42 U.S.C. § 1983

A prevailing defendant in a section 1983 action may recover attorney’s fees from the plaintiff only if the claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

City of North Pole v. Zabek · filed 1997-02-21

Alaska courts do not award attorney’s fees against section 1983 plaintiffs for that portion of the prevailing party’s attorney’s fees incurred defending against the section 1983 action, unless the 1983 action was “frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.”

Section 1983’s remedy cannot be limited by applying a state attorney fee rule instead of the federal fee standard.

Cherry Creek Aviation, Inc. v. City of Steamboat Springs · filed 1998-11-27

We agree that allowing attorney fees under §24 — 10—110(5)(c) rather than under 42 U.S.C. §1988 would limit the remedy available under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

A pro se litigant cannot recover attorney’s fees for prosecuting a § 1983 action.

Sawyer v. Luby · filed 1999-06-24

However, as a pro se, litigant, he is not entitled to attorney’s fees for prosecuting this suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not itself authorize attorney fees; fees for a successful Section 1983 claim are awarded under Section 1988.

Ass'n v. Mason County · filed 1999-07-23

But, section 1983 does not grant successful litigants attorney fees; those fees are granted by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 when a litigant is successful under section 1983.

Section 1983 claims to enforce IDEA rights are not subject to the statutory cap on attorneys’ fees for cases brought under the IDEA.

Blackman v. District of Columbia · filed 2001-07-10

In its May 10 opinion, the Court concluded that because the claims of members of the Black-man and Jones classes (including the claims asserted by these plaintiffs) were brought under Section 1983 and not under the IDEA itself, the statutory cap on attorneys’ fees does not apply; the Court therefore may both award and order immediate payment of attorneys’ fees in excess of the statutory cap. ... With respect to the motion for interim attorneys’ fees and costs, the only argument advanced by defendants has been foreclosed by the Court’s May 10 decision.

Section 1983 cannot support an award of attorney’s fees when the plaintiffs never brought a Section 1983 claim.

Adams Ex Rel. Adams v. District of Columbia · filed 2002-09-30

Furthermore, plaintiffs cannot acquire attorney’s fees under § 1983 without ever filing claims based on § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to recover attorney fees incurred in a state criminal case when the expense foreseeably results from the defendant’s acts.

Kerr v. City of Chicago · filed 1970-03-11

The defendants also contend that attorneys’ fees expended in a criminal action are not recoverable in a civil rights action. We disagree. ... A plaintiff in a civil rights action should be allowed to recover the attorneys’ fees in a state criminal action where the expenditure is a foreseeable result of the acts of the defendant.

Section 1983 does not provide for counsel fees, but courts may award them under their general equitable power in actions brought under the section.

Goode v. Rizzo · filed 1974-11-01

Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contains no language dealing with counsel fees, there have been awards under the general equitable power in some cases brought under the terms of the statute.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 action may be assessed the defendant's attorney fees if the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe · filed 1985-12-27

The plaintiff bringing an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 may be assessed the defendant's attorneys' fees if "the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14, 101 S.Ct. 173, 178, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978); Boatowners & Tenants Ass'n v. Port of Seattle, 716 F.2d 669, 674 (9th Cir.1983).

In a Section 1983 case, the jury may be instructed that the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees are not part of a damages award.

Scott v. City of Chicago · filed 2010-07-20

Scott’s attorney’s fees are not to be included in any damages award. This Court regularly includes such an instruction in Section 1983 cases. As with other motions, Scott’s Motion 15(g) is granted in the manner framed, although the jury instructions will include a provision to the effect just indicated.

A prevailing defendant may recover attorney’s fees for defending a § 1983 claim only if the claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Maness v. Daily · filed 2013-08-16

Alaska courts “do not award attorney’s fees against section 1983 plaintiffs for that portion of the prevailing party’s attorney’s fees incurred defending against the section 1983 action, unless the 1983 action was ‘frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.’ ”

Section 1983 does not permit an award of attorney fees to a defendant.

Durland v. San Juan County · filed 2013-09-30

Instead, we reject an award of fees in this case because it is, essentially, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, which does not permit an award of fees to a defendant.

A respondent lawyer cannot obtain attorney fees under § 1983 in a disciplinary proceeding that was not brought as a civil rights action under the section.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cottingham · filed 2018-08-16

This action was not a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor was it judicial review of an agency action under RCW 4.84.350.

A state criminal-rule motion for the return of property is not a Section 1983 civil action and does not support attorney fees under Sections 1983 and 1988.

State Of Washington v. Huber · filed 2019-08-12

But this is nota civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, so Huber is not entitled to fees under 42 U.S.C. §~ 1983 and 1988 here.

A party requesting appellate attorney fees for a Section 1983 claim in Washington state court must comply with RAP 18.1.

Maytown Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Thurston County · filed 2018-08-09

We hold that RAP 18.1 applies to requests for appellate attorney fees under Section 1983 and that Maytown complied with RAP 18.1's requirements.

Section 1983 imposes civil liability on a person acting under color of state law only when that person deprives someone of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Anderson v. Reynolds · filed 1972-03-09

The plaintiff was not denied his right to counsel or his right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed by Amendment V and Amendment VI, Constitution of the United States. The plaintiff’s arrest was not a deprivation of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil-rights remedy only when the defendant's conduct deprives a person of constitutional or other federal rights.

Reverend Francis X. Lawlor v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago · filed 1972-04-10

We hold that plaintiffs’ complaint is fatally deficient for lack of a showing of denial of constitutional rights. There is no basis therefore for the contention that defendants have an affirmative duty to “ameliorate all manifestations” of de facto segregation which has developed in the O’Toole area. Absent violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional or other federal rights, plaintiffs have no basis for their claim of civil rights relief.

Section 1983 does not turn an ordinary breach-of-contract claim into a civil-rights action when the complaint alleges no constitutional right or substantial federal question.

Sanders v. Independent School District No. I-2, of Kiowa County, Oklahoma · filed 1972-05-11

Plaintiff’s complaint asserts nothing more than a breach of contract claim, alleges no claim to diversity jurisdiction, negates specifically any claim to a constitutional right to wear a mustache, and recites no involvement of a substantial federal question. ... The Civil Rights Act cannot be used as a jurisdictional subterfuge for traditional lawsuits.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional or federally secured right under color of state law; violating a state statute alone, including unlawfully dismissing an election inspector, does not support a § 1983 claim.

