42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant supervised others; the defendant must be personally involved in the alleged deprivation.

Diaz v. Carroll · filed 2008-09-15

Liability in a § 1983 action, however, cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. ... For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant State defendants Carroll, Merson, and Atallian summary judgment on the bases of respondeat superior and lack of personal involvement.

Section 1983 supervisory liability based on personal involvement requires overt participation in the violation of the plaintiff’s own rights; mere presence while subordinates act is insufficient.

Mesa v. Prejean · filed 2008-09-23

We reject it because supervisory liability under the “personal involvement” theory requires something more than mere presence at the scene where subordinates allegedly violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The plaintiff must demonstrate an officer’s “overt personal participation” in the violation of his own rights, not someone else’s.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on general responsibility for prison operations.

Wilson v. Rick Toney · filed 2008-09-25

Having carefully reviewed the record, we agree with the district court that Wilson failed to establish that the ADC defendants--who had no medical expertise or role in delivering medical care--knew of but ignored Wilson’s risk of exposure to TB, and that liability cannot be based solely on defendants’ general responsibility to oversee prison operations.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Estate of Chance v. First Correctional Medical Inc. · filed 2008-09-30

Liability in a § 1983 action cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisor in an individual capacity to allege the supervisor’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation.

Liner v. Goord · filed 2008-10-09

A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a supervisory official in his individual capacity must allege that the supervisor was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability depends on the supervisor’s own knowledge of the policies or practices affecting the plaintiff and personal responsibility for them.

Almaraz v. HALEAS · filed 2008-10-09

The focus of the Supervisory Defendants’ liability is their own personal knowledge of the policies and practices that affected plaintiff and whether they were personally responsible for those policies and practices.

A supervisor is not entitled to dismissal of a § 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds when the complaint sufficiently alleges widespread constitutional violations that the supervisor knew about and failed to correct.

Jenkins v. Hale · filed 2008-10-10

Thus, in light of Jenkins’s allegation of widespread abuse with respect to medical care for inmates, Sheriff Hale has not demonstrated that he is entitled to a dismissal based on qualified immunity or that he has a clear legal right to mandamus relief on this issue.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Morris v. Meyers · filed 2008-10-10

Claims under section 1983 cannot be based on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires the supervisor’s knowledge of a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury, deliberate indifference or tacit authorization, and a causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the injury.

Copper Ex Rel. Copper v. Denlinger · filed 2008-10-21

While we are not bound by decisions of the Fourth Circuit, we find the reasoning in Shaw persuasive and adopt its longstanding test for § 1983 supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a supervisor; a failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise claim requires facts supporting the supervisor’s liability.

Frentzel v. Boyer · filed 2008-10-30

We conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Boyer, ... because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply under section 1983, and Frentzel did not plead facts sufficient to establish Boyer’s liability under a failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise theory, ... (occasional missed dose of medicine, without evidence that defendant knew missing doses could cause serious injury or pain, does not violate Eighth Amendment).

Supervisor status alone does not establish liability under § 1983.

Duffield v. Jackson · filed 2008-11-04

Dr. Jackson supervised the JCCC medical operation, but supervisor status is not sufficient to create § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires a government official’s direct involvement in a constitutional violation for personal liability; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Muhammad v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-11-04

As a general rule, government officials are personally liable under Section 1983 for constitutional violations only if they are shown to have been directly involved in the wrongful acts.

Section 1983 makes a supervisor liable for subordinates' constitutional violations only if the supervisor participated in or directed them.

Humphries v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2008-11-05

Under § 1983, a supervisor is only liable for his own acts. Where the constitutional violations were largely committed by subordinates the supervisor is liable only if he participated in or directed the violations.

Section 1983 makes a supervisor liable only for his own acts.

Humphries v. La County · filed 2008-11-05

Under § 1983, a supervisor is only liable for his own acts.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence that the supervisor caused the alleged constitutional deprivation.

White v. Thompson · filed 2008-11-07

White did not present any evidence the defendants caused the alleged due process deprivation based on their actions as supervisors.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisor in an individual capacity to allege the supervisor’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation.

Shell v. Brun · filed 2008-11-13

A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a supervisory official in his individual capacity must allege that the supervisor was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

A supervisory official is individually liable under § 1983 only if personally involved in the alleged deprivation or if the official’s own actions are causally connected to it.

Bradley Ex Rel. Bradley v. City of Jackson · filed 2008-11-24

Under well-settled legal principles, in order for a supervisory official to be found liable under § 1983, he must have been personally involved in conduct causing the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, or there must be a causal connection between his own actions and the constitutional violation sought to be redressed.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence connecting a supervisor’s conduct to the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright · filed 2008-11-26

Even if an underlying substantive constitutional violation by subordinate officers were stated by plaintiffs, we nevertheless agree with the district court that plaintiffs offer insufficient evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to find a policy, custom, practice or any deliberate indifference on the part of either Herrick or the County that bears the requisite causal relationship to the alleged constitutional deprivation to establish liability under a supervisory theory.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for failure to train or supervise when the subordinate officers committed no constitutional wrong.

Heine v. Connelly · filed 1986-10-01

Counts IX, X and XI charge Corrigan, Simpson and ten members of the Delaware Council on Police Training with violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by failing to properly train and supervise their subordinates and by acquiescing in the procedures used against Heine. Defendant Spillan is a member of the Delaware Council on Police Training. The complaint against these three Defendants is predicated upon the wrongfulness of the arresting troopers’ conduct. Because this Court has held that Connelly and Gunning committed no constitutional wrong, we will grant summary judgment in favor of these three Defendants.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s authorization of force creates an affirmative link to officers’ constitutional violations.

