42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims are subject to collateral estoppel when a state criminal proceeding necessarily resolved the same issue after a full and fair opportunity to litigate it.

Miller v. Glanz · filed 1993-03-19

The Supreme Court has held that issues decided in state criminal proceedings are collaterally precluded from relitigation in subsequent § 1983 civil suits. ... Pursuant to Oklahoma's collateral estoppel rules, plaintiff's § 1983 excessive force claim is precluded.

Section 1983 does not exempt a claim alleging facial unconstitutionality from the full faith and credit requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1738.

Medvick v. City of University City, Missouri Frank Ollendorff, City Manager of University City · filed 1993-06-15

Thus, even if the work rule is facially unconstitutional, § 1738 applies to Medvick’s § 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims are subject to state-law claim preclusion from prior state-court judgments, even when different theories or requests for relief arise from the same facts.

Jones v. Moore · filed 1993-06-28

In examining the effect of Jones’ suit in state court, we begin with the observation that “issues actually litigated in a state-court proceeding are entitled to the same preclusive effect in a subsequent federal § 1983 suit as they enjoy in the courts of the State where the judgment was rendered.” ... Nonetheless, the same set of derivative facts are involved, and neither the employment of different, previously unadvanced theories of liability nor requests for previously unsought relief arising from those facts will allow Jones to avoid the bar imposed by his state court action.

Under North Carolina law, a judicially reviewed administrative award for discharge without just cause does not preclude a separate § 1983 claim alleging constitutional injuries and seeking damages unavailable in the administrative proceeding.

Davenport v. North Carolina Department Of Transportation · filed 1993-08-18

In combination, we believe these procedural and substantive differences between the state administrative claim and the Sec. 1983 claims alleged by plaintiff would cause them to be treated as different claims for res judicata purposes by the North Carolina courts. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the Sec. 1983 action on the basis of claim preclusion.

An ex parte judicial finding of probable cause does not preclude a plaintiff from challenging probable cause in a subsequent § 1983 action against the police officer.

Simmons v. Ronald Pryor and City of Evanston · filed 1993-12-14

Thus, in a subsequent civil action against the police officer, a judicial officer’s finding of probable cause to issue a warrant is not dispositive. ... Consequently, the district court erred in giving preclusive effect to Judge Loverde’s finding of probable cause.

Section 1983 damages claims need not be joined with habeas petitions, and under Kansas law a prior habeas action does not preclude a damages claim involving a different cause of action.

Rhodes v. Robert D. Hannigan G.B. Whittington · filed 1993-12-21

Here, Mr. Rhodes’ petition for habeas corpus and his § 1983 action are premised on different wrongs and request different relief. ... We, too, have recognized that although a § 1983 action and a habeas corpus action can be joined, there is no requirement that a prisoner do so.

A prior Ohio judgment bars a Section 1983 action involving the same necessary facts and standards of proof when the federal claim could have been brought in the state action.

Longstreth v. Franklin County Children Services · filed 1993-12-21

Therefore, because plaintiffs' prior state action and subsequent Sec. 1983 action involve the same necessary facts and standards of proof and because plaintiffs' Sec. 1983 claim could have been brought in state court along with their state tort claim, the district court did not err in concluding that res judicata barred plaintiffs' Sec. 1983 action.

Relitigation of issues in a Section 1983 action is barred by an earlier state criminal suppression hearing when the elements of collateral estoppel are met.

Robert M. GRAY, suing individually and by his next friend; Rosemary Gray, his mother, Plaintiffs-Appellants… · filed 1993-12-30

A suppression hearing in an earlier state criminal trial collaterally estops the relitigation of the same issues in a Sec. 1983 action if the elements of collateral estoppel are met.

A state criminal suppression hearing precludes relitigation of the same issues in a Section 1983 action when the elements of collateral estoppel are met.

Gray v. Farley · filed 1993-12-30

A suppression hearing in an earlier state criminal trial collaterally estops the relit-igation of the same issues in a § 1983 action if the elements of collateral estoppel are met.

A state habeas judgment precludes a section 1983 action when state law would give the judgment preclusive effect.

Somoza v. Charles D. Marshall, Warden · filed 1994-01-12

A state habeas judgment is res judicata in a section 1983 action when state law would give the judgment preclusive effect.

A Section 1983 claim may be barred by collateral estoppel when the same issue was litigated in a state criminal proceeding and state preclusion requirements are met.

Reed v. Pizzi · filed 1994-01-13

A federal civil rights plaintiff may be collaterally estopped from litigating a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claim by a state court criminal judgment in which the same issue has already been litigated. ... Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that Reed was collaterally estopped by his state criminal proceedings from pursuing his fifth amendment claim in this civil rights action.

A prior state agency decision reinstating an employee with back pay does not preclude a Section 1983 claim seeking relief for constitutional violations arising from the dismissal.

Helms v. Rafter · filed 1994-04-14

... the Court finds that Plaintiffs § 1983 claim is not precluded by the state agency decision previously entered herein.

Section 1983 claims can be subject to collateral estoppel based on findings from a state administrative hearing when the hearing provided adequate judicial safeguards and state law would give those findings preclusive effect.

Roberts v. Las Vegas Valley Water District · filed 1994-04-18

It is proper for this Court to. give collateral estoppel effect to the administrative decision in this case. ... The Court further finds that under the facts of the instant case, Nevada would give preclusive effect to Hearing Officer Beko’s findings. ... Thus, collateral estoppel is appropriate, and this Court gives preclusive effect to Hearing Officer Beko’s conclusion that Roberts was not arbitrarily and capriciously terminated.

A state habeas decision precludes relitigation of an identical issue in a later section 1983 action if the state court gave a full and fair opportunity to resolve the issue under federal standards.

McCright v. Daniel B. Vasquez, Warden · filed 1994-05-05

The decision of a state habeas proceeding has collateral estoppel effect, precluding an identical issue from being relitigated in a subsequent section 1983 action, if the state habeas court afforded a full and fair opportunity for the issue to be heard and determined under federal standards.

Section 1983 claims are subject to res judicata, and a prior federal habeas judgment may preclude the same claim.

Jimison v. Brenda M. Burns, Ed Maynard · filed 1994-06-16

Res judicata applies to claims brought under section 1983. ... Thus, a prior judgment in a federal habeas corpus proceeding may have preclusive effect in a section 1983 action.

A state habeas judgment on the merits can preclude a § 1983 action if the habeas court gave the claimant a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue under federal standards.

Davis v. S.R. Campbell · filed 1994-06-28

A state habeas proceeding decided on the merits can be the basis for precluding a section 1983 action in federal court "if the state habeas court afforded a full and fair opportunity for the issue to be heard and determined under the federal standards." Silverton v. Department of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Silverton v. Regan, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).

Section 1983 civil rights actions are subject to collateral estoppel under applicable state law.

Brown v. City of Hialeah · filed 1994-09-08

Collateral estoppel rules fully apply to civil rights actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Section 1983 action may be barred by res judicata when its issues could have been litigated in an earlier state proceeding.

Garry v. Geils · filed 1995-01-19

That Mr. Garry and Mr. Thompson bring their lawsuit under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act does not preclude this conclusion. It is appropriate to apply res judicata to bar a civil rights action if the action involves issues which could have been, but were not, litigated in a prior state proceeding.

A Section 1983 claim is not barred by res judicata merely because the claimant did not join it with a related state claim subject to a shorter filing period.

Hayes v. City of Seattle · filed 1995-02-13

Consequently, a section 1983 claim is not foreclosed under res judicata by a claimant’s failure to join it with a state claim which must be brought within a shorter period.

Section 1983 does not let a litigant avoid state-law res judicata principles after litigating the same cause of action in state court.

Burgess v. UNH · filed 1995-03-28

Moreover, a litigant may not avoid this application of state law principles of res iudicata by styling a subsequent federal lawsuit as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims in Montana courts are barred by res judicata when the constitutional claims could have been raised in an earlier proceeding.

State Ex Rel. Harlem Irrigation District v. Montana Seventeenth Judicial District Court · filed 1995-05-04

We hold that the doctrine of resjudicata does bar § 1983 claims in Montana's courts when the constitutional claims could have been raised in an earlier proceeding, but were not.

Section 1983 does not exempt a federal civil rights suit from applicable state-law res judicata principles after a prior state-court judgment.

Homo v. Henniker, et al · filed 1995-07-06

That plaintiff's subsequent federal lawsuit is styled as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is insufficient to prevent the application of state-law principles of res judicata.

A state criminal judgment may collaterally estop a § 1983 plaintiff from relitigating an issue already litigated there.

Boudette v. William Curtis Singer City of Cottonwood, Arizona, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1995-08-07

A federal civil rights plaintiff may be collaterally estopped from litigating a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claim by a state court criminal judgment in which the same issue already has been litigated.

A Section 1983 claim is barred by res judicata when an earlier California mandamus judgment resolved the same primary right and the claimant could have raised the constitutional claims there.

Ferrell v. County of San Diego · filed 1995-09-22

We affirm the district court on the basis that Ferrell's section 1983 action, alleging violations of his right to equal protection and due process, is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

A § 1983 damages claim following successful habeas relief is not barred by res judicata when the habeas court could not award damages.

Campbell v. Illinois Department of Corrections · filed 1995-11-28

Accordingly, Campbell could not file his Section 1983 claim until the state granted his habeas corpus petition. Therefore, as “statutory and jurisdictional” barriers precluded Campbell’s recovery of damages in his initial action, res judicata will not bar his subsequent Section 1983 claim for damages, even though it arises from the same factual circumstances.

Section 1983 claims challenging a search warrant are barred by collateral estoppel when the warrant’s validity was resolved against the plaintiff in a prior federal criminal trial.

Depugh v. Swearingin · filed 1995-12-15

To the extent the claims in DePugh's section 1983 complaint challenged the validity of the state warrant, the District Court properly decided DePugh was collaterally estopped from pursuing these claims, because these issues were resolved against him in his federal criminal trial.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for enforcing an existing federal right, so ordinary claim and issue preclusion apply when that right was addressed in a prior adjudication.

Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre · filed 1995-12-27

Thus, in order to maintain a cause of action under section 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he has been deprived of some cognizable federal right by someone acting under color of state law. ... If a claim or issue related to that federal right has been determined in a prior adjudication, the established rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply.

Federal courts must give state-court judgments res judicata and collateral-estoppel effect in § 1983 actions; adding state-official defendants bound by the prior judgment does not defeat preclusion.

Krug v. Kenney · filed 1995-12-27

We affirm. See Piatt v. MacDougal, 773 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.1985) (federal courts hearing a Sec. 1983 claim must give collateral estoppel and res judicata effect to state court judgments). The res judicata effect of the prior judgment is not undermined by the fact that Krug has named additional defendants in the federal action.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by collateral estoppel when a state criminal proceeding has already decided the same issue.

Lato v. Sieverman · filed 1996-02-15

The principle of collateral estoppel applies in Section 1983 actions to bar the relitigation of claims previously decided in a state criminal action.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by collateral estoppel when the same federal constitutional issue was decided in a prior criminal proceeding after a full and fair hearing.

DePugh v. Sutton · filed 1996-02-22

Collateral estoppel has been applied to civil rights actions brought pursuant to section 1983 to preclude relitigation of federal constitutional issues previously decided in prior criminal proceedings after a full and fair hearing.

Section 1983 does not permit relitigation of facts and issues decided in fairly conducted, judicial administrative proceedings when state courts would give those proceedings preclusive effect.

Gay v. Howard Grant Thomas Carter Robert Chambers Thomas Stewart Corporal Lockley · filed 1996-04-08

We agree with the magistrate and district judges that because the IGO proceedings were judicial in nature, were fairly conducted, and would be given preclusive effect by Maryland courts, Gay is collaterally estopped from using § 1983 to relitigate facts and issues decided against him in the earlier proceedings.

A prior Article 78 judgment can collaterally estop constitutional issues in a later § 1983 damages action when the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate them.

Giakoumelos v. Coughlin · filed 1996-06-20

Giakoumelos chose to litigate his claims by way of an Article 78 proceeding. Collateral estoppel in a subsequent § 1983 action is one of the risks attendant to his decision to follow that route.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the same preclusive effect for prior state court judgments that those judgments receive under state law.

Bar-Tec, Inc. v. Akrouche · filed 1997-03-25

In § 1983 actions, federal courts look to state law and give the judgments of state courts the same preclusive effect as would be given in the state in which the judgment-was rendered.

A § 1983 claim is barred by collateral estoppel when its underlying issue was fully and fairly litigated in state court.

McCurdy v. Sandoval · filed 1998-01-20

Appellant would bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim arising from his criminal conviction, but is collaterally estopped from doing so as the issue was fully and fairly litigated in state court.

A plaintiff who contested probable cause at a state preliminary hearing cannot relitigate that finding in a subsequent § 1983 action.

Smith v. Jeff Thornburg, Kenneth Slagle, Chris Line, Jim Claiborne, Ron Trentham, Mark Fortner, and the City o · filed 1998-02-13

The law of our Circuit provides that where "the state affords an opportunity for an accused to contest probable cause at a preliminary hearing and the accused does so, a finding of probable cause by the examining magistrate or state judge should foreclose relitigation of that finding in a subsequent § 1983 action." Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 175 (6th Cir.1987).

Section 1983 actions are subject to collateral estoppel for issues already decided in state court.

Perez v. D.M. Slayton E.M. Powers Mather Jones C.P. Matlock Garcia B. Carter Alex M. Astorga · filed 1998-02-19

The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in section 1983 actions to preclude the consideration of issues already decided in state court.

A state judgment on the merits bars a § 1983 claim based on the same asserted wrong between the same parties, even if the plaintiff did not raise the federal claim in state court.

Scoggin v. Terry Schrunk, Mayor of the City of Portland, Oregon · filed 1975-10-17

It is now established that where the federal constitutional claim is based on the same asserted wrong as was the subject of a state action, and where the parties are the same, res judicata will bar the federal constitutional claim whether it was asserted in state court or not, for the reason that the state judgment on the merits serves not only to bar every claim that was raised in state court but also to preclude the assertion of every legal theory or ground for recovery that might have been raised in support of the granting of the desired relief. ... This rule is made to apply to federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Francisco Enterprises v. Kirby, 482 F.2d 481, 485 & nn. 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916, 94 S.Ct. 1413, 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974).

A § 1983 action seeking to undo a state court’s removal of a judicial officer is barred by res judicata when it would collaterally attack that judgment.

Adams v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · filed 1980-12-09

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s order removing the plaintiff from office bars the instant § 1983 action under the doctrine of res judicata.

Section 1983 does not permit relitigation of a constitutional issue raised in state court and necessary to its decision, even if the state court did not expressly analyze the issue.

Huston v. Linscott · filed 1998-09-28

... where a constitutional issue has actually been raised in state court and was necessary to the court's decision, regardless of a lack of analysis, it may not be relitigated in a section 1983 action. ... These facts are sufficient to trigger the collateral estoppel bar, thereby precluding relitigation of the constitutional claims before this court.

A Section 1983 claim is not barred by collateral estoppel unless the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.

Clark v. Department of Correctional Services · filed 1983-06-08

However, collateral estoppel will not preclude continued litigation of an issue unless the litigant against whom it is invoked has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in a prior action. ... We find that the interests of justice will best be served by allowing plaintiff to pursue his § 1983 claim against the individual correction officers in the action before us.

Constitutional claims actually litigated and determined in state court cannot be relitigated in a Section 1983 action.

Vasquez v. Van Lindt · filed 1983-12-20

Consequently, we conclude that Vasquez is barred from relitigating these claims in a section 1983 federal action.

Section 1983 actions are subject to ordinary res judicata and collateral estoppel rules.

Colvin v. Deaton · filed 1984-01-13

Having found that cases brought under the Civil Rights Act are not exempted from the normal principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the court must now look to whether under Virginia law the courts of that state would give preclusive effect to the interdiction proceedings in Charlottesville Circuit Court held on June 28, 1982, as against the claims raised in this action.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by res judicata when the plaintiff raised or could have raised them in a prior state court proceeding that afforded due process.

Howkins v. Caldwell · filed 1984-01-17

Both res judicata and collateral estoppel have been applied to bar litigating claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In summary, this court concludes that based on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, Howkins is precluded from litigating claims that he either presented or could have presented in his Fulton County Superior Court action.

Section 1983 claims cannot relitigate search-and-seizure issues already fully and fairly litigated in state criminal proceedings.

Kirk v. Morrow · filed 1999-08-25

Kirk is collaterally estopped from relitigating Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure issues already fully and fairly litigated in the state court ... criminal proceedings against him.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by res judicata when they were litigated, or could have been litigated, in earlier state court proceedings.

Vance v. Bowen · filed 1984-02-13

Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits because the § 1983 claims asserted in the present complaint were actually litigated, or could have been litigated, in the state court proceedings.

Section 1983 civil rights actions are subject to res judicata under the same rules as other suits.

Joseph Hagee, Reed Mitchell Hagee and Raymond Jump v. City of Evanston, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1984-03-09

We note that this rule applies to civil rights actions under § 1983 as it does to other types of suits.

Section 1983 claims are subject to res judicata when they arise from the same cause of action as a previously adjudicated claim.

Roman v. Jury Selection Commission · filed 2001-07-16

Therefore, the Appellant’s present action under Section 1983 and the Constitution of Pennsylvania is barred under the theory of res judicata.

A § 1983 claim is not barred by a Nevada state employee’s administrative appeal when the appeal addresses different facts and offers narrower remedies.

Douglass-Woodruff v. Nevada · filed 2001-11-30

The district court dismissed Plaintiffs § 1983 claim on the basis of res judicata. We reverse the dismissal of the § 1983 claim because the facts pertinent to Plaintiffs § 1983 claim differ from those that the Nevada statute permits to be adjudicated in Plaintiffs administrative appeal. Nevada Statute § 284.390, the section under which Plaintiff brought her administrative appeal, permits the adjudication of the reasonableness only of a dismissal, demotion or suspension, and provides only reinstatement and back pay as remedies. Nevada Administrative Code § 281.305 grants a hearing to state employees who claim that reprisal or retaliatory action was taken against them for disclosing information concerning improper governmental action, but provides only injunctive relief. Therefore, the Nevada administrative appeal process does not provide Plaintiff with the same remedies that § 1983 does.

A prior Article 78 challenge to a prison disciplinary determination can collaterally estop a subsequent § 1983 action.

Cowart v. Pico · filed 2002-01-23

As we have previously stated, “Collateral estoppel in a subsequent § 1983 action is one of the risks” attendant to a decision to challenge a prison disciplinary determination in a proceeding brought pursuant to Article 78.

A collective bargaining arbitration has no collateral estoppel effect on a Section 1983 claim brought in New York state court.

Farooq v. New York State Office of Mental Health · filed 2002-06-20

The Supreme Court’s decision in McDonald is very persuasive in its determination that arbitrations under collective bargaining agreements should have no effect on section 1983 actions and in the court’s refusal to fashion a rule permitting collateral estoppel effect. For that reason, and for the reasons previously stated, the arbitration will have no collateral estoppel effect on the instant action, and defendant’s motion is denied on that issue.

Collateral estoppel applies to civil rights claims under § 1983.

Walker v. Vaughan · filed 2002-08-15

This doctrine is fully applicable to civil rights claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A government employee’s § 1983 due process action is not barred by res judicata merely because a court previously reviewed the employee’s administrative hearing.

Kirkcaldy v. Richmond County Board of Education · filed 2002-08-23

... the Court shall follow Davenport’s holding that a Section 1983 action asserting a violation of a governmental employee’s due process rights is not barred for res judicata purposes by a preceding judicial review of the employee’s administrative hearing.

Collateral estoppel can bar a Section 1983 plaintiff from relitigating an issue decided against him in a state criminal proceeding.

Thomas v. Herman · filed 2003-04-16

Thomas is collaterally es-topped from relitigating the issue of volun-tariness. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (collateral estoppel applies to section 1983 actions when a plaintiff attempts to rehtigate in federal court issues decided against him in a state court criminal proceeding); Lombardi v. City of El Cajon, 117 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.1997) (state court’s rulings are binding on a federal court if they are binding under state collateral estoppel law in section 1983 action).

A § 1983 claim challenging an arrest is barred by collateral estoppel when a state suppression hearing resolved the arrest’s legality after a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

Mitchell v. Hartnett · filed 2003-05-05

Thus, the same issue, the lawfulness of Mitchell’s arrest, was the subject of the suppression hearing and underlies this § 1983 action. Mitchell has not offered any reasons why he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his unlawful arrest claim in state court, and the Court is not aware of any such reasons from its review of the record. Accordingly, the determination by the state court is conclusive, and the instant action is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

Administrative findings do not preclude a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in the administrative proceedings.

Locurto v. Giuliani · filed 2003-06-24

Although the Court concurs with the district court’s analysis, and that of the Third Circuit, it need not decide that legal issue because it concludes that plaintiffs did not receive a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate their First Amendment claims in the course of their respective administrative proceedings.

Res judicata can bar an action brought under § 1983 after an adverse state court determination of the federal constitutional claims.

Francisco Enterprises, Inc., a Corporation v. Kirby · filed 1973-08-20

Further, res judicata principles have been expressly applied to actions brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by a prior state court judgment, including as to issues that could have been litigated in the state proceeding.

Lawrence Vandenplas and Barbara Vandenplas v. City of Muskego · filed 1985-01-21

This rule applies to § 1983 actions with respect to the issues actually litigated, Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980), and also issues which could have been but were not litigated in the state court proceedings, Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196, 198-99 (7th Cir.1982).

A sufficiently firm state court decision can preclude relitigation of the same claim in a federal § 1983 suit, even when the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the state action before entry of judgment.

Employees Own Federal Credit Union v. City of Defiance · filed 1985-01-17

That decision is “sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.” The Credit Union had a full and fair opportunity to litigate its claim in state court, and we see no reason to allow a party to get an adverse judgment in state court and turn around and sue on the same claim in federal court. One bite at the apple is enough. If federal law required exhaustion of state remedies in § 1983 cases, as in habeas corpus, perhaps some relaxation of the doctrine of res judicata would be justified. But there is no such requirement and no reason to permit the same case to be tried in both courts.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the preclusive effect that the rendering state's law gives a prior state court judgment.

City Of Canton, Ohio v. Maynard · filed 1985-06-28

In determining what preclusive effect to give to a prior state court judgment, federal courts must give the same effect to that judgment as would be given it under the law of the state that rendered the judgment. ... The Supreme Court has explicitly applied this rule to actions under section 1983. ... Thus, we conclude that at least in respect to the City of Canton and its public officials, the district court properly dismissed their complaint.

Section 1983 actions are subject to res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Raffe v. Doe · filed 1985-10-11

The Supreme Court has removed any doubt that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to actions brought under § 1983. ... On the basis of that review, I think it plain that the instant action is barred by the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel set out above.

A prior New York Article 78 judgment does not bar a later § 1983 damages claim arising from the same facts when Article 78 cannot provide the full measure of relief.

Giano v. Walter J. Flood, Warden, Nccc and Saul Jackson, Commissioner, Nccc, Defendants · filed 1986-10-20

In Davidson we specifically held that a prior judgment in a New York State Article 78 proceeding would not preclude, under the doctrine of res judicata, a later § 1983 civil rights claim for damages. ... There is no doubt, therefore, that Davidson controls the case before us on this appeal.

Section 1983 claims can be barred by res judicata when a prior final judgment involves the same parties, facts, and damages and could have included the claim.

Osiris Enterprises v. Borough of Whitehall · filed 2005-11-08

Because the present case and Case No. GD 03-12928 involve the identical parties, arise out of the same factual allegations, and seek compensation for the same damages, and because all of the claims asserted in the present case (the remaining Section 1983 claim and the dismissed claims) could have been raised in Case No. GD 03-12928, it is clear that plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim in the present case is barred by res judicata as a result of the final judgment entered by Judge O’Brien in Case No. GD 03-12928.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by a state-court judgment when the state courts would give it preclusive effect and the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

Crocker v. Wetlaufer · filed 2005-12-08

We therefore agree with the district court’s reasoning and conclusions in the present case. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96, 104 (1980) (federal courts afford state-court judgments preclusive effect in § 1983 cases whenever the state courts themselves would do so, provided the adjudicating court acted within its proper jurisdiction and the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the federal claim).

Section 1983 actions in federal court are subject to the preclusive effect a prior state-court judgment would have under that state's law.

Torromeo v. Town of Fremont · filed 2006-02-21

Under federal law, "a federal court must give to a state- court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the state in which the judgment was entered." ... This principle applies to a § 1983 action brought in federal court following a state-court judgment.

Section 1983 does not provide an exception to res judicata when the state court afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the constitutional claims.

Claud-Chambers v. City of West Haven · filed 2006-03-29

Because the state court has provided a full and fair opportunity for plaintiffs to prosecute their claims, no exception to the res judicata principle applies.

Section 1983 claims can be brought in state court and may be barred by res judicata when they could have been raised in an earlier state action.

Osiris Enterprises v. Borough of Whitehall · filed 2007-06-06

Because the Appellants could have raised all of their claims, including the RICO and § 1983 claims, in state court, the doctrine of res judicata applies and bars those claims.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by res judicata when a final state court judgment covers the same matter.

Tomsick v. Jones · filed 1979-02-06

Given these facts, I can only conclude that the state action as a matter of res judicata bars the present action. If plaintiff was dissatisfied with the award in the state action his remedy was to appeal it. Since he has failed to do so, that judgment is final and this court is precluded from retrying the same matter in federal court. Under these circumstances a plaintiff may not litigate in a state court and then attempt to use the state court decision as a base for launching a federal court action.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue for deprivation of constitutional rights, but res judicata can bar claims that could have been raised in a prior state proceeding.

Schiavulli v. Aubin · filed 1980-12-17

Because the prerequisites for application of res judicata to plaintiff’s action against the School Committee defendants have been met, and because plaintiff did not in fact raise her constitutional claims in the state proceedings, the next question must be whether plaintiff might have raised such claims before the state tribunals. ... However, if the constitutional elements of her claim could have been considered in the state proceedings, the doctrine will bar plaintiff from now litigating such issues in this Court.

Section 1983 permits a person to seek damages for violations of constitutional and statutory rights, but a prior judgment on the same injury can bar the claim.

Jeanne HARRINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VANDALIA-BUTLER BOARD OF EDUCATION Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1981-05-22

We find that the differences between Title VII and § 1983 do not mandate the conclusion that res judicata is inