42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for deliberate indifference to training deficiencies that cause constitutional violations.

Young v. City of Providence · filed 2005-11-02

To the contrary, as head of the Training Academy attended by Solitro, Cohen clearly can be liable as a supervisor in a § 1983 action for the failure to train.

Section 1983 permits a supervisor to be held liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violation when the supervisor acts or fails to act with deliberate indifference to others’ constitutional rights.

Atteberry v. Nocona General Hospital · filed 2005-11-03

However, supervisors may be liable for constitutional violations committed by subordinate employees when supervisors act, or fail to act, with deliberate indifference to violations of others’ constitutional rights committed by their subordinates.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if the supervisor personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or has a causal connection to it.

Asad v. James v. Crosby · filed 2005-11-09

Rather, such liability attaches under § 1983 only “when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. (emphasis added).

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

David v. Hill · filed 2005-11-16

Moreover, the mere fact that Major Wallace was Officer Hill’s supervisor fails to allege personal involvement, a prerequisite for § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because of their supervisory positions; personal involvement in the alleged wrong is required.

Brown v. Williams · filed 2005-11-21

Because § 1983 prohibits the imposition of liability on the sole basis of the doctrine of respondeat superi- or, the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Swain v. Price · filed 2005-11-22

Swain is effectively relying on a respondeat superior theory that is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on a supervisor’s own breach of a duty to supervise staff, rather than vicarious liability for the staff’s acts.

Billops v. Sandoval · filed 2005-11-23

Rather, Plaintiff complains of the Doctor Defendants’ own malfeasance — namely, the Doctor Defendants’ breach of their legal duty to supervise their staff. Based on the authorities and analysis below, the Court concludes Plaintiffs claim against the Doctor Defendants under § 1983 does not sound in vicarious liability and this ground for dismissal is denied.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a subordinate’s unconstitutional acts solely on a respondeat superior or vicarious liability theory.

Hyland v. Kolhage · filed 2005-11-29

The district court did not err in err in dismissing the suit as to Kolhage because supervisory officials are not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged wrong; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Brookins v. Williams · filed 2005-11-30

Personal involvement can be established through allegations of either personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence; however, such allegations must be made with particularity. ... Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court finds that plaintiff has not shown any evidence that defendant had either personal knowledge of, or in any way acquiesced to, plaintiffs situation.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a supervisor’s acts or omissions and the alleged deprivation of rights.

Rodriguez v. Garcia · filed 2005-11-30

Further, for plaintiff to prevail he must bring evidence of a casual connection or relationship between the alleged misconduct and the supervisor’s acts or omissions. ... We find there is no connection between any acts or omissions of the supervisors and the alleged illegal confinement. Thus, we conclude that there is no basis for supervisory liability in this case.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest on respondeat superior; a defendant must be personally involved.

Ford v. Wolfe · filed 2005-12-06

With respect to Ford’s remaining claims, the Magistrate Judge explained that § 1983 liability cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior. ... We agree with the District Court’s analysis of Ford’s claims, as expressed in the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation.

Supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 solely because of their general supervisory responsibilities.

Sanders v. Fayetteville City Police Department · filed 2005-12-13

Specifically, the district court correctly concluded that Mr. Sanders could not maintain his claims against the FPD, because it is not capable of being sued; Ms. Shue, because of prosecutorial immunity; the Chief and Assistant Chief of Police, and the Mayor of Fayetteville, because Mr. Sanders sought to hold them liable based solely on their general supervisory responsibilities; and Captain Tabor, because his purportedly inadequate investigation of Mr. Sanders’s treatment during his arrest and detention did not deprive Mr. Sanders of “any rights, privileges, or immunities” giving rise to a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a supervisor whose own conduct causes a constitutional injury, who acquiesces in a constitutional deprivation, or whose conduct shows reckless or callous indifference to others’ rights.

Estate of Abdollahi Ex Rel. Abdollahi v. County of Sacramento · filed 2005-12-15

For the court to hold defendants liable in their individual capacities, plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) that defendants’ “own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates” caused the constitutional injury; (2) that they “acquiesce[d] in the constitutional deprivations of which [the] complaint is made;” or (3) that their conduct showed a “reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.”

Section 1983 liability for a sheriff’s allegedly inadequate hiring of jail medical staff requires deliberate indifference and a causal link to the injury.

Bunton v. Kreuzer · filed 2005-12-15

Bunton has failed to show that Kreuzer was “deliberately indifferent” in failing to hire adequate medical personnel or that the purported inadequate hiring caused Bunton’s injury.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability, but a supervisor may be liable for acts or omissions showing reckless or callous indifference to others’ constitutional rights.

Niemic v. Maloney · filed 2005-12-21

While the theory of respondeat superior does not support liability under § 1983, a plaintiff can state a § 1983 claim for supervisory liability where he alleges with some foundation that the defendant’s acts or omissions “amounted] to a reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others”.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of that position; the subordinate’s misconduct must be linked to the supervisor’s action or inaction.

Betts v. Gilbert · filed 2005-12-22

A supervisor cannot be held liable under section 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior. ... Rather, the misconduct of the subordinate must be affirmatively linked to the action or inaction of the supervisor.

Section 1983 generally does not make supervisors liable for employees’ actions under respondeat superior.

Redd v. R.L. Conway · filed 2005-12-22

Second, the doctrine of respondeat superior generally is not recognized under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability without direct participation when a supervisor sets in motion acts he knew or reasonably should have known would cause a constitutional injury.

Motley v. Parks · filed 2005-12-29

A supervisor can be liable under § 1983 if he “set[s] in motion a series of acts by others ..., which he knew or reasonably should have known, would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Liability can exist without direct participation by the supervisor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely under a theory of respondeat superior.

Young v. Dretke · filed 2005-12-30

The district court “pierc[ed] the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations” and held that Young sought 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relief based on the meritless legal theory of respondeat superior liability. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 303-04 (5th Cir. 1987). Our review of Young’s complaint convinces us that its dismissal as frivolous was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires more than conclusory allegations of a policy or custom; the plaintiff must describe the policy or custom and the unconstitutional practices it permitted.

Rivera v. Salazar · filed 2005-12-30

Although he asserts that Castillo created a “policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred,” he describes neither the policy or custom nor the “unconstitutional practices.” These conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish supervisory liability.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires unconstitutional conduct by a subordinate.

McQueen v. Beecher · filed 2006-01-05

These principles make clear that a prerequisite of supervisory liability under § 1983 is unconstitutional conduct by a subordinate of the supervisor.

Section 1983 requires more than a conclusory allegation that a supervisor failed to train or supervise staff.

Salas v. Tillman · filed 2006-01-17

Finally, Salas’s conclusory allegation that Warden Tillman failed to properly train and supervise his staff to protect Salas from their unconstitutional actions was insufficient to set forth a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against supervisors when grievances show they knew of repeated missed medication and may have failed to take corrective action.

King v. Busby · filed 2006-01-18

These grievances tend to show that Bonner, Cooper, and Harper were aware of King’s missed medication and may have failed to take corrective action because King continued to miss medication doses.

A non-physician prison supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for medical mistreatment if the supervisor knew or had reason to know of it.

Flanyak v. Hopta · filed 2006-01-23

This holding has, however, been limited by Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir.2004), in which the Third Circuit held that a non-physician supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if he had knowledge or reason to know of the medical mistreatment. ... The record fails to establish that defendant Cerullo had actual knowledge or reason to believe that the plaintiff was not being treated or was being mistreated by prison medical staff.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor acts or fails to act with deliberate indifference to a subordinate’s violation of constitutional rights.

Atteberry v. Nocona General Hosp · filed 2006-01-23

However, supervisors may be liable for constitutional violations committed by subordinate employees when supervisors act, or fail to act, with deliberate indifference to violations of others’ constitutional rights committed by their subordinates.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s actions under respondeat superior.

Norris Anderson, Jr. v. Ga. State Pardons & Parole · filed 2006-01-25

Additionally, to the extent that Anderson asserts that Ray or the Board are responsible for the actions by Henderson and Collins, § 1983 does not provide for liability under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only when an affirmative link connects the deprivation to the supervisor’s participation, direction, control, or failure to supervise.

Specht v. Jensen · filed 1988-02-04

A supervisor is not liable under section 1983 unless an "affirmative link" exists between the deprivation and either the supervisor's "personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise."

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Volk v. Coler · filed 1988-05-02

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Volk, Coler’s and Hairston’s actions, although very close to the line at which liability attaches, are not sufficient to establish their liability. The personal involvement of Coler and Hairston with respect to Volk’s § 1983 claims is equally lacking with respect to her § 1985(3) claims. We therefore affirm the district court’s directed verdicts for defendants Coler and Hairston with respect to Volk’s claims under §§ 1983 and 1985(3).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires deliberate indifference and an affirmative link between the supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional deprivation.

Estate of Smith v. Silvas · filed 2006-01-30

To succeed in such a section 1983 supervisory liability claim, the Estate must again demonstrate deliberate indifference, as well as “an affirmative link between the supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional deprivation.”

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s failure to use a specific practice creates a known, disregarded risk of injury and causes a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Johnson v. Anhorn · filed 2006-01-31

In order to render a supervisor liable for the constitutional violations of a subordinate under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 1) identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure that the supervisor failed to employ, and show that 2) the existing practice and procedure without the identified, absent one created an unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury, 3) the supervisor was aware that this unreasonable risk existed, 4) the supervisor was indifferent to the risk, and 5) the underling’s violation resulted from the supervisor’s failure to employ that supervisory practice and procedure.

A § 1983 supervisory liability claim fails when the supervisor’s subordinates committed no constitutional violation.

Aselton v. Town of East Hartford · filed 2006-02-07

Although there is a question of fact as to whether there is a causal link between Shay’s failure to institute certain policies and procedures in the dispatch department and the misinformation conveyed to the decedent, our conclusion that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment as to the claims against Shay’s subordinates, and thus that no constitutional violation occurred, precludes a claim of supervisory liability against Shay.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor and a subordinate’s misconduct to establish supervisory liability.

Velez-Rivera v. Alicea · filed 2006-02-10

In this case, Peña has failed to allege any link between Agosto and whoever canceled his contract, whether Díaz or another, unnamed individual.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervising officer actually acquiesces in subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct.

Cuvo v. De Biasi · filed 2006-02-14

We note that Cuvo alleges that Chief Fretz “actually acquiesced” in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct perpetrated by Officer De Biasi and Detective Monek. This can provide the basis for supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff liable under respondeat superior for constitutional violations committed by jailers.

Vaughn v. Greene County, AR · filed 2006-02-17

Such an assertion attempts to establish Sheriff Langston’s liability on a theory of respondeat superior for any constitutional violations committed by those directly involved with Blount before his death, and it is well settled the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to section 1983 claims.

A § 1983 discrimination claim against a supervisor requires evidence that the supervisor discriminated directly or knew of and acquiesced in another’s discrimination.

Evans v. Port Auth · filed 2006-02-23

Claims that supervisors directly or indirectly participated in alleged discriminatory behavior must be supported by evidence of direct discrimination by the supervisor or evidence that the supervisor possessed actual knowledge of and/or acquiesced in the discriminatory behavior of others.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for another person’s actions solely because of a supervisory role.

Olivarez v. Petter · filed 2006-02-23

Finally, Olivarez’s claim that Ratcliff and Buchanik are liable for Petter’s actions solely due to their supervisory roles is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors through respondeat superior; a claim must allege their personal involvement.

