42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of supervisory authority or the right to control employees.

Cutsinger v. Louisville Metro Department of Corrections · filed 2019-07-19

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Bolton liable based on his supervisory authority as Director of LMDC, the doctrine of respondeat superior, or the right to control employees, does not apply in § 1983 actions to impute liability onto supervisors.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation; prison officials cannot be held liable solely because they supervise others.

Turben v. Carter · filed 2019-07-22

Furthermore, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and these individuals cannot be held liable simply because they oversee operations at the prison or supervise other correctional officers.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; supervisory position alone does not establish liability.

Ali v. Governor of Delaware · filed 2019-07-23

For the claims that the District Court dismissed with prejudice, it correctly con- cluded that Ali could not pursue Eighth Amendment claims against several defendants who were sued solely for being supervisors of various departments but who had no per- sonal involvement in his alleged harms.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in an alleged constitutional violation; supervisory liability cannot rest solely on respondeat superior.

THE ESTATE OF ULISSES M. RODRIGUEZ v. JOHNSON · filed 2019-07-23

Personal involvement by the defendant in an alleged constitutional violation is central to a § 1983 claim, and liability cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff solely because of his supervisory position.

Hall v. Twitty · filed 2019-07-23

Moreover, Plaintiff cannot seek to impose liability on Defendant Goins based on his status as Sheriff, as a court may not impose liability under § 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior.

A supervisor must be personally involved in an alleged constitutional deprivation to be liable for damages under § 1983.

Edwards v. Penix · filed 2019-07-24

Finally, Edwards has failed to allege that defendant Penix was "personally involved" in any of Montgomery's alleged misbehavior, or that Penix was on sufficient notice of either instance of alleged misconduct to give rise to a duty to take some corrective action.

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability when the supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional violation or the supervisor’s conduct was causally connected to it.

Pantastico v. Department of Education, State of Hawaii · filed 2019-07-24

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, supervisors may be liable for the constitutional violations of their subordinates if they are “personally involved” in the constitutional deprivation or where there is a “causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Collins v. Warden · filed 2019-07-24

It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor who made and enforced a policy that allegedly caused a constitutional deprivation, even without direct participation in the incident.

Buford v. Jensen · filed 2019-07-29

Buford may also proceed on a claim against defendant Schrubbe at this stage. While Schrubbe did not have any direct participation in the incident, she allegedly made and enforced a rule that did not permit inmates to have their inhalers at school, which arguably caused Buford’s injuries.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability; a defendant must cause or participate in the violation.

Jarrard v. Indiana Department of Corrections · filed 2019-07-29

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant solely for another person’s conduct.

Coates v. DPSCS · filed 2019-07-29

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff for medical treatment decisions merely because of his position or his failure to respond to complaints; personal involvement is required.

Cox v. Watson · filed 2019-07-29

Plaintiff has not pled any facts that would allow the Court to infer that Defendant Watson had any direct involvement in the decisions whether to administer treatment to Plaintiff, and neither his status as Sheriff or his failure to respond to Plaintiff’s complaints is sufficient to impose liability against him.

Section 1983 allows a claim against an official who oversees prison medical services when persistent, systemic deficiencies in care have repeatedly been brought to the department's attention.

Reaves v. Dep't of Corr. · filed 2019-07-30

Because Mr. Reaves' claims do not arise from discrete medical judgments, but rather from longstanding, systemic deficiencies in his care, spanning multiple medical providers, which have been raised repeatedly with the DOC and its contractual providers, Defendants Collins is a proper defendants in Mr. Reaves's constitutional claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Section 1983 supervisory liability based on knowledge and acquiescence requires allegations that the supervisor knew of the incident or a similar pattern and communicated approval through inaction.

HARRISON v. NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE · filed 2019-08-01

As noted above, for Plaintiff's “knowledge and acquiescence” claim to survive, she must allege that Fuentes (1) had knowledge of the incident or a prior pattern of similar incidents and (2) communicated a message of approval.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor participates in a rights violation, directs it, or knows of and acquiesces in a subordinate's violation.

Bonner v. Sipple · filed 2019-08-01

"Second, a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct."

Section 1983 requires allegations supporting a defendant’s personal involvement or supervisory liability.

PETTY v. JOHNSON · filed 2019-08-01

... or that they were personally involved in the events, supervisory liability cannot attach under the circumstances as alleged, and declaratory relief cannot be ordered for past conduct.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s actions solely because of their supervisory role.

Smith v. Hurdle · filed 2019-08-01

Tyus cannot be held liable under § 1983 for Hurdle’s actions under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits liability for a superior’s ratification of an unconstitutional act after the fact only when the superior’s past actions were a moving force behind the violation.

(PC) Witkin v. Wise · filed 2019-08-02

In addition, ratification of an unconstitutional act by superiors after the fact will only support liability when the superiors’ past actions were the moving force behind the constitutional violation in the first place.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor vicariously liable for constitutional violations committed by subordinates.

DePaola v. Clarke · filed 2019-08-05

DePaola cannot hold Malone vicariously liable under § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations by the QMHPs, her subordinates.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to be personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation before she can be held liable.

Soto v. Yarbrough · filed 2019-08-05

Additionally, for a supervisor to be held liable under § 1983, she must have been personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation. ... Here, Soto has sufficiently alleged Yarbrough’s personal involvement in the claimed political discrimination.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because a subordinate violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Abdullah v. Ducey · filed 2019-08-06

Further, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, so a defendant’s position as the supervisor of someone who allegedly violated a plaintiff’ s constitutional rights does not make him liable.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation for damages liability; high-level decisions about healthcare providers alone are insufficient.

Barfield v. Cook · filed 2019-08-06

Their allegations establish only that Semple made high-level decisions about which provider group would provide healthcare to individuals in CT DOC custody, but this is insufficient to state a Section 1983 supervisory liability claim for damages.

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability when the supervisor is personally involved in a subordinate’s constitutional violation or the supervisor’s wrongful conduct has a causal connection to it.

Pantastico v. Department of Education, State of Hawaii · filed 2019-08-06

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, supervisors may be liable for the constitutional violations of their subordinates if they are “personally involved” in the constitutional deprivation or where there is a “causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because they oversee the people involved in an alleged violation.

Deck v. Griffin · filed 2019-08-06

I’ve already told Deck (ECF 31, ECF 58), there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of her supervisory position.

Jackson v. Gelsinger · filed 2019-08-06

To the extent Plaintiff intended to hold Gelsinger liable based on her supervisory position, it is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires the same degree of knowledge for a supervisory school official’s liability for another person’s violation of a student’s rights as Title IX requires for the school’s liability.

KC v. Mayo · filed 2019-08-06

Having concluded that Curley’s, Summers’s, and Mayo’s knowledge was insufficient to impose liability on the District, and given that the same degree of knowledge is necessary for them to be personally liable under § 1983, the Court must grant them summary judgment on Counts III and IV.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement to hold a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Langer v. The County Of Suffolk · filed 2019-08-08

“Absent some personal involvement by [a] supervisory official in the allegedly unlawful conduct of his subordinates, he cannot be liable under section 1983.” ... The Court does not find supervisor liability.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor solely because of that supervisory role.

Scott v. Holladay · filed 2019-08-09

The law is clear that respondeat superior is not a recognized basis for § 1983 liability.

A supervisor who knows of a deputy’s prior sexual misconduct and does nothing to prevent further abuse may be denied qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim.

CHRISTMAS v. PIERSON · filed 2019-08-09

In light of the clearly established law that law enforcement officers may not detain a citizen for the illegitimate purpose of sexually harassing or assaulting her, no reasonable person in Jolley’s position could have believed that doing nothing in light of Pierson’s past conduct was lawful. ... The Court therefore denies Jolley’s motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of the supervisor’s position over employees who allegedly violated constitutional rights.

Mason v. Eddy · filed 2019-08-09

A supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 simply based upon the theory of respondeat superior.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if he directly participates in a constitutional violation or his failure to train or supervise causes the deprivation.

Edwards v. Frazier · filed 2019-08-12

Defendant Harrell, as a supervisor of Defendants Bowers, Boyd, and Frazier, can be held liable here only “if he directly participated in the constitutional violation, or if his failure to train or supervise the offending actor caused the deprivation.”

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a plaintiff must allege their personal participation in causing a rights violation.

(PC) Hill v. Rios · filed 2019-08-12

These assertions do not support § 1983 liability. There is no vicarious liability under the civil rights statute. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff may state claims against Baughman and Tebrock only to the extent he can allege that they actively participated in causing the violation of his rights.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s own conduct to be connected to the alleged constitutional violation; a supervisory position alone is insufficient.

Staunton v. Harrington · filed 2019-08-12

To state a claim against a supervisor under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that each “[g]overnment-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” ... Staunton’s “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” fail to state a colorable claim for relief against Warden Thomas and Warden Harrington and claims against them are DISMISSED with leave to amend.

Section 1983 does not impose liability merely because a supervisor denies a grievance or fails to act on information in it.

Gibbs A038617218 v. Miller · filed 2019-08-12

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or the supervisor’s wrongful conduct was sufficiently connected to it.

Gleason v. Gastelo · filed 2019-08-13

Thus, the supervisor is liable if either he was personally involved in the unconstitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection existed between his wrongful conduct and the deprivation.

Section 1983 does not make a warden or employer liable solely because they employ someone who violated a prisoner’s rights.

Hamilton v. Warden · filed 2019-08-13

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and these defendants cannot be held liable simply because they employ other defendants.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires proof that the supervisor was deliberately indifferent to the alleged constitutional violation.

BETHUNE v. OWENS · filed 2019-08-13

These undisputed facts refute any claim that Defendant or other supervisors at CCCF were “deliberately indifferent” to the alleged constitutional violations, which is the mental culpability that must be proven to find liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Evans v. Warden of Otis Bantum Correctional Facility · filed 2019-08-13

A plaintiff cannot recover against a defendant under § 1983 solely on a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability for supervisors based solely on their subordinates’ conduct.

Kneitel v. Rose · filed 2019-08-13

Because “vicarious liability is inapplicable” to § 1983 suits, this claim is dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ conduct.

Cobey v. Waxford Health Services, Inc. · filed 2019-08-14

Further, vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

A § 1983 supervisory liability claim requires the supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Acosta v. Thomas · filed 2019-08-14

Magistrate Judge Dancks recommended: (1) dismissal of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Dr. Vadlamudi and Gullo because no reasonable factfinder could conclude they were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs and (2) dismissal of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims of supervisory liability against Superintendent Thomas and Dr. Koenigsmann for lack of personal involvement. ... As a result, the Report-Recommendation is accepted and adopted in its entirety for the reasons stated therein.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor personally participates in a constitutional deprivation or has a sufficient causal connection to it; conclusory allegations of failure to supervise or train do not suffice.

Antquan Durpree Clay v. San Bernardino County · filed 2019-08-15

“A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” ... Plaintiff also does not set forth any facts suggesting that Castillo personally participated in or knowingly acquiesced to any of the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely for their employees’ actions; the plaintiff must allege a causal link between each supervisor and the claimed violation.

(PC) Howell v. Camargo · filed 2019-08-15

Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a defendant's supervision of others; the defendant must be personally involved in the deprivation of rights.

Owens v. Illinois Department of Human Services · filed 2019-08-15

Instead, the allegations against Corcoran are purely supervisory, and supervisory liability is non-cognizable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior; a plaintiff must allege the supervisor’s own misconduct.

Ross v. Merlak · filed 2019-08-15

The Plaintiff’s Complaint does not set forth discernible allegations of misconduct on the part of the Warden himself, and it is well established that supervisory liability cannot be established under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) solely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for a subordinate’s conduct; the plaintiff must allege the supervisor’s personal involvement.

(PC) Levi v. Hill · filed 2019-08-16

As currently set forth, plaintiff’s claim against defendant Hill is based on nothing more than a theory of respondeat superior, which is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a jail administrator solely because of her supervisory position.

Goings v. Baldwin · filed 2019-08-16

To the extent Goings argues that Butler is liable because of her status as the chief administrator of the jail, this argument is without merit because there is no respondeat superior liability in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because a subordinate caused a constitutional violation.

Ganaway v. Goidman · filed 2019-08-16

A defendant cannot be liable merely because he or she supervised a person who caused a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor for employees’ misconduct without the supervisor’s personal involvement.

Freeman v. Lawson · filed 2019-08-16

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for subordinates’ acts without allegations that the supervisor acquiesced in, participated in, or condoned those acts.

Hugueley v. Parker · filed 2019-08-16

Although Defendant Parker is the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction, supervisors cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for acts or inactions of subordinate employees, absent allegations that the supervisor acquiesced in, participated in, or condoned the employees’ wrongful acts.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s misconduct solely because of the supervisory relationship.

Braithwaite v. Smelcer · filed 2019-08-19

The doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be used to hold a supervisor liable for the misconduct of a subordinate.

Section 1983 does not allow a supervisor to be held liable solely because of a subordinate’s conduct.

Wilson v. Wexford Medical and Administration/staff at fault · filed 2019-08-19

As explained, an individual cannot be held liable under § 1983 pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a state official based solely on general supervisory authority; the official must cause the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Turning Point USA at Arkansas State University v. Rhodes · filed 2019-08-19

General supervisory authority over a state entity’s operations, alone, is insufficient to connect a state official to a plaintiff’s injury under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because a subordinate violated someone’s rights.

Winters v. Overholser · filed 2019-08-19

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of a subordinate’s misconduct.

Collins v. Warden · filed 2019-08-19

It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely because a subordinate allegedly violated a constitutional right.

Roberts v. Delta County Prosecutor's Office · filed 2019-08-19

Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability in claims under § 1983. ... Here, Roberts alleges nothing more than John Doe was Trooper Belonga’s supervisor.

A Section 1983 supervisory liability claim requires facts supporting liability against the supervisor; conclusory allegations of supervisory duties do not suffice.

WANG v. NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE · filed 2019-08-19

The most liberal reading of this Count, as well as all others asserted against Fuentes, fails to articulate any facts that would support a claim against Fuentes.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because she supervises someone who violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Winters v. Smalls · filed 2019-08-19

A defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 does not make a defendant liable solely because the defendant holds a supervisory position.

Davis v. Thompson · filed 2019-08-20

And so, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to hold Defendants liable solely because they are in supervisory positions, these claims are dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely for a subordinate’s misconduct; the supervisor must have encouraged, participated in, or knowingly acquiesced in it.

Parker v. Hildreth · filed 2019-08-20

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 lawsuits to impute liability onto supervisory personnel, see Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978), unless it is shown “that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).

Section 1983 does not permit an excessive force claim against supervisors based solely on their supervisory roles and notice of the incident afterward.

Ellerbe v. Herring · filed 2019-08-20

Plaintiff does allege that he informed Defendants Herring, Ingram, and Lambert about the incident the day after after it occurred, but his claim in this regard appears to be based on respondeat superior and will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability under a theory of respondeat superior.

Moore v. Corpening · filed 2019-08-20

As to Defendant Boysworth, there is no liability under § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a warden over prison policies to show that the policies created a substantial risk of harm, the warden knew of that risk, and the warden disregarded it.

Doe v. Ziemer · filed 2019-08-21

To prevail under § 1983, Plaintiff must prove: (1) the implemented policies and procedures at Logan created a substantial risk that Ziemer’s sexual assaults and the subsequent retaliation would occur; (2) Burke personally knew that such policies and procedures at Logan created a substantial risk that Ziemer’s sexual assaults and the subsequent retaliation would occur; and (3) Burke acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, “[I]t is enough to show that the defendants knew of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s misconduct.

Clark v. Harrington · filed 2019-08-21

This is an attempt to assert a respondeat superior claim, which § 1983 does not recognize.

Section 1983 does not make prison officials liable solely because they hold administrative positions.

Nelson v. Wexford Healthcare Providers · filed 2019-08-21

But prison officials cannot be held liable based solely on their positions as administrators as the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation; supervisors are not liable merely for their subordinates’ acts.

HAMPTON v. KRYPEOS · filed 2019-08-21

“Liability under § 1983 is direct rather than vicarious; supervisors are responsible for their own acts but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to ensure that subordinates carry out their tasks correctly.”

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for merely failing to supervise or control employees.

Douglas v. Greenup Co. Det. Facility · filed 2019-08-21

However, liability under § 1983 does not arise from the mere failure to supervise or control employees.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; respondeat superior, negligence, and a mere failure to act do not establish individual liability.

Young v. Warden Eric Ivey · filed 2019-08-21

Supervisory officials cannot be liable for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 solely on the basis of respondeat superior. ... The plaintiff has not set forth allegations sufficient to demonstrate that the defendants are individually liable for the conditions he alleges because, at the most, his allegations suggest he seeks to hold the defendants liable on the basis of respondeat superior, negligent conduct, or a failure to act.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a supervisor’s failure to enforce required safety checks.

McMillen v. Windham · filed 2019-08-26

Because McMillen relies on Program Supervisor Kimbler’s inaction in enforcing the required bed checks, she has failed to make out a claim.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s misconduct solely because of the supervisory relationship.

Headrick v. Hague · filed 2019-08-26

The doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be used to hold a supervisor liable for the misconduct of a subordinate.

Section 1983 requires plausible facts showing that a proposed supervisor caused the alleged violations; speculation about responsibility for training is insufficient.

Tabi v. John Doe No.1 · filed 2019-08-26

Moreover, Plaintiff's Objections reveal that he is merely speculating as to who is responsible for the alleged failure to train the employees about whose conduct he complains and accordingly cannot plausibly allege facts showing that Drs. Isaac and Hendrick caused such alleged violations.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for employees’ misconduct; individual liability requires personal involvement or direct responsibility for the deprivation of rights.

Avery v. Hill · filed 2019-08-27

"[A] supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an employee’s unconstitutional activity." ... Avery has presented no evidence that Sheriff Helder or Major Denzer were personally involved, or even aware, of Woods’ erratic and/or aggressive behavior or the situation in S-block. Accordingly, there is no basis on which to hold Sheriff Helder or Major Denzer liable in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 requires a complaint against a supervisor to allege a causal link between the supervisor and the claimed constitutional violation; supervision alone does not establish liability.

(PC) Green v. Link · filed 2019-08-27

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for failure to train when the supervisor knew of a pattern of similar incidents or the narrow single-incident exception applies.

Marzett v. Tigner · filed 2019-08-27

Plaintiff also has not stated a proper failure-to-train claim by (1) alleging that Sheriff Gusman had actual or constructive knowledge of a pattern of similar incidents or (2) establishing that the “single incident” exception applies.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a supervisor’s policy, custom, or failure to train or supervise and the alleged harm.

Webb v. Smith · filed 2019-08-28

Since Smith and Houck did not cause any of the plaintiffs' harm, we cannot say that a policy or custom their supervisors created or applied, or their alleged failure to train or supervise them, did either.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position; the plaintiff must allege the supervisor’s own involvement in the violation.

(PC) Salcido v. Warden · filed 2019-08-28

However, there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a supervisory role; the claim must allege personal participation or a causal connection to the constitutional violation.

Floyd v. Broward County Sheriff's Department · filed 2019-08-28

Because liability under § 1983 cannot attach solely because of Sheriff Israel’s supervisory role, the SAC fails to state a § 1983 claim against him.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely because of their supervisory authority; they must have participated in or knowingly acquiesced in the misconduct.

Carter v. Washington · filed 2019-08-28

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 lawsuits to impute liability onto supervisory personnel, see Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978), unless it is shown “that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor denied a grievance or failed to act on information in it.

Berryman 107202 v. Washington · filed 2019-08-28

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor is personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or the supervisor’s conduct is causally connected to it.

Humphers v. McElroy · filed 2019-08-29

Nor is there any other evidence of either personal involvement in the underlying allegations or a causal connection between the Supervisory Defendants’ conduct and the constitutional violations.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 requires personal involvement in a constitutional violation.

Taylor v. Coller · filed 2019-08-30

Absent personal involvement in a constitutional violation, supervisory liability cannot state a claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a supervisory role; the supervisor must be directly involved.

Estate of Joseph Biegert v. Molitor · filed 2019-08-30

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against individual supervisors based upon their supervisory role over another person. ... Because Plaintiff has not established that Molitor was directly involved in the incident, he will be dismissed as a defendant in this action.

Section 1983 does not make a defendant liable solely for employing or supervising someone who violated another person's rights.

Penninger v. Indiana Dept of Corrections · filed 2019-08-30

To the extent Mr. Penninger is alleging the defendants did not properly supervise, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and they cannot be held liable simply because they employed or supervised others.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a warden for others’ conduct.

Bullock v. Rish · filed 2019-08-30

As noted in the court’s screening order, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in one.

Butler 307281 v. Scholten · filed 2019-08-30

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for the acts of subordinates.

Denton v. Thrasher · filed 2019-09-03

Section 1983 supervisory liability cannot be based on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in, or causal connection to, a deprivation of rights; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

(PC) Franklin v. Tate · filed 2019-09-03

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must prove that the defendants holding supervisory positions personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. ... Here, Plaintiff does not allege personal involvement by Defendants Baniga, Shiesha, and Lewis, and fails to allege specific facts tending to show that these Defendants were causally connected to the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-train claim against a supervisor when the complaint plausibly alleges deliberate indifference to the grave risk of harm posed by a subordinate.

Ramos v. Hodgson · filed 2019-09-03

A supervisor’s failure to train subordinates who commit constitutional violations may constitute direct involvement for purposes of § 1983, but only when “the complaint plausibly alleges that [the supervisor] was deliberately indifferent to the grave risk of harm that [his subordinate] posed.” Saldivar v. Racine, 818 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2016). Here, Ramos does not allege that Hodgson was aware of any risk of harm posed by Cardoso or any other facts demonstrating a reckless or callous indifference by Hodgson to the constitutional rights of others. See Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 209 (1st Cir. 1990).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in one.

Lopp 654488 v. Washington · filed 2019-09-03

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 permits failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise liability against a supervisor only in limited circumstances, such as when the failure amounts to deliberate indifference.

(PC) Legare v. Cryer · filed 2019-09-04

A “failure to train” or “failure to supervise” theory can be the basis for a supervisor’s liability under § 1983 in only limited circumstances, such as where the failure amounts to deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 does not permit a supervisor to be held liable solely for a subordinate’s conduct.

(PC) Davis v. Wheeler · filed 2019-09-04

This is a respondeat superior theory of liability which is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory position.

Heisch v. Lakin · filed 2019-09-04

Standing alone, a defendant’s supervisory position does not subject him or her to liability under Section 1983 because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in this context.

Section 1983 does not impose individual supervisory liability for a subordinate’s misconduct without the supervisor’s participation, authorization, approval, or knowing acquiescence.

Estate of Robert Matthew Bradley v. Wright · filed 2019-09-04

It is well established that liability under a § 1983 claim cannot be based on a theory of respondeat superior. ... Here, Plaintiff has not provided evidence that Jailer Wright participated in the alleged misconduct or implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged deliberate indifference to medical care.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knew or should have known of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, responded with deliberate indifference or tacit approval, and that inaction caused the injury.

Pevia v. Bishop · filed 2019-09-04

Supervisory liability under § 1983 must be supported with evidence that: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor’s response to the knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for their subordinates’ actions.

