42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors for tacitly authorizing subordinates’ conduct when the underlying constitutional claims fail.

Prosser v. Nagaldinne · filed 2013-01-18

Likewise, Lombardi, Griffin and Bailey cannot be held liable under § 1983 for tacit authorization because the underlying purported constitutional violation claims against the CMS defendants fail.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s direct involvement in a constitutional violation or responsibility for a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occur; mere knowledge of a subordinate’s discriminatory conduct is insufficient.

Firestone v. Berrios · filed 2013-01-22

Thus, the Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged direct personal involvement. The Supreme Court has plainly rejected the essence of the Plaintiffs allegations against this particular defendant, which is that a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution. If the Plaintiff can allege that Dr. Kendall was directly involved in the constitutional violation or was responsible for the policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occur, then a claim for damages under Section 1983 may lie.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct; general allegations of failure to supervise or investigate are insufficient.

Moniz v. Cox · filed 2013-01-22

Moniz’s general allegations of Cox’s failure to supervise and investigate are insufficient to state a claim under these standards.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based on respondeat superior; each defendant must be personally involved in the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Parkell v. Morgan · filed 2013-01-22

A § 1983 claim cannot be premised upon a theory of respondeat superior. In order to establish liability for deprivation of a constitutional right, a party must show personal involvement by each defendant.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely for being in charge of someone who committed a constitutional violation.

Phillips v. Tiona · filed 2013-01-23

We have said that a plaintiff cannot establish liability under § 1983 merely by showing that the defendant was in charge of others who may have committed a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a supervising physician based on vicarious liability.

Bustetter v. Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc. · filed 2013-01-23

Furthermore, Plaintiffs § 1983 claim against Dunn cannot be based on vicarious liability.

Section 1983 supervisory liability fails when the underlying claims are inadequate.

Verbanik v. Harlow · filed 2013-01-28

However, we agree with the District Court that because Verbanik’s claims upon which the supervisory liability was necessarily based were inadequate, his claim of supervisory liability fails.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations connecting a supervisor’s own conduct to a constitutional violation; conclusory allegations of policy responsibility or ratification are insufficient.

Mateos-Sandoval v. County of Sonoma · filed 2013-01-31

In short, Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations related to Freitas are insufficient to state a claim for individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 supervisory policy or custom claim requires factual allegations identifying the policy or custom, rather than general claims of policy responsibility.

Sheils v. Bucks County Domestic Relations Section · filed 2013-01-31

Not one of Sheils’s allegations describes “exactly” — let alone discernibly — the substance of a DRS policy or custom except in the most conclusory terms.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a supervisor must act directly or knowingly acquiesce in a constitutional violation.

Clayworth v. County of Luzerne · filed 2013-02-05

Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each government official has violated the Constitution through his own individual actions. ... A supervisor can be held liable through direct supervisor action or “actual knowledge and acquiescence” to constitutional violations. ... For essentially the reasons stated by the District Court, Clayworth has failed to allege a claim of supervisory liability against Frank Castano, the Director of CYS.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires factual allegations linking a supervisor’s actions to a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Diaz-Colon v. Toledo-Davila · filed 2013-02-08

Similarly, as the magistrate judge found, because there are no factual allegations linking any subordinate’s violation of constitutional rights to the actions of defendants Colon, Fuentes, Solivan, Tirado, and Toledo, the plaintiffs’ supervisory liability allegations fail to support a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor whose responsibility for a policy caused constitutional harm, if the complaint sufficiently alleges the supervisor’s deliberate indifference.

Keith v. Koerner · filed 2013-02-12

We have held that a plaintiff may establish the first prong with evidence that “the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy” that caused the constitutional harm. Id. at 1199. The question here, then, is whether Ms. Keith has alleged facts sufficient to support such a deliberate indifference violation by Mr. Koerner.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor participates in or directs a subordinate’s constitutional violation, or knows of it and fails to prevent it.

Maxwell v. County of San Diego · filed 2013-02-14

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s constitutional violations “if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989).

A supervisor who merely receives an inmate’s complaints and refers them to others is not personally involved for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Rush v. Fischer · filed 2013-02-14

It is well settled in the Second Circuit that merely receiving letters from an inmate and referring the letters to others does not constitute personal involvement for the purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor sued for a subordinate’s discrimination to have ordered or acquiesced in conduct that led to the discrimination.

Kasper v. County of Bucks · filed 2013-02-15

Because Kasper has brought this claim against LoBianco but has not specifically alleged any acts of direct discrimination by LoBianco herself in this connection, Kasper must further demonstrate that LoBianco’s affirmative conduct, by order or acquiescence, led to discrimination by Cianfichi, her subordinate.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without evidence of prior widespread constitutional abuse or an improper custom or policy that puts a supervisor on notice of a need to act.

Schwartz v. Gwinnett County · filed 2013-02-15

There are no grounds for imposing supervisory liability on the 911 Defendants or Brown because there is no evidence of the existence of prior widespread constitutional abuses or an improper custom or policy that resulted in deliberate indifference by Perry or the 911 operators to put Brown or the 911 Defendants on notice of a need to take action with regard to them.

A supervisor may face a § 1983 claim when her alleged failure to address ongoing abuse has a causal connection to a constitutional deprivation.

Haywood v. Alexander · filed 2013-02-22

Thus, the counterclaim alleges “a causal connection between actions of [Sheriff Alexander (i.e., her failure to address the alleged ‘ongoing and continuous’ sexual assault of Clay County inmates),] and the alleged constitutional deprivation [ (i.e., the violation of Haywood’s and Hall’s Fourth Amendment rights) ].” Ex parte Alabama Dep’t of Youth Servs., 880 So.2d at 403. Therefore, pursuant to this Court’s decision in Ex parte Alabama Department of Youth Services, Sheriff Alexander is not entitled to have Haywood’s and Hall’s Fourth Amendment claims against her dismissed on the basis that she cannot be held vicariously liable for the alleged violations.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional acts solely because they supervise them.

Moss v. United States Secret Service · filed 2013-02-26

Supervisors may not be held liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of their subordinates based solely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires each defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Damone Flowers v. Phelps · filed 2013-02-28

However, liability under § 1983 cannot be premised on the theory of respondeat superior; instead, each individual defendant “„must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing.‟” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)); see also Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

A § 1983 claim against a supervisor requires plausible allegations of conduct that supports supervisory liability.

Padilla v. State of Nevada Dept. of Corrections · filed 2013-03-01

As to the remaining Defendants, Plaintiff’s allegations are inadequate because he has not plausibly alleged conduct for which supervisory officials may be held liable. See Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., No. 10-36152, 2013 WL 674059, at *23 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2013) (listing the circumstances in which supervisors may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor individually liable without direct participation in a constitutional violation or a failure to train or supervise that caused one.

Burlison v. Springfield Public Schools · filed 2013-03-04

The district court correctly concluded that Arnott is not liable under § 1983 in his individual or official capacity. Arnott did not participate in the drug dog procedure at C.M.'s school and he was not at the school for the drug detection walkabout. ... There is also no evidence that Arnott failed to train or supervise the deputies who conducted the drug dog procedure at C.M.'s school.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for their subordinates’ actions.

Walker v. Institutional Div of TDCJ · filed 2013-03-04

Supervisory officials may not be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of their subordinates under any theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 makes a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s unconstitutional acts only when the supervisor’s actions are causally connected to the deprivation.

Powell v. Sheriff, Fulton County Georgia · filed 2013-03-07

A supervisory official is only liable under § 1983 “for the unconstitutional acts of [her] subordinates . . . . if there is a causal connection between [her] actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” West, 496 F.3d at 1328 (original alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory position; personal involvement in the alleged deprivation is required.

Hartmann v. Carroll · filed 2013-03-12

It appears that Pierce and Carroll were named as defendants based upon their supervisory positions and, as discussed above, § 1983 liability cannot lie under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor participates in, directs, or knowingly acquiesces in a subordinate’s violation of rights.

D.M. v. County of Berks · filed 2013-03-14

In order to find a supervisor liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s conduct, a plaintiff must show that the supervisor “participated in violating their rights, or that he directed others to violate them, or that he, as the person in charge ... had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.”

A § 1983 claim against supervisors for an unlawful policy requires a causal connection between the policy and the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

Williams v. Harrington · filed 2013-03-18

Moreover, Williams did not allege that there was a causal connection between the wardens’ policies and any alleged unconstitutional conduct. Williams therefore failed to state a claim for implementation of an unlawful policy.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; supervisory liability may rest on direct participation or on creating or continuing a policy under which the violation occurred.

Butler v. Suffolk County · filed 2013-03-19

Accordingly, the Section 1983 claims asserted against DeMarco, Caracappa, and Meyerricks are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Thompson v. Officer Burach · filed 2013-03-22

The district court properly dismissed Thompson’s claims against the supervisory defendants because Thompson failed to allege facts demonstrating their personal involvement in any constitutional violation or a causal connection between their conduct and any such violation.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement to hold a supervisor individually liable for failure to train or supervise; a mere failure to act is insufficient.

Essex v. County of Livingston · filed 2013-03-25

Indeed, it is an allegation of only a failure to act, which alone is insufficient to support a supervisory-liability claim.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 requires an underlying constitutional deprivation.

Williams v. Community Solutions, Inc. · filed 2013-03-25

Because the alleged conduct is not sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth Amendment, the Complaint does not state a claim upon which any of the State Defendants could be held liable for violating the plaintiffs’ rights under the Eighth Amendment, including under theories of conspiracy, aiding and abetting, or supervisor liability.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a supervisor’s own acts or omissions, including direct participation, condonation, or tacit authorization of unconstitutional conduct.

Sayan-Resto v. Berrios · filed 2013-03-27

As stated above, although there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, a supervisor may be liable for his/her own acts or omissions through “the supervisor’s direct participation in the unconstitutional conduct or through conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit authorization.”

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without the supervisor’s direct participation in, encouragement of, or knowing acquiescence in the unconstitutional conduct.

Ramage v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government · filed 2013-03-28

But even if the SWAT team violated Ramage’s Fourth Amendment rights, she still cannot prove supervisory liability under § 1983 here. ... Aside from the initial decision to bring in the SWAT team, Det. Jackman had no control over the specific actions of the officers. He was not present when they secured the Ramage home and he did not instruct them as to the level of force they should employ. Det. Jackman had no reason to think that they would use excessive force.

Section 1983 requires facts linking a supervisor’s own conduct to a constitutional violation; general allegations of inadequate training or supervision are insufficient.

Wilmot v. Tracey · filed 2013-03-28

Because the Complaint lacks any allegations of fact which would support such a link, Wilmot has not alleged a claim against Gemski and Burns for supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims for supervisory liability or unconstitutional policy administration require an underlying constitutional violation.

Bridges v. Alvin Keller, Jr. · filed 2013-03-29

We further conclude that because Bridges failed to state a claim for a constitutional violation, he also failed to state a claim for supervisory liability or unconstitutional policy administration.

A § 1983 supervisory liability claim requires evidence that subordinates engaged in widespread unconstitutional conduct and that the supervisor knew of and was deliberately indifferent to it.

Gandy v. Robey · filed 2013-04-04

Terry has not identified what evidence, if any, she proffered to show that Sergeant Pittman’s subordinates were engaged in widespread unconstitutional conduct by using lethal force under circumstances where the suspect posed no threat or that he was aware but deliberately indifferent to such conduct. Therefore, no triable issue was created on Terry’s supervisory liability theory.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking supervisory liability to allege the supervisor’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation.

Hershey v. Goldstein · filed 2013-04-09

To support a supervisory liability claim under § 1983 in the Second Circuit, a plaintiff must allege “personal involvement” of a defendant in any alleged constitutional deprivations.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participated in the deprivation or the supervisor’s wrongful conduct had a sufficient causal connection to the constitutional violation.

M.H. v. County of Alameda · filed 2013-04-18

Supervisory liability for violation of constitutional rights exists only if either (1) the supervisor was personally involved in the deprivation or (2) there is a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 liability requires personal participation in unlawful conduct and cannot rest solely on an employer’s supervisory role.

Rodriguez v. Nichols · filed 2013-04-18

Liability, however, requires personal participation in unlawful conduct and “cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor is responsible for a policy that causes constitutional harm and acts with the required state of mind.

Muskrat Ex Rel. J.M. v. Deer Creek Public Schools · filed 2013-04-23

A plaintiff can hold a supervisor liable under § 1983 only if: “(1) the [supervisor] promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1199–1200.

Section 1983 does not allow a failure-to-train or supervision claim against a sheriff or local government when no employee committed a constitutional violation.

Anderson v. Caldwell County Sheriff's Office · filed 2013-04-24

No actionable claim against supervisors or local governments can exist without a constitutional violation committed by an employee. ... Sheriff Jones and the CCSO, therefore, are not liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-train claim against a supervisor only when the failure amounts to deliberate indifference.

Thomas v. Poveda · filed 2013-04-24

However, a supervisory official is not liable under § 1983 for a failure to train unless that ... failure to train amounts to a deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for ratification only when the supervisor consciously approves the subordinate’s decision and its basis.

Price v. City of Sutherlin · filed 2013-05-09

Likewise, a supervisor’s subsequent “ratification” of a subordinate’s conduct can also form the basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; however, the supervisor must actually approve of the subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, and be the product of a “conscious, affirmative” choice to ratify the conduct in question.

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability; a plaintiff must plead that each official violated the Constitution through that official’s own actions.

Clayworth v. County of Luzerne · filed 2013-05-15

Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each government official has violated the Constitution through his own individual actions. ... For essentially the reasons stated by the District Court, Clayworth has failed to allege a claim of supervisory liability against Frank Castano, the Director of CYS.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for their subordinates’ actions.

Estate of Laura Allison v. Wood County, Tex · filed 2013-05-15

“Under [42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”)], supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.”

Section 1983 requires factual allegations of a supervisory defendant’s personal involvement; supervisory position alone does not establish liability.

Parris v. New York State Department Correctional Services · filed 2013-05-23

Moreover, the plaintiff has also failed to allege sufficient personal involvement by the named supervisory defendants to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts linking a supervisor’s own acts or omissions to the alleged constitutional violation.

Brown v. Massachusetts · filed 2013-05-30

Because Brown has failed to set forth any specific facts linking Marks to the alleged constitutional violation, Marks is entitled to summary judgment on Brown’s claim against him under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a supervisor’s actions or omissions caused the constitutional injury; speculation that additional supervision might have prevented it is insufficient.

Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Department · filed 2013-06-05

To establish this, Ms. Schneider would need to show that if Sergeant Baker had known the relevant details, he would have taken specific actions and that these actions would have prevented Officer Coyne’s attack. She has not provided such evidence.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely on the basis of respondeat superior.

Coulter v. Studeny · filed 2013-06-10

The amended complaint properly was dismissed as to probation supervisor Eidenmuller because liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be imposed on a supervisor on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory position.

Mearin v. Swartz · filed 2013-06-12

The mere fact that a defendant is in a supervisory position is insufficient to establish liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not automatically make employers or supervisors liable for constitutional violations committed by their employees.

Kitchens v. Pierce · filed 2013-06-14

In section 1983 actions, employers and supervisors are not automatically liable for constitutional torts committed by their employees.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires allegations that the supervisor personally participated in, directed, or knowingly failed to prevent the alleged constitutional violation.

Brazier v. California Department of Correction & Rehabilitation · filed 2013-06-14

The district court properly dismissed Brazier’s due process claim against defendant Salinas because Brazier failed to allege that defendant Salinas personally participated in, directed, or knowingly failed to prevent the alleged due process violation. See id. (setting forth the standard for liability against supervisory personnel under § 1983).

Section 1983 requires a supervisor sued for failure to train or supervise to have personally failed to train or supervise the subordinate.

Blank v. Eavenson · filed 2013-06-19

A claim for failure to train or supervise still requires “overt personal participation” by the supervisor—in that the supervisor must have overtly failed to train or supervise the subordinate, even if it was the subordinate who directly acted to inflict the constitutional deprivation upon the plaintiff.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor facing a failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise claim to have personally failed to train or supervise the subordinate.

Blank v. Evenson · filed 2013-06-20

A claim for failure to train or supervise still requires “overt personal participation” by the supervisor—in that the supervisor must have overtly failed to train or supervise the subordinate, even if it was the subordinate who directly acted to inflict the constitutional deprivation upon the plaintiff.

Section 1983 requires sufficient facts connecting a supervisor’s conduct to an alleged constitutional violation.

