42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a supervisory official to be personally involved in the alleged deprivation of rights; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Whitford v. Captain Boglino · filed 1995-08-30

To state a claim under § 1983, however, Whitford must allege that McGinnis, Sandahl, and Welborn were personally involved in the deprivation of his due process rights.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for the acts of someone who was not a state actor.

Smith v. Robert A. Myers, Larry Faith and Richland County, Ohio · filed 1995-09-01

If Myers is not a state actor, then Faith cannot be liable under Section 1983 in his capacity as a supervisor.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a subordinate’s misconduct.

Shaffer v. Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General · filed 1995-09-13

The doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when supervisors know of subordinates’ unconstitutional acts and turn a blind eye to them.

Walker v. Godinez · filed 1995-09-13

Because a reasonable factfinder could find that the two supervisors turned a “blind eye” to their subordinate’s allegedly unconstitutional acts, Godinez and Fleming are not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of lack of personal involvement.

Section 1983 does not allow supervisory liability based on vicarious liability alone; the defendant’s own conduct must violate the plaintiff’s civil rights.

Wright v. Neal Brown, Superintendent Bob Shaw, Assoc. Superintendent Mark Crewson Abe Clark Larry Kincheloe, Sup · filed 1995-09-25

A Sec. 1983 suit cannot be based on vicarious liability alone, but must allege the defendants' own conduct violated the plaintiff's civil rights.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior; the supervisor must be personally involved in the conduct giving rise to the claim.

Johnson v. Mary Henderson David Trippett Ronald Knuckles John Nunnery M. Kearns · filed 1995-09-28

Plaintiff has not established that Trippett was personally involved in events giving rise to his claims. Respondeat superior liability is not applicable in section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a supervisor for a subordinate’s actions.

Harris v. Ostrout · filed 1995-09-29

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability for supervisors who fail to address workplace harassment when they can prompt an appropriate response, even if the harasser does not report to them.

Nicks v. Missouri · filed 1995-10-12

Kesselring and Karras were in supervisory positions, and because of their positions Nicks was entitled to look to them for protection from Little. They could have taken action to produce an appropriate response by BHC to Nieks’s complaints, and they were totally remiss in not doing so. As Nicks’s supervisors, they had a duty to act. That the harasser did not report to them does not excuse their derehction of this duty.

Section 1983 supervisors may be liable for failing to respond to workplace harassment even when the harasser does not report directly to them.

Nicks v. State Of Missouri · filed 1995-10-12

Kesselring and Karras were in supervisory positions, and because of their positions Nicks was entitled to look to them for protection from Little. They could have taken action to produce an appropriate response by BHC to Nicks's complaints, and they were totally remiss in not doing so. As Nicks's supervisors, they had a duty to act. That the harasser did not report to them does not excuse their dereliction of this duty.

Section 1983 requires specific allegations of a supervisor’s personal involvement; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Velasquez v. O'KEEFE · filed 1995-10-16

However, consistent with the Report-Recommendation, plaintiff has failed to allege specifically any action by defendant Walsh that would fall into any of these supervisory liability categories. ... But because he has failed to allege exactly how Walsh was involved, defendant appears to rely on what would be better characterized as a theory of respondeat superior. As a result, the Court finds that the Complaint should be dismissed as against defendant Walsh.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a subordinate committed an error.

Oden v. Amdor · filed 1995-10-23

Because Section 1983 does not create collective or vicarious responsibility, supervisors cannot be held liable for the errors of their subordinates.

Section 1983 does not make supervisory officials liable for violations committed by their subordinates solely because of their supervisory role.

Oden v. Conklin · filed 1995-10-25

Supervisory officials cannot be held liable for violations committed by their subordinates.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged injury or a policy the supervisor promulgated that caused it.

Hammond v. Delano · filed 1995-11-08

As to Lynn Delano, Walter Leapley, and Dr. Donald M. Frost, Hammond's claims fail because he admitted they were not personally involved in the alleged events, and Hammond did not show that any policy promulgated by these defendants (or their refusal to change a policy) caused him injury.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors who had no personal involvement in the alleged wrong.

Jeffery v. Collins · filed 1995-11-15

There is no vicarious liability under § 1983 so those claims made against persons in their supervisory capacity only, and who are not alleged to have had any personal involvement in the affair, are frivolous.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability for an employee’s unconstitutional conduct only when the supervisor encouraged or directly participated in it, or at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in it.

Berryman v. Epp · filed 1995-12-12

a failure of a supervisory official to supervise, control, or train the offending individual [employees] is not actionable absent a showing that the official either encouraged or in some way directly participated in it. At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending [employees].

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct.

Gibbs v. Richard Johnson, Held Personally and Individually Liable · filed 1995-12-12

Respondeat superior liability is not applicable in Sec. 1983 actions.

Section 1983 can impose liability on supervisory officials who implement a deficient policy even if they were not directly involved in the resulting denial of care.

LaQuey v. Green · filed 1995-12-14

A deficient policy can implicate the supervisory officials who implemented the policy, even if those defendants were not directly involved in the denial of care.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a supervisor and the alleged injury; a supervisor cannot be held liable solely under respondeat superior.

Abrams v. Hunter · filed 1995-12-28

However, Plaintiff Abrams must meet his burden of showing that Defendant Hunter was causally connected to Plaintiffs injury because he cannot hold Defendant liable under the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 supervisory liability for student abuse requires deliberate indifference; negligence or a mere failure to act or investigate is insufficient.

