42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a warden based solely on his supervisory authority over a disciplinary process.

Armstrong v. Shaw · filed 2019-09-25

The only claim asserted against Warden Frank Shaw is the direct challenge to the RVR conviction. Furthermore, Plaintiff admitted at the hearing that he named Shaw as a defendant merely because he has supervisory authority over the disciplinary process. For these reasons, Defendant Shaw is hereby dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the deprivation.

Gomez v. Madden · filed 2019-09-26

The TAC fails to allege facts sufficient to support an inference that Defendant Sangha was personally involved in any constitutional deprivation of Plaintiff’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights or that a sufficient causal connection exists between any of the conduct as supervisor and the constitutional deprivations at issue here.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for a subordinate’s misconduct solely because of their supervisory role; a complaint must allege facts showing their personal involvement.

KC v. LaPorte Community School Corporation · filed 2019-09-26

Ms. Nichols, Ms. Jeffers, and Ms. Alexander can’t be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for conduct of a subordinate that violates a plaintiff's constitutional rights. ... These conclusory allegations, without more, aren’t sufficient “to raise the plaintiff’s supervisory liability claim[s] above the speculative level.”

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for subordinates’ actions solely because of their supervisory roles; liability requires personal involvement or a causal connection to the constitutional violation.

Landry v. Rogers · filed 2019-09-26

Any allegation that these Defendants are responsible for the actions of subordinate officers or co-employees under a theory of vicarious responsibility or respondeat superior is alone insufficient to state a claim under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s direct involvement in the alleged misconduct; a subordinate’s misconduct alone does not make the supervisor liable.

Rice v. Resendes · filed 2019-09-26

In other words, a commissioner, superintendent, or other supervisory employer cannot be held liable under § 1983 based solely on the misconduct of a subordinate; the supervisor must have had some form of direct involvement in the alleged misconduct.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor denied a grievance or failed to act on information in it.

Miles 237011 v. Rink · filed 2019-09-26

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to have caused a constitutional harm through a policy or to have been personally involved in the violation.

KELLY v. WOLF · filed 2019-09-26

Kelly makes no averment that Carney and Delaney instituted a policy, practice or custom with deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights, and does not assert that they were personally involved in acts that caused him to be harmed.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a prison administrator’s conduct and the injury to support personal or supervisory liability.

Grimsley v. MacKay · filed 1996-08-16

Accepting the magistrate judge’s factual findings as not clearly erroneous, we hold that the Administrators’ involvement in the incident in which Mr. Grimsley was injured is insufficient as a matter of law to support either personal or supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor encourages, directly participates in, or knowingly acquiesces in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Leary v. Daeschner · filed 2003-11-19

Thus, whether Daeschner can be held liable in his supervisory capacity for the violation of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights remains an issue for the trier of fact.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on prison supervisors; a plaintiff must allege the supervisor’s own involvement in the constitutional violation.

Bilik v. Hardy · filed 2019-09-27

To state a deliberate indifference claim against a prison supervisor, “a § 1983 plaintiff may not rely on a theory of respondeat superior.” Perez, 792 F.3d at 781. Rather, the plaintiff must “allege that the defendant, through his or her own conduct, has violated the Constitution.” Id.

Section 1983 does not allow a prison official to be held liable solely because of a supervisory role; the plaintiff must plead the official’s personal involvement.

Bilik v. Hardy · filed 2019-09-27

However, “a § 1983 plaintiff may not rely on a theory of respondeat superior” to hold a prison official liable.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because a subordinate committed a constitutional violation.

Pendermon v. Moore · filed 2019-09-27

The mere fact that a defendant acted in a supervisory capacity is not enough: respondeat superior (vicarious liability) is not an available theory of liability in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Perkins v. New York City · filed 2019-09-27

In this case, Perkins claims against Sergeant Jackson appear to rest solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior. The SAC contains no factual allegations regarding Jackson, except for the conclusory allegations that he “fail[ed] to supervise his subordinates.” (SAC at 4.) The SAC does not even allege that he was present at the precinct during the lineup, much less that he was involved in the identification procedure. Accordingly, the supervisory liability claim against Jackson is dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ constitutional violations.

Landman v. Kaemingk · filed 2019-09-27

“[V]icarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits[.]” ... Although Landman alleges that all defendants had personal involvement in or direct responsibility for Landman’s mail being rejected, Landman cannot sue Fluke, Kaemingk and Reyes under a theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely for their subordinates’ actions; liability requires personal involvement in the alleged violation.

Willard v. Leibach · filed 2019-09-27

To the extent Plaintiff names Warden Leibach or any other Defendant simply because of their supervisory capacities, the law is clear that supervisors are not liable under Section 1983 for the actions of their subordinates.

Section 1983 supervisory liability cannot rest on a supervisor’s mere failure to act.

Summers v. Leis · filed 2004-05-21

Section 1983 supervisory liability cannot be predicated on the mere failure to act.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Boateng v. Aurora Police Department · filed 2019-09-30

However, § 1983 does not allow claims against supervisors under a theory of respondeat superior liability.

Mandatory reporter status alone does not make a school investigator a supervisor for purposes of § 1983 supervisory liability.

C H v. ASHLEY · filed 2019-09-30

The fact that Investigator Farley was a mandatory reporter does not make him a supervisor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional acts.

NP A MINOR BY EP HIS NATURAL GUARDIAN v. THE SCHOOL BOARD OF OKALOOSA COUNTY FLORIDA · filed 2019-09-30

Supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional acts solely because of their supervisory role.

N R v. SCHOOL BOARD OF OKALOOSA COUNTY · filed 2019-09-30

Supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement and does not impose liability solely because a defendant supervised someone who violated a person's rights.

Johnson v. Wexford Health Sources Inc. · filed 2019-09-30

Because personal involvement is required, there is no respondeat superior liability for § 1983 claims.

In a § 1983 failure-to-protect claim, a supervisor is not liable solely because of his rank; liability requires personal knowledge of the risk and failure to act.

Luera v. Godinez · filed 2019-09-30

It was important to instruct the jury that Lyerla could not be held liable based solely on his rank for the acts of his subordinates in failing to protect Plaintiff. Rather, Lyerla could only be held liable if he personally knew about the risk of an attack but took no action to prevent it.

Section 1983 requires personal fault and does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of that role.

Cole v. Pepper · filed 2019-09-30

An individual cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in an alleged constitutional violation for damages liability.

Ross v. City of New York · filed 2019-09-30

“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” ... Plaintiff has not set forth evidence demonstrating a genuine dispute of material fact that Defendant Maresca was personally involved in the alleged evidence fabrication by Defendant Loria.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation before the supervisor can be liable for a subordinate’s acts.

Grant v. Annucci · filed 2019-09-30

“To recover damages against supervisory officials for the acts of their subordinates, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s personal involvement caused the constitutional deprivation.” ... Here, the Court agrees with Defendants that there is no evidence that Annucci was personally involved in the alleged denial of due process.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Trecker v. Kalinch · filed 2019-09-30

Supervisory liability under § 1983 may not be premised upon a theory of respondeat superior.

A supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 for a jail suicide without actual knowledge of the inmate’s substantial suicide risk.

Holland v. Glanz · filed 2019-09-30

Because Plaintiff never alleges that Mr. Glanz even knew of Mr. Holland, let alone of Mr. Holland’s suicide risk, Mr. Glanz cannot be held liable under a theory of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose strict supervisory liability; a plaintiff must link the supervisor to the constitutional deprivation through personal participation, control, direction, or failure to supervise.

Dawson v. Rios · filed 2019-09-30

However, “§ 1983 does not recognize a concept of strict supervisor liability; the defendant’s role must be more than one of abstract authority over individuals who actually committed a constitutional violation.” Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008). Thus, to hold a supervisor liable for the acts of his or her subordinates, a plaintiff must plead facts showing an “affirmative link . . . between the constitutional deprivation and either the supervisor’s personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s generic allegation that Defendant Rios failed to prevent a constitutional violation by subordinate officers does not satisfy this burden.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a right to control employees; a plaintiff must show the supervisor’s participation in or approval of the challenged conduct.

Atkins v. Parker · filed 2019-09-30

“[Section] 1983 liability must be based on more than respondeat superior, or the right to control employees.” ... Plaintiffs have not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Parker encouraged, actively participated in, or knowingly approved any particular aspect of TDOC’s policy concerning treatment of HCV inmates.

Section 1983 generally does not make supervisors liable for their employees’ actions.

(PC) Calloway v. CDCR · filed 2019-10-01

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability merely because a defendant supervises the staff who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Armour v. Santos · filed 2019-10-01

However, neither Wexford nor John Baldwin can be liable on this basis alone because respondeat superior liability is not recognized under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory position, but a claim may proceed when the defendant was personally involved in creating, applying, or interpreting an unconstitutional policy.

Cobb v. Madlock · filed 2019-10-01

Plaintiff cannot proceed against Wigfall, Clark and Griffith based solely upon their administrative or supervisory positions. However, plaintiff can be understood to allege that these defendants were personally involved in creating, applying and/or interpreting a policy that was unconstitutional and failed to adhere to the notice requirements of Procunier.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires factual allegations supporting a claim against a supervisor.

Ackbar v. Monaco · filed 2019-10-01

Finally, as the Magistrate Judge correctly held, both the Amended Complaint and Complaint fail to allege facts raising a constitutional claim against any individual defendants, and entirely fails to allege facts regarding supervisory liability under §1983.

Section 1983 allows a supervisory liability claim when a supervisor maintains a policy, practice, or custom that directly causes constitutional harm.

