42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for an employee’s conduct; the supervisor must encourage or participate in a particular unconstitutional act.

Barnett v. Mark Luttrell, Jr. · filed 2011-03-10

However, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and Barnett does not allege that Luttrell encouraged or participated in any particular unconstitutional action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because of their position; a complaint must state a basis for supervisory liability.

Bell v. Kansas City Police Department · filed 2011-03-22

We affirm the preservice dismissal of the claims against the KCPD chief and individual commissioners, see Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1128 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (standard of review), because respondeat superior is inapplicable to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Vaughn v. Greene Cnty., 438 F.3d 845, 851 (8th Cir. 2006), and Bell’s allegations did not state claims of supervisory liability, see Pool v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr. & Human Res., 883 F.2d 640, 645 (8th Cir. 1989) (discussing supervisory liability).

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only for an official’s own misconduct.

Carnaby v. City of Houston · filed 2011-03-22

Under § 1983, however, a government official can be held liable only for his own misconduct. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Beyond his own conduct, the extent of his liability as a supervisor is similar to that of a municipality that implements an unconstitutional policy. There is no evidence that Washington established any sort of policy during this one incident, so summary judgment on this claim was proper.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s action or inaction is affirmatively linked to a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Howe v. Town of North Andover · filed 2011-03-23

Defendant Downer’s motion will be denied with respect to Count II which alleges supervisory liability under § 1983. As a supervisor, Downer may be held liable if his action or inaction is affirmatively linked to the behavior of a subordinate that resulted in a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 holds a government official liable only for the official’s own misconduct.

Carnaby v. City of Houston · filed 2011-03-23

Under § 1983, however, a government official can be held liable only for his own misconduct.

Section 1983 permits liability for municipal officials who know of constitutional violations by subordinates and fail to act.

Manzer v. TOWN OF ANSON · filed 2011-03-23

Accordingly, by 2008, the law was clear that municipal officials could be liable under § 1983 for failing to act against known constitutional violations.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on an official’s failure to act; the complaint must allege willful ignorance of or active involvement in the constitutional deprivation.

Irshad Learning Center v. County of DuPage · filed 2011-03-28

In any event, Plaintiffs allegation that Schillerstrom “failed to exercise his authority” to curtail the constitutional violations does not appear to state a claim. ... Plaintiff does not plead any specific facts as to Schillerstrom’s conduct that suggest either willful ignorance of the alleged constitutional deprivation or an active role in it. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Schillerstrom is granted.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation to establish liability.

Francis v. Carroll · filed 2011-03-29

Hence, it appears that, under a supervisory theory of liability, and even in light of Iqbal, personal involvement by a defendant remains the touchstone for establishing liability for the violation of a plaintiffs constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory position; the plaintiff must plead the defendant’s personal involvement.

DuPREE v. Doe · filed 2011-03-29

It may be that Williams and Phelps are named as defendants based upon their supervisory positions. Even if so, DuPree cannot prevail against them under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without an underlying federal statutory violation.

Chambliss v. Buckner · filed 2011-03-29

To the extent that Mr. Chambliss seeks to hold any Defendant liable on a § 1983 supervisory theory, that theory fails for the same reasons previously enunciated. There can be no supervisory liability if there is no underlying federal statutory violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in a constitutional violation or is causally connected to a subordinate’s violation.

American Federation of Labor v. City of Miami · filed 2011-04-05

A supervisor can be held liable for the actions of his subordinates under § 1983 if he personally participates in the act that causes the constitutional violation or where there is a causal connection between his actions and the constitutional violation that his subordinates commit.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged misconduct; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Flournoy v. Schomig · filed 2011-04-15

But nothing in the record suggests that the warden condoned of or knew of the alleged practice. The correctional officer’s statement does not connect Schomig personally to the pepper spraying, nor does it suffice to impute liability to the warden merely because of his supervisory role.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged misconduct; supervisory position alone does not establish liability.

Dawn Ball v. Oden · filed 2011-04-28

However, “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Thus, Ball’s claims against these defendants are not viable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make prison officials liable solely because they supervise subordinates who allegedly violated an inmate’s rights.

Mosley v. Anderson · filed 2011-05-13

To the extent that Mosley alleges that, because of their supervisory positions, Anderson and Scott are responsible for their subordinates, this claim is without merit.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor for another person’s misconduct unless the supervisor was personally involved.

Goodman v. McVey · filed 2011-05-23

In addition, Goodman’s claims against McVey under § 1983 cannot be sustained on the basis of respondeat superior; rather, she is liable only for her own misconduct.

Section 1983 applies the Colon personal involvement standard to supervisory officials in excessive force claims.

Plair v. City of New York · filed 2011-05-31

In this action Colon remains the standard for establishing personal involvement by supervisory officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a basis for holding supervisory officials personally responsible for a constitutional violation; their supervisory positions alone do not establish liability.

Barrett v. MS Department of Corrrections, et · filed 2011-06-03

Further, Barrett has not established that either Epps or King, who occupied non-medical supervisory positions, was involved in determining the medical treatment that he received or otherwise interceded in his medical care; Barrett has not alleged or shown that King or Epps was personally involved in delaying or denying his medical care or that they played a role in treating him or in deciding a course of treatment for him.

Section 1983 permits liability for a supervisor’s subordinates only when the supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional violation or had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Lacey v. Maricopa County · filed 2011-06-09

Under § 1983, Arpaio can be liable for the actions of his subordinates only if (1) he was personally involved in a constitutional violation, or (2) there was a “sufficient causal connection” between his wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only when the supervisor directly participates in or encourages the specific misconduct.

ESTATE OF FAHNER EX REL. FAHNER v. County of Wayne · filed 2011-06-22

Although it is true that an individual supervisor may still be liable in her individual capacity under a failure-to-train theory, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that the supervisor Defendants were directly involved or encouraged the specific misconduct at issue. ... Because Plaintiff has failed to make such allegations, Plaintiffs claims against the supervisor Defendants fails as a matter of law.

A conclusory allegation that a supervisor directed a deficient procedure is insufficient to establish supervisory liability under § 1983.

Nowell v. Reilly · filed 2011-06-22

Nowell‟s conclusory allegation that there was a deficient “procedure, applied under the direction of the Appellee Reilly, the prison superintendent” is insufficient to raise a question of fact and is not enough to establish supervisory liability under § 1983.

Supervisory authority alone does not establish liability under § 1983; the defendant must be personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Styles v. Goord · filed 2011-06-23

The mere fact that a defendant possesses supervisory authority is insufficient to demonstrate liability for failure to supervise under § 1983.

A supervisor’s mere affirmance of a disciplinary ruling does not establish personal involvement under § 1983, but allegations that the supervisor modified and later reversed the ruling can suffice at the pleading stage.

Collins v. Ferguson · filed 2011-06-23

In general, the mere fact that a supervisory official affirmed the result of a disciplinary hearing will not suffice to establish that official’s personal involvement in an alleged constitutional violation, which is a prerequisite to liability under § 1983. ... As with plaintiffs claims against Ferguson, then, I conclude that plaintiff has alleged enough to go forward with his claim against Fischer, at least for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because the supervisor oversaw state actors who violated constitutional rights; the plaintiff must establish the supervisor’s deliberate, intentional act.

Martinez v. DeCesaro · filed 2011-06-24

A plaintiff cannot establish liability under § 1983 merely by “‘show[ing] the defendant was in charge of other state actors who actually committed the [constitutional] violation. Instead, . . . the plaintiff must establish a deliberate, intentional act by the supervisor to violate constitutional rights.’” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006)).

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a sheriff for jail staff’s conduct.

MacMillan v. Roddenberry · filed 2011-06-28

To begin, MacMillan does not allege that Sheriff Borders personally participated in MacMillan’s incarceration, and there is no vicarious liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not hold supervisors liable for their subordinates’ conduct solely because they supervise them.

Leavitt v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc. · filed 2011-06-29

Nor can supervisory officials, like Tritch, be held liable for the conduct of their subordinates solely under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a triable showing that the supervisor was personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

Robinson v. Vega · filed 2011-06-30

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Robinson’s claims against defendant Kolender because Robinson failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether Kolender was personally involved in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity supervisory claim to proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges the supervisor had actual knowledge and acquiesced in a subordinate’s unconstitutional actions.

Schor v. NORTH BRADDOCK BOROUGH · filed 2011-07-12

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim against Chief Bazzone in his individual capacity because Chief Bazzone may have had actual knowledge and acquiescence in Officer Wittlinger’s alleged unconstitutional actions.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when officials implement a deficient policy that causes a constitutional violation.

Gregge v. California Department of Corrections · filed 2011-07-22

Gregge’s complaint, liberally construed, did not seek to allege a respondeat superior theory of liability. Rather, Gregge alleged that defendants implemented a policy that resulted in the denial of his constitutional rights. See Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (“Supervisory liability exists even without overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A was premature, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in an alleged constitutional violation for liability to attach.

Festa v. Jordan · filed 2011-07-25

There is no respondeat superior liability in the § 1983 context; a defendant must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs for liability to attach.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor for a subordinate’s conduct without the supervisor’s own active involvement in unconstitutional behavior.

Siggers v. Campbell · filed 2011-07-27

Furthermore, Jackson’s alleged “approval” of Campbell’s two Notices does not qualify as “active[] engage[ment] in unconstitutional behavior” because even though it may show that Jackson applied P.D. 04.07.112 incorrectly, it certainly does not show that he did so to retaliate against Siggers, which is the key to the constitutional violation asserted by Siggers. We therefore reject this argument.

Supervisors cannot be held liable under § 1983 for inadequate training or policies when those policies cause no violation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Barber v. Quarterman · filed 2011-08-03

According to Barber, the director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and the warden of the prison should be held liable for failing to properly train the other officials on the procedures to follow when a prisoner reports that his safety is in danger and for implementing unconstitutional policies that were inadequate to protect prisoners. However, because the policies have resulted in no violation of Barber’s rights, he cannot succeed.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement by each defendant; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Lane v. Phelps · filed 2011-08-04

The Third Circuit has reiterated that a § 1983 claim cannot be premised upon a theory of respondeat superior and, that in order to establish liability for deprivation of a constitutional right, a party must show personal involvement by each defendant. ... Plaintiff provides no specific facts how defendants violated his constitutional rights, that they expressly directed the deprivation of his constitutional rights, or that they created policies wherein subordinates had no discretion in applying them in a fashion other than the one which actually produced the alleged deprivation.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only when the supervisor at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Fowler v. Burns · filed 2011-08-04

Section 1983 liability does not attach to a supervisor unless he “at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.”

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based on respondeat superior without proof of the supervisor’s personal involvement.

Dillingham v. Millsaps · filed 2011-08-10

Supervisory liability cannot be imposed in a Section 1983 action based on the theory of respondeat superior without proof of personal involvement.

Section 1983 permits liability for a supervisor’s own neglect in supervising subordinates, but not liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Ammons v. Washington Department of Social & Health Services · filed 2011-08-17

In so holding, we hold LaFond accountable with respect to her own failure to manage and supervise her employees. We do not, as the dissent suggests, create § 1983 liability on the basis of respondeat superior. It is well established that a supervisor may be held liable for a constitutional rights violation based on his or her own neglect in failing to properly superintend his or her subordinate’s duties.

A supervisor’s presence at the scene does not establish liability under § 1983 for a subordinate’s excessive force without actual or constructive knowledge of the risk.

Housley v. Holquist · filed 2011-08-30

Although she was present at the residence, Sergeant Morgan is also entitled to summary judgment. Even construing the facts in the light most favorable to the Housleys, there is no evidence Sergeant Morgan had actual or constructive knowledge that her subordinates would use excessive force upon entering the home.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s unconstitutional acts solely because of their supervisory role.

German v. Broward County Sheriff's Office · filed 2011-08-31

First, “supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 1983 permits a claim against an official who implements a policy that causes a constitutional violation, even if the official was not personally involved in the plaintiff’s treatment.

Marquez v. Quarterman · filed 2011-09-07

The magistrate judge erroneously concluded that Marquez was suing Thaler solely because of his supervisory role, ignoring the fact that Thaler may be held liable if he implemented a policy that itself causes a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a subordinate’s constitutional violation; negligent conduct alone is insufficient.

Estate of Wilbert Lee Henson v. Cou · filed 2011-09-07

The operative principle, then, is that a supervisor cannot be liable under Section 1983 unless a subordinate employee has violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights — not just that a subordinate has acted negligently.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s acts solely under respondeat superior.

Bloom v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2011-09-16

As noted above, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so as to make supervisors liable for the acts of subordinates or employees and the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims against Sgt. DiBernardo in Counts 1, 4, and 5 to the extent that they seek to impose vicarious liability on her for Officer Peacock’s conduct.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability; a defendant is liable only for personal acts or decisions.

Vinning-El v. Evans · filed 2011-09-16

Section 1983 creates liability only for a defendant’s personal acts or decisions.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on reviewing a grievance after the alleged deprivation.

Abraham v. Danberg · filed 2011-09-19

While the evidence of record indicates that plaintiff wrote to Danberg and Phelps, he did so after the events in question. It is well established that participation in the after-the-fact review of a grievance is not enough to establish personal involvement.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; a high position of authority alone does not establish liability.

Chambers v. North Rockland Central School District · filed 2011-09-27

Under § 1983, a supervisor “cannot be held liable for damages ... merely because he held a high position of authority, but can be held liable if he was personally involved in the alleged deprivation.” Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 127 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). ... Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish supervisory liability on the part of either Watkins or Monahan.

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability when the supervisor personally participates in a constitutional deprivation or has a sufficient causal connection to it.

Jones v. HOUSTON COMMUNITY COLLEGE SYSTEM · filed 2011-09-30

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if he is personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or if there is “a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for the actions of officers they employ.

Bailey v. Hughes · filed 2011-09-30

To the extent that Bailey’s claims against the supervisory defendants are an attempt to hold them vicariously liable for the actions of the corrections officers, Bailey’s claims fail as a matter of law. Neither the express language of § 1983 nor the holdings of the United States Supreme Court support liability on this basis.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s own acts or omissions are affirmatively linked to a subordinate’s constitutional violation through deliberate indifference.

Ramirez-Lluveras v. Pagan-Cruz · filed 2011-10-03

Plaintiffs have adequately pled that each of the Supervisory Defendants’ conduct was linked to each of the Field Officers’ alleged unconstitutional conduct under a theory of deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of and acquiesces in subordinates’ rights violations; grievances and a failure to correct the practice can support that finding.

Diaz v. Palakovich · filed 2011-10-14

Here, a reasonable factfinder could find that these defendants had knowledge of the violations through Diaz’s grievances and acquiesced in the violations by failing to address a practice of opening legal mail outside of an inmate’s presence.

Section 1983 permits liability against a supervisor for the supervisor’s own unconstitutional conduct, but does not impose liability based solely on a subordinate’s actions.

Hall v. Millicent Warren · filed 2011-10-18

Although we agree that liability may not be imputed to a supervisor based entirely upon the actions of a subordinate, see, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York City , 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), “this does not automatically mean that a supervisor can never incur liability under § 1983,” Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 81 (6th Cir. 1995). Supervisors can be held liable for their own “active unconstitutional conduct . . . rather than on their supervision of others engaging in unconstitutional conduct.” Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 730 (6th Cir. 2006).

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a claim against an official in a personal capacity requires that official’s own involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Brown v. Wilhelm · filed 2011-10-19

Liability under § 1983, however, cannot be based on a theory, as pleaded here, of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely through respondeat superior; a claim needs facts connecting the supervisor to the alleged wrong.

Bey v. Stumpf · filed 2011-10-17

Thus, claims against the supervisors are subject to dismissal to the degree they are based solely on the respondeat superior theory. See Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir.2003) (because respondeat superior or vicarious liability cannot be a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a corporation — even if it is operation under contract with the state— cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees and agents under those theories).

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s active unconstitutional conduct; supervisory authority alone does not establish liability.

Flagg Ex Rel. J. B. v. City of Detroit · filed 2011-11-01

In particular, “liability under § 1983 must be based on active unconstitutional behavior,” and cannot rest solely upon an individual’s supervisory role or “the right to control employees.”

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation for liability.

Tillman v. Burge · filed 2011-11-02

With respect to his due process claims, Plaintiff has not alleged that Daley or Martin were personally involved in his torture, an allegation necessary to establish their liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a supervisor’s responsibility for a policy that caused the constitutional harm and the state of mind required for the underlying violation.

Brown v. Montoya · filed 2011-11-08

Instead, to establish supervisory liability, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1199.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor who did not personally participate in a constitutional violation only if the supervisor’s actions have a causal connection to the violation.

Abella v. Simon · filed 2011-11-28

There are no allegations in the Amended Complaint that Director Parker personally participated in the harassment, so he may only be held liable if there is a causal connection between his alleged actions and the constitutional violations.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a failure to investigate an alleged use of force that occurred before the investigation.

Lavender v. City of Roanoke Sheriff's Office · filed 2011-11-30

First, though Johnson’s alleged failure to investigate the alleged excessive use of force against Lavender possibly might serve as grist should another excessive force claim arise in the future, it could not have resulted in the constitutional deprivation Lavender alleges — the antecedent excessive use of force — and consequently is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against supervisory officials in their individual capacities based solely on respondeat superior.

Dickerson v. Graterford · filed 2011-12-01

With regard to the supervisory prison officials who were sued in their individual capacities, the District Court correctly concluded that Dickerson failed to state a claim for relief under a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates' omissions.

Feliciano-Hernandez v. Pereira-Castillo · filed 2011-12-09

Regardless of any purported duty on the "directors," the named former-Secretary defendants cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the supposed omissions of their subordinates.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only when a defendant knows of alleged wrongdoing and facilitates, approves, or turns a blind eye to it.

Rones v. Schrubbe · filed 2011-12-09

But as the district court noted, a defendant is liable in a supervisory capacity under § 1983 only if he knows about alleged wrongdoing and facilitated, approved, or turned a blind eye to it.

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability for supervisors; a plaintiff must plead that each official violated the Constitution through the official’s own actions.

Giammatteo v. Newton · filed 2011-12-16

As an initial matter, we note that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits,” Giammatteo was required to plead that “each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1977). Giammatteo fails to plead any specific conduct by defendants Peck or Galvin from which to infer that they were negligent or reckless in managing their subordinates, that they knew or were informed of any unconstitutional conduct and failed to act, or that polices they instituted enabled such conduct.

Section 1983 allows a supervisor to be held individually liable for her own actions or omissions in a constitutional violation.

Wagner v. Jones · filed 2011-12-28

Wagner’s claim against Dean Jones is based on Dean Jones’s own actions and omissions during the hiring process. Wagner has alleged facts establishing that even though Dean Jones was on notice that Wagner’s political beliefs and associations may have impermissibly affected the faculty’s hiring recommendation, she still refused to hire Wagner for any position. Accordingly, Dean Jones’s position as a supervisor does not shield her from § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors, and a supervisor cannot be liable for a policy that causes no constitutional violation.

Webb v. Arbuckle · filed 2011-12-29

“A supervisory officer cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.” Thibodeaux v. Arceneaux, 768 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1985). ... Because there was no constitutional violation, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing the claims against Sheriff Arbuckle.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on prison officials for subordinate misconduct and requires a causal link and deliberate indifference for supervisory liability.

Walker v. Nunn · filed 2011-12-30

The defendants may not be held vicariously liable for the misconduct of their subordinates. See Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987). To hold any of the defendants liable based on a supervisory role over the prison staff, Walker must show that (1) the defendant failed to supervise or to train the prison staff member; (2) a causal link exists between that failure and the violation of Walker’s rights; and (3) that failure amounts to deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a supervisor’s direct participation in an arrest or failure to adequately train, supervise, or discipline before the supervisor can be held liable for it.

Tracy v. Neuberger · filed 2012-01-06

Absent some evidence of direct participation in the arrest, or of failure to adequately train, supervise, or discipline, a supervisor simply cannot be held liable for an arrest under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability for a supervisory official only when the official was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Shehata v. Cate · filed 2012-01-09

The district court properly dismissed Shehata’s claims against defendants Cate, Poulos, Hartley, Farooq and Chapnick because Shehata failed to allege that they were personally involved in any alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking supervisor liability to show a failure to train or supervise, a link to the rights violation, and deliberate indifference.

Batiste Ex Rel. Pierre v. Theriot · filed 2012-01-10

In order to hold a supervisor liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) the supervisor failed to train or supervise, (2) there is a link between the failure and the violation of the plaintiff’s rights, and (3) the failure amounts to deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires proof that the subordinate officers violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Ramirez-Lluveras v. Pagan-Cruz · filed 2012-01-12

Under both theories, to establish liability against the field officers and the supervisory officers, the plaintiffs must establish that the field officers violated Caceres’ constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor who personally participates in a constitutional deprivation or whose conduct has a sufficient causal connection to it.

Schwartz v. Lassen County ex rel. Lassen County Jail · filed 2012-01-19

A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the Constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the Constitutional violation. ... In this case, based on two of the aforementioned theories, Plaintiffs complaint contains sufficient factual allegations to establish a causal connection between Mineau’s allegedly wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation such that it survives Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor denied grievances; unsupported, conclusory allegations of inadequate training or supervision are insufficient.

Taylor v. Fischer · filed 2012-01-19

The mere fact that plaintiffs grievances over these matters were denied is not enough to establish those supervisory defendants’ liability, and his allegation that they failed to adequately train or supervise their subordinates is wholly conclusory and unsupported by evidence in the record.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in a constitutional violation or a causal connection links the supervisor’s actions to the deprivation.

McCreary v. Brevard County Sheriff Jack Parker · filed 2012-01-25

Supervisory liability under § 1983 occurs when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for failure to train or supervise someone who works for a different state entity.

Mataele v. Nunn · filed 2012-01-25

The district court properly dismissed Mataele’s claims against defendant Nunn for failure to train and supervise defendant Allen-Prescott because Nunn and Allen-Prescott worked for different state entities.

Section 1983 claims against supervisory officials fail when the plaintiff cannot show an underlying constitutional violation.

Brumley v. Livingston · filed 2012-02-06

Because Brumley fails to demonstrate a constitutional violation related to his medical claims, his claims against the supervisory officials fail as well.

Section 1983 requires a failure-to-train claim against an individual supervisor to plausibly allege that the supervisor’s personal involvement caused a constitutional violation and that the supervisor acted with the required intent.

Kemp v. Lawyer · filed 2012-02-08

I conclude that the factual allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint, even when viewed as true, are insufficient to establish that Defendant Turano’s personal involvement caused the underlying constitutional violations and that his intent, in so doing, was to deliberately and intentionally fail to implement policies and train CSP officers in order to violate Jason’s legal rights. As such, Plaintiffs’ complaint does not establish a plausible claim for individual supervisory liability under § 1983 against Defendant Turano for failure to train.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity supervisory liability when a supervisor’s inadequate training, supervision, or discipline substantially causes a constitutional injury, even without direct participation.

Morales v. City of Delano · filed 2012-02-14

This assertion completely misses the point of supervisory liability which places liability on supervisors in their individual capacity where it can be shown that the supervisor’s action were a substantial cause of the constitutional harm because the officials who actually performed the acts leading to the harm were inadequately trained, supervised or disciplined. Personal participation in the acts that directly lead to the constitutional harm are not a necessary element of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely under a theory of respondeat superior; personal involvement is required.

Bobbie Sims, Jr. v. Piazza · filed 2012-02-22

First, although Sims contests the matter strongly in his brief, the District Court was correct to dismiss defendant Beard for lack of personal involvement. Liability under § 1983 cannot be premised on the theory of respondeat superior that Sims relied on in his allegations.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in an alleged constitutional deprivation before damages can be awarded against that supervisor.

Roland v. Smith · filed 2012-02-22

Insofar as the Complaint may be construed to allege that the Moving Defendants are liable for Roland’s alleged beating in a supervisory capacity, the Court notes that a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation is a prerequisite to an award of damages.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely for denying a prisoner’s institutional grievances.

Harris v. Caruso · filed 2012-02-29

A denial of a prisoner’s institutional grievances is insufficient to support a claim of supervisory liability in the §1983 context.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Brown v. Ridgway · filed 2012-02-29

Supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 on the basis of respondent superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires active unconstitutional behavior; a supervisor’s mere failure to act is insufficient.

Bright v. Thompson · filed 2012-03-13

“[s]upervisory liability under § 1983 cannot be based upon a mere failure to act but must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior.”

Section 1983 requires factual allegations affirmatively linking a supervisor’s action or inaction to a subordinate’s alleged constitutional violation.

Stewart v. Fleming · filed 2012-03-13

Thus, because Stewart offers no factual allegations to show that Chief Fleming’s action or inaction was affirmatively linked to the allegedly constitutionally improper behavior of those he supervised, I will dismiss all the federal claims.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s constitutional violation when the supervisor directs it.

Hoffman v. Lee · filed 2012-04-02

On the contrary, a supervisor is liable for the acts of his subordinates when he directs the violation.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory defendant’s personal participation in unconstitutional conduct or an affirmative link to a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Allen v. Reynolds · filed 2012-04-06

The district court concluded that Mr. Allen failed to state a claim against Warden Leyba and Major Filer because the complaint did not allege their personal participation in unconstitutional conduct or an affirmative link to a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. ... Mr. Allen makes the same argument again on appeal. We agree with the district court that it lacks merit.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional acts solely because of their supervisory role.

Moss v. United States Secret Service · filed 2012-04-09

Supervisors may not be held lia- ble under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of their subordinates based solely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor’s conduct and a constitutional violation; rank and presence alone do not establish supervisory liability.

Howe v. Town of North Andover · filed 2012-04-11

A supervising police officer is not vicariously liable for the conduct of his subordinate officers. For supervisory liability to attach under § 1983, in addition to establishing a constitutional deprivation, the plaintiff must show an affirmative link between the conduct of the supervisor and the constitutional violation, such as “supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference.” ... The mere presence of Chief Stanley and Lieutenant Carney in the checkpoint area along with their status as supervising officers, without more, is too tenuous a connection to give rise to supervisory liability.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor who personally participates in unconstitutional misconduct or is causally connected to a policy of deliberate indifference.

Woodburn v. State of Florida Department of Children & Family Services · filed 2012-04-17

Therefore, Lanaza has not only sufficiently alleged Allegra’s personal participation in unconstitutional misconduct by Our Kids (as set forth above), but she has also alleged that a specific policy of Our Kids existed that resulted in deliberate indifference to Lanaza’s rights, sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against Allegra based on a causal connection to that policy.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor for a subordinate’s conduct only if the supervisor personally participated or the supervisor’s actions had a causal connection to the alleged constitutional violation.

Ganstine v. Williams · filed 2012-04-19

Supervisory officials may be liable under § 1983 for the acts of their subordinates only when “the supervisor personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a subordinate’s errors; a supervisor is liable only for the supervisor’s own conduct.

Paine v. Cason · filed 2012-04-26

Earnest can be liable only for what he did; there is no doctrine of super- visory liability for the errors of subordinates such as Berglind.

Section 1983 requires allegations of a supervisor’s personal involvement in the misconduct; general allegations of failure to supervise are insufficient.

Broyles v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc. · filed 2012-04-30

These general allegations are insufficient to establish liability under § 1983 for failure to supervise.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because a subordinate committed a violation.

Harvey v. Montgomery County · filed 2012-04-30

Nearly all of Plaintiffs allegations against Sheriff Gage are actually complaints about his supervisees’ conduct, and there is no supervisory liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability for an officer’s excessive force requires evidence that the supervisor’s own conduct, such as deliberate indifference to use-of-force training, was linked to the violation.

Levy v. Lique et al. · filed 2012-05-07

Even if Lique violated Levy’s constitutional rights by using excessive force in effecting her arrest, her Section 1983 claim against Chief Alexander fails because she has presented no evidence that the Chief was deliberately indifferent to proper police training on the use of force, the claim she asserts in her complaint.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor liable to show a deliberate, intentional act by the supervisor to violate constitutional rights; being in charge of others is insufficient.

Boles v. Newth · filed 2012-05-08

However, a plaintiff cannot establish liability under § 1983 merely by “show[ing] the defendant was in charge of other state actors who actually committed the [constitutional] violation. Instead, . . . the plaintiff must establish a deliberate, intentional act by the supervisor to violate constitutional rights.” ... Mr. Boles’ allegations do not satisfy this standard.

Section 1983 does not make a warden liable solely on a theory of supervisory liability.

Allen v. Zavaras · filed 2012-05-18

As to Warden Zavaras, the magistrate judge recommended summary judgment in his favor because Mr. Allen failed to establish that he was entitled to any relief under the Eighth Amendment and, furthermore, could not hold the warden liable under § 1983 on a theory of supervisor liability. The district court adopted the recommendations and granted summary judgment to defendants. ... We affirm the summary judgment for substantially the same reasons given by the magistrate judge and the district court.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for retaliation when a supervisor directly participates in, encourages, authorizes, or acquiesces in the retaliatory acts.

King v. ZAMIARA · filed 2012-05-22

The supervisor must be said to have “directly participated, encouraged, authorized or acquiesced in the claimed retaliatory acts” to be liable under § 1983.

A prison superintendent can be liable under § 1983 for personally participating in a violation or knowing of it and failing to act.

Voth v. Don Mills · filed 2012-05-22

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the claims against Mills, the prison superintendent, because Voth failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Mills personally participated in the alleged violations, or knew of the alleged violations and failed to act.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 if the supervisor participated in or directed a violation, or knew of it and failed to act to prevent it.

Bryan Ransom v. Scribner · filed 2012-05-25

The district court properly granted summary judgment to Scribner because Ransom failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Scribner knew of any problems concerning the sanitization of barbering tools during the relevant time period. See id. at 1057 (prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (to establish a supervisor’s liability under § 1983, an inmate must demonstrate that the official “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them”).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires participation in the constitutional violation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s actions and the deprivation.

Raoul Lynch v. Sheriff Theodore Jackson · filed 2012-06-05

Supervisory theory of liability requires participation in the alleged constitutional violation or a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability for personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation, a sufficient causal connection to it, or a deficient policy that causes it.

Heirs of Del Real v. Eason · filed 2012-06-07

A supervisor may be held liable under Section 1983 if (1) he is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, (2) a sufficient causal connection exists between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional deprivation, or (3) he implements a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force behind a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s own acts or omissions plausibly caused a violation of federal rights.

Peña-Peña v. Figueroa-Sancha · filed 2012-06-11

In short, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs’ complaint pleads plausible supervisory liability claims against the Supervisors.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence that the supervisor knew or had reason to know of potentially unjustified conduct by subordinates; one unrelated incident was insufficient here.

Taylor v. Lang · filed 2012-06-21

Taylor, however, cannot establish Warden Cohen’s liability based on his supervision of Lang. Taylor’s identification of one admittedly unrelated occasion on which he was subjected to an application of pepper spray several months after the incident at issue here is insufficient to establish that Cohen knew or had reason to know that Lang or other prison officials were engaging in potentially unjustified uses of force.

Section 1983 requires a claim against supervisory officials to allege their personal involvement or a policy they implemented that caused injury.

Perkins v. Terrell · filed 2012-06-26

Perkins does not allege, however, that the defendants were involved personally with any decisions concerning his diet or that they implemented any policies that resulted in injury to him. He thus fails to dispute the basis for the dismissal of the officials.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s policy or practice creates an unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation and the failure to correct it causes the violation.

Jackson v. Gandy · filed 2012-06-29

In addition, “a supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if he or she implements a policy or practice that creates an unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation on the part of the subordinate and the supervisor’s failure to change the policy or employ corrective practices is a cause of this unconstitutional conduct.” ... Here, Plaintiff has failed to present any factual basis upon which Plaintiff can support the allegation that Defendants Balicki, Sullivan, and Hayman, were personally involved in the alleged incident.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement and does not impose liability solely based on a supervisory position.

Brown v. Poorman · filed 2012-07-02

Brown seeks to impose liability based solely on this defendant’s supervisory position, but liability in a § 1983 action must be predicated upon personal involvement, not on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a sheriff’s awareness of detention policies and practices creates a genuine factual dispute about responsibility.

Williams v. County of San Mateo · filed 2012-07-02

Williams has also raised a genuine issue of material fact as to Sheriff Horsley’s supervisory liability, because a jury could reasonably find that the Sheriff was aware of the policies and practices concerning the detention of civil detainees.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-train claim against a supervisor when the supervisor encouraged the misconduct or directly participated in it.

Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation · filed 2012-07-11

A supervisor may be liable pursuant to § 1983 for failing to train his officers if he “either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” ... Here, Plaintiff Aaron does not allege the supervisor Defendants were personally involved in the incidents that occurred on January 23, 2011, nor does he allege that they encouraged the misconduct. Accordingly, his supervisory liability claim fails.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; supervisory responsibility alone does not establish liability.

Mitchell v. Beard · filed 2012-07-19

Essentially, Mitchell alleges that they are liable for improperly supervising those directly responsible for his injuries. Such allegations are not sufficient to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that each government official violated the Constitution through the official's own actions to establish supervisory liability.

Sanford v. Newton · filed 2012-07-20

Sanford did not rebut defendants’ evidence that the altercation did not influence his housing assignments and that Dutcher had no control over Sanford’s housing assignments; Sanford stated that his housing assignment prior to the December 2007 attack was authorized by a nondefendant officer; and Sanford did not show that Davis and Newton were liable in their supervisory capacity. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (plaintiff must plead that each government official violated Constitution through official’s own actions); Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001-02 & n.1 (8th Cir. 2010) (discussing showing required to establish supervisory liability); cf. Haynes v. Stephenson, 588 F.3d 1152, 1155-56 (8th Cir. 2009) (prima facie case of retaliation requires, inter alia, evidence of retaliatory motive).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the violation.

Lamon v. Masiel · filed 2012-07-26

The district court also properly dismissed Lamon’s claims with respect to the supervisory defendants because the second amended complaint failed to state the supervisors’ personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between any supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 makes a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violation only if the supervisor participated in or directed it, or knew of it and failed to act.

Grindling v. Thomas · filed 2012-07-26

Furthermore, Grindling failed to offer evidence that defendant Thomas deprived him of grievance forms or directed others to do so. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (supervisor only liable for constitutional violations of subordinates if he or she participated in or directed the violations, or knew of but failed to act to prevent them).

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s direct involvement in the wrongdoing for liability.

Cordero-Suarez v. Rodriguez · filed 2012-08-03

But "Section 1983 does not impose purely supervisory liability; it aims at persons who have actually abused their positions of authority, and hence only persons who were directly involved in the wrongdoing may be held liable." ... This rule means Fas and Serrano prevail unless they actually did something wrong.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without evidence that the supervisor encouraged or directly participated in the misconduct.

Jeannie Parsons v. MDOC · filed 2012-08-07

In this case, although prison officials arguably engaged in unconstitutional conduct, as required for supervisory liability, Parsons cannot show that Caruso “either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for their subordinates’ conduct; a claim against a supervisor requires a causal connection to the alleged constitutional injury.

Heard v. Commissioner, GA DOC · filed 2012-08-10

As the district court ruled, Owens cannot be held vicariously liable, under section 1983, for the conduct of his subordinates. And Heard failed to allege plausible facts to support a causal connection between any actions of Owens or Davis and Heard’s alleged constitutional injuries.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for inadequate training when past violations called for more training or the training was so deficient that a deprivation of rights was inevitable.