Shepard v. Kemp · filed 1995-12-29

Deliberate indifference must be something more culpable than a negligent failure to recognize a high risk of harm to the plaintiffs and the mere failure to act or investigate cannot be the basis of liability.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a rights deprivation for damages liability; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Pugliese v. Cuomo · filed 1996-01-04

Therefore, a supervisor may only be held liable for the deprivation of a person’s constitutional rights if that supervisor carried some personal involvement in the deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on defendants solely because they supervise those who allegedly committed the violation.

Meyer v. Reno · filed 1996-01-04

Therefore, any potential § 1983 or Bivens claims against these defendants, whose only relationship to the instant litigation is their ultimate supervisory status, must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s acts.

Raineri v. Hills. Cty. Correct. · filed 1996-01-09

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ misconduct.

Eason v. Thaler · filed 1996-01-17

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for subordinates’ acts; liability requires personal involvement in the deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation.

White v. Cooper · filed 1996-02-14

Under Section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for subordinates’ actions on a vicarious liability theory. A supervisor may be held liable if either of the following exists: (1) personal involvement in the deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between his conduct and the constitutional violations.

Supervisory officials cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely for a subordinate’s conduct, but their own gross negligence or deliberate indifference in supervision can create liability when it proximately causes a constitutional violation.

Cantu v. Rocha · filed 1996-02-28

Although supervisory officials cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior, they may be liable if their own action or inaction, including a failure to properly supervise, amounts to gross negligence or deliberate indifference which is the proximate cause of a constitutional violation. Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979, 988 (5th Cir. 1982).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisor to allege that the supervisor personally directed, acquiesced in, authorized, or approved the challenged acts.

Robinson v. Keen · filed 1996-03-06

To state a claim against a supervisor such as Mr. Keen, Mr. Robinson must allege that Mr. Keen either personally directed the acts complained of or acquiesced in, authorized, or approved of them.

Section 1983 permits individual supervisory liability only when the supervisor encouraged the specific misconduct or directly participated in it.

Smith v. Williams · filed 1996-03-06

A supervisory employee cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless it is shown "that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it." Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282 (6th Cir.1994), (quoting Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984)).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisory personnel solely through respondeat superior.

Darryl Smith v. Raymond Capots Zakee Mumin B. Eric Flannery · filed 1996-03-06

His attempts to hold Warden Zent responsible for the actions of the guards and officers at MaCI are unavailing. The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 actions to impute liability onto supervisory personnel.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a supervisory defendant personally participated in the alleged deprivation or failed to perform an act he was legally bound to do.

Robinson v. Joseph Arpaio Cox, Sgt. · filed 1996-03-18

Because Robinson failed to present evidence showing that Arpaio personally participated in the alleged deprivation or failed to perform an act which he was legally bound to do, see id. at 633, the district court properly granted summary judgment for Arpaio, id. at 631.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisor to show that the supervisor played an affirmative role in the deprivation of constitutional rights; a mere failure to act is insufficient.

Chapman v. Guessford · filed 1996-03-30

A plaintiff must establish that a supervisor played an affirmative role in the deprivation of constitutional rights. ... An affirmative role cannot be established by a mere failure to act.

A supervisory official is liable under Section 1983 only if personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or sufficiently causally connected to it.

Henry v. Sanchez · filed 1996-04-07

A supervisory official, such as a warden, may be liable under Section 1983 only if he was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or if there was a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a constitutional violation when the supervisor acts with deliberate, reckless or callous indifference and an affirmative link connects that conduct or inaction to the violation.

Comfort v. Town of Pittsfield · filed 1996-04-12

Supervisory personnel are liable under § 1983, upon a showing of a constitutional violation, when: (1) the supervisor’s conduct or inaction amounts to either deliberate, reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others, and (2) an affirmative link exists between the street-level constitutional violation and the acts or omissions of the supervisory officials.

Section 1983 supervisory-liability claims cannot survive summary judgment when they rest on conclusory allegations and an unsupported unlawful-arrest theory.

Goerger v. St. Charles County · filed 1996-04-22

Summary judgment was properly entered on the supervisory-liability claims because the allegations were conclusory and predicated on Goerger's unlawful-arrest theory.

A § 1983 supervisory-liability claim fails when it depends on an unlawful-arrest theory that fails.

Goerger v. City of St. Charles · filed 1996-04-22

Summary judgment was properly entered on the supervisory-liability claim because the claim was predicated on Goerger's unlawful-arrest theory.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely through respondeat superior.

Vaughn v. United States Small Business Administration · filed 1996-04-23

In short, there may be a genuine issue of fact as to whether Vaughn’s clearly established rights were violated by others not party to this suit, but plainly Whitmore’s liability cannot rest upon respon-deat superior, which is at best what the complaint alleges, beyond the vague and generalized allegation of the type condemned by the . Supreme Court as inadequate in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038-39, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

Supervisory officials sued under § 1983 are not vicariously liable for their subordinates’ actions.

Morris v. Comstock · filed 1996-04-23

Supervisory officials sued under § 1983 are not vicariously liable for the actions of their subordinates.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; inadequate training or supervision requires deliberate indifference to the rights of people affected by subordinates.

Prather v. City of Louisville, Douglas Hamilton, Steve Cambron, and Robert Adams · filed 1996-05-10

It would be impermissible to hold Chief Hamilton liable for the acts of his subordinates on a respondeat superior theory. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). And Chief Hamilton could not be held liable for failure adequately to train and supervise his subordinates in the absence of "deliberate indifference" to the rights of those with whom the subordinates come in contact.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because a defendant oversees employees who violate constitutional rights.

Fernandez v. Rapone · filed 1996-05-14

Indeed, it is firmly established that supervisory liability under § 1983 may not be predicated upon a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a person faces a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm and the supervisor fails to take corrective action through deliberate indifference or tacit authorization; a single isolated incident generally does not meet that burden.