Taek Sang Yoon v. Hickman · filed 2006-02-24

Yoon did not allege any facts showing how either played a role in denying Yoon dental care and the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to Yoon’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation, but does not require direct participation.

Morello v. James · filed 1992-06-17

Although personal involvement is necessary to a finding of liability, direct participation of a Corrections Facility superintendent in the alleged constitutional deprivations is not always necessary.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisory official to show the official’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Locicero v. O'CONNELL · filed 2006-03-06

It is well-established that, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a supervisory official, a plaintiff must show that the official was personally involved in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for supervisory liability; a supervisor cannot be held liable solely because of a subordinate’s conduct.

Reynolds v. Smythe · filed 2006-03-09

Under § 1983, supervisory liability cannot be predicated on respondeat superior, but must be based on personal involvement. Plaintiff has not presented evidence to show that Chief Smythe was personally involved in the detention and arrest on May 26, 2002.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior when supervisors had no notice of the risk and no involvement in the attack.

Sepulveda v. Burnside · filed 2006-03-13

Sepulveda's claims against Defendants Oelrich, Burnside, and Morrow are essentially respondeat superior claims, and there is no evidence that any of them was on notice that Sepulveda was at risk of being harmed by any inmate, or that any of them was involved with the attack by Small.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged violation; a supervisory role alone does not establish liability.

Smith v. Freil · filed 2006-03-14

Mr. Smith makes no allegations that Defendants Carver, Friel, or Garfield had any knowledge of the risk other inmates posed to Mr. Smith. In fact, he never mentions any of these defendants at all in his factual allegations; it appears that these defendants were named solely based on their supervisory roles. Accordingly, these defendants were properly dismissed. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that respondeat superior liability is not cognizable for an action based on § 1983 and that “personal participation is an essential allegation in a § 1983 claim”) (quotations and alteration omitted).

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Henderson v. New York · filed 2006-03-14

Liability of supervisory officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be premised on re-spondeat superior. Rather, the plaintiff must establish fault and causation on the part of each defendant. Consequently, a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation is a prerequisite to the imposition of damages.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for subordinates’ conduct when the subordinates did not violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Asad v. Jeb Bush · filed 2006-03-14

Taylor cannot be held liable for the conduct of the other chaplains under any theory of liability if the conduct of the subordinate chaplains did not violate Asad’s rights.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s unconstitutional acts solely because of the supervisory relationship.

McBride v. Rivers · filed 2006-03-14

“It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because an official supervised officers who violated constitutional rights; the official must be personally involved.

Cruz v. Rico · filed 2006-03-16

Therefore, inasmuch as § 1983 does not provide for supervisory liability, plaintiffs averments against Gue-varez-Garcia are not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely through respondeat superior.

Prince v. Reyes · filed 2006-03-17

Prince’s claims against Kolendar in his individual capacity are based on respondeat superior liability, which is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Strong v. Woodford · filed 2006-03-21

Under section 1983, a supervisor may be liable only if there exists either “(1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows or should know of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, responds with deliberate indifference or tacit authorization, and that inaction causes the injury.

Ensko v. Howard County, Md. · filed 2006-03-22

To establish supervisor liability under § 1983 a plaintiff must show: 1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinates were engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; 2) that the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the conduct; and 3) that the supervisor’s inaction caused the plaintiffs constitutional injury.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because the officers involved acted under their authority.

Hendrickson v. Davis · filed 2006-03-22

Hendrickson’s allegations that the officers involved in the incident were acting under the authority of Colonel Davis and Sheriff Rogers are insufficient to state a claim against these two officials.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ conduct.

Rios v. City of Del Rio TX · filed 2006-03-27

There is no vicarious or respondeat superior liability of supervisors under section 1983.

A supervisor may be liable under Section 1983 for creating and maintaining a policy that permits a constitutional deprivation, even without direct involvement in the particular hiring decision.

Krause v. BUFFALO AND ERIE COUNTY WORKFORCE DEV. · filed 2006-03-28

Although direct involvement in an alleged constitutional deprivation is the first of five conditions identified by the Second Circuit as supporting supervisory liability under § 1983, a plain reading of the Complaint shows that Krause claims that Giambra, Calabrese, Finamore and Bratek created and maintained a policy that permitted the alleged constitutional deprivation, the third condition supporting § 1983 supervisory liability.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of rights before the supervisor can be held personally liable.

Mayorga v. State of MO · filed 2006-03-30

As Mayorga cannot establish personal involvement of the supervisory defendants, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires specific facts showing a supervisor’s personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of rights to establish personal liability.

Mayorga v. Missouri · filed 2006-03-30

To establish personal liability of the supervisory defendants, Mayorga must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his constitutional rights.

Under § 1983, a supervisor’s actual knowledge of sexual harassment followed by inaction can establish supervisory liability.

Fye v. Oklahoma Corp. Commission · filed 2006-04-06

Fye alleges that she told Bode about Daxon’s conduct and that Bode never investigated it. “Such knowledge and subsequent inaction is sufficient to establish supervisory liability under § 1983.” Martin, 195 F.3d at 1220. Bode’s complete inaction in the face of actual knowledge, if proven, violated a constitutional right that was, at the time, clearly established, and she is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 supervisory liability for an Eighth Amendment claim can be shown by a supervisor’s failure to respond appropriately to a pattern of similar injuries.

Counterman v. Warren County Correctional Facility · filed 2006-04-11

The simplest way for a plaintiff to make out such a claim is to demonstrate a supervisor’s failure to respond appropriately when confronted by a pattern of injuries similar to the plaintiff’s, thereby suggesting deliberate indifference on the part of the supervisor.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying injury; supervisors cannot be liable for failing to stop conduct that did not violate the statute.