Clark v. Beeman · filed 2019-09-04

To the extent that Clark seeks to hold Warden Graham and McKenzie responsible for the actions of subordinates, the doctrine of respondeat superior, or vicarious liability, is not applicable to § 1983 claims.

A supervisor may be individually liable under § 1983 if the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or the supervisor’s wrongful conduct had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Stone v. Van Wormer · filed 2019-09-04

To hold supervisors individually liable in § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must allege either (1) the supervisor’s “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,” or “(2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011).

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s actions solely because of the supervisory relationship.

(PC) Tevin L. Harris v. Valencia · filed 2019-09-05

To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to hold Defendant Kristin Kyle liable because she is a supervisor, the claim fails. “Under Section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.”

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a supervisor for another employee’s conduct.

Bradley v. Neal · filed 2019-09-05

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in or direct responsibility for a deprivation of rights to impose personal liability.

Onyiah v. St. Cloud State University and Board of Trustees · filed 2019-09-05

The undisputed evidence shows that Gregory was not involved in this decision in a way that could generate liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a personal liability claim against supervisors who are present during an allegedly unconstitutional search and knowingly acquiesce in it.

CHAPOLINI v. CAPODANNO · filed 2019-09-05

This allegation of physical presence during the search would surely satisfy these defendants’ knowledge and acquiescence of a constitutional violation if Chapolini could prove a violation occurred. ... As the court has also already determined that the defendants have not satisfied their burden to show that Chapolini has failed to state a claim pertaining to the strip search, the court must also deny their motion to the extent that they seek dismissal of supervisory liability, personal liability claims against Captain Johnson and Officer Gamber relating to the strip search.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation; a supervisory title alone is insufficient.

Farah v. Richeson · filed 2019-09-06

The fact that these defendants occupy supervisory positions is, alone, insufficient to establish their personal involvement in the constitutional deprivations.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of her supervisory role.

Price v. Brookhart · filed 2019-09-06

Respondeat superior liability is not recognized under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a pattern of widespread abuse to establish supervisory liability based on a failure to supervise.

Robinson v. Wexford Health · filed 2019-09-06

Plaintiff’s assertions do not demonstrate any pattern of widespread abuse necessary to establish supervisory action or inaction giving rise to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to remedy alleged misconduct.

Whorton v. Roggenbuck · filed 2019-09-06

Pursuant to Shehee, failure to award an administrative remedy does not create § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in, or a causal connection to, a constitutional violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Wilkerson v. Peters · filed 2019-09-06

This allegation fails to establish Ms. Peters’s personal involvement. Nor does Mr. Wilkerson allege that Ms. Peters was deliberately indifferent to sexual assaults by ODOC employees.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a supervisor to allege personal participation, direction, knowing acquiescence, or a deliberately indifferent policy that directly caused the harm.

JACKSON v. TALNODGE · filed 2019-09-06

To the extent that Mr. Jackson intends to assert claims against Warden Talmadge or Captain Love because they are supervisory officials, he would have to plead either that each of them participated in violating his rights, directed others to violate them, knew of and acquiesced in the violation of his rights, or “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015). He has made no such allegation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely for their subordinates’ conduct.

Certeza v. Krishnaswamy · filed 2019-09-09

It is firmly established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for other staff members’ failure to provide care without the supervisor’s own involvement.

Murray, Anthony v. Waterman, Jolinda · filed 2019-09-09

Waterman cannot be held responsible if other health services staff failed to respond to plaintiff’s requests for treatment.

A supervisor who made no treatment decisions is not liable under § 1983 without a causal connection between the supervisor’s inaction and a violation of constitutional rights.

Hines v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2019-09-09

Dr. Balmir made no decisions involving Hines’s treatment, so for supervisory liability to exist, Hines had to establish a causal connection between Dr. Balmir’s inaction and the alleged violation of Hines’s constitutional rights. See Keith v. DeKalb Cty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047 (11th Cir. 2014). Because, as stated above, Dr. Smith did not violate Hines’s rights, there can be no supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely because their subordinates allegedly violated constitutional rights.

(PC) Petillo v. Baughman · filed 2019-09-10

Rather, Plaintiff asserts, because Baughman and Clough are in supervisory positions, they are liable for the alleged violations of their subordinates. This is an improper theory of liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ actions.

Burgess v. Wehn · filed 2019-09-10

To the extent that Burgess seeks to hold Gelsinger and Moyer responsible for the actions of subordinates, the doctrine of respondeat superior, or vicarious liability, is not applicable to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely because they oversee someone who violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Tolentino v. Xue · filed 2019-09-10

However, it is well settled that “[a] plaintiff cannot predicate liability on her § 1983 claims on a respondeat superior basis.”

Section 1983 requires a supervisory defendant to be personally involved in the alleged violation or to have adopted a deficient policy that caused it.