Mitchell v. J.E. Strickland, and Lillie Mae Brown Gary T. Dixon L.C. Brown, Jr. John W. Acree v. Lee Bounds · filed 1996-05-31

To prove supervisory liability, Mitchell must show that he faced a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm from a specified source and that Strickland failed to take corrective action as a result of deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the offensive practice. Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1035 (1985). Single or isolated incidents generally do not satisfy this burden of proof.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Romero v. Donley County Tx · filed 1996-05-31

Both Doe and Hare make clear, however, that imposing liability on a supervisor or municipality requires proof that the plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisory official solely because a subordinate committed an unlawful act.

Banks v. Lackawanna County Commissioners · filed 1996-06-14

Liability may not be imposed under § 1983 on the principle of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a negligent failure to supervise, investigate, or monitor unless that failure amounts to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.

Whaley v. County of Saginaw · filed 1996-06-14

In this case, the allegedly unlawful “policy”—failure to adequately supervise, investigate and monitor—is not itself unconstitutional. Therefore, the negligence on defendant’s part is only indirectly a “moving force” behind the deprivation, and cannot provide a basis for a § 1983 suit unless plaintiffs demonstrates “deliberate indifference”.

Supervisory authority over staff alone does not make an official personally liable for damages under § 1983.

Abdush-Shahid v. Coughlin · filed 1996-06-24

Although it is undisputed that the supervisory defendants had direct or indirect supervisory authority over the medical staff, this fact alone is insufficient to hold them personally liable for damages for constitutional violations alleged under § 1983.

A supervisor’s individual liability under § 1983 does not depend on evidence of a government custom or policy.

Denmark v. Lee County · filed 1996-07-01

Defendant McDougaU’s individual UabUity under § 1983, however, is not dependent upon evidence of custom or poUcy.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on supervisors solely because they have supervisory authority over officials who allegedly violated constitutional rights.

Napoleoni v. Scully · filed 1996-07-10

Although it is undisputed that the defendants had direct or indirect supervisory authority over Green Haven, this fact alone is insufficient to hold them personally liable for damages for constitutional violations alleged under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a supervisor and the alleged deprivation; supervisory status alone does not create liability under respondeat superior.

Shiflet v. Cornell · filed 1996-07-10

Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish a causal connection between Defendant Cornell and the alleged misconduct; Plaintiff is attempting to hold Defendant Cornell liable based solely on a theory of respondeat superior which, as noted, is not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a supervisor merely because he oversaw the facility where a prisoner’s documents were to be copied.

Gregory v. Rick Shannon & Kelly Combs · filed 1996-07-22

The record contains no evidence that Combs ever saw, let alone possessed, the documents in question before they were lost. And the mere fact that he supervised the facility where prisoners had their documents copied is insufficient to support personal liability.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of their officers.

Seekamp v. Michaud · filed 1996-07-30

It is well established that a supervisor may not be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of vicarious liability for the acts or omissions of his officers.

Section 1983 requires facts connecting a supervisor’s handling of grievances to the alleged misconduct before the supervisor can be liable for it.

Evers v. McClelland · filed 1996-07-30

Evers has not provided facts indicating a nonfrivolous contention that defendant Caskey’s alleged failure to rule in Caskey’s favor on his grievances against McClelland and Jennings was responsible for McClelland’s and Jennings’s actions.

A supervisory official is liable under § 1983 only if personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or sufficiently causally connected to it.

Stewart v. Block · filed 1996-08-02

A supervisory official, such as defendant Block, may be liable under Section 1983 only if he was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or if there was a sufficient causal connection between the official’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability when subordinate officials committed no constitutional violation.

Stotts v. Salas · filed 1996-08-09

Here, because the court finds that the subordinate Defendants have committed no constitutional violation, the issue of supervisor liability is MOOT.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability without a defendant’s personal involvement in or causal connection to the alleged constitutional violation.

Howland v. Sgt. Wallingford Tana Wood Carol Noonan Custody Unit Supervisor Snively · filed 1996-08-19

After a de novo review, see Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam), we conclude that the district court did not err by finding that Wood could not be held liable in Howland's section 1983 action under a respondeat superior theory. Howland failed to show that Wood had any personal involvement in or causal connection to any alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; a supervisor must have condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged misconduct.

Watkins v. Evans · filed 1996-09-03

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 lawsuits to impute liability onto supervisory personnel; rather, in order to find those persons liable, Watkins must allege that the supervisors condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged misconduct.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on a public official merely for failing to supervise, correct, or control subordinates.

Cormier v. Constantino · filed 1996-09-13

That concession is appropriate because public officials cannot be held liable for “failure to supervise, correct and control the actions of their subordinates.”

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for failure to stop subordinates’ abuse only when the abuse puts the supervisor on notice to correct the deprivation.

Stafford Cross v. City of Ontario, a Public Entity Ontario Police Department and Lowell Stark · filed 1996-09-16

Moreover, a supervisor can only be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for failure to supervise others if the abuse is such that the supervisor is on notice to correct the alleged deprivation. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). Here, the alleged racial slurs and jokes were not so rampant as to require Stark's intervention. We therefore conclude that Stark is not subject to personal liability for the racial slurs and jokes.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only when the supervisor’s actions lead to an underlying constitutional violation.

Giordano v. Powell · filed 1996-09-24

However, supervisory liability cannot attach unless the supervisor's actions "le[a]d inexorably to [a] constitutional violation." ... As the plaintiff has failed to establish an underlying constitutional violation, his supervisory liability claim fails.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; a defendant must be personally involved in the alleged violation or have encouraged or condoned it.

McClain v. Lake County, Ohio Daniel A. Dunlap, Sheriff Frank Leonbruno, Administrator Burney Puzar, Chaplain · filed 1996-09-25

The district court's decision to grant summary judgment against McClain on all respondeat superior claims is also supported by the record and law. In order to prevail in this context, it was incumbent upon McClain to show that the defendants were personally involved in the alleged First Amendment violations, see, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), or that the defendants actually encouraged or condoned the violations.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a supervisor who was neither personally involved in the deprivation of a federal right nor sufficiently connected to it through action or inaction.

Read v. Attaway · filed 1996-09-26

Thus, the Court finds that Durr is not personally liable under § 1983. He was not personally involved in the shooting, nor was his action or inaction sufficiently connected to the deprivation of a federal right.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the official was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or the official’s wrongful conduct had a sufficient causal connection to the violation.

Jeffries v. Block · filed 1996-09-30

A supervisory official, such as defendant Block, may be liable under Section 1983 only if he was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or if there was a sufficient causal connection between the official’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor for failure to supervise or control subordinates only upon a showing of deliberate indifference or authorization of their wrongful acts; absent evidence from which the supervisor’s knowledge can be inferred, the claim fails.

Tokar v. Bill Armontrout Robert Drennen Myrna E. Trickey · filed 1996-10-08

However, this court has stated that an inmate’s section 1983 “cause of action predicated on a supervisor’s failure to supervise or control his subordinates may be maintained only if a defendant demonstrated deliberate indifference or [] authorization of the offensive acts.” ... In this case, although Tokar’s failure to complain or file a grievance about any condition is not dispositive of the question whether appellees had actual knowledge, Tokar also failed to offer any circumstantial evidence from which a trier of fact could infer the officials had the requisite knowledge.

Section 1983 permits individual supervisory liability when a supervisor directly participates in a constitutional violation or deficient supervision or training causes the violation.

Andrews v. Fowler · filed 1996-10-23

Also, a supervisor may be held individually liable under § 1983 if he directly participates in a constitutional violation or if a failure to properly supervise and train the offending employee caused a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits individual supervisory liability when a supervisor fails to act on prior complaints of an officer’s misconduct or to adequately supervise the officer, and a genuine factual dispute on that liability precludes summary judgment.

Andrews v. Fowler · filed 1996-10-23

We conclude that Andrews has demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial concerning Price's individual liability under § 1983 for failure to act on prior complaints of Fowler's misconduct and failure to adequately supervise Fowler.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for a subordinate’s conduct solely under respondeat superior.

Barnes v. Grimes · filed 1996-10-31

Barnes showed no basis for holding Grimes or Rush liable for Simpson's alleged delay in responding. See Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995) (supervisor cannot be held liable on respondeat superior theory).

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability, including respondeat superior, on a supervisory defendant.

Williams v. Phillips · filed 1996-11-05

A defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of vicarious liability, including respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a showing of personal participation to impose individual liability on a supervisor for a constitutional violation.

Flynn v. Menino · filed 1996-11-05

... although plaintiffs in any event have not made the showing of personal participation on the Mayor’s part that would be necessary to establish liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a medical institution or its director merely for negligently hiring staff who misdiagnose or mistreat a prisoner.

McDowell v. Hancock Cty Med Univ · filed 1996-11-08

McDowell’s allegation that Hancock County Medical ... University and its director were negligent in hiring medical personnel who misdiagnosed and mistreated his medical condition is insufficient to give rise to a § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 imposes personal liability on a supervisor only if the supervisor participated in the violation, directed it, or knew of and acquiesced in a subordinate’s violation.

Willowby Ex Rel. McKoy v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1996-11-15

In order to render a supervisor personally liable under § 1983, the plaintiffs must show that he participated in violating their rights, or that he directed others to violate them, or that he, as the person in charge of the raid, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a subordinate’s constitutional deprivation when the supervisor caused it by participating in or directing the conduct, failing to train or supervise, or creating a policy that resulted in the unconstitutional conduct.

Woolley v. Dr. B. Textor Robert G. Borg James Rowland · filed 1996-11-20

A supervisor cannot be held liable for constitutional deprivations effected by his subordinates unless the supervisor caused the deprivation by (1) participating or directing the conduct in question, (2) failing to train or supervise subordinates, or (3) creating a policy which resulted in the unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only when the supervisor personally participates in the constitutional deprivation or has a sufficient causal connection to it.

Smith v. Vaughn · filed 1996-11-20

In order to hold a supervisor Hable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the supervisor has to have had personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or there must be a ... sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because of a supervisor’s relationship to a subordinate.

Williams v. Jabe · filed 1996-11-25

Liability under a § 1983 claim cannot be based on respondeat superior.

Supervisory authority alone does not establish damages liability under § 1983; the supervisor must be personally involved in the constitutional deprivation.

Farrell v. State of NY · filed 1996-11-25

Both Conway and Dennin are alleged to have had supervisory authority over the plaintiff. However, this fact alone is insufficient to hold the defendants liable for damages for constitutional violations alleged under § 1983. ... The plaintiff must allege that the two defendants were “personally involved” in actions that cause the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability without direct participation only when the supervisor has culpably acted or failed to act in training, supervising, or controlling subordinates; a supervisory relationship alone is insufficient.

Lewis v. Meloni · filed 1996-12-04

Although the personal participation of the supervisor in the unconstitutional conduct is not a prerequisite to § 1983 liability, something more must be shown than merely the existence of a supervisor-subordinate relationship. Thus, absent personal participation in the constitutional violation, supervisor liability in § 1983 actions may be imposed only where there is some culpable action or inaction by the supervisor in the training, supervision or control of his subordinates.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory official to have engaged in affirmative conduct that played a role in the alleged discrimination before the official may be held liable.

Lewis v. State of Del. Dept. of Public Instruction · filed 1996-12-04

Further, to hold a supervisory official liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege the supervisor engaged in affirmative conduct that played a role in the discrimination.

