42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisory official in an individual capacity to show the supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Graham v. Poole · filed 2007-03-12

A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a supervisory official in his individual capacity must show that the supervisor was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability cannot rest solely on a type of training identified after the fact that might have prevented the harm.

Ontha v. TN · filed 2007-03-13

Yet, to establish supervisory liability, it is not enough to point after the fact to a particular sort of training which, if provided, might have prevented the harm suffered in a given case.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a subordinate’s constitutional violation when the supervisor personally participates or has a causal connection to the violation.

Mathews v. McDonough · filed 2007-03-16

We have held that supervisors can be held liable for subordinates’ constitutional violations on the basis of supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). Supervisory liability under § 1983 occurs “when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on school board members who were not alleged to know of retaliation before it occurred.

Spittal v. Houseman · filed 2007-03-16

Moreover, Spittal did not allege that members of the Board of Trustees of the Sacramento City Unified School District knew of the alleged retaliation before it happened. See Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir.2006) (“[TJhere is no pure respondeat superior liability under § 1983....”).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability where the complaint does not allege that the supervisor knew of the alleged retaliation before it happened.

Spittal v. Shubb · filed 2007-03-16

The district court properly dismissed the claims against the Superintendent of the Sacramento City Unified School District because Spittal did not allege that she knew of the alleged retaliation before it happened.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor participates in or directs a subordinate’s constitutional violation, or knows of it and fails to prevent it; respondeat superior alone is insufficient.

Preschooler II v. Clark County School Board of Trustees · filed 2007-03-20

Although there is no pure respondeat superior liability under § 1983, a supervisor is liable for the acts of his subordi- nates “if the supervisor participated in or directed the viola- tions, or knew of the violations [of subordinates] and failed to act to prevent them.”

Section 1983 does not recognize supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Calloway v. Cowan · filed 2007-03-20

Calloway is effectively relying on a respondeat superior theory that is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor participates in or directs a constitutional violation, or knows of it and fails to prevent it; it does not impose liability solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Preschooler II v. Clark County School Bd. of Trustees · filed 2007-03-21

Although there is no pure respondeat superior liability under § 1983, a supervisor is liable for the acts of his subordinates "if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations [of subordinates] and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence that the supervisor implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct; mere presence is insufficient.

Caudell v. City of Loveland · filed 2007-03-28

However, Caudell has alleged, through his deposition testimony and the James affidavit, nothing more than Mays’s presence during the search; even accepting this as true (Mays himself appears to have denied that he was there) for the purpose of evaluating a summary judgment motion, this allegation fails to make out a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983. Such a claim requires a showing “that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (no simple respondeat superior municipal liability under § 1983).

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the challenged conduct for supervisory liability.

Blake v. Race · filed 2007-03-29

To state a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983, plaintiff must demonstrate the personal involvement, in the challenged conduct, of the supervisor.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official knows of a subordinate’s misconduct, responds with deliberate indifference or tacit authorization, and the inaction causes a constitutional injury.

Jennings v. University Of North Carolina · filed 2007-04-09

More specifically, Jennings's evidence would allow a jury to find that Ehringhaus had actual knowledge of Dorrance's misconduct; that her response was "so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices"; and that there exists "an affirmative causal link" between Ehringhaus's inaction and Jennings's constitutional injury. See Baynard, 268 F.3d at 235 (quoting Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799). Ehringhaus is therefore not entitled to summary judgment on Jennings's § 1983 claim against her for supervisory liability.

Section 1983 requires deliberate indifference, rather than mere negligence, to hold a supervisor liable for inadequate supervision or training.

Gaston v. Ploeger · filed 2007-04-12

Yet, as the sheriff emphasizes, mere negligence is not enough; he must have been deliberately indifferent to the risk of prisoner suicide if he is to be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a supervisory liability claim to proceed when the complaint alleges that supervisors created a custom or practice under which their subordinates violated constitutional rights.

Danley v. Allyn · filed 2007-04-24

Without having conducted any discovery, Danley has done a creditable job of alleging facts and circumstances to show that Rikard and Willis created an atmosphere or practice under which the three hands-on employees operated in, and that can create supervisory liability without resort to respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position; the plaintiff must allege personal involvement.

Brown v. Williams · filed 2007-04-25

Because § 1983 prohibits the imposition of liability on the sole basis of the doctrine of respondeat superior, the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official implements a policy that repudiates constitutional rights and causes the violation, even without personal involvement.

Scribner v. Linthicum · filed 2007-04-26

Further, the district court did not consider that regardless of the defendant’s personal involvement with any alleged constitutional violations, supervisory liability may exist where the supervisory official implements a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only for a supervisor’s own acts or omissions.

Hernandez-Payero v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico · filed 2007-04-27

Supervisors, such as Haddock and Cor-rea, can be held liable under § 1983 only on basis of their own acts or omissions.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on respondeat superior.

James v. PA Dept Corr · filed 2007-04-27

Because this action is under § 1983, James cannot rely solely on respondeat superior as a theory of liability.

Supervisors are liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s constitutional violation only when their deliberate indifference and failure to take adequate remedial action proximately caused the injury.

Cox v. Sugg · filed 2007-04-27

In general, supervisors in this position are liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s violation of a third person’s constitutional right only if their deliberate indifference to the offensive conduct and failure to take adequate remedial action proximately caused the injury.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Jaimes v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2007-04-27

Because this action is under § 1983, James cannot rely solely on respondeat superior as a theory of liability.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor participates in or directs a violation, or knows of it and fails to act to prevent it.

