42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit damages against state officials sued in their official capacities, and even pro se plaintiffs must specify an individual-capacity claim to avoid dismissal on that ground.

Bass v. Reynolds · filed 1990-12-13

State officials are not subject to damages when sued in their official capacities. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311-12 (1989). Even pro se plaintiffs must specify that they are suing state officials in their individual capacities in order to avoid dismissal on this ground. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593-94 (6th Cir.1989).

State officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to damages under § 1983.

Portee v. Tollison · filed 1990-12-14

Because they are state officials, however, any claim for damages is barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity as well as the Supreme Court’s holding in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), that states and state officials are not "persons” as that term is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to impose liability on a governmental unit through an official-capacity suit against its official without naming the unit, if the unit receives notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Gegenheimer v. Galan · filed 1991-01-09

Under Brandon and Graham, then, a plaintiff need not join the governmental unit itself as a defendant to impose liability against it, but may sue the individual official in his official capacity, so long as the governmental unit the official represents is given notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Section 1983 treats an official-capacity claim as a claim against the public entity, so the official may be dismissed when that entity is also a defendant.

Leatherman v. TARRANT COUNTY NARCOTICS I. & C. UN. · filed 1991-01-22

Inasmuch as Curry and Carpenter are sued only in their respective official capacities, and the respective entities they are alleged to represent are joined as party defendants, there is no reason why Curry or Carpenter should continue to be defendants in this action. The court is ordering their dismissal.

A plaintiff seeking damages under § 1983 against state employees must specify that they are sued in their individual capacities; they are not subject to damages in their official capacities.

Favors v. M. Barnett S. Johnson Foster, Mr. · filed 1991-02-07

Favors's claims for monetary relief were properly dismissed because he failed to specify that he was suing defendants in their individual capacities. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593-94 (6th Cir.1989). Defendants are not subject to suit for damages in their official capacity. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311-12 (1989).

Section 1983 permits suits for injunctive or declaratory relief against state officials acting in their official capacities, but bars money damages or other retrospective relief against states or those officials.

Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n v. Paradis · filed 1991-02-08

Although Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police precludes § 1983 suits against states or state officials acting in their official capacities for money damages or other forms of retrospective relief, it does not prohibit suits for injunctive or declaratory relief.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities; defendants are deemed sued in that capacity when the complaint does not name them in their individual capacities.

El-Amin v. Robert Brown, Jr., Dan Bolden, Judy Kalmanek, John Jabe, Sally Langley · filed 1991-02-08

Further, because El-Amin has not named the defendants in their individual capacity, they are deemed in their official capacity and are not subject to suit for monetary damages under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not subject state corrections officials sued in their official capacities to monetary damages.

Quigley v. Wilson · filed 1991-02-11

Moreover, the defendants are clearly not subject to suit for monetary damages in their official capacity under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the government was a moving force behind a rights deprivation for an official-capacity claim, but a personal-capacity claim against the official can proceed without those facts.

Herrera v. Nieto · filed 1991-02-22

We agree with the district court that plaintiff's official-capacity action must be dismissed; plaintiff has alleged no facts which suggest that the government was a moving force behind the alleged rights deprivation. However, we must conclude that plaintiff did meet the burden for a personal-capacity Sec. 1983 action.

A § 1983 plaintiff must clearly notify state officials in the complaint that they face personal liability; otherwise the suit is treated as one against their offices.

Childs v. Margery B. Koosed, Richard L. Aynes, Isaac C. Hunt, William D. Rich, Frank Marini, and William v. Mus · filed 1991-03-13

The plaintiff did not clearly notify the defendants that they could be personally liable for those counts brought under federal law. According to this Court's holding in Wells, therefore, the federal suit brought by the plaintiff is one against the defendants' offices and thereby, against the University.

Section 1983 does not treat state officials sued in their official capacities for money damages as persons subject to monetary liability.

Jackson v. Stephen H. Norris, Michael Dutton, Michael Kendrick · filed 1991-03-28

In addition, the complaint does not state that the defendants are sued in their individual capacities. State officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are not persons for the purposes of Sec. 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Therefore, none of the defendants are monetarily liable to Jackson for actions taken in their official capacities.

Naming a municipal mayor only in his official capacity duplicates the Section 1983 claim against the municipality.

Doe v. Village of Crestwood, Ill. · filed 1991-04-02

Because Mayor Stranczek was named only in his official and not his individual capacity, his inclusion as a defendant was essentially equivalent to naming Village twice — and thus was really surplusage.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Ambrose v. Robert Brown, Jr., Director, Department of Corrections, Steve Winchester, Hearing Investigator, I. · filed 1991-05-15

State officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are not persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against a state official sued in her official capacity.

Forte v. Sullivan · filed 1991-05-16

Thus, to the extent appellant is suing Ms. Sullivan in her official capacity and is asking for monetary damages instead of injunctive relief, appellant has failed to state a claim under § 1983.

An official-capacity suit under Section 1983 against a municipal officer is treated as a suit against the municipality, making the officer an unnecessary defendant when the municipality is already sued.

Busby v. City Of Orlando · filed 1991-05-17

Because suits against a municipal officer sued in his official capacity and direct suits against municipalities are functionally equivalent, there no longer exists a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, because local government units can be sued directly (provided, of course, that the public entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond).

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a sheriff sued in his official capacity, and a plaintiff seeking individual liability must specify that capacity.

Gallagher v. Rex Yeagley, Sheriff · filed 1991-05-17

In his official capacity, the defendant sheriff is not a "person" subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Even pro se plaintiffs must specify that they are suing state officials in their individual capacity in order to avoid dismissal on this ground. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593-94 (6th Cir.1989). Gallagher failed to properly name and adequately notify the defendant that he sought individual liability in damages; thus this suit seeking damages was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages against state officials sued only in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Drobil v. Brown · filed 1991-05-24

The complaint does not state that the defendants are sued in their individual capacities. State officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are not persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Foster v. Brown · filed 1991-05-31

The complaint does not state that the defendants are sued in their individual capacities. State officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are not persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A state official sued only in an official capacity is not amenable to suit under § 1983.

