42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not make a supervisory official vicariously liable for an investigator’s actions.

Ago · filed 1988-04-28

With regard to an action against the State Attorney under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the actions of a special organized crime investigator, a supervisory official may not be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior or vicarious liability theory.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for a municipal policymaker who knowingly approves an unconstitutional policy carried out by subordinates, even without personal knowledge of the particular incident.

Wilson v. City of Chicago · filed 1988-05-02

Although one could read this statement as requiring the official’s personal knowledge of the particular incident giving rise to § 1983 liability, such a reading is inconsistent with other Seventh Circuit decisions. ... However, where a municipality may be held liable for the knowing acquiescence of one of its policy-makers in an unconstitutional policy of his municipal employees, surely the policy-maker himself can be held personally accountable for his actions.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a supervisor’s own act and a subordinate’s alleged constitutional violation; creating an antagonistic atmosphere through legislation alone does not establish personal liability.

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah · filed 1988-06-10

In order to sustain a section 1983 action against these named Defendants for the actions taken by their alleged subordinates, “Plaintiff[s] must show some causal connection between an act of the official and the alleged violations.” ... This Court concludes that the facts of this case do not warrant subjecting the individual Defendants to civil rights liability for the alleged atmosphere they created by their legislative acts, because no causal connection has been shown.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisory officials for subordinates’ acts without evidence of a relevant policy or custom or the supervisors’ participation in or condoning of the deprivation.

Geter v. Wille · filed 1988-06-14

There is simply no evidence in the record showing that either the sheriff's office or the jail had any policies, customs, or usages relating to the events that led to Geter's death. Without any evidence that the supervisory employee participated in or condoned the alleged deprivations, there can be no Section 1983 liability for the acts of the subordinates.

Section 1983 permits damages against supervisors whose deliberate indifference in training or supervision contributes to subordinates’ constitutional violations; supervisory liability cannot rest on vicarious liability alone.

Boswell v. County of Sherburne · filed 1988-06-21

This responsibility is not premised on the notion of vicarious liability; rather, it is bottomed on the principle that, in some contexts, failure of an official to safeguard against constitutional transgressions by subordinates constitutes an actionable wrong under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We have recently held that a plaintiff must link the alleged constitutional violations to the supervisors’ conduct by showing that the supervisors were “deliberately indifferent” to the constitutional rights of the plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits vicarious liability for a state official only when state law imposes it; otherwise, the official must have a personal role in the constitutional deprivation.

Wood v. Sunn · filed 1988-07-27

In a section 1983 action in this circuit, vicarious liability may not be imposed in the absence of a state law imposing such liability. ... In the absence of such a law, the state official must play a personal role in the constitutional deprivation to be liable.

Section 1983 permits damages against supervisors when their deliberate indifference in training or supervising subordinates is linked to a constitutional violation.

Boswell v. County of Sherburne · filed 1988-08-11

This responsibility is not premised on the notion of vicarious liability; rather, it is bottomed on the principle that, in some contexts, failure of an official to safeguard against constitutional transgressions by subordinates constitutes an actionable wrong under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... We have recently held that a plaintiff must link the alleged constitutional violations to the supervisors' conduct by showing that the supervisors were "deliberately indifferent" to the constitutional rights of the plaintiff. Wilson v. City of North Little Rock, 801 F.2d 316, 322, and n. 3 (8th Cir.1986).

Section 1983 requires a claim against supervisory officials to allege their direct involvement in a constitutional deprivation or a custom or policy they maintained that led to the violation.

McFall v. Collins · filed 1988-08-22

In addition, the district court properly dismissed the former Governor, the Commissioner of Corrections, and the Secretary of Corrections because plaintiff did not allege that they were directly involved in any constitutional deprivation, nor did he allege any custom or policy maintained by these defendants which led to the violation of his rights.

Section 1983 requires some personal involvement by a supervisor to state a claim for supervisory liability.

Rivera v. King · filed 1988-10-18

In order to state a claim for supervisory liability under the Civil Rights Act, plaintiff must show some personal involvement on the part of the defendant.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely on the basis of vicarious liability.

Long v. Vandivier · filed 1988-10-18

The district court found that the supervisor at the Center could not be found liable solely on the basis of vicarious liability. ... We agree with these conclusions of the district court.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity liability for supervisors whose failure to investigate and stop known constitutional harassment amounts to gross negligence or deliberate indifference.

Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico · filed 1988-10-26

(4) The plaintiff presented facts from which it could be found that the failure by Drs. Blanco and Gonzalez to investigate and take reasonable measures to stop the harassment directed against her constituted gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference. Thus, she established that they could be found liable in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits evidence of a pervasive pattern of misconduct to support liability against defendants sued as supervisors.

Hill v. Ronald C. Marshall T.L. Morris and Lt. Wente · filed 1988-11-04

The Supreme Court and this Circuit have approved the introduction of such evidence to establish a pervasive pattern of conduct that could justify imposing liability on defendants in civil rights actions based on their capacity as supervisors.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation before damages may be imposed; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Anderson v. Sullivan · filed 1988-12-02

A defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional violation is a prerequisite to imposing damages in a civil rights suit. A supervisory official is not liable simply by virtue of his subordinates’ actions.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability without personal knowledge of a violation if the supervisor was indirectly responsible for it or could have prevented it.

Figueroa v. Hon. Awilda Aponte-Roque, Etc., Aurora Figueroa v. Hon. Awilda Aponte-Roque, Etc. · filed 1989-01-04

Supervisors need not have personal knowledge of the alleged violation, however, if they were indirectly responsible for or could have prevented the challenged act.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s wrongdoing; the official must personally participate in the constitutional violation.

Cygnar v. City of Chicago · filed 1989-01-04

Although the mayor may have indirectly (through Ware) approved Mathis's transfer program, there is no doctrine of superior's liability in Sec. 1983 actions; instead, the official must actually have participated in the constitutional wrongdoing.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when an affirmative link connects the supervisor’s acts or omissions to the constitutional deprivation.

Bendiburg v. Dempsey · filed 1989-01-05

Rather, § 1983 liability can only attach to a supervisory official if the requisite causation is established; i.e., that an affirmative link exists between the official’s acts and/or omissions and the constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a state official to play a personal role in the constitutional deprivation unless state law permits vicarious liability.

Wood v. Sunn · filed 1989-01-17

In a section 1983 action in this circuit, vicarious liability may not be imposed in the absence of a state law imposing such liability. Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941, 99 S.Ct. 2883, 61 L.Ed.2d 311 (1979). Wood brought no such law to our attention. In the absence of such a law, the state official must play a personal role in the constitutional deprivation to be liable.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor based solely on supervisory status.

Grays v. Bartelt · filed 1989-01-18

It is well settled that mere supervisory status does not create liability in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability when a supervisor allows proper procedures to be ignored or fails to adequately supervise personnel.

United Steelworkers of America v. Milstead · filed 1989-01-27

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for permitting proper procedures to be ignored or failing to adequately supervise personnel.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged deprivation to impose damages liability on an official; a supervisory position alone is insufficient.

Peterson v. Scully · filed 1989-03-10

Plaintiff has not alleged any acts or omissions on the part of either Scully or Coughlin which contributed to his alleged injuries. Therefore, they cannot be held responsible for any deprivation of plaintiffs constitutional rights under § 1983.

A § 1983 supervisor claim requires that the supervisor knowingly, willfully, or recklessly caused a deprivation of rights; negligent supervision alone is insufficient.

Zralka v. Tures · filed 1989-03-16

Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has stated that it is not sufficient for a § 1983 plaintiff to show that a supervisory official was remiss in his supervisory duties; the supervisory official must be shown to have knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly caused a deprivation of rights. ... Plaintiff merely alleges negligence on Sautkus’ part, and therefore fails to state a claim against Sautkus in his individual capacity.

A supervisory official may be personally liable under § 1983 for failing to develop and implement required policies or for delegating that responsibility without adequate supervision.

Langley v. Coughlin · filed 1989-03-31

To the extent that he failed to develop and implement such programs or policies, or delegated that responsibility to others whom he then failed to supervise adequately, he remains personally liable according to Williams.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisory officials solely because they supervise a person who committed the alleged wrong.

Engles v. Hopkins · filed 1989-04-06

Supervisory officials cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based solely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 bases supervisory liability on the supervisor’s participation in causing the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.

Heine v. Receiving Area Personnel · filed 1989-04-14

In order to determine liability for supervisory officials, the inquiry is directed not on the conduct of the subordinate officials but rather on the supervisor’s participation in causing the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires proof that a supervisory official authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct before the supervisor can be held liable.

Jones v. Lewis · filed 1989-05-18

In the case at bar, appellant offered no proof at trial that any of the named city officials authorized, approved, or acquiesced in the actions at issue in the instant appeal. Accordingly, the district court properly granted a directed verdict in favor of the city officials.

Section 1983 requires personal responsibility for supervisory liability; a supervisor is not liable solely for subordinates’ acts.

Garrido v. Coughlin · filed 1989-06-27

Supervisory officials cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely for the acts of others; “there must be some showing of personal responsibility.”

Section 1983 does not impose individual supervisory liability without direct participation in, encouragement of, or implicit authorization of a subordinate’s alleged misconduct.

Kolb v. Ohio, Department of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, Cleveland Developmental Center · filed 1989-07-10

However, the evidence fails to show that defendants Brown and Rafter directly participated in, encouraged, or implicitly authorized Darling’s allegedly wrongful conduct. Therefore, the court shall grant summary judgment to defendants Brown and Rafter in their individual capacities on Kolb’s section 1983 discriminatory discharge claims.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because they oversaw officers who committed a constitutional violation; the supervisor must have personal involvement.

East v. City of Chicago · filed 1989-07-18

No factual allegations here suggest any personal involvement on the part of the unnamed supervisors. Instead Perrijean attempts to impose liability merely because they supervised the actual wrongdoers. But case after case has rejected such liability (see, e.g., Smallwood, 708 F.Supp. at 189).

Section 1983 permits a claim against supervisory officials who, with deliberate indifference, maintain a policy or custom that directly causes constitutional harm, even without a separate duty to protect the plaintiff.

Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District · filed 1989-08-16

Thus, to the extent that the Supreme Court's remand of this case in light of DeShaney required us to consider whether Stoneking still may maintain a viable section 1983 claim if there is no predicate duty by defendants to protect her, we hold that she may because she has also alleged that defendants, with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused her constitutional harm.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s indifference to constitutional rights is deliberate, reckless or callous.

Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Desiderio Cartagena and Domingo Alvarez, Carlos A. Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Pedro N. Soto · filed 1989-08-17

We hold that indifference that rises to the level of being deliberate, reckless or callous, suffices to establish liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a direct causal connection between a supervisor’s act and the alleged deprivation of rights.

Newcomb v. City of Troy · filed 1989-08-18

Recovery against these defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be predicated on a showing that direct causal connection exists between an act of the Sergeants and the alleged deprivation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a superior knows subordinates caused constitutional deprivations and shows deliberate indifference or tacit authorization by failing to remedy them.

Pool v. Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources Dick Moore John Ashcroft · filed 1989-08-28

To hold supervisors liable under section 1983, a plaintiff must show that a superior had actual knowledge that his subordinates caused deprivations of constitutional rights and that he demonstrated deliberate indifference or “tacit authorization” of the offensive acts by failing to take steps to remedy them.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a specific omitted supervisory practice, a known unreasonable risk of constitutional injury, deliberate indifference to that risk, and a causal link between the omission and the subordinate’s violation.

Sample v. Diecks · filed 1989-09-12

Based on City of Canton, we conclude that a judgment could not properly be entered against Robinson in this case based on supervisory liability absent an identification by Sample of a specific supervisory practice or procedure that Robinson failed to employ and specific findings by the district court that (1) the existing custom and practice without that specific practice or procedure created an unreasonable risk of prison overstays, (2) Robinson was aware that this unreasonable risk existed, (3) Robinson was indifferent to that risk, and (4) Diecks' failure to assure that Sample's complaint received meaningful consideration resulted from Robinson's failure to employ that supervisory practice or procedure.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in unconstitutional conduct for damages liability; awareness of events and a high position of authority alone are insufficient.

Al-Jundi v. Estate Of · filed 1989-09-15

Rockefeller's part in the decision to retake the prison and rescue the hostages, and in the formulation and implementation of the plan to carry out that decision, simply did not rise to the level of personal involvement necessary to establish liability under section 1983. True, the Governor was kept abreast of the events that transpired at the prison throughout the crisis; but that alone is not sufficient to hold him responsible for any wrongs committed by others.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for supervisory damages liability; general approval of an operation does not establish that involvement.

Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller · filed 1989-09-15

Rockefeller’s part in the decision to retake the prison and rescue the hostages, and in the formulation and implementation of the plan to carry out that decision, simply did not rise to the level of personal involvement necessary to establish liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in a constitutional deprivation or has a sufficient causal connection to the violation.

Hansen v. Black · filed 1989-09-19

A supervisor may be liable if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability cannot rest on a single incident or isolated incidents of subordinate misconduct.

Williams v. Garrett · filed 1989-10-04

As a result, the plaintiff in such a case may not rely on evidence of a single incident or isolated incidents to impose supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s actions under a vicarious liability theory.

Ago · filed 1989-10-18

Thus, pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , a supervisor of elections may not be held personally liable for the actions of a deputy supervisor of elections or volunteer deputy voter registrar under a vicarious liability theory.

Section 1983 requires a complaint against a supervisor to allege personal involvement and responsibility for the deprivation of constitutional rights; liability cannot rest solely on the supervisory relationship.

Figueroa v. Molina · filed 1989-10-25

Consequently, it is not enough for plaintiff to imply guilt by association; plaintiff must show in the complaint that Superintendent was personally involved and responsible for the alleged deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Supervisory officials sued individually under § 1983 are liable only if their actions have a causal connection to the claimed deprivation.

Croft v. Harder · filed 1989-11-09

Supervisory officials sued in their individual capacities are answerable in a section 1983 action only when there is a causal connection between their actions and the claimed deprivation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for reckless disregard of constitutional violations without proof that the supervisor actually knew of them.

Howard v. George Adkison and Henry Jackson · filed 1989-11-15

Proof of actual knowledge of constitutional violations is not, however, an absolute prerequisite for imposing supervisory liability. This court has consistently held that reckless disregard on the part of a supervisor will suffice to impose liability.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold supervisors liable for failure to train to show deliberate indifference to inmates’ rights.

Vasquez v. Coughlin · filed 1989-12-05

Plaintiff must show that the actions of these defendants in failing to train the officers amounted to a “deliberate indifference” to the rights of inmates.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because an official holds authority or learns of misconduct after it occurs.

Weaver v. Toombs · filed 1989-12-05

The mere fact that a supervisory person is in a position of authority, or that he was aware of illegal conduct after the fact, does not allow the imposition of liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for subordinates’ acts, but allows liability based on the supervisors’ own conduct.

Greason v. Kemp · filed 1990-01-09

We recognize, of course, that supervisory personnel cannot be held liable under section 1983 for the acts of their subordinates under the doctrine of respondeat superior, ...; this, however, does not preclude an inquiry into whether the supervisors were independently liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose strict liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ constitutional violations; liability requires that a defendant caused or participated in the deprivation.

Pearly Wilson v. Richard P. Seiter Harry K. Russell and Norris W. McMackin · filed 1990-01-10

Because "there is no concept of supervisor strict liability under section 1983[,]" Harris v. Greer, 750 F.2d 617, 618 (7th Cir.1984) (dismissing claims against prison warden); accord Wilson v. Beebe, 612 F.2d 275, 275-76 (6th Cir.1980), and Wilson has identified no evidence suggesting that any of the defendants "caused or participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation[,]" Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir.1983), the district court appropriately granted summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiff's equal protection claim.

Section 1983 failure-to-train or supervise liability is irrelevant when the plaintiff fails to establish the underlying assault.

Watson v. Mike Gardner, Sheriff Keith Waye, Jailer Jeff Parker, Deputy B.J. Richardson · filed 1990-04-09

Watson's claim against Sheriff Gardner was correctly dismissed, Watson having failed to establish that he was assaulted. Any failure to train or supervise is thus irrelevant.

Section 1983 liability for failing to prevent a constitutional violation requires the failure to be a substantial factor in the denial of the right and deliberate indifference to the violation.

Timothy Seay, by Next Friend Agnes Seay v. Judy Seaton, Paul Fox Greene County Board of Education · filed 1990-04-16

In order to state a constitutional claim under Section 1983 for failure to take actions to prevent violation of a constitutionally protected right, a plaintiff must show (1) that the failure to act was a substantial factor leading to the denial of the right and (2) that the defendants displayed deliberate indifference toward the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor for a subordinate’s acts when the supervisor was not personally involved.

Dykhouse v. Mugge · filed 1990-04-24

Captain Storm was not personally involved in the stop and detention of Dykhouse and the constitution does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for the acts and omissions of their subordinates.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for constitutional deprivations even without direct involvement, and a plaintiff presenting that theory is entitled to a jury instruction on it.

Wilks v. Young · filed 1990-05-07

The question presented in Rascon, one which is closely related to that which is presented to the court today, was whether a director of a correctional facility could be held liable under Sec. 1983 for the injuries sustained by an inmate who was improperly disciplined by prison officials. This court concluded that under certain circumstances, such liability can be imposed. Plaintiff's proposed instruction on supervisory liability within the context of the Waupun prison facility asked the district court to do no more than inform the jury that such a theory of liability was available to the plaintiff. We believe such an instruction should have been given.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the conduct of subordinates.

Mowatt v. G.B. Brown E. Perry D. Wozniak · filed 1990-05-09

Liability under Sec. 1983 cannot be established on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor liable to allege that the supervisor condoned, encouraged or participated in the misconduct; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Taylor v. Loyd Fletcher, Warden Jane Doe, Nurse · filed 1990-05-10

Under circumstances such as these, respondeat superior no longer applies to impute liability onto supervisory personnel. In order to find them liable, a plaintiff must allege that the supervisors condoned, encouraged or participated in the alleged misconduct.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a supervisor for a subordinate’s misconduct without allegations tying the supervisor to that misconduct.

Martin v. O'GRADY · filed 1990-06-13

Martin cannot hold O’Grady personally liable for acts of one of his subordinates, no matter how egregious, without giving any hint of O’Grady’s involvement. A contrary ruling would allow Martin to proceed on a theory of vicarious or superiors’ liability, which is unavailable under § 1983.

Under § 1983, a supervisor can be personally involved in a constitutional deprivation by failing to remedy it after learning of it.

Fominas v. Kelly · filed 1990-06-13

However, a supervising official may be personally involved in a constitutional deprivation by failing to remedy a wrong after learning of it. ... The plaintiff alleged as much and, therefore, Kelly should have been retained in this suit.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires personal involvement in the alleged violation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Oliver v. James A. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division · filed 1990-06-28

The magistrate properly held that Oliver failed to state a claim against these defendants in their supervisory roles. Oliver did not allege that the defendants were personally involved in the assault, nor did he allege a sufficient causal connection between their conduct and the assault.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisor to allege that the supervisor’s deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct caused the constitutional injury.

Wheeler v. Barnett · filed 1990-07-19

To state a cognizable Sec. 1983 claim against a supervisory official, a plaintiff must allege that the official's deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct was a causative factor of the constitutional injury inflicted by the subordinates.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a supervisor’s own participation in wrongdoing or a causal connection between the supervisor’s breach of a state or local duty and a constitutional violation.

White v. Taylor · filed 1990-07-24

Rather, a supervisor can only be found liable on the basis of his or her own personal participation in the wrongful conduct, or where there is a causal connection between the supervisor’s breach of a duty imposed by state or local law and the constitutional violation sought to be redressed.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor personally participates in a constitutional violation or the supervisor’s actions are causally connected to it.

Columbus Brown, A/K/A Lenwood Johnson v. Fred Crawford, Director of Dade County Jail · filed 1990-07-24

Supervisory liability occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

A § 1983 claim against a supervisor may survive summary judgment when verified allegations raise a factual question whether the supervisor knew or should have known of the violation and condoned or implicitly authorized it.

Johnson v. Chris Daniels G.B. Brown Robert Atherton · filed 1990-08-09

However, plaintiff argues that Daniels did know or at least should have known about the denial of his equal protection rights such that he may well have condoned or implicitly authorized the wrongdoings. These verified allegations are sufficient to raise a factual question for the factfinder.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a mere failure to supervise or train based on simple negligence.

Coleman v. Wirtz · filed 1990-08-10

The mere failure to supervise or properly train under § 1983 cannot be based upon simple negligence.

Section 1983 supervisory liability cannot rest on mere negligence in supervising subordinates.

Meyer Ex Rel. Wyrick v. Litwiller · filed 1990-09-05

Plaintiff may not rely on the supervisory official’s mere negligence in supervising subordinates.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a supervisor’s own conduct or inaction to amount to reckless or callous indifference to constitutional rights.

Roman Figueroa v. Molina · filed 1990-09-19

A careful review of the documents leads us to conclude that the conduct of Superintendent López-Feliciano while in office comes nowhere near to the “reckless or callous indifference” standard necessary to find section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors merely because they are responsible for officers who committed the alleged wrong.

Oliver v. James A. Collins, Texas Dept. Of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division · filed 1990-09-19

Oliver’s section 1983 allegations against Ly-naugh and Alford are that they are “responsible for the actions of the officers,” the defendants who beat Oliver. This is not sufficient for section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires allegations that the supervisor condoned, encouraged or participated in the alleged misconduct.

Maniece v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Corrections Cabinet, John T. Wigginton, Secretary of Corrections · filed 1990-09-21

Moreover, Maniece did not allege that Wigginton, as a supervisor, condoned, encouraged or participated in the alleged misconduct, as required to impute liability to supervisory personnel.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ misconduct merely because they knew of a risk; liability requires responsibility for the challenged omission.

Geitz v. Moreland · filed 1990-10-31

It is difficult to see, for example, how Warden Thieret could be liable just because he was aware of a risk to Geitz. Wardens do not fill out transfer papers personally, and supervisors are not liable for the operational delicts of their subordinates.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a supervisor was responsible for the challenged conditions; supervisory authority alone does not establish liability.

Brown v. Corrections Cabinet, Dewey Sowders, George W. Noe · filed 1990-11-13

Brown's drinking water and asbestos claims against Warden Dewey Sowders were properly dismissed because Brown's complaint does not allege that Sowders is responsible for the conditions that Brown has identified.

A supervisor who encouraged or otherwise participated in another person’s sexual harassment could be liable under § 1983.

Hubbard v. City of Middletown · filed 1990-12-05

Thus, the law was clearly established at the time Howard acted that a supervisor who encouraged or otherwise participated in another’s sexual harassment is liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability only for defendants whose own actions or inactions caused the injury; supervisory responsibility alone is insufficient.

Shaw ex rel. Strain v. Strackhouse · filed 1990-12-06

Only those defendants whose inactions or actions personally caused Shaw’s injury may be held liable under § 1983. In more concrete terms, liability may only be imposed on those defendants who had the power and the responsibility to protect Shaw’s safety after February 3, but who failed to do so.

Section 1983 supervisory liability does not reach an entity that lacks responsibility or authority to supervise or train the staff of a separate care provider.

Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, Inc. · filed 1990-12-06

We do not believe that the basis for supervisory liability discussed in City of Canton or Sample v. Diecks can be established in the present case. As previously discussed, Northeast did not have responsibility for supervising daily activities in the Greenwich home. Northeast did not have an employment or even a contractual relationship with Greenwich, an independent corporation under contract with Philadelphia, or with Lucas, a Greenwich employee. Northeast could not hire, fire, or supervise Greenwich staff. Nor was Northeast responsible for training that staff.

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability only when the supervisor shows reckless or callous indifference to constitutional rights and an affirmative link connects that indifference to the subordinate’s misconduct.

Fournier v. Joyce · filed 1990-12-14

A plaintiff may establish a supervisor’s liability only by showing that “the supervisor’s conduct or inaction amounted to a reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others,” and that there was “an affirmative link” between the misconduct of the supervised and the indifference of the supervisor.

Section 1983 supervisory liability based on deliberate indifference does not extend to an entity that did not supervise or train the alleged direct wrongdoers and at most failed to warn them of a particular risk.

Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home For Children, Inc. · filed 1991-01-03

We do not believe that the basis for supervisory liability discussed in City of Canton or Sample v. Diecks can be established in the present case. As previously discussed, Northeast did not have responsibility for supervising daily activities in the Greenwich home. Northeast did not have an employment or even a contractual relationship with Greenwich, an independent corporation under contract with Philadelphia, or with Lucas, a Greenwich employee. Northeast could not hire, fire, or supervise Greenwich staff. Nor was Northeast responsible for training that staff. ... At worst, Northeast failed to warn Greenwich, an independent entity with expertise in the care of mentally retarded persons, about a potential danger facing a particular individual under Greenwich's care. This evidence showed no more than that "an otherwise sound program" did not do everything it might possibly have done on this particular occasion. Accordingly, the available evidence was clearly inadequate to support a Section 1983 claim under City of Canton and related cases.

Section 1983 permits liability for supervisory officers who order excessive force or fail to stop it when they have a duty to act.

Burgin v. Iowa Department Of Corrections · filed 1991-01-22

The district court found that although only Bartholomew and Freesmeier actually used excessive force, Peterson and Bowden, as supervisory officers, also must share in the responsibility; Peterson for ordering Bartholomew and Freesmeier to proceed with the riot shield and Bowden for failing to take any action to stop the situation when he had a duty to do so. ... We have carefully studied the record, including the district court's opinion and the briefs of the parties, and find that no such mistake or error of law has been committed. Accordingly, we affirm.

Section 1983 generally does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s conduct solely because of the supervisory relationship.

Cokley v. Townley · filed 1991-02-11

Furthermore, Cokley failed to allege any direct involvement by Townley. The doctrine of respondeat superior generally is inapplicable to Sec. 1983 suits.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a supervisor’s conduct caused the deprivation of protected rights.

Correa v. Feliciano · filed 1991-03-14

Plaintiffs have not come forward with evidence sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to the causation element necessary to hold a supervisor liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose strict supervisory liability; a supervisor must be personally responsible for the alleged deprivation.

Ruark v. Henry Solano and Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 1991-03-20

Plaintiff has not alleged defendant Solano was personally responsible for the denial of access to legal resources. Moreover, “there is no concept of strict supervisor liability under section 1983.”

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of a subordinate’s misconduct.

Corrente v. Rhode Island, Department of Corrections · filed 1991-03-21

Supervisory liability under Section 1983 has three facets. First, liability may not be based on principles of responde-at superior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without direct involvement in the alleged misconduct or reckless indifference to known constitutional violations.

Hamilton v. Scott · filed 1991-03-29

Absent any allegation that O’Leary and Lane were either directly involved in the alleged misconduct or were recklessly indifferent to the constitutional violations of which they had some knowledge, they cannot be held liable in this case. They must be dismissed regardless of the outcome as to the other defendants in this action.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for supervisory liability; a supervisor must encourage the misconduct or directly participate in it.

Jones v. John Jabe, Chris Daniels, J. Graham, and Dennis Parker · filed 1991-04-12

As Jones has recognized, Jabe did not have sufficient personal involvement to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Jabe was merely a supervisor. His only involvement with Jone's administrative segregation was that he received a copy of a letter from the Central Office. His receipt of a letter is insufficient personal involvement to constitute a violation of a state-created liberty interest. In Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416 (6th Cir.1984), we held that to establish supervisor liability there must be a showing that a supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. Id. at 421. In light of the absence of personal involvement, the judgment against Jabe should be reversed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisory officials solely because they supervise those who caused a deprivation; individual fault is required.

McNeal v. MacHt · filed 1991-05-03

However, the liability of supervisory officials under § 1983 may not be predicated on the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for an institutional administrator when deficient training or supervision under the institution’s policies shows deliberate indifference to clearly established constitutional rights and causes a deprivation.

George v. McIntosh-Wilson · filed 1991-05-24

The administrator of a mental health care institution may incur supervisory liability under § 1983 for a constitutional deprivation where the policies of the Hospital as formulated or applied result in such a lack of training and supervision as to constitute deliberate indifference to clearly established constitutional rights to a reasonably safe environment.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a supervisor’s personal wrongdoing contributed to a deprivation of civil rights to hold the supervisor individually liable.

Weber v. Village of Hanover Park · filed 1991-06-12

To state a Section 1983 claim against Altergot in his individual capacity, plaintiffs must allege personal wrongdoing on the part of Altergot that contributed to the deprivation of plaintiffs’ civil rights.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a supervisor must personally deprive the plaintiff of federally protected rights.

Depineda v. Martinez · filed 1991-06-13

Plaintiff, however, failed to allege that they personally deprived him of federally protected rights. Section 1983 does not impose liability vicariously nor does it create a federal law of repsondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for employees’ acts without personal involvement, such as condoning, encouraging, participating in, or implicitly authorizing the conduct.

Bennett v. Batchik · filed 1991-06-24

As we stated when discussing plaintiff's claim against Dr. Jones, liability under section 1983 cannot be established on the basis of respondeat superior. Plaintiff has not made the requisite showing of personal involvement, as he has failed to allege that Nichols condoned, encouraged, participated, or implicitly authorized the actions of the sheriff's deputies.

A § 1983 complaint against supervisors must allege their personal involvement in the alleged violation.

Cruz v. Sielaff · filed 1991-07-02

The only claim against the Commissioner and the Warden that Cruz could be alleging is a failure to exercise supervisory liability. Since the Commissioner and the Warden are not alleged to have been personally involved, the complaint against them is also dismissed.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when an official learns of a constitutional violation through an appeal and fails to remedy it, or allows a policy or custom of unconstitutional practices to continue.

Howard v. Wilkerson · filed 1991-07-02

The Court rejects defendants’ argument that Sullivan cannot be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he was not personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations. A supervisory official may be liable if, after learning of the violation through an appeal, the official failed to remedy the wrong or allowed a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred to continue.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for medical professionals’ acts unless the supervisors were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of medical treatment.

Johnson v. Williams · filed 1991-07-25

Moreover, plaintiff may not hold supervisory defendants liable for acts of medical professionals unless he alleges personal involvement by those defendants in the alleged deprivation of medical treatment.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor has the right to control employees.

Allen v. Board of Com'rs of County of Wyandotte · filed 1991-08-02

Section 1983 liability must be based on more than the right to control employees.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of general supervisory responsibility for subordinates’ acts.

Smith v. Julian Boyd Laverta Barns Gloria Blocker Dav Kovac · filed 1991-09-25

We also note that Smith did not identify or name as defendants the officials who allegedly tampered with his mail, and Boyd cannot be held liable for their acts as a result of his general supervisory responsibility.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor for a subordinate’s conduct; the supervisor must personally participate in, knowingly facilitate, approve, condone, or deliberately ignore the conduct.

Floyd Sanders, III v. Don English, Curtis McCoy Ed Perry, and the City of Mansfield · filed 1992-01-21

Because “[t]here is no principle of superiors’ liability, either in tort law or in the law of constitutional torts,” ... Chief English cannot be held vicariously liable for the conduct of Lt. McCoy; none of the evidence shows that he “[knew] about the conduct and facilitate[d] it, approve^] it, condone[d] it, or tum[ed] a blind eye for fear of what [he] might see.”

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires the official to have at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Martin v. Swift · filed 1992-01-27

In a Section 1983 action against a supervisory official, a plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability based on a constitutional violation by a subordinate who is not a defendant, if the other requirements for supervisory liability are met.

Stanley Woodbridge (90-3574) James Moss (90-3575) Douglas Hairston (90-3576) Kevin Williams (90-3577) v. Eric Dahlberg D · filed 1992-01-28

As appellants assert, the jury could have found constitutional violations other than those alleged to have been committed by the nonsupervisory defendants and these could ... have provided the basis for a finding of liability on the part of the supervisory defendants, assuming the other requirements for supervisory liability were met.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for subordinates’ constitutional violations only when the supervisor participated in or directed the violations or failed to train the subordinates.

Hernandez v. Fitzsimons · filed 1992-02-03

A supervisor cannot be held liable under section 1983 for the constitutional deprivations caused by his subordinates, absent participation, direction, or failure to train.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisory officials who were not personally involved in alleged constitutional violations and did not condone, encourage, or participate in the misconduct.

Bell-Bey v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 1992-02-06

Defendants Brown (MDOC Director) and Toombs (warden of the prison where Bell-Bey was confined) were not personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations, and Bell-Bey did not establish that these defendants condoned, encouraged, or participated in the alleged misconduct. Thus, they are not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A supervisor’s failure to correct alleged misconduct after learning of it on administrative appeal sufficiently alleges personal involvement for a § 1983 claim.

Cepeda v. Coughlin · filed 1992-02-07

As discussed above, the allegation that supervisory personnel learned of alleged misconduct on appeal yet failed to correct it constitutes an allegation of personal participation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others.

Morgan v. Ellerthorpe · filed 1992-02-20

The standard for supervisory liability in § 1983 cases is “reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others” which has not been alleged here.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor and the alleged rights violation; supervisory status alone does not support liability.

Williams v. Jerry D. Gilmore, Willie Rockett, Robin Jones · filed 1992-02-28

As the district court correctly explained, a section 1983 claim cannot be maintained under a theory of supervisory liability: some sort of affirmative link is required.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor participates in or directs a constitutional violation, or knows of a violation and fails to prevent it.

Dixon v. Corrections Dept., State of Cal. · filed 1992-03-02

Because Dixon's allegations do not show that Borg either participated in or directed any alleged constitutional violation or that Borg knew of a violation and failed to prevent it, the district court properly dismissed the claim of deliberate indifference against Borg.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability when a subordinate committed no constitutional violation.

Hicks v. Leake · filed 1992-03-03

Finally, with respect to the substantive due process claim brought against Superintendent Corvello, no supervisory liability is applicable where no constitutional violation was effected by a subordinate.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for supervisory liability; a supervisor’s mere knowledge of a subordinate’s conduct is insufficient.

Candelaria v. Coughlin · filed 1992-03-17

However, even assuming knowledge by these defendants both of the alleged assault and the alleged extension of confinement, mere knowledge by a supervisory official of an employee’s conduct is not sufficient to impose supervisory liability.

Supervisory officials cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely because of their positions; liability requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Campbell v. Michael P. Lane, Howard Peters, Dr. Howard Mueller, Dr. Johnson · filed 1992-03-26

However, supervisory officials cannot be held responsible under § 1983 under a respondeat superior theory of liability.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of a subordinate’s conduct.

Hardin v. Hayes · filed 1992-04-09

Supervisory officials are not liable.under section 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

A § 1983 claim against a supervisory official requires proof that the official knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly caused the constitutional violation.

Phillips v. Robert Caldwell, C.W. Groom, J.C. Alemond, D. Gannon, Ronald J. Haws, and Michael P. Lane · filed 1992-04-23

To establish a § 1983 claim against a supervisory official, the plaintiff must show that the official knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly caused the constitutional violations.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because they supervised the alleged wrongdoers.

Miller v. Jones · filed 1992-05-01

Respondeat superior liability cannot be asserted in a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors merely because of their positions; a defendant must be personally involved in the alleged violation.

Lucien v. Howard A. Peters, III and William C. Goskie, as Superintendent · filed 1992-05-18

The mere fact that Peters is the Warden and Goskie the Segregation Unit superintendent is insufficient to establish liability, as the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 holds supervisors liable for employees’ acts only when their failure to train, supervise, direct, or control employees amounts to deliberate indifference.

Aswegan v. Captain Bruhl Lieutenant Birdsell C/o Gary Rea C/o Roush Lieutenant Bowden Roger Lawson Charlie Ha · filed 1992-06-04

The district court was well aware that Emmett and Henry, as supervisors, could not be held responsible for the acts of their employees unless they failed to train, supervise, direct, or control their employees so as to amount to deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors or employers vicariously liable for employees’ torts.

Summage v. McEvers · filed 1992-06-30

Assuming that Ghearing's actions were in fact tortious, neither supervisors nor employers are vicariously liable for the torts of employees in section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor’s conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Freddie Harrison, Named: Freddie L. Harrison v. John R. Enright, Frank O. Gunter · filed 1992-07-09

A plaintiff must show an affirmative link between the supervisor's conduct and the constitutional deprivation alleged; "liability based upon respondeat superior will not do." Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1622 (1991). Harrison's complaint does not allege the required link between defendants' actions and a constitutional violation. Therefore, defendants cannot be held liable in their supervisory capacity.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation and does not impose liability solely for a subordinate’s conduct.

Churchill v. Wilson · filed 1992-07-10

Liability under section 1983, however, arises only upon a showing of personal involvement by the defendant in the alleged constitutional violations; there is no respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only for the supervisor’s own acts or omissions, not merely for acts of subordinate officers.

Agresta v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1992-08-11

While Baker made the decision to deploy the stake-out unit that evening, any liability as a supervisor for the unit must be based on his own acts or omissions, not those of the individual officers in the stake-out unit.

Section 1983 does not impose collective or vicarious liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ errors.

Nancy Pacelli, as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Huron Loyd Cain v. Devito · filed 1992-08-25

Section 1983 does not create collective or vicarious responsibility. Supervisors are not liable for the errors of their subordinates.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s constitutional deprivation only if the supervisor participated in or directed it, or failed to train the subordinate.

William Terry Hood, A/K/A James Herman Pritchett v. Jerry Hill, (Cv-84-2098), William Terry Hood v. Officer Brooks, A133 · filed 1992-09-02

A supervisor cannot be held liable under section 1983 for the constitutional deprivations caused by subordinates, absent participation, direction, or failure to train.

Section 1983 permits liability for a supervisory official who personally participates in a constitutional deprivation or who knows of widespread abuses and deliberately fails to prevent further misconduct.

Arnold on Behalf of HB v. Lewis · filed 1992-09-03

Rather, plaintiff must establish that the official personally participated in the constitutional deprivation or that a state supervisory official was aware of the widespread abuses and with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s constitutional rights failed to take action to prevent further misconduct.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Mott v. Ledbetter · filed 1992-09-25

He also recommended granting summary judgment on the § 1983 claims against Defendants Tanner and Ledbetter as these were based solely on a respondeat superior theory. ... After having carefully reviewed the record and the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the Report and Recommendation is approved and adopted as the Opinion and Order of the Court as to all of the above claims.

Section 1983 does not support a failure-to-supervise or failure-to-train claim against a supervisor without proof of an underlying violation by the other defendants.

Caputo v. Fauver · filed 1992-09-30

However, as discussed above, Caputo has failed to offer sufficient proof of any “violations of the other defendants” to withstand their motion for summary judgment. As a result, he obviously cannot recover from defendant Fauver on the theory that Fauver failed properly to supervise or train the other defendants.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability for constitutional torts.

Gerald E. Hessel and Leatrice A. Hessel v. O'Hearn · filed 1992-10-06

There isn’t even a doctrine of respondeat superior in constitutional tort cases, and anyway the agencies that employed the defendants are not themselves named as defendants.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a supervisor for subordinates’ actions.

Smith v. Sublett · filed 1992-10-19

Respondeat superior does not apply in section 1983 cases.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires intentional participation in, or knowing acquiescence in, a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct; merely alleging that the supervisor should have known of it is insufficient.

Woodward v. City of Worland · filed 1992-10-19

However, merely asserting that the defendant "should have known” of unconstitutional behavior on behalf of his or her subordinates without establishing an intentional, conscious, and deliberate act by the defendant participating in, or knowingly acquiescing in, the unconstitutional behavior fails to allege the requisite scienter for § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor liable to allege the supervisor’s personal knowledge of or involvement in the deprivation.

Harris v. O'GRADY · filed 1992-10-23

For liability to attach to prison supervisors under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the personal knowledge or involvement of those superiors.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires allegations of facts sufficient to establish that liability.

Kruitbosch v. Fred Van De Veire Gary W. Deland Van O. Austin, Dr. Bob Steele Mike Jenson Gary Fulkerson · filed 1992-10-23

We agree with the district court that Plaintiff has not alleged the necessary facts to establish supervisory liability for § 1983 purposes.

Supervisors with a duty and power to ensure adequate medical care may be liable under § 1983 for their own breach of that duty when it results in a constitutional violation.

Williams v. O'LEARY · filed 1992-10-27

Indeed, under appropriate circumstances, supervisory personnel with the power and duty to ensure adequate medical care may be held liable under § 1983 for breaches of their legal obligations resulting in constitutional violations.

A supervisor can face a § 1983 claim when the supervisor personally participates in, and has a direct causal connection to, the constitutional violation.

Lyon v. Grossheim · filed 1992-10-30

Therefore, because Grossheim personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation, and there is a direct causal connection between his actions and the alleged constitutional violations, a viable claim of supervisory liability has been established by Lyon.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor solely because subordinates committed the alleged violation.

Washington-Boney v. Illinois Department of Corrections, Pat Matsko, Louis Lowery, and Michael P. Lane · filed 1992-11-02

Lane may have supervised those who were responsible for these actions, but his liability cannot be imposed vicariously on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor or official to have knowingly, willfully, or recklessly caused the alleged deprivation through action or failure to act.

Scott v. McCaughtry · filed 1992-11-06

In order to establish a claim against a supervisor or official under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must show that the official acted knowingly, willfully, or recklessly in causing the alleged deprivation by his action or failure to act.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; the supervisor must have condoned, encouraged, or participated in the alleged misconduct.

Cullens v. Donald L. Bemis Michigan Department of Corrections Michigan Board of Education Spring Arbor Co · filed 1992-11-18

Section 1983 liability may not be based upon respondeat superior, but requires evidence that the supervisor condoned, encouraged, or participated in the alleged misconduct.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior unless the plaintiff shows that the supervisor condoned, encouraged, or participated in the alleged conduct.

Reed v. Fred Abdalla, Sheriff County Commissioner, Jefferson County · filed 1992-11-25

However, contrary to Reed's argument, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to impute liability on supervisory personnel such as the sheriff, unless the plaintiff alleges and shows that the supervisor condoned, encouraged or participated in the alleged conduct, which Reed has failed to do in this case.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisory defendant solely under a theory of respondeat superior.

McCellan v. Denis Dowd Kenneth J. Kluver Arnold Dement Joseph O'COmpO Daniel Henry · filed 1992-12-01

McCellan failed to allege any facts linking these defendants to the possible diversion of his legal correspondence; McCellan failed to produce any evidence of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs; McCellan failed to produce any evidence that he was not provided with a bed; and all claims against defendant Dowd fail because he cannot be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior.

A supervisory official is liable under § 1983 only if his action or failure to act knowingly, willfully, or recklessly caused the deprivation; an official without power to act cannot be liable for inaction.

Nelson v. Haws · filed 1992-12-03

In order to maintain a successful claim against Haws as a supervisory official, Nelson had to show that Haws "knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly caused the alleged deprivation by his action or failure to act." Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir.1986). Because Haws did not have the power to act, he could not be held liable for a failure to act.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors unless state law supplies that basis.

Bishop v. Kaiser · filed 1992-12-03

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, unless a state law imposes such liability.

Section 1983 holds a supervisor liable for subordinates’ conduct when the supervisor participated in it and knowingly facilitated, approved, condoned, or deliberately ignored it.

Angarita v. St. Louis County · filed 1992-12-09

For Kleinknecht to be held liable under Section 1983 for conduct of his subordinates, he must have participated to some extent in that conduct, ... and known about and facilitated the conduct, approved it, condoned it, or turned a blind eye for fear of what others might see.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; supervisory officials may be liable when evidence shows their direct participation in the challenged conduct.

Hamilton v. Roger v. Endell · filed 1992-12-15

Because there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, the district court properly denied summary judgment for those officials whom the evidence tended to show were direct participants in the transfer decision.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based on respondeat superior alone.

Carter v. Thompson · filed 1992-12-16

Respondeat superior, without more, does not provide a basis for recovery under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Risdal v. Martin · filed 1993-01-07

Of course, Defendant Sanders could not be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability when the subordinate officials are not liable.

Wildauer v. Frederick County · filed 1993-01-12

Without liability on the part of Cruger, Emerson, Trail, and Anderson, there can be no liability of their supervisors.

Section 1983 generally does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors without their direct involvement.

Headley v. Means · filed 1993-01-15

The district court appropriately dismissed Saxton, the Director of the Prince Georges County Detention Center, because respondeat superior is generally inapplicable to § 1983 actions, see Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1977), and because Headley did not allege his direct involvement.

A supervisory official is liable under Section 1983 only if personally involved in the constitutional deprivation.

Garcia-Diaz v. Roberts · filed 1993-01-15

Similarly, Garcia-Diaz has failed to show that Roberts was personally involved in any deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s conduct merely because of the supervisory relationship.

Long v. Board of Educ. of City of Philadelphia · filed 1993-01-20

Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Clayton must fail as Clayton cannot be held responsible for the actions of Defendant Hoban merely because Clayton was Hoban’s supervisor.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on a corrections commissioner where the complaint alleges neither his participation in the misconduct nor a department policy of denying medical treatment.

Kilgo v. Ricks · filed 1993-02-08

First, he challenges the court's dismissal of his claim against the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections, David Evans, as frivolous. The court dismissed the claim on the pleadings, which, though somewhat more specific than the court suggested, did not allege any participation in the allegedly illegal conduct by Commissioner Evans, and did not allege that the department had a policy of refusing to provide prisoners medical treatment. Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this claim.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ conduct.

Pennington v. Charles Ryan, Warden, Az Prison Complex-Winslow · filed 1993-02-22

Liability under section 1983 cannot be predicated on the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a state official liable solely because a subordinate committed the violation.

Sivak v. Derek Butler Steven Shayne Lisa Cates Dave Paskett, Warden · filed 1993-03-01

A plaintiff bringing a section 1983 action against a state official may not base liability on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability for deliberate indifference, but not mere negligence.

Langley v. Adams County · filed 1993-03-03

Liability of a supervisor under § 1983 must be predicated on the supervisor's deliberate indifference, rather than mere negligence.

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability only when the supervisor personally participates in a deprivation, knows of violations and fails to prevent them, or implements a constitutionally deficient policy.

Harvey v. Glen Craig Donald Corbett · filed 1993-03-15

Liability may be imposed on a supervisor under section 1983 only if the supervisor (1) personally participated in the deprivation, (2) knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them, or (3) implemented a constitutionally deficient policy.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without facts showing personal involvement, deliberate indifference, or tacit authorization.

Coley v. Lockhart · filed 1993-03-17

We conclude that Coley failed to state a claim under section 1983 in regard to defendants Lockhart, Sargent, and McGarity. Coley did not sufficiently allege facts showing that these defendants were personally involved in his assignment to the hoe squad, see Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985), and respondeat superior is not applicable in section 1983 actions where, as here, there is no showing of deliberate indifference or tacit authorization by a supervisor.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an affirmative link between the constitutional violation and the supervisor’s control or failure to supervise.

Wilson v. Kansas · filed 1993-03-17

A supervisor cannot be liable in either an official or individual capacity in the absence of some affirmative link between the alleged constitutional violation and the supervisor’s exercise of control or a failure to supervise.

Section 1983 does not impose derivative liability for another person’s constitutional violation.

Hylok v. Dickey · filed 1993-03-22

There is no derivative liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for officers’ conduct solely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Earnest Lee Langston v. Donald L. Smith Cindy Stueber Sherry Jenkins K. Farley · filed 1993-03-22

Langston's allegation that Smith failed to properly supervise his officers did not state a claim because Smith could not be held liable under section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely under respondeat superior.

Delores Grandberry Carl Johnson Gabriel Grandberry v. Memphis City Police Department James Ivy Sgt. O. Anderson Sgt. M. · filed 1993-03-24

In addition, liability solely under the theory of respondeat superior does not support § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an officer’s supervisors for failure to train or supervise when the officer committed no constitutional violation.

Chamberlain v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1993-03-29

Finally, because plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a constitutional violation by a police officer, there can be no action against the officer's supervisors for failing to train or supervise the officer.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory official to be held personally involved in a constitutional deprivation if, after learning of it through an appeal, the official fails to remedy it.

McCormack v. Cheers · filed 1993-04-01

The circuit has determined that a supervisory official, such as Selsky, may be held to have been personally involved in a constitutional deprivation within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when “after learning of the violation through a report or appeal, [he] may have failed to remedy the wrong.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor liable to allege and show the supervisor’s personal participation in or direct responsibility for the alleged violations.

McDowell v. Jimmie M. Jones, and Bill M. Armontrout · filed 1993-04-07

To hold a supervisor liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show that the supervisor personally participated in or had direct responsibility for the alleged violations.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because of their supervisory roles when they lack personal involvement or direct responsibility for the alleged misconduct.

Toler v. Reeves · filed 1993-04-13

We conclude the district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of Reeves and Cameron. Toler did not allege that they were personally involved in or had direct responsibility for the incidents in question, and he is apparently attempting to hold them liable in their supervisory capacities. See Givens v. Jones, 900 F.2d 1229, 1233 (8th Cir. 1990) (section 1983 claims cannot be based on respondeat superior).

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Thrower v. Kovein · filed 1993-04-20

Thrower based his § 1983 claims against Chief Barnes solely on a respondeat superior theory. Such a theory is insufficient to support a claim brought under § 1983.