Tate v. Huskey · filed 2007-04-30

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tate’s supervisory liability claim because Tate presented no evidence that defendants Huskey and Newton participated in, directed, or knew of violations and failed to act to prevent them.

A § 1983 retaliation claim against wardens fails when the plaintiff does not demonstrate their liability for an officer’s alleged retaliation.

McKnight v. Eason · filed 2007-05-07

Regardless, his claim fails as Officer Grey was not named as a defendant in the lawsuit, and, although McKnight named three wardens as defendants in his lawsuit, he has not demonstrated that the wardens are liable for the alleged retaliation by Officer Grey.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for a subordinate’s unconstitutional acts solely through respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

AG Ex Rel. KC v. Autauga County Bd. of Educ. · filed 2007-05-11

It is established in the Eleventh Circuit that Butler and Cleveland would not be liable under section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinate, Wright, on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ conduct.

Felder v. Howerton · filed 2007-05-11

As the district court correctly found, it is well- settled law that § 1983 does not provide for vicarious liability.

A school principal is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim based on an employee’s sexual abuse when the principal’s response to limited notice is not deliberately indifferent.

King v. Conroe Independent School District · filed 2007-05-29

The test for this court to apply is not whether Stockton did all he could, or should, have done, but whether he acted with deliberate indifference to King’s constitutional rights. Because there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Stockton acted with deliberate indifference, he is entitled to qualified immunity on King’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability under respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Clark v. Hebert · filed 2007-05-30

Moreover, the Sheriff and the Warden cannot be held liable on any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 requires more than a bare allegation that a supervisor failed to train subordinates to establish supervisory liability.

Figueroa-Flores v. Acevedo-Vilá · filed 2007-06-04

Finally, merely alleging that a supervisor failed to train his subordinates is patently insufficient to establish a § 1983 claim against the supervisor.

Section 1983 does not permit claims based solely on respondeat superior or supervisory liability.

Hardy v. Sutton · filed 2007-06-11

While the district court may have erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to exhaust under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Jones v. Bock, ___U.S.___, 2007 WL 135890 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2007) (No. 05-7058), we affirm the district court’s order on the modified ground that Hardy cannot proceed on claims based upon respondeat superior and supervisory liability. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985).

Section 1983 requires a supervisor sued in an individual capacity to be personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation; forwarding a grievance to staff does not suffice.

Ortiz-Rodriguez v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 2007-06-13

Berbary’s involvement, at most, consists of his forwarding the document to his staff, which is not enough to give rise to personal involvement for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor and a subordinate’s constitutional violation, such as the supervisor’s active participation or acquiescence.

Strope v. Collins · filed 2007-06-15

In order to establish a § 1983 claim against a supervisor for the unconstitutional acts of subordinates, a plaintiff must show an affirmative link between the supervisor and the violation, “namely the active participation or acquiescence of the supervisor in the constitutional violation by the subordinates.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors for subordinates’ acts or omissions unless the supervisors participated in the conduct.

Spencer Ex Rel. Spencer v. Staton · filed 2007-06-15

Unless they participated in the conduct, supervisors are not subject to § 1983 liability for the acts or omissions of their subordinates.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability without direct participation only when a subordinate violates a constitutional right and the supervisor’s conduct is affirmatively linked to that violation.

Cruz v. Puerto Rico-Dept. of Justice · filed 2007-06-20

Under Section 1983, absent participation in the challenged conduct, a supervisor can be held liable only if (1) the behavior of his subordinates results in a constitutional violation and (2) the supervisor’s action or inaction was affirmatively linked to the behavior in the sense that it could be characterized as supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence of the supervisor amounting to deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 does not make a prison official liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violation solely because the official supervised that subordinate.

Lenz v. M.D. Reed · filed 2007-06-20

A prison official, such as Warden Reed, “may not be held liable under § 1983 for the constitutional violations of a subordinate on a respondeat superior theory.” Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070, 1079 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on prison supervisors; a supervisor must know of and disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.

Lenz v. Wade · filed 2007-06-20

A prison official, such as Warden Reed, "may not be held liable under § 1983 for the constitutional violations of a subordinate on a respondeat superior theory." Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070, 1079 (8th Cir.2007) (quotation omitted). ... The record here does not establish Warden Reed ever had the requisite knowledge or drew the necessary inferences to support a claim of deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in a constitutional violation or has a causal connection to it.

Dale v. Stephens County, Georgia School · filed 2007-06-27

However, even if a supervisor did not personally perpetrate the violation, supervisors may be held liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations of their subordinates when a supervisor “personally participates” in the constitutional violation or when there is a “causal connection” between the supervising official’s acts and the constitutional deprivation alleged.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for subordinates’ acts solely because of the supervisory relationship.

Ibarra v. Harris County Texas · filed 2007-06-28

As a supervisory official, Sheriff Thomas may not be held liable under § 1983 for the acts of his subordinates based on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires that the supervisor knew of and facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye to a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Goldschmidt v. Coco · filed 2007-06-29

To be liable for the constitutional violation of a subordinate, Judge Coco must have known of and facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye to the conduct.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory defendant’s personal involvement in an alleged constitutional deprivation before damages may be awarded.

Finch v. NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN · filed 2007-07-03

It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability without personal involvement or a policy that infringes constitutional rights.

Hailey v. Savers · filed 2007-07-18

Hailey does not allege personal involvement on the part of Buck, nor does Hailey allege that Buck implemented policies to infringe upon Hailey’s constitutional rights. See Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303- 04 (5th Cir. 1987). Hailey’s claim of supervisory liability is non-actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based on respondeat superior; the plaintiff must allege the supervisor’s personal involvement in the deprivation.