Green v. Davis · filed 2019-09-10

Plaintiff has not shown that defendants Davis, Werner, or Harris were personally involved in his medical treatment, or that they adopted a deficient policy that was the moving force of a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires allegations linking a supervisor personally to the alleged rights violation; collective allegations against defendants are insufficient.

Rowe v. Sumner County · filed 2019-09-11

Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff relies on claims that identify the defendants as “Sumner County et al.” he fails to sufficiently allege a claim of supervisory authority and must amend those claims to comply with this standard.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for deficient hiring, training, or supervision when the officer committed no constitutional violation.

James v. Cheatdum · filed 2019-09-12

As a result, Chief Davis in his individual and official capacities cannot be held liable under § 1983 for failure to train, failure to supervise, or deficient hiring procedures.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a supervisor’s position or conclusory allegations about subordinates’ actions.

Nelson v. Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections · filed 2019-09-12

Likewise, Nelson’s conclusory argument in her brief that “the actions of Secretary LeBlanc’s subordinates in carrying out such policies directly implicate him and create liability for him”63 does not state a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely because of the supervisor’s position.

Ben v. Moskal · filed 2019-09-12

Sheriff Popkin cannot be held liable simply because he occupied a supervisory position, as the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 claims.

A supervisor sued under § 1983 for a subordinate’s conduct is liable only if the subordinate violated the plaintiff’s rights and the supervisor’s own conduct and state of mind did so as well.

Leyba v. Strom · filed 2019-09-13

When an official is sued under § 1983 for conduct “arising from his or her superintendent responsibilities,” the plaintiff must demonstrate not only that a subordinate employee violated his rights but that the supervising official “by virtue of his own conduct and state of mind did so as well.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position; the plaintiff must link the supervisor’s conduct to the constitutional violation.

Bird v. Demers · filed 2019-09-13

The doctrine of respondeat superior cannot serve as the basis for liability in an action under § 1983. ... The Court will therefore grant summary judgment to Chief Cordeiro on Counts One and Three.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a causal connection between the supervisor’s policies and the constitutional harm, along with the requisite state of mind.

Willis v. Oklahoma County Detention Center · filed 2019-09-13

For both the excessive force and inadequate medical care claims, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly establish that the policies at issue caused Willis’ constitutional harm and that Defendants had the requisite state of mind.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; unsupported allegations that the supervisor directed misconduct do not suffice.

MARTIN v. WETZEL · filed 2019-09-14

Liability under § 1983 requires a defendant’s “personal involvement” in the deprivation of a constitutional right. ... Because Plaintiff has failed to plead facts to support the applicability of either “general instance” of personal involvement of Defendant Wetzel, all claims against him based upon supervisory liability must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for subordinates’ acts solely because of their employment relationship.

Johnson v. Griffie · filed 2019-09-16

Supervisors cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts of subordinates simply because of the employment relationship.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a supervisor must personally participate in a rights violation or be causally connected to it.

Leal v. Vang · filed 2019-09-16

Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any factual allegations that the supervisory Child Protective Services worker personally participated in removing the child or that the child was removed due to a policy that violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the unidentified supervisory employee.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Brooks v. Nelson · filed 2019-09-16

Further, insofar as Plaintiff attempts to hold Defendants liable based on the theory of respondeat superior, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected this theory of liability in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisory official for a subordinate’s acts.

Langley v. Wiseman · filed 2019-09-16

There is no vicarious liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for merely neglectful conduct.

Howlett v. Warren, City of · filed 2019-09-16

Notably, merely “neglectful” conduct is not sufficient for § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the alleged constitutional violation.

Hoffman v. Peters · filed 2019-09-16

Because there is no dispute of material fact about the lack of Defendants’ personal involvement in the underlying claims, summary judgment is granted to Defendants Bell, Gilmore, and Peters.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on a supervisor’s position; the plaintiff must allege the supervisor’s personal involvement.

TALBERT v. CORRECTIONAL DENTAL ASSOCIATES · filed 2019-09-16

To the extent Mr. Talbert’s allegations may be construed as a respondeat superior claim—Dr. Kalu serves as Corizon’s regional medical director and Mr. Talbert does not allege Dr. Kalu was present in the prison or treated him—he cannot rely solely on respondeat superior as a theory of liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely for their employees’ actions.

Pendergrass v. Parker · filed 2019-09-16

However, supervisors are not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable merely because their subordinates acted unlawfully; liability requires the supervisor’s participation or an unconstitutional policy the supervisor implemented.

Cash v. Rupert · filed 2019-09-17

Supervisory officials generally are not liable for the actions of subordinates on a theory respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a plaintiff must allege their personal involvement or a causal connection through their own wrongdoing.