Buck v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2008-12-09

We agree that he authorized his officers to use force against protestors, and, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Excessive Force Plaintiffs, we agree with the district court that Capt. Gonzales could be held liable under § 1983 as a supervisor.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a supervisory defendant to allege personal involvement or attribute the alleged constitutional violation to a policy the defendant implemented.

Drgac v. Murray · filed 2008-12-10

Drgac failed to state a claim against the only named defendant by failing to allege any personal involvement by the defendant and by failing to attribute the constitutional violation he alleges to any policy implemented by the defendant.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in a constitutional violation or has a causal connection to it.

McCall v. Crosthwait · filed 2008-12-23

Supervisory liability under § 1983 occurs “when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of their position; the supervisor must be personally involved in the alleged misconduct.

Caldwell v. Beard · filed 2008-12-29

Moreover, respondeat superior cannot form the basis of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on wardens.

Funderburk v. McDaniel · filed 2009-01-14

The district court properly dismissed Funderburk’s claims against the warden defendants to the extent they were based on respondeat superior liability. See Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir.1993) (explaining that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983).

Section 1983 holds a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violation only if the supervisor participated in or directed it.

Humphries v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2009-01-15

Under § 1983, a supervisor is only liable for his own acts. Where the constitutional violations were largely committed by subordinates the supervisor is liable only if he participated in or directed the violations.

Section 1983 requires a defendant's personal involvement, either through direct action or preincident approval of a custom or policy.

Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sheriff's Department · filed 1987-07-28

Liability under § 1983 requires personal involvement of the defendant, either by action or preincident approval of a custom or policy.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison supervisors for medical treatment when the underlying claim against medical staff lacks merit; supervisors may rely on medical recommendations after investigating.

William S. Sires, Jr. v. Berman · filed 1987-11-24

Since we find no merit to the claim against the infirmary and medical personnel, there is perforce no merit to the claim against their superiors. In fact, these prison officials, after proper investigation, learned of and relied upon the recommendations of the doctors and nurses, as they are entitled to do.

A § 1983 claim against a supervisor in an individual capacity requires the supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Loret v. Selsky · filed 2009-01-27

A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a supervisory official in his individual capacity must allege that the supervisor was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation to impose individual supervisory liability.

Lloyd v. Van Tassell · filed 2009-01-27

Because no evidence demonstrated a causal connection between Geiger’s actions as supervisor and the alleged excessive force used on Card, the district court did not err in finding that no admissible evidence supported the imposition of individual liability on Geiger as a supervisor.

Section 1983 makes a supervisor liable for subordinates’ constitutional violations only if the supervisor participated in or directed them.

Humphries v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2009-01-30

Under § 1983, a supervisor is only liable for his own acts. Where the constitutional violations were largely committed by subordinates the supervisor is liable only if he participated in or directed the violations.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor deliberately maintains a policy, practice, or custom that directly causes constitutional harm.

Tsakonas v. Cicchi · filed 2009-01-30

Supervisors may be held liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations of their subordinates if it is shown that they, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)). As discussed above, there was no constitutional harm, as Tsakonas was provided with adequate medical care. Therefore, the District Court correctly granted summary judgment to these appellees.

Section 1983 makes a supervisor liable only for the supervisor’s own acts.

Humphries v. La County · filed 2009-01-30

Under § 1983, a supervisor is only liable for his own acts.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisor in an individual capacity to allege the supervisor’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation.

Abdur-Raheem v. Selsky · filed 2009-02-06

A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a supervisory official in his individual capacity must allege that the supervisor was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability; each defendant’s liability depends on that defendant’s own knowledge and actions.

Burks v. Raemisch · filed 2009-02-10

Section 1983 does not establish a system of vicarious responsibility.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for the actions of their subordinates.

Burks, Wallace v. Raemisch, Rick · filed 2009-02-10

Section 1983 does not establish a system of vicarious responsibility.

Section 1983 does not impose individual supervisory liability based solely on a supervisor’s right to control employees.

Everson v. Leis · filed 2009-02-20

Section 1983 liability must be premised on more than mere respondeat superior, the right to control one’s employees.

A supervisor is liable for failure to train under § 1983 only if the supervisor directly participated in, encouraged, authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the misconduct.

Everson v. Leis · filed 2009-02-20

A supervisor is not liable under § 1983 for failing to train unless the supervisor “either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”

Section 1983 holds a supervisor liable only for the supervisor’s own culpable involvement in a constitutional violation.

Starks v. Lewis · filed 2009-02-23

Supervisors are only liable under § 1983 for their own culpable involvement in the violation of a person's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor who personally participates in a constitutional violation or whose actions are causally connected to it.

Amnesty International, USA v. Battle · filed 2009-02-23

Supervisors are liable under § 1983 when “the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional violation.” Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1234.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence that the supervisor knew of and was deliberately indifferent to a pattern of unconstitutional acts by subordinates.

Roby v. McCoy · filed 2009-02-25

While supervisors may be liable under section 1983 in some circumstances, the record was insufficient to establish McCoy knew of and was deliberately indifferent to a pattern of unconstitutional acts by his subordinates.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a supervisor’s own acts or omissions; it cannot rest solely on a subordinate’s conduct.

J.R. v. Gloria · filed 2009-02-26

§ 1983 supervisory liability is based on a supervisor’s own acts or omissions, not through respondent superior.

Section 1983 permits liability for jail supervisors who implement a housing policy with deliberate indifference to inmates’ safety; a claim requires evidence of that indifference or a substantial risk of harm.

Martin v. Alameda County Board of Supervisors · filed 2009-03-02

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants Hagan and Sehueller because Martin failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety by implementing the Santa Rita County Jail classification and housing policy, or whether the policy created a substantial risk of harm to the inmates.