Newell v. Troy · filed 1972-06-08

Examining this complaint with the greatest liberality, no claim is stated under § 1983. ... Accepting as true the complaint allegations that these actions of defendants are being accompanied by publicized threats of political retaliation against patronage jobholders, the complaint falls far short of stating any claim of a “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”, the sole basis for relief under § 1983. ... Even assuming defendants may be regarded as acting “under color of” State law, i. e., the New York Election Law, as defined by the Supreme Court in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1940), and confirmed in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1960), there is wholly absent any factual showing of deprivation of a constitutional right. Certainly there is no constitutional right to be an election inspector nor to be free from dismissal in violation of State law. “Mere violation of a state statute does not infringe the federal Constitution.”

Section 1983 permits federal district courts to redress deprivations under color of state law only when a Constitution- or federal-law-protected right is implicated.

Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Association · filed 1973-07-31

Although we have found, in our earlier ruling, that NCAA’s imposition of sanctions against Centenary, and the athletes here involved, is State action for constitutional and jurisdictional purposes, still plaintiffs’ position does not raise a substantial federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wherein Congress has granted federal district courts jurisdiction and authority to redress deprivations, under color of State law, custom, or usage, of a right or privilege secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity guaranteed by federal law.

Peterson v. Knutson · filed 1973-12-12

An action to be cognizable under the pertinent civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, requires an allegation that there is a deprivation of some right, privilege or immunity guaranteed under federal law.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws; absent such a deprivation, no damages action lies.

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Lopez · filed 1975-01-25

A fundamental requirement for sustaining a suit for damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 is that the citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof be deprived of ". . . any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. . . ." Since we have determined that Santa Fe’s disclosure of the subpoenaed information would not violate the constitutional rights of its employees, there is no basis for the employees to maintain a Section 1983 action against Santa Fe in a federal court.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a malicious-prosecution claim based only on prosecution without just cause, absent a deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right.

Taylor v. Nichols · filed 1976-02-11

Accordingly, for the reasons announced above, the court holds that on the facts alleged the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, or 1988. The plaintiff’s grievance here, succinctly stated, is that he was prosecuted without just cause. While this allegation might state a classic claim for relief under the tort theories relating to malicious prosecution, it is not justiciable under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 is not a catch-all federal cause of action for state-law disputes; a plaintiff must show deprivation of a constitutional right.

Sullivan v. Brown · filed 1976-10-19

Section 1983 was never intended as a catch-all statute under which myriads of suits, traditionally within the exclusive jurisdiction of state courts, may be filed in federal courts, in the absence of a showing of deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires more than simple defamation; a plaintiff must allege conduct depriving them of a constitutional or federal right, privilege, or immunity, and it does not provide a remedy for mere common-law torts committed under color of state law.

Sorenson v. Zapien · filed 1978-09-18

In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, something more than simple defamation must be alleged. ... Plaintiff must allege some conduct which has deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Civil Rights Act does riot provide a remedy for mere common law torts, even if they are committed under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of a constitutional right.

Lange v. Nature Conservancy, Inc. · filed 1979-10-08

The Langes offer no applicable authority, and we can find none, to support the proposition that public hearings must be held before a governmental body may participate in an information gathering process. Absent some deprivation of a constitutional right, no cause of action inures under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make the commission of a tort by a state official, by itself, a cognizable injury.

Wooters v. Jornlin · filed 1979-09-20

Assuming that a tort may have been committed, the Court is still compelled to find that no injury cognizable under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment occurred.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws, and without such a deprivation the defendant's state of mind is immaterial.

Skipper v. Phipps · filed 1980-01-24

The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit, therefore, is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws.’ If there has been no such deprivation, the state of mind of the defendant is wholly immaterial. (Footnote omitted.)

Section 1983 provides a remedy when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Tunnell v. Robinson · filed 1980-03-20

It is provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that: “Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any state or territory subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution, and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” ... In the present case, the plaintiff has presented a series of grievances which he would like to see corrected. However, none of the matters raised amount to deprivations of constitutional proportion or involve matters secured by the laws of the United States.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal remedy for a violation of state law unless the violation also breaches constitutional rights.

James Roy Schlette, by Wanda Roe, Conservator of His Person v. Burdick · filed 1980-12-10

Unless there is a breach of constitutional rights, however, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide redress in federal court for violations of state law.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional right, privilege, or immunity before liability may be imposed.

Mother Goose Nursery Schools, Inc. v. Sendak · filed 1980-12-16

In order to find liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there must be a deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution.

Section 1983 provides no claim for a handicapped child seeking additional educational services unless the alleged deprivation constitutes a Fourteenth Amendment violation or a violation of federal law.

Pinkerton v. Moye · filed 1981-02-17

Absent a Fourteenth Amendment violation or a federal statutory violation, ... a violation of the All Handicapped Children Act or the Rehabilitation Act, no claim for the handicapped child exists under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law; without that deprivation, the action cannot be maintained.

Brescia v. McGuire · filed 1981-03-12

The first inquiry in a § 1983 suit is whether plaintiff has been deprived of a right “secured by the Constitution and laws”; if there has not been such a deprivation, plaintiff has failed to satisfy the threshold requirement for maintaining a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a prison disciplinary-rule violation when the rule is not constitutionally mandated, the delay does not deny due process, and the alleged disparate treatment is conclusory.

Dowdy v. Johnson · filed 1981-03-25

Using the above list as a framework, the Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Section 1983. ... The guidelines referred to by the plaintiff are not intended to secure and protect established constitutional rights, and compliance with the guidelines is thus not mandated by the Constitution or federal law. ... The plaintiff’s equal protection claim will be dismissed. ... This is insufficient to state a cause of action under Section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only when the plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws.

Howard v. Cronk · filed 1981-11-30

“[T]he first inquiry in any section 1983 suit ... is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws.’ ”

Section 1983 imposes liability only for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, not for ordinary tort-law duties, and an excessive-force claim turns on the reasonableness of force in light of the need, motivation, and injury.