Mattox v. Lea Chrones · filed 2013-06-24

Dismissal of Mattox’s claims against defendant May was proper because Mattox failed to allege sufficient facts in his First Amended Complaint to show a causal connection between May’s conduct and the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ constitutional violations.

Rosa v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2013-06-26

Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 actions, Rosa failed to state a plausible claim for relief against these defendants.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 when widespread abuse puts the supervisor on notice, the supervisor fails to correct it, and that failure causes the injury.

Hawk v. Robinson · filed 2013-06-27

One way to establish supervisory liability in a § 1983 case is to show a causal connection between the injury and a history of widespread abuse that has put the “responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation,” and the supervisor’s failure to do so.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because an officer supervises someone who violated a constitutional right; liability must rest on the supervisor’s own acts or omissions.

Walker v. Jackson · filed 2013-07-08

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 claims. ... Rather, officers may be liable only for their owns acts or omissions.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor for another employee’s conduct.

Medley v. Bruce Lemmon, Julie Stout, Pam Ferguson, Stacey Milner, Sherry White, L.A. Vannatta, Mike Pavese, Virg · filed 2013-07-17

Similarly, there is no such thing as vicarious liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim when a failure to discipline officers is affirmatively linked to a subordinate’s alleged civil rights violation.

Stone v. Caswell · filed 2013-07-17

If ultimately substantiated (and that is a capital “if’), such allegations state a claim because deficient performance of one’s duty to discipline officers for misconduct can contribute to civil rights violations and could be “affirmatively linked” to the misconduct alleged here.

Section 1983 permits liability for a supervisor who did not participate in the wrongful conduct only if the supervisor’s actions have a causal connection to the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Faulkner v. Monroe County Sheriff's Department · filed 2013-07-22

Here, the district court did not err by dismissing Faulkner’s claim against Peryam based on the theory of supervisory liability because Faulkner did not establish a causal connection between Peryam’s actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant holds a supervisory position.

Joe Jimenez, Jr. v. Bexar County Sheriff's Dept, e · filed 2013-07-26

With respect to his claims against the remaining defendants, he alleges only that some of them should be liable to him because they held supervisory positions. This theory is not viable.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official implicitly authorizes, approves, or knowingly acquiesces in the alleged constitutional violation.

Cook v. Caruso · filed 2013-07-29

To find a supervisory official liable, a defendant need not prove personal involvement, but must at least show that the official “implicitly authorized [or] approved” or “knowingly acquiesced in” the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a supervisor’s position, but can impose liability for the supervisor’s own role in a constitutional violation.

Morgan v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice McConnell Unit · filed 2013-07-31

A defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 pursuant to a theory of respondeat superior, but may be held liable for his or her role in a constitutional violation premised on the defendant’s individual conduct as a supervisor, for example, his or her failure to train.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory role; the defendant must be personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing.

Rivers v. SCI Huntingdon Prison · filed 2013-08-02

To the extent that Rivers is asserting a claim against the defendants based on their supervisory role, that claim must be dismissed.

A supervisor can be liable under § 1983 when personally involved in a constitutional violation or when the supervisor’s conduct has a sufficient causal connection to it.

Hunter v. Gomez · filed 2013-08-05

The district court properly dismissed Hunter’s claims against the supervisor defendants because Hunter failed to allege facts demonstrating their personal involvement in the alleged violations or a causal connection between their conduct and the alleged violations.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or when the supervisor’s unlawful conduct had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Lemire v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation · filed 2013-08-07

As noted above, a prison official in a supervisory position may be held liable under § 1983 if he was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection exists between his unlawful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires allegations that the supervisor’s own actions violated the Constitution; general allegations of deliberate indifference do not suffice.

Adkins v. Suba · filed 2013-08-12

Adkins failed to plead adequately a claim of supervisory liability against Suba.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a police supervisor to proceed when allegations of deficient training and deliberate indifference plausibly support supervisory liability.

Molina v. Vidal-Olivo · filed 2013-08-16

These findings allege gross insufficiency, deliberate indifference, and blatant disregard for safety, which plausibly entitle Plaintiffs to relief against Defendant Figueroa-Sancha.

Section 1983 requires a failure-to-train claim against a supervisor to allege personal involvement in the injury, awareness of inadequate training, or a pattern of similar incidents.

Paul v. Allison · filed 2013-08-21

The district court properly dismissed Paul’s Eighth Amendment failure-to-train claim against defendant Allison because Paul failed to allege facts demonstrating that Allison was personally involved in causing his injury, was aware that any training program was inadequate, or that a pattern of similar incidents existed.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in unconstitutional conduct or has a causal connection to the constitutional deprivation.

Hendrix v. Tucker · filed 2013-08-26

Supervisors can be held “liable under . . . § 1983, for the unconstitutional acts of [their] subordinates if [they] personally participated in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct or if there is a causal connection between [their] actions . . . and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).

Section 1983 permits personal liability for a supervisor only if the supervisor causes or participates in a constitutional deprivation.

Williams v. County of Cook · filed 2013-08-28

An individual supervisor may be personally liable under § 1981 or § 1983 only if the supervisor causes or participates in a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on a sheriff when the complaint alleges neither his participation in the unlawful conduct nor notice of it that he failed to act on.

Ruby Garnett v. University Hospital · filed 2013-08-29

Garnett failed to allege that Sheriff Webster participated in the arrest or that he had notice of and failed to correct any unlawful conduct by his officers.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison superintendent solely because of the superintendent’s position.

Washington v. Afify · filed 2013-09-03

Plaintiff asserts claims against defendant Napoli based on a claim of supervisory liability. These claims are premised on Napoli’s role as superintendent, which is not enough to establish his liability.

Section 1983 damages against a supervisor require plausible allegations of personal involvement; supervisory rank alone is insufficient.