Schloesser v. Kansas Department of Health & Environment · filed 1991-06-04

Because a state official acting in his official capacity is not amenable to suit under section 1983, ... defendant Grant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Wilson v. John Jabe, Vonda Jamrog · filed 1991-06-14

State officials are not subject to suit in their official capacity for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages against state officials sued in their individual capacities even when the challenged conduct was part of their official duties.

Chaudhuri v. State of Tenn. · filed 1991-07-24

Even if the defendants’ actions were wholly “official,” the plaintiff still may seek compensation from them individually for allegedly violating his rights under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Jackson v. Pamela Withrow, Warden, Robert Brown, Jr., Director, James J. Blanchard, Governor · filed 1991-07-29

State officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are not persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against city officials are treated as claims against the city and depend on the claim against it.

Bennett v. Village of Oak Park · filed 1991-08-13

A suit against a city official in his or her official capacity is in reality a suit against the city. ... The court believes, and Bennett does not dispute, that the success of these official capacity claims depends upon the success of Bennett's claim against the Village of Oak Park.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Scothorn v. State of Kan. · filed 1991-08-15

Additionally, State officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” subject to liability under § 1983.

Zavaro v. Coughlin · filed 1991-09-20

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), holding that neither a state nor its officials in such capacity are “persons” for purposes of § 1983 liability, such an action simply may not be sustained, and each defendant is entitled to summary judgment insofar as he is sued in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not subject state officials sued in their official capacities to monetary damages.

Chapman v. Parke · filed 1991-10-04

To the extent that Chapman seeks monetary damages against the defendants in their official capacity, they are not subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities, but monetary damages are unavailable in such claims.

McCoy v. Nevada Dept. of Prisons · filed 1991-10-11

This court previously determined (# 25) that the complaint failed to allege the personal involvement of Defendant Knapp and Defendant Angelone (in substitution for Sumner), and therefore this action could only be pursued against Defendants in their official capacities (# 27). As a result, the recovery of monetary damages is not possible. Thus, the only relief available to Plaintiffs under this section 1983 action is injunctive relief.

An official-capacity § 1983 claim against a school district employee duplicates a § 1983 claim against the district and may be dismissed when both are pleaded.

Doe v. Douglas County School District RE-1 · filed 1991-10-17

Because I must treat plaintiff’s official capacity claim “as a suit against the entity,” it is apparent that the sixth claim for relief is identical to her first claim for relief asserting the same § 1983 violations directly against the School District. Although there is no Tenth Circuit decision on point, dismissal of plaintiff’s redundant claim is warranted as a matter of judicial economy and efficiency.

A § 1983 suit is presumed to name officials in their official capacities only when it challenges official policies or customs.

Lambert v. G. Michael Broglin, Superintendent, Lieutenant Nash, Commanding Officer and Officer O. Garcia · filed 1991-10-17

Mr. Lambert correctly contends in his first argument that a district court cannot assume that all § 1983 suits are intended as official capacity suits. An official capacity suit should be presumed only where the appellant challenges official policies or customs.

Section 1983 does not allow damages or retroactive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Patrick v. Staples · filed 1991-10-31

In addition, it is clear that Mr. Patrick cannot maintain an action against the defendants in their official capacities for damages or retroactive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a municipality or an official sued in his official capacity.

Kennedy v. McCarty · filed 1991-11-25

Suing Chief McCarty in his official capacity is no different than suing the City of Franklin. Thus, punitive damages on the federal constitutional claims are not recoverable against either the City of Franklin or Chief McCarty in his official capacity and defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to punitive damages on the federal constitutional claims will be GRANTED in this respect.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state officials in their individual capacities when they act under color of state law; alleging state action does not turn the claim into an official-capacity suit.

LCS Services, Inc. v. Hamrick · filed 1991-12-06

"Official capacity" means that the individual's office (and hence the governmental unit's treasury) is being attacked; "individual capacity" means that damages are only sought from the individual. "Color or authority of state law" is an element of the § 1983 claim in either case. LCS' assertion of appellees' "color or authority" is a requisite, not a defect, of its claim.

An official-capacity § 1983 claim runs against the official’s governmental entity and imposes no personal liability on the official.

Cook v. Holzberger · filed 1992-01-09

An official-capacity action is not a suit against the official personally, and no personal liability may be imposed.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state prison officials in their individual capacities.

Gilbert v. State of Arizona · filed 1992-01-21

Gilbert's claims against the prison officials, acting in their individual capacities, may be asserted under section 1983, Hafer v. Melo, --- U.S. ---, 60 U.S.L.W. 4001, 4004 (Nov. 5, 1991), and are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

State employees sued in their official capacities are not subject to monetary damages under § 1983; a complaint that does not specify personal capacity is treated as an official-capacity suit.

Swartz v. Robert Hurt, Deputy Warden Doug Richardson, Unit Manager · filed 1992-02-10

Under the Eleventh Amendment, state employees are immune from damages when a § 1983 action is brought against them in their official capacity. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592 (6th Cir.1989). It appears that the defendants in the instant case were being sued in their official capacity because the complaint does not indicate that they are being sued personally. See Id. at 592. They are therefore not even subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Suing a state employee in an official capacity under § 1983 does not make the state or its agency a party entitled to counterclaim.

Nitcher v. Does · filed 1992-02-10

Neither case authorizes a state or state agency to counterclaim as a party when a state employee is sued in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued only in their official capacities.

Butts v. Mr. Yarborough, Warden, Michigan Training Unit · filed 1992-02-26

Finally, Butts named only defendants Yarborough, Carbery, Carey, Hurt, and Sage in their individual capacities. The remaining defendants, named in their official capacities only, are not liable to suit for monetary damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state employees sued in their official capacities; a complaint that does not specify personal capacity treats them as sued in their official capacities.

Bobby Peak Joe Crowhorn Alphonso Duncan v. Stephen Smith John Wigginton Domingo Baisas, M.D. · filed 1992-03-27

It appears that the defendants in the instant cases were being sued in their official capacity because the complaints do not indicate that they are being sued personally, see Wells, 891 F.2d at 592. They are therefore not subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats state officials sued for monetary relief as persons when they are sued in their personal capacities, but not when they are sued in their official capacities.

Duane v. Michael P. Lane, James Thieret, Warden, James Buch and Daniel Cowen · filed 1992-04-01

In light of ... which together hold that state officials sued for monetary relief are persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when sued in their personal capacities but not when sued in their official capacities, we treat Duane’s action as a personal-capacity suit.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity suit against an independently elected county treasurer.

Willis v. Edgcomb · filed 1992-04-20

The defendant’s argument creates a catch-22 for section 1983 plaintiffs. In essence, the argument eliminates the possibility of official capacity suits against independently-elected officials, such as sheriffs, and county treasurers. Because the court cannot find support for this result in section 1983 cases, the defendant’s motion is denied.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a state official in his official capacity because the claim is treated as one against the State.

Brooks v. Augusta Mental Health Institute · filed 1992-04-22

The law is well established that a suit against Commissioner Glover in his official capacity “is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office [and] [a]s such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself” and is not subject to liability under section 1983.

A Section 1983 suit against state employees in their official capacities does not make the state or its agency a party entitled to counterclaim.

Nitcher v. Does · filed 1992-05-01

Neither case authorizes a state or state agency to counterclaim as a party when a state employee is sued in his official capacity.

In federal court, § 1983 claims against a state agency and official-capacity damages claims against its officers are barred, while claims for prospective relief against the officers may proceed.

Norfleet v. Arkansas Department of Human Services · filed 1992-06-01

The Court finds that the plaintiffs’ claims against the DHS itself, as well as those against the individual defendants in their official capacities for money damages, are barred as a matter of law. The Court denies summary judgment, however, for the individual defendants in their official capacities to the extent that the relief sought is prospective.

State officials sued in their personal capacities may face § 1983 claims for conduct undertaken in their official roles.

Ching v. Samuel A. Lewis, Director of Adoc · filed 1992-06-02

The district court's interpretation of Will is foreclosed by Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991). The defendant in Hafer had also contended that § 1983 liability turns not on the capacity in which defendants are sued, but on the capacity in which they act when injuring the plaintiff. Id. at 363. The Court rejected that argument. Such a reading of Will would defeat the purpose of permitting redress for deprivations of civil rights by persons acting under color of state law, and would extend absolute immunity to all state officers. Id. at 363-64. Therefore, appellant's amended complaint, naming defendants in both their official and personal capacities, was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

A suit under § 1983 against county officials in their official capacities is treated as a suit against the county itself.

Ater v. David Armstrong and Leon E. Jones, Sr. · filed 1992-06-26

Ater sued these defendants in their official capacities, which is tantamount to suing Jefferson County itself.

Section 1983 permits prospective equitable relief against state officials in their official capacity, but does not permit monetary damages against them in that capacity.

Lenzer v. Flaherty · filed 1992-07-07

For purposes of a claim for prospective equitable relief from violation of federal constitutional law, State officials acting in their official capacity are “persons” reachable under section 1983. ... However, State officials and agents are not “persons” covered by section 1983 when the remedy sought is monetary damages.

State troopers sued for monetary damages in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Get Away Club, Inc. v. Vic Coleman, Jim Snyder · filed 1992-07-13

Furthermore, when sued for monetary damages in their official capacities, the troopers are not considered "persons" subject to suit within § 1983 and therefore, the troopers are immune from any civil damages in their official capacities as well.

Section 1983 allows suits against these prison officials in their individual capacities, but not their official capacities.

Sturdevant v. Haferman · filed 1992-08-06

As the magistrate judge noted, the defendants may not be sued in their official capacities, but only in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against state officials in their official capacities.

Wolfel v. Morris · filed 1992-08-18

In addition, a suit for damages against a state official in his or her official capacity cannot be maintained pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat state employees sued for money damages in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Smith v. McCaughtry · filed 1992-09-04

However, both defendants are employees of the State of Wisconsin; state employees sued for money damages in their official capacity are not “persons” within the meaning of that term as it appears in § 1983.

Section 1983 damages are unavailable against state employees when the complaint alleges only official-capacity claims and does not allege personal-capacity claims.

Bell v. C. Blocker Northpoint Training Center Adjustment Committee Sgt. Bill Case Tommie Lawrence C.T.O. Mc · filed 1992-10-07

Moreover, Bell was not entitled to collect damages from any of the defendants because he failed to allege that they were being sued personally rather than in their official capacity as state employees.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Wingard v. Harold Smith, Warden Charles Holden, Corporal Ricky Holtsclaw, Co 1 B.J. Potter, Sgt. Timothy Stallard, · filed 1992-11-23

The district court's judgment is affirmed in part as these defendants, in their official capacities, are not "persons" subject to suit for monetary damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages suits against state officials in their official capacities.

Jones v. Calkins · filed 1993-01-29

To the extent that they are sued in their official capacities as state officials, they are not subject to suit for monetary damages in that capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued only in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Charron v. Picano · filed 1993-02-02

Having determined that the original complaint asserts claims against Picaño and Fraieli only in their official capacities, it follows that they are not “persons” and that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the § 1983 claims against them should be granted.

Section 1983 treats a suit against police officers in their official capacity as a suit against the municipality itself.

Cruz v. City of Wilmington · filed 1993-02-23

Before addressing the alleged deprivation of “rights elsewhere conferred”, the Court notes that the officers in their official capacity are legally indistinct from the city itself.

Under § 1983, an official-capacity suit against school district officials is a suit against the district itself.

Wilkerson v. Columbus Separate School District · filed 1993-03-15

The official capacity suits in effect are suits against the school district.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary relief against a state jail or its officers sued only in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Williams-El v. Dunning · filed 1993-03-30

Because plaintiff has sued these defendants in their official capacities only, they are immune from suit and are not persons under § 1983.

A § 1983 complaint that does not specify the capacity in which it sues state officials is treated as an official-capacity suit, barring monetary relief against them.

Russell v. Potts · filed 1993-03-31

Initially, we note that Russell's complaint fails to specify in what capacity he is suing the defendants; therefore, we must assume that he is suing the defendants in their official capacity. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593-94 (6th Cir.1989). Because state officials sued in their official capacity are immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment, Russell is precluded from seeking monetary relief in this section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Diaz v. Broglin · filed 1993-04-15

Dismissal of Diaz' claims for damages against the defendants in their official capacities was proper. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) ("neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983"); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985).

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a state official sued only in an official capacity absent state consent.

Presnick v. Goldberg, No. Cv22 00085 (Apr. 29, 1993) · filed 1993-04-29

The court determines that the defendant is being sued in his official capacity only, therefore the State is immune from suit for damages under 1983 absent consent from the Claims Commissioner.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state official in her official capacity unless the suit seeks injunctive relief.

Martinez v. Alan Kunimoto, Dr., Kim M. Thorburg · filed 1993-05-11

A state official sued in her official capacity is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless the suit seeks injunctive relief.

Section 1983 does not allow retrospective damages against Virgin Islands officials sued in their official capacities.

Brow v. Farrelly · filed 1993-05-13

Notwithstanding the verbiage of Brow's prayer for relief, it is evident that his "injunctive" claim for past wages and benefits was essentially a claim for retrospective damages, see supra I. at p. 4, and thus not actionable against territorial officials in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity suits against state officials; when the complaint leaves capacity unclear, courts examine the pleadings and course of proceedings.

Shawn C. Pride, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant v. Various John Does, Trooper Jan Lamb, Defendant-Counter-Claimant · filed 1993-06-15

It is well-settled that the Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 civil actions against the states but permits such suits brought against state officials sued in their individual capacities. ... Thus, where the complaint fails to specify the capacity in which the government official is sued, we look to the substance of the pleadings and the course of the proceedings in order to determine whether the suit is for individual or official liability. ... Although Pride failed to specify that he was suing Lamb in her individual capacity, it is clear from both the pleadings and the course of litigation that Pride was doing so.

Section 1983 does not permit suits for monetary damages against state officials in their official capacity.

Smith v. Wendee Jones, R.N. · filed 1993-06-28

To the extent that Smith seeks monetary damages against the defendant in her official capacity, the suit was properly dismissed because state officials sued in their official capacity are not subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A plaintiff, including one proceeding pro se, must affirmatively plead individual capacity to seek monetary damages under § 1983 from state officials.

Woods v. Eric C. Dahlberg, Warden Lanny Enboden · filed 1993-07-02

A state and its officials are not considered to be persons for purposes of § 1983 when sued in their official capacity for monetary damages. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). Because Woods did not affirmatively plead the capacity in which he sued the defendants, they are considered to be sued in their official capacities and are not subject to suit for monetary damages in this case. See Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358, 362-64 (1991); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593-94 (6th Cir.1989). Woods is not excused from this requirement merely because he is proceeding pro se. Id.

State officials sued in their official capacity are not subject to suit for monetary damages under § 1983.

Martin v. O'Dea · filed 1993-07-06

As Martin only sought monetary relief, the defendants are not subject to suit in this case, because state officials are not subject to suit for monetary damages in their official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to damages liability under Section 1983.

Birdwell v. Kevin Concannon, Director, Oregon State Department of Human Resources Charles Crookham Denise G. · filed 1993-08-02

"[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under [42 U.S.C.] Sec. 1983." Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Concannon, therefore, is not subject to liability for damages under the civil rights statutes when he is sued in his official capacity.

State officials are not subject to monetary damages under Section 1983 for actions taken during their official duties when the complaint does not specifically name them in their individual capacities.

Hunt v. Reynolds · filed 1993-08-13

Because Hunt did not specifically name the state defendants in their individual capacities, and the actions complained of were taken during the course of their official duties, the defendants are not subject to suit under Sec. 1983 for monetary damages.

Section 1983 does not permit suits for monetary damages against state officials in their official capacities.

Smith-El v. Robert Jensen Dennis J. Oosterbaan Harold Jones Chaplain Brander · filed 1993-08-26

State officials are not subject to suit for monetary damages in their official capacities. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). Because we construe the pleadings to sue the defendants in their official capacities, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989), we conclude that the defendants are not subject to suit for damages here.

Official-capacity claims under Section 1983 against local officials are redundant and should be dismissed when the local government itself is also sued.

Admiral Theatre v. City of Chicago · filed 1993-08-30

Where the unit of local government is sued as well, the suit against the officials is redundant and should therefore be dismissed ... That is the posture of Daley and Mardis here. ... They are indeed dismissed as defendants, and from here on out this opinion will speak only of City as defendant.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for individual liability and a policy or custom causing the constitutional violation for official-capacity liability.

Walton v. Fairman · filed 1993-10-05

It is well established that liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation. ... These attachments indicate that plaintiffs have tried to bring the conditions to the attention of those in authority. The court accordingly declines to grant defendants’ motion to dismiss them in their individual capacity. ... Governmental entities cannot be held liable unless an'official policy caused the constitutional violation asserted in the complaint. ... The court has carefully examined all of plaintiffs’ pleadings and determines that plaintiffs' have not alleged any kind of policy or custom on the part of officials at CCDOC to allow rats or any other four-legged vermin to roam the jail freely. The court accordingly grants defendants’ motion to dismiss them in their official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against states or state officers in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Duncan v. Gunter · filed 1994-02-04

Neither states nor state officers sued in their official capacity are "persons" subject to suit under section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Duncan therefore may not seek damages from Gunter in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not authorize damages suits against state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons within the statute.

Pope v. Gary Mendenhall, Lieutenant and Captain Shaffer · filed 1994-03-02

In addition, the Supreme Court has held that neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). Pope's suit against these defendants in their official capacities is thus barred by the U.S. Constitution and is not authorized by federal statute.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against state officials in their official capacities.

Bass v. Hodges · filed 1994-03-17

Furthermore, to the extent Bass sought damages from Hodges in his official capacity, Hodges is not amenable to suit.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities; when the complaint does not specify capacity, the officials are treated as sued in their official capacities.

Prunty v. Wilson · filed 1994-03-21

We further note that Prunty did not specify the capacity in which he was suing the defendants. Consequently, they are considered as sued in their official capacities, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989), and are therefore not subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat state employees acting in their official capacities as persons subject to liability.

Connolly v. Beckett · filed 1994-03-23

In their official capacity as Program Administrator and prosecuting attorney of the Colorado Board of Medical Examiners, respectively, Beckett and Norwood are immune from liability. State employees acting in their official capacities are not considered “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow money damages against a state board or state officials sued only in their official capacities.

