42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 makes a supervisor liable for a constitutional deprivation only when an affirmative link connects it to the supervisor’s personal participation, control or direction, or failure to supervise.

Butler v. City Of Norman · filed 1993-04-28

A supervisor is not liable under § 1983 unless an "affirmative link" exists between the constitutional deprivation and either the supervisor's personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for inadequate training or supervision unless a subordinate violated a federal statutory or constitutional right.

Cole v. Bone · filed 1993-05-17

Nevertheless, because we have found that plaintiffs have failed to establish that David Cole’s constitutional rights were violated, they have no section 1983 claim against those defendants sued as supervisors. A vital element of any section 1983 claim is a showing that a right secured by the Constitution or federal law was violated.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between a supervisor’s failure to train and the constitutional injury to impose individual supervisory liability.

Camps v. City of Warner Robins · filed 1993-05-19

Moreover, plaintiffs have presented no evidence that any failure to train by Sheriff Taitón caused this particular injury. Thus, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Sheriff Taitón in his individual capacity cannot stand.

Section 1983 permits liability against a supervisor for failure to train or supervise when substantial evidence shows deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s rights that a reasonable person in the supervisor’s position would have recognized.

Rogers v. Alabama Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation · filed 1993-05-26

In order to impose liability on these two Defendants in their supervisory capacity, Plaintiff must submit substantial evidence that the two Defendants were "deliberately indifferent" to her security needs and that a reasonable person in the position of Bartlett and/or Boyd would have known that their failure to train and/or supervise their subordinates reflected deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor individually liable for a subordinate’s misconduct merely because of the supervisory relationship.

House v. New Castle County · filed 1993-05-27

Consistent with the settled doctrine that traditional concepts of respondeat superior do not apply to civil rights actions arising under section 1983, Plaintiffs claim against Defendant Gordon in his individual capacity must be dismissed on the pleadings.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on a supervisor under respondeat superior without facts implicating that supervisor in the alleged wrong.

Bryant v. Randy Lee, Superintendent Officer Brown, Mailroom Officer · filed 1993-06-02

However, Lee cannot be held liable because Bryant does not allege any facts implicating Lee in the delayed mail and the doctrine of respondeat superior generally does not apply ins 1983 litigation.

A supervisor cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for failing to supervise subordinates when the plaintiff has not established a claim against those subordinates.

Czajka v. Paul D. Caspari, Barbara Buescher, Dr. Schoenen · filed 1993-06-16

Inasmuch as Czajka failed to establish a claim against Schoenen or Buescher, he also failed to establish a basis upon which to hold Caspar! liable for failing to supervise his subordinates.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability under respondeat superior without personal participation in, authorization or approval of, or knowing acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct.

King v. Roger Overberg Lawrence Mendel · filed 1993-06-18

First, he does not allege that the defendants personally provided inadequate medical care, or that they authorized, approved of, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged unconstitutional conduct. The theory of respondeat superior will not support § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisory official merely identified as a detention facility's director without any allegation of wrongdoing by that official.

Browning v. Gordon F. Yach John Moran Joseph K. Evers · filed 1993-06-24

Browning's argument fails. Browning's complaint listed Moran simply as the director of the CCDC and did not allege any wrongdoing on his part.

Section 1983 does not permit a supervising judge to be held liable for other judges' violations on a respondeat superior theory.

Gorenc v. Robert R. Bean, Honorable, Presiding Judge of the Superior Court of Pinal County, Az · filed 1993-06-28

Finally, Judge Bean cannot be held liable for any violations committed by the justices of the peace on a respondeat surperior theory.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on a theory of respondeat superior.

Bragg v. Lamar Glenn, Columbus City Police · filed 1993-06-29

Joseph, Smith, and O'Brien cannot be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for implicitly authorizing, approving, or knowingly acquiescing in subordinates' unconstitutional conduct, but not on a respondeat superior theory alone.

Hicks v. Frey · filed 1993-07-01

The jury could have believed that Locke displayed deliberate indifference to Hicks' serious medical needs both by failing to address them herself and by implicitly authorizing, approving, or knowingly acquiescing in unconstitutional conduct of others over whom she had supervisory authority. This is not equivalent to finding Locke liable under a respondeat superior theory. In Hays we recognized that respondeat superior may not be the basis for liability of a supervisory officer in a § 1983 action, but we described the circumstances in which a supervisor can be held liable for the misconduct of subordinates. We believe the evidence in this case supports the jury's verdict against Locke.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors for inadequate training or supervision when no underlying violation of constitutional rights has been established.

Cole v. Bone · filed 1993-07-12

Nevertheless, because we have found that plaintiffs have failed to establish that David Cole's constitutional rights were violated, they have no section 1983 claim against those defendants sued as supervisors. A vital element of any section 1983 claim is a showing that a right secured by the Constitution or federal law was violated.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Norris v. Davis · filed 1993-07-14

Respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... To recover for a violation of the right not to be defrauded by government officers, therefore, Plaintiffs must prove that Brewer and Carlson, acting in their official capacity, actively participated in Davis’ schemes.

A damages claim under § 1983 against a state supervisory official in his individual capacity requires direct responsibility for the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Moore v. State of Indiana, Indiana Department of Corrections and Thomas D. Richards · filed 1993-07-20

Nonetheless, a valid § 1983 claim for damages against a state supervisory official in his individual capacity requires “a showing of direct responsibility for the improper action.”

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on the right to control employees without direct personal involvement.

Joplin v. Baylor · filed 1993-07-28

This court has repeatedly held that without direct involvement, a right to control employees, standing alone, will not support liability of supervisory personnel in a section 1983 action. Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 429 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989). Thus, plaintiff's claims against defendants Horning and Baylor shall be dismissed for lack of personal involvement.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 does not require proof of actual knowledge; reckless disregard by a supervisor suffices.

Hall v. George Lombardi William Armontrout, Warden Donald Cline · filed 1993-08-11

Although Armontrout and Lombardi may not be liable under a respondeat superi- or theory, proof of actual knowledge is not an absolute prerequisite for imposing supervisory liability. ... We have “consistently held that reckless disregard on the part of a supervisor will suffice to impose liability.”

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 when a reasonable person in the supervisor's position would have known that the conduct infringed the plaintiff's constitutional rights and the conduct was causally related to the subordinate's constitutional violation.

Mckinney v. Dekalb County · filed 1993-08-17

A supervisor can be held liable under § 1983 when a reasonable person in the supervisor's position would have known that his conduct infringed the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and his conduct was causally related to the constitutional violation committed by his subordinate.

A supervisory position alone does not establish liability under Section 1983.

Hiler v. Henrietta Hiler v. Susan C. Thompson, Housing Inspections Supervisor for the City of Grand Rapids · filed 1993-08-17

It appears that she was sued simply because of her supervisory position. As such, Thompson is not liable under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; a superior must be affirmatively linked to a constitutional deprivation through participation or acquiescence to be liable.

Winters v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1993-09-02

Because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to actions brought under Sec. 1983, Deputy Penny and Sheriff Wayman are not liable unless they have an affirmative link to the constitutional violations. Kaiser v. Lief, 874 F.2d 732, 736 (10th Cir.1989). Before a superior may be held liable under the affirmative link requirement, he must have participated or acquiesced in the constitutional deprivations. Kite v. Kelley, 546 F.2d 334, 337 (10th Cir.1976).

Section 1983 liability for failure to supervise, train, or instruct subordinates requires a resulting constitutional injury.

Lasley v. Godinez · filed 1993-09-24

The critical factor, of course, is whether a constitutional injury has occurred as a result of defendants’ failure to train their subordinates. As discussed earlier, plaintiffs did not have a liberty interest in having their cells searched nor did a due process violation occur in plaintiffs’ disciplinary hearings. Because no constitutional injury has occurred, defendants cannot be held liable for any lack of failure to supervise, train, or instruct.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ conduct.

Reynolds v. Bucks · filed 1993-10-01

Despite the fact that the prison officials, who are the defendants in this case, are supervisors of the guards who allegedly ridicule the plaintiffs, they cannot be held responsible for the guards’ behavior because there is no respondeat superior liability in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires proximate causation, and an intervening cause that was not reasonably foreseeable to the supervisor defeats liability.

ESTATE OF Marilyn Marie CONNERS, by its administrator, Howard Meredith; Howard Meredith; Lillian Beatty… · filed 1993-10-04

Even if the defendant's conduct is an actual or a "but for" cause of the plaintiff's injury, however, the question remains whether the defendant's conduct is the legal or proximate cause. White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1505-06 (9th Cir.1990) (citing W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 42, at 272-73 (5th ed. 1984)). ... Because the grant of grounds privileges to Duncan in March 1985 was an intervening cause of Conners's death that was not reasonably foreseeable to O'Connor, it frees him of liability for the deprivation of Conners's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for supervisory liability and does not impose liability solely on respondeat superior or a right to control employees.

Rogers v. City of Port Huron · filed 1993-10-05

Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 will not be imposed solely on the basis of respondeat superior and must be based on more than a right to control employees. ... Moreover, even assuming that Officers Reid’s and Mal-ott’s actions could establish a violation of decedent’s rights, plaintiffs do not allege that Corbett implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced to their conduct. Plaintiffs simply fail to allege sufficient personal involvement.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors, but a supervisor may be liable for known constitutional violations by subordinates through deliberate indifference or tacit authorization manifested by failure to remedy them.

Boyle v. City of Liberty, Mo. · filed 1993-10-06

The court agrees with the defendants that to the extent the plaintiffs allege vicarious liability, the claims under § 1983 should be dismissed against the plaintiff. However, it appears that the plaintiffs also allege direct liability against defendant Houston. A supervisor is liable for the constitutional violations of his or her subordinates if the supervisor had knowledge that the subordinates caused deprivations of constitutional rights and the supervisor “demonstrated deliberate indifference or ‘tacit authorization’ of the offensive acts by failing to take steps to remedy them.”

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Kula v. State of Nebraska Alan McElravy Robert O. Cutshall, M.D. · filed 1993-10-25

Section 1983 claims cannot be based on the theory of respondeat superior, Givens v. Jones, 900 F.2d 1229, 1233 (8th Cir. 1990), and Kula did not allege that these defendants were personally involved in any constitutional deprivations.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors for Eighth Amendment violations; supervisory liability requires personal involvement or corrective inaction amounting to deliberate indifference or tacit authorization.

Choate v. A.L. Lockhart · filed 1993-10-26

As a preliminary matter, it is undisputed that "[s]upervisors are not liable for [E]ighth [A]mendment claims brought under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir.1989) (citation omitted). Supervisors can incur liability for cruel and unusual punishment in two ways: they can "be liable for their personal involvement in a constitutional violation," Fruit v. Norris, 905 F.2d 1147, 1151 (8th Cir.1990), or " 'when their corrective inaction amounts to 'deliberate indifference' to or 'tacit authorization' of the violative practices.' " Howard, 887 F.2d at 137 (quoting Williams v. Willits, 853 F.2d 586, 588 (8th Cir.1988)). ... Moreover, Lockhart did not fail to take "corrective action" for constitutional violations here because there were no predicate violations to correct in the first place.

A supervisor cannot be liable under Section 1983 for corrective inaction without an underlying constitutional violation to correct.

Choate v. Lockhart · filed 1993-10-26

Nor can Smith be liable for “corrective inaction” where there were no constitutional violations to correct.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; a supervisor must know of a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm and fail to take corrective action through deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the offensive practices.

Wyche v. City of Franklinton · filed 1993-11-05

Supervisory liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior does not exist in § 1983 actions. ... To establish supervisory liability, the plaintiff must show that the supervisory official was aware of a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm, yet failed to take corrective action as a result of deliberate indifference towards or tacit authorization of the offensive practices.

Supervisors are liable under § 1983 only if they actually participated in the alleged wrongful act or a causal connection exists between their acts and the alleged violation.

Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale · filed 1993-11-09

Supervisors can be liable under section 1983 only if they actually participated in the allegedly wrongful act, or if a causal connection exists between their acts and the alleged violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisory defendant through vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Corbin v. Cannon · filed 1993-11-10

In Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that the theories of vicarious liability and respondeat superior may not be used to hold a defendant liable in a civil rights suit. Thus, Defendant Cannon may not be held liable under either one of these theories.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for supervisors who implement an unconstitutional policy that is the moving force of a constitutional violation.

Priestly v. Doucette · filed 1993-12-21

Where an official policy is the moving force of the constitutional violation, the policy makers and supervisory officials of that policy may be personally responsible under §1983 for implementing such a policy.

Section 1983 permits a denial-of-medical-treatment claim against a supervisor only when the supervisor was personally connected with the denial.

Vestal Scarberry, Plaintiff-Defendant v. Bill Bowman, Corrections Administrator, McDowell County Correctional Center · filed 1993-12-30

A medical treatment claim cannot be brought against a supervisor absent an allegation that he was personally connected with the denial. ... Though Bowman appears to be a supervisor in the jail, Scarberry alleges that he and Blevins were personally involved in denying him medical treatment.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for failing to respond to prior reports of an officer’s excessive force.

McPherson v. Auger · filed 1994-01-06

Further, genuine issues of material fact are in dispute with respect to whether Defendant Dugre failed to act in response to prior reports of Officer Auger’s use of force in handcuffing that would render him liable as a supervisor.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, responds with deliberate indifference or tacit authorization, and that inaction causally links to the plaintiff’s injury.

Shaw v. Stroud · filed 1994-01-06

We have set forth three elements necessary to establish supervisory liability under Sec. 1983: (1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed "a pervasive and unreasonable risk" of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show "deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices,"; and (3) that there was an "affirmative causal link" between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; a supervisor’s personal involvement cannot be inferred solely from employees’ knowledge unless that knowledge was communicated to the supervisor.

Lucien v. Peters · filed 1994-01-12

All the same, Lucien and his counsel must realize that respondeat superior principles do not apply under Section 1983 (Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)) — so the Memorandum’s quoted reference to “employees of the Department of Corrections” cannot lead to an inference of the necessary personal involvement by Peters and Godinez (see, e.g., Moore v. Indiana, 999 F.2d 1125, 1128 (7th Cir.1993)), unless of course those employees were shown to have communicated their knowledge to Peters and Godinez.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors merely because they hold supervisory positions.

Hadley v. Peters · filed 1994-01-26

The mere fact that those individuals hold supervisory positions within the Graham Correctional Center and the D.O.C. is insufficient to establish liability, as the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow respondeat superior liability; a supervisor must be liable for the supervisor’s own conduct.

Gierlinger v. New York State Police · filed 1994-01-26

It is not possible to determine from the instructions whether the jury found Gleason liable on the theory of respondeat superior, which is not available in a Sec. 1983 claim, or liable for his own performance as a commanding officer.

Section 1983 permits liability for a responsible supervisor who fails to investigate and address sexual harassment when that failure makes the conduct an accepted custom or practice of the employer.

Gierlinger v. New York State Police · filed 1994-01-26

Section 1983 liability can be imposed upon individual employers, or responsible supervisors, for failing properly to investigate and address allegations of sexual harassment when through this failure, the conduct becomes an accepted custom or practice of the employer.

Section 1983 claims that a supervisory official created an unconstitutional policy require detailed factual allegations; a single alleged incident does not establish such a policy.

Chayo v. Kaladjian · filed 1994-02-09

However, claims brought under section 1983 require specific allegations at the pleading stage and thus represent a departure from the liberal pleading requirements set forth in Rule 8(a). ... While in the cited cases the claims alleging an unconstitutional policy were asserted against municipalities, the Court concludes that the same pleading requirements apply to claims against individual defendants. ... Thus, plaintiffs have clearly failed to meet the burden of alleging facts that suggest Kaladjian established a policy under which the alleged violation occurred.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s conduct when the supervisor did not participate in the alleged deprivation.

Kennard v. Jerry Wray, Director, Ohio Department of Transportation, Individually and in His Official Capacity · filed 1994-02-24

Wray's lack of involvement in Kennard's demotion shields him from the claims against him in his individual capacity because respondeat superior is not an appropriate basis for liability under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position; the supervisor must participate in or direct the violation, or know of it and fail to prevent it.

Andrews v. Noren · filed 1994-03-02

A supervisor cannot be held liable under section 1983 based on a respondeat superior theory. See Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir.1992). Rather, "[a] supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Id. (citation omitted).

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a subordinate's constitutional violation only if the supervisor participated in or directed the violation.

Land v. Del Papa · filed 1994-03-03

A supervisor can be held liable for the constitutional violations of her subordinates only if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for subordinates’ acts based solely on respondeat superior.

Ellis v. City of Fairburn · filed 1994-03-04

Respondeat superior may not serve as the basis for imposing section 1983 liability on supervisory personnel for the acts of their subordinates.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s own conduct is linked to the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Dolihite Ex Rel. Dolihite v. Videon · filed 1994-03-21

Instead, liability arises when plaintiffs are capable of demonstrating a link between the supervisory defendant’s behavior and the deprivation of David’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor has notice of pervasive constitutional violations or participates in conduct beyond undirected or sporadic acts of subordinates.

Salhab v. Middlesex County · filed 1994-03-23

At least as alleged, the acts of which McGonigle had notice and the acts in which he participated (including ethnic and religious harassment and retaliatory forced resignation), appear to be more than undirected or sporadic acts and thus could result in liability under §1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely through respondeat superior; the supervisor must have individual responsibility for the alleged wrong.

Harris v. Sheahan · filed 1994-03-24

At the outset, Harris cannot proceed against Sheriff Sheahan. No possible individual responsibility has been ascribed to Sheriff, and respondeat superior principles are inapplicable in the Section 1983 context (Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)).

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s own acts are grossly negligent or deliberately, recklessly, or callously indifferent to a constitutional violation.

Luciano v. Alvarez · filed 1994-03-30

In the First Circuit, supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 attaches upon proof that defendant’s acts were grossly negligent, or deliberately, recklessly, or callously indifferent.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a failure to train or supervise, a policy, or knowing failure to prevent future misconduct leads to a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Huffman v. Fiola · filed 1994-04-06

Moreover, a section 1983 violation may be stated by alleging that a supervisor’s failure to properly train or supervise personnel led to the deprivation of constitutional rights, or by alleging that a policy existed that led to the deprivation of constitutional rights, or by alleging that the defendant knew of the alleged misconduct and failed to act to prevent future misconduct.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for mere negligence in failing to detect and prevent a subordinate’s conduct.

Ripson v. Alles · filed 1994-04-11

In addition, mere negligence in failing to detect and prevent a subordinate’s conduct is not enough for liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a failure to supervise, control, or train unless the supervisor encouraged the misconduct or directly participated in it.

Lindsey v. McGinnis · filed 1994-04-28

A supervisory official's failure to supervise, control, or train the offending individual is not actionable, unless the supervisor "either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it." Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833 (1982). At best, Lindsey has merely claimed that these defendants were aware of the inadequate medical staffing at LCF since May and June 1992, but did not take appropriate action to cure the problem. This is insufficient to impose liability on supervisory personnel under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based only on the right to control subordinates; liability requires acquiescence in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct.

Cardine v. Sheri Tucker Ron Claxton Ann Farmer C. Ramey, Lt. Patti Treat William Seabold · filed 1994-05-02

This court has repeatedly held that liability of supervisory personnel under section 1983 must be based on something more than the right to control the actions and conduct of subordinate employees. ... A party cannot be held liable under Sec. 1983 absent a showing that the party acquiesced in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for inadequate training when the training deficiency did not cause a constitutional injury.

Metcalf v. County of Sutter · filed 1994-05-02

Accordingly, the training deficiency did not cause any constitutional injury, and the supervisors are not liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors for a subordinate’s constitutional misconduct.

Dillon v. Murray · filed 1994-05-04

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to impose liability against Defendants Huffman and Murray under a re-spondeat superior theory, such claim is barred under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only when evidence establishes an affirmative link between the supervisor’s conduct and the underlying violation.

Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez · filed 1994-05-06

Supervisory liability attaches only if a plaintiff can demonstrate by material of evidentiary quality an affirmative link between the supervisor’s conduct and the underlying section 1983 violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely under respondeat superior.

Russell v. Heineman · filed 1994-05-12

Heineman is not liable solely under the theory of respondeat superior, as this theory no longer supports Sec. 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a supervisor based solely on supervisory liability; the plaintiff must link the defendant to the alleged misconduct.

Diaz v. D.R. McBride & Indiana Attorney General · filed 1994-05-16

However, Diaz fails to allege any sort of affirmative link between the named defendants and Officer Jirtle. A Sec. 1983 claim cannot be maintained under a theory of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on supervisors solely because they oversee employees who allegedly violated a constitutional right.

Philip Rogers Scalice v. John Doe Davies, Sgt., Bill Weber Kurt Peterson, Superintendent Larry Kincheloe Linda Buccini, · filed 1994-05-17

There is no respondeat superior liability for damages in the Sec. 1983 context.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability when the person supervised committed no constitutional violation.

James v. City of Chester · filed 1994-05-18

Because the court has determined that the claims against Officer Madden fail as a matter of law, it follows that the claims for supervisory liability against the remaining defendants must be dismissed as well. There is no liability on the part of supervisory officials in the absence of a constitutional violation on the part of the person supervised.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for employees’ unconstitutional acts; a failure-to-supervise claim requires deliberate indifference or tacit authorization.

White v. Madeline Holmes Charles Rosenkoetter · filed 1994-05-18

A supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an employee’s unconstitutional activity. ... Rather, “a cause of action predicated on a supervisor’s failure to supervise or control his subordinates may be maintained only if a defendant demonstrated deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the offensive acts.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s actions under respondeat superior.

Cohen v. Bane · filed 1994-05-20

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to section 1983 claims and thus, the claims against Defendant Abrams too must fail.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for mere negligence in failing to detect and prevent a subordinate’s conduct.

Ripson v. Alles · filed 1994-06-01

In addition, mere negligence in failing to detect and prevent a subordinate's conduct is not enough for liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a supervisor for a subordinate’s constitutional deprivation absent the supervisor’s participation or direction.

Osborn v. McCauley ex rel. Arizona Dept. of Corrections · filed 1994-06-16

The district court also properly dismissed Osborn's claim against Lewis because Osborn did not allege that Lewis personally engaged in any wrongful conduct. See Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680 (9th Cir.1984) ("[a] supervisor cannot be held personally liable under Sec. 1983 for the constitutional deprivations caused by his subordinates, absent his participation or direction in the deprivation.").

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a subordinate’s constitutional violation unless the subordinate committed a constitutional violation.

Henderson v. Kessler · filed 1994-06-20

Moreover, Kessler and Murray cannot be held accountable under a theory of supervisory liability for a subordinate's constitutional violation, absent a constitutional violation by that subordinate.

Section 1983 makes a supervisor liable only for her personal role in a violation.

Holmes v. Fell · filed 1994-06-24

As an administrator, defendant Prigitano is liable on a § 1983 claim only for her personal role in the violation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability even when the officer whose actions immediately caused the constitutional injury is exonerated.

No. 91-55718 · filed 1994-06-27

Supervisorial liability may be imposed under section 1983 notwithstanding the exoneration of the officer whose actions are the immediate or precipitating cause of the constitutional injury.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because of their supervisory role.

Redd v. Gilless · filed 1994-06-29

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor promulgates a policy that sets a constitutional deprivation in motion or condones subordinates’ actions afterward.

Washington v. Rowland · filed 1994-06-30

When the defendant is in a supervisory position, the plaintiff must show that the defendant promulgated a policy that set in motion the series of events resulting in the constitutional deprivation, or that he condoned the actions of his subordinates after the fact.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for deficient training when an obvious need for more or different training is likely to result in constitutional violations and the deficiency is causally connected to a violation.

Shakka v. Smith · filed 1994-07-05

When the need for more or different training is blatant, and the deficiency likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, administrators responsible for training can be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the needs. Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577 (4th Cir.1989). If Shakka's condition is found to constitute a serious medical need and the Defendants were indifferent to that need, Shakka may be able to demonstrate a causal connection between the alleged deficient training and the constitutional violation, in which case the claims against Smith and Presbury would have merit. Therefore, we also vacate as to this issue.