Bailey v. City of New Orleans · filed 1982-01-29

It is now well settled that the civil rights statute upon which plaintiff bases her claim is not a general tort statute. Rather, it imposes liability only for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. ... Whether the above described actions of Officer Curet amount to a constitutional violation that would make plaintiff’s arrest and confinement actionable under § 1983 must be determined by the reasonableness of the force in light of the need, the motivation, and the extent of the injury inflicted.

Section 1983 requires a clear showing that a person was subjected to a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws before liability or relief can be imposed.

Rogers v. Scurr · filed 1982-05-05

Therefore, in the absence of a clear showing of such a deprivation, there is no predicate for liability or for the relief granted.

Section 1983 permits a claim only when the plaintiff personally alleges deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.

Packish v. McMurtrie · filed 1982-05-21

This Court may hear a claim under § 1983 only where a plaintiff alleges that he has personally been deprived of a constitutionally protected right.

Section 1983 enforces only duties grounded in the Constitution or federal law, not a duty to protect the public from dangerous madmen.

Thomas L. Bowers, Administrator of the Estate of Marguerite Anne Bowers, Deceased v. Robert A. Devito, M.D. · filed 1982-09-02

But the only duties of care that may be enforced in suits under section 1983 are duties founded on the Constitution or laws of the United States; and the duty to protect the public from dangerous madmen is not among them.

Section 1983 does not make a single failure to comply with facially valid service procedures a constitutional violation absent constitutionally inadequate notice.

Brody v. Moan · filed 1982-11-22

None of these cases supports the proposition that a single instance of alleged failure to comply with the service provisions of a facially valid statute or procedure constitutes a constitutional violation under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy only when conduct under color of state law deprives a person of a constitutional or federal right; harassment and slander alone are not actionable under it.

Savage v. Snow · filed 1983-06-01

The averment that a tort was committed under color of state law is not enough. To be cognizable in a section 1983 action, the wrongdoing must amount to a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. ... Section 1983 requires that the alleged conduct violate a constitutionally safeguarded right. Neither harassment nor slander rises to the level of a constitutional claim. Therefore, plaintiff’s tort action, if any, must lie in state court.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must satisfy the threshold requirement of showing deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Heddan v. Dirkswager · filed 1983-07-01

Finally, appellants have failed to satisfy 42 U.S.C. § 1983's threshold requirement that the plaintiff be deprived of a right "secured by the Constitution and laws," and therefore they have no cognizable claims under § 1983.

State-created procedural guarantees alone do not create substantive federal rights or liberty interests enforceable through Section 1983.

Jackson v. Illinois Department of Corrections · filed 1983-07-01

Although as an original matter it might seem logical a state-created procedural scheme can (or absent evidence of a contrary intention does) create an entitlement to rely on that scheme, both the Supreme Court and our Court of Appeals have decisively rejected the notion state procedural guaranties themselves create substantive federal rights — or liberty interests— protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 1983.

Recovery under Section 1983 requires a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.

American National Insurance v. Ingram · filed 1983-07-05

Recovery under this Act is predicated upon a finding of deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution. Since no such violation has been shown, we find this argument unpersuasive.

Section 1983 does not remedy every wrong under color of law; the plaintiff must show deprivation of a right secured by federal law or the Constitution.

Ervin v. Blackwell · filed 1983-07-06

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for every wrong committed under color of law. The plaintiff must show deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States before the injury is actionable.

Section 1983 affords no relief when the plaintiff proves no deprivation of a right or privilege guaranteed by the Constitution or federal law.

White v. Walsh · filed 1985-07-19

This Court also concludes that plaintiff is not entitled to relief under § 1983 or § 2000a. Plaintiff was not deprived of any right or privilege guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and there is no evidence that he was discriminated against on the basis of race.

A § 1983 claim fails when the defendant has not infringed any right belonging to the plaintiff.

Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside · filed 1985-09-11

While the Tribe’s first basis for its Section 1983 Claim must fail because no due process deprivation occurred, its second basis fails because the county has not infringed on any “right” of the Tribe.

Section 1983 liability requires the challenged state action to deprive the plaintiff of a federally secured right.

Donahoo v. State · filed 1985-09-27

the first inquiry in any § 1983 suit ... is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right “secured by the Constitution and laws.”

A § 1983 claim fails when the plaintiff shows no deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Pritchard v. Elizabeth City · filed 1986-07-01

Having shown no deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, the firefighters’ claim based on 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 must fail.

Section 1983 supplies no cause of action when the challenged conduct is lawful and therefore deprives the plaintiff of no constitutional or federal right.

Board of Education v. Bosworth · filed 1986-07-01

Therefore, plaintiffs were not deprived of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws” (42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 (1976)) and have not alleged a cause of action based on any violation of plaintiffs’ civil rights.

A Section 1983 claim is not stated when state officials complied with the governing extradition process and therefore violated no federal right.

Good v. Allain · filed 1986-10-29

Since the state officials complied with the extradition process, the Plaintiff’s federal rights were not violated and no cause of action is stated for a Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 generally provides no claim against the state for a private third party's criminal act absent a special relationship between the state, victim, or criminal.

Ketchum v. County of Alameda Alameda County Board of Supervisors Sheriff Glenn Dyer and Chief Ron Cain · filed 1987-03-02

Ketchum does not dispute that she was simply a member of the public at large. In the absence of a special relationship with the state or the criminal, she had no federal constitutional right to state protection from criminal attacks. She therefore failed to meet the threshold requirement under § 1983 of establishing that the state deprived her of a constitutional right.

Recovery under § 1983 requires proof that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right.

Anthony Allen Noel, Cross-Appellant v. Colleen Andrus, Lafayette Parish School Board, Cross-Appellee · filed 1987-03-03

Recovery under § 1983 here requires proof that the School Board deprived Noel of a constitutionally protected right.

A consent decree's judicial approval does not itself convert the decree into a federal right enforceable under § 1983.

Gill v. Neaves · filed 1987-03-10

[t]he mere approval by this Court of a consent decree by parties to a civil action does not raise the status of that decree to the status of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.

A prisoner's expectation of retaining a particular prison job is not a property or liberty interest cognizable under § 1983.

Wolfenbarger v. Ken Aydelotte, James Worthington, and Steve Coffee · filed 1987-08-27

The expectation of keeping a particular job does not amount to either a property or liberty interest cognizable under Sec. 1983.

An admonitory letter that leaves a physician's hospital privileges intact does not state a § 1983 deprivation.

Yee v. B. Ward Smith · filed 1987-08-28

As pointed out, no formal action was ever taken against the plaintiff and his medical privileges remained intact. All that any defendant did was to cause a letter to be written to the plaintiff stating that he had disregarded directives of the hospital and requesting that he observe the rules and regulations in the future. Under this set of facts, the plaintiff stated no claim upon which relief could have been granted by the district court.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by federal law.

Haskins v. City of Chattanooga · filed 1993-05-13

To recover under section 1983, plaintiffs must show that they were deprived of a right, privilege or immunity secured to them by federal law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to recover to prove deprivation of a federal right.

Crowe v. Henry · filed 1995-05-18

To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that he was deprived of a federal right.

Section 1983 requires an adequately alleged deprivation of a federal right; a vague assertion that an election violated constitutional rights does not state a cognizable claim.

Contreras v. James Gomez, Director · filed 1995-05-22

Contreras's allegation that the election somehow violated his constitutional rights fails to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove deprivation of a federal right.

Sanders v. City of Dallas, TX · filed 1996-03-07

To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove, among other elements, that he was deprived of a federal right.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Garza v. Stansbury · filed 1996-10-01

The first inquiry in a section 1983 action is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 applies only to a deprivation of a federal right.

Iowa Coal Mining Co. v. Monroe County · filed 1996-10-23

Second, as Iowa Coal contends, a § 1983 claim applies only to a deprivation of a federal right.

Section 1983 provides redress only for deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right; a common law wrong alone is insufficient.

McGee v. City of Warrensville Heights · filed 1998-07-30

Section 1983 is not a separate source of substantive rights. The Sixth Circuit has held that unless plaintiffs show deprivation of some federal constitutional or statutory right, Section 1983 does not provide for redress even if the plaintiffs common law rights have been violated and even if remedies available under state law are inadequate.

Section 1983 permits recovery only when an independent source of federal or constitutional rights is implicated.

Shannon v. Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians · filed 1999-06-03

As a plaintiff may only recover under Section 1983 where an independent source of ... or constitutional rights is implicated, the Court agrees with the Band that Count I of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint fails to state a claim and therefore dismisses that claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant's conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by federal law.

Smith v. City of Cumming · filed 2000-05-31

Nonetheless, under Section 1983, the Smiths must prove that the conduct complained of deprived them of "a right, privilege or immunity secured by the constitution or laws of the United States." Nail v. Community Action Agency of Calhoun County, 805 F.2d 1500, 1501 (11th Cir.1986).

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right; when the sole alleged deprivation has been rejected, the claimant has no viable Section 1983 claim on that basis.

Care and Treatment of Burgess v. State · filed 2002-03-28

Since Burgess’s § 1983 allegations raised issues only about the constitutionality of the Act, Burgess did not have a § 1983 action to assert when, on July 9, 2001, the court adjudged that Nixon, Wilson, and Barton should not be joined as parties. This follows because the court’s finding that the Act withstood all of Burgess’s constitutional challenges foreclosed him from proving a necessary element of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a claimant to show the deprivation of a federal right.

Magic Carpet Limousines v. DFW International Airport · filed 2003-08-22

Hafke's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims fail because Hafke has not shown the deprivation of a federal right.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right; a claim fails when no such deprivation can be shown.

Zezulewicz v. Port Authority of Allegheny County · filed 2003-11-13

However, since we have concluded that defendant should be granted summary judgment on each of the plaintiff’s constitutional claims, plaintiff cannot satisfy the first element of a § 1983 violation. Accordingly, as there are no facts from which a jury could find that a federal right has been violated, we will grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to this claim.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right; a claim fails when the plaintiff shows no such deprivation.

Piedmont Behavioral Health Center, LLC v. Stewart · filed 2006-01-31

Having dismissed the plaintiffs’ other federal claims, the court FINDS that the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim fails to show that John and Jane Doe were deprived of a federal right.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Dunleavy v. New Jersey · filed 2007-10-16

To the extent Dunleavy presented a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (rather than merely citing the statute), his § 1983 action could not proceed, either. Among other infirmities with his pleading, Dunleavy did not allege that he was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of a constitutional or federal right.

Williams v. Savage · filed 2008-03-10

To maintain a claim under § 1983, therefore, the plaintiffs must allege a violation of a constitutional or federal right.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking civil rights relief to allege deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Thomas v. Ruben M. Torres, George G. Killinger, Connie L. Jackson and Ken Casner · filed 1983-10-17

Neither habeas nor civil rights relief can be had, however, absent the allegation by a plaintiff that he has been deprived of some right secured to him by the United States Constitution or laws. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 42 U.S.C. § 1983; ... Therefore, if Thomas has not alleged a deprivation of any such right, he has failed to state a claim for either habeas or civil rights relief.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendants deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Cortland v. Myers · filed 2012-11-20

The district court properly dismissed Cortland’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Cortland failed to allege that defendants deprived him of a federal right.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant’s conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Lewis v. Unknown Diponzio · filed 2013-06-20

The district court properly dismissed Lewis’s action because Lewis failed to allege facts showing that defendant’s conduct deprived him of a federal right.

Section 1983 permits relief only when a constitutional or statutory deprivation has occurred.

Hearring v. Sliwowski · filed 2015-11-20

It requires a constitutional (or statutory) “deprivation” before the court may hear “an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”

Section 1983 provides no relief for wrongful conduct unless the plaintiff shows a deprivation of a federally protected right.

Boudreaux v. McArtor · filed 2017-03-02

Moreover, even if Chief McArtor was improperly attempting to oust Mr. Boudreaux to make room for other firefighters, “no matter how discriminatory or wrongful” the challenged conduct may have been, there can be no relief under § 1983 if Mr. Boudreaux cannot show he was deprived of a constitutional right. See Am. Mfrs., 526 U.S. at 49–50. We therefore affirm the district court’s ruling that Chief McArtor is entitled to qualified immunity, and the grant of summary judgment in his favor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to explain how the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Carter v. Kane · filed 2017-12-21

Carter cannot state a § 1983 claim against Wolfson where he has not explained how Wolfson deprived him of a federal right, a threshold requirement under § 1983.

A § 1983 retaliation claim must identify the federal constitutional provision or statute that supplies the right allegedly violated.

Shahrivar v. City of San Jose · filed 2018-10-22

The SAC does not contain sufficient material to determine what, if any, federal constitutional provision or statute serves as the foundation for Shahrivar’s retaliation claim under § 1983. This omission is fatal and dismissal was appropriate.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege facts showing that a defendant deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Sherrell v. Univ. of N.M. · filed 2018-11-13

Sherrell does not allege any facts showing that the Defendants University of New Mexico, Golden, or Learner deprived him of a federal right. Consequently, Sherrell has not stated a claim under § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim cannot proceed without a deprivation of a federal right.

Joeys Auto Repair & Body Shop v. County of Fayette · filed 2019-08-29

A § 1983 claim cannot proceed without a deprivation of a federal right, and we will therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of that claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant deprived her of a federal right.

Morrison v. UNMH · filed 2020-01-21

Morrison does not allege any facts showing that the Defendants deprived her of a federal right. Consequently, Morrison has not stated a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional or federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Dunkelberger v. Story · filed 2020-08-31

Section 1983 creates liability against people acting under the color of state law who deprive another of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dunkelberg fails to assert facts that a constitutional or federal right has been violated by defendants with regards to the manufacturing of the metal shears. Thus, his Count II claim against defendants is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the unconstitutional conduct for individual liability.

" BD" v. DeBuono · filed 2000-01-15

A defendant is not individually liable for Section 1983 violations unless he or she is “personally involved in the unconstitutional conduct.”

Section 1983 permits liability for an official’s omission when the official had authority to prevent an alleged constitutional deprivation.

Cotter v. City of Boston · filed 1999-10-20

Since section 1983 authorizes liability on the basis of omissions, see Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994), and Hartnett was authorized to prevent the alleged deprivation of the White Officers’ constitutional rights by the Police Department, this Court DENIES Hart-nett’s motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for officers who plan and act together during an excessive-force incident without proof that each officer independently caused severe injury.

Simpson v. Hines · filed 1990-06-19

Defendants argue that they cannot be held individually liable absent evidence that each defendant’s actions caused severe injuries. Their argument is unpersuasive where the officers discussed beforehand how to handle the situation and functioned as a unit once inside Simpson’s cell.

Section 1983 liability for a sheriff or sheriff’s department requires personal involvement or an official policy or custom that causes a constitutional deprivation.

Jordan v. Spell · filed 1990-04-20

Our review of the record and other materials before us discloses that Sheriff McQueen and the New Hanover County Sheriff's Department were properly dismissed because Jordan was unable to demonstrate either personal involvement or the existence of an official policy or custom that resulted in the deprivation of any of Jordan's constitutional rights.

A Section 1983 complaint must allege a causal connection between each named defendant and the constitutional deprivation because respondeat superior does not apply.

Cox v. Gene Barksdale, Bill Morris, and Sheriff's Deputy Genbrye · filed 1986-11-13

It is axiomatic that a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must show a causal connection between the named defendants and the alleged constitutional deprivation; the doctrine of respondeat superior has no application thereunder.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to demonstrate a causal connection between a state official's alleged wrongful action and the deprivation of life, liberty, or property.

David D. Daly, M.D., ph.d. v. Charles C. Sprague, M.D. · filed 1982-05-14

It is axiomatic that a plaintiff cannot succeed in a § 1983 action if he fails to demonstrate a causal connection between the state official’s alleged wrongful action and his deprivation of life, liberty, or property.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant who neither caused nor participated in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

McBride v. Gary Soos and Lamar Haney · filed 1982-06-08

A defendant cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 imposes liability on officials whose conduct subjects or causes a person to suffer a constitutional deprivation, and requires an affirmative link between each defendant and the deprivation.

Olitsky v. O'MALLEY · filed 1978-06-12

The plaintiffs are entitled to show that members of the A.B.C.C. and Licensing Board, as well as the Police Commissioner and his officers did subject or cause plaintiffs to be subjected to a deprivation of constitutional rights. ... If the affirmative link between the individual officers and the other defendants is not proven, plaintiffs will not be entitled to any relief against those other defendants.

For monetary damages under § 1983, respondeat superior cannot impose vicarious liability on a defendant without personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.

Jennings v. Davis · filed 1972-03-14

Where the relief sought under the Civil Rights Act is monetary damages, rather than equitable relief, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not available to impose vicarious liability upon a defendant who has no personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s federally-protected rights.

Section 1983 requires proof that each defendant personally participated in the constitutional deprivation; a supervisor may be liable for directing subordinates or knowingly acquiescing in their acts.

Landman v. Royster · filed 1973-01-31

Significantly, the plaintiff must prove actual conduct depriving him of his rights on the part of each defendant whom he seeks to hold liable. An official is not liable for the acts of his subordinates in the absence of some personal involvement in those acts on the part of the party sought to be charged. The requirement of personal involvement is met, however, not only when the superior personally directs his subordinates to do acts, but also when he has actual knowledge of their acts and acquiesces in them.

Section 1983 provides relief only against persons personally involved in the deprivation of constitutional rights and does not impose respondeat superior liability on a public official.

Boreta v. Kirby · filed 1971-06-03

The Civil Rights Act provides for relief only against those who are personally involved in the deprivation of constitutionally protected rights. A public official cannot be held liable pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 allows compensatory and punitive damages against an individual state actor for an unjustifiable constitutional violation under color of state law, but an official acting in reasonable good-faith reliance on established jail procedures is not personally liable in damages.

Collins v. Schoonfield · filed 1973-09-18

The thrust of a damage action under § 1983 is somewhat different. This statute authorizes the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages against an individual defendant for the unjustifiable violation of the constitutional rights of an individual plaintiff “under color” of state law. ... Thus, the liability is entirely personal in nature, intended to be satisfied out of the individual defendant’s pocket. ... This Court finds that defendants, in not affording plaintiffs their due process rights before punishing them, acted in a reasonable good faith reliance on what was standard operating procedure at the Baltimore City Jail for many years. Accordingly, defendants cannot be required to respond personally for damages.

Section 1983 requires a defendant's direct and personal participation, under color of state law, in conduct that deprives the plaintiff of federal constitutional rights.

Washington v. Anderson · filed 1974-02-13

It is the general rule that an official will not be liable in a Civil Rights action unless he directly and personally participates in conduct under color of State law which deprives the plaintiff of rights, privileges, and immunities secured him by the Federal Constitution. ... It is an essential element of a Civil Rights claim that the particular defendant be personally involved in the alleged denial of the Constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be personally involved in the alleged deprivation of a constitutional right.

Phillips v. Anderson · filed 1974-02-28

It is an essential element of a Civil Rights claim that the particular defendant be personally involved in the alleged denial of the Constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an official unless the official directly and personally participates under color of state law in conduct that deprives the plaintiff of federal constitutional rights.

Hill v. Anderson · filed 1974-03-05

It is the general rule that an official will not be liable in a Civil Rights action unless he directly and personally participates in conduct under col- or of state law which deprives the plaintiff of rights, privileges, and immunities secured him by the Federal Constitution.

Section 1983 requires a defendant's personal involvement in conduct under color of state law that deprives the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Armstrong v. McCracken · filed 1974-02-14

It is the general rule that an official will not be liable in a Civil Rights action unless he directly and personally participates in conduct under color of state law which deprives the plaintiff of rights, privileges, and immunities secured him by the Federal Constitution.

Section 1983 requires a defendant's personal involvement in conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of constitutional rights.

Fowler v. Anderson · filed 1974-02-15

Moreover, it is the general rule that an official will not be liable in a Civil Rights action unless he directly and personally participates in conduct under color of state law which deprives the plaintiff of rights, privileges, and immunities secured him by the Federal Constitution. ... It is an essential element of a Civil Rights claim that the particular defendant be personally involved in the alleged denial of the Constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability, but indirect or remote nonfeasance by a state official may qualify as personal involvement and support liability when it proximately caused or contributed to the injury.

Payne v. Rollings · filed 1975-10-01

The Court agrees with defendant’s conclusion as to vicarious liability, but disagrees with his reading of the complaint. ... To be sure, this alleged nonfeasance may be characterized as indirect or even remote, but it is nevertheless “personal involvement” which, if found to be true and to have proximately caused or contributed to the injuries claimed, may sustain liability therefor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely under respondeat superior; the person sued must have personal involvement.

Brunson v. Hyatt · filed 1976-01-27

Unlike the sheriff, who is liable by statute for the acts of his deputies, Mathis can be held liable for his assistant jailer’s actions only under the doctrine of respondeat superior. ... Other district courts in the Fourth Circuit have dealt with this issue and have concluded that respondeat superior has no applicability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the statute contemplates “personal involvement” of the person sued thereunder. ... This court is in agreement on that issue and the present action against defendant Mathis must therefore be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat-superior liability for an agent's conduct; the defendant's personal involvement is required.

Price v. Parks-Belk, Inc. · filed 1976-08-05

The defendant’s contention that no claim is stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the defendant is not alleged to have been acting at the pertinent times under color of state law, lacks merit. ... There is merit, however, to the defendant’s further contention that it cannot be held liable vicariously herein for the conduct of its agent under the doctrine of respondeat superior. “* * * Where monetary damages * * * [are] * * sought under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply; personal involvement of the defendant is required. * * *”

Section 1983 generally does not impose respondeat superior liability; a superior is liable only when personal knowledge or involvement, ordering of wrongful acts, or knowledge of subordinates acts and acquiescence is established.

Mitchell v. Hendricks · filed 1977-04-18

Rather, it is necessary to establish actual personal knowledge or involvement, the personal ordering of a subordinate to do acts, or actual knowledge of the acts of subordinates and acquiescence therein if liability of a superior, in a civil rights action is to be found.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in an alleged constitutional deprivation for an official to be liable for damages.

McKinnon v. Patterson · filed 1977-09-15

In this Circuit personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 damages require personal involvement by the defendant in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

McKINNON v. PATTERSON · filed 1978-02-21

In this Circuit personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 liability requires an individual defendant to have actually participated in the unlawful conduct or had actual knowledge of and acquiesced in it, and cannot rest on vicarious liability.

Coggins v. McQueen · filed 1978-03-30

It is well settled in this circuit that liability based directly upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be based on a theory of vicarious liability, but instead requires actual participation in the unlawful conduct, or actual knowledge of and acquiescence in that conduct.

Section 1983 requires personal action by an official to impose liability for a constitutional deprivation; respondeat superior does not apply.

Jane D. v. Seurynck · filed 1978-09-18

“[l]iability will only lie where it is affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs’ rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead each defendant’s personal involvement with factual specificity and does not impose liability on a supervisor under respondeat superior.

Light v. Blackwell · filed 1979-06-01

In actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the courts have found it necessary to impose special pleading limitations. The pleading limitations were found necessary in order to identify frivolous suits, and to prevent public officials from being subjected to vexatious actions. "Personal involvement must be plead with factual specificity and bare allegations on this issue are not sufficient. ... It is also to be noted that the doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 permits an injured party to seek damages from individual defendants even when they hold public office.

Jackson v. Kurtz · filed 1979-12-12

Redress under Section 1983 may be had in the form of damages against individual defendants notwithstanding the fact that they hold public office.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability, but permits direct liability for an official's failure to properly train, supervise, direct, or control a subordinate who causes injury.

Pearl v. Dobbs · filed 1981-05-26

As the State correctly notes, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We note that although the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 cases, a § 1983 plaintiff may maintain a theory of direct liability against a prison or other official if that official fails to properly train, supervise, direct or control the actions of a subordinate who causes the injury.

Section 1983 damages liability requires a defendant's personal involvement, or at least knowing disregard, in an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.

Love v. Duckworth · filed 1983-01-12

Therefore, plaintiff must prove personal involvement, or at least a knowing disregard, on the part of the defendant concerning alleged deprivation of constitutionally protected rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking monetary damages to establish the defendant's personal involvement or knowledge.

Owens v. Coughlin · filed 1983-04-28

It is well-settled that a plaintiff must establish the personal involvement or knowledge of a defendant before he can recover monetary damages in a section 1983 civil rights suit.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show an official's personal involvement in a subordinate's unconstitutional conduct and does not permit respondeat superior liability.

Stefaniak v. State of Mich. · filed 1983-05-10

Finally, plaintiffs’ allegation that the prosecutor should be held liable for the conduct of the defendant officers in allegedly arresting plaintiffs is without merit. It is settled law that a plaintiff proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must allege that the defendant official was somehow personally involved in the unconstitutional activity of a subordinate. It is beyond question that respondeat superior is not a basis for imposing liability on public officials under section 1983.

Section 1983 damages require the defendant's personal responsibility, which may be shown by deliberate or reckless inaction or by a deprivation occurring at the official's direction or with the official's knowledge and consent.

Bruce D. Wellman, Cross-Appellees v. Gordon H. Faulkner, Cross-Appellants · filed 1983-08-09

To recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish a defendant’s personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right. ... The personal responsibility requirement is satisfied “if the official acts or fails to act with a deliberate or reckless disregard of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, or if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at her direction or with her knowledge and consent.”

Senior prison administrators are not liable under Section 1983 for an inmate's individualized conditions absent actual or constructive knowledge of facts placing them on notice.

Ross v. Reed · filed 1983-10-12

In these large prisons, the highest level administrators cannot be held responsible for the individualized complaints of every prisoner, absent knowledge, actual or constructive, of facts sufficient to put them on notice.

A sheriff is liable under Section 1983 only through personal involvement in the acts causing the constitutional deprivation or a causal connection between the sheriff's own act and the violation.

Lozano v. William French Smith, Elton Faught · filed 1983-11-03

To be liable under section 1983, a sheriff must be either personally involved in the acts causing the deprivation of a person’s constitutional rights, or there must be a causal connection between an act of the sheriff and the constitutional violation sought to be redressed.

Section 1983 liability requires the defendant’s personal involvement or personal responsibility for the unlawful conduct.

Goodwin v. LaPolla · filed 1984-06-19

In order for civil liability to attach in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it must be shown that the defendant in question was personally involved or in some way personally responsible for the alleged unlawful conduct.

Personal damages liability under Section 1983 cannot rest on prison conditions that were beyond the defendant official’s control.

Pinto v. Carlos Jimenez Nettleship, Etc. · filed 1984-06-21

The district court correctly concluded that personal liability in damages under section 1983 cannot be based on prison conditions beyond the control of a defendant.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant under a theory of respondeat superior, and mere failure to act, without allegations of affirmative conduct or direct responsibility for the actions of others, does not state a claim under the statute.

Del Valle Ex Rel. Sigette v. Taylor · filed 1984-07-10

The doctrine of respondeat superi- or is inapplicable to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In addition, mere allegations of failure to act, without allegations of affirmative conduct or direct responsibility for the actions of others, are insufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 liability against an individual defendant requires a showing of that defendant's personal involvement or participation in the alleged deprivation of civil rights, not mere supervisory status.

McAdoo v. Toll · filed 1984-08-07

The defendants are correct in arguing that liability under § 1983 is conditioned on a showing of some personal involvement or participation in the denial of civil rights.

Section 1983 liability is personal, so each defendant’s conduct must be considered individually and vicarious liability is unavailable absent special circumstances.

Arebaugh v. Dalton · filed 1985-01-04

Liability under § 1983 has always been personal in nature. ... Vicarious liability has been rejected in the absence of special circumstances. ... Each defendant is entitled to have his case considered individually.

Section 1983 requires a defendant's personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation and does not impose respondeat-superior liability.

Wright v. George Collins, Warden, Maryland Penitentiary Dr. Berry Officer Larry Donnell · filed 1985-01-07

Consequently, Collins must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of appellant’s rights in order to be liable.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat-superior liability on prison supervisors and requires personal responsibility for the alleged violation.

Balabin v. Scully · filed 1985-01-31

When a prisoner brings an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ... a showing of some personal responsibility of the defendant is required.”

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on individual defendants who had no direct involvement in the claimed deprivation.

LaVerne v. University of Texas System · filed 1985-03-27

With regard to the individual defendants, vicarious liability cannot support a section 1983 claim.

A supervisory official is not liable under § 1983 for inadequate training or supervision unless specific allegations establish an affirmative link between the supervisor's own failings and the constitutional harm.

Lawrence v. Board of Police Com'rs · filed 1985-04-03

In the absence of more specific allegations establishing an affirmative link between Berner's failings and the harm, this Court cannot impose liability. Plaintiff must allege, for example that defendant Berner was aware of previous negligent conduct on behalf of his subordinates, but nonetheless failed to actively correct the situation.

A section 1983 claim against a supervisory official fails without admissible evidence of the official's personal involvement, knowledge, or consent in the alleged constitutional violation.

Roland J. Steinle, Jr. v. Robert W. Warren and Herbert Krusche · filed 1985-06-13

Since Steinle has not established any personal involvement by Judge Warren in any alleged violation of Steinle’s constitutional rights and has not produced any evidence which would be admissible at trial to con ... trovert the affidavits of Judge Warren and Krusche so as to create genuine issues of material fact, we hold that the district court properly granted appellees’ motions for summary judgment on the merits.

Section 1983 imposes personal rather than vicarious liability and requires a supervisor’s direct involvement or knowing acquiescence in the unconstitutional conduct.

Titus v. Newtown Township · filed 1985-07-24

Furthermore, it is quite clear that liability under § 1983 is personal, and may not be imposed vicariously or upon a theory of respondeat superior. ... The plaintiff must allege direct, personal involvement by the defendant in the alleged unconstitutional conduct, or active knowledge and acquiescence on the defendant’s part to such conduct.

Section 1983 damages liability for a prison disciplinary due-process violation requires personal involvement, and a personally involved official remains protected when qualified immunity applies.

Wells v. Israel · filed 1986-03-04

Of the named defendants, only the then warden of Waupun, Thomas Israel, could be held responsible for this deprivation. None of the other named defendants are alleged to have had any involvement with the September 27, 1977 decision. Accordingly, these defendants are hereby dismissed from this action. ... The Court finds that the only defendant who could be at fault for this deprivation was shielded from liability by the cloak of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 liability requires specific factual allegations that the defendant participated in, directed, conspired in, or knew of the challenged conduct.

Minotti v. Wheaton · filed 1986-03-13

Nowhere does plaintiff allege that defendant participated in the activities which led to the alleged deprivation of his rights, or that defendant conspired with others to deprive him of his rights, or that defendant directed the employees to act as they did, or that defendant even had knowledge of the employees’ activities.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat-superior liability on correctional officials; the plaintiff must allege a tangible connection between each defendant's acts and the injury.

Bass v. Jackson · filed 1986-05-13

However, respondeat superior liability does not lie against corrections officers in Section 1983 actions. ... A plaintiff must thus allege a tangible connection between the acts of a defendant and the injuries suffered.

A § 1983 complaint must allege that the defendant personally participated in or knew of the circumstances giving rise to the claim.

James W.. Fitzgerald, Gentry E. McCauley Jr., Commonwealth Attorney, 14th Judicial District and the Commonwealth Attorne · filed 1986-06-16

The district court correctly found that a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action must allege that the defendant has personally participated in or had knowledge of the circumstances giving rise to the complaint.

A defendant who did not participate in initiating a retaliatory prosecution cannot be held personally liable for that prosecution under § 1983.

Dunn v. State of Tenn. By and Through Roberts · filed 1986-06-23

Accordingly, this court affirms the trial court's decision dismissing the Sec. 1983 action instituted against Hight for the reason that Hight had not participated in initiating the criminal proceedings against the plaintiff.

Personal participation or causation is required for individual § 1983 liability.

Papapetropoulous v. Milwaukee Transport Services, Inc. · filed 1986-07-02

An individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; each defendant must be personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Volk v. Coler · filed 1986-07-08

Director Coler’s only participation in the entire grievance process was to assure the establishment of a structural review process and to approve the final decisions of the grievance committee. In almost every organization, these kinds of decisions eventually require final approval by the head of the organization; such events, however, cannot alone form the basis for § 1983 liability. These facts preclude any conclusion that the Director was personally involved in the claimed deprivations of Plaintiff’s rights, or that he “caused” such deprivations.

Section 1983 liability requires a supervisor's direct involvement or factually supported knowledge and approval of the challenged conduct; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Hughley v. Downton · filed 1987-02-25

Because appellant did not allege that Warden Lack was directly involved in the disciplinary action, he was properly dismissed. ... With respect to Associate Warden Slaughter, appellant offered no factual support for his conclusion that Slaughter knew about the contemplated disciplinary actions in advance. Because appellant offered no factual support for his claim against Slaughter, the district court properly granted his motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 individual-capacity damages liability requires personal involvement or knowledge of the constitutional deprivation; respondeat superior does not apply.

Jackson v. Elrod · filed 1987-03-11

To hold a defendant personally liable for damages under Section 1983, plaintiff must specifically allege defendant’s personal involvement or knowledge in constitutional deprivations; ... respondeat superior ... does not apply.

Section 1983 damages liability requires an official’s personal involvement, through acts or omissions, in the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Rondon Pinto v. Nettleship · filed 1987-05-06

First of all, the ... opinion does not abandon, as suggested by plaintiffs, the basic principle that liability for damages can only be imposed on the official if he was involved personally through acts or omissions in the deprivation of constitutional rights.

A § 1983 plaintiff must allege the defendant’s personal involvement in the claimed deprivation.

Banks v. Galley · filed 1987-08-06

The district court properly dismissed the action, with prejudice, against defendant Galley. Banks failed to allege any personal involvement on defendant Galley's part in his deprivation.

Section 1983 requires each defendant to be personally responsible for the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Juan Morales, and Cross-Appellant v. Mateo Cadena, and Cross-Appellee, and Edwin Kehl, Defendant-Cross-Appellee · filed 1987-08-19

Moreover, section 1983 requires that the defendant be personally responsible for the deprivation of plaintiffs rights.

An individual defendant is liable under § 1983 only for personal wrongdoing that deprived the plaintiff of a federal right, not for subordinates’ unconstitutional acts under respondeat superior.

Davis-El v. O'Leary · filed 1987-09-08

An individual defendant can only be subject to § 1983 liability if that defendant deprived plaintiff of a federally protected right. A defendant cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of others.

Section 1983 liability requires that the individual defendant have caused the claimed deprivation.

Santella v. Grishaber · filed 1987-10-15

Again there is no allegation that Grishaber either promised Santella the Supervisor title ... or took the title away. ... Because the Complaint comes no closer to stating a Section 1983 claim against Grishaber than the original complaint, despite the Opinion’s clearly stated reasons for the earlier dismissal, no purpose would be served by allowing Santella an opportunity to re-plead. Count I is dismissed with prejudice as to Grishaber.

A government official generally is not liable under § 1983 for failing to prevent another official's constitutional violation unless the defendant had an affirmative duty to act.

Musso v. Hourigan · filed 1988-01-05

As a general rule, a government official is not liable for failing to prevent another from violating a person’s constitutional rights, unless the official is charged with an affirmative duty to act. ... We therefore conclude that Maz-zafero’s alleged failure to act is protected under the doctrine of qualified immunity, and consequently we reverse that portion of the district court’s order which held that Mazzafero could be liable for failing to prevent Millar from violating Musso’s first amendment rights.

Supervisory authority alone does not support Section 1983 liability; the plaintiff must establish the supervisor's personal involvement in the challenged conduct.

McCoy v. Celeste · filed 1988-01-13

Without direct involvement, a right to control employees standing alone, will not support liability of supervisory personnel in a Sec. 1983 action. ... Because the defendant's sworn denial of personal involvement in enforcing the haircut regulation is not controverted, the plaintiff's claims under Sec. 1983 were properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against an official who was not personally involved in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Giacalone v. Abrams · filed 1988-06-21

Apparently Giacalone does not challenge the district court's finding that he failed to show Abrams’, Rifkin’s or Allee’s personal involvement in forbidding Giacalone to draft a memorandum detailing his concerns. In the absence of such involvement, they cannot be held liable for damages under § 1983 based on this alleged incident.

Section 1983 allows damages against officials only for their personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Kerkado v. de Ramos · filed 1988-09-06

At the outset, we note that liability in damages can only be imposed upon officials who were involved personally in the deprivation of constitutional rights since there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

A § 1983 claim against a supervisory official may proceed when evidence raises a factual question about that official’s personal involvement.

Jones v. Coughlin · filed 1988-09-20

Defendants make the point that supervisory official can not be held liable under section 1983 without personal involvement. ... However, here, both Scully and Coughlin are alleged to have dealt personally with Jones’ case, and evidence raising questions of facts has been presented to that effect as is set forth above.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged deprivation; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Cameron v. Metcuz · filed 1989-02-10

The decisional law is clear that there must be individual participation and involvement by a defendant, and that the concept of respondeat superior cannot be the basis of a claim under § 1983.