Kraus v. Kentucky State Senate · filed 1994-03-24

Members of the Workers’ Compensation Board do not have legislative immunity from suit although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects the Board from a Federal Civil Rights claim for money damages.

Section 1983 treats state officials as persons for official-capacity claims seeking prospective injunctive or declaratory relief.

Doe v. Wigginton · filed 1994-04-19

Each of the individual defendants is a “person” under § 1983 for purposes of Doe’s official-capacity claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.

Section 1983 treats state officials sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief as persons subject to suit.

Demaray v. Dept. of Environmental Quality · filed 1994-04-20

Although the individually named defendants are correct that this is an official-capacity action, they are nonetheless “persons” within the meaning of section 1983, because the claim is for prospective injunctive relief.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities; when a plaintiff does not specify capacity, the suit is treated as an official-capacity suit.

Meehan v. Douglas Pardue Phil Bredesen David Scobey Hunt Brown Kirschner Luedice Cantrell · filed 1994-05-02

Finally, it is apparent that the defendants are not even subject to suit in this case for monetary damages. Meehan failed to specify the capacity in which he sued the defendants, and hence they are assumed to be sued in their official capacities, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989), and not subject to suit for monetary damages. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for monetary damages against state officials or agents in their official capacities.

Lee v. Greene · filed 1994-05-03

When the remedy sought is monetary damages, there can be no section 1983 claim against state officials and agents in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary relief against state employees sued in their official capacities.

Howard v. John Doe Alexander Janet Price D. Trudell · filed 1994-05-11

Initially, it is noted that to the extent Howard sued the defendants in their official capacities for monetary relief, the defendants are not subject to suit in that capacity under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

When a complaint does not specify the capacity in which individual state defendants are sued, they are treated as sued in their official capacities and are not subject to monetary damages under § 1983.

Kirk v. William Griner, Dr. Donald Boatright, Dr. George Herron Frank Basile · filed 1994-05-17

We also note that Kirk did not state the capacity in which he was suing the individual state defendants. Consequently, they are considered as sued in their official capacities, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989), and are therefore not subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against a state official sued in an official capacity; when the complaint does not specify capacity, the official is treated as sued in that capacity.

Donald v. Lawrence Mendel, Doctor · filed 1994-06-21

We also note that Donald did not state the capacity in which he was suing defendant Mendel. Consequently, Mendel is considered as sued in his official capacity, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989), and he is therefore not subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 & n. 10 (1989).

Section 1983 does not permit damages against state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Burkes v. Klauser · filed 1994-06-24

Accordingly, the Court has held that neither states nor their officials acting in their official capacities are persons under sec. 1983. We therefore dismiss the plaintiffs claim for damages against the defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary relief against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Stepp v. Reginald A. Wilkinson Arthur Tate, Jr. Paul Thompson, Lt. · filed 1994-06-27

Initially, it is noted that to the extent Stepp sued the defendants in their official capacity for monetary relief, the defendants are not subject to suit in that capacity under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

State officials sued for damages in their official capacities do not qualify as § 1983 persons.

Richards Irrigation Co. v. Karren · filed 1994-08-02

Since Linn and Palmer were acting in their official capacity for the Division, they do not qualify as “persons” for purposes of a section 1983 action. Therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing Rock Products’s section 1983 claims against Linn and Palmer.

Section 1983 does not subject state officials sued in their official capacities to monetary relief.

El-Amin v. Tirey · filed 1994-08-16

We also note that, to the extent El-Amin sued the defendants in their official capacities for monetary relief, the defendants are not subject to suit in that capacity under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Davis v. Ricky Bell Andrea Crossnos Doris Halford Charles Sullivan Jerry Collins · filed 1994-09-27

Davis is not entitled to monetary damages from the defendants in their official capacities because state officials sued in their official capacities are not considered "persons" under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 & n. 10 (1989).

Section 1983 does not allow compensatory damages against state officials sued only in their official capacities because they are not persons for that claim.

Brooks v. Celeste · filed 1994-11-09

State officials sued only in their official capacities are not “persons” under § 1988 when sued for compensatory damages.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities; when the complaint does not specify capacity, the officials are treated as sued in their official capacities.

Thomas v. Michigan State Board of Law Examiners Michael F. Cavanagh, Chief Justice Dennis Donohue Jeanette Paskin · filed 1994-11-22

We also note that Thomas did not state the capacity in which he was suing the individual state defendants. They are therefore considered as sued in their official capacities, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989), and are not subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

When a § 1983 plaintiff does not specify the capacity in which a state judge is sued, the suit is treated as an official-capacity claim, which cannot seek monetary damages from the judge.

Berry v. O'COnnell · filed 1994-11-23

Consequently, O'Connell is considered as sued in his official capacity, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989), and he is therefore not subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits a damages suit against a state official as an individual for misconduct in office, even when the conduct occurred during official duties.

Ford v. New Mexico Department of Public Safety · filed 1994-11-30

Thus, the nature of the liability of a state official sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is essentially the same as the nature of the liability of the official in a suit in state court under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. Both are sued for misconduct in office. In both, the defendant is the individual, not the office.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Cummins v. Campbell · filed 1994-12-28

The district court correctly held that damages against defendants in their official capacities were barred because officials acting in their official capacities are not "persons" under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat state officials sued only in their official capacities as persons liable for compensatory damages.

Brooks v. Celeste · filed 1995-01-17

State officials sued only in their official capacities are not "persons" under Sec. 1983 when sued for compensatory damages.

A state official sued in his official capacity is a person under § 1983 only when the plaintiff seeks prospective relief; monetary relief is barred.

Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation · filed 1995-01-19

A state official acting in his official capacity is not a person under § 1983 unless the relief requested in a suit against him in this capacity is prospective relief.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not subject to monetary damages under § 1983.

Callihan v. Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 1995-01-24

As the state officials are deemed sued in their official capacities, they are not subject to monetary damages under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Hill v. Wilkinson · filed 1995-01-31

Initially, we note that Hill failed to state in what capacity he sued the state defendants. Consequently, the defendants are deemed to be sued in their official capacities, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir. 1989), and are, therefore, not subject to suit for monetary damages under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against a state employee sued in an official capacity.