Tolentino v. Xue · filed 2019-10-02

This allegation is sufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability on the theory that Price “established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [Tolentino’s] constitutional harm.” Parkel/, 833 F.3d at 330.

An official is not personally liable under § 1983 for subordinates’ acts unless the official participated in, acquiesced to, authorized, or encouraged them.

Thurman v. Knox County, Tennessee · filed 2019-10-02

Further, Defendant Jones may not be held liable in his individual capacity under § 1983 based on the acts of the pod officers alleged in the amended complaint, as nothing in the complaint allows the Court to plausibly infer that Defendant Jones directly participated in, acquiesced to, or authorized or encouraged those acts or omissions.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the deprivation of a plaintiff’s rights; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Krell v. Braightmeyer · filed 2019-10-03

But deliberate indifference requires that a defendant be “personally involved” in the deprivation of a plaintiff's rights, not merely a supervisor in a facility where a plaintiff received inadequate medical care.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because an official denied a grievance or failed to act on information in one.

Duskin 311778 v. Olson · filed 2019-10-03

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because subordinates allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Welch v. Prescott Police Department · filed 2019-10-04

With respect to Defendant Polk, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely for their subordinates’ conduct; liability requires a connection to the supervisors’ own actions or inactions.

(PC) Canfield v. CDCR · filed 2019-10-04

This is a respondeat superior theory of liability, which is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not make supervisors liable for their employees’ actions.

(PC) Windham v. Wofford · filed 2019-10-04

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely for their subordinates’ conduct; a plaintiff must allege a causal connection to the supervisor’s own conduct.

(PC) Hubbard v. Roberds · filed 2019-10-07

This is a respondeat superior theory of liability, which is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a specific causal connection between a supervisor’s conduct and a constitutional violation; knowledge of a subordinate’s conduct alone is insufficient.

(PC) Merriman v. Harris · filed 2019-10-07

Plaintiff appears to allege liability on the part of the Supervisors based purely on their knowledge and acquiescence to Harris’s conduct. This alone is insufficient. Plaintiff must allege a specific causal connection between the Supervisors’ conduct and a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of that role; the plaintiff must allege the supervisor’s own involvement in a constitutional violation.

Sanchez v. Covello · filed 2019-10-07

There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s conduct.

Cornelius, III v. Union County Illinois Sheriff's Department · filed 2019-10-07

However, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Harvell did not properly supervise John Doe #1 in securing Plaintiff in the vehicle, respondeat superior, or supervisor liability is not recognized under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make prison supervisors liable for subordinates’ acts solely under respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Wheeler v. Alison · filed 2019-10-08

Furthermore, in a § 1983 claim, prison officials in a supervisory role are not subject to liability for the acts of lower officials based on a respondeat superior or vicarious liability theory.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s actions.

Jones v. Nisleit · filed 2019-10-08

Moreover, there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for Eighth Amendment violations under the Colon personal involvement categories, which this court held remain applicable after Iqbal.

Tangreti v. Semple · filed 2019-10-08

For these reasons, I find that, “[u]nless and until the Supreme Court or Second Circuit rule otherwise,” the Colon categories apply to a case, like this one, alleging Eighth Amendment violations.

A § 1983 claim alleging inadequate training or supervision may proceed at initial screening despite sparse allegations when the prisoner lacks access to supporting details before discovery.

Cherry v. Siegert · filed 2019-10-08

The Court has considered that Plaintiff’s additional allegations of inadequate training and supervision are sparse, but that he does not have access to such information before he engages in discovery. The Court will liberally construe the Complaint to find that Plaintiff has stated adequate allegations to proceed against Defendants Dolan and Siegert.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct without the supervisor’s own involvement.

Henderson v. Schwochert · filed 2019-10-09

Under § 1983, a government official “may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. The official may be liable only when the official, through her “own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. ... Henderson’s conclusory allegation alone is insufficient to raise his supervisory liability claim above the speculative level.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for subordinates’ conduct.

Williams v. Moyer · filed 2019-10-09

In a § 1983 claim, a defendant cannot be found liable under a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s actions are causally connected to a constitutional deprivation, but not solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Foster v. Maloney · filed 2019-10-10

While § 1983 does not allow for liability on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability, see Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994), supervisor liability under § 1983 is appropriate “when there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation,” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Lopez v. Wu · filed 2019-10-10

That some of these Defendants are supervisors is insufficient. Plaintiff must describe either personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between a supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in one.

Vontz 380134 v. Jackson · filed 2019-10-10

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant supervises others; a supervisor must have directed or knowingly consented to the constitutional violation.

Wilson, David v. Dittman, Michael · filed 2019-10-11

While § 1983 does not recognize claims on the theory of supervisory liability, supervisory defendants may be liable under the Eighth Amendment if the supervisor “directed the conduct causing the constitutional violation, or . . . it occurred with [his] knowledge or consent.” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 739-40 (7th Cir. 2001).

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the supervisor is personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Sierra-Lopez, Kevin v. Mink, Angela · filed 2019-10-11

Supervisors may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if they are “personally responsible for the deprivation of the constitutional right.”

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity claims against supervisors for inadequate supervision or deliberate indifference to deficiencies in their subordinates’ training.

Flemons v. Devane · filed 2019-10-11

Similarly, the administrators were entitled to summary judgment in their individual capacities, as there was no evidence showing that they failed to supervise adequately the other defendants, or that they were deliberately indifferent to any inadequacies in the other defendants’ training.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for a subordinate’s conduct; the complaint must allege the supervisor’s involvement or failure to prevent a known violation.

Rodriguez v. Koenig · filed 2019-10-11

However, there is no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal participation, encouragement, or knowing acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Delk v. Bumphus · filed 2019-10-11

He does not allege Austin personally encouraged, participated in, or knowingly acquiesced to their actions. Delk’s allegations are therefore insufficient to hold Defendant Austin responsible for the attack or to state a claim for relief against Austin under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because a subordinate allegedly violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Bey v. Gascon · filed 2019-10-15

Bey has not alleged any facts regarding Sheriff Hennessey’s personal involvement in the wrongs allegedly committed by doe deputies. A supervisory official, like Sheriff Hennessey, cannot be held liable pursuant to § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior. Accordingly, claims against Sheriff Hennessey are dismissed without leave to amend.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for an employee’s actions; the plaintiff must show the supervisor’s personal participation or a causal connection to the alleged violation.

EL v. KEMP · filed 2019-10-15

To the extent that El seeks to hold Evans and Talton liable for the actions of their employees at WRPD and HCDC, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a plaintiff cannot prevail under § 1983 based on respondeat superior. ... Instead, El must show that the supervisor ... personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation or that there is a causal connection, or an affirmative link, between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability; a defendant must cause or participate in the violation.

Gericke v. Wilson · filed 2019-10-15

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in it.

Seastrom 853617 v. Jennett · filed 2019-10-15

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability when the supervisor personally participates in a constitutional violation or implements an unconstitutional policy that causes the injury.

Ramsey v. Management Training & Corporation · filed 2019-10-15

There are only two scenarios in which a supervisor may be held liable under § 1983: (1) when he affirmatively participates in the incident, or (2) when he implements an unconstitutional policy that results in the constitutional injury.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Haywood v. Streekstra · filed 2019-10-16

The fact that they are supervisors, on its own, is not enough for the plaintiff to state a claim against them under §1983. Section 1983 requires that an individual be personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Martinez v. Litteral · filed 2019-10-16

Thus, for a supervisor to be held liable under § 1983, he or she must have personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct in order to be held liable for the conduct about which the plaintiff complains.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement; failing to correct a subordinate’s misconduct does not establish individual liability.

Ultimate Cakra Liberation v. Trinity Food Service · filed 2019-10-17

Furthermore, a failure to take corrective action in response to an inmate grievance or complaint does not supply the necessary personal involvement for § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not make government officials liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct solely because they supervise them.

Meyers v. Clarke · filed 2019-10-18

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s actions.

Balle v. Hobart · filed 2019-10-18

The doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisor liability), however, does not apply to actions filed under 42 USC §1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement; supervisory status or vicarious liability alone does not support a claim.

Solomon v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2019-10-18

It is well-settled that a civil rights plaintiff must allege the personal involvement of a defendant to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that liability cannot be based upon a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a supervisor based solely on respondeat superior.

Wilson v. Precynthe · filed 2019-10-18

Claims sounding in respondeat superior are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 makes a supervisor liable only if the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Hahn v. Waddington · filed 2019-10-21

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants Waddington and Russell because Hahn failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these defendants personally participated in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there was “a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Section 1983 does not make a warden liable for a subordinate’s conduct merely because the warden supervises that person.

Collins v. Warden · filed 2019-10-21

It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not make an individual supervisor or private corporation liable solely because it supervises someone who caused a constitutional deprivation.

Burns v. Cunningham · filed 2019-10-22

Supervisor liability, the doctrine of respondeat superior, is not applicable to Section 1983 actions, whether it is applied to an individual supervisor or a corporate entity.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for personally participating in a constitutional deprivation or implementing an unconstitutional policy that causes the injury.

Saville v. Winston · filed 2019-10-23

A supervisory official may be held liable under § 1983 “only if (1) he affirmatively participates in the acts that cause the constitutional deprivation, or (2) he implements unconstitutional policies that causally result in the constitutional injury.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against supervisors who know of a subordinate’s sexual harassment and consciously fail to stop it.