Section 1983 requires deliberate indifference for claims based on inadequate training or supervision.

Kruse v. State of Hawaii · filed 1994-07-11

“Deliberate indifference” is the specific state of mind required for § 1983 claims based upon “inadequate training or supervision” theories.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on defendants solely through respondeat superior; they must have a sufficient connection to the alleged constitutional violation.

Miller v. Pulaski County Sheriff's Department Ralph Dobbins Dixon Williams, Dr. · filed 1994-07-20

We find that the district court was correct in determining that because Miller had alleged no facts to suggest that the named Defendants had a sufficient connection with the alleged constitutional violations, Miller's claim against the Defendants was based on the doctrine of respondeat superior which is inapplicable toSec. 1983 actions.

Section 1983 liability cannot be based solely on respondeat superior.

Mosby v. Don Smith, Superintendent, Fulton Reception & Diagnostic Center · filed 1994-07-27

The district court properly held that liability under section 1983 cannot be founded on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on a supervisor solely under respondeat superior.

James v. H. Hibb, Officer, and Edward W. Murray Alton Baskerville, Warden Department of Corrections · filed 1994-07-28

The doctrine of respondeat superior is generally not applicable to Sec. 1983 actions, and James has failed to make out a claim under the doctrine of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability for personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the violation.

Armendariz v. Penman · filed 1994-08-01

A supervisor may be liable based on either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not make supervisory personnel liable for subordinates’ acts under respondeat superior.

M.R. v. Cox · filed 1994-08-02

The law is well settled that supervisory personnel cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the acts of subordinates under the doctrine of Respondeat Superior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a subordinate’s misconduct unless the supervisor encouraged or directly participated in it.

Howell v. Kenneth McGinnis Director Judy Stahl, Mailroom Supervisor Joseph Abramajtys, Warden · filed 1994-08-03

However, supervisory officials, like McGinnis, are not liable for the alleged harassment of their subordinates absent a showing that they encouraged the misconduct or directly participated in it.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on a respondeat superior theory.

Dawson v. Thomas · filed 1994-08-09

Additionally, liability under section 1983 cannot be predicated on the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; a supervisor must have condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged misconduct.

Hines v. Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director · filed 1994-08-10

The doctrine of respondeat superior no longer applies to impute liability onto supervisory personnel in civil rights actions; in order to find them liable, a plaintiff must allege that the supervisors condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged misconduct.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; supervisory position alone does not establish liability.

Gaston v. Coughlin · filed 1994-08-12

A defendant’s personal involvement in an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights is a necessary element of a § 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisory official solely under a theory of respondeat superior.

Woodard v. Mennella · filed 1994-08-25

Finally, to the extent the Complaint seeks to assert individual-capacity claims against Mennella, it is deficient for the additional reason that a supervisory official cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor based on supervisory status alone.

Stradley v. John Nichols Oakland County Robert Smith Maurice Sutton Gerald Reeves Len Schubring and Edward · filed 1994-08-31

To the extent that Reeves is implicated in Stradley's transfers because of his supervisory status as a lieutenant, Stradley has pointed to no evidence that would support the imposition of Sec. 1983 liability on Reeves on that basis alone.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only for a supervisor’s own acts or omissions, not solely through respondeat superior.

Figueroa v. Vose · filed 1994-09-13

In order to show supervisory liability, the supervisor must be liable on the basis of his own acts or omissions and not just on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose general supervisory liability; a supervisor cannot be held liable for a subordinate’s conduct without an allegation that the conduct effectuated an official policy or custom for which the supervisor was responsible.

Martin v. Michael Cox, Sheriff Arnold Coffee, Captain Chuck Ingalls, Lieutenant · filed 1994-09-21

Here, however, the named Defendants were entitled to summary judgment because Martin did not allege that Deputy Call's conduct was undertaken "to effectuate official policy or custom" for which these defendants were responsible.

Section 1983 imposes no supervisory liability when the supervised official committed no underlying constitutional violation.

Martinez v. Mafchir · filed 1994-09-27

Plaintiffs' Sec. 1983 substantive due process claim against Ms. Roybal and Mr. Samora is based solely on their supervision of Ms. Mafchir's investigation and pursuit of the Neglect Petition. Because Ms. Mafchir did not violate plaintiffs' constitutional right to familial integrity, neither did Ms. Roybal nor Mr. Samora.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only when the supervisor causes the constitutional violation; a subordinate’s conduct alone is insufficient.

Allen v. Marshall · filed 1994-09-27

Supervisory liability under Section 1983 requires that the supervisor somehow cause the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only when the supervisor is directly responsible for the improper action, with a causal connection to the alleged misconduct.

ESTATE OF · filed 1994-09-28

Our cases require a showing that supervisors--like Alderman and Campagna--were "direct[ly] responsibl[e] for the improper action" before liability will attach under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a supervisor’s policy decisions and the alleged constitutional injury for supervisory liability.

Estate of Porter ex rel. Nelson v. Illinois · filed 1994-09-28

Given the obvious lack of connection between the policies set by Alderman and Cam-pagna and Porter’s death, the district court properly granted summary judgment in their favor.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts showing that the supervisor encouraged or acquiesced in the subordinate’s actions.

Joiner v. Wisdom · filed 1994-10-05

The district court properly dismissed defendant Wisdom because plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that defendant Wisdom encouraged or acquiesced in any of the actions taken by defendant Clifford.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s direct personal knowledge or involvement in the alleged rights violation to impose liability.

Pansy v. Preate · filed 1994-10-06

Because Plaintiff has failed to allege any direct personal knowledge or involvement on the part of Defendant Gallagher, Plaintiff fails to meet the requirements of § 1983 and for that reason the Court will dismiss the claims in Count IV against Gallagher as well.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires sufficient evidence that the supervisor was deliberately indifferent to, personally involved in, or tacitly authorized the alleged misconduct.