Julian-Bey v. Lewis Upchurch Marsha Foresman, A.D.W. · filed 1995-02-03

A state employee sued in his official capacity is not subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons for that remedy.

Hawkins v. State · filed 1995-02-07

Because defendants in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of section 1983 for recovering money damages, we hold that the trial court erred in denying defendants’ amended motion to dismiss plaintiff’s federal claims against defendants in their official capacities for monetary damages.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity suit against a territorial official even when the official acted within the bounds of lawful authority.

Nibbs v. Roberts · filed 1995-02-08

We hold that an official of the Virgin Islands Government, such as appellant, may be sued in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when he has acted within the bounds of his lawful authority.

A Section 1983 claim against officials in their official capacities is a claim against the municipality they represent.

Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, Georgia · filed 1995-03-31

Claims against defendants in their official capacities are claims against the municipality, in this case the City of Apharetta, of which the individual defendants are agents.

When a § 1983 damages complaint against state officials does not specify their capacity, the suit is construed as an official-capacity suit, and state officials are not subject to monetary damages in that capacity.

Luna v. Sutherland · filed 1995-04-12

State officials are not subject to suit for monetary damages in their official capacities. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). Where a plaintiff seeking monetary damages in this context has failed to plead the capacity in which he is suing the state officials, the court will construe the suit to be one against them in their official capacities. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593-94 (6th Cir.1989). As Luna did not specify the capacity in which he was suing the named defendants, the complaint was subject to dismissal on this ground.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials in their official capacities, and a damages suit that does not specify capacity is construed as an official-capacity suit.

Sweet v. Sutherland · filed 1995-04-12

In addition, Sweet sought monetary damages only from three officials of the State of Ohio, but failed to allege the capacity in which any of them were being sued. State officials are not subject to suit for monetary damages in their official capacities. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). Where a plaintiff seeking monetary damages in this context has failed to plead the capacity in which he is suing the state officials, the court will construe the suit to be one against them in their official capacities. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593-94 (6th Cir.1989). As Sweet did not specify the capacity in which he was suing the named defendants, the complaint was subject to dismissal on this ground.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities; when the complaint does not specify capacity, the officials are treated as sued in their official capacities.

Mercer v. Noble · filed 1995-04-19

In addition, Mercer did not state the capacity in which she was suing the individual state defendants. Consequently, they are considered as sued in their official capacity, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989), and they are therefore not subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

An official-capacity § 1983 claim against a municipal officer is redundant when it states the same claim against a municipality that can itself be held liable.

Rini v. Zwirn · filed 1995-05-05

Therefore, any official-capacity § 1983 claim against these town employees is a redundant method of stating a claim against the Town itself.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against a state official sued in his official capacity.

Abdur-Rahman v. Michigan Department of Corrections, Kenneth McGinnis · filed 1995-06-21

McGinnis is not subject to suit for monetary damages in his official capacity under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities, but not retroactive money damages.

Welch v. Laney · filed 1995-07-07

We reverse the dismissal of Welch’s § 1983 claims against Laney and Pruett in their official capacities to the extent that she may seek prospective injunctive relief but not retroactive money damages.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary relief against state prison officials sued in their official capacities.

Chandler v. Brown · filed 1995-07-27

It is noted that, to the extent Chandler sued the defendants in their official capacities for monetary relief, the defendants are not subject to suit in that capacity under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 treats an official-capacity claim as a claim against the municipality; evidence of municipal policy or custom can support that claim.

Barnett v. Karpinos · filed 1995-08-15

This evidence of policy is sufficient to withstand defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the trial court erred in dismissing this portion of plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim. A section 1983 claim against the individual defendants in their official capacity is essentially a claim against Chapel Hill. Because Chapel Hill is not immune from suit, neither are defendants in their official capacity. However, we affirm summary judgment as to defendant McCall as plaintiffs presented no evidence of policy or custom on the part of her employer, the Town of Carrboro.

Section 1983 permits declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Tang v. Rhode Island, Department of Elderly Affairs · filed 1995-08-21

Because defendants Maigret and Sweet, acting in their official capacities, may be subject to declaratory or injunctive action pursuant to § 1983, they are properly named as defendants and will not be dismissed from this action in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary relief against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Lacey v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 1995-09-21

Initially, we note that to the extent Lacey sued the defendants in their official capacity for monetary relief, the defendants are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 covers claims against state defendants alleging that state action deprived the plaintiffs of constitutional rights.

Louisiana Affiliate of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Guste · filed 1974-03-19

The state defendants come within the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 since state action is attacked which allegedly results in the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 claims based on wrongful conduct under color of state law cannot be immunized by state law.

Moore v. Buckles · filed 1975-11-28

“ * * * Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 * * * cannot be immunized by state law. * * * ”

Section 1983 permits claims against state and county commissioners sued in their official capacities.

Holley v. Lavine · filed 1976-02-03

Judge Burke also held, however, that 'Neither the state commissioner nor the county commissioner,' sued in their official capacities, 'are within the scope of Section 1983' and that, in any event, 'The complaint asserts no substantial claim of unconstitutionality.' The former holding is incorrect under McMillan v. Board of Education, 430 F.2d 1145, 1148--49 (2d Cir. 1970), and Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1208 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889, 93 S.Ct. 126, 34 L.Ed.2d 147 (1972).

Section 1983 does not authorize suit against a state that is immune under the Eleventh Amendment, and a claim against individual officials requires allegations of their personal involvement in the unconstitutional conduct.

Kravitz v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, United States of America Ex Rel. Kravitz, Ethel v. Commonwealth of Pennsy · filed 1977-02-23

We also affirm the dismissal of the complaint predicated upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. ... The Governor and Attorney General named in the complaint were not in office when the alleged unconstitutional conduct occurred and it is not averred that they personally had anything to do with it. Under these circumstances, no claim for relief is stated against them.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only against state actors, not agents of the federal government.

American Science and Engineering, Inc. v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and · filed 1978-02-23

Plaintiff alleges entitlement to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, that is available only against state actors, not against agents of the federal government.

Section 1983 requires conduct attributable to state action, and an individual defendant must personally participate in the alleged constitutional deprivation to be liable.

