces-soiled mattress. The lack of any such evidence precludes him from showing that any of the supervisory defendants personally violated his Eighth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a supervisor who personally participates in a constitutional violation, directs it, or has a sufficient causal connection to it.

Tekoh v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2017-08-31

Supervisors may be held liable in their individual capacities for constitutional violations under § 1983 if the supervisor: (1) personally participated in the constitutional violation; (2) directed the violations; or (3) there is a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor learns of a potential constitutional violation and fails to remedy it despite having the opportunity to do so.

Warr v. Liberatore · filed 2017-09-05

These circumstances give rise to the potential for § 1983 supervisory liability, see Williams, 781 F.2d at 323-24, and, as such, summary judgment is inappropriate.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts connecting the supervisor to the alleged constitutional violation.

Cordle v. Rubenstein · filed 2017-09-14

There are insufficient facts alleged by plaintiff to allow this Court to find a claim of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 supervisor liability requires facts showing personal involvement or a causal connection between the supervisor’s training or supervision and the alleged constitutional violation.

Saldivar v. Lorie Davis, Director · filed 2017-09-29

Saldivar’s allegations, which fail to include any facts demonstrating personal involvement by the defendants or a causal connection between the defendants’ supervision or training of their employees and the alleged constitutional violations, are insufficient to establish supervisor liability.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a causal connection between the supervisor and the alleged constitutional violation.

Grogan v. Kumar · filed 2017-09-29

Nor has Grogan adduced evidence of a causal link between Woodall and the allegedly indifferent response to the July 2014 suicide attempt. See Thompkins, 828 F.2d at 304 (causal connection required for § 1983 supervisory liability).

A § 1983 claim against a supervisor requires facts plausibly connecting the supervisor’s own conduct to a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Horan v. Cabral · filed 2017-09-29

Even assuming an underlying constitutional violation by medical personnel in the respect alleged, the complaint fails to support a plausible inference that Cabral had personally been -involved with the subordinate personnel who provided the care such that she could be liable as a supervisor.

A § 1983 claim for failure to train or supervise requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Sigg v. Allen County, Kansas, Board of County Commissioners · filed 2017-10-16

Likewise, the failure to train and supervise claim against Sheriff Murphy fails without evidence of any constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct; general awareness that an incident is unfolding does not establish supervisory liability.

Williams v. Papi · filed 2017-10-25

Fisher’s generalized knowledge that the situation was unfolding is too slender a reed upon which to hold him liable for the conduct of his ... on-site subordinates.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a subordinate’s conduct.

Murray v. Rubenstein · filed 2017-10-26

“There is, however, no respondeat superior liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 failure to train and supervise liability requires unconstitutional conduct by a subordinate officer.

Grise v. Allen · filed 2017-10-26

Because Dr. Grise cannot establish any unconstitutional conduct by Deputy Allen, neither Sheriff O’Donnell nor Madison County can be held liable on a § 1983 failure to train and supervise theory.

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability for an official’s conduct.

Johnson v. Thompson-Smith · filed 2017-11-09

Nor can they be vicariously liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor is personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or implements a constitutionally deficient policy.

Watkins v. Baca · filed 2017-11-21

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Watkins failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Baca permitted by regulation more than a “cursory visual inspection” of outgoing legal mail, Nordstrom v. Ryan, 856 F.3d 1265, 1272 (9th Cir. 2017), or otherwise knowingly tolerated a violation of Watkins’s First Amendment rights. See Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265-66 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing prisoners’ First Amendment right to send and receive mail); see also Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) (supervisors can only be liable under § 1983 if they are personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or if they implement a constitutionally deficient policy).

A supervisor cannot be liable under § 1983 without an underlying deprivation of rights.

Kanciper v. Lato · filed 2017-12-05

The failure to establish an underlying deprivation of her rights is also fatal to her § 1983 claim against Spota, which is based on a theory of supervisor liability.

A § 1983 supervisory liability claim requires proof that a subordinate violated the Constitution.

Rachel v. Troutt · filed 2017-12-05

The first step in establishing a § 1983 claim against a supervisor is showing that her subordinates violated the constitution.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; a supervisor may be liable for personal involvement or corrective inaction amounting to deliberate indifference or tacit authorization.

Blair v. Bowersox · filed 2017-12-08

At oral argument, pertaining to Blair’s claim against Gerke, Defendants argue Gerke cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. While this is true, Gerke can “incur liability . . . for [his] personal involvement in a constitutional violation, or when [his] corrective inaction amounts to deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the violative practices.”

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because an employee allegedly violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Brakeall v. Stanwick-Klemik · filed 2017-12-08

Brakeall’s § 1983 cruel and unusual punishment claim regarding his bed against Kaemingk, Dooley, and Stanwick-Klemik are dismissed, because the only allegation against them is their supervision of Klimek.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a defendant for another person’s conduct.

Back v. TDCJ-CID · filed 2017-12-11

However, a defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of vicarious liability, including respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for an employee’s unconstitutional conduct; a claim against supervisors without alleged personal involvement is futile.

Abdulrazzak v. Smith · filed 2017-12-12

With regard to the Parole Board Director and the Parole Officer Supervisor, the proposed second amended complaint does not allege that they had personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of Abdulrazzak’s constitutional rights. “A supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an employee’s unconstitutional activity.” White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994). Thus, it would be futile to add the two supervisors as named defendants in Count II.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts showing encouragement, condonation, acquiescence, or gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference.

Hernandez v. City of Boston · filed 2017-12-14

In addition, the Court found that the pleaded facts did not characterize the individual defendants’ actions or omissions as “supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference” as required for supervisory liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires specific facts showing that supervisors knew of and acquiesced in the alleged retaliation; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Paul Thompson, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 2017-12-18

We summarily affirm because Mr. Thompson only makes conclusory allegations without any specific facts that these defendants had knowledge that retaliation was taking place and that they acquiesced in the retaliatory acts.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; directing subordinates generally does not establish liability.

Willoughby v. Village of Fox Lake · filed 2017-12-21

The manner in which plaintiffs have alleged Filenko’s personal involvement appears to improperly rely on a respondeat superior theory; in paragraph 22 of the complaint, they allege that because Task Force officers generally acted at Filenko’s direction, he “thus” personally participated in the complained-of conduct.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation; a claim that the supervisor failed to protect the plaintiffs needs facts showing what he knew and what he should have done.

Welch v. Saunders · filed 2017-12-29

As we have explained, “[Section] 1983 imposes liability for a defendant’s own actions—personal participation in the specific constitutional violation complained of is essential.” Henry v. Storey, 658 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011). It is not enough to say that Sheriff Mink failed to protect Plaintiffs, when the Complaint provides no particulars on what relevant information he had or what specific action he should have taken. We affirm the order dismissing the claims against Sheriff Mink.

A supervisor sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless both the supervisor’s and the subordinate’s actions violate clearly established law.

Marin v. King · filed 2018-01-03

Moreover, when a supervisor seeks qualified immunity in a §1983 action, the clearly established prong is met only when the supervisor’s and the subordinate’s actions violate clearly established law.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a superior officer directly orders a subordinate to use excessive force, establishing the required action and causal link.

Pena v. City of Rio Grande City, Texa · filed 2018-01-12

A superior officer issuing a direct order to a subordinate to use excessive force demonstrates both the necessary action and causality for a supervisor-liability claim. Peña’s proposed amended complaint thus stated a claim against Solis under this theory.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a supervisory defendant participated in the constitutional violation or that the supervisor’s acts or omissions had an affirmative link to it.

Henry v. Hodgson · filed 2018-01-12

The Court grants defendants’ motion as to supervisory defendants Thomas Hodgson, Steven J. Souza, and James Lancaster, because there is no factual allegation that they were involved in either the alleged excessive force incident or the alleged deliberate indifference, nor has the plaintiff pled facts to support proof that there was an affirmative link between any acts or omissions by them and the constitutional violations alleged.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Jackson v. Hodge · filed 2018-01-19

The district court properly dismissed Jackson’s supervisory liability claim because Jackson failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants Hightshoe, Covello, Briggs, and Hatton were personally involved in a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a supervisor when no underlying constitutional violation occurred.

Goffin v. Peek · filed 2018-01-23

In the present case, the Court has found that Ashcraft did not violate Goffin’s constitutional rights. Therefore, the claims against her supervisors, Chief Peek and Mayor Martin, must fail.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisory official solely because of the official’s position.

DeLeon v. Winnebago County Jail Medical, Mental Health System · filed 2018-01-23

Moreover, there is no respondeat superior (i.e., supervisory) liability under § 1983. See Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus, plaintiff may not sue a supervisory official based solely on his position.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors merely because they failed to stop another official’s decision.