A § 1983 complaint alleges more than supervisory responsibility when it identifies a supervisor’s direct personal involvement in the challenged conduct.

Phillips v. Ayers · filed 2009-03-04

Moreover, as to two of the supervisor defendants whom the district court identified Phillips alleged direct personal involvement and not merely supervisory responsibility: Phillips alleged on page 4 of his supporting facts that defendant Wayne Reaume personally participated in the attack upon Phillips and other inmates, and on page 7, Phillips alleged that defendant Calvin Campbell III personally kept Phillips illegally confined in administrative segregation by fabricating false misconduct charges against him.

A Section 1983 failure-to-supervise claim requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Garner v. City of Federal Way · filed 2009-03-05

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Garner’s failure to supervise claim because there was no underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinate misconduct when it causally contributes to a constitutional injury.

Burnham v. West · filed 1987-12-28

Supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct, if demonstrably a causative factor in a constitutional injury, is actionable under 42 U.S. C. section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability under respondeat superior.

White v. Harold Farrier Crispus C. Nix · filed 1988-06-13

A section 1983 action against supervisory officers cannot be based on the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only when the supervisor authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Jones v. Lewis · filed 1989-07-11

In the case at bar, appellant offered no proof at trial that any of the named city officials authorized, approved, or acquiesced in the actions at issue in the instant appeal. Accordingly, the district court properly granted a directed verdict in favor of the city officials.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a subordinate’s conduct when the supervisor was personally involved, including by approving it.

Caudle-El v. Peters · filed 1989-10-15

To be held liable for the conduct of subordinates, a supervisor must have been personally involved in that conduct.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Smith v. Carroll · filed 2009-03-16

In order to prevail under § 1983, plaintiff must establish that Carroll had personal involvement in the alleged wrongs since liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. ... Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court finds that plaintiff has not provided evidence that Carroll had personal knowledge of, or in any way acquiesced to, plaintiffs situation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor liable to show the supervisor’s personal involvement or authorization, approval, or knowing acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct.

Walters v. Stafford · filed 2009-03-18

Supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot attach where the allegation of liability is based upon a mere failure to act.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior; supervisors are liable only when deficient training or supervision caused the constitutional deprivation and they had notice of the deficiency.

Teas v. Ferguson · filed 2009-03-19

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply under section 1983. ... Instead, Sheriff Ferguson and Captain Petray may only be held liable if their failure to train or to supervise the offending employee caused the deprivation of constitutional rights and they had notice that the training procedures were inadequate and likely to result in a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in unconstitutional conduct or has a causal connection to the constitutional deprivation.

Johnson v. Andalusia Police Department · filed 2009-03-19

However, “supervisory liability under § 1983 occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim to proceed when the allegations plausibly link the supervisor’s action or inaction to subordinate officers’ conduct.

McLeod-Lopez v. Algarin · filed 2009-03-23

Next, this Court must consider whether Toledo’s actions or inactions were affirmatively linked to the police officer’s behavior. Although the allegations against Toledo may be less specific than those regarding the arresting officers, they still pass muster under Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a constitutional deprivation in certain circumstances, even without the supervisor’s direct involvement.

Wilks v. Young · filed 1990-03-14

Plaintiff’s proposed instruction on supervisory liability within the context of the Wau-pun prison facility asked the district court to do no more than inform the jury that such a theory of liability was available to the plaintiff. We believe such an instruction should have been given.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity liability for a supervisor's own culpable action or inaction that causes a constitutional deprivation.

Larez v. City Of Los Angeles · filed 1991-10-07

Supervisory liability is imposed against a supervisory official in his individual capacity for his "own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates," Clay v. Conlee, 815 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir.1987); for his " 'acquiesce[nce] in the constitutional deprivations of which [the] complaint is made,' " Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1528 (10th Cir.1988) (citation omitted); or for conduct that showed a " 'reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.' " Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1163. It was not plain error for the jury to find any one of these standards fulfilled.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; a supervisor must be personally involved in the alleged violation or aware of circumstances that would trigger it.

Sutton v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2009-04-23

The court next determined that summary judgment was proper for Defendants Crouse, Rogers, Clark, and Thatcher in their supervisory capacities, because liability by respondeat superior is not within the purview of § 1983, and Mr. Sutton failed to establish that they either personally participated in the alleged violations or were aware of circumstances that would trigger those violations. ... We have reviewed the parties’ briefs, the record on appeal, and the relevant legal authority, and we agree with the magistrate judge’s detailed and well-reasoned report and recommendation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisory official to show that the official directly participated in, authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct.

Cardinal v. Metrish · filed 2009-04-24

“At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” ... Since the plaintiff does not allege that the defendant was actively involved in the denial of kosher food, we find that the district court’s analysis of the issue was correct.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a causal link between the supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional injury; allegations of inadequate training alone do not suffice.

Morales v. Toledo · filed 2009-04-27

Thus, Plaintiff does not establish a causal nexus between the alleged failure and the actions committed by the officers pertaining to the assault. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Toledo was deliberately, recklessly, or callously indifferent to his constitutional rights. Furthermore, Plaintiff failed to show any training deficiencies, much less that Toledo should have known that there were any training problems. Therefore, there is no Supervisory Liability. This Court holds that Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to state a Section 1983 claim against Toledo.

Section 1983 does not impose liability under respondeat superior; a defendant must be personally involved.

Townes v. Swenson · filed 1972-11-10

Under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply and personal involvement of the ... defendant is required.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s misconduct under respondeat superior.

Ashenhurst Ex Rel. Hall v. Carey · filed 1972-11-30

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in civil rights cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Glass v. Hamilton County, Tennessee · filed 1973-08-29

It should be noted in this regard that an action will not lie under Section 1983 where liability is sought to be imputed under principles of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a superior officer solely for a subordinate’s wrongful acts when the superior neither ordered nor participated in the acts and did not know or have reason to know of and acquiesce in them.

Fisher v. Volz · filed 1974-04-15

We need not decide at this time whether vicarious liability is ever applicable under § 1983. We hold, however, that it will not support an award for punitive damages. A superior police officer may not be subjected to punitive damages because of wrongful acts by a subordinate officer if there is no evidence that the superior officer ordered or personally participated in the acts, or knew or should have known that the acts were taking place and acquiesced in them.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s acts; personal involvement is required.

Mathis v. Pratt · filed 1974-04-17

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in civil rights cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law, subject to defenses and limits such as immunity and personal liability requirements.

Coney v. Dept. of Human Resources of State of Ga. · filed 1992-03-27

Qualified immunity shields all government officials from liability for damages in a § 1983 action “insofar as their conduct does not violate the clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.” ... Once defendants raise the defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to plaintiff to identify the clearly established law and adduce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether defendants’ conduct violated clearly established law. ... No liability, however, could be imposed under § 1983 for merely failing to supervise or control one’s employees. ... Therefore, Ledbetter and Kurtz’s motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to all § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires conduct by the defendant that caused the plaintiff harm; a police chief cannot be held liable without evidence that he directed the unlawful conduct or was deliberately indifferent to it.

Brawley v. Sapp · filed 1993-01-28

To recover for a civil rights violation, Plaintiff must identify specific conduct engaged in by the defendant that caused harm to the Plaintiff. ... Nor has Plaintiff presented evidence that Defendant Sapp directed the purportedly unlawful conduct, or was deliberately indifferent to it. ... Thus, even if all of Plaintiff's allegations are accepted to be true, Defendant Sapp is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 1983 requires personal culpability; supervisors’ public statements encouraging a “get tough” policy do not, by themselves, establish liability for officers’ brutality.

Rende v. Rizzo · filed 1976-07-13

Without even considering the First Amendment implication of predicating liability on such statements, when it is remembered that liability under Section 1983 must be based on personal culpability, ... it is patently obvious that this allegation is insufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because an official is the alleged client of the attorney who committed the misconduct; the official must have acquiesced in the conduct.

Tryon v. McDonald · filed 1993-05-11

But, without a finding that McDonald acquiesced in her attorney's conduct, imposition of liability on her simply because she allegedly held the position of "client" would violate the very tenets of Monell.

A § 1983 claim against a supervisor requires allegations of personal involvement in the constitutional violation; general responsibility for policies or training alone is insufficient.

Estate of Cassara v. Illinois · filed 1994-02-02

In sum, plaintiff fails to allege the personal involvement of Basit in the suicide death of Cassara and therefore do not state a claim for which relief may be granted under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because a subordinate violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Quimby v. DCYS · filed 1994-03-31

However, a supervisor cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of their supervisory position.

Ike Hill, Jr. v. Francis Grazono, Adult Probation Officer Tom Agnos, McSo Ex-Sheriff Rick Romley, Maricopa County Attorn · filed 1994-05-18

Generally, a supervisor cannot be liable in a Sec. 1983 action under a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on supervisors solely because of their position; they must have directed the wrongful acts or known of and acquiesced in them.

Souder v. McGuire · filed 1976-12-09

It is true, as defendants claim, that the doctrine of respondeat superior has no application in an action for damages under § 1983. No liability may be imposed upon defendants McGuire and Watson unless it is shown that they were personally involved in the alleged wrongful acts. However, it is not necessary to show that they were present when the violations occurred. It is sufficient to show that they directed their subordinates to commit improper acts, or had actual knowledge that such acts were being committed and acquiesced in them.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant solely under respondeat superior.

Pedro Arroyo and Christopher McCormack v. Peter M. Schaefer, Former Deputy Warden in Command, Manhattan House of Detenti · filed 1977-01-11

Respondeat superior is not a doctrine that is applicable to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of their position; the plaintiff must allege the supervisor’s personal involvement in or knowledge of the rights violation.

Cochran v. Rowe · filed 1977-10-20

Defendant accurately asserts that the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff must therefore allege that Rowe was personally involved in or had personal knowledge of the alleged violation of civil rights.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when officials affirmatively promote a policy that causes constitutional violations, even if they did not direct action against the particular plaintiffs.

Josephina Duchesne as Administratrix of the Estate of Pauline Perez v. Sugarman · filed 1977-11-08

It is not necessary for § 1983 liability that the appellees directed any particular action with respect to these specific individuals, only that they affirmatively promoted a policy which sanctioned the type of action which caused the violations.

Section 1983’s personal responsibility requirement for a damages claim against a supervisory official can be met by a rule requiring a report to that official.

De Jesus v. Ward · filed 1977-11-22

Therefore, there was a statutory requirement that the superintendent of the facility send a report to the Commissioner. Thus, the personal responsibility requirement of section 1983 was met, and defendant Ward’s motion for dismissal is denied.

Section 1983 permits a claim against supervisors when their acceptance or support of department policies contributes to a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Norton v. McKeon · filed 1977-12-28

I believe this averment amounts to allegations both of the existence of general policies and practices within the Philadelphia Police Department which led to the violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights and of acceptance or support of these policies by O’Neill and Rizzo. By the criteria announced in Santiago, these allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action against supervisory officials under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors who were not personally involved in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Belcher v. South Carolina Board of Corrections · filed 1978-05-19

Under the doctrine set forth in Vinnedge v. Gibbs, supra, the individual defendants, with the exception of Dennis and Thornton who were personally involved, cannot be held liable under respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on supervisors solely because of their position; the plaintiff must allege their individual responsibility for the violation.