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lake County Agricultural Society · filed 1980-08-14

Ordinarily, a private person or private corporation cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the wrongful action was committed under color or state law or authority. Therefore, the plaintiff must make a showing that the defendant’s actions are properly attributable to state action. ... In the present action both a nexus and symbiotic relationship between the state and the defendants can be shown. ... It has been agreed upon by the parties that there was no personal wrongdoing by any of the individually named defendants, with the exception of John H. Patterson, to bring them within the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “It has long been a rule that personal participation is a prerequisite to liability under § 1983.” ... In the present situation, John H. Patterson personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation or deprivation of the plaintiffs’ rights under the First Amendment by requesting that plaintiffs leave the fair. As a result of his personal participation, John H. Patterson is a proper party to the present action.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federally secured right; judges and prosecuting attorneys are immune from damages actions for judicial or prosecutorial acts, municipalities are not liable solely under respondeat superior for the acts of employees, and a State may not be sued for damages.

Whiteside v. State of Wash. · filed 1982-03-26

Section 1983 requires allegations sufficient to show deprivation of a right secured by the United States Constitution. ... Judges are immune from damages actions under Section 1983 based upon their errors when trying cases. ... The defendant prosecuting attorneys, officers of the court and acting for the City of Richland, similarly enjoy immunity. ... While the City of Richland is a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983, it is not liable for the alleged wrongs to plaintiff under traditional respondeat superior principles, as argued by plaintiff, by the mere act of employing the City Attorneys and judges. ... Finally, the State of Washington may not be included as a defendant in Section 1983 civil rights damages actions.

A supervisory official is not liable under § 1983 merely on a respondeat superior theory without personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing.

Isiah v. Williams v. Robert Brown · filed 1987-07-06

We are called upon only to consider the plaintiff's asserted cause of action against Brown, who was properly determined not to be liable on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires an agency policy or custom for official-capacity liability and personal involvement for a sheriff’s individual liability, excludes vicarious liability for detectives’ violations, and permits liability of private towing companies acting at police direction.

Segura v. Sherman Block Dale Christiansen Charles Overlease S & W Towing · filed 1993-11-12

In other words, the LASD's policies or customs must have played a part in the § 1983 violation. ... Segura may hold Block individually liable under § 1983 only if the sheriff was directly involved with, and played a personal role in, the deprivation of Segura's federal rights. ... Because Block is not vicariously liable for the detectives' alleged violations of § 1983, e.g., id., summary judgment in favor of the sheriff also was appropriate for his personal liability. ... Private towing companies that act at the behest of police may be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a city manager whose conduct constitutes unlawful employment retaliation.

Hall v. City of Brawley · filed 1995-05-23

As such, the reasoning employed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Miller is appropriately applied to this case, and the Plaintiffs claim of individual liability against Mr. Bennett under FEHA must fail but Mr. Bennett’s liability as established herein does exist under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat state officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Jolly v. Klein · filed 1996-03-29

Hence, while state officials literally are persons, if sued in their official capacities, they are not deemed “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes suits against state and local officers, but does not apply to the federal government or its officers.

Mays v. United States Postal Service · filed 1996-04-08

While Ms. Mays refers to § 1983 in her complaint, the court notes that § 1983 only authorizes suits against state and local officers. Thus, § 1983 has no application to the federal government or its officers.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or its officials in their official capacities as persons who may be sued under the statute.

Gamache v. Cavanaugh · filed 1996-04-12

Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), neither a state nor its officials in their official capacities are "persons" under section 1983. Thus, the appellants were entitled to summary judgment on all of Gamache's claims naming them in their official capacity.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for simple medical malpractice or a mere difference of opinion between a prisoner and physician; a constitutional claim requires mistreatment approaching a failure to provide medical care at all.

Shields v. Dr. E. P. Kunkel · filed 1971-05-10

Failure or refusal to provide medical care may violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but mistreatment does so only under exceptional circumstances that approach failure to provide care at all. Simple malpractice does not give rise to an action under section 1983. (Stiltner v. Rhay (9th Cir.) 371 F.2d 420, cert. denied (1967) 386 U.S. 997, 87 S.Ct. 1318, 18- L.Ed.2d 346.) The record in this case shows only a difference of opinion as to diagnosis and treatment, not a refusal to provide treatment. The defendant’s views may be wrong and might give rise to a malpractice claim under state law, but they cannot be said to be so outrageous as to amount to no treatment at all. A difference of opinion between patient and physician, without more, does not state a claim under section 1983. (Coppinger v. Townsend (10th Cir. 1968) 398 F.2d 392.)

Section 1983 does not provide a civil-rights action for a claim that is merely a tort claim for malpractice and negligence by defense counsel.

Smith v. Alfred C. Clapp, Esq · filed 1970-12-07

This contention must be rejected since the “claim * * * amounts to no more than a tort claim for malpractice and as such is not cognizable under the Civil Eights Act.”

Section 1983 does not provide federal relief for mere malpractice or simple negligence absent a constitutional deprivation.

Matthews v. Brown · filed 1973-05-02

Even had the plaintiff established a simple claim of malpractice this Court would not have jurisdiction to grant relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil-rights cause of action for a tort claim alleging malpractice by a professional man.

Fletcher v. Hook · filed 1971-05-17

We have consistently held that such a tort claim against a professional man for malpractice “is not cognizable under the Civil Rights Act.” Smith v. Clapp, 436 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1970); Isenberg v. Prasse, 433 F.2d 449 (3d Cir. 1970); cf. Bush v. Robinson, 442 F.2d 393 (3d Cir., 1970); Fear v. Commonwealth et al., 413 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1969); Christman v. Commonwealth et al., 275 F.Supp. 434, 435 (W.D.Pa.1967), application for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis denied (3d Cir., Misc. No. 893, Orders of 3/11/68 and 4/5/68), cert. den. sub nom. Christman v. Lesher, 393 U.S. 885, 89 S.Ct. 195, 21 L.Ed.2d 161 (1968).

Section 1983 does not provide a federal civil-rights claim for ordinary legal malpractice that does not amount to a constitutional violation.

Brown v. Steven Schiff, Granville Roberts, Jr. v. James J. Weldon · filed 1980-01-14

Similarly none of the alleged conduct by court appointed defense counsel in these cases is so egregious as to be violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Claims of legal malpractice do not achieve constitutional status solely by virtue of a claimant’s status as a defendant in a criminal proceeding. At most, appellants’ allegations sound in tort and a more proper forum could be provided in state court. We need not decide and do not reach the issue of whether defense attorneys are immune from suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 actions brought in Louisiana do not permit exemplary or punitive damages because § 1988 requires application of Louisiana law, which allows only compensatory damages absent a specific provision.

Ricard v. State · filed 1980-01-21

We conclude that exemplary or punitive damages are not available in a § 1983 action brought in this state. In this regard, Louisiana law is applicable pursuant to the provisions of § 1988.

Section 1983 does not provide recovery for medical malpractice that does not rise to a constitutional violation.

Majied v. Dr. Benjamin Ulep, in His Individual and Official Capacity as Director of the Medical Dept. Of Marqu · filed 1985-07-22

Plaintiff's complaint sounds in medical malpractice of nonconstitutional dimensions.

Section 1983 does not turn a workplace medical malpractice claim into a federal civil rights claim.

Godinet v. Thomas · filed 1991-12-19

Appellant is attempting to turn an accidental on-the-job injury into a deprivation of Valdez’s constitutionally protected rights. This is a State medical malpractice tort ease involving the treatment of Valdez. The Supreme Court has stated that section 1983 is not a “font of Tort Law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States.”

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights conferred by the Constitution or other statutes; it does not itself create substantive rights.

Hernandez v. Pierce · filed 1981-04-29

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights; rather, it “merely provides a remedy for the violation of rights conferred by the Constitution or other statutes.”

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of rights granted by the Constitution and federal laws, but creates no substantive rights of its own.

H. R. v. Hornbeck · filed 1981-09-24

Section 1983, however, provides no substantive rights of its own, but rather is a remedial statute imposing liability upon those who, under color of state law, work a deprivation upon a person’s rights, privileges or immunities otherwise granted by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 does not independently create or secure any substantive rights; it only authorizes a cause of action in federal court when rights established by another source have been infringed.

L & L Started Pullets, Inc. v. Gourdine · filed 1984-07-13

Section 1983 does not, however, independently create or secure any substantive rights; it merely authorizes a cause of action maintainable in federal court when rights established by another source have been infringed.

Section 1983 provides no substantive rights of its own; a claim under it rests on the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws.

Krupa v. New Castle County · filed 1990-03-15

Section 1983 provides no substantive protections of its own, rather, it refers to “deprivation[s] of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws....” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights of its own, so a claim under it depends on the disposition of the underlying rights asserted.

Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, Metropolitan Fire Department of Dade County · filed 1991-09-04

Because § 1983 secures no substantive rights of its own, our affirmance of Peightal’s Title VII and remand of his constitutional claims are dispositive also of his action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Williamson v. City of Virginia Beach, Va. · filed 1992-03-13

It is axiomatic that section 1983, standing alone, vests no substantive rights upon a plaintiff; it merely provides a remedy for deprivations of rights found elsewhere in the Constitution or in federal laws.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for damages and other relief for violations of federal constitutional rights, but does not itself guarantee substantive rights.

Ambrogio v. Carusone, No. 285291 (Apr. 19, 1993) · filed 1993-04-19

42 U.S.C. § 1983 guarantees no rights but provides a cause of action for damages and other relief for violation of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

Section 1983’s requirement of redress for a deprivation of civil rights does not require a monetary award.

Kaswan v. Mannings · filed 1993-11-23

There is no conflict between this rule and the requirement in 42 USC § 1983 that there be "redress” for a deprivation of civil rights, since the term "redress” is not limited to monetary awards.

Section 1983 provides remedies for violations of rights established elsewhere but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Gallipo v. City of Rutland · filed 1994-12-16

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights — “it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.”

Section 1983 permits a claim tied to a constitutional violation, but does not supply substantive rights on its own.

Green v. Clarendon County School District Three · filed 1996-04-30

Because Plaintiff does not assert any substantive rights arising out of § 1983 alone, but only in conjunction with constitutional violations, this court denies Defendants’ motion to that effect.

Section 1983 does not treat states or state officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to a claim for damages.

Lilley ex rel. Missouri Defense Bonds v. Missouri · filed 1996-02-27

It is well established that states and state officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Therefore, plaintiffs’ claim in Count III will be dismissed against the State of Missouri, the Board, and the individual defendants in their official capacities.

States, state agencies, and state officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are not persons subject to liability under § 1983.

Ruh v. Samerjan · filed 1993-03-01

Still another deficiency in Ms. Ruh’s claim for relief stems from the fact that her suit against the state agencies and the state officials in their official capacities for money damages are barred because states, state agencies, and state officials sued in their official capacity are not considered “persons” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and thus are not subject to liability under that statute.

Section 1983 does not authorize a suit against a state as an entity by naming its attorney general in an official capacity.

Sherman v. Community Consolidated School District 21 Of Wheeling Township · filed 1992-11-20

Plaintiffs apparently named the office of the Attorney General in an effort to obtain a judgment binding the State of Illinois as an entity, a step that Congress did not authorize when enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that the eleventh amendment does not permit in the absence of such authorization.

Section 1983 does not permit suit for damages or equitable relief against a state department, but permits injunctive relief against the responsible official; damages against the official are barred when the official acted in objective good faith.

Nebraska Department of Roads Employees Ass'n v. Department of Roads · filed 1973-08-08

In view of City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973), holding that a city is not a “person” under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore is subject neither to damages nor to equitable strictures, the Department of Roads, a subdivision of the State of Nebraska, similarly is free of the Civil Rights Act. The considerations relating to a city appear to be equally persuasive for a department of a state government. The defendant Doyle, however, under the Act, is subject to injunctive relief and may be liable in damages. ... Careful review of the .evidence leads me to conclude that the plaintiff has not carried his burden of proving that the defendant Doyle did not act in good faith, measured by an objective standard. Doyle thought he had an unlimited right to fire Kiernan, and he thought that Kiernan was insubordinate. He was mistaken in both instances, but he did not act in bad faith. ... Necessarily, the result is that no judgment for damages should be entered against Doyle.