Rangel v. Lorum · filed 2019-10-23

As to Plaintiff’s claims against Thoreson and Francis, a supervisor may be held liable for a subordinate’s sexual harassment if the plaintiff alleges “intentional sex discrimination or a conscious failure to protect the plaintiff from abusive conditions created by subordinates amounting to intentional discrimination.” ... Here, Plaintiff asserts that Thoreson and Francis, Lorum’s supervisors, were aware of her conduct but did not take steps to prevent it from continuing. In short, Plaintiff may proceed on his claims against these defendants.

A supervisor’s alleged knowledge of a pattern of overdetention and deliberate failure to adopt corrective policies can support individual liability under § 1983 and overcome qualified immunity at the pleading stage.

Traweek v. Gusman · filed 2019-10-23

Mr. Traweek’s allegations regarding DOC’s pattern of overdetention and LeBlanc’s deliberate failure to act or implement policies addressing the overdetention problem suffice to overcome LeBlanc’s invocation of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to participate in, direct, or know of and fail to prevent a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Salazar v. Calderin · filed 2019-10-23

There are no allegations that any of these supervisory defendants directed or knew that Mullins, Wheeler, or Gonzales were going to conduct a cell search on February 21, 2016 and destroy Pompilius’s property. ... As such, Pompilius fails to state any colorable supervisory liability claims against defendants Baker, Triston, Castro, and Dzurenda.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in one.

Mims 838715 v. Huss · filed 2019-10-24

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because a supervisor oversees an employee who violates someone’s rights.

Christian v. Garman · filed 2019-10-24

Supervisors cannot be held liable under § 1983 on the traditional standard of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires direct participation in misconduct to hold a supervisor liable; a vague allegation that the supervisor knowingly allowed an assault is insufficient.

Williams v. Troutt · filed 2019-10-24

Here, the plaintiff’s vague allegation that Defendant Troutt “knowingly let” Defendant Stockdale assault him does not reflect the type of “direct participation” necessary for liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, responds with deliberate indifference or tacit authorization, and that inaction causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Fletcher v. Foxwell · filed 2019-10-25

Supervisory liability under § 1983 therefore must be supported by evidence that: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor’s response to the knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not make supervisory officials vicariously liable for their subordinates’ acts.

Gilmore v. Sullivan · filed 2019-10-28

It is well established, however, that supervisory officials cannot be held vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts of their subordinates.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because a defendant holds a supervisory position.

Melvin v. Kramer · filed 2019-10-28

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, and supervisory liability does not attach automatically based on Kramer’s role as sheriff.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s violation merely because she approves another officer’s finding of probable cause.

Bishop v. Chicago Police Department, The · filed 2019-10-28

A supervisor is not liable for a subordinate’s violation of § 1983 merely because she approves another officer’s finding of probable cause.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for an alleged constitutional violation when the underlying claim fails.

KWANZAA v. TELL · filed 2019-10-28

First, Plaintiff has failed to state an underlying racial profiling claim against Defendants Tell and Van Syckle and therefore, the attendant ... claim that their supervisors are also liable for that alleged constitutional violation must fail as well.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an affirmative link connects a subordinate’s misconduct to the supervisor’s inaction; a supervisor is not liable solely because of the subordinate’s actions.

Mark v. Hickman · filed 2019-10-29

Although supervisory officials cannot be held liable for the actions of their subordinates based on a theory of respondeat superior, a supervisor like Revelle may be held liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s actions if there is an affirmative link between the subordinate’s misconduct and supervisory inaction.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official knows about unconstitutional conduct and facilitates, approves, condones, or deliberately ignores it.

Young v. McArdle · filed 2019-10-29

Supervisory prison officials may be liable only if they “know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see.”

Section 1983 requires allegations showing how each defendant is individually liable; broad allegations based on supervisory status are insufficient.

Rasuwl v. Hays · filed 2019-10-29

To the extent that Plaintiff may be seeking to hold the named Defendants liable in their supervisory capacity, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any of the named Defendants. These type of broad and generalized claims fails to plausibly show how, or to what extent, Defendants may be held individually liable for violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not permit liability against a supervisor based solely on the supervisor’s position.

(PC) West v. High Desert State Prison · filed 2019-10-30

Plaintiff cannot impose liability on warden Spearman based solely on his position as warden.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because a subordinate violated someone’s rights; the supervisor must participate in or direct the violation, or know of it and fail to prevent it.

McKinley v. Miller · filed 2019-10-30

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and a supervisor may be held liable for the constitutional violations of his subordinates only if he “participated in or directed the violations or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013).

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because subordinates may have violated someone’s rights.

Frazier v. Daniels · filed 2019-10-30

Plaintiff may not proceed against Sheriff Daniels in his role as a supervisor of others who may have violated his rights.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of unconstitutional conduct and facilitates, approves, condones, or turns a blind eye to it.