Davis v. Bolanos · filed 2019-09-17

In § 1983 cases the traditional doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply. ... The allegations of the complaint do not state a plausible claim for supervisory liability against Sheriff Bolanos or Undersheriff Robbins based on their alleged failure to require body cameras for all food handlers/transporters.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor whose failure to stop known constitutional violations by subordinates has a sufficient causal connection to the plaintiff’s injury.

(PC) Bradford v. Khamooshian · filed 2019-09-17

A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). ... Here, Plaintiff alleges Voong knew that prison guards were inflicting a constitutional injury onto Plaintiff, yet Voong did nothing to stop the actions. Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations against Voong survive the Court’s screening process.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation or a violation caused by a deficient policy.

Dodd v. Texas Department Of Criminal Justice · filed 2019-09-18

Dodd does not state a viable claim against Warden Herrera or Major Sullivan, as supervisory officials, because he does not demonstrate that either one was personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or that a violation occurred as the result of a deficient policy.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because of a supervisor’s position; the supervisor must participate in or knowingly approve the misconduct.

White v. Jindal · filed 2019-09-18

Additionally, liability in a § 1983 action cannot be based on a theory of respondeat superior. ... There is no evidence that either Klee or McRoberts directly participated in or implicitly authorized the actions plaintiff considers adverse.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a failure to supervise subordinates when the supervisor’s personal involvement is not alleged.

Dahir v. Ellison · filed 2019-09-18

Dahir has not alleged Swanson’s or Poupore’s personal involvement, only that each failed to properly supervise their subordinates. Thus, the Court will overrule Dahir’s objection and adopt the Magistrate Judge’s R&R as it pertains to Dahir’s claims against Swanson and Poupore.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Simmons v. Marasa · filed 2019-09-18

Plaintiff’s failure to include any allegations that Diaz was grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent in addressing unconstitutional conduct of which he had actual or constructive notice is fatal to his claims against Diaz.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official causes constitutional harm through a deliberately indifferent policy or participates in, directs, or knowingly acquiesces in a subordinate’s violation.

Bloom v. Hollibaugh · filed 2019-09-18

However, a prison official may be personally liable under § 1983 through two theories of supervisory liability: (1) if the official “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the constitutional harm;” or (2) “if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates' violations.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).

Section 1983 permits a claim against supervisors alleged to have directed and supervised excessive force, even if they did not personally apply it.

Woods v. Marquez · filed 2019-09-20

Although defendants Celaya and Correa are not alleged to have personally applied force to Mr. Woods, they are alleged to have directed and supervised the use of force, and that allegation is sufficient to state a claim against them.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of that person’s position.

Klein v. County of Lake · filed 2019-09-20

There are no other factual allegations directed against Philp, and there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to have participated directly in a constitutional violation or to have a sufficient causal connection to it.

Colburn v. Odom · filed 2019-09-23

Without Odom’s direct participation in a constitutional violation or a sufficient causal connection between her actions as a supervisory official and the alleged constitutional wrongdoing, the plaintiffs have not stated a viable claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Grimes v. Chisum · filed 2019-09-23

If his claim is based on Dunlap’s role as supervisor, there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely for their subordinates’ wrongdoing.

Hill v. Sturgis · filed 2019-09-23

Liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior is not available for § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of their supervisory position.

Levy v. Green · filed 2019-09-23

To the extent that Corcoran and Baucom are named simply because they are supervisors, it is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior, or vicarious liability, does not apply to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in one.

Naseman 285527 v. Kim · filed 2019-09-23

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a defendant must be personally involved in or causally connected to the alleged violation.

Triplett v. Banks · filed 2019-09-23

There is no vicarious or respondeat superior liability of supervisors under section 1983. ... He does not allege personal involvement on the part of the named defendants nor acts by the named defendants that are causally connected to the lighting issue.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement; prison administrators are not liable solely because they supervise someone who violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Hogan v. Lemmon · filed 2019-09-24

Administrators aren’t liable just because they are in charge of the prison or supervise other individuals who violate a plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for another official’s misconduct.

Hency v. St. Clair County · filed 2019-09-24

And there is no supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor or employer solely for another person’s conduct; liability requires direct acts or omissions.

Smith v. Management and Training Corporation · filed 2019-09-24

“’[I]ndividual liability under Section 1983 may not be predicated on the vicarious liability doctrine of respondeat superior.’ Instead, ‘[o]nly the direct acts or omissions of government officials’ give rise to individual liability under that statute.” ... Smith has failed to allege any direct acts or omissions related to either the May 15 or May 30, 2017, incidents by either Shaw or MTC.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely because of their positions; a plaintiff must allege their personal involvement or a causal connection to the violation.

Amezquita v. Hough · filed 2019-09-25

There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s actions.

Cleveland v. DOC · filed 2019-09-25

The doctrine of respondeat superior, which allows an employer to be held liable for a subordinate’s actions in some types of cases, has no application to § 1983 actions.