Section 1983 requires facts establishing a defendant’s individual liability and does not allow liability against an individual based on respondeat superior.

Johnson v. John Ratelle, Warden · filed 1996-12-19

Johnson failed to allege any specific facts establishing individual liability against Ratelle and cannot prevail as a matter of law on a theory of respondeat superior against an individual under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Nissen v. Silbaugh · filed 1996-12-20

By definition, the predicate to supervisory liability is the existence of a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Nissen v. John Silbaugh William Hettgar Duane Shillinger · filed 1996-12-20

By definition, the predicate to supervisory liability is the existence of a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not permit an inadequate training or supervision claim against a supervisor without a constitutional violation by the supervised official.

Roush v. Justice · filed 1996-12-23

However, since “[a] claim of inadequate training under § 1983 cannot be made out against a supervisory authority absent a finding of a constitutional violation on the part of the person being supervised,” Temkin, 945 F.2d at 724, and this Court has determined Wayne and Dunlap caused no Due Process Clause deprivation and thus violated no constitutional right of Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s inadequate training and supervision claims are unpersuasive.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Maria De Los Angeles SANCHEZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Carlos ALVARADO, Et Al., Defendants, Appellees · filed 1996-12-30

Supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be predicated on the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for an official who approves and maintains allegedly arbitrary regulations, without relying on respondeat superior.

Weiler v. Purkett · filed 1997-01-03

He is not potentially liable for the acts of others, but for his own acts in approving and maintaining regulations that could be found to be arbitrary. Therefore, Weiler's claim against him does not depend on respondeat superior principles.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on a county commissioner who had no responsibility or authority to supervise or train the officers involved.

Duffey v. Bryant · filed 1997-01-06

Moreover, as Chairman of the Board of Commissioners Batchelor had no responsibility or authority for supervising or training officers. Under these facts he cannot be held hable under § 1983 on a theory of supervisory liability.

Under § 1983, a supervisor may be personally responsible for a constitutional deprivation if the supervisor authorized, supervised, or participated in the conduct causing it.

Roberts v. Glanz · filed 1996-12-31

While such personal responsibility may be established through the defendant's failure to supervise his or her employees, the plaintiff must be able to show the supervisory defendant "expressly or otherwise, authorized, supervised, or participated in conduct which caused the constitutional deprivation." Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991).

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a supervisor.

Cote v. Donovan · filed 1997-01-23

The plaintiff's respondeat superior claims fail, because respondeat superior "will not attach under § 1983."

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on individuals through respondeat superior; supervisory liability requires a direct or supervisory role in depriving someone of a federally protected right.

Gaither v. J.C. Smith Joe L. Pratt · filed 1997-01-27

Pratt cannot be held vicariously liable for Smith's actions because individuals cannot be sued under § 1983 by virtue of respondeat superior. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir.1985). Furthermore, since Pratt did not directly or in a supervisory capacity deprive Gaither of any federally protected right, Pratt cannot be held individually liable under § 1983 based on his supervisory capacity.

Section 1983 does not impose strict supervisory liability for a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Mason v. Stock · filed 1997-01-30

Although a supervisor may incur liability, there is no strict supervisor liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a showing of personal involvement to impose personal liability on a police commissioner; holding that office alone is insufficient.

DiJoseph v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1997-01-31

I determined that Commissioner Neal could not be subjected to personal liability without a demonstration of his personal involvement in this particular case. DiJoseph had shown none then, and he has not redirected me to any evidence in the record that would indicate otherwise. Based on the evidence before me, I cannot hold Commissioner Neal liable in this case simply because of his official position within the Philadelphia Police Department.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a supervisor for an employee’s misconduct.

Jones v. Basoukas · filed 1997-02-03

It is well established that respondeat superior "will not attach under § 1983."

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if the supervisor personally participated in or had direct responsibility for the alleged violation.

Olson v. Clarke · filed 1997-05-05

We conclude, however, that the district court properly dismissed as frivolous the claims against Clarke and Nelson, see McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 435 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that supervisor liability under § 1983 requires proof that the supervisor personally participated in or had direct responsibility for the alleged violations), and the Lincoln General Hospital, see Gentry v. City of Lee's Summit, 10 F.3d 1340, 1342 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that § 1983 liability requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor oversaw employees who carried out an arrest and detention; a constitutional injury is required.

Turner v. Kight · filed 2005-01-07

The fact that they supervised individuals who carried out Turner’s arrest and detention in compliance with Sheriff’s Office policies and procedures is insufficient, standing alone, to create liability under § 1983, absent a constitutional injury.

Section 1983 claims against supervisors can survive dismissal when allegations link them to past practices and specific warnings of likely constitutional violations.

Estate of Phillips v. District of Columbia · filed 2005-01-11

Therefore, accepting all of plaintiffs factual allegations as true, the Phillips plaintiffs may be able to “link the likelihood of particular constitutional violations to ... past transgressions, and ... to link these particular supervisors to those past practices or any familiarity with them.” Int’l Action, 365 F.3d at 27. Thus, plaintiffs’ claims against the individual defendants survive the defendants’ motion to dismiss and the defendants’ motion to vacate is denied.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a constitutional violation by a supervisee.

Graham v. Corrections · filed 2005-01-12

Graham’s supervisory liability claims fail because he cannot establish that any of the supervisees violated his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 imposes liability on a supervisor for failure to train only when the failure caused a rights violation and amounted to deliberate indifference.

Roberts v. City of Shreveport · filed 2005-01-13

To establish § 1983 liability against supervisors, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the police chief failed to supervise or train the officer; (2) a causal connection existed between the failure to supervise or train and the violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the failure to supervise or train amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages from a supervisory official to show that official’s personal involvement in the alleged rights violation.