Holland v. Rubin · filed 1978-11-14

Moreover, it is the rule in this circuit that the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to damage claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on supervisory control over an entity.

Allston v. Lewis · filed 1979-02-27

Having concluded that plaintiff cannot challenge the disciplinary rule in question at this time, this Court further decides that the mere fact that the State Supreme Court has supervisory control over the Bar does not create a claim against these defendants for either injunctive or monetary relief.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on superior officers merely because they supervise officers who allegedly violated constitutional rights.

Randle v. Gokey · filed 1979-03-06

The defendants may not be subjected to liability under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because of their positions; the complaint must allege their personal involvement in the injury.

Ronnei v. Robert Butler, Russ Berehends, Richard Tebbee, Calvin Auger, and Donald Eighleberger · filed 1979-05-15

They are not alleged to have done any act personally which caused injury to appellant. Because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see, e. g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S 362, 370-71, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Cotton v. Hutto, 577 F.2d 453, 455 (8th Cir. 1978), appellant has failed to allege any basis for liability against these named appellees.

Section 1983 permits liability based on a warden’s neglect of a duty to supervise and control guards, but not on respondeat superior alone.

Davis v. Zahradnick · filed 1979-06-29

By alleging and swearing that warden Zah-radnick had neglected his duty to supervise and control the prison guards, Davis proceeded upon a proper theory of § 1983 liability, and not upon the discredited respondeat superior doctrine.

A § 1983 claim against police supervisors for failure to prevent officer misconduct requires a showing of direct responsibility for the improper action.

Wilson v. Beebe · filed 1980-02-04

It appears that the United States Supreme Court has held that a § 1983 action ... will not lie against police supervisory officers for failure to prevent police misconduct, absent a showing of direct responsibility for the improper action. ... The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff vicariously liable for deputies’ acts; liability requires the sheriff’s personal involvement.

Mollie H. Watson and Jack Watson v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Company, William C. Cowart and Edward M. Mouser · filed 1980-02-06

This court in a recent opinion, Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1979) (on rehearing), held that vicarious liability cannot be the basis for recovery against a sheriff for the acts of his subordinates in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Liability may be found only if there is personal involvement of the officer being sued, a circumstance which is clearly absent here.

Section 1983 does not make a Louisiana sheriff vicariously liable for the acts of his deputies.

Campbell v. Bergeron · filed 1980-03-17

The law is now settled that in a Section 1983 action a Louisiana sheriff may not be held liable for the acts of his deputies under the doctrine of respondeat superior or any other theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior; a defendant’s personal involvement is material to the claim.

Clifton v. Robinson · filed 1980-08-25

Also, I note that § 1983 suits may not be maintained on the basis of respondeat superior, ... and that the defendants have denied any personal involvement in or awareness of the alleged Fourth Amendment violations. ... Thus there exists before me a genuine issue as to the matter of defendants’ personal involvement, clearly a material fact.

Section 1983 permits a sheriff to be held liable for constitutional violations caused by policies he adopted, but not solely for his deputies’ actions.

Niles B. Wanger and Shirley Wanger v. Ray Bonner, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Dekalb County, · filed 1980-09-05

This is not a case in which Sheriff Bonner was held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of his deputies. As pointed out in Part II above, he was held to answer in damages for those violations caused by his adoption of particular policies and practices for the serving of arrest warrants.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for others’ wrongdoing when they had no personal involvement.

Freeman v. Trudell · filed 1980-09-19

The doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in actions under § 1983, and these defendants cannot be held vicariously liable for the alleged wrongdoing of others.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages from supervisory officials to allege their personal involvement or knowledge; general supervisory responsibility alone is insufficient.

Williams v. Franzen · filed 1980-09-24

With respect to the respondeat superior issue, it is clear that the plaintiff must allege “personal involvement or knowledge” on the part of the defendants to state a claim for monetary damages against supervisory personnel under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim for equitable relief against a supervisor on a theory of respondeat superior.

Roe v. Borup · filed 1980-10-16

Thus Adams does not bar a suit that seeks equitable relief under section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official causes a constitutional deprivation by acquiescing in subordinates’ misconduct.

Vaughn v. Trotter · filed 1980-10-16

Section 1983 provides for damages against every person who, under color of state law, subjects any citizen or causes any citizen to be subjected to a deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. Here, defendant Thompson deprived the plaintiff Vaughn of his constitutional right to free and meaningful access to the courts through a pattern of acquiescence in, and even approval of, the unconstitutional behavior of the ex-warden’s subordinates. That is the equivalent of causing Vaughn to be subjected to constitutional deprivations.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff vicariously liable for the actions of subordinate officers.

Dunkin v. Lamb · filed 1980-10-30

Thus, it is clear that plaintiff is trying to hold Sheriff Lamb vicariously liable because of the actions of his subordinate officers. Such a claim is not cognizable in a § 1983 action in this Court.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a prosecutor merely because his investigator allegedly threatened a plaintiff.

Winters v. Callahan · filed 1981-01-26

Because there is no vicarious liability under § 1983, Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976), defendant Callahan is not potentially liable merely because his investigator allegedly threatened plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits claims against supervisors for their participation in or knowing acquiescence in prison or parole practices that cause misconduct, but not solely for a subordinate’s actions.

McDaniel v. Rhodes · filed 1981-03-25

Although Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) precludes a finding that these Defendants might be held vicariously liable for the actions of subordinates by respondeat superior (i. e., in the absence of actual fault), there is nothing in Monell or in the Complaint, herein, which would preclude a finding of primary liability against the Defendants, either by virtue of their participation in, or their knowing acquiescence in the customs and usages of Ohio’s prison system and/or parole programs (which in turn might effectively have created the circumstances and sanctioned the conduct of which Plaintiff complains).

Section 1983 requires a supervisor's own acts or omissions to link the supervisor to a constitutional violation and show reckless or callous indifference.

Priestly v. Doucette · filed 1994-05-31

Because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to §1983 actions, Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 209 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2266 (1991), Priestly must prove that Baran and Henderson, as supervisors, performed acts or omissions which “affirmatively link” them to the acts of the offending employee. Id. In addition, Baran and Henderson’s conduct must reflect a “reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others.”

Section 1983 permits relief for constitutional violations caused by state actors and does not impose liability based solely on supervisory status.

Pine Ridge Recycling, Inc. v. Butts County, Ga. · filed 1994-06-22

Plaintiff has stated a claim for relief under § 1983, to wit, a state actor maliciously swore out an arrest warrant in retaliation for Mr. Dale’s free speech. ... The courts have unanimously held that the Civil Rights Act precludes the finding of liability on the basis of a supervisory position alone.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors, who may be liable for personal involvement or corrective inaction amounting to deliberate indifference or tacit authorization.

Oldham v. Chandler-Halford · filed 1995-02-21

Respondeat superior liability will not lie against supervisors under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability when a sufficient causal connection exists between the supervisor's actions and the injury, but not solely under respondeat superior.

Salinas v. Breier · filed 1981-07-15

Chief Breier cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely by operation of the doctrine of respondeat superior. Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Boettger v. Moore, 483 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1973). He can, however, be held liable if a sufficient causal connection can be established between his actions and the injury. McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1979); Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1980).

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability, so a supervisory defendant's own state of mind matters.

Layne v. Douglas Vinzant, Frank Hall and Charles Gaughan, Robert M. Layne v. Douglas Vinzant · filed 1981-09-23

Because “an inadvertent failure to provide medical care” is not actionable, even if negligent, Estelle, ante, 429 U.S. at 105-06, 97 S.Ct. at 291-92, and because there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, Kostka v. Hogg, 1 Cir., 1977, 560 F.2d 37, 40, see Sims v. Adams, 5 Cir., 1976, 537 F.2d 829, 831-32, the ultimate question is the state of mind of the defendant.

Section 1983 does not make supervisory officials liable under respondeat superior.

Douglas v. Black · filed 1995-04-24

Although Douglas claims that Black, as the duly elected sheriff of Rock County, should have known of the danger to his safety, we have long held that supervisory officials will not be held liable in Sec. 1983 actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely under a respondeat superior theory.

Stephen v. Hewitt · filed 1995-12-27

Initially, the district court properly dismissed Stephen's complaint against defendants Gomez, Prunty, Moschetti, and Tingely on the basis that they could not be held liable under a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 permits a claim against supervisors based on their own responsibility for a constitutional deprivation.

Baker v. Angus · filed 1996-01-11

However, the Bakers’ complaint alleges that the state defendants acted in a supervisory role, which is actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s conduct.

Smith v. Jordan · filed 1981-11-12

Defendant correctly argues that, under § 1983, there is no liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged wrong; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Howard v. Koch · filed 1982-01-11

The plaintiff’s allegations of intentional conduct, policy, and conspiracy to deprive him of his rights merely amass inferences to an unsupported conclusion, and at best attempt to impose liability upon defendants Koch, Santucci, and Gold on a respondeat superior theory. ... In light of Howard’s failure to allege that Koch, Santucci, or Gold was personally involved in the alleged wrongs, plaintiffs claims against these defendants must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior, but a supervisor’s grossly negligent failure to correct conditions substantially likely to violate rights can support liability.

Doe v. Burwell · filed 1982-03-25

The doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In view of this affidavit, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Sheriff’s role in the sexual battery on the plaintiff was one of simple negligence in inadequate supervision or whether it amounted to gross negligence as a reckless failure to correct a situation which was substantially likely to result in the harm complained of and to violate plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely under a respondeat superior theory.

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, ETC. v. Dalton · filed 1982-06-04

In § 1983 actions, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a proper basis of liability.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional violation to hold the supervisor liable.

Koch v. Schneider · filed 1982-08-23

In order to state a claim against supervisory personnel under' § 1983 there must be alleged an affirmative link between the supervisory personnel’s acts or omissions and the actions causing the alleged constitutional violations so that the supervisor can be said to have encouraged, approved of or acquiesced in the complained-of conduct.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a public official liable for a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct to allege the official’s personal involvement.

Origel v. Washtenaw County · filed 1982-10-19

A § 1983 plaintiff must allege that the official was somehow personally involved in the unconstitutional activity of the subordinate, e.g., that he actively participated in, encouraged or directed the illegal acts; or that he affirmatively implemented an unconstitutional policy; or that he tolerated a pattern of unconstitutional conduct by subordinates.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Miles v. City Council of Augusta, Ga. · filed 1982-11-15

Finally, in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 he may not be sued under the theory of respondeat superior.

A supervisor’s knowledge of and acquiescence in a rights violation can satisfy § 1983’s personal involvement requirement.

Dyson v. Kocik · filed 1983-03-30

In this circuit knowledge of and acquiescence in the acts which violate the plaintiff’s right can satisfy the requirement of personal involvement.

Section 1983 does not make a police chief liable for subordinates’ misconduct solely through respondeat superior.

Maloney v. Caffrey · filed 1984-09-11

As respondeat superior is unavailable as a theory by which to hold the chief responsible for misconduct of his subordinates, there is no viable claim against Caffrey in Count I and Count I is dismissed, sua sponte, as to him.

Section 1983 permits a prison superintendent to be held liable for his own failure to develop adequate policies to protect inmates.

Gary Martin and Michael L. Gleason v. Carl White, Superintendent, Steve Long, Dr. Lee Roy Black, and Lew Kollias · filed 1984-09-21

Here, however, White’s liability is founded upon his own conduct — a failure to develop adequate protection policies.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on vicarious liability.

Birdwell v. Livingston · filed 2009-04-29

Birdwell’s attempt to establish the defendants’ liability through vicarious liability is unavailing.

Section 1983 requires personal responsibility for damages liability; a supervisor cannot be held liable solely because of a position of authority.

Mandala v. Coughlin · filed 1996-03-16

Applying these standards the Court finds that Coughlin cannot be held liable for damages under section 1983 because the plaintiff is unable to establish that Coughlin had any personal responsibility for the events alleged.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only for a supervisor’s own acts or omissions.

Hebert v. State · filed 1996-04-18

Plaintiff has made no allegations to support a finding of “deliberate indifference” on the part of defendants Patrisi and Robinson. Supervisors may be held liable under § 1983 ‘“only on the basis of [them] own acts or omissions.’”

A single, isolated alleged failure to investigate does not satisfy the burden of proving supervisory liability under § 1983.

Mitchell v. Strickland · filed 1996-05-31

In any event, this single, isolated incident of alleged improper investigation does not satisfy the heavy burden of proving supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors based solely on respondeat superior.

Smith v. Debruyn · filed 1996-07-18

Furthermore, even if the defendants within the Indiana Department of Corrections had some type of supervisory duties, they could not be held liable on the ground of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant is a supervisor.

Schwartz v. Zavaras · filed 1996-08-27

Supervisor status by itself is insufficient to support a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for failure to train only when the failure amounts to deliberate indifference and actually causes the injury.

Boyd v. Nichols · filed 2009-05-05

A supervisory official is not liable under § 1983 for an injury resulting from his failure to train subordinates unless “his failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the subordinates come into contact” and the failure has actually caused the injury about which the plaintiff complains.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisory officials who had no knowledge of the alleged deprivation and instituted no policy or custom that caused it.

Williams v. Robert G. Borg Dr. Textor Dr. Burvant Dr. Shedler M. Spanos · filed 1997-03-13

Accordingly, because there was no evidence indicating that Williams's constitutional rights were deprived by a policy or custom instituted by either Textor or Borg, the district court did not err by granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendants Textor and Borg.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior; a defendant must be personally involved in the alleged violation.

Lindsey v. O'Conner · filed 2009-05-13

As an initial matter, Defendants O’Connor and Kelcher were not appropriate Defendants in the action, as there was no allegation they were involved in the events which gave rise to Lindsey’s claim. Civil rights claims cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff solely because of his supervisory position.

Tipps v. Leonard · filed 2009-05-15

To the extent that Tipps argues that Leonard is liable based on his supervisory position, Tipps also fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on government officials; a plaintiff must plead that each defendant’s own actions violated the Constitution.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal · filed 2009-05-18

Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and §1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.

Section 1983 can impose supervisory liability without personal awareness of an attack if the plaintiff establishes a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation.

Wisenbaker v. Crawford · filed 2009-05-26

Although Wisenbaker did not allege that the defendants were personally aware of and failed to respond to his attack and subsequent injuries, the defendants may nonetheless be liable if Wisenbaker can establish a “sufficient causal connection” between their wrongful conduct and the ... constitutional violation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an affirmative link between the supervisor’s conduct and a subordinate’s constitutional violation; a policy silent on how pets would be collected and disposed of, plus the mayor’s mere presence at a raid, did not establish that link.

Maldonado v. Fontanes · filed 2009-06-04

Here, the Mayor's promulgation of a pet policy that was silent as to the manner in which the pets were to be collected and disposed of, coupled with his mere presence at one of the raids, is insufficient to create the affirmative link necessary for a finding of supervisory liability, even under a theory of deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Forehand v. Morgan · filed 2009-06-04

As is well established, liability in a § 1983 action cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison supervisor solely because of the supervisor's general responsibility for prison operations; personal involvement is required.

Keeper v. King · filed 1997-12-11

It is well settled that " '[r]espondeat superior is not a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.' " Kulow v. Nix, 28 F.3d 855, 858 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Smith v. Marcantonio, 910 F.2d 500, 502 (8th Cir. 1990)).

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s liability to rest on more than respondeat superior.

Braddy v. Florida Department of Labor & Employment Security · filed 1998-01-21

For Davis, as Lynch's supervisor, to be liable under § 1983, her liability must be based on something more than the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 can impose supervisory liability for failing to address an officer’s disciplinary problems when the supervisor’s conduct is linked to a constitutional violation.

Gonzalez-Perez v. Davila · filed 2009-06-08

A supervisor’s failure to identify and take remedial action concerning an officer with disciplinary problems can create supervisory liability pursuant to section 1983. ... In light of these disputes of material facts, the court DENIES defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs supervisory liability claims.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Innis v. Wilson · filed 2009-06-10

Innis’s allegation against Wilson also fail because Innis is attempting to establish liability based on supervisory liability. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior, as a defendant must have personal involvement in a civil rights action). Innis does not allege that Wilson had personal knowledge of his injury and subsequently acted with deliberate indifference.

A prison supervisor must actually know of a substantial risk of inmate abuse for liability under § 1983.

In Re: Bayside · filed 2009-06-15

Kaigh appropriately emphasized the requirement of actual knowledge, arguing that Faunce was, in fact, aware of allegations of inmate abuse.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a subordinate's unconstitutional conduct; each government official is liable only for the official's own conduct.

Robinson v. Pack · filed 2009-06-18

As it stands today, the issue of supervisory liability in connection with an alleged civil rights violation is clear: there is none. ... a supervising police officer may not be held liable for the wrongful actions of his or her subordinate officers in connection with an alleged civil rights violation because a supervising police officer is only liable for his or her own conduct and not that of his/her subordinates.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability, and supervisory liability requires the plaintiff to establish the required supervisory elements.

Estate of Chance v. First Correctional Medical, Inc. · filed 2009-06-23

To establish supervisory liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the existence of a policy or practice that created an unreasonable risk of an Eighth Amendment violation; (2) the supervisor’s awareness of the creation of the risk; (3) the supervisor’s indifference to the risk; and (4) that the plaintiff’s injury resulted from this policy or practice. Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (respondeat superior liability not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek relief when a person acting under color of state law deprives the plaintiff of a constitutional right, including through a supervisor's personal involvement or enforcement of a harmful policy.

Chatham v. Colonel Blake Adcock · filed 2009-06-24

Although Col. Adcock may not be held liable in his individual capacity simply because he "runs the jail," as Plaintiff suggests, he may be held liable if he knew ... about or was personally involved in any decision that violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights, or if he enforced a custom or policy that resulted in a violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors without personal involvement in the alleged violation.

Morris v. Ley · filed 2009-06-24

For similar reasons, Ley’s supervisor, who only approved Ley’s actions and had no direct contact with Morris, could not be held liable for any of the events in this case.

Supervisory defendants in a § 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity on claims that neither name them nor present evidence connecting them to the alleged conduct.

McCrary-El v. Delo · filed 1999-08-13

We note, however, that Mr. Lombardi and Mr. Moore were not specifically named in those counts, Mr. McCrary has not pointed to evidence in the record that would connect these two supervisory defendants with Counts V and VI, and the district court did not address their liability on those counts. ... We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Mr. Lombardi and Mr. Moore on Counts V and VI, and we affirm the district court’s order in all other respects.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Flowers v. Ahern · filed 2009-07-01

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors when their subordinates have not violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Seals v. Russell · filed 2009-07-06

Finally, the district court properly determined that the supervisory defendants cannot be held liable under section 1983 where there has been no showing that their subordinates violated Seal’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor personally liable solely because of their position; the plaintiff must show personal participation or a basis for supervisory liability.

Rock for Life-Umbc v. Hrabowski · filed 2009-07-08

Because Plaintiffs have failed to show personal participation by Defendant Hrabowski or to produce any evidence to support a finding of supervisory liability, Defendant Hrabowski is entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims against him in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations linking a supervisor’s conduct to a subordinate’s constitutional violation; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Colon-Andino v. Toledo-Davila · filed 2009-07-13

The Court finds that the allegations of the complaint do not allege a link between Toledo-Davila and the alleged constitutional violations sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s unconstitutional acts solely because of the supervisory relationship.

Gross v. Sheriff Bob White · filed 2009-07-17

“Supervisory officials cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of their subordinates based on respondeat superior liability.” ... Gross’ allegations fail to meet the “extremely rigorous standard” for supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Sudler v. Danberg · filed 2009-07-21

Liability in a § 1983 action cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in or direct causal connection to an alleged violation; respondeat superior alone does not establish liability.

Thomas v. Owens · filed 2009-07-21

As for the supervisory officials whom Thomas sought to hold responsible for the incident under a theory of respondeat superior, Thomas’s legal boilerplate fails to establish that the supervisor defendants had any personal involvement in or a direct causal connection to the alleged violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a prison official knows of and disregards a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate.

Lindsey v. Fauver · filed 2009-07-22

In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court clarified that supervisory liability may attach when an “official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” ... Adequate evidence supported the jury’s determination that Faunce, Bay-side’s administrator, knew, but chose to disregard, allegations of inmate abuse.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the conduct causing a deprivation occurs with the supervisor’s knowledge and consent.

T.E. Ex Rel. C.E. v. Sperlik · filed 2009-07-23

Under § 1983, however, supervisory liability can be established if the conduct causing the deprivation occurred with the supervisor’s knowledge and consent.

A § 1983 claim against a prison supervisor based on a policy must connect that policy to subordinates’ deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.

Provencio v. Vazquez · filed 2009-07-29

Plaintiffs therefore fail to establish the third prong of the standard set forth by this court for stating a cause of action against Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in violation of Eighth Amendment; Plaintiffs fail to connect how Defendant’s alleged policy caused individuals to act in deliberate indifference to Provencio’s serious medical needs.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because a supervisor oversees someone who violated a person’s rights.

Bryant v. CEO DeKalb Co. · filed 2009-07-31

It is well established that liability in § 1983 cases cannot be premised solely upon a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based on respondeat superior.

Aruanno v. Blodgett · filed 2009-08-04

Finally, the former governor of New Jersey was properly dismissed because respondeat superior cannot form the basis of liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 can impose supervisory liability when a failure to establish a policy causes a constitutional injury.

Jackson v. Carroll · filed 2009-08-05

The absence of a policy or failure to establish a policy can give rise to liability. ... Defendants have not addressed this standard and, therefore, have not carried their burden to warrant summary judgment.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in a constitutional violation or when the supervisor’s actions have a causal connection to it.

Williams v. Santana · filed 2009-08-11

Because Brown was decided in 1990, the law, at the time of the incident alleged in Williams’s complaint, was clear that a supervisor could be held responsible under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations committed by subordinates if the supervisor personally participated in the constitutional violation or if there was a causal connection between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.