Rother v. NYS Department of Corrections & Community Supervision · filed 2013-09-04

Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Fischer knew or should have known about the Individual Defendants’ conduct. ... The § 1983 claim against Fischer, to the extent it seeks damages, is therefore dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor personally liable to show that the supervisor at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Top Flight Entertainment, Ltd. v. Schuette · filed 2013-09-06

“[A] § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.” ... Plaintiffs do not allege that Schuette “implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced” to his subordinate’s conduct, or that Schuette was otherwise personally involved in the events leading to Plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, the claims against Schuette in his individual capacity were properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on a supervisor’s failure to watch an employee.

Shue v. Custis · filed 2013-09-09

But because a § 1983 action can’t be based on such a theory of supervisor liability, this claim cannot succeed either.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a supervisor’s knowledge of and acquiescence in a subordinate’s conduct; the supervisor must personally engage in misconduct.

Martin v. District of Columbia Government · filed 2013-09-16

Because a section 1983 claim cannot be based on mere knowledge and acquiescence to the behavior of a subordinate,3 and because the complaint contains no ... allegation that Mr. Brodsky otherwise engaged in any affirmative misconduct, the Court will dismiss the section 1983 claim against Mr. Brodsky for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely for their subordinates’ conduct.

Eason v. Frye · filed 2013-09-18

Brisolara cannot be held liable for a claim under § 1983 based on the conduct of his subordinates.

Section 1983 supervisory liability fails when it rests on the same allegations that are insufficient to show prison officials knew of a substantial risk of serious harm.

Bettencourt v. Owens · filed 2013-10-02

To that end, Mr. Bettencourt’s claim of supervisory liability against Mr. Owens also failed because it was based on the same insufficient allegations.

Section 1983 generally does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors.

Silva v. Moses · filed 2013-10-02

There is generally no vicarious supervisory liability in a § 1983 case, see Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987), and Silva’s allegations that the Sheriff and the Warden had a policy not to staff every shift with personnel trained in basic first aid are entirely speculative and thus do not save his claim from dismissal, see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on a supervisor’s position.

Jones v. Tyson Foods, Inc. · filed 2013-10-03

Because this Court is bound by the precedent of the United States Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit, the Court finds that Plaintiffs respondeat superior liability theory may not be brought in this § 1983 action.

A Section 1983 claim against a supervisor requires allegations of personal involvement in the constitutional violation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Blacher v. Diaz · filed 2013-10-04

Dismissal of Blacher’s access-to-courts claim was proper because Blacher failed to allege facts demonstrating defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged denial of access to the prison law library or a causal connection between defendant’s conduct and the alleged violations.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires allegations that the supervisor was responsible for a policy causing constitutional harm and acted with the mental state required for that harm.

Rozenberg v. Knight · filed 2013-10-09

Because he failed to allege the required mental state, Mr. Rozenberg has not adequately pleaded supervisory liability under § 1983 or a prima facie case of violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; an official sued in an individual capacity must be personally involved in the alleged violation.

Saavedra v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System · filed 2013-10-09

But it does not allege that any policy promulgated by them caused the violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights, and there is no vicarious liability for supervisors under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional violation or the supervisor’s conduct had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Dixon v. O'Connor · filed 2013-10-10

The district court properly dismissed Dixon’s claims against the supervisory defendants because Dixon failed to allege facts demonstrating their personal involvement in the alleged violations or a causal connection between their conduct and the alleged violations.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged rights violation; denying or mishandling a grievance alone is insufficient.

Sherratt v. Utah Department of Corrections · filed 2013-10-23

Denial of a grievance or failure to properly investigate or process grievances, without any connection to the violation of constitutional rights alleged by the plaintiff, is not sufficient to establish personal participation for purposes of a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits liability for a supervisor who fails to stop another’s unconstitutional act only if the supervisor had a reasonable opportunity to prevent it.

Golden v. Stutleen · filed 2013-10-23

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for failing to stop others from committing unconstitutional acts, but only if that officer had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the misconduct.

Section 1983 allows liability for a supervisor who personally participates in a constitutional violation or creates a policy that causes subordinates to commit one.

Estate of Bearden Ex Rel. Bearden v. Anglin · filed 2013-10-29

As a supervisor, Anglin can be liable for either his personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation or his actions as a supervisor in creating a custom or policy that caused his subordinates to commit the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors, who may be liable only for personal involvement or a sufficient causal connection to the constitutional violation.

Crowley v. Bannister · filed 2013-10-30

“‘Under Section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.’ ... ‘A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is ‘a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’”

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely for their subordinates’ actions.

Brown v. Cain · filed 2013-11-04

To the extent Brown sought to hold Cain, Barr, and Roundtree liable for the actions of their subordinates, the district court is correct that such claims are insufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a corrections secretary liable for prison conditions merely because he receives a prisoner’s complaint letter when he does not supervise the prison’s day-to-day operations.

Williams v. Rick Raemisch · filed 2013-11-06

The secretary did not supervise the day-to-day operations of the prison, so his receipt of Williams’s letter is insufficient to establish liability for deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor who knew of and failed to remedy a subordinate’s alleged constitutional misconduct.

Kanciper v. Lato · filed 2013-11-07

In this case, the Plaintiff contends that Spota knew of, acquiesced, and failed to remedy Lato’s alleged constitutional misconduct. Indeed, Spota does not dispute that he knew of and failed to remedy the allegedly unconstitutional acts. Under these circumstances, the Court denies Spota’s motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claims against him.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for excessive force when the supervisor encouraged, participated in, or knowingly acquiesced in the officers’ conduct.

