42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a causal link between the official sued and the alleged wrong; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Hawkins v. O'LEARY · filed 1990-01-12

In order for the Warden to incur liability under section 1983, the plaintiff must show some type of causal link between the action complained of and the official sued.

Section 1983 imposes individual liability only when the defendant personally participated in the challenged conduct or had a causal connection to the constitutional deprivation.

C-1 v. City of Horn Lake · filed 1990-06-15

Individuals are not liable under Section 1983 unless they were personally involved in the complained of actions or there is some causal connection between their actions and the constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 liability requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.

Madewell v. Roberts · filed 1990-07-31

Liability under Sec. 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials solely because they supervise employees who allegedly violated constitutional rights; the officials must be personally involved.

Lopez v. Robinson · filed 1990-09-17

Assuming that the inmates have alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right of access to the courts, no record evidence establishes that any of the named defendants were personally involved with these incidents of alleged constitutional deprivations. Because liability under § 1983 cannot be premised on re-spondeat superior, Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926 (4th Cir.1977), the prison officials are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Section 1983 imposes liability only on defendants whose own actions or inactions personally caused the plaintiff’s injury; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Shaw v. Strackhouse · filed 1990-12-06

All professional members of the Embreeville staff are not, ipso facto, liable solely because one or more of their colleagues failed to exercise professional judgment on Shaw's behalf. Only those defendants whose inactions or actions personally caused Shaw's injury may be held liable under Sec. 1983. In more concrete terms, liability may only be imposed on those defendants who had the power and the responsibility to protect Shaw's safety after February 3, but who failed to do so.

Section 1983 liability for a sheriff in either an individual or official capacity requires an affirmative link between the alleged constitutional violation and his participation, control, or failure to supervise.

Ives v. Montezuma County, Colorado, James R. Aiken and John Glazner · filed 1991-02-20

In so doing we note that plaintiff did sue Mr. Glazner in both his individual and official capacities. However, Mr. Glazner is not liable in either capacity absent an affirmative link between the alleged constitutional violation and his participation, control or failure to supervise.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be directly responsible for the deprivation or a supervisor to have knowingly, willfully, or recklessly caused it through action or inaction.

Moore v. Final Reviewing Authority Bd. · filed 1991-03-20

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant was either directly responsible for the claimed deprivation or that a supervisory official knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly caused the alleged deprivation by his action or failure to act. See Wilks v. Young, 897 F.2d 896, 898 (7th Cir.1990) (citing Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir.1986)). Moore alleged that Duckworth and Abbott directly caused him to be segregated and transferred to the ISF. This is not sufficient to establish that Duckworth and Abbott, employees at the ISP, directly or indirectly caused the alleged deprivations at the ISF. Consequently, Moore has failed to state a claim in this regard.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s direct or personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation and does not impose liability on supervisors solely through respondeat superior.

Allen v. Ronan · filed 1991-04-03

Lastly, a plaintiff must allege the defendants’ direct or personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. ... In § 1983 actions, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable. ... Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of facts describing the acts or omissions of defendants, Holden, Bellitto, LaBelle, Goldberg and Sedensky. Accordingly, as to these defendants, the complaint must be dismissed.

Individual-capacity liability under § 1983 requires facts supporting the named official’s personal responsibility; substituting a successor official does not itself establish liability for earlier conduct.

Kenyon v. Sullivan · filed 1991-04-10

Plaintiffs’ second argument regarding the Eleventh Amendment is that even if it prevents retroactive relief against the state defendant in her official capacity it does not affect retroactive relief that may be ordered against her in her individual capacity. The facts in the complaint, however, do not suggest individual liability, particularly as defendant Dawn Sullivan did not take office until January 1, 1991, and was substituted as the defendant in place of Anthony Barile pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25. Ms. Sullivan, therefore, was not in office for most of the past class period and Mr. Barile, who was in office, is no longer a party to this suit. The argument for individual liability does not advance plaintiffs’ cause in any meaningful way.

Section 1983 requires an officer to take part in the alleged misconduct; a supervisor is not liable solely for supervising the officers involved.

Bailey v. Lancaster · filed 1991-05-15

Officers who take no part in the alleged acts of misconduct are entitled to escape liability as a matter of law. ... Furthermore, superior officers may not be held liable solely on the basis of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged constitutional deprivation and does not impose liability solely through respondeat superior.

Stoffel v. Robert Brown D. Dyke John Jabe D. Straub Jerry Haufbaure R. Atkins C.O. Parkinson · filed 1991-11-04

In order to sustain a section 1983 action, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant personally participated in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Section 1983 liability will not be imposed solely on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s individual participation or involvement; supervisory status alone cannot support liability under respondeat superior.

Hagan v. Clark · filed 1991-11-25

The decisional law is clear that there must be individual participation and involvement by a defendant, and that the concept of respondeat superior cannot be the basis of a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation to recover damages; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Winston v. Coughlin · filed 1992-03-10

However, in this Circuit, “[pjersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison warden for medical treatment when he was neither directly involved in the treatment nor supervised those who provided it.

Vincent v. William Armontrout, Warden Dr. Carbone Dr. Robert Drennen · filed 1992-04-21

Summary judgment in favor of Armontrout was appropriate because Armontrout's affidavit established that he was not directly involved in Vincent's medical treatment and did not supervise persons involved in his treatment.

A prison official who learns of a due process violation through an inmate’s appeal and fails to remedy it may be personally involved for purposes of a § 1983 claim.

Gabai v. Jacoby · filed 1992-08-06

However, liberally construed, plaintiff’s complaint can be read to state a claim that, after learning of Sanford’s denial of plaintiff’s right to due process of law at the hearing through plaintiff’s appeal, Artuz failed to remedy the wrong by overturning the hearing officer’s decision.

Section 1983 requires personal participation in or causation of unconstitutional conduct; supervisory status alone does not create respondeat superior liability.

Lowery v. Warren Young, Thomas J. Borgen, Michael Traut · filed 1992-09-14

Lowery must prove that the defendants personally participated in or caused unconstitutional actions. Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 650. Showing that the defendants acted in a supervisory role is insufficient because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 claims. Id.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for official liability; an official is not liable merely because a subordinate allegedly violated constitutional rights.

Orrin S. Reed v. Linley E. Pearson, Jack R. Duckworth, Warden, Gordon Faulkner · filed 1992-09-17

We agree with the district court that Reed failed to meet his burden of proof in defending against the summary judgment motion, and therefore affirm its decision for the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum and Order. ... Officials cannot be held liable simply because those subordinate to them allegedly violated Mr. Reed's constitutional rights; personal involvement must be shown.

Section 1983 does not impose derivative liability; a defendant must have personal involvement in the alleged deprivation.

Adams v. Richard Raemisch and Jerome Lacke · filed 1992-11-02

There is no derivative liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory official’s personal participation or causal connection to the alleged constitutional deprivation before that official can be held personally liable.