Evans v. George Lombardi Carl White Co-I J. Linn John Doe · filed 1994-10-07

Further, Evans failed to produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find supervisory officials Lombardi and White were deliberately indifferent toward, were personally involved in, or had tacitly authorized the guard's alleged misconduct.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Boldthen v. Independent School District No. 2397 · filed 1994-10-25

Because the Court has found no deprivation of a constitutional right, Plaintiff has failed to establish the first element necessary to impose liability upon supervisory individuals.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on officials without authority over the challenged decision, and respondeat superior alone is not a basis for liability.

Beatty v. Lanham · filed 1994-10-25

However, nothing in the guidelines or regulations creating the program grant MDOC and MDE officials supervisory authority over HJC officials' suspension decisions. Therefore, no supervisory liability can be imposed upon these Defendants. See generally Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1035 (1985). Additionally, respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because of their subordinates' conduct.

Thompson v. Director, California Department of Corrections · filed 1994-11-04

Respondeat superior alone is not a sufficient basis for the liability of these officials under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisory officials for the actions of their subordinates.

Pierce v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division · filed 1994-11-14

Vicarious liability does not apply to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Prophete v. Gilless · filed 1994-11-15

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Franklin v. Gilless · filed 1994-11-15

Furthermore, there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

A supervisor may face a § 1983 claim based on personal involvement when evidence shows he received requests for medical care and failed to act.

Sappington v. Ulrich · filed 1994-11-15

These forms indicate, at least at this stage in the proceeding, that Ulrich had personal involvement with the matter at hand. Failure to act can amount to deliberate indifference. Therefore, plaintiff asserts a direct claim against defendant Ulrich and not one of respondeat superior. Summary judgment on this issue cannot be granted.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a plaintiff must show their personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between their conduct and the violation.

Fain v. Robert G. Borg Beckford and Pieper, Mailroom Sergeant · filed 1994-11-23

Borg, Bickford and Pieper are all supervisory officials with responsibility for the implementation of Folsom Prison mailroom policies. Under Sec. 1983, they cannot be held "liable for actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability." Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir.1989). For Fain to prevail he must demonstrate "(1) [their] personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between [their] wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation." Id. at 646.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability for reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others.

Parker v. Vose · filed 1994-11-28

The standard for supervisory liability in § 1983 cases is “reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others” which has not been proven here.

Section 1983 requires affirmative conduct by a supervisor for supervisory liability; a supervisor is not liable merely under respondeat superior.

Callahan v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit 13 · filed 1994-12-05

It is well established in § 1983 case law that a supervisor cannot be held liable merely on a theory of respondeat superior, but that a plaintiff must allege some affirmative conduct on the part of the supervisor.

Section 1983 does not impose individual damages liability on supervisory officials for subordinates’ constitutional violations without the officials’ personal involvement.

Martino v. Hogan · filed 1994-12-13

Finally, even were it assumed that the constitutional rule was “clearly established” and violated, so that qualified immunity did not attach, the defendants could be held individually liable for damages for the infractions under § 1983 only if they themselves participated directly in them.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official implicitly authorizes, approves, or knowingly acquiesces in an unconstitutional search.

Washington v. Whitaker · filed 1994-12-19

Under § 1983, supervisory liability may be established upon a showing that the defendant implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced to the strip search.

Section 1983 does not permit an inadequate-training, supervision, or policy claim against a supervisory authority unless the person supervised committed a constitutional violation.

Webber v. Mefford · filed 1994-12-19

A claim of inadequate training, supervision, and policies under Sec. 1983 cannot be made out against a supervisory authority absent a finding of a constitutional violation by the person supervised.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery against supervisory officials solely on a respondeat superior theory.

Burgess v. Dick Moore Gary Blanks Michael Groose David Dobson Tony Lander Gerald Bommel, Caseworker Eric Franks · filed 1994-12-28

Burgess cannot recover against Groose and Moore on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because of the supervisor’s position; the supervisor must participate in or direct the violation, or know of it and fail to prevent it.

Higgins v. Lloyd F. Hames, Commissioner · filed 1995-01-11

Liability under section 1983 cannot be predicated on the theory of respondeat superior. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). "A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Id.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; a supervisor must participate in or direct the violation, or know of it and fail to prevent it.

Stephen v. Mary Zulfacar, Dr. · filed 1995-01-11

Liability under section 1983 cannot be predicated on the theory of respondeat superior. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). "A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Id.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor at least implicitly authorizes, approves, or knowingly acquiesces in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Bremiller v. Cleveland Psychiatric Institute · filed 1995-01-12

At a minimum, a section 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate(s).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor's position; personal involvement is required.

Williams v. A. G. Bierman, James Greer and M. Busch · filed 1995-01-18

Liability, under Sec. 1983, cannot be imputed merely based upon an individual's supervisory position.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity liability only for a defendant’s own wrongdoing; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Geder v. Godinez · filed 1995-01-28

However, there is no doctrine of superiors’ liability in Section 1983 suits; defendants who are sued in their individual capacities can be held liable only for their individual wrongdoing.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for an employee’s unconstitutional acts solely through respondeat superior.

Boyd v. Knox · filed 1995-02-15

In the section 1983 context, supervisor liability is limited. A supervisor cannot be held liable, on a theory of respondeat superior, for an employee's unconstitutional actions.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely under respondeat superior.

Randle v. B.R. Parker · filed 1995-02-17

This leaves only the doctrine of respondeat superior, which cannot serve as a basis for imposing liability in a Sec. 1983 case.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely under respondeat superior.

Randle v. Parker · filed 1995-02-17

This leaves only the doctrine of respon-deat superior, which cannot serve as a basis for imposing liability in a § 1983 case.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Treadwell v. Murray · filed 1995-03-01

Although Plaintiffs allegations establish the proper framework for liability based on respondeat superior, that theory is not available under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when officials deliberately fail to stop subordinates’ rights violations despite a duty to act, or create policies and practices under which the deprivation occurs, but does not impose respondeat superior liability.

Jeanine B. Ex Rel. Blondis v. Thompson · filed 1995-03-02

Although there is no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983, supervisory liability satisfies the causation requirement of Section 1983 when supervisory officials who have not been directly involved in the deprivation itself fail to take action which they are required to take to stop the violations of their subordinates in a manner which amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the subordinates come in contact, or when they create policies and practices pursuant to which the constitutional deprivation was carried out.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors.

Crighton v. Schuylkill County · filed 1995-03-06

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the complaint adequately alleges a causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and a constitutional violation.

Gaston v. Colio · filed 1995-03-08

The Court finds that the complaint adequately alleges a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s misconduct only if the supervisor encouraged the specific incident or directly participated in it; a failure to supervise, control, or train alone is insufficient.

Redman v. Lima City School District Board of Education · filed 1995-03-10

The Sixth Circuit has held that a supervisor will not be liable under § 1983 even if the supervisor has failed to supervise, control, or train the offending individual. ... Rather, the supervisor must have “either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” ... Plaintiff presents no evidence that Haller or Buroker encouraged or participated in any harassment of plaintiff. Accordingly, summary judgment shall be granted to Haller and Buroker on plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without evidence that the supervisor’s own conduct, omissions, or policies caused the alleged rights violation.

Jermosen v. Coughlin · filed 1995-03-14

Whether or not plaintiffs due process rights were violated by defendant Bashaw’s determination, there is ho evidence that Coughlin failed to promulgate appropriate pre-hearing confinement procedures or that Coughlin, by implementation of any policy or practice, was himself responsible for any violation of plaintiffs rights to due process. Indeed, in light of Coughlin’s memorandum the opposite appears to be true. Furthermore, plaintiffs allegations of “supervisory liability” cannot be maintained under § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes personal supervisory liability when a supervisor participates in a rights violation, directs it, or knows of and acquiesces in subordinates’ violations.

Baker v. Township · filed 1995-03-22

In order to render Armstrong personally liable under section 1983, the Bakers must show that he participated in violating their rights, or that he directed others to violate them, or that he, as the person in charge of the raid, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the supervisor caused the constitutional deprivation through participation, direction, failure to train or supervise, or creation of a policy that produced the unconstitutional conduct.

Antun Damjanovic Milgros Damjanovic and Klara Damjanovic v. County of Los Angeles Sherman Block, Sheriff of Los Angeles · filed 1995-04-05

A supervisor cannot be held liable for constitutional deprivations effected by his subordinates unless the supervisor caused the deprivation by (1) participating or directing the conduct in question, (2) failing to train or supervise subordinates, or (3) creating a policy which resulted in the unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in a constitutional violation or a causal connection links the supervisor to it; widespread abuse can establish that connection by putting the supervisor on notice of a need to act.

CROSS v. STATE OF ALABAMA · filed 1995-04-06

Supervisory liability occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation. The causal connection can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely through respondeat superior; the supervisor must be otherwise involved in the alleged deprivation.

Burley v. Edward Nemeth, Sheriff · filed 1995-04-12

The defendants sheriff and warden could not be held liable in this case solely on the basis of respondeat superior, and Burley made no showing that they were otherwise involved in his treatment.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely through respondeat superior.

Stubbs v. Wilkinson · filed 1995-04-20

In addition, respondeat superior is not an appropriate basis on which to impute Sec. 1983 liability.

Section 1983 makes a supervisor individually liable for a constitutional violation only when the supervisor was personally involved in the wrongful conduct and acted with recklessness or deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Sadrud-Din v. City of Chicago · filed 1995-04-24

In order to hold a supervisor individually hable under § 1983 for an alleged violation of Selena Johnson’s due process rights, plaintiff must prove that the supervisor was personally involved in the allegedly wrongful conduct and acted with recklessness or deliberate indifference to plaintiffs constitutional rights.

Section 1983 imposes personal liability on a supervisor who participates in a rights violation, directs others to commit it, or knows of and acquiesces in subordinates’ violations.

Baker v. Township · filed 1995-05-01

In order to render Armstrong personally liable under section 1983, the Bakers must show that he participated in violating their rights, or that he directed others to violate them, or that he, as the person in charge of the raid, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates' violations.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor’s acts or omissions and an employee’s constitutional misconduct; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Brooker v. Powell · filed 1995-05-04

Although plaintiff does allege that certain NHSP Medical Department staff failed or refused to provide him with needed medical treatment, plaintiff's complaint does not contain a single factual allegation that shows or suggests an "affirmative link" between the acts or omissions of Powell and Cunningham and those of the prison's medical staff.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors; they can be liable only for their own acts or omissions.

Chamblin v. Northwood, NH, et al · filed 1995-05-08

Insofar as "the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to claims under [42 U.S.C. § 1983]," Gaudreault v. Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 209 (1st Cir. 1990) (per curiam), cert, denied, 500 U.S. 956 (1991), supervisors can only be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of their own acts or omissions, Febus-Rodriguez, supra, 14 F.3d at 91-92.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without direct responsibility for the alleged misconduct and a causal connection between the official and the harm.

Griffin v. Murphy · filed 1995-05-24

Liability will not lie against a supervisory official absent a showing of direct responsibility for the improper action; in other words, “a causal connection, or an affirmative link, between the misconduct complained of and the official sued is necessary.”

A § 1983 failure-to-supervise claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence bearing on the supervisors’ training or oversight of the officers involved.

Cameron v. Fair · filed 1995-05-25

What is at issue is whether the plaintiff has established a triable issue regarding the defendants’ claimed failure adequately to supervise Treatment Center correction officers in the use of force on a Treatment Center inmate during a strip or body cavity search. The plaintiff has adduced no evidence which supports his claim of liability under Count Three of the amended complaint. He has presented nothing whatsoever about the disciplinary history of the individuals involved in the alleged unreasonable search; nor has he presented anything about the supervision of the correction officers at the Treatment Center generally or about the training of the officers with respect to the use of force during body cavity searches.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely through respondeat superior; personal involvement in the alleged deprivation is required.

Ryan v. Banks · filed 1995-06-05

Furthermore, Ryan did not show that the wardens were personally involved in his placements in solitary confinement. Respondeat superior cannot form the basis for liability in a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely through respondeat superior; the supervisor must be personally involved in, or authorize, approve, or knowingly acquiesce in the unconstitutional conduct.