Jones v. Sandusky County, Ohio · filed 2013-11-12

Regarding the TRT’s use of deadly force, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment to Overmyer because factual questions remain as to his planning, participation, and encouragement of the TRT members on the night of Jones’s death.

A supervisor is liable under Section 1983 only if the supervisor had actual knowledge of subordinates’ actions and failed to take remedial steps.

Word v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2013-11-20

We hold that the district court properly dismissed Word’s claims against MDOC, see Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997) (Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 claims against State and its agencies); and against Smith, absent any allegation that he had actual knowledge of his subordinates’ actions and failed to take remedial steps, see Pool v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr. & Human Res., 883 F.2d 640, 645 (8th Cir. 1989) (requirements for supervisor liability under § 1983).

A supervisor is liable under Section 1983 only if personally involved in a constitutional violation or causally connected to it.

Hubbs v. Penrod · filed 2013-12-09

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hubbs’s claims against defendant Sheriff Penrod in his individual capacity because Hubbs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Penrod was personally involved in any constitutional violation or whether there was a causal connection between his conduct and any such violation.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal participation in or causal connection to the alleged constitutional violation.

Spaulding v. Poitier · filed 2013-12-09

However, even if we liberally construe this as a § 1983 claim, it is still futile because Spaulding did not claim that Captain Mera personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation or that he was somehow causally connected to the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Jenkins v. Caplan · filed 2013-12-10

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Jenkins’s claims against supervisory defendants because Jenkins failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these defendants were personally involved in any constitutional violation or whether there was a causal connection between their conduct and any such violation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts showing a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Seely v. Gibbons · filed 2013-12-10

The district court properly dismissed Seely’s claims against the supervisory defendants because Seely failed to allege facts demonstrating their personal involvement in any constitutional violation or a causal connection between their conduct and any such violation.

Section 1983 requires facts showing supervisory liability; a defendant’s supervisory position alone is insufficient.

Moser v. McGinnis · filed 2013-12-11

The district court properly dismissed Moser’s claim against defendant ... Waugh because Moser sued Waugh solely on the basis of his position as a supervisor, and Moser alleged no facts showing supervisory liability.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a supervisor’s personal involvement in an alleged violation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Rouse v. Warner · filed 2013-12-11

The district court properly dismissed Khalif’s claims against the supervisory defendants because Khalif failed to allege facts demonstrating their personal involvement in the alleged violations or a causal connection between their conduct and the alleged violations.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because a defendant was the police chief; the defendant must have been personally involved in the alleged misconduct.

Carr v. City of Camden · filed 2013-12-13

Although Carr argues that Thomson was the chief of the Camden Police Department at the time of the investigation, § 1983 “liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondent superior.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005).

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to have participated in a constitutional deprivation or have a causal connection to it; respondeat superior alone does not establish liability.

Lilburn J. Nunnelee, II v. Morgan · filed 2013-12-17

We have held that it “is axiomatic, in section 1983 actions, that liability must be based on something more than a theory of respondeat superior.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990). A supervisor must have either participated in the constitutional deprivation, or taken actions linked to the deprivation through a causal connection.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s own conduct constitutes deliberate indifference to risks posed by a subordinate.

Franklin v. Curry · filed 2013-12-23

Nothing in Iqbal suggests that supervisors cannot be held liable for deliberate indifference toward risks posed by their subordinates or that such liability requires a higher mens rea than any other deliberate indifference claim. So long as a supervisor’s own conduct—and not that of his subordinate—constitutes deliberate indifference, his status as a supervisor changes nothing.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Estate of Henson v. Wichita County · filed 2013-12-27

Because Krajca did not violate Henson’s constitutional rights, her conduct cannot serve as a predicate for Bolin’s supervisory liability.

Section 1983 claims against supervisory defendants must allege their personal participation in the claimed violations.

Robinson v. Saxe · filed 2013-12-31

The district court properly dismissed Robinson’s action after giving Robinson two opportunities to amend because his second amended complaint was lengthy and overly detailed, included fifty-three claims, and named more than a dozen supervisory defendants who were not alleged to have personally participated in the alleged violations.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a supervisory defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation or a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the alleged violation.

Christopher Carrea, Jr. v. State of California · filed 2014-01-02

The district court properly dismissed defendants Schwarzenegger, Tilton, and Woodford because Carrea failed to allege facts demonstrating that these defendants were personally involved in any constitutional violation or that there was a causal connection between their conduct and any alleged violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in a violation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Abdul-Latif v. County of Lancaster · filed 2014-01-07

As First Amendment retaliation is a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the standard for supervisory liability is the same as plaintiffs § 1983 Equal Protection claim. There is ample evidence for a jury to conclude that defendant Long participated in plaintiffs termination in violation of plaintiffs First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff vicariously liable for deputies’ violations.

Davis v. Davis · filed 2014-01-09

This type of privity does not exist here because under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978), Sheriff Lamberti cannot, as a matter of law, be vicariously liable for the § 1983 violations of the three deputy sheriffs.

Section 1983 does not automatically make supervisors liable for employees’ constitutional torts; liability requires the supervisor’s own involvement or acquiescence.

Kitchens v. Pierce · filed 2014-01-14

In section 1983 actions, employers and supervisors are not automatically liable for constitutional torts committed by their employees. ... Instead, a plaintiff must prove that the supervisor personally committed the tort, set in motion events which he knew or reasonably should have known would cause the alleged constitutional harm, or ... acquiesced in a constitutional deprivation by subordinates.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a sheriff for the actions of employees.