Supreme Video, Inc. v. Schauz · filed 1992-12-14

Chief Thome did not direct the manner, means, methods or procedures that were followed by Detectives Schauz and Novotny during the investigation, nor did he participate in the execution of the search warrant. (Id.) ... Thus, regardless of whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the claims would still have to be dismissed as against Chief Thome in his personal capacity.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the claimed constitutional violation and does not impose liability through respondeat superior.

Lucien v. Godinez · filed 1993-02-22

Because Section 1983 liability may be based only on a defendant’s personal involvement in the claimed constitutional violation, and not on vicarious responsibility grounded in respondeat superior doctrine (Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-94, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) and its many progeny), the sole focus of inquiry here must be on Stateville’s policy— not simply on the application of that policy to Lucien (which has not been and cannot be laid at Warden Godinez’ doorstep).

Section 1983 requires proof of each defendant’s fault and a causal connection to the injury; a supervisor is not liable solely because of a subordinate’s conduct.

Herrera v. Scully · filed 1993-03-08

Section 1983 claims require that a plaintiff establish both the defendant’s fault and the causal connection between the defendant’s actions and the plaintiffs injury. Thus, liability of a supervisory official under § 1983 cannot be premised on the principle of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 imposes individual liability on officials who act under color of law, personally participate in discrimination, and causally contribute to the challenged decision.

Bruhn v. Foley · filed 1993-06-03

Because defendants Foley and Schefcik were acting under color of law, were personally involved in the gender-based discrimination that underlies plaintiffs equal protection claim, and because their actions were causally connected to the decision not to hire her, they too are liable to plaintiff under § 1983 for discriminating against her upon the basis of her gender in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

A Section 1983 claim requires allegations of the defendant's personal involvement in depriving the plaintiff of a federally protected right and cannot rest on respondeat superior liability.

Gilbert v. State of Arizona · filed 1993-07-09

Appellant cannot state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against appellees based on a respondeat superior theory. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376-77 (1976). An essential element of a § 1983 action is an allegation that the defendant's conduct deprived plaintiff of a federally protected right. See Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th Cir.1986). Gilbert's complaint contains no such allegation. Absent such an allegation that the named prison officials were personally involved, Gilbert failed to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 liability for a prisoner's disputed medical treatment requires evidence of the defendant's personal involvement in that treatment.

Mathieu v. Chun · filed 1993-08-27

Furthermore, plaintiff presented no evidence indicating that Dr. Chun played any role in this doctor/patient dispute over the use of tegretol. For these reasons, defendant deserves summary judgment.

To survive summary judgment under Section 1983, a plaintiff must raise a material factual issue as to each defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation.

Rutledge v. Springborn · filed 1993-10-20

Under Section 1983 Rutledge also faces the additional burden of raising a material factual issue as to defendants’ personal involvement (see, e.g., Moote v. Indiana, 999 F.2d 1125,1129 (7th Cir.1993). ... Although Rutledge has proffered his own eonelusory assertions that Nelson was in cahoots with Fairman and Springborn, he has not directed this Court to any evidence suggesting either (1) that Nelson was deliberately indifferent to Rutledge’s safety in any way or (2) that Nelson had any responsibility for or involvement in any action that was detrimental to Rutledge. Nelson too is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 1983 imposes liability on an individual prison official only when the official's actions or omissions cause a deprivation of a constitutional right.

Green v. Mr. Elias, Correctional Service Officer · filed 1993-10-26

An individual prison official will deprive a prisoner of a constitutional right within the meaning of section 1983 only if the official's actions or omissions "cause" the deprivation. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.1988) ("the inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the/duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant").

Section 1983 requires evidence of a defendant's personal involvement or acquiescence in the alleged unconstitutional conduct and does not impose liability solely on a respondeat superior theory.

Jordan v. Koehler · filed 1993-12-27

Section 1983 "will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability." Polk v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). A party cannot be held liable under Section 1983 absent a showing that the party personally acquiesced in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir.1989). Jordan was therefore required to present some evidence that defendant Koehler had some personal involvement in Jordan's alleged deprivations.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement and does not impose liability on a supervisor under respondeat superior for a subordinate's tortious acts.

US Ex Rel. Verdone v. CIR. COURT FOR TAYLOR CTY. · filed 1993-12-29

The motion to dismiss of defendant Whiley, the captain of the Wisconsin State Patrol, will be granted because plaintiff has not alleged that she was personally involved in the search. The doctrine of respondeat superior, under which a superior may be liable for a subordinate's tortious acts, does not apply to claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged violation and does not impose liability under respondeat superior.

United States ex rel. Verdone v. Circuit Court for Taylor County · filed 1993-12-29

The motion to dismiss of defendant Whiley, the captain of the Wisconsin State Patrol, will be granted because plaintiff has not alleged that she was personally involved in the search. The doctrine of respondeat superior, under which a superior may be liable for a subordinate’s tortious acts, does not apply to claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal responsibility for a constitutional deprivation; a supervisor may be liable without direct participation when the supervisor recklessly disregards the plaintiff’s rights or directs, knows of, and consents to the conduct.

Aultman v. Howard A. Peters, III · filed 1994-02-24

To recover for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must establish the defendant's personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right. Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir.1986). However, a supervisory official's direct participation in the deprivation is not required so long as he acts with a deliberate or reckless disregard of plaintiff's constitutional rights, or if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at his direction or with his knowledge and consent. Id. We agree with the district court that with respect to the Director, the Warden and the Chief Engineer of the Taylorville Correctional Center, Aultman failed to make out a claim establishing their personal responsibility in the alleged failure to provide Aultman with proper medical treatment.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory defendant’s personal involvement, which may be shown by direct participation, failure to remedy a known violation, a policy fostering violations, or grossly negligent supervision.

Sealey v. Coughlin · filed 1994-07-15

A supervisory official can be said to have been personally involved in a constitutional violation only if that official: (a) directly participated in the violation; (b) failed to remedy the wrong after learning of the violation through a report or appeal; (c) created a custom or policy fostering such violations, or allowed such a custom or policy to continue; or (d) was grossly negligent in managing subordinates who caused the violation.

Section 1983 generally requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; respondeat superior generally does not impose liability.

Motee Persaud, ph.d. v. Morgan State University Otis Thomas, and Earl S. Richardson Clara Adams Wallace Gatewood · filed 1994-08-19

Appellant has not alleged how Thomas was personally involved in denying him tenure, and respondeat superior is generally inapplicable to Sec. 1983 suits.

Section 1983 claims against individual jail officials require evidence linking each defendant to the challenged conditions and showing that defendant knew of them; responsibility for supervising the jail alone is insufficient.