Walker v. Beard · filed 2007-07-19

It is well settled, however, that liability under § 1983 may not based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a showing that an affirmative policy or plan links supervisory officials’ actions to the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.

Butler v. Cooper · filed 1977-05-16

It is evident from the pleadings and affidavits that there was never a showing of an affirmative policy or plan linking the plaintiff’s alleged deprivation of constitutional rights with actions by any of the defendants.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of supervisory status; personal involvement is required.

Bumpus v. Canfield · filed 2007-07-20

The mere fact that Nurse Hopkins was a supervisor at the time of the events in question is not enough to give rise to § 1983 liability, however, since the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because they employ the alleged wrongdoers.

Heyliger v. Gebler · filed 2007-07-24

Fischer and Conway move to dismiss the claims against them on the ground that they are named only in their supervisory capacities. ... The motion is therefore granted. See Green v. Bauvi, 46 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir.1995) (“There is no respondeat superior liability in § 1983 cases”) (citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)).

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s conduct only if the supervisor was aware of and approved it.

Sides v. City of Champaign · filed 2007-08-08

Stavins testified that he supervised the city legal department, but a supervisor is not liable for the acts of her subordinates under § 1983 unless she was aware of and approved her employees’ conduct.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to have caused a subordinate’s deprivation of constitutional rights; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Chancellor v. Pottsgrove School District · filed 2007-08-08

However, Wishart cannot be liable under § 1983 simply by virtue of her position as Oakes’s supervisor; she must have in some way caused the deprivation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for employees’ deliberate indifference; the supervisor must have been personally deliberately indifferent.

Calhoun v. Volusia County · filed 2007-08-13

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to claims arising under § 1983. ... Therefore, Plaintiff must establish that Dr. Smyth was himself deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs serious medical needs, not simply that the employees he supervised were deliberately indifferent.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Allah v. Poole · filed 2007-08-14

Finally, Poole’s and Napoli’s supervisory status alone is not enough to establish their personal involvement, since the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only when a supervisor caused or participated in the constitutional violation.

Thomas Ex Rel. Smith v. Sheahan · filed 2007-08-15

Accordingly, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 actions; supervisors may be held liable only if they caused or participated in the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for the acts of their subordinates.

Daker v. Ferrero · filed 2007-08-24

As Defendants correctly point out, Defendants Benton and Jones, as supervisory officials of the GDC, may not be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the acts of their inferiors.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a subordinate’s conduct; the supervisor must be responsible through their own wrongful behavior.

Avalos v. Baca · filed 2007-08-24

Supervisory officials may not be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior, but only for their own wrongful behavior.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in unconstitutional conduct or a causal connection links the supervisor’s actions to the constitutional deprivation.

West v. Tillman · filed 2007-08-27

Thus, the Supervisory Defendants are liable only if they personally participated in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct or if there is “a causal connection between [their] actions . . . and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not detail each supervisor’s role in a constitutional violation at the pleading stage if they sufficiently allege the supervisors’ involvement.

Hydrick v. McDaniel · filed 2007-08-30

At this stage of pleading, however, the Plaintiffs’ need not specifically delineate how each Defendant contributed to the violation of their constitutional rights. ... Therefore, we hold the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the Defendants’ role in the alleged constitutional violations against SVPs to survive this motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 requires more than control over subordinates to support supervisor liability.

Meadows v. Whetsel · filed 2007-08-30

Section 1983 demands more than mere control over subordinates to support supervisor liability.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor who was personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or whose wrongful conduct had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Curtis R. Francis, TDCJ-ID 564414 v. TDCJ-CID · filed 2007-08-31

A supervisory official such as Horton “may be held liable [under section 1983] if there exists either (1) his personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; a supervisor’s conduct must be sufficiently causally connected to the constitutional violation.

Byerly v. Deputy Warden · filed 2007-08-31

Pure respondeat superior liability does not apply to § 1983 claims, see Hydride v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir.2006), but a supervisor may be subject to § 1983 liability if the supervisor’s wrongful conduct is sufficiently causally connected to the constitutional violation, see Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc).

Section 1983 permits a claim against supervisors when the complaint sufficiently alleges their role in causing constitutional violations.

Hydrick v. Hunter · filed 2007-08-30

Therefore, we hold the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the Defendants’ role in the alleged constitutional violations against SVPs to survive this motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a subordinate’s acts when a failure to train or supervise caused a violation of the plaintiff’s rights and amounted to deliberate indifference.

Payne v. Parnell · filed 2007-09-05

To hold a supervisory official liable for the acts of a subordinate, Payne must show that “(1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.” Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911–12 (5th Cir. 1998).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence that a supervisor was personally involved in the violation or was aware of and deliberately indifferent to the risk of it.

Prentzel v. State, Department of Public Safety · filed 2007-09-14

Prentzel's § 1983 claims against the supervising officers fail for several reasons. First, Prentzel has failed to show that Tanner and Godfrey were personally involved in his arrest or that they were subjectively aware of and deliberately indifferent to the risk that his rights would be violated.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking supervisory liability to show knowledge of a pervasive risk, deliberate indifference or tacit authorization, and an affirmative causal link to the constitutional injury.

Maradiaga v. Wilson · filed 2007-09-24

After a review of the entire record, the R & R, and Plaintiffs Objections, the court finds the Magistrate Judge fairly and accurately summarized the facts and applied the correct principles of law. Accordingly, the court adopts the R & R and fully incorporates it into this Order. ... To establish supervisory liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices,”; and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. See Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir.1990).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; a complaint must allege the supervisor’s personal involvement.