Money Market Pawn, Inc. v. Boone County Sheriff Duane Wirth · filed 2014-01-17

These claims also fail because there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s affirmative involvement in discrimination; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Mitchell v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 2014-01-17

Section 1983 liability cannot be predicated on respondeat superior; instead, “there must be some affirmative conduct by the supervisor that played a role in the discrimination.”

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s direct involvement in the alleged harm or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and that harm.

Oliva v. Rupert · filed 2014-01-24

Oliva does not allege facts showing either that Rupert was directly involved in the events at issue or that there was a sufficient causal connection between Rupert’s conduct and those events.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires personal involvement in a constitutional violation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Manzanillo v. Jacquez · filed 2014-01-27

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Manzanillo’s supervisory liability claims against defendants Jacquez, Lewis, and McLean because Manzanillo failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether those defendants were personally involved in any constitutional violation or whether there was a causal connection between their conduct and any such violation.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Fletcher v. Baca · filed 2014-01-28

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Fletcher’s claim against defendant Baca because Fletcher failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Baca was personally involved in any constitutional violation or whether there was a causal connection between Baca’s conduct and any such violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for deliberate indifference to a subordinate’s constitutional violations outside the Eighth Amendment context without proof that the supervisor believed harm would result.

Jones v. Han · filed 2014-01-28

Outside the Eighth Amendment context, however, an official can be deliberately indifferent to constitutional violations by her subordinates without holding a subjective belief that their actions would result in constitutional harms.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a subordinate’s constitutional violation when the supervisor’s failure to act is causally connected to the violation.

Pozdol v. City of Miami · filed 2014-01-29

At the time of decedent’s killing, the law clearly established that supervisory officials could be held liable under section 1983 for their subordinates’ constitutional violations where a causal connection exists between the supervisor’s failure to act and the constitutional violations.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a showing of a pervasive pattern or policy condoning constitutional deprivations.

Vanterpool v. Cuccinelli · filed 2014-02-07

However, supervisory liability under section 1983 requires a showing of a pervasive pattern or policy condoning constitutional deprivations. Vanterpool has made no such allegations and, therefore, her argument fails.

Section 1983 does not impose derivative liability on supervisors for subordinates’ constitutional violations absent personal involvement in the underlying acts.

Crawford v. Geiger · filed 2014-02-10

Absent personal involvement in the acts giving rise to a claim of constitutional violation, plaintiffs cannot prevail against the supervisory officers.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability for failure to train without an underlying constitutional violation.

Campbell v. Bastin · filed 2014-02-10

As has been discussed in significant detail, even with the facts construed in the light most favorable to them, Campbell’s Estate has not shown that the actions of Officers Wallace, Smith, or Bastin constituted a constitutional violation. Therefore, in the absence of an underlying constitutional violation, the Police Defendants’ motion for summary judgment shall be granted as to the Estate’s claim for failure to train.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 requires evidence of the supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged violation.

Doe v. Whidden · filed 2014-02-20

We need not decide how the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), affected the standards for establishing supervisory liability as articulated in Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 874 (2d Cir. 1995), as Doe has not adduced sufficient evidence to show personal involvement under either standard.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for constitutional violations committed by their subordinates.

Peralta v. Dillard · filed 2014-03-06

Supervisors aren’t vicariously liable for constitutional violations under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make an individual supervisor liable solely because a subordinate violated someone’s rights.

Pittman v. County of Madison, Illinois · filed 2014-03-10

An individual supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 simply on the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement for individual liability; a prisoner’s letter or written request alone does not establish it.

Young v. Choinski · filed 2014-03-13

The fact that a prisoner sent a letter or written request to a supervisory official does not establish the requisite personal involvement of the supervisory official.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity supervisory claim when a supervisor’s responsibility for a policy plausibly caused a constitutional injury and the supervisor had the required state of mind.

Revilla v. Glanz · filed 2014-03-17

These allegations sufficiently allege facts stating plausible claims by each plaintiff against Sheriff Glanz in his individual capacity for supervisory liability under Dodds and Estelle.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim when an official’s responsibility for continuing an allegedly unlawful policy sufficiently connects the official to the claimed constitutional harm.

Romero v. City of Miami · filed 2014-03-20

Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Romero has adequately alleged personal involvement on the part of the Individual Defendants sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of a supervisory liability § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ conduct.

Potter v. Board of Regents · filed 2014-03-21

The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires each defendant's personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Richards v. Jones · filed 2014-03-24

The Third Circuit has reiterated that a § 1983 claim cannot be premised upon a theory of re-spondeat superior and that in order to establish liability for deprivation of a constitutional right, a party must show personal involvement by each defendant.

A supervisory official is personally liable under § 1983 only if the official encouraged the specific misconduct or directly participated in it.

Smith v. McBurney · filed 2014-03-25

A supervisory official such as Mobley is not liable under § 1983 in his personal capacity unless he “either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because an official supervises others; the official’s own action must cause a constitutional deprivation, directly or through culpable indifference.

Everett H. ex rel. Havey v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary School District · filed 2014-03-26

There is'no supervisory liability under § 1983, however, absent action by the individual that causes a constitutional deprivation either directly, or by acquiescence through culpable indifference.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without the supervisor’s personal involvement in the constitutional violation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Doe v. City of San Diego · filed 2014-03-27

It is undisputed that the Supervisor Defendants did not personally participate in the sexual assault and battery of Jane Doe. Accordingly, to prevent summary judgment, Doe must produce evidence demonstrating a causal connection between the Supervisor Defendants’ conduct and Doe’s injury.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for their subordinates’ constitutional violations; liability requires direct participation or a causal connection to the supervisor’s actions.

Harrison v. Culliver · filed 2014-04-02

“It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” ... Therefore, a plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor liable for constitutional violations must show that the supervisor either participated directly in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.