Lee v. Evans · filed 1994-11-18

In the proceedings below, Lee made no effort to demonstrate which defendants might have been responsible for which conditions, or that a particular defendant must have known of a particular condition. Indeed, during his deposition, Lee conceded that the only reason he brought suit against defendants was because the jail was under their supervision, and acknowledged that he had no evidence of intent. ... Because he chose to sue the individuals responsible for operating LPCJ, Lee was required to submit evidence of each defendant's intent in order to survive summary judgment.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s individual participation or involvement; respondeat superior alone cannot support a claim.

Killen v. McBride · filed 1994-12-08

The decisional law is clear that there must be individual participation and involvement by a defendant, and that the concept of respondeat superior cannot be the basis of a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 damages require the plaintiff to allege that he personally suffered harm from the asserted violations.

Slezak v. Evatt · filed 1995-01-12

To the extent that Slezak seeks damages, he is not entitled to relief because he fails to assert that he himself has been harmed by the violations he alleges.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show each defendant’s personal involvement in the unconstitutional conduct; liability cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Green v. Bauvi · filed 1995-01-25

In order to establish a Sec. 1983 claim for the deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest without due process, a plaintiff must also show that the defendants were personally involved in the unconstitutional conduct. There is no respondeat superior liability in Sec. 1983 cases.

Section 1983 requires a defendant official to have been involved in the constitutional violation; officials cannot be held liable solely for their subordinates' acts.

Chavis v. J.W. Fairman, Warden/director, O. Sheahan, Cook County Sheriff and Superintendent Russell, of Divis · filed 1995-04-06

In order to state a claim against any of the defendants under Sec. 1983, Chavis must allege that the defendants were somehow involved in the constitutional violation at issue. While Chavis may have grounds for an action against the guards themselves, government officials cannot be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors merely for failing to look into alleged misconduct by subordinates; the supervisors must be personally involved, know of and condone the conduct, or act with deliberate and reckless indifference.

Geraghty v. Shirley S. Chater, 2 Commissioner of Social Security · filed 1995-05-19

However, plaintiff's employer, the Governor of Illinois and the Attorney General of Illinois were not involved in the disability proceedings, or knew about their subordinates' conduct, condoned it, or otherwise acted with deliberate and reckless indifference. See Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 273-74 (7th Cir. 1986); Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983). Plaintiff only alleges that these defendants should have looked into the situation, an allegation which does not constitute a Sec. 1983 violation.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement; state officials are not individually liable solely under respondeat superior.

Fechter v. Shiroky · filed 1995-06-23

Even if a defendant is a state actor, liability under section 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the defendant and not on the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires an individual defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Falk v. Cook County Sheriff's Office · filed 1995-10-26

It is well-settled law that a plaintiff cannot base a § 1983 claim on the theory of respondeat superior. ... Accordingly, viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the court finds that there is sufficient evidence that Whitney and Byrne were involved in plaintiffs reassignments.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged deprivation; supervisory position alone does not establish liability.

Howell v. Koch · filed 1995-10-30

Personal participation is an essential allegation in a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir.1976); Massey v. Wilson, 484 F.Supp. 1332, 1333 (D.Colo.1980). These defendants apparently are being sued merely because of their positions of authority at the Limon Correctional Facility and the State of Colorado. These defendants may not be held liable in a civil rights action merely because of their supervisory positions.

A § 1983 claim against supervisors requires facts showing their direct involvement in the deprivation or failure to train or supervise the person who caused it.

Jacobsen v. Howard · filed 1995-11-06

Jacobsen fails to state a section 1983 claim against the named defendants, Howard and Holden. ... Jacobsen has alleged no facts which, if proven, would establish that the named defendants were directly involved in the constitutional deprivation or that they failed to train or supervise Beeman.

Section 1983 requires personal participation by a defendant; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Begaye v. Charles L. Ryan M.O. Savage, Deputy Warden Green, Lt. George Herman, Deputy Warden · filed 1995-11-24

Here, Begaye failed to establish that defendant Ryan participated in the alleged violation, or that he had any involvement in the incident other than in a supervisory capacity. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment for Ryan.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s individual participation and involvement; respondeat superior alone cannot support liability.

Dorsey v. St. Joseph Co. Jail Officials · filed 1996-01-18

There must be individual participation and involvement by a defendant, and the concept of respondeat superior cannot be the basis of the claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation for damages liability; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Garcia v. Senkowski · filed 1996-03-20

It is well settled that a defendant’s personal involvement is a prerequisite for the assessment of damages in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, ... and that the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Mitchell v. Maynard · filed 1996-04-01

Although he does name the Warden and the Director of the Correctional facilities as defendants, supervisor status by itself is insufficient to support liability. ... Rather, "[p]ersonal participation is an essential allegation in a § 1983 claim."

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged deprivation and does not permit liability based solely on a respondent superior theory.

Ball v. Norris · filed 1996-07-01

Ball failed to show any personal involvement on the part of the Arkansas Department of Correction employees, PHP Healthcare, Inc. (PHP), and PHP Nurse Delois Ford in denying or delaying his medical treatment. Ball cannot predicate his Eighth Amendment claim against these defendants on a risk of harm of which they were unaware or on a respondent superior theory.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the deprivation of federal rights; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Hancock v. Thalacker · filed 1996-07-09

Before liability may be imposed under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that each defendant either did some affirmative act, participated in the affirmative act of another, or failed to perform an act which resulted in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s federally-protected rights.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement or acquiescence in the alleged constitutional violation for individual liability; supervisory authority alone is insufficient.

Kelly v. Municipal Courts of Marion County · filed 1996-10-02

In order for a defendant to be held liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was personally involved or acquiesced in the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner seeking to hold an official liable to show personal wrongdoing, a policy causing a constitutional violation, or tacit authorization or deliberate indifference to subordinates’ unlawful conduct.

Counts v. Newhart · filed 1996-11-05

In order to establish liability for civil rights violations, a prisoner must show that the defendant (1) personally violated a specific right under federal law; (2) implemented an official policy which resulted in a constitutional violation; or (3) tacitly authorized or demonstrated deliberate indifference to the unlawful conduct of subordinates.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison supervisors named solely for their positions when the complaint alleges no personal knowledge or action by them.

Jones v. Russell · filed 1996-11-26

As to Warden DeTella and Assistant Warden Schomig, the answer is simple. The complaint does not allege that they either knew anything or did anything; apparently they were named solely because of the positions they hold.

Section 1983 imposes personal liability only on a defendant who participated in a violation or knew of it and failed to prevent it; respondeat superior liability does not apply.

Morrison v. Hall · filed 1996-12-19

A defendant is personally liable under section 1983 only if the defendant personally participated in the violations or knew of the violations and failed to prevent them. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). Thus, respondeat superior liability does not exist under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; supervisory position alone does not establish liability.

Marshall v. Fairman · filed 1997-01-02

Liability under § 1983 requires personal involvement; the defendant must have acted or failed to act with a deliberate or reckless disregard of the plaintiffs constitutional rights, or others’ actions violating the plaintiffs rights must have occurred at his direction or with his knowledge and consent.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged deprivation and does not impose liability under respondeat superior.

Edward Slone, Jr. v. Michael J. O'dea, III Dewey Sowders Dr. Sheridan, Individually Bashirahmed Ameji, Individually · filed 1997-02-18

We also note Slone did not establish any personal involvement on the part of O'Dea, Sowders or Dr. Sheridan, see Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984), nor could they be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior in a § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 requires a defendant supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; a complaint lacking such allegations fails to state a claim against the supervisor.

Watson v. McGinnis · filed 1997-05-01

Magistrate Judge Peck plainly is correct in his view that the complaint is sufficient as to Officer Ruiz and insufficient as to defendants McGinnis and Many. There is no reason to deny plaintiff the opportunity to amend in an effort to state a claim against the latter defendants, so his report and recommendation with respect to these three defendants will be adopted.

Section 1983 does not make governing board members vicariously liable for employees’ conduct; a claim against them requires personal participation in the constitutional violation.

Weisbuch v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1997-07-11

Dr. Weisbuch's claim against the members of the County Board of Supervisors was also properly dismissed, because he did not allege any personal participation by them in violating his constitutional rights. As he described how and when his position was changed, none of the members of the Board of Supervisors had any personal participation. Members of a governing board cannot be vicariously liable under section 1983 for conduct by employees.

Section 1983 liability requires personal involvement in the rights violation or acts causally connected to it; a supervisor is not liable merely for subordinates’ violations.

Thomas v. Collins · filed 1997-10-30

Only those personally involved in the violation or whose acts are causally connected to it may be liable in a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires an official to have participated in the alleged deprivation or adopted a policy that caused it.

Rhett v. Scott · filed 1998-05-25

Because Rhett did not allege that Pierson or Casel actively participated in depriving him of medical treatment or adopted policies which caused the alleged constitutional violations, however, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ... dismissing Rhett’s claims against Pierson and Clark.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; a supervisor cannot be held liable solely under respondeat superior.

James v. Coughlin · filed 1998-06-11

As defendants have argued in their motion for summary judgment, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the personal involvement of any of these remaining defendants in the allegedly unconstitutional actions of defendant Busch, and plaintiff cannot rely on a theory ... of respondeat superior to establish the liability of defendants Kelly and Coughlin.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; supervisory status alone cannot support liability.

Harris v. Hanks · filed 1998-08-06

Harris has failed to demonstrate that Hanks or Dutton were personally involved in deciding what kind of health care would be provided to him or in any other decision or action pertinent to the condition of his finger. "[T]here must be individual participation and involvement by a defendant, and ... the concept of respondeat superior cannot be the basis of a claim under § 1983." Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1047 (7th Cir.1994).

Section 1983 requires personal responsibility for individual liability; a supervisor is liable if the supervisor directed the violation or knew of and consented to it.

Johnson v. Peek · filed 1998-10-23

However, for Peek to be individually liable for the alleged constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Johnson must establish that Peek was personally responsible for opening his legal mail. Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir.1995). For Peek to be liable as a supervisor, Johnson must prove that Peek directed that his legal mail be opened or that it was done with Peek's knowledge and consent.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner to show that the defendant personally violated a federal right, implemented a policy causing a constitutional violation, or tacitly authorized or was deliberately indifferent to subordinates’ unlawful conduct.

Harksen v. Garratt · filed 1998-11-04

A prisoner must show that the defendant (1) personally violated a specific right under federal law, (2) implemented an official policy which resulted in a constitutional violation; or (3) tacitly authorized or demonstrated deliberate indifference to the unlawful conduct of subordinates.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation or a causal connection to it; supervisory liability may arise from a deficient policy that causes the violation.

Early v. Dallas Co Jail's Med · filed 1998-11-23

Early has not shown that either Judge Entz or Michael Beck was personally involved in the alleged denial of medical care. He has also not shown that either of these defendants had authority to implement any policy concerning medical care for inmates of the Dallas County Jail System. Early has therefore not stated a § 1983 claim against Entz or Beck.

Section 1983 liability requires personal involvement; a defendant cannot be held liable solely in a supervisory capacity.

White v. Mendoza · filed 1999-06-29

The summary judgment evidence showed that Mendoza was not personally involved with the forwarding of White’s state habeas record to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, that Mendoza could not otherwise be held liable in her supervisory capacity, and that White failed to show how he was prejudiced by the delayed transmittal of his state habeas record to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Powell v. Cook · filed 1999-11-08

Plaintiff Powell has failed to show any personal involvement, other than involvement under a respondeat superior theory of liability, on the part of defendants Cook, de Haan, Armenakis, Thompson, Shelton, Santos, Meier, and Cahal, in the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, plaintiff Powell cannot prevail on his section 1983 claims for damages against these defendants.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in an alleged constitutional deprivation before damages may be awarded against that supervisor.

Richardson v. Coughlin · filed 2000-06-19

“[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish a defendant’s personal involvement before damages can be assessed against that defendant.

Jackson v. Johnson · filed 2000-09-13

A plaintiff must establish the personal involvement of the defendant prior to the assessment of damages in a § 1983 case.

Section 1983 damages liability requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation; merely naming a high-ranking official is insufficient.

Word v. Croce · filed 2001-04-27

It is not enough to merely name high-ranking officials and ascribe to them the alleged unconstitutional activity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s conduct; the supervisor must be personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Aguirre v. New York State Police · filed 2001-07-05

However, no § 1983 liability will sound under a theory of respondeat superior; therefore the Court must look to the extent of Defendants’ involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 requires either personal participation in the deprivation of rights or a basis for supervisory liability.

De Ventura v. Keith · filed 2001-09-21

As stated above, without either personal participation or a basis for supervisory liability, there can be no valid § 1983 claim. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts a fourth amendment search claim, it fails.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer merely for belonging to a group; liability requires personal involvement in and a causal connection to the unlawful act.

Jones v. Williams · filed 2002-04-18

We reject the idea that simple membership in a group, without personal involvement in and a causal connection to the unlawful act, can create liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant official to participate directly in the alleged deprivation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Donaldson v. Purkett · filed 2002-04-23

Further, Donaldson has not claimed, as he must to succeed under § 1983, that the defendant corrections officials directly participated in the alleged deprivation. Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 635 (8th Cir. 2001). No liability attaches to supervisors through respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the deprivation of rights; supervisory liability requires encouragement, acquiescence, or direct participation in the alleged misconduct.

Morris v. Boyd · filed 2002-06-26

First, Morris did not allege facts establishing that Detective Schumacher took any action that violated his rights— his complaint alleged only that Schumacher was a lieutenant and an investigating officer at the time, that he received a call from the deputy warden, and that he received false information from a prison official, not that Schumacher was personally involved in the deprivation of Morris’s rights, as required in a § 1983 action. ... Moreover, he has not shown that Schumacher encouraged, acquiesced in, or directly participated in the alleged misconduct, as is required for a showing of supervisor liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims against municipalities for constitutional violations caused by a policy, custom, or practice and requires a defendant’s personal involvement, subject to qualified immunity.