Trevino v. Ogden · filed 2018-01-25

Their suggestion that Brown and Ogden had a duty to step in and halt his transfer effectively argues for vicarious liability, which is not a basis for relief.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor who is personally involved in subordinates’ misconduct, but does not impose liability solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Sumlin v. Varga · filed 2018-01-25

Plaintiff’s allegations sufficiently describe excessive force by the correctional officers, as well as personal involvement by the warden. The complaint may thus proceed against these defendants in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability when the supervisor’s subordinates committed no constitutional violation.

Jackson v. Powers · filed 2018-01-25

Because the Court finds no constitutional violation by Powers-Johnson or any of Reid’s other subordinates, the Court declines to find Reid liable as supervisor.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a supervisor to encourage, directly participate in, authorize, approve, or knowingly acquiesce in the misconduct.

Boggs v. Stevens · filed 2018-02-06

Even assuming Officer Martin's use of force, no reasonable jury could find that Stevens "implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced" in Martin's allegedly unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in an alleged rights violation; knowledge of and support for others’ actions alone do not establish individual liability.

Solomon v. Corporal Griffin · filed 2018-02-06

He only claims these Defendants had knowledge of other’s actions and “supported” them—this is insufficient to establish § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor liable to show that the supervisor directly participated in unconstitutional conduct or that the supervisor’s actions had a causal connection to the violation.

Hochstein v. Demings · filed 2018-02-07

In a § 1983 suit, “to hold a supervisor liable a plaintiff must show that the supervisor either directly participated in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.” ... As a result, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence sufficient to establish that Sheriff Demings’s conduct had a causal connection to any constitutional violations.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for their subordinates’ actions.

Walker v. Shafer · filed 2018-02-09

To the extent the complaint does attempt to hold Mr. Jegeris liable, it fails and must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). “Supervisors [such as Mr. Jegeris] cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of a subordinate.”

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for personal involvement in a constitutional violation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's conduct and the violation.

Pierce v. Cnty. of Marin · filed 2018-02-14

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. ... The Court finds that plaintiff has alleged enough to hold Doyle liable as a supervisor.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because the supervisor oversaw an employee who allegedly violated someone’s rights.

Wilmoth v. Murphy · filed 2018-02-20

A claim of deprivation of a constitutional right cannot be based on a respondeat superior theory of liability.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the deprivation of rights; supervisory officials are not liable solely for their employees’ acts.

McCallister v. Davis · filed 2018-02-22

To the extent that McCallis-ter alleged that the TDCJ Director should be held liable for the wrongful acts of his employees, the district court correctly found that a defendant must be personally involved in the deprivation of rights. See James v. Texas Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 286 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that supervisory officials are not subject to respondeat superior liability under § 1983).

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor vicariously liable for an employee’s unconstitutional conduct.

Berk v. Holloway · filed 2018-02-28

“A supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an employee’s unconstitutional activity.”

A § 1983 supervisory claim fails without allegations establishing a basis for supervisory liability.

Penny v. Holloway · filed 2018-03-01

In this case, Plaintiff has made no allegations sufficient to establish a basis for supervisory liability.

A Section 1983 failure-to-supervise claim requires the plaintiff to identify a specific supervisory policy or practice and connect it to an unreasonable risk and the plaintiff’s injury.

Fox v. Bayside State Prison · filed 2018-03-02

At the outset, Fox fails to identify a specific policy to undergird his claim, which necessarily forecloses the possibility of adequately pleading that any risk associated with the policy was unreasonable, that prison officials were aware of and indifferent to this risk, and that the specific policy led to his injury. Accordingly, Fox fails to plead a valid failure to supervise claim.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires more than respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Goodwin v. Pennridge Sch. Dist. · filed 2018-03-06

To assert a § 1983 claim based on supervisory liability, a plaintiff must show more than respondeat superior or vicarious liability. ... Goodwin has sufficiently pled claims of supervisory liability against Rattigan and DeBona.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant holds a supervisory position.

Duff v. Griffie · filed 2018-03-09

In other words, Adams, Moore, and Stovall cannot be held liable merely because they hold supervisory positions at the MCDC.

Section 1983 permits individual supervisory liability when the supervisor is personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or has a sufficient causal connection to it.

King v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2018-03-12

A county official sued in his individual capacity may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 “if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)).

A supervisor is individually liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct only if the supervisor personally participated in it or authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in it.