Elkins v. DC · filed 2012-08-10

Supervisory liability under § 1983 is triggered only when a supervisor fails to provide more stringent training in the wake of a history of past transgressions by the agency or provides training “so clearly deficient that some deprivation of rights will inevitably result absent additional instruction.” Int’l Action Ctr., 365 F.3d at 27 (quoting Haynesworth, 820 F.2d at 1261-62) (internal quotation mark omitted).

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor’s failure to train or supervise and a constitutional injury; mere negligence is insufficient.

Elkins v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-08-10

Supervisory liability is limited under § 1983. The plaintiff must show that “a duty to instruct the subordinate to prevent constitutional harm arose from the surrounding circumstances.” Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Even if Maloney did have a responsibility to train and supervise Williams-Cherry, which he disputes, summary judgment in his favor was still appropriate because the record shows, at best, “mere negligence,” not an “affirmative link” between Maloney’s conduct and the constitutional injury. Id. at 1260.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s conduct.

Reid v. Secretary, FL Dept of Correc. · filed 2012-08-15

In a § 1983 suit, liability must be based on something more than respondeat superior.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires more than conclusory allegations that officials maintained a policy of deliberate indifference.

Terry v. LeBlanc · filed 2012-08-15

Nor do we find any basis for supervisory liability. ... In the instant case, however, the allegations of a policy of deliberate indifference do no more than present “legal conclusion[s] couched as . . . factual allegations.”

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts supporting more than a supervisor’s position and presumed knowledge of subordinates’ conduct.

Cook Ex Rel. Estate of Cook v. Howard · filed 2012-08-24

Simply put, the amended complaint does not set forth facts that raise beyond the level of speculation any claim of entitlement to relief under § 1983 or 1985 founded on a theory of supervisory liability.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 for failure to supervise only if the supervisor directly participated in, encouraged, authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct.

Horner v. Klein · filed 2012-08-29

A claim for failure to supervise is actionable under § 1983 only if the supervisor “either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officer[].” Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoted case and internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for the actions of their subordinates.

Beaulieu v. Cal Ludeman · filed 2012-08-29

"Supervisors . . . cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of a subordinate."

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on officials whose support for a policy falls short of implementing it or being the moving force behind the violation.

Kanelos v. County of Mohave · filed 2012-09-06

Without more, however, their passive support of AP 3-1 does not make the Board members the “moving force” behind AP 3-1. ... In short, Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of fact that the Board members are subject to supervisory liability or any other form of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because they oversee the people alleged to have committed misconduct.

Wingo v. Tennessee Department of Corrections · filed 2012-09-07

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in section 1983 lawsuits to impute liability onto supervisory personnel.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if personally involved in a constitutional violation and sufficiently connected to it.

Campbell v. Singh · filed 2012-09-07

He could be subject to supervisory liability under § 1983 if he was “personally involved in the constitutional violation,” and “a sufficient causal connection . . . [existed] between [him] and the constitutional violation.” Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for ordering an officer to execute a warrant based on a false affidavit, even if the supervisor knew it was false, when the supervisor did not prepare or present the warrant.

Butler v. Hammett · filed 2012-09-07

Similarly, Hammett cannot be held liable for ordering Bragg to arrest Butler even if he knew that Weppelman’s affidavit was false.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor participates in or directs a subordinate’s constitutional violation, or knows of it and fails to prevent it.

Maxwell v. County of San Diego · filed 2012-09-13

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s constitutional violations “if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989).

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant is a supervisor; liability requires personal involvement.

Houser v. Grant-Ellis · filed 2012-09-19

The district court properly dismissed defendant Baird because Houser’s allegations predicate liability solely upon Baird’s supervisory status. See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (“Liability under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the defendant.”).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the violation.

Dunsmore v. San Diego County Sheriff's Dep · filed 2012-09-25

The district court properly dismissed Dunsmore’s claims against the supervisory defendants because Dunsmore failed to allege facts in his second amended complaint sufficient to demonstrate either the supervisors’ personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivations or a sufficient causal ... connection between any supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violations.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged violation for liability.

Holmberg v. Gregoire · filed 2012-09-26

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant Vail because Holmberg failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Vail personally participated in the decision to deny Holmberg MSA access.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of oversight; the plaintiff must allege the supervisor was personally responsible.

Brady v. Aldridge · filed 2012-09-26

We add that the district court properly dismissed Brady’s claim against Shicker because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 suits and Brady did not allege that Shicker was personally responsible for his dental care.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only against a defendant acting in a supervisory role.

Glover v. Gartman · filed 2012-09-27

A supervisor liability claim, rather, can only be claimed against an individual acting in a supervisory role, such as a warden or a sheriff, and not an individual officer.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s conduct is linked to a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct through deliberate indifference.

Rivera-Freytes v. Rico · filed 2012-09-28

The Court finds that plaintiff Rivera has adequately pled that defendant Somoza’s conduct was linked to the other defendants’ alleged unconstitutional conduct under a theory of deliberate indifference.

A supervisory liability claim under § 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Hallman v. Cate · filed 2012-10-04

Absent an underlying constitutional violation, Hallman’s supervisory liability claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 does not make government officials vicariously liable for their subordinates’ conduct.

Peterson v. Lampert · filed 2012-10-15

In fact, “under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, government officials may not be held vicariously liable for the conduct of their subordinates.”

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence of personal involvement, awareness of inadequate training, or a pattern of similar incidents.

Fort v. Mauney · filed 2012-10-17

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Fort’s Eighth Amendment failure-to-train claim because Fort failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were personally involved in the incident, whether they were aware their training program was inadequate, or whether a pattern of similar incidents existed.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ misconduct.

Osu Student Alliance v. Ed Ray · filed 2012-10-23

Section 1983 suits, like Bivens suits, do not support vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on denying a grievance or respondeat superior.