Jennings v. University of North Carolina · filed 2006-04-11

If no “injury” has taken place, then the plaintiff cannot satisfy element three and the claim fails. Because neither Dorrance nor Palladino violated section 1983, the supervisory defendants cannot be held liable for failing to stop a non-violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the supervisor plays an affirmative part in the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Trujillo v. City of Ontario · filed 2006-04-14

Under § 1983, supervisors can only be held liable if “they play an affirmative part in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.”

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of their position of authority.

Raile v. Ortiz · filed 2006-04-17

Contrary to Mr. Raile’s assertions, however, case law makes clear “[a] defendant cannot be liable under a respondeat superior theory in a section 1983 case.” McKee v. Heggy, 703 F.2d 479, 483 (10th Cir. 1983).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires the supervising official’s personal participation in a constitutional violation.

Branson v. Fairman · filed 2006-04-17

Summary judgment was also proper on Brandon’s claims against supervising officials because he failed to allege that they personally participated in any constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because they oversee officials who violate constitutional rights.

Omar Ex Rel. Kelaher v. Babcock · filed 2006-04-18

Moreover, Morales and Rowley cannot be implicated based solely upon their supervisory authority.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional injury.

Mejia v. City of Sacramento · filed 2006-04-19

Because no supervisory liability exists if no constitutional harm has been done, Mejia can bring supervisory claims relating only to his viable knock-and-announce claim.

Supervisors sued under § 1983 for failure to train or supervise are entitled to qualified immunity when the evidence raises no genuine issue that they acted with deliberate indifference.

Chishty v. TEXAS DEPT. OF AGING AND DISABILITY · filed 2006-05-04

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the individual Defendants' actions constituted deliberate indifference. Sibley, Russell and Brookins are, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity.

A supervisor sued under § 1983 for failure to train or supervise is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show deliberate indifference.

Chishty v. Texas Department of Aging & Disability Services · filed 2006-05-04

Moreover, the Plaintiffs have presented no summary judgment evidence that the training of employees was so inadequate as to be obviously likely to result in a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the individual Defendants’ actions constituted deliberate indifference. Sibley, Russell and Brookins are, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity.

A supervisor’s failure to investigate an abuse claim made after an alleged attack does not establish personal involvement for § 1983 liability.

Lewis v. Rawson · filed 2006-05-09

Also without merit is Lewis’s claim that the supervisory defendants were personally involved in the incident based upon their failure to investigate the claims of abuse he made after he had allegedly been attacked.

Section 1983 liability for failure to train or supervise requires evidence that the supervisor had notice of the subordinates’ conduct.

Thorbes v. Bahl · filed 2006-05-11

Likewise, the record does not support liability based on a theory of failure to train or supervise, given the lack of evidence from which a jury could infer either Bahl or Williams had notice their subordinates were delaying the administration of Thorbes’s medication, see Otey v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1150, 1155 (8th Cir. 1997); and for the same reason, the record also does not present any trialworthy issues on Thorbes’s negligent-supervision claim, see Cook v. Smith, 33 S.W.3d 548, 553 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (plaintiff must show one who has breached duty of care to plaintiff could reasonably have foreseen resulting injuries of type suffered by plaintiff).

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor when a failure to train or supervise, or a policy, leads to a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Tripati v. State · filed 2000-12-19

Federal courts have thus recognized a cause of action under § 1983 when a plaintiff alleged that a supervisor’s failure to train or to supervise personnel led to the deprivation of constitutional rights, or when a policy existed that led to the deprivation of such rights.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a showing of the defendant’s personal participation in the alleged violation.

Volpicelli v. Baca · filed 2006-05-18

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants Baca, Budge, and Hallinan because Volpicelli failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding their involvement in the alleged violations. See Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir.2001) (section 1983 supervisory liability arises only upon a showing of personal participation by defendant).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a subordinate’s conduct; a plaintiff must show the supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged violation.

Jones v. Goord · filed 2006-05-26

In a § 1983 action, a supervisor cannot be held liable for his subordinates under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Rather, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had some “personal involvement” with the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 permits a claim against supervisory school officials when their alleged deliberate indifference supports a state-created-danger claim.

Sylvia v. Rivera, No. 547719 (Mar. 14, 2001) · filed 2001-03-14

Thus, the court concludes that the state created danger exception, as filtered through the deliberate indifference standard, would be sufficient, given the allegations of this complaint, to permit a viable § 1983 claim certainly against the supervisory school defendants Little and Birch.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor directly participates in a constitutional violation or a failure to train causes the deprivation.

Miller v. Andy Lee · filed 2002-02-07

Upon de novo review, see Spencer v. Knapheide Truck Equip. Co., 183 F.3d 902, 904-05 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1157 (2000), we agree with the district court, see Williams v. Kelso, 201 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir. 2000) (to establish claim of deliberate indifference to substantial risk of serious harm, plaintiff must show more than negligence); Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 635 (8th Cir. 2001) (supervisor liability arises only if supervisor directly participates in constitutional violation, or failure to train causes constitutional deprivation).

Section 1983 supervisory liability for inadequate prisoner medical care requires allegations that the supervisors actually knew their subordinates posed a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk.

Pubill-Rivera v. Curet · filed 2002-05-31

Accordingly, Farmer’s subjective inquiry of “deliberate indifference” requires plaintiff to allege that Dr. Curet and Dr. Madera had actual knowledge that their subordinates engaged in a conduct that posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Amaury’s health and that they disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based on respondeat superior; a supervisor must direct the challenged actions or know of and acquiesce in them.

Jetter v. Beard · filed 2006-05-31

Liability under § 1983 cannot be imposed on the basis of respondeat superior. Personal involvement must be alleged and is only present where the supervisor directed the actions of supervisees or actually knew of the actions and acquiesced in them.

Section 1983 claims against supervisors can survive a motion to dismiss when the complaint sufficiently alleges that their policy decisions set constitutional violations in motion or that they knew of abuses and were deliberately indifferent.