Godinez v. City Of Chicago · filed 2019-10-30

Because there are genuine issues of material fact about the unconstitutional conduct in this case, there are also genuine issues of material fact about whether Officers Jerome and Corlett can be held liable. A jury will need to weigh the evidence to determine if unconstitutional conduct occurred and if Officers Jerome and Corlett knew about it and facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye to it.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act on information in it.

Fawfaw 511339 v. Tighe · filed 2019-10-30

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a supervisor to allege personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Palmer v. Alameda County · filed 2019-10-31

However, nowhere does he allege Ahern had any personal involvement or a sufficient causal connection between the constitutional violation and any conduct by him, instead bringing his allegations generally against “Defendants.” Palmer also fails to address whether he intends to bring his § 1983 claim against Sheriff Ahern in his opposition. Since it is not clear whether he intends to bring such a claim against him, the Court GRANTS Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss Palmer’s § 1983 claim as to Sheriff Ahern WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a supervisor’s own culpable failure to train, supervise, or control an officer to support individual supervisory liability.

Hess v. Metropolitan Police Dept · filed 2019-10-31

This claim is vague and does not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that the Sheriff is culpable in his own right for failing to train, supervise or control Detective Hawkins.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable merely because of their subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct; liability requires the supervisor’s own actions.

Lineberry v. Alexandria · filed 2019-10-31

Under § 1983, “[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” ... Nor does he allege any basis for holding either Defendant responsible as a supervisor of Sergeant Wilkerson.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in or direct responsibility for the incidents that caused the injury; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Brown v. Deol · filed 2019-11-01

To state a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant was personally involved in or had direct responsibility for incidents that resulted in injury.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because a subordinate violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Bueno v. Chang · filed 2019-11-04

However, there is no respondeat superior liability ... under § 1983, and therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights does not impose liability.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor who knows of a subordinate’s misconduct and facilitates, approves, condones, or turns a blind eye to it.

Harwick v. Foster · filed 2019-11-05

A supervisor can be held liable for a subordinate’s misconduct if he knows about the conduct and facilitates it, approves it, condones it, or turns a blind eye.

A Section 1983 claim against a supervisor must allege a causal link between the supervisor and the alleged constitutional violation.

Gustafson v. City of San Jose · filed 2019-11-05

Further, Plaintiff never connects Mayor Liccardo or City Attorney Lipton to the alleged civil rights violations, as is her obligation.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on supervisors for their employees’ conduct.

Cureton v. Havlin · filed 2019-11-05

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires unconstitutional conduct by a subordinate and a supervisor who at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in it.

Strickland v. Detroit, City of · filed 2019-11-05

To establish supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to Defendants Chief Craig and Commander Bliss6, Plaintiff must show that a subordinate engaged in unconstitutional conduct, and that a supervisor at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the conduct.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or their wrongful conduct had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Cathy v. Kuzmicz · filed 2019-11-06

A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. ... To the extent that plaintiff seeks to hold these defendants liable as supervisors, he has failed to show any personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor participates in a constitutional violation or implements an unconstitutional policy that causes it.

Thomas v. Gryder · filed 2019-11-06

A supervisory official may be held liable under § 1983 “only if (1) he affirmatively participates in the acts that cause the constitutional deprivation, or (2) he implements unconstitutional policies that causally result in the constitutional injury.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s conduct; the supervisor must directly participate in the violation or cause it through a failure to supervise or train.

Lane v. Short · filed 2019-11-06

First, “[a] supervisor may not be held liable under § 1983 for the constitutional violations of a subordinate on a respondeat superior theory.” ... Plaintiff asserts allegations of medical mistreatment against Jail medical staff; however, plaintiff does not assert that Jail Administrator Brenda Short or Sheriff David Marshak had any supervisory or training responsibility over these medical staff members.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor participates in a rights violation, directs it, or knows of and acquiesces in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

DEECK v. SERODY · filed 2019-11-06

“Second, a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.” Id. Deeck makes no allegations that would show a policy and deliberate indifference, or direct participation in the events he describes in his Complaint.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on supervisors solely because of their supervisory roles.

Hall v. Daigle · filed 2019-11-07

Because Hall sought to hold the supervisory officials vicariously liable based solely on their role as supervisors, the district court did not err in dismissing Hall’s § 1983 claims against them in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely for failing to supervise staff.

Daniel v. Lashbrook · filed 2019-11-07

But Defendants cannot be liable for failing to properly supervise their staff, because respondeat superior, or supervisor liability, is not recognized under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor denied a grievance or failed to act on information in it.

Daniels 657826 v. Lamb · filed 2019-11-07

Section 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; a supervisory or hiring role alone is insufficient.