D.M. v. State · filed 2018-03-13

The standard by which a supervisor is held liable under § 1983 in his or her indi- vidual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous. ... The plaintiff must establish that the supervisor personally participated in the unconstitutional conduct or was otherwise the moving force of the viola- tion by authorizing, approving, or knowingly acquiescing in the unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of supervisory responsibility.

Black v. Helder · filed 2018-03-13

The law is clear that a claim of deprivation of a constitutional right cannot be based on a respondeat superior theory of liability.

A § 1983 complaint must sufficiently allege a supervisory defendant’s personal involvement to state a claim against that defendant.

Harding v. Rubenstein · filed 2018-03-15

First, he reasoned that Harding had failed sufficiently to allege personal involvement on the part of supervisory defendants Jim Rubenstein, Karen Pszczolkowski, Evelyn Seifert, David Ballard, Katherin Dillon, and Debbie Hissom. ... Upon review of the R&R and the record for clear error, the Court: ... 1) ADOPTS the R&R (Dkt. No. 81); ... 9) DISMISSES the complaint WITH PREJUDICE (Dkt. No. 1).

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a supervisor based solely on the supervisor’s position; the plaintiff must allege personal involvement or facts supporting supervisory liability.

Lucas v. Ballard · filed 2018-03-21

Without more specific factual allegations, the claims against Ballard, Rubenstein, and Sandy sound in nothing more than respondeat superior, which is insufficient to support a claim of supervisory liability under section 1983.

A supervisory official is individually liable under § 1983 only if the official participates in the deprivation or implements a deliberately indifferent policy that causes the injury.

Hauenstein v. Sheriff's Dept Rapides Parish · filed 2018-03-27

Moreover, because the Sheriff is a ... supervisory official, Hauenstein must show the Sheriff: (1) affirmatively participated in the acts causing the constitutional deprivation; or (2) implemented policies evincing a deliberate indifference to prisoners’ medical needs that caused Hauenstein’s injury.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim against supervisors whose policies causally contribute to a constitutional deprivation.

Collier v. Buckner · filed 2018-03-27

Thus, Plaintiff Collier has alleged sufficient facts to establish a causal connection between the alleged constitutional deprivation and the actions of Defendants Buckner and Mashego. The motion to dismiss is due to be denied as to Plaintiff Collier's § 1983 monetary damages claim against Defendants Buckner and Mashego for propounding policies that deprived her of a hearing.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only for a supervisor’s own acts or omissions, not solely for a subordinate’s misconduct.

Doe v. Sanderson · filed 2018-03-30

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, supervisory liability may not be predicated only on the theory of respondent superior; a supervisor is deemed liable “only on the basis of his own acts or omissions.” ... The isolated incident on September 5, 2013, alone does not give rise to an inference of a policy or custom that the DOC Defendants and Defendant Gelb knew of, approved of, or ignored Defendant Sanderson’s alleged conduct. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against these three Defendants must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

McGary v. Cunningham · filed 2018-04-03

The district court properly dismissed the claims against Governor Inslee because McGary failed to allege facts showing Inslee’s personal involvement in any constitutional violation or a causal connection between Inslee’s conduct and any such violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor is personally involved in a constitutional deprivation by directing or consenting to the conduct.

Carter v. City Of Chicago · filed 2018-04-10

Supervisory officials face liability under § 1983 if they had “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivations, essentially directing or consenting to the challenged conduct.”

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows about unconstitutional conduct and facilitates, approves, condones, or deliberately ignores it.

Lanahan v. County of Cook · filed 2018-04-13

But, as noted above, personal involvement is not required for a supervisor’s liability under § 1983; it is enough that the supervisor know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye toward it.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely for overseeing employees; the supervisor must have participated in or directed the constitutional violation, or known of and consented to it.

Presley v. Villareal · filed 2018-04-19

Thus, for example, Sheriff Dart cannot be held liable under section 1983 merely because he oversees jail operations, as Plaintiff appears to seek to do; there is no suggestion (and it does not appear at all likely) that Dart was personally involved in each incident Plaintiff mentions.

A § 1983 supervisory liability claim cannot proceed without an underlying constitutional violation.

Wilgus v. Bannister · filed 2018-04-20

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wilgus’s claim of supervisory liability because Wilgus failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether there was any underlying constitutional violation.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 when constructive knowledge of a subordinate’s grave risk of harm is coupled with a failure to take easily available measures to address it.