Smith v. O'Boyle · filed 2007-10-04

As the District Court correctly assessed, Smith’s complaint against Beard (Secretary of the Department of Corrections) and Cerullo (Health Care Administrator at SCI-Frackville) cannot withstand a motion to dismiss because he did make any specific allegations against them, and liability cannot be imposed on the basis of respondeat superior.

A supervisor’s responses to untimely grievances do not establish § 1983 liability for excessive force without evidence that the supervisor sanctioned or was involved in the force.

Taylor v. Edelman · filed 2007-10-05

In particular, the evidence supports the district court’s findings that defendants used an appropriate amount of force in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline when Taylor refused to submit to handcuffing halfway through the process, and when he directed threatening remarks at one prison official and made some physical movement toward him after submitting to restraints; that Taylor failed to request medical treatment after the use-of-force incident; and that the supervisory defendants’ responses to Taylor’s untimely grievances did not show they sanctioned or were any way involved in an excessive use of force.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a supervisor’s actions and a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct to impose supervisory liability.

Schlier v. Rice · filed 2007-10-09

To hold a superior liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional activities of one of his subordinates, a plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the superior’s actions and the subordinate’s unconstitutional activity.

Section 1983 does not hold supervisory officials vicariously liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional acts.

Hirschhorn v. Honorable Dale Ross · filed 2007-10-10

The law is clear in this circuit that supervisory officials cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates.

Section 1983's personal-involvement requirement can be satisfied at the pleading stage by allegations that supervisors administered the challenged procedures and supervised the staff who applied them.

FELIX-TORRES v. Graham · filed 2007-10-17

Liberally construing the complaint and viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Felix-Torres, Felix-Torres alleges that as Superintendent and Deputy Superintendents, Graham, Brown, and Bellnier created and administered the procedures at Auburn by which assignments of inmates to upper bunks were made and that they supervised subordinates who assigned Felix-Torres to an upper bunk in spite of his known medical condition. ... This suffices to allege the personal involvement of Graham, Brown, and Bellnier.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisory official in an individual capacity to allege the official’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation.

Guarneri v. West · filed 2007-10-23

A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a supervisory official in his individual capacity must allege that the supervisor was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability when the supervisor authorizes, supervises, or participates in conduct causing a constitutional deprivation.

Bruner v. Baker · filed 2007-10-30

A supervisor can also be held liable if the supervisor expressly “authorized, supervised, or participated in conduct which caused the constitutional deprivation.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the wrongdoing; a prison administrator is not liable solely for subordinate officials’ misconduct.

Glenn v. Barua · filed 2007-10-30

Finally, to the extent that Glenn seeks to hold Tretinik liable under § 1983 for the misconduct of subordinate officials, the complaint fails to state a claim.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official affirmatively participates in acts causing a constitutional deprivation or implements an unconstitutional policy that causes the plaintiff's injury.

Lentworth v. Potter · filed 2007-11-28

A supervisory official may be held liable under § 1983 if he “affirmatively participate[s] in acts that cause constitutional deprivation” or “implement[s] unconstitutional policies that causally result in plaintiff’s injury”.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when a supervisor directly participates in, encourages, authorizes, approves, or knowingly acquiesces in unconstitutional conduct.

Morrison v. Board of Trustees of Green Tp. · filed 2007-11-29

A supervisor can be held liable under § 1983 only if he “encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it,” or “at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant solely because the defendant supervises the person who violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Cameron v. Allen · filed 2007-12-04

Defendant Allen cannot be held liable in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the theory of respondeat superior or on the basis of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 supervisory liability may proceed when evidence raises a genuine factual dispute about officials’ failure to discipline and report abuse.

Roe v. Nevada · filed 2007-12-10

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of fact sufficient to maintain their claim on the issue of Defendants’ alleged failure to discipline and report abuse.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability when a supervisor’s response to a known risk is reasonable rather than deliberately indifferent.

Sanders v. Brown · filed 2007-12-11

Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact, construed in Sanders’ favor, that demonstrates that Lewis was deliberately indifferent to any risk associated with Brown, and she cannot be held liable under § 1983 to Sanders for Brown’s misconduct.

Section 1983 does not make the head of an indigent defender board liable merely for appointing counsel to represent a defendant.

Walton v. Parish of Lasalle · filed 2007-12-11

The head of the Indigent Defender’s Board may not be held liable under § 1983 for appointing counsel to represent Walton.

Section 1983 does not make a department head liable solely because of their position; the plaintiff must show that the official participated in the challenged decision.

Ayala-Rodriguez v. Rullan · filed 2007-12-19

The burden of showing that Rullan participated in the decision lay squarely upon Ayala. That Rullan headed the department does not make him liable merely on that account; there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability under respondeat superior.

Hotchkiss v. Neel · filed 2007-12-21

Hotchkiss’s claim regarding supervisory liability is likewise unavailing because there is no such liability in § 1983 suits.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor for a subordinate’s conduct.

Goebert v. Lee County · filed 2007-12-21

We do not recognize vicarious liability, including respondeat superior, in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims against supervisory personnel require allegations of personal involvement.

Ralston v. Hurley · filed 2008-01-02

Inasmuch as Ralston renews his claims against supervisory personnel, the claims were properly dismissed for lack of any alleged personal involvement.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Peterson v. Warden NHSP · filed 2008-01-07

Thus, a § 1983 claim cannot be predicated on a respondeat superior theory.

In a § 1983 supervisory liability claim, a student's voluntary participation in a relationship with a teacher is relevant to the principal's knowledge to the extent the student intentionally concealed the relationship.

Chancellor v. Pottsgrove School District · filed 2008-01-07

The voluntary nature of the relationship is relevant only to the extent that Wishart can show that Chancellor intentionally concealed the relationship from Wishart, thus interfering with Wishart’s duty to learn of Oakes’s inappropriate behavior. Therefore, evidence of voluntariness is admissible to establish the state of Wishart’s knowledge.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state official merely because of her office; she must play a personal role in the constitutional deprivation.

Samonte v. Bauman · filed 2008-01-18

Governor Lingle is not liable merely by reason of her office because there is no general respondeat superior liability under § 1983; “the state official must play a personal role in the constitutional deprivation to be liable.” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc).

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation for an award of damages; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Stevens v. Goord · filed 2008-01-22

Second Circuit precedent holds that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in a suit for money damages under Section 1983, and that some “ ‘personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.’ ”

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ actions solely through vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Fife v. Dabeties · filed 2008-01-31

Supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official implements a policy that causes a constitutional violation.

Huffman v. Linthicum · filed 2008-02-06

Supervisory liability may exist where the supervisory official “implement[s] a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors merely for a subordinate’s actions; failure to train or supervise supports liability only when it constitutes deliberate indifference.

Alvarado v. Battaglia · filed 2008-02-13

A supervisory official may not be held liable for the actions of a subordinate under a theory of respondeat superior. A supervisory official may be held liable for failing to train or supervise subordinate officers only when such a failure constitutes deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim when a supervisor’s alleged failure to train and supervise officers proximately caused the constitutional injury.

Mangual v. Toledo · filed 2008-02-15

Here, Plaintiffs did allege in the complaint that Defendant Toledo was responsible for training the officers involved in the allegedly unlawful arrest and death of Rosa, and that Defendant Toledo’s failure to supervise and train the police officers proximately caused the incidents that led to the drowning. Thus, the complaint suffices to state a claim of supervisory liability under Section 1983 at this state of the litigation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a supervisor's own culpable action or inaction, acquiescence in a constitutional deprivation, or reckless or callous indifference to others' rights.

Tensley v. City of Spokane · filed 2008-02-15

For the benefit of the parties and the district court, however, we note that supervisors may be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under some circumstances.

A jury may find a supervisor liable under § 1983 when the supervisor’s acts or omissions create jail conditions that proximately cause an inmate’s assault.

Tafoya v. Salazar · filed 2008-02-21

However, acts or deficiencies that result in a jail atmosphere in which discipline and supervision is entirely lacking, may be sufficiently related to a particular instance of assault that a jury is permitted to conclude that the conditions proximately caused the assault.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because a defendant supervises the person who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Jones v. Taylor · filed 2008-02-21

As is well established, supervisory liability cannot be imposed under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Joy v. Healthcare C.M.S. · filed 2008-02-21

As is well established, supervisory liability cannot be imposed under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a warden who allegedly knew of ongoing unconstitutional prison conditions and failed to remedy them.

Cockcroft v. Kirkland · filed 2008-03-10

These allegations, liberally construed, go beyond respondeat superior liability and are sufficient to state a claim against defendant Kirkland for the Eighth Amendment violation.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against supervisors based solely on their position when they did not personally participate in the alleged acts.

Case v. Riley · filed 2008-03-25

And claims against supervisory personnel who did not personally participate in the acts complained of are not actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability, including respondeat superior, on supervisors.

Smith v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2008-03-25

We do not recognize vicarious liability, including respondeat superior, in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations connecting a supervisor’s failure to train to the subordinate’s misconduct; a conclusory failure-to-train allegation is insufficient.

Rossi-Cortes v. Toledo-Rivera · filed 2008-03-26

Allegations that a supervisor failed to train his subordinate officers and that he should be held liable for such failure, without identifying the factual underpinnings of such failure, nor identifying the causal nexus between the failed training and the subordinate’s misconduct, are not enough to sustain a claim of liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability for a subordinate's constitutional violation only when there is an affirmative link through the supervisor's active participation or acquiescence.

Lowery v. County of Riley · filed 2008-04-14

A supervisor may be held liable under § 1983 for the acts of his subordinate only if the plaintiff shows that the subordinate violated the Constitution and that there is an affirmative link between the supervisor and the violation—“namely the active participation or acquiescence of the supervisor in the constitutional violation by the subordinate[].”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisory officials for the actions of subordinates under a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Williams v. Leonard · filed 2008-04-15

Supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Section 1983 allows supervisory officials to be held liable for civil rights violations without proof of their personal participation when they fail to control a subordinate's known propensity for improper force.

Cook v. City of Miami · filed 1979-02-05

The Court finds that “personal participation” is not a necessary prerequisite to imposing liability upon the supervisory defendants.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisory official’s acts or omissions and a constitutional violation caused by subordinates.

Stringer v. City of Chicago · filed 1979-02-12

In order to establish the liability under § 1983 of supervisory officials for deprivations of constitutional rights through the acts of their subordinates, an affirmative link must be proven between their own acts or omissions and the actions directly causing the alleged violation, so that they can be said to have encouraged, approved of, or acquiesced in the violation.

Section 1983 permits liability against a supervisory official only when the official is personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing.

Donaldson v. Hovanec · filed 1979-06-27

In an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a supervisory official is only liable if he is personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor affirmatively promotes a policy that sanctions a violation; approval of a policy alone is insufficient.

Doores v. McNamara · filed 1979-09-21

The approval of an affirmative action plan by the Board members and its adoption by Chief McNamara in this case would not appear to be a sufficient basis for imposing liability. The court recognizes that where supervisory personnel have affirmatively promoted a policy which sanctioned the action which caused the violation, liability under § 1983 has been imposed.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against persons acting under color of state law, subject to immunity doctrines and limits on supervisory liability.

Henzel v. Richard Gerstein, Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General · filed 1979-12-21

Supervisory officials need not have participated personally in an act in order to be liable under § 1983 for the consequences of the act, but the plaintiff must show some causal connection between an act of the official and the alleged violation. A supervisory official may not be held responsible solely on a theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for a constitutional deprivation caused by state officials, including supervisors whose statutory responsibilities provide the required causal link.

Arruda v. Berman · filed 1981-09-28

For this reason, I rule that the plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because a defendant holds a supervisory position.

Jones v. Denton · filed 1981-10-15

It is well settled that in a § 1983 action supervisors cannot be held liable solely on the basis of respondeat superior, that is, solely for being in a supervisory position.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without personal involvement or awareness of the alleged misconduct.

Glynn v. Calvin Auger, Warden, Iowa State Men's Reformatory · filed 1982-05-25

There is nothing in the allegations to indicate that Warden Auger engaged in or was aware of any harassment of Glynn.

Section 1983 permits liability for supervisory inaction only when the supervisor had actual or fairly imputable knowledge of the misconduct.

Hector v. Weglein · filed 1982-09-01

In order for supervisory inaction to form the basis of § 1983 liability, it is necessary that the supervisor have actual or fairly imputable knowledge of the misconduct.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on supervisors through respondeat superior; supervisory officials can be liable for their own reckless or intentional conduct under color of state law.

Strachan v. Ashe · filed 1982-10-13

It is well settled that § 1983 does not encompass a theory of damages liability based upon respondeat superior, Monell v. Department of City Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). ... These undisputed facts are sufficient to establish at least recklessness on the part of defendants, if not intentional misconduct. In either case, there is an adequate basis for damages liability under § 1983 for deprivation under color of state law of plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on prison administrators solely because they knew of prior thefts by employees.

Steffen v. Vernon Housewright, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 1981-12-07

Since responde-at superior is not applicable in § 1983 cases, ... the motion to dismiss as to Housewright and Cowan is granted. ... For the reasons stated above and for the reasons stated by the district court, we affirm.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal participation in or acquiescence in the alleged misconduct; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Townsend v. Frame · filed 1984-05-30

Consequently, where, as here, the complaint fails to allege “personal involvement by [both Frame and DeBruyn] in the form of actual participation or acquiescence in the alleged unlawful conduct”, there is no § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely for their subordinates’ acts; a supervisor may be liable when a breach of the duty to train, supervise, or control subordinates causes injury.

Hahn v. Maurice McLey Arnold Dischler and Officer Andy Anderson, Thomas Hahn v. Maurice McLey Arnold Dischler and · filed 1984-06-29

It is conceded that the theory of respondeat superior cannot be used under § 1983 to shift the responsibility for the plaintiff’s injuries to the supervisors of the actual wrongdoers. ... However, a supervisor may be liable for the acts of a subordinate if injury is inflicted upon the plaintiff as a result of a breach of the supervisor’s duty to train, supervise, or control the actions of subordinates.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a causal connection between the constitutional violation and the supervisor’s participation, direction, or failure to supervise.

Rider v. Werholtz · filed 2008-04-25

To make such a claim, plaintiff must allege a causal connection or an affirmative link between plaintiffs constitutional deprivation and “either the supervisor’s personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise.”

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on government officials.

Pierce v. Cook · filed 2008-05-01

Section 1983 does not create a general respondeat superior liability for government officials.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only for a supervisor’s own acts or omissions, including direct participation, condonation, or tacit authorization of unconstitutional conduct.

Diaz v. Unknown Officers of the Puerto Rico Police Department · filed 2008-05-01

Under section 1983, supervisory liability can only be grounded on the supervisor’s own acts or omissions either through the supervisor’s direct participation in the unconstitutional conduct, or through conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit authorization.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official affirmatively participates in acts causing a constitutional deprivation or implements an unconstitutional policy that causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Hinojosa v. Johnson · filed 2008-05-01

For a supervisory official to be held liable, they must “affirmatively participate in acts that cause constitutional deprivation” or “implement unconstitutional policies that causally result in plaintiff’s injury.”

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires the supervisor’s personal participation in a constitutional violation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s actions and the violation.

Goree v. City of Atlanta, Georgia · filed 2008-05-01

Moreover, Goree has also failed to demonstrate that Chief Pennington had any personal involvement in this matter. See Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Supervisory liability occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”).

Section 1983 does not make a government official liable solely for supervising someone who violated a constitutional right.

Pierce v. Amaranto · filed 2008-05-01

Section 1983 does not create a general respondeat superior• liability for government officials.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison supervisor who responds reasonably to allegations of a subordinate’s misconduct.

Ortiz v. Goord · filed 2008-05-05

“Defendants may be held liable under § 1983 if they ... exhibited deliberate indifference to a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty, and their failure to perform the duty or act to ameliorate the risk or injury was a proximate cause of plaintiffs deprivation of rights under the Constitution.” ... Construing all evidence in the manner most favorable to Ortiz, as nonmoving party, we find that he has not established a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the reasonableness of Lacey’s actions in response to allegations of defendant Gar-rant’s misconduct at Bare Hill Correctional Facility.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; supervisory authority alone does not establish liability.

Burns v. Trombly · filed 2008-05-07

The mere fact that, during the incident, Defendant Quinn was somewhere else in the prison serving in a position of authority over the referenced Defendants is precisely the sort of liability that is precluded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which requires something more than an officer’s position as a supervisor for him to be liable for a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires personal involvement in the violation; a warden’s response to an administrative remedy request alone does not establish it.

DuBois v. Dooley · filed 2008-05-13

Warden Robert Dooley undisputedly lacked medical training, and his only involvement was to respond to DuBois’s administrative remedy request. See Meloy, 302 F.3d at 849 (noting that prison officials cannot substitute their judgment for medical professional’s prescribed treatment); Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 635 (8th Cir. 2001) (supervisor liability occurs for Eighth Amendment violation when supervisor is personally involved in violation). We thus conclude that summary judgment was proper.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor vicariously liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violation without the supervisor’s knowledge and approval of the conduct.

Worlds v. Spiegla · filed 2008-05-13

As to Donahue, Worlds does not allege that he contributed to or knew about the mistake, and a supervisor is not vicariously liable for a subordinate’s conduct that violates a plaintiff’s constitutional rights absent the supervisor’s knowledge and approval of the conduct.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a supervisor’s own acts or omissions, including conduct that condones or tacitly authorizes a constitutional violation.

Tavarez-Guerrero v. Toledo-Davila · filed 2008-05-16

Under section 1983, supervisory liability can only be grounded on the supervisor’s own acts or omissions either through the supervisor’s direct participation in the unconstitutional conduct, or through conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit authorization.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest solely on respondeat superior.

Davila-Bajana v. Sherman · filed 2008-05-21

Furthermore, it is well established that liability under section 1983 cannot be predicated solely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires active unconstitutional behavior by a supervisor; the mere right to control subordinates does not establish supervisory liability.

Eaton v. Oklahoma · filed 2008-05-27

As noted above, however, supervisory liability under § 1983 requires “active unconstitutional behavior,” not just the right to control.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or the supervisor’s wrongful conduct was causally connected to it.

Signorelli v. Stalder · filed 2008-06-03

A supervisor may be held liable under § 1983 only if either (1) he was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there existed a causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position over an alleged wrongdoer.

Crawford v. Carroll · filed 2008-06-03

Johnston’s liability under § 1983 as Carroll’s supervisor must be based on something more than the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability through respondeat superior; a defendant’s conduct must have an affirmative link to the injury.

Gann v. Schramm · filed 1985-04-18

Traditional concepts of respondeat superior do not apply to actions brought under section 1983. ... An “affirmative link” between the injury and the Defendants’ conduct is essential to the showing of causation.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff liable solely because the alleged wrongdoers were in the sheriff’s employ.

Douglas v. Gusman · filed 2008-06-09

Thus, neither Sheriff Gusman nor former Sheriff Foti can be held liable under Section 1983 pursuant to a theory of respondeat superior simply because the persons allegedly responsible for plaintiffs injury, if any, were in the sheriffs employ.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for violations committed by subordinates.

THELMA v. School Dist. of Philadelphia · filed 2008-06-10

Instead, plaintiffs seek to hold defendant Gaffney liable for violations committed by officials of the District operating under his auspices. This amounts to respondeat superior liability, which cannot be the basis of liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because of a supervisor’s position; the plaintiff must show personal involvement or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation.

Cox v. Irby · filed 2008-06-13

“There is no vicarious or respondeat superior liability of supervisors under § 1983.” ... Cox may have put Warden Irby on notice that his needs for medication and a wheelchair were not being met, but he did not show that the warden was personally involved in his medical care or that there was a causal connection between her conduct and the alleged harm.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor vicariously liable for a subordinate’s conduct.

Simon v. State of Georgia · filed 2008-06-16

Appellant cannot recover against the Sheriff because a supervisor cannot be held vicariously liable for his subordinates’ conduct under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a government employee’s personal involvement in the alleged misconduct; a supervisor cannot be held liable solely because of a subordinate’s actions.

Heckler v. Montgomery · filed 2008-06-17

Magistrate Judge Dolinger’s recommendation to grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment is. therefore, adopted. ... If a plaintiff seeks to impose damage liability on a government employee under section 1983, he cannot rely on the principle of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor implicitly authorizes, approves, or knowingly acquiesces in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Lanman v. Hinson · filed 2008-06-17

As the supervisor of the restraint procedure, she can be held liable for the actions of the resident care aides if she “at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate[s].” Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.1984) (citing Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 872-74 (6th Cir.1982)).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on prison officials merely for denying administrative grievances or failing to act.

Grinter v. Knight · filed 2008-06-19

The “denial of administrative grievances or the failure to act” by prison officials does not subject supervisors to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s deliberate, intentional conduct to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; supervisors are not vicariously liable for subordinates’ misconduct.

Boyett v. County of Washington · filed 2008-06-19

To hold a supervisor liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must show the supervisor’s deliberate, intentional conduct amounted to a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Government officials are not vicariously liable for the misconduct of their subordinates.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability based on a supervisor’s own direct participation in unconstitutional conduct or conduct amounting to condonation or tacit authorization.

Martinez-Rivera v. Sanchez-Ramos · filed 2008-06-20

Under section 1983, supervisory liability can only be grounded on the supervisor’s own acts or omissions either through the supervisor’s direct participation in the unconstitutional conduct, or through conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit authorization. ... Thus, this Court finds Plaintiffs have proffered an adequate supervisor liability claim under Section 1983 against Defendants.

A § 1983 supervisory liability claim can survive dismissal when its allegations rise above speculation, without a heightened pleading requirement.

Tavárez-Guerrero v. Toledo-Dávila · filed 2008-06-23

With these general allegations Plaintiffs have certainly not proven that there is supervisor liability in the present ease. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs have raised their right to relief above the speculative level, which is sufficient to bar the dismissal of this section 1983 claim that does not have a heightened pleading requirement.

Section 1983 holds a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s conduct only when the subordinate acted at the supervisor’s direction or with the supervisor’s knowledge and consent.

Davis v. Peters · filed 2008-06-27

Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is predicated on fault; therefore, a supervisor will not be liable for a subordinate’s conduct unless the subordinate either acted at the supervisor’s direction, or acted with the supervisor’s knowledge and consent.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when a supervisor affirmatively participates in acts causing a constitutional deprivation or implements an unconstitutional policy that causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Berenguel v. Bell · filed 2008-06-27

This court holds that supervisory officials may be held liable only if: (1) they affirmatively participated in acts that caused constitutional deprivations; or (2) implemented unconstitutional policies that causally resulted in a plaintiff’s injury.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor merely for subordinates’ constitutional violations; the supervisor must have encouraged or directly participated in the misconduct.

Dever v. Kelly · filed 2008-07-02

A supervisory employee cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of those he supervises unless it is shown “that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor based on respondeat superior.

McCarty v. Doe · filed 2008-07-07

This plaintiff argues that the Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections is a named defendant, but there is no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a subordinate's constitutional violation is affirmatively linked to the supervisor's encouragement, condonation, acquiescence, or deliberate indifference.

Pineda v. Toomey · filed 2008-07-16

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a supervisory official may be held liable for the behavior of his subordinates only if "(1) the behavior of [his] subordinates results in a constitutional violation, and (2) the [supervisor]'s action or inaction was affirmative[ly] link[ed] to that behavior in the sense that it could be characterized as supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference."

Section 1983 permits a person to sue a state official who, acting under color of state law, deprives the person of a federal constitutional right, and it does not impose supervisory liability solely through respondeat superior.

Williams v. Barrett · filed 2008-07-17

To establish liability in an individual capacity claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that an official, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional right. ... Supervisory officials are not liable, however, “for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” ... This causal connection can be made through either: (1) a history of widespread abuse putting the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation; (2) a supervisor’s custodial policy resulting in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; or (3) facts supporting an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so. ... We conclude from the record that Williams fails to meet her burden even though she had a reasonable opportunity to discover evidence which would tend to support her claims.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a subordinate's unconstitutional acts without the supervisor's personal involvement or a causal connection.

Kramer v. Donald · filed 2008-07-17

Kramer sought to hold Martin liable in her supervisory capacity; but section 1983 does not allow a supervisor to be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when there is a sufficient causal connection between a supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Snyder v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2008-07-23

A supervisor may be liable for constitutional violations under § 1983 if there is “a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely on respondeat superior and requires specific supervisory acts or omissions linked to the injury for supervisory liability.

Price v. Kozak · filed 2008-07-28

Liability in a § 1983 action cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. ... It is not enough for a plaintiff to argue that the alleged injury would not have occurred if the supervisor had “done more.” ... He must identify specific acts or omissions of the supervisor that evidence deliberate indifference and establish a link between the act or omission and the ultimate injury.

Section 1983 allows a person to seek relief for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law, and a supervisor is liable only for personal participation in the violation.

Bryson v. Gonzales · filed 2008-07-28

But supervisory liability is “not . . . a theory of respondeat superior.” Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1214 (10th Cir. 2000). Supervisors are not strictly liable for the torts of their underlings; instead, they are liable only when they “personally participated in the alleged violation.”

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for unconstitutional acts of subordinates when the supervisor personally participated or a causal connection exists.

Douglas v. Yates · filed 2008-07-28

As a supervisor, Yates is liable under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the unconstitutional acts of his subordinates if he “personally participated in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct or if there is ‘a causal connection between [his] actions . . . and the alleged constitutional deprivation.’”

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a supervisor for a subordinate's conduct.

Jimmy Twilley, Jr. v. Governor Bob Riley · filed 2008-07-30

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, see Harris, 65 F.3d at 917, and accordingly the district court properly dismissed these claims.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on officials solely because their subordinates committed unconstitutional acts.

Battiste v. Lamberti · filed 2008-08-11

“It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respon-deat superior or vicarious liability.”

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a subordinate's acts or a violation of prison policy.

Cole v. Charles Frizzell, Donna Latham, and Charles Wakefield · filed 2008-08-14

A violation of TDCJ policy neither gives rise to a constitutional violation nor entitles a prisoner to section 1983 relief.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when supervisors know of widespread misconduct, fail to act, and that failure is causally connected to a constitutional deprivation.

Danley v. Allen · filed 2008-08-22

Because they allegedly failed to do so and the misconduct continued, Danley has established the necessary causal connection to hold Rikard and Willis liable in their supervisory capacities.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Collins v. Williams · filed 2008-09-11

Liability in a § 1983 action cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a supervisory position; the defendant must have personal involvement in the alleged deprivation.

Brown v. Rinehart · filed 2008-09-12

The law is clear that a § 1983 action cannot lie against Drysdale based upon his supervisory position. Moreover, it is undisputed that Drysdale was not present at the time plaintiff was arrested and, therefore, had no personal involvement in the arrest.