Taylor v. Hansens · filed 2019-11-08

Similarly, to the extent Plaintiff attempts to join Anne Precythe, Director of Corrections, and Alana Boyles, Director, Division of Adult Institutions, in this action for their roles in supervising and hiring employees at the Missouri Department of Corrections, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would show their personal involvement in this matter sufficient to maintain a section 1983 claim against them.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence that the supervisor was personally involved in or responsible for the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Rodriguez v. Malcolm · filed 2015-12-01

The district court properly granted summary judgment for McMorran and Malcolm because Rodriguez failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these defendants were personally involved or responsible for any of the alleged inadequate care.

Section 1983 failure-to-supervise claims generally cannot rest on a single incident.

Scott v. Burl · filed 2016-06-09

As to the grant of summary judgment, upon careful de novo review, see Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2011), we agree with the district court that Scott’s failure-to-supervise claims failed. See Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001-02 (8th Cir. 2010) (discussing supervisor liability); Lenz v. Wade, 490 F.3d 991, 995-96 (8th Cir. 2007) (single incident usually provides insufficient basis upon which to assign supervisor liability).

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for a subordinate’s conduct; the supervisor must have been personally involved or causally connected to the violation.

Wallace v. Pierce County Sheriff's Department · filed 2019-11-12

However, in a § 1983 action, “supervisory officials are not liable for actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.” ... Here, Plaintiff has not alleged Defendant Slohouser was involved in, or had any causal connection to, the treatment provided by Pierce County Jail medical staff. Therefore, even if Defendant Slohouser’s subordinates engaged in unconstitutional conduct, Defendant Slohouser cannot be held liable for the treatment they provided.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because of their position; the supervisor must personally cause or participate in the violation.

Scott v. Hassel · filed 2019-11-12

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a supervisor’s direct participation in the violation or deliberate indifference in supervising or training those who committed it.

Johnson v. Sheriff Department Plymouth · filed 2019-11-12

Such allegations are insufficient to demonstrate that Defendants directly participated in the assault or that they were deliberately indifferent in supervising or training the employees who allegedly committed the assault.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in one.

Brown 723909 v. Vanderwagon · filed 2019-11-12

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor deliberately maintains a policy or custom that directly causes constitutional harm.

WILLIAMS v. NUTTER · filed 2019-11-12

Additionally, a supervisory defendant may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the defendant, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the plaintiff’s] constitutional harm.” Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because an official denied a grievance or failed to act on information in one.

Galeski 829281 v. Trierweiler · filed 2019-11-13

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in one.

Howard 602189 v. Bauman · filed 2019-11-13

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not make supervisory officials vicariously liable for their subordinates’ conduct.

Watts v. Pickett · filed 2019-11-13

His motion should be granted because he was not present when the assault occurred, and supervisory officials cannot be vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s conduct.

Lockhart v. Best · filed 2018-06-15

Plaintiff does not state a claim against the John Doe Medical Director, nor does plaintiff state a claim for the alleged denial of grievances. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (no respondeat superior in § 1983 cases); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007) (ruling against prisoner in a grievance does not, by itself, state a constitutional claim).

A § 1983 claim against a supervisor must plausibly allege personal involvement in the constitutional violation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Rushdan v. R. Gear · filed 2018-12-05

The district court properly dismissed Rushdan’s claims against defendants Singh, Vasquez, Sexton, and Voong because Rushdan failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim against these defendants. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” (citation omitted)); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.”).

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Rothman v. City of New York · filed 2019-08-05

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to supervisor liability alleged under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make government officials liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct solely because they supervise them.

Kennedy v. Curtis · filed 2019-11-14

Government officials, however, may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement; supervisory status alone does not create liability for another person’s conduct.

Kelley v. Hissong · filed 2019-11-14

It is well-settled that a civil rights plaintiff must allege the personal involvement of a defendant to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that liability cannot be based upon a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor based solely on the right to control employees.

Hyman v. Lewis · filed 2019-11-14

A supervisor may not be held liable in his individual capacity under § 1983 based upon a theory of respondeat superior, “or the right to control employees.”

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely because they oversee officials who violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.

Griffin v. Hooks · filed 2019-11-14

Supervisors are not liable in § 1983 actions merely by virtue of their status as supervisors of officials who have violated a prisoner’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a supervisor liability claim when supervisors are notified of a subordinate’s alleged misconduct and fail to respond.

Fox v. Uribe · filed 2019-11-15

Liberally construed, the Court finds Plaintiff states a claim based on supervisor liability against Defendants Kumar and Brizendine based on Defendant Nguyen’s wrongful conduct.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on a supervisor’s position; the defendant must be personally responsible for the alleged deprivation.

Headrick v. Glass · filed 2019-11-15

Plaintiff’s allegations against Glass and Barnes sound in respondeat superior. However, such claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of a supervisory role; the plaintiff must show personal involvement in the violation.

Hayes v. Josey · filed 2019-11-18

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, see Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989), which means that a person is not automatically held responsible simply because he or she is a supervisor of an employee who commits a wrong. ... There is nothing in the complaint that indicates Diaz’s personal knowledge or involvement.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory role; liability requires personal responsibility for the constitutional deprivation.