Dunbar v. County of Saratoga · filed 2005-03-03

To establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unconstitutional acts perpetrated by its employees, a plaintiff must show that the violation of his constitutional rights resulted from a municipal policy, custom or practice. ... It is well-established that a defendant will be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only when he is personally involved in the violation. ... The court finds that Bowen is entitled to qualified immunity and grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Bowen.

Section 1983 requires evidence connecting the named officers to the alleged conduct; they are not vicariously liable for the acts of unnamed officers.

Neyland v. Molinaro · filed 2005-04-29

Plaintiffs attempt to argue that the four named defendants were somehow vicariously liable for the actions of the unnamed officers. Plaintiffs cite no authority for this proposition, and the court is not persuaded by the argument. Plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the actions of the four named defendants toward Barbara and Anthony Milton.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability for another officer’s constitutional violation.

Remillard Ex Rel. Estate of Remillard v. City of Egg Harbor City · filed 2006-03-27

There is no vicarious, respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement and does not impose liability based on collective or vicarious responsibility.

Smith v. Gomez · filed 2008-12-15

And, once again, § 1983 does not create a claim based on collective or vicarious responsibility.

Section 1983 does not make an individual business owner liable for employees’ conduct without personal involvement, direction, or a policy causing that conduct.

McCabe v. City of Chicago · filed 1984-07-24

At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the Court directed a verdict for Long on the section 1983 claims. No evidence linked Long personally to any of the disputed actions. Neither had the McCabes proved that the action of Long’s employees were in response to a direction from Long or one of his policies. Under Iskander and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), no recovery against Long was possible. It is irrelevant that Long is an individual entrepreneur and not a corporation.

Section 1983 does not make an official liable for damages based solely on another official’s viewpoint discrimination.

Collegians for a Constructive Tomorrow-Madison v. Regents of Universtity of Wisconsin System · filed 2011-10-26

As discussed, however, vicarious liability is not allowed under § 1983, Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49, and therefore no individual Board member can be held liable for damages on the basis of an act of viewpoint discrimination committed by other governmental officials.

Section 1983 requires an individual defendant’s own violation of the plaintiff’s rights or an entity policy that violates those rights.

Prince v. Acheson · filed 2018-04-04

Even if Amtrak is a state entity – a debatable proposition – Prince never alleges that Acheson, the General Counsel, has herself violated his rights in any way. Similarly, Plaintiff has not alleged that the entity Defendants (Amtrak and Amtrak Police) implemented or executed any policy to violate his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on officials who were not personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

Dr. Toney Ford, Sr. v. Sessoms · filed 2018-06-21

None of these defendants were personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional conduct, which “is a fatal flaw because there is no vicarious liability in a suit under section 1983.” Lennon v. City of Carmel, 865 F.3d 503, 507–08 (7th Cir. 2017).

Section 1983 requires specific allegations of a defendant’s personal involvement; vicarious liability alone does not establish a claim.

Boots v. Johnson · filed 2018-08-02

With respect to Defendants O’Connor, Torgerson, Rose, Kulas, Kosloski, and Moser, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff failed to allege specific facts to demonstrate their personal involvement and impose liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, the Magistrate Judge rejected the imposition of vicarious liability as to these defendants. ... The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s objections fail to establish any reason to depart from the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on an officer for damage caused during a search; the plaintiff must show the officer’s personal involvement.

Gardner v. Evans · filed 2019-04-04

Nevertheless, the defendant police officers are entitled to summary judgment for a different reason. “Under § 1983, there is no respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”

Section 1983 requires facts connecting an alleged rights deprivation to a defendant’s personal conduct or to a defendant’s custom or policy.

Schwartz v. Well Path Health Services · filed 2019-07-24

Also, while Plaintiff alleges that this permit was previously revoked twice due to recommendations by unauthorized staff, he does not identify the staff who made these unauthorized recommendations or set forth facts to establish that a custom or policy of any Defendant caused these revocations.

Section 1983 liability requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing and cannot rest solely on respondeat superior.

LaSpina v. SEIU Pennsylvania State Council · filed 2019-09-11

Liability in a civil rights action under §1983 cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead each defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; vicarious liability does not apply.

O'Brien v. Garcia · filed 2019-12-20

Because Plaintiff’s FAC fails to provide any factual allegations which plausibly describe any personal participation on the parts of the remaining Defendants with respect to either the First Amendment retaliation or Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims comprising Counts 1 and 2, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to … § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Governmental‒official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); ... Defendants Santana, Paramo, Buckel, Covello, Murphy, and Voong are hereby DISMISSED as parties to this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Section 1983 requires facts showing a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; vicarious liability is insufficient.

Mease v. Washington · filed 2020-09-15

It is well-settled that a civil rights plaintiff must allege the personal involvement of a defendant to state a claim under § 1983 and that liability cannot be based upon a theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 provides a civil-rights claim for constitutional violations, but conclusory, factually unsupported prison-condition allegations do not present a cognizable denial under it.

Benfield v. Bounds · filed 1973-08-13

His assertions, therefore, do not present a denial cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for public employees' alleged retaliation or discrimination when the facts show no restriction on union membership, advocacy, or other constitutionally protected activity.

Hanover Township Federation Of Teachers Local 1954 (Afl-Cio) v. Hanover Community School Corporation · filed 1972-03-14

We therefore, agree with Judge Beamer's conclusion that the specific allegations made by the 22 individual appellants in their Third Amended Complaint did not state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 or 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343(3), (4).

Section 1983 provides a damages cause of action when state actors, acting under color of state law, unlawfully detain a person and forcibly obtain fingerprints and a mug shot in violation of federal rights.

Brad S. Beightol, a Minor, by His Guardian, Arlene L. Beightol v. Kunowski · filed 1973-09-19

The complaint sufficiently charges that acting under color of state law the defendants illegally detained Beightol and forcibly and unlawfully obtained fingerprints and a mug shot. These allegations state a cause of action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Verbal abuse and threatening language or gestures by custodial officers alone do not state a § 1983 claim.

Burnette v. Phelps · filed 1985-11-18

Allegations of verbal abuse alone do not present claims under § 1983.

Even where the state owes an affirmative protective duty, simple negligence does not establish a constitutional tort actionable under § 1983.

Roe v. Fairfax Virginia County · filed 1987-07-02

Assuming arguendo that such an affirmative duty existed, Roe cannot recover because the failure to close and lock the window amounts to no more than negligence, which does not give rise to a constitutional tort.

Section 1983 bars respondeat superior liability and permits supervisory liability only for a supervisor’s own acts or omissions, such as direct participation, condonation, or tacit authorization.

Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo · filed 2008-04-18

It is well settled law that there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits relief against supervisory officials when they knew of illegal activities and either encouraged them or took no steps to prevent them.