Supervisory liability under Section 1983 depends on the underlying constitutional violation.

R.H. v. Los Gatos Union School District · filed 2014-04-02

Because supervisory liability is derivative of the underlying Section 1983 claim, whether Plaintiff can prove deliberate indifference on the part of the Defendant coaches will determine the resolution of this claim as well.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for failure to train only when the failure amounts to deliberate indifference and is closely related to the plaintiff’s injury.

Pressley v. Huber · filed 2014-04-04

Here, however, Pressley provided no allegations in his complaint which implicate the type of deliberate indifference required for § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on a sheriff who lacked knowledge of the alleged constitutional violation.

Cacciola v. McFall · filed 2014-04-11

Because Cacciola has no evidence that Cady knew of an Eighth Amendment violation, his theory boils down to supervisor liability, which does not apply to § 1983 suits.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a prison warden who knows an officer has a history of abusing inmates but fails to take reasonable steps to protect them.

Oscar Williams, Jr. v. Turner · filed 2014-04-16

Williams also stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Donat, warden of the prison, by alleging that Do-nat knew of Hanke’s history of violence and propensity to physically abuse inmates but failed to take reasonable steps to protect them from him.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor; liability requires personal participation or a causal connection to a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Hayes v. Secretary, Florida Department of Children and Families · filed 2014-04-18

But Hayes has not shown that the Secretary of DCF could be liable under § 1983 based on vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional acts.

Keith Ex Rel. Estate of Cook v. DeKalb County · filed 2014-04-23

These are incidents of subordinates failing to follow the written policy directives of Sheriff Brown, but, as stated previously, supervisors cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts showing that a subordinate violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Christopher Beaulieu, a/k/a Crystal Beaulieu v. Craig Orlando, et al. · filed 2014-04-30

To establish supervisory liability under § 1983, a plaintiff first must allege facts that show the subordinate of the supervisor violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisory officials.

Dwayne Valentine v. Dir, TDCJ Corrtl Inst Div, et · filed 2014-04-30

Supervisory officials are not subject to respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires proof that the supervisor actually or constructively knew of a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury from subordinates.

Wilkins v. Montgomery · filed 2014-05-05

First, there is no evidence that Appellee had actual or constructive knowledge that Harris and Thompson, the charge nurse and mental health technician, were engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to Davis.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim when a supervisor’s failure to respond to specific information about an untreated serious medical need plausibly contributes to continued inadequate care.

Kelly v. Dowaliby · filed 2014-05-07

The facts alleged, if taken as true with all reasonable inferences construed in Kelly’s favor, state a plausible claim that Dowaliby’s failure to respond to specific information regarding Kelly’s untreated seizure disorder manifested deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm, and further, led to the medical staff’s continuing failure to treat Kelly. Accordingly, the motion to amend is granted to add a section 1983 claim of supervisory liability as to Dowaliby, relating to his conduct with respect to the failure to treat Kelly’s seizure disorder at the SCHC.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if the supervisor personally participated in the unconstitutional conduct or a causal connection links the supervisor’s actions to the constitutional deprivation.

Jonie Key v. Lundy · filed 2014-05-07

To establish supervisory liability under § 1983 for a constitutional violation, as Key attempts to do here, she must allege that the supervisor-defendant “personally participated in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or that there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Franklin, 738 F.3d at 1249 (emphasis added).

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official is responsible for a policy that causes a constitutional violation and acts with the required state of mind.

Bame v. Iron County · filed 2014-05-13

A government official can be held liable (in a § 1983 suit) for a constitutional violation under a theory of supervisory liability but only if the plaintiff shows: “(1) the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires the supervisor’s own acts or omissions; a position of authority alone is insufficient.

Cabrera-Berrios v. Pedrogo · filed 2014-05-27

Although liability pursuant to section 1983 “cannot rest solely on a defendant’s position of authority,” plaintiffs’ subsequent reference to the Department of Justice’s 2011 report on the PRPD shifts the focus of their claims away from the Superintendent position itself to the potential acts and/or omissions of the individuals who occupied that position of authority.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory role.

Parkell v. Morgan · filed 2014-06-06

It is well established that supervisory liability cannot be imposed under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 requires a causal relation between a supervisor’s policies and employees’ allegedly unlawful conduct to hold the supervisor liable.

Riggins v. Rick Beseler, Jr. · filed 2014-06-12

To hold Beseler liable as a supervisor, Riggins had to establish a causal relation between Beseler’s official policies and the allegedly unlawful conduct of his employees.

Section 1983 official-capacity and failure-to-supervise claims require an underlying constitutional violation.

Jackson Ex Rel. Estate of Tucker v. Buckman · filed 2014-06-27

Absent an underlying constitutional violation, Tucker’s official-capacity and failure-to-supervise claims against Holladay and Morgan necessarily fail.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in a constitutional violation or directs unlawful conduct, or knows it will occur and fails to stop it.

Hatcher Ex Rel. Hatcher v. Fusco · filed 2014-06-30

“[S]upervisors are liable under § 1983 ‘either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional violation.’” Keating, 598 F.3d at 762 (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003)). ... The allegations also support a reasonable inference that Fusco either directed that Hatcher be disciplined or actually knew that she would be and failed to intervene.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence connecting the defendants to the alleged injury.

Williams v. Traquina · filed 2014-07-02

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants because Williams failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants caused any delay in scheduling his back surgery.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior.

Ramirez-Lluveras v. Rivera-Merced · filed 2014-07-14

Additionally, the tort theory of respondeat superior does not allow imposition of supervisory liability under § 1983.