Ruffin v. Trotter · filed 2019-11-18

Finally, a plaintiff cannot pursue a constitutional claim against a defendant based solely upon his or her supervisory role because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a claim against them requires facts showing personal involvement in the alleged deprivation.

Wilson v. Baldwin · filed 2019-11-18

“Liability under § 1983 is direct rather than vicarious; supervisors are responsible for their own acts but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to ensure that subordinates carry out their tasks correctly.” Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018). ... Other than repeating the same conclusory statement of law for each defendant regarding their “duty to ensure that subordinates were properly trained[,]” Plaintiff does not provide any information suggesting these defendants were personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivations. The fact a defendant is in a position of authority cannot be the sole basis for liability. For these reasons, Count 10 will be dismissed.

Section 1983 makes supervisors liable for their own acts, but not for their subordinates’ acts without personal involvement.

Barnes v. Lawrence · filed 2019-11-18

“[l]iability under § 1983 is direct rather than vicarious; supervisors are responsible for their own acts but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to ensure that subordinates carry out their tasks correctly.” ... But he does not include facts suggesting that Lawrence or Allsup were personally involved in the attack or subsequent segregation placement. Therefore, Count 3 will be dismissed against them.

Section 1983 requires a public employee’s personal responsibility for a constitutional violation; supervisory position alone does not establish liability.

Bennett v. Clark · filed 2019-11-19

Section 1983 limits liability to public employees who are personally responsible for a constitutional violation. ... Because the plaintiff has not alleged that Clarke knew about or was personally involved in what happened to him on June 7, 2017, the court will dismiss Clarke as a defendant.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory role; the defendant must be personally responsible for the constitutional deprivation.

Ruffin v. Cunningham · filed 2019-11-19

Finally, a plaintiff cannot pursue a constitutional claim against a defendant based solely upon his or her supervisory role because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, responds with deliberate indifference or tacit approval, and that response causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Younger v. Green · filed 2019-11-19

Although Younger does not allege that the Defendants personally assaulted him, he has stated a claim for “supervisory liability” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff based solely on supervisory status, failure to act, or respondeat superior.

Rendina v. Seals (PSLC2) · filed 2019-11-19

Moreover, Plaintiff cannot seek to impose liability on Defendant Seals based only on his status as Sheriff, as a court may not impose liability under § 1983 based on a failure to act and/or a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff for subordinates’ actions without the sheriff’s personal involvement.

Stewart v. Quality Correctional Care · filed 2019-11-20

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of the supervisor’s position; the supervisor must be personally involved in or causally connected to the alleged constitutional violation.

Christian v. Russell · filed 2019-11-20

A plaintiff proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot establish that a government official violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights simply by virtue of the official’s role as a supervisor.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff personally liable for jail conditions based solely on the sheriff’s position.

Greer v. Madison County Sheriff's Department · filed 2019-11-20

Instead, he appears to seek to hold the Sheriff personally responsible for the conditions at the CJC based solely on his position. That is not a sufficient basis for imposing liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor for subordinates’ acts; the plaintiff must allege the supervisor’s personal involvement.

A.P. Pew v. J.E. Wetzel, Sec'y. of Corrections · filed 2019-11-21

To the extent Inmate seeks to hold Wetzel vicariously liable for the actions of his subordinates, his claim must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors merely because they employ someone who violated a person’s rights.

Solis v. Indiana Department of Correction · filed 2019-11-21

There is no general respondeat superior liability (an employer’s liability for what the employee does) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because the supervisor employs or oversees someone who violated the plaintiff’s rights; the plaintiff must allege personal involvement.

Hassan v. Correction Officer Jane Doe · filed 2019-11-22

A defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff's rights.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in one.

Furman 760006 v. Traylor · filed 2019-11-25

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct based solely on an official’s position.

Tubbs 292944 v. Washington · filed 2019-11-25

Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; a position of authority alone does not establish liability.

Poulos v. Annucci · filed 2019-11-25

“An individual cannot be held liable for damages under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 ‘merely because he held a high position of authority,’ but can be held liable if he was personally involved in the alleged deprivation.” ... For all of the above reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting that Defendants Annucci and Miller were personally involved in the conduct alleged.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor only when the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or their wrongful conduct had a sufficient causal connection to it.

(PC) Bryant A. Reagor v. Losacco · filed 2019-11-26

A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 only upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a supervisory role; the plaintiff must allege personal involvement in the wrong.

Andrews v. Richman · filed 2019-11-26

It is well established that claims based solely on the theory of respondeat superior or supervisor liability are facially deficient.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s unconstitutional actions.

Hamilton v. Woods · filed 2019-11-26

The doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be used to impose liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a supervisor for a subordinate’s unconstitutional actions.