Doe v. Town of Stoughton · filed 2018-04-25

The facts pled in the complaint, construed in the light most favorable to Doe, could give rise to an inference that, having constructive knowledge of a grave risk of harm, Miller failed to take sufficient, easily available measures to address the risk. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the section 1983 claim against Miller is therefore DENIED.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or the supervisor’s actions are causally connected to it.

Rankin v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia · filed 2018-04-26

A supervisor is liable for a subordinate’s conduct “when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff liable merely because of his title or general awareness of jail operations; liability requires his own misconduct.

McReynolds v. Glenn · filed 2018-04-27

Finally, Plaintiff’s claim that, as sheriff, Defendant Martin knew what was going on in the jail does not subject him to liability under § 1983. Despite a government official’s title, he is only liable for his own misconduct.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for supervisors whose own supervision or control makes them culpable for a constitutional violation.

Bown v. Reinke · filed 2018-05-08

Supervisors can be individually liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability when an official’s responsibility for the alleged misconduct is too indirect and remote.

Wheeler v. Burgum · filed 2018-05-08

Although Governor Burgum is responsible for supervising the DOCR director, who is responsible for the NDSP and its staff, the Governor's supervisory responsibility over the alleged actions Wheeler complains of is too indirect and remote to support § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 generally requires more than a single incident of inadequate staffing, training, or supervision to establish supervisory liability.

Leal v. Wiles · filed 2018-05-08

Rather, Leal’s allegations concern a single instance in which inadequate staffing, training, and supervision resulted in his assault. More is required for section 1983 liability to attach.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Blackstone v. Stark · filed 2018-05-09

Plaintiff identifies David Ortiz as the warden at FCI Fort Dix, however, respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under § 1983 and Bivens.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a supervisor for merely failing to notice irregularities in subordinates’ reports.

Rivera v. Guevara · filed 2018-05-11

Rivera points to various irregularities and defects in the reports approved by Rinaldi and Weingart, but at most, failing to notice them can be seen as negligent, which does not suffice to impose § 1983 damages liability on a supervisor.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a prison official who can be expected to know of or participate in creating a systemic constitutional violation.

Brown v. Bryant · filed 2018-05-14

Where officials like Dart “can be expected to know of or participate in creating systemic, as opposed to localized, situations,” they may be individually liable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor participates in or directs a constitutional violation, or knows of it and fails to act to prevent it.

Kimbro v. Miranda · filed 2018-05-22

Construed liberally, however, the allegations in Kimbro’s Complaint that Hougland threatened Kimbro that if he ever went “man down” again, Hougland would have his officers beat him and that Hougland was present when excessive force was used against Kimbro, were sufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability. See, e.g., Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that a supervisor is “liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates [under § 1983] if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them”).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability where no injury or constitutional violation occurred.

Daniel v. Kiang · filed 2018-05-24

Because no constitutional violation took place, the district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Magtoto sued in his supervisory capacity. See Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 2001) (a supervisor cannot “be held liable under § 1983 where no injury or constitutional violation has occurred”).

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Serrano v. Guevara · filed 2018-05-29

The fact that Mingey was the other officers' supervisor does not automatically implicate him in their constitutional violations, absent adequately pleaded personal involvement.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or the supervisor’s wrongful conduct had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2018-05-30

A supervisory official is liable under § 1983 so long as “there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)).

Section 1983 requires facts connecting a supervisor personally to the plaintiff’s alleged deprivation; supervising officers alone does not establish liability.

Willoughby v. Village of Fox Lake · filed 2018-06-06

Plaintiffs thus persist in impermissibly relying on the doctrine of respondeat superior. They fail to connect Filenko in any way to their arrests or detentions. They do not plead that Filenko directed their arrests or detentions or knew about them and facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye to them. Accordingly, the Court grants Filenko’s motion to dismiss the complaint as against him.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor and a constitutional violation, established through personal involvement, causation, and a culpable state of mind.

McLemore v. Saline County Sheriff's Office · filed 2018-06-07

To state a § 1983 claim against a supervisor of one who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the plaintiff “must show an affirmative link between [the supervisor] and [a] constitutional violation”; this requires proof of “(1) personal involvement; (2) causation; and (3) [the requisite culpable] state of mind.” Keith v. Koerner, 843 F.3d 833, 838 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s complaint does not satisfy these requirements.