Lewis v. State of Connecticut Dept. of Corrections · filed 2005-01-24

It is well settled that “ ‘personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.’ ” ... This is a standard that Officer Lewis has not met with regard to Warden Murphy.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a constitutional deprivation and a supervisor’s participation, control, direction, or failure to supervise before the supervisor can be liable.

Gibbons v. Lambert · filed 2005-01-31

In a § 1983 claim, a supervisor is not liable “unless an ‘affirmative link’ exists between the constitutional deprivation and either the supervisor’s personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise.”

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 through personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the violation.

Smith v. North Las Vegas Police Department · filed 2005-02-09

A supervisor may be hable under § 1983 only if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits liability against supervisory prison officials who deliberately maintain conditions that create an inherent risk of harm to inmates.

Randall v. Thompson · filed 1986-04-18

Supervisory prison officials may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment where they deliberately maintain prison conditions in such a manner as to create an inherent risk of harm to an inmate committed to their custody.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-protect claim against a high-level official when the complaint alleges a risk specific to a detainee rather than only a general risk of violence.

Brown, David v. Budz, Timothy · filed 2005-02-16

A failure to protect claim may sound against even a “high- level” official so long as the averred risk is specific to a detainee, and not a mere general risk of violence.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for subordinates’ actions on a theory of vicarious liability.

Ashby v. Willis · filed 2005-02-16

Ashby’s claim against Dr. Willis for failing to properly supervise his subordinates is also without merit. “[S]upervisory officials are not liable [under § 1983] for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.”

A supervisor sued in an individual capacity under § 1983 must have been personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Withrow v. Donnelly · filed 2005-02-17

A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a supervisory official in his individual capacity must show that the supervisor was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking supervisory liability to show that the supervisory defendant authorized, supervised, or participated in conduct causing the constitutional deprivation.

Horton v. Ward · filed 2005-02-23

This omission is fatal to plaintiff’s claims against those defendants. See Snell v. Tunnell , 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that, to establish supervisory liability in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that “a supervisory defendant, expressly or otherwise, authorized, supervised, or participated in conduct which caused the constitutional deprivation”).

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisory officials for subordinates' acts or omissions.

Johns v. Richard Johnson, Janie Cockrell · filed 2005-02-23

Under section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the acts or omissions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a supervisor’s conduct and the alleged constitutional violation for supervisory liability.

Greer v. Tran · filed 2005-02-24

Because Greer has not shown that the appellants’ training of officers had any causal connection with the alleged constitutional violation, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on this issue.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official knows of continuing culpable failures by subordinates and, despite having authority to address them, makes no reasonable attempt to do so.

Alsina-Ortiz v. Laboy · filed 2005-03-09

To prevail on such a theory Alsina would have to show that (1) during the relevant time period Laboy or Marrero knew of a continuing pattern of culpable failures by guards or other prison staff to refer to health providers those prisoners with colorable complaints or manifest symptoms, and (2) that, having authority over the subject, Laboy or Marrero made no reasonable attempt to remedy such deficiencies.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory official sued in an individual capacity to be personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Gilmore v. Goord · filed 2005-03-22

A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a supervisory official in his individual capacity must show that the supervisor was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not make a warden vicariously liable for employees’ actions, but a claim alleging the warden’s personal knowledge is not solely a supervisory liability claim.

Comeaux v. Mackwani · filed 2005-03-23

In addition, while the district court was correct that Warden Rick Thaler, a defendant in Cause No. 4:01-CV-1411, could not be held vicariously liable for the actions of his employees, it erred in finding that the warden was sued only in his supervisory capacity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability through respondeat superior; a plaintiff must show an affirmative link between the constitutional deprivation and the defendant’s participation, control, direction, or failure to supervise.

Sandifer v. Green · filed 2005-03-28

We first hold that Mr. Sandifer has not alleged the requisite actionable conduct for § 1983 liability on the part of defendants Green, Hopkins, and Prison Health Services. “[U]nder § 1983, a defendant may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior. Instead, a plaintiff must show that an affirmative link exists between the constitutional deprivation and either the defendant’s personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise.” ... Mr. Sandifer has alleged none of these circumstances.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor based solely on supervisory status; the supervisor must actively participate in, encourage, authorize, or acquiesce in the unconstitutional conduct.

Perez v. Oakland County · filed 2005-03-31

As noted by Defendants, however, these supervisory allegations alone cannot sustain a § 1983 claim, absent allegations and evidence that Sheriff Bouchard himself engaged in “active unconstitutional behavior” by directly participating, encouraging, authorizing, or acquiescing in the allegedly offending conduct of a sheriffs deputy.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because an official served as acting warden; the claim requires personal participation or a causal connection to the constitutional deprivation.

Valdes v. Crosby · filed 2005-03-31

Although A.D. Thornton was the acting warden on July 17, 1999, the day Valdes died (and perhaps the day before as well), this alone is insufficient to hold him liable for Valdes’ death under § 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation by the supervised officer.

Hidalgo v. Perez · filed 2005-03-31

Because Badgley can be subjected to § 1983 supervisory liability only if Defendant Perez violated Hidalgo’s constitutional rights, see Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653-54 (9th Cir. 2001), the jury verdict in favor of Perez, which we sustain, precludes supervisory liability for Badgley.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; their actions or inactions must be causally linked to the misconduct.

Heggenmiller v. Edna Mahan Correctional Institution for Women · filed 2005-04-11

This causal link is necessary because “[t]here is no vicarious, respondeat superior liability under [Section] 1983.” Oliva, 226 F.3d at 202.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for an inmate’s injury based on institutional deficiencies the officials only partly controlled and that may or may not have contributed to the injury.

Crow v. Montgomery · filed 2005-04-12

Crow alleges, at most, institution-wide deficiencies which were known to these supervisory officials but over which they had only partial control. On these facts, we refuse to hold supervisory jail officials liable for acts that may or may not have contributed to Crow's injury in June of 2001.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement; forwarding a prisoner’s complaints to appropriate staff is insufficient.

Shell v. Brzezniak · filed 2005-04-21

Likewise, plaintiffs claim against Superintendent Greiner and Deputy Superintendent Perlman must fail because they lack sufficient personal involvement to be liable under § 1983. The only action either Greiner or Perlman took was to forward plaintiffs complaints about his medical care to the appropriate officials (including Dr. Koenigsman) for follow-up.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; a supervisor must have directed the conduct or known of it and acquiesced.

Jetter v. Beard · filed 2005-05-05

Liability under § 1983 cannot be imposed on a supervisor on the basis of respondeat superior. Personal involvement must be alleged and is only present where the supervisor directed the actions of supervisees or actually knew of the actions and acquiesced in them.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Gordon v. Morton · filed 2005-05-10

Additionally, because Gordon fails to demonstrate he suffered a constitutional violation, he cannot satisfy any theory of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 supervisory liability attaches when a supervisor encourages or condones a constitutional violation.

Carter v. Detroit · filed 2005-05-27

Supervisor liability attaches when a supervisor encourages or condones a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a supervisor to encourage or condone another person's constitutional violation; an official cannot be his own supervisor.

Estate of Tori Carter Brenda Chambers v. City of Detroit, Donald Hollins, Lieutenant · filed 2005-05-27

Supervisor liability attaches when a supervisor encourages or condones a constitutional violation. ... Hollins was clearly not his own supervisor; therefore, he was not acting as a supervisor with respect to anyone who committed a constitutional violation. Hollins is therefore entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the supervisor claim.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on prison wardens for the actions of medical staff.

Pickett, Calvin A. v. Childs, Judson · filed 2005-06-10

To the extent Pickett means to challenge the district court’s holding that there is no vicarious liability under § 1983, his argument is a non-starter.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a constitutional violation learned of only afterward when the supervisor played no causal role in it.

MacArthur v. San Juan County · filed 2005-06-13

Where an official becomes aware of a constitutional violation only after the fact, he or she cannot be held liable for the violation under § 1983 because the violation has already occurred and the official played no causal role in it.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of supervisory status; the supervisor must be personally involved in the alleged misconduct.

Turner v. City of Taylor · filed 2005-06-15

There is no evidence, however, that Lieutenant Canning participated either directly or indirectly in the particular decision to not send Plaintiff to the hospital, apparently against the recommendation of the paramedic. Plaintiff seeks to impose liability on Lieutenant Canning solely by virtue of his supervisor status, which is not permitted under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison supervisors for mishandled mail when they did not personally deliver it to other inmates or implement a policy reflecting deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s right to receive it.

Sandoval v. Fox · filed 2005-06-21

Sandoval’s complaint does not reflect that the defendants personally delivered his mail to other inmates or implemented a mail delivery policy that was so deficient that it reflected deliberate indifference to his right to receive his mail.

Section 1983 permits liability against a supervisor who did not directly participate in a constitutional violation if the supervisor knowingly ratified or allowed the unlawful conduct.

Christopher v. Nestlerode · filed 2005-06-22

Supervisory officials who did not directly participate in a constitutional violation may nonetheless be held responsible for it under § 1983 if they knowingly ratified or allowed the unlawful conduct.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only for a supervisor’s own acts or omissions affirmatively linked to a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Collins v. Graham · filed 2005-06-24

Supervisory liability under section 1983 “cannot be predicated on a re-spondeat theory, but only on the basis of the supervisor’s own acts or omissions.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisor in an individual capacity to show the supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Withrow v. Goord · filed 2005-06-27

A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a supervisory official in his individual capacity must show that the supervisor was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 allows supervisory liability when conduct causing a constitutional deprivation occurs at a supervisor’s direction or with the supervisor’s knowledge and consent.

Nanda, Navreet v. Moss, Gerald · filed 2005-06-27

Under § 1983, however, supervisory liability can be established if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at the supervisor’s direction or with the supervisor’s knowledge and consent.

A § 1983 claim based on a supervisor’s hiring decision requires a strong connection between the applicant’s background and the specific constitutional violation alleged.

Gros v. City of Grand Prairie · filed 2000-04-25

There must be a strong connection between the background of the particular applicant and the specific violation alleged.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory or respondeat superior liability for a subordinate’s actions.

Oliver v. Scott · filed 2002-01-09

Section 1983 does not create supervisory or respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a supervisor who directly participates in excessive force or whose failure to train or supervise causes it.

Marley v. Crawford County, Arkansas · filed 2005-07-12

Sheriff Ross may be held individually liable under Section 1983 if he directly participated in the alleged use of excessive force or if his failure to properly supervise or train the offending deputies caused the use of excessive force.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on a person’s supervisory position.

Patton v. Przybylski · filed 1987-06-17

Section 1983 does not permit a suit based on a theory of superiors’ liability.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior or vicarious liability on a supervisor.

Sylvester v. Fogley · filed 2005-07-28

Respondeat superior and vicarious liability do not attach under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor’s action or inaction and a subordinate’s misconduct for supervisory liability.

Vega v. Vivoni · filed 2005-08-01

In accordance with the Memorandum and Order issued today, the Court enters partial judgment ADOPTING the Magistrate-Judge’s Report and Recommendation. ... Plaintiffs must, however, show that there is “an ‘affirmative link’ between the sheet-level misconduct and the action, or inaction, of supervisory officials.”

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a defendant to participate in a rights violation, direct it, or know of and acquiesce in a subordinate’s violation.

Dobrich v. Walls · filed 2005-08-02

To the extent that Plaintiffs seek to hold all the individual Defendants responsible based on supervisory liability for the actions of teachers or other third parties within the District, the Court likewise concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief. To state a claim based on supervisory liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the named defendant participated in the alleged violation of rights, that he or she directed others to violate the plaintiffs rights, or that he or she had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ alleged violations of the plaintiffs’ rights.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a showing of the defendant’s personal participation in the alleged violation.

Brown v. Lithel · filed 2005-08-05

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant Lithel because Brown failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding Lithel’s involvement in the alleged violations. See Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir.2001) (section 1983 supervisory liability arises only upon a showing of personal participation by defendant).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires knowledge of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, deliberate indifference or tacit authorization, and a causal link to the injury.

Mikkelsen v. DeWitt · filed 2005-08-08

Three elements are required to establish supervisor liability under § 1983. A plaintiff must show: (1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) that there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior.

McRoy v. Sheahan · filed 2005-08-09

Instead, McRoy is inappropriately relying on the inapplicable doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits claims against state actors, including supervisory liability claims requiring personal participation or participation in wrongful conduct.

Breedlove v. Sanchez · filed 2005-08-11

Although upon request Breedlove could have obtained a more specific instruction on supervisor liability, the instructions given on deliberate indifference, personal participation, and participation in another’s wrongful conduct were sufficient for the jury to determine whether the defendants acted with deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based on respondeat superior.

Johnson v. Kulongoski · filed 2005-08-12

With respect to defendants Kulongoski, Reed, Meyers, de Haan, Morrow, Hill, and Belleque, the district court properly granted summary judgment because Johnson attempted to base their liability on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position; personal involvement is required.

Martin v. Red Lion Police Dept. · filed 2005-08-16

It is well-established that there is no respondeat superior liability in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing supervisors to show that they knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly caused the deprivation of rights.

Jacobsen, Harlan L. v. IL Dept Trans · filed 2005-08-17

As for Jacobsen’s § 1983 claims against the individual defendants, he must show that in their supervisory role, they “knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly” caused a deprivation of his First Amendment rights.

A § 1983 claim against a supervisor requires showing that the supervisor knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly caused the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Jacobsen v. Illinois Department of Transportation · filed 2005-08-17

As for Jacobsen’s § 1983 claims against the individual defendants, he must show that in their supervisory role, they “knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly” caused a deprivation of his First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without personal involvement and direct control, and conclusory allegations of failure to investigate are insufficient.

Landol Rivera ex rel. Rivera Figueroa v. Cosme · filed 1987-08-06

Accordingly, without alleged personal involvement and direct control of codefendant Garcia Arache over the incident which gives rise to the complaint, we hereby enter summary judgment in favor of Andrés García Arache. The mere conclusory allegation that Mr. Garcia-Arache failed to investigate the alleged loose-illegal use of firearms is insufficient to activate the respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff merely for failing to supervise subordinates whose conduct caused the deprivation.

Abshire v. Walls · filed 1987-10-02

In Fisher, we held that a sheriff could not be vicariously liable under § 1983 for the acts of his subordinates, nor could he “be held liable on the basis of a failure adequately to supervise or control any conduct that directly caused the specific deprivation charged.” Id. at 1143. Since Abshire’s complaint alleged only that Chief Behan failed to adequately supervise the County’s strip search policy, the district court acted properly in granting summary judgment to Chief Behan.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the supervisor’s action or inaction is affirmatively linked to a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Roy v. Stanley · filed 2005-09-20

Supervisors are liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates when their "action or inaction is affirmatively linked to that behavior in the sense that it could be characterized as supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference." Wilson v. Town of Mendon, 294 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Davis v. Carroll · filed 2005-09-27

Supervisory liability cannot be imposed under Section 1983 based on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 requires more than conclusory allegations to establish a causal connection between a supervisor’s conduct and a constitutional violation.

Bailey v. Turner · filed 2005-09-29

Insofar as Bailey is suing supervisory defendants Smith and Swindle, his allegations remain far too conclusory to establish a causal connection between either supervisor’s conduct and any constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not make a prison warden liable solely because he supervises prison operations.

Brewer v. Graves · filed 2005-10-10

As to Warden Graves, he cannot be liable based solely on his responsibility to supervise the prison’s operation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s conduct.

Nigel Renard Sanders v. Barrett · filed 2005-10-17

Liability of supervisory officials under § 1983 cannot be predicated on vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor who did not personally participate in the violation when the supervisor’s deficient supervision is causally connected to the constitutional injury.

Marcotte v. Monroe Corrections Complex · filed 2005-10-18

A jury could reasonably find a causal connection between Superintendent Moore’s and Dr. Kenney’s deficient supervision and Marcotte’s constitutional injury. Accordingly, the court denies Defendants’ summary judgment motion on the ground that Superintendent Moore and Dr. Kenney did not personally participate in the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for another officer’s acts without personal involvement.

Poole v. Dept of Corr · filed 2005-10-19

The Complaint is devoid of any fact from which we can infer that Patrick was personally involved in the alleged retaliatory acts and Patrick is not liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely through respondeat superior; the supervisor must participate in the alleged violation or have a causal connection to it.

Hilton v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections · filed 2005-11-01

Furthermore, because Hilton has failed to present any evidence showing that Prevatt participated in the alleged unconstitutional acts or that there was a causal connection between Prevatt and the alleged constitutional violation, Hilton was not entitled to relief against Prevatt based on respondeat superior.