Hydrick v. Demorales · filed 2006-05-31

Because Defendants were directors and policy-makers for Atascadero State Hospital, we believe Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the constitutional violations they suffered were “set in motion” by Defendants’ policy decisions or, at the very least, that Defendants knew of these abuses and demonstrated a deliberate indifference to the SVPs’ plight.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in a constitutional violation or has a causal connection to it.

Valdes v. James v. Crosby, Jr. · filed 2006-05-31

Supervisory liability under § 1983 occurs “when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor participates in or directs a constitutional violation, or knows of it and fails to act to prevent it.

Hydrick v. Hunter · filed 2006-06-01

Although there is no pure respondeat superior liability under § 1983, a supervisor is liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates "if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989).

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s policy decisions cause constitutional violations or the supervisor knows of violations and fails to act.

Hydrick v. Hunter · filed 2006-06-01

In limited circumstances, a person can also be subject to § 1983 liability for the acts of others. ... Because Defendants were directors and policy-makers for Atascadero State Hospital, we believe Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the constitutional violations they suffered were “set in motion” by Defendants’ policy decisions or, at the very least, that Defendants knew of these abuses and demonstrated a deliberate indifference to the SVPs’ plight.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Burch v. Regents of the University of California · filed 2006-06-05

However, a supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior basis, absent a statute stating otherwise.

Section 1983 supervisory liability cannot rest on a mere failure to act; it requires active unconstitutional conduct.

Spencer v. Bouchard · filed 2006-06-06

The defendants press only one argument in urging us to affirm the district court on this claim: “supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot be based on a mere failure to act.” Appellee Br. at 17. This proposition is, of course, true.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based on respondeat superior or another theory of vicarious liability.

Truvia v. Julien · filed 2006-06-12

Moreover, § 1983 does not create supervisory liability based on respondeat superior or any other theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 supervisory liability for inadequate training or supervision requires an underlying constitutional violation and an affirmative link between that violation and the supervisor’s actions or failure to supervise.

Randall v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2006-06-13

In addition, because Randall is seeking to impose § 1983 liability on defendant Bruner based on an inadequate supervision and training theory, Randall must show both that one or more of the employees at the jail acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and that there is “an affirmative link between the constitutional violation and the supervisor’s own actions, or failure to supervise.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff solely because he supervises a jail; the claim requires personal participation or evidence of improper training or an unconstitutional policy or custom causing the alleged violation.

Justice v. Wallace · filed 2006-06-22

W e agree with the district court that M r. Justice came forward with only conclusory allegations to support his claims against Commissioner W allace, and failed to show personal participation by Sheriff Pearson in the alleged constitutional violations. He also failed to present any evidence of improper training or unconstitutional policy or custom by Sheriff Pearson resulting in the alleged violations.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for supervisors who directly participate in a constitutional violation or fail to supervise and train officers.

Johnson v. Blaukat · filed 2006-06-27

Supervisors can be individually liable if they directly participate in a constitutional violation or if they failed to supervise and train officers.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for the acts of subordinates.

Arens v. Fletcher · filed 2006-06-27

we conclude dismissal was proper. See Vaughn v. Greene County, Ark., 438 F.3d 845, 851 (8th Cir. 2006) ( “[I]t ... is well settled the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to section 1983 claims”).

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a constitutional deprivation and a supervisor’s participation, control, direction, or failure to supervise.

Guttman v. Widman · filed 2006-06-28

To establish supervisor liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that “an affirmative link exists between the [constitutional] deprivation and either the supervisor’s personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise.”

Section 1983 does not automatically charge supervisors with personal knowledge of risks described in an inmate’s written complaints.

Armstrong v. Price · filed 2006-06-28

Armstrong failed to show, however, that they, as supervisors, were automatically charged with personal knowledge of the risks Armstrong had written about or that they actually were required to investigate those risks.

Section 1983 permits individual supervisory liability when a supervisor facilitates, approves, or condones subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct and thereby personally causes a deprivation of rights.

Mayes v. City of Hammond, In · filed 2006-07-05

Upon a review of the facts of record, viewed in the light most favorable to Mayes, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Solan is individually liable in his supervisory role for the conduct of Townsell, Ratajczak, and Myszak by facilitating, approving, and condoning their alleged unconstitutional activity and thus personally causing Mayes to be deprived of his right to a fair trial.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely because they oversee officials who commit constitutional violations.

Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson · filed 2006-07-06

It is settled law that supervisors cannot be held liable in a § 1983 suit solely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a prison official’s denial of grievances.

Collins v. Goord · filed 2006-07-11

As for Mazzuca, plaintiff offers no specific allegations, but his submissions suggest that Mazzuca’s only involvement in plaintiffs exhausted claims consisted of affirming the Fishkill IGRC’s denial of Collins’ photocopying and stiff-barreled pens grievances. Such denials, standing alone, do not suffice to support Section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisory officials solely for their subordinates’ unconstitutional acts.

Cotton v. Burgess · filed 2006-07-12

“It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a failure-to-train claim requires a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the alleged injury.

Hathcock v. Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc. · filed 2006-07-12

As for the allegations against Jenne for inadequate training, the magistrate judge found that the conclusory allegations were insufficient to sustain the complaint, Hathcock had not identified a specific policy leading to a constitutional violation, and Hathcock could not rely on the theory of vicarious liability. The magistrate judge noted that Hathcock did not make any specific claims against Jenne that established a causal connection between the alleged failure to train and any injury he sustained. ... After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the magistrate judge applied the proper legal standards, and we agree with the well-reasoned report and recommendation, which the district court affirmed.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a supervisor’s conduct and the alleged constitutional harm before the supervisor can be held indirectly liable.

Libman v. City of Avondale Estates · filed 2006-07-12

To establish that Tarpley, Tweed’s supervisor, is indirectly liable for the alleged unconstitutional acts of Tweed, Libman must establish that Tarpley’s behavior caused Libman’s alleged harm.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of their position; the supervisor must be personally involved or knowingly acquiesce through deliberate indifference.

Spann v. Roper · filed 2006-07-13

Spann’s claim based on the treatment he received in the months following the incident fails, see Phillips v. Jasper County Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 795 (8th Cir. 2006) (mere disagreement with treatment decisions does not rise to level of constitutional violation); and summary judgment was also proper as to Roper for the reasons explained by the district court, see Frey v. City of Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 672 (8th Cir. 1995) (civil rights plaintiff cannot pursue § 1983 claim against officials under respondeat superior); Ottman v. City of Independence, 341 F.3d 751, 761 (8th Cir. 2003) (supervisory liability for violation of federally protected right occurs when supervisor is personally involved or when corrective inaction constitutes deliberate indifference; supervisor must know about conduct and in some way acquiesce).

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff liable for deputies’ conduct solely under a respondeat superior theory.

Oliver v. Prator · filed 2006-07-17

However, the Sheriff cannot be held liable pursuant to Section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.

A plaintiff bringing an individual-capacity § 1983 claim against a supervisor must show the supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Goodson v. Evans · filed 2006-07-18

A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a supervisory official in his individual capacity must show that the supervisor was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability for a subordinate's conduct.

Hughes v. Stottlemyre · filed 2006-07-19

"[I]t is well settled that § 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability." Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)), and nothing in the cases cited by Hughes changes this longstanding rule.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation for supervisory liability.

Hirsch v. Fortner · filed 2006-07-27

To the extent that Hirsch sued Dr. Love, Warden Blevins, Dr. Stovo, Dr. Reimer, and Dr. Murray in their supervisory capacities, Hirsch has not shown the defendants’ personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires personal involvement in the alleged violation or actual knowledge and acquiescence.

Grayer v. Township of Edison · filed 2006-08-01

Moreover, there is no indication that Anderko was personally involved or actually knew and acquiesced in Wheeler’s alleged violative activities in the kitchen. See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1294 (3d Cir. 1997). He therefore is entitled to summary judgment on the supervisory liability claims against him as well.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for an Eighth Amendment violation when the supervisor was neither aware of the conduct nor personally involved in the violation.

Otha Smith v. Clark · filed 2006-08-07

Although Mr. Clarke is the chief administrator of Nebraska's prison system, we have repeatedly held that a supervisor cannot be held liable for an eighth amendment violation if he or she is neither aware of the conduct nor "personally involved in the violation." Meloy v. Bachmeier, 302 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 2002); Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1995).

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional actions solely because of their supervisory role.

Laquarius Gray v. Bostic · filed 2006-08-07

Supervisory officials cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of their subordinates based on respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a constitutional violation when the supervisor was neither aware of the conduct nor personally involved in the violation.

Otha Smith v. Harold Clarke Patrick Colerick · filed 2006-08-07

Although Mr. Clarke is the chief administrator of Nebraska’s prison system, we have repeatedly held that a supervisor cannot be held liable for an eighth amendment violation if he or she is neither aware of the conduct nor “personally involved in the violation.” ... There is no evidence that Mr. Clarke was personally aware of Mr. Smith’s health problems or his medical treatment.

Section 1983 does not permit injunctive relief against a public official based solely on isolated misconduct by subordinates without the official’s participation or knowing failure to stop it.

Wilgus v. Peterson · filed 1972-01-05

Except to the extent defendants in this action have been shown, either by way of action or inaction, to have personally violated a right secured to plaintiffs by the United States Constitution, they are not responsible to the plaintiffs under the Civil Rights Act. While the application of this principle may be somewhat different in an action for injunctive relief than in an action for damages, I do not believe that injunctive relief against a public official is appropriate based solely on the isolated actions of subordinates where there is no showing that the official has participated in the wrongful conduct or has knowingly ignored that conduct when he had the duty and the practical ability to terminate it.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be personally involved in causing a constitutional deprivation or to have actual knowledge, or be charged with such knowledge, of subordinates’ deprivations and negligently fail to prevent them.

Potts Ex Rel. Potts v. Wright · filed 1973-03-30

A defendant will not be held liable under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the defendant was personally involved in causing the deprivation of a constitutional right or he either has or is charged with having actual knowledge that his subordinates are causing deprivations of constitutional rights, and he is negligent in failing to take action to prevent the deprivations.

A supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 for implicitly authorizing a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Lanman v. Hinson · filed 2006-08-10

A reasonable jury could therefore hold Defendant Stiver liable for implicitly authorizing the allegedly unconstitutional restraint of the decedent.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a failure to prevent a subordinate’s conduct; the supervisor must have encouraged, participated in, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct.

Mosby v. Colson · filed 2006-08-14

The essence of Mosby’s arguments regarding these defendants is that they failed to prevent subordinate employees from terminating his prison employment. Nowhere in his complaint does Mosby allege that Defendants Steward and Colson either encouraged or directly participated in the termination decision.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot rest solely on respondeat superior.

Rodriguez v. Town of West New York · filed 2006-08-14

Leaving aside the question of qualified immunity, in order to be liable under § 1983 as supervisors, individual city officials must have "personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior." Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)).

A § 1983 supervisory liability claim cannot proceed when the record presents no trialworthy issue of the supervisor’s personal involvement.

Wilson v. Boone County, AR · filed 2006-08-14

For the reasons explained by the district court, we agree with the court that the record did not establish trialworthy issues as to (1) Hickman’s personal involvement in the preparation and presentation of the affidavit, see Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir. 1996) (supervisory liability under § 1983); (2) Rupp’s and Lafferty’s entitlement to qualified immunity on the individual-capacity claims against them, see Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986) (question is whether reasonably well-trained officer in petitioner’s position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for warrant); Turpin, 262 F.3d at 783 (two-step analysis in qualified immunity determination); and (3) the constitutionality of the County policy Wilson challenged, see Monell v. NY City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978) (local government’s § 1983 liability).

Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability for a supervisor’s subordinate’s acts.

Hayes v. Woodford · filed 2006-08-16

Respondeat superior liability is not available in § 1983 claims.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot rest on a single incident of supervisors upholding and ratifying a subordinate’s decision.

Moore v. Greenwood School District No. 52 · filed 2006-08-18

The single incident of upholding and ratifying Defendant Doolittle’s decision not to renew Moore’s coaching contract is insufficient as a matter of law to establish supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not make a warden liable for a subordinate’s conduct merely because the warden participates in the grievance process.

Thomas, Wayman v. Knight, Stanley · filed 2006-08-23

A warden, however, does not incur liability under § 1983 for a subordinate’s conduct just by participating in the grievance process.

Section 1983 did not support a supervisory liability claim based on the denial of GED opportunities to death row inmates in this case.

Scheanette v. Dretke · filed 2006-08-28

Sheanette’s claim of supervisor liability is also without merit.

A § 1983 supervisory-liability claim against a sheriff requires supervisory indifference or tacit authorization leading to a deputy’s constitutional violation.

Caldwell v. Green · filed 2006-09-07

Because the sheriffs liability must be centered upon supervisory indifference or tacit authorization leading to the violation of Caldwell’s constitutional rights by his deputies, the claim against Hammons must fail.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely through agency or respondeat superior; the supervisor must know of or participate in the alleged rights deprivation.

Walker v. Woodford · filed 2006-09-12

Defendant Woodford cannot be liable under § 1983 under agency or respondeat theories, where she neither knew of or participated in any Constitutional violations.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory official sued in an individual capacity to have been personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Brooks v. Chappius · filed 2006-09-21

A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a supervisory official in his individual capacity must show that the supervisor was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement; a supervisor cannot be held liable solely under respondeat superior.

Rowe v. Norris · filed 2006-09-22

We find no error in the dismissal of the claims that were based on respondeat superior, rather than personal liability.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires personal involvement in a rights violation or corrective inaction amounting to deliberate indifference; an official’s position alone is insufficient.

Hogan v. City of El Dorado · filed 2006-09-29

A supervisor can only incur liability for a violation of a federally protected right when the supervisor is personally involved in the violation or when the supervisor’s corrective inaction constitutes deliberate indifference toward the violation. ... The mere fact that this Defendant is the City of El Dorado’s highest official is not enough for a reasonable jury to find that he himself was involved in a violation of Hogan’s constitutional rights or that his inaction amounted to deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor ordered a subordinate’s constitutional violation or knew of it and failed to intervene.

Wilkins v. Ramirez · filed 2006-10-02

A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his or her subordinates if he or she ordered the violations or knew of the violations and failed to intercept.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a sheriff’s personal participation or failure to supervise and the alleged constitutional deprivation for personal liability.

Tatum v. Simpson · filed 2006-10-05

The court further held that, because plaintiff offered no evidence of any affirmative link between the constitutional deprivation and either the Sheriff’s personal participation or his failure to supervise, there could be no personal liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. ... We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, ... and affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for their subordinates’ acts.

Herrin v. Treon · filed 2006-10-10

It is well settled law that supervisory personnel like Warden Treon and Executive Director Johnson cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the acts of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement; supervising the area where a violation occurred does not alone establish liability.

Bell v. Arnone · filed 2006-10-11

The mere fact that Amone was supervising SHU at the time is not enough to demonstrate her personal involvement, however, for there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor for a subordinate’s actions based solely on the supervisory relationship; liability requires the supervisor’s own acts or omissions.

Ham v. Brice · filed 2006-10-25

A supervisory official cannot be held individually liable under § 1983 for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability; only the official’s direct acts or omissions will give rise to individual liability.

Section 1983 requires each defendant’s personal involvement; a supervisory position alone does not make a defendant liable for subordinates’ acts.

Robinson v. Taylor · filed 2006-11-07

Robinson cannot hold these defendants responsible for the acts of their subordinates simply because of their supervisory positions.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for subordinates’ unconstitutional acts solely because of their supervisory role; liability requires personal participation or a causal connection.

Dominguez v. Lang · filed 2006-11-08

Rather, such liability attaches under § 1983 only “when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1269 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence of the defendant’s personal participation in the alleged violation.

Williams v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2006-11-13

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant Baca because Williams failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding his involvement in the alleged violations. See Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir.2001) (section 1983 supervisory liability arises only upon a showing of personal participation by defendant).

Section 1983 requires evidence that a supervisor authorized, approved, condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct before the supervisor can be held liable.

Wells v. City of Dayton · filed 2006-11-21

Herein, the Plaintiffs have failed to point to any evidence which would raise an inference that McManus implicitly authorized, approved, condoned, encouraged or knowingly acquiesced in Corn-well’s allegedly unconstitutional misconduct. Accordingly, Defendant McManus is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ federal law, § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not make a police chief personally liable for an officer’s conduct solely because the chief supervises the officer.

Kohler v. Englade · filed 2006-11-21

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a police chief under theories of vicarious or respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor sets in motion acts the supervisor knew or should have known would cause a constitutional injury.

Blackhawk v. City of Chubbuck · filed 2006-11-24

Considering the fact that Webb, Severe and Galloway were in charge of the plan to apprehend Max Galloway, this testimony is sufficient to present a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Webb, Severe and Galloway set in motion a series of actions, which they knew or should have know, would result in Officer Merica shooting Max Galloway.

Section 1983 does not make supervisory officials liable under a respondeat superior theory.

Patterson v. Maciel · filed 2006-12-13

The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Patterson’s claims that defendants Schriro and Klein faded to stop prison staff abuses of the rules regarding inmate property, because supervisory officials cannot be held liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only for a supervisor's own acts or omissions.

Thomas v. Hillsborough Cty HOC · filed 2006-12-18

Instead, the Supervisor Defendants can only be liable under § 1983 based on their own acts or omissions.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Shane v. Fauver · filed 2006-12-20

Notably, Stewart did not allege any personal involvement by Fauver, Barbo, or Rogers in his claim. Liability for constitutional violations cannot be based solely on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in a subordinate’s unconstitutional acts or the supervisor’s actions have a causal relationship to the constitutional deprivation.

Gary v. Modena · filed 2006-12-21

Supervisory liability under § 1983 attaches only when the supervisor personally participates in the allegedly unconstitutional acts of his subordinates or where the actions of the supervising official bear a causal relationship to the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the plaintiff’s injury; speculation does not establish that link.

Atwood v. Town of Ellington · filed 2007-01-03

Thus, because there is insufficient evidence beyond speculation indicating an affirmative causal link between defendant’s failures to supervise and report and Nieliwocki’s conduct toward plaintiff, the Court grants summary judgment on Counts Three and Four.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, responds with deliberate indifference, and that inaction causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Jones v. Murphy · filed 2007-01-04

The plaintiffs have made sufficient allegations of supervisory liability under the Fourth Circuit’s requirements to survive this motion to dismiss.

A supervisor sued in an individual capacity under § 1983 must have been personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Saxon v. ATTICA MEDICAL DEPARTMENT · filed 2007-01-05

A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a supervisory official in his individual capacity must show that the supervisor was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s conduct.

McKeithan v. Jones · filed 2007-01-08

In addition, liability under section 1983 cannot be imposed on a supervisor on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on officials for their employees’ conduct; liability requires personal participation.

Fisher v. Oklahoma Department · filed 2007-01-19

Defendants are not vicariously liable. M oreover, plaintiffs proffered no allegation or evidence that any of the named defendants, except M r. Yott, personally participated in activities that violated their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violation solely because of their supervisory role; failure-to-train liability requires inadequate training, a deliberate choice not to train, and causation.

Ambrose v. Major Darin Young · filed 2007-01-23

Warden Weber “may not be held liable under § 1983 for the constitutional violations of a subordinate on a respondeat superior theory.” Tlamka, 244 F.3d at 635. Warden Weber may be liable for failure to train if (1) the DOC’s training practices regarding disaster relief were inadequate; (2) Warden Weber’s “failure to train reflects a deliberate and conscious choice” by the DOC; and (3) an alleged deficiency in the DOC’s training procedures actually caused Ambrose’s death.

Section 1983 allows a claim against a supervisor who knows subordinates are acting unlawfully and fails to stop them, when that failure is causally connected to the deprivation.

Johnny Woods v. Sheriff Phil D. Miller · filed 2007-01-24

One way to show a causal connection is by proving facts that support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or that the supervisor knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so. ... Woods has thus alleged facts that, if proven, may state a claim against Miller under § 1983, and the district court erred by dismissing the claim against him.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim based on sufficient allegations that supervisors knew or should have known of officers’ constitutional violations and failed to train, supervise, or discipline them.

Simons v. New York · filed 2007-01-31

Plaintiffs have alleged that Sergeant Hovey and Senior Investigator Graham, as supervisors of Trooper Fitzgerald and Investigator Schultz, knew or should have known of their alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiffs have alleged that Sergeant Hovey and Senior Investigator Graham failed to properly train, supervise, and reprimand or discipline Trooper Fitzgerald and Investigator Schultz. ... Taken together, these allegations are sufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability against Sergeant Hovey and Senior Investigator Graham.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a decision that did not itself cause a constitutional deprivation.

Sims v. G. Lay · filed 2007-02-02

Because this decision in itself did not amount to a constitutional deprivation, there can be no supervisory liability for the decision.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the deprivation of rights; general supervisory duties alone are insufficient.

Clemmons v. Estate of Brooks · filed 2007-02-12

As to Warden Armontrout, his general supervisory duties are also insufficient to establish his personal involvement in the investigation.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Baylis v. Taylor · filed 2007-02-23

The facts as alleged against Malaney appear to be based solely on an impermissible theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisory officials solely under a theory of respondeat superior.

Hopkins v. Pusey · filed 2007-02-23

The State defendants are correct that liability cannot be imposed against them under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits an inadequate-nutrition claim against prison supervisors when the complaint sufficiently alleges their awareness of the inadequate diet.

Day v. Norris · filed 2007-02-26

Accepting the allegations in Day’s complaint as true, Arkansas Department of Correction defendants Food Service Administrator John Doe #1, dietician John Doe #2, Deputy Director Larry May, Chief Deputy Director Ray Hobbs, and Wardens M.D. Reed, R.G. Lay, Marvin Evans, David White, and Kim Luckett were aware that Day was receiving inadequate nutrition. See Fruit v. Norris, 905 F.2d 1147, 1151 (8th Cir. 1990) (supervisors can be liable for personal involvement in constitutional violation, and may also be liable when their corrective inaction amounts to deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of constitutionally violative practices); Martin, 780 F.2d at 1338 (to survive dismissal, prisoner need not plead more than that warden was directly involved in decision which created unconstitutional conditions). Accordingly, we reverse as to Day’s inadequate-nutrition claim against these defendants.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a constitutional violation by the subordinate.

Waybright Ex Rel. Waybright v. Frederick County Maryland Department of Fire & Rescue Services · filed 2007-03-01

In this case, Plaintiffs’ claims for supervisory liability fail for at least three reasons. First, as explained above, there is no basis for concluding that the subordinate—in this case, Coombe—committed a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based on respondeat superior.

Williams v. Wood · filed 2007-03-01

supervisory officials may not be held liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because the supervisor oversees an employee who allegedly violated someone’s rights.

Thompson v. Faddis, Unpublished Decision (3-2-2007) · filed 2007-03-02

However, supervisory personnel may not be held liable under Section 1983, simply by application of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor personally liable to show that the supervisor at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Petty v. Oh · filed 2007-03-06

At a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.