Johnson v. Aramark · filed 2012-11-05

But his primary argument against Crews is that she failed to respond to his grievances, and the denial of a grievance or the failure to act upon the filing of a grievance is insufficient to establish liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a supervisor to be held individually liable when the supervisor participates in, directs, or knowingly acquiesces in a subordinate's rights violation.

Torres v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2012-11-15

To hold supervisor individually liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the individual participated in violating their rights, or that he directed others to violate them, or that he had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violation. ... Regardless of whether LaSalle’s direct action render him liable under § 1983, Plaintiffs’ claims against him can survive under the nonfeasance theory: His refusal to discipline Deblasis was itself a sufficiently affirmative act to render him liable under § 1983 because he had actual knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinate’s violations of Plaintiffs’ rights. ... I cannot say that there is no set of facts under which LaSalle could be liable under § 1983. Defendants’ motion to dismiss LaSalle as a defendant is denied.

Section 1983 permits individual supervisory liability when a supervisor directly participates in a constitutional violation or deficient supervision and training causes the deprivation.

Pitts v. City of Cuba · filed 2012-11-16

A supervisor may be held individually liable under § 1983 if he directly participates in a constitutional violation or if a failure to properly supervise and train the offending employee caused a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because of their position; the supervisor must encourage or directly participate in the specific misconduct.

Taylor v. Larson · filed 2012-11-19

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to a section 1983 action to impute ... liability onto supervisory personnel, ... unless it is shown “that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.”

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for an officer’s acts solely because of the supervisory relationship; liability must arise from the supervisor’s own actions.

Bloom v. Peacock · filed 2012-11-19

Section 1983 claims cannot be founded in respondeat superior, but must arise from the officer’s own actions.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a supervisor to have participated in or failed to prevent a subordinate’s violation of a constitutional right.

Corbray v. Cunningham · filed 2012-11-20

The district court properly dismissed Corbray’s claims against supervisor Becerra because Corbray failed to allege that Becerra participated in or failed to prevent the violation of a constitutional right by his subordinates.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor vicariously liable for staff misconduct; the supervisor must cause or participate in the constitutional violation.

Keller v. Elyea · filed 2012-11-21

But we need not reach the question of qualified immunity because there is a more direct basis for affirmance—Keller has not shown that Dr. Elyea caused or participated in any constitutional violation. ... As the district court recognized, Dr. Elyea, the head of the prison system’s medical hierarchy, cannot be vicariously liable for the acts of his staff.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 requires a plausible allegation that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge of subordinate misconduct.

Coleman v. Charles Poff, Jr. · filed 2012-11-27

Nor did Coleman plausibly allege actual or constructive knowledge by Defendants Poff and Conmed Health Service of misconduct by their subordinates, as necessary to support supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement to hold a supervisor liable; the supervisor’s position alone is insufficient.

Wesley v. Varand · filed 2012-11-28

A corollary to this is that a supervisor may not be held vicariously liable for the wrongs of his subordinate. To state a viable claim against a supervisor a plaintiff must make “allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence” in the wrongdoing.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-train claim against a supervisor who encouraged or directly participated in the misconduct.

Campbell v. City of Springboro, Ohio · filed 2012-11-29

A supervisor is not liable pursuant to § 1983 for failing to train unless the supervisor “either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.”

A § 1983 supervisory liability claim requires evidence that the supervisor’s acts or omissions caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Estate of Cuffee Ex Rel. Cuffee v. Newhart · filed 2012-11-29

Even assuming the Estate's evidence was sufficient to prove Sheriff Newhart's alleged omissions in overseeing the Jail's medical staffing, the Estate also had to provide evidence that Sheriff Newhart's acts led to Cuffee's death.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; supervisory status alone does not establish individual liability.

Karp v. Garrett · filed 2012-12-04

The magistrate judge further found that because Karp attributed liability to Broaddus merely on the basis of his supervisory role, his claims should be dismissed for failure to sufficiently show personal participation. ... We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal for substantially the same reasons articulated by the magistrate judge in her report and recommendation and adopted by the district court in its order of October 28, 2011.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a mere failure to act; a failure-to-train or supervise claim requires the supervisor to encourage or directly participate in the misconduct.

Robert Reed, Jr. v. Speck · filed 2012-12-11

“Supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot attach where the allegation of liability is based upon a mere failure to act.” ... To succeed on a failure to train or supervise claim, a plaintiff must show that the supervisor “encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” ... Appellants have not put forth evidence suggesting that Rudd condoned or encouraged Speck to withhold medical care from Reed.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for an Eighth Amendment violation based on deliberate indifference or gross negligence, without direct participation.

Tacheau v. Mastrantonio · filed 2012-12-31

Consequently, this court concludes that Eighth Amendment claims for supervisory liability can be sustained with a showing of deliberate indifference and/or gross negligence, and does not require direct participation by the defendant.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 only if personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or sufficiently connected to it through the supervisor’s conduct.

Reece v. Traquina · filed 2013-01-02

The district court properly dismissed, without leave to amend, Reece’s claim that Traquina violated his constitutional rights by not ensuring that a nurse was available to take blood pressure in a specific location in the prison on certain dates in May and June 2010, because there is no allegation that Traquina was personally involved in any alleged lack of availability of a nurse at a particular location, and the complaint and attachments thereto showed that Reece was aware of and utilized alternative locations in the prison for testing his blood pressure.

Section 1983 requires allegations connecting a supervisory defendant to the alleged constitutional violation.

Johnson v. Runnels · filed 2013-01-02

The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s claims against defendant Runnels and other supervisory defendants because Johnson failed to allege that any of these defendants personally participated in any alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of rights; supervising the people who provide care is insufficient by itself.

Chambers v. Mitcheff · filed 2013-01-07

Dr. Mitcheff supervises prison physicians; he does not treat inmates, and Chambers has not shown that he has denied any requests to treat Chambers or that he otherwise has been personally involved in Chambers’s care since May 2011.

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability when the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or the supervisor’s wrongful conduct had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Martinez v. Maverick County · filed 2013-01-15

Liability under § 1983 for a supervisor may exist based either on “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,” or “a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.”