Boyd v. Gullett · filed 1974-08-02

If the plaintiffs prove that the supervisory defendants knew of the illegal activities and either encouraged them or took no steps to prevent them, such proof would certainly justify the relief requested in this case.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor for a subordinate's constitutional violation; the supervisor must have personally caused, participated in, or otherwise contributed to the deprivation.

Knipp v. Weikle · filed 1975-11-05

This Court has consistently held that the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires at least some express or implied participation or acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation before a public official may be held liable for monetary damages on a personal-misfeasance theory.

Delaney v. Dias · filed 1976-06-30

Before a public official can be held liable for monetary damages on a theory of personal misfeasance under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there must be an allegation of, at least, some participation or acquiescence— express or otherwise — in the constitutional deprivations complained of. The degree of alleged culpability specified by the plaintiffs in their complaints does not amount to personal misfeasance sufficient to state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 individual liability requires causation, but personal participation is only one possible theory of causation.

Sims v. C. L. Adams, III · filed 1976-08-25

The language of § 1983 requires a degree of causation as an element of individual liability, but it does not specifically require “personal participation.”

Section 1983 requires proof that a supervisor was actually involved in the alleged misconduct to establish liability for damages based on a subordinate's actions.

Delores Taken Alive v. Litzau · filed 1977-02-23

The remote and unrecorded prior incident in which Officer Litzau was implicated, and of which Chief Quinn was aware, was wholly insufficient to raise an inference of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the part of Quinn. ... In order to prevail on this aspect of her § 1983 claim, the plaintiff was bound to prove some actual involvement of Quinn in the alleged misconduct.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for constitutionally protected news reporting, an isolated statement lacking an immediate threat or deliberate indifference, or a subordinate’s conduct solely because the defendant is a supervisor.

Fitzpatrick v. Wert · filed 1977-05-27

Even read liberally, the statement attributed to Mr. Wert cannot be said to constitute an abuse of prisoners by corrections personnel. Plaintiffs’ pleadings indicate that this was an isolated instance where a prison guard (who is also president of the guards’ union) expressed a personal opinion to the news media that inmates intended “to do their thing” in support of proposed prison reform legislation and that the inmates might not be peaceful in doing it. This alone fails to support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that words or actions of corrections personnel posed an immediate threat to the safety and welfare of inmates or that supervisory personnel directly abused inmates. ... Nor is there any indication in the complaint of an evil intent or recklessness on Mr. Wert’s part, or even deliberate indifference to the consequences of his conduct for the inmates for whom he was responsible. ... In addition, Commissioner Ward and Superintendent Smith cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action for any of Mr. Wert’s actions merely because of the fact that they are Mr. Wert’s superiors. ... Defendants Lynch and Conners cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1985 for doing that which is their constitutionally-protected right as newsmen.

Section 1983 makes a supervisory official’s deliberate or reckless indifference to constitutional violations by subordinates or others under the official’s control actionable.

Perry v. Elrod · filed 1977-08-19

Thus, if a supervisory official is deliberately or recklessly indifferent to constitutional violations by his subordinates, or others under his control, his indifference is actionable.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because of the supervisor’s office; authorization or participation in the challenged conduct is required.

Langle v. Bingham · filed 1978-03-23

The evidence which composes the proof in this case fails to establish liability on the part of the defendant Kehoe, either in his official or individual capacity. ... The conspectus of the plaintiff’s evidence in its most favorable aspect to his case shows that the defendant Kehoe cannot be held liable for the acts of his junior warden merely by virtue of his office as commissioner of the Department of Fish and Game. ... Without such a showing, the evidence is insufficient to impose liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely under a respondeat-superior theory.

Seymour F. Cotton, Jr. v. Terrell Don Hutto, Commissioner, Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 1978-06-15

Thus, any attempt to obtain damages from Hutto is predicated on a respondeat superior theory which does not apply in § 1983 suits.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat-superior liability on supervisors; a plaintiff seeking damages must show the named defendant's personal involvement.

Lodermeier v. City of Sioux Falls · filed 1978-10-30

Personal involvement by a named defendant is a prerequisite to recovering damages under a 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking recovery to show that the defendant directly participated in the alleged violation.

Castle News Co. v. Cahill · filed 1978-11-13

In order to recover from a defendant under section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendant was a direct participant.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant was directly and personally responsible for the unlawful conduct attributed to subordinates.

Kane v. City of New York · filed 1979-03-19

Moreover, to state a claim for deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, “the plaintiff must allege the defendant’s direct and personal responsibility for the purportedly unlawful conduct of his subordinates.”

Section 1983 permits a direct claim against a supervisor when the supervisor breaches a duty that sufficiently causes a deprivation of a federally secured right, including failing to act after knowing or having reason to know of subordinate misconduct.

McCLELLAND v. FACTEAU · filed 1980-01-22

Under direct liability, plaintiff must show the supervisor breached a duty to plaintiff which was the proximate cause of the injury. The law clearly allows actions against supervisors under section 1983 as long as a sufficient causal connection is present and the plaintiff was deprived under color of law of a federally secured right. ... We agree with those courts that have found a cause of action under section 1983 when the defendant was in a position of responsibility, knew or should have known of the misconduct, and yet failed to act to prevent future harm. ... The standard to be applied is the conduct of a reasonable person, under the circumstances, in the context of the authority of each police chief and what he knew or should have known.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a government official merely because subordinates committed the alleged deprivation; the official must have personally caused, fostered, or knowingly acquiesced in it.

State ex rel. Hill v. Travers · filed 1980-07-08

If, therefore, defendants’ liability under this section is to be based on the malfeasance of subordinate election officials, plaintiffs must demonstrate more than that malfeasance and the employment relationship between those officials and defendants; it must be alleged and shown that defendants actively caused or fostered that conduct or knowingly acquiesced in it.

Section 1983 permits liability when a person causes a constitutional deprivation through custom or practice, including intentional condonation of subordinate acts by inaction that foreseeably and proximately causes the injury.

Penick v. Columbus Board of Education · filed 1981-01-08

The State defendants can be held liable if, through custom or practice, unlawful acts of subordinates are intentionally condoned by inaction when a foreseeable consequence of such inaction is an intrusion on constitutional rights and the inaction is a proximate cause of the injustice.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisory official vicariously liable for subordinates’ unlawful acts; the plaintiff must show the supervisor’s personal involvement or a causal connection to the constitutional violation.

Douthit v. Clarence Jones, Sheriff, Dallas County, Texas, and W. H. McCallum · filed 1981-04-03

The plaintiff must establish either that the defendant supervisory official was personally involved in the acts causing the deprivation of his constitutional rights or that a causal connection exists between an act of the official and the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits liability for a supervisory official who participates in planning an unconstitutional act or later ratifies it, even without direct participation.

Ziegman Productions Inc. v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1981-04-16

To be liable under § 1983, a supervisory official need not directly participate in an unconstitutional act if he participates in the planning of or subsequently ratifies the act.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a defendant's misconduct and an official policy to support liability for inaction.

Zarrilli v. Randall · filed 1981-08-06

The inaction attributed to Sands does not provide the “affirmative link" between misconduct and official policy which section 1983 requires. See, Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-77 (1976).

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor for a subordinate's constitutional violation; the plaintiff must allege the supervisor's personal involvement or deliberate indifference.

Torname v. Phair · filed 1981-10-30

The claim against Trabucco cannot be based upon a theory of respondeat superior. “In actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983... there is no vicarious liability on the part of superior officials for the actions of their subordinates unless the superior actually directed or participated in the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Dukakis, 409 F.Supp. 895, 896 (D.Mass. 1976). See also, Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 40 n.l (1st Cir. 1977). Thus, in order to state a ciaim against defendant Trabucco for liability as the supervising officer, the plaintiff must allege either personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation or deliberate indifference to the violation. The plaintiff has done neither.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking supervisory liability to show that the supervisor acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to constitutional deprivations.

Hearn v. Hudson · filed 1982-04-23

In order to hold a supervisory official liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that the official acted or neglected to act in a manner indicative of deliberate indifference to deprivations of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires causation for individual liability but does not specifically require personal participation.

Jones v. Evans · filed 1982-08-10

The language of § 1983 requires a degree of causation as an element of individual liability, but it does not specifically require “personal participation.”

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ conduct; personal involvement is essential.

Thompson v. L.A. Steele · filed 1983-07-11

Certainly § 1983 does not give a cause of action based on the conduct of subordinates. ... Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action.

Section 1983 imposes individual liability on supervisory officials only when they caused or participated in the constitutional deprivation, requiring an affirmative causal link that makes their own conduct a proximate cause.

Roman v. City of Richmond · filed 1983-09-01

In their individual capacities Defendants LEO GARFIELD, and ERNEST CLEMENTS cannot be held liable unless they caused or participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation. It is for you to decide whether a causal connection, or an affirmative link, between the constitutional violations complained of and the supervisory official exists. The supervisory officials must have so exercised their authority as to have made their own conduct a proximate cause of the alleged constitutional violations. ... This instruction is a proper statement of the law regarding civil rights liability of supervisory officials in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat-superior liability on supervisors merely because they hired the alleged wrongdoers.

Harris v. City of New York · filed 1983-10-07

However, there is no ... liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Supervisory inaction can support Section 1983 liability only when a causal relationship connects that inaction to the constitutional deprivation.

Taylor v. Mayone · filed 1983-11-10

A supervisor’s inaction can, under certain circumstances, result in liability under § 1983. ... However, liability cannot be found where there is no causal relationship between the supervisor’s inaction and the deprivation of the constitutional right.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 requires a causal connection or affirmative link between the supervisor and the challenged conduct.

Sulie v. Duckworth · filed 1984-04-05

With respect to the liability of supervisory officials in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show a causal connection, or “affirmative link,” between such an official and the conduct complained of.

A single incident of a subordinate's wrongdoing is insufficient to establish that a supervisor maintained a § 1983 policy of condoning rule violations.

Radick v. Hardiman · filed 1984-05-31

A single incident is not enough to establish a claim against Hardiman for condoning guards’ violations of his rules.

A supervisory official sued in his individual capacity under Section 1983 cannot be held liable for negligent supervision based on isolated instances of subordinate misconduct of which he had no knowledge and to which he was not connected.

Marchant v. City Of Little Rock · filed 1984-08-21

We hold that the chief of police, Walter Simpson, cannot be held liable in his individual capacity for negligent supervision because the alleged instances of improperly dispensing medications, even if true, apparently were isolated instances of which Simpson had no knowledge and to which Simpson was not connected.

A supervisor is not strictly liable under Section 1983 for subordinates' misconduct and may be liable only if personally at fault.

McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1985-01-10

All this is not to say that a supervisor is immune from liability; it is just that he must be personally at fault.

A state official cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely on a respondeat-superior theory.

Williams v. Sheriff Eugene Barksdale, Warden Michael Dutton · filed 1985-01-25

It is axiomatic that a state official cannot be liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior basis.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat-superior liability and instead requires personal responsibility for the deprivation.

Zingmond v. Harger · filed 1985-02-05

The doctrine of respondeat superior is unavailable as a basis for imposing liability under § 1983, there must be a showing of personal responsibility.

A supervisor who knowingly acquiesces in a subordinate's constitutional violations may be sued under Section 1983.

ESTATE OF SCOTT BY SCOTT v. DeLeon · filed 1985-03-13

In light of this overwhelming consensus in the case law, I conclude that it was clearly established that a supervisor who knowingly acquiesced in a subordinate's constitutional violations could be sued under section 1983.

Section 1983 liability requires state action that deprives a federal right, and county officials' failure to protect an identifiable person requires deliberate indifference to a constitutional duty.

Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley · filed 1985-05-10

In determining whether the defendants here may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Gilmore’s murder, initial inquiry, as in any § 1983 case, must focus on two threshold issues: “(1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” ... defendant county officials may not be held liable under § 1983 unless they acted with deliberate indifference to that duty.

Personal participation is not the only basis for § 1983 liability; an official may be liable for omitting a legally required act when the official reasonably should know the omission will cause others to inflict injury.

Cook v. Housewright · filed 1985-06-19

It is true that personal participation is not the only predicate for § 1983 liability. If a defendant sets in motion, by omitting to do that which he is legally required to do, a series of acts by others that the defendant reasonably should know would cause the others to inflict injury, the defendant may be held liable.

A supervisor's actual knowledge of subordinates' unlawful actions is sufficient for § 1983 liability.

Lloyd v. Hines · filed 1985-08-13

Actual knowledge by Dougherty of his deputies' unlawful actions is enough to subject him to section 1983 liability.

A supervisory officer cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for a subordinate's actions on a vicarious-liability theory.

Tammy Thibodeaux, Thomas K. Thibodeaux and Tonya Thibodeaux v. Elton A. Arceneaux, Gayle Newton · filed 1985-08-19

A supervisory officer cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.

A supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s constitutional deprivation without participating in or directing it.

Hennessey v. STATE OF WASH., DEPT. OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERV. · filed 1985-08-27

It is beyond dispute that a superior cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the constitutional deprivation caused by his subordinates, absent a showing that he participated or directed the deprivation.

A supervisor is not liable under Section 1983 for a subordinate's constitutional deprivation unless the supervisor participated in or directed it.

Hennessey v. Washington, Department of Social & Health Services · filed 1985-08-27

It is beyond dispute that a superior cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the constitutional deprivation caused by his subordinates, absent a showing that he participated or directed the deprivation.

Section 1983 imposes liability on a superior official when an official policy causes a subordinate to violate constitutional rights.

Rankin v. Colman · filed 1985-08-29

Section 1983 imposes liability upon a superior officer when that officer or official, under color of official policy, causes an employee of the official to violate a person's constitutional rights.

A state corrections agency’s abuse of supervisory control over county jails is actionable under § 1983.

Brown v. Wilson · filed 1985-09-27

it plainly appears that the Corrections Cabinet does, indeed, have some supervisory control over the county jails which, if it is alleged to be abused, is actionable in federal court under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 requires an affirmative link between the supervisor's alleged oversight and the particular constitutional violation.

Thomson v. Jones · filed 1985-10-04

City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, ... teaches the liability of a supervisory official under Section 1983 for inadequate training and control of inferior officers must stem from an “affirmative link” between the supervisor’s alleged oversights and the “particular constitutional violation alleged” — here the unlawful use of force by Jones and Baskin.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires direct personal responsibility affirmatively linked to the deprivation, and the supervisor's acts or omissions must be intentional or reckless.

Goka v. Bobbitt · filed 1985-12-03

The supervisors are correct that liability under § 1983 requires the showing of a direct, personal responsibility on their part for acts and omissions that deprived the inmate of his rights. ... That is, Goka must affirmatively link the supervisors’ acts or omissions to the conduct which caused the violation. ... In addition, the acts and omissions of the supervisors must have been intentional or reckless.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires personal participation in the constitutional violation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s actions and the violation.

Claiborne v. Director, Department of Health & Human Resources · filed 1986-02-12

In order to state a claim under § 1983, the complaint must allege either that the defendants personally participated in the acts that constitute the alleged constitutional violation or that a causal connection exists between the defendants’ actions and the alleged violation.

Section 1983 failure-to-supervise liability requires a deliberate decision not to supervise or gross negligence, not ordinary negligence, inadvertence, or managerial incompetence.

Charles D.O. Kline v. North Texas State University, C.C. Nolen · filed 1986-02-14

As that requirement relates to our consideration here, it means that a failure to supervise must be the result of a deliberate decision not to supervise or the result of gross negligence, but not the result of ordinary negligence, inadvertence or managerial incompetence.

A supervisory official’s conduct need not be intentional to support a Section 1983 claim; negligence may violate a protected right in some circumstances.

Western World Insurance v. Harford Mutual Insurance · filed 1986-02-25

Negligence by a state supervisory official under some circumstances may itself violate a constitutionally protected right and thereby create a colorable claim under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires that the official condoned, encouraged, or participated in the alleged misconduct.

Edwards v. Livesay · filed 1986-04-09

The plaintiff did not state a cause of action against the Commissioner and Warden as he failed to demonstrate that these defendants condoned, encouraged or participated in the alleged misconduct.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a direct causal relationship between the supervisor’s own acts and the plaintiff’s injury, through either specific orders or acquiescence in the misconduct.

Ford v. Herman Davis, Warden · filed 1986-09-22

In order to establish liability of a supervisory official such as appellee under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, it is necessary that her acts in regard to appellant have some direct causal relationship to the injuries of which he now complains either in the form of her specific ordering of those events or at least her acquiescence in their occurrence.

A Section 1983 supervisory-liability claim requires more than negligent supervision; the supervisor must knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly cause the constitutional deprivation by action or failure to act.

Rascon v. Hardiman · filed 1986-09-26

Thus, it is not sufficient for a section 1983 plaintiff to show that a supervisory official was remiss in supervising the implementation of policy in force in an institution. Rather, to establish a claim against a supervisory official, there must be a showing that the official knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly caused the alleged deprivation by his action or failure to act.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat-superior liability; a supervisory official must personally participate in the misconduct or be responsible through negligent selection or supervision.

Adams Apple Distributing Co. v. Zagel · filed 1986-11-20

It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in section 1983 actions. ... Absent an allegation that Zagel participated in the alleged unlawful conduct or that he was negligent in the selection or supervision of his subordinates, the plaintiff’s action based on section 1983 cannot stand.

Section 1983 individual-capacity damages require an affirmative causal connection between the supervisory official's acts or omissions and the constitutional deprivation.

Zatler v. Wainwright · filed 1986-12-03

In addition, section 1983 requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

A § 1983 failure-to-train or supervise claim requires gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference, proximate causation, and more than simple negligence.

Fratiello v. Mancuso · filed 1987-02-12

In order to successfully pursue a § 1983 claim based on a police chief’s alleged failure to adequately train or supervise subordinate police officers, plaintiff must provide proof of gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference. Proof of simple negligence is insufficient to impose liability on either the police chief or the municipality. ... Further, such conduct must be the proximate cause of the subordinate’s violation of plaintiff’s civil rights.

The scope of supervisory and municipal § 1983 liability depends on supervisors’ knowledge of and participation in their subordinates’ acts.

Scouler v. Craig · filed 1987-06-04

Under § 1983, the extent of supervisors’ knowledge of and participation in the acts of their subordinates determines the scope of their liability and the municipality’s liability.

A supervisor’s § 1983 liability must rest on causing or participating in the constitutional violation, not merely on supervising the wrongdoers.

Howard v. Wheaton · filed 1987-08-12

Unquestionably Wheaton’s exposure to liability must rest on his having caused or participated in the Eighth Amendment violation, not simply because he supervised the actual wrongdoers ... .

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat-superior or superior-official liability; a supervisory defendant must have participated personally and substantially in the alleged violation.

Riordan v. William L. Kempiners and Shirley Randolph · filed 1987-09-08

Just as there is no doctrine of respondeat superior (employers’ “vicarious” liability) under section 1983, so also there is no doctrine of superiors’ liability. ... Riordan therefore had to prove that Kempiners had participated personally and substantially in the alleged discrimination against her, that is, in the refusal to grant her a special salary adjustment that would have brought her pay above that of any of her subordinates.

A § 1983 supervisor is not vicariously liable for subordinates and may be liable only through personal involvement or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

George Thompkins, Cross-Appellee v. Bill Belt, Sheriff, Avoyelles Parish, Cross · filed 1987-09-29

Under section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability. ... However, a supervisor may be held liable if there exists either (1) his personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

A supervisory official is not vicariously liable under § 1983; liability requires a direct causal link between the subordinate officers' conduct and the supervisor's own actions.

Sharp v. Nibert · filed 1987-11-24

However, respondeat superior is not recognized under section 1983 in this Circuit. ... To impose liability a direct causal link must exist between the actions of the individual officers and the supervisory defendant.

Supervisors may be liable under § 1983 when grossly negligent hiring, training, supervision, or retention, together with failure to act on known misconduct, affirmatively causes a constitutional deprivation.

Schaefer v. Wilcock · filed 1987-12-29

The court, therefore, holds that plaintiffs’ allegations of the UHP officials’ gross negligence in qualifying, hiring, training, supervising, and retaining Wilcock, and the UHP officials’ failure to act on Wilcock’s known misconduct, satisfy the deprivation and causation requirements and thus state a claim under § 1983.