George Hickey, Jr. v. Robert Ficano, Hollom, Nurse · filed 1995-06-09

To the extent that Hickey's complaint alleges that Hollom is responsible based on her capacity as medical supervisor, Hickey has not demonstrated that Hollom was personally involved in, or authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged unconstitutional conduct, Birrell v. Brown, 867 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir.1989), and Hollom is not liable solely based on the theory of respondeat superior, as this theory no longer supports Sec. 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior; the supervisor must have been personally involved in the violation or encouraged or condoned it.

Copeland v. Mark MacHulis James Stephens · filed 1995-06-13

Copeland’s allegation is meritless because it is premised on nothing more than respondeat superior liability which is insufficient to sustain a § 1983 action, see Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), and he has not alleged that Stephens somehow encouraged or condoned others to act illegally.

Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability against a supervisor, and that limitation can supply a facially meritorious defense to a request for default judgment.

Duncan v. Speach · filed 1995-06-14

Defendants cite several facially valid defenses here. These include the absence on the part of either defendant of the deliberate indifference necessary for plaintiff to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim; the unavailability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of respondeat superior liability against defendant Speaeh; and defendants’ qualified immunity from plaintiffs claim. Because such defenses possess at least the appearance of validity, they are sufficient to meet the “meritorious defense” requirement.

Section 1983 generally does not allow supervisory liability based on respondeat superior.

McGuinness v. DuBois · filed 1995-06-19

Liability under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 may generally not be premised on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because a subordinate violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Blanche Road Corporation v. Bensalem Township · filed 1995-06-21

Plaintiffs' argument that Staerk should be liable under a theory of supervisor liability also fails. It is well settled that the doctrine of respondeat superior may not be employed to impose Sec. 1983 liability on a supervisor for the conduct of a subordinate which violates a citizen's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because they control subordinates.

Moongate Water Co., Inc. v. State · filed 1995-06-30

Supervising officers may not be subjected to Section 1983 liability simply by way of their control over subordinates.

Section 1983 requires a basis for a supervisor’s personal involvement or responsibility before liability for a subordinate’s conduct can be imputed to the supervisor.

Johnson v. Co-I Hodge Bill Armontrout -Sydow, Housing Unit Manager Michael Dixon · filed 1995-07-03

We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Johnson's claim against Armontrout. See Cokeley v. Endell, 27 F.3d 331, 332 (8th Cir. 1994) (standard of review). Johnson never alleged any basis for imputing liability for Hodge's conduct to Armontrout. See Mark v. Nix, 983 F.2d 138, 139-40 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (Sec. 1983 liability requires some personal involvement or responsibility).

Section 1983 does not make supervisory officials vicariously liable for the actions of their subordinates.

Flowers v. Bowles · filed 1995-07-10

Under § 1983, supervisory officials cannot be held liable for the actions of their subordinates on any vicarious liability theory.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Newman v. James Roland, and Charles D. Marshall, Warden, Counselor Dillard C. Johnson and Peetz · filed 1995-07-11

Thus, Newman failed to cure the deficiency from the original complaint because he again alleged that defendant Peetz was liable under a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not make state officials liable for their subordinates’ acts under a respondeat superior theory.

Rise v. State of Oregon · filed 1995-07-18

It is well established that section 1983 does not impose liability upon state officials for the acts of their subordinates under a respondeat superior theory of liability.

A supervisor is not liable under § 1983 for failing to institute follow-up medical exams where existing monitoring and complaint-reporting policies reasonably protect inmates’ rights.

Brown v. Sheridan · filed 1995-07-22

Nor does the record support the imposition of supervisory liability on Crosier for his failure to institute a policy of follow-up medical exams for inmates admitted to OBS I. ... These policies are reasonably designed to provide sufficient protection of inmates’ rights under the Eighth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory officials to be held vicariously liable for unauthorized acts of their subordinates.

Merrett v. Moore · filed 1995-07-25

Defendants Dempsey and Butterworth cannot be held vicariously liable for unauthorized acts of their subordinates: the doctrine of respondeat superior is unavailable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on supervisors for a subordinate’s acts when the supervisors were not responsible for those acts.

Houston v. Michael F. Sheahan and James W. Fairman, Jr. · filed 1995-08-02

Houston does not contend that either was responsible for the condition of his mattress, and neither can be held liable in damages for the acts of a subordinate.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery against a supervisor based solely on respondeat superior.

Vaughn v. Kerley · filed 1995-08-07

Respondeat superior, without more, does not provide a basis for recovery under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make state officials liable for their subordinates’ acts under vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Chavaris v. G. Trujillo C. Lopez Rodrigo Brizuela · filed 1995-08-08

Here, amendment of Chavaris's complaint to add these defendants would have been futile because section 1983 does not impose liability upon state officials for the acts of their subordinates under the doctrines of vicarious liability or respondeat superior. See Rise v. State of Oregon, No. 93-35521, slip op. 8687, 8702 (9th Cir. July 18, 1995); Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993).

Section 1983 requires affirmative conduct by a supervisor that plays a role in the alleged unconstitutional conduct to sustain a claim against that supervisor.

Litz v. City of Allentown · filed 1995-08-18

To sustain a § 1983 claim against Police Chief Stephens, plaintiff would have to show that some affirmative conduct by him played a role in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Karraker v. Howard A. Peters, Iii, George E. Detella, Larry D. Hewitt · filed 1995-08-18

The doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because of their supervisory relationship to those who committed the alleged acts.

Wagner v. Pennsylvania · filed 1995-08-18

Defendants correctly note that they cannot be liable to Plaintiff under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not allow recovery against officers solely in their supervisory capacity when the claim of supervisory liability is insufficient to survive a frivolity inquiry.

Melvin v. North Carolina Department of Corrections C.M. Creecy Charles E. Hill Lieutenant McNorwood Officer Powel · filed 1995-08-21

Accordingly, we vacate and remand the district court's order only with regard to the two officers allegedly directly involved in the altercation, because Melvin's claims of supervisory liability are insufficient to withstand a frivolity inquiry, and the district court properly found there was no possibility of recovery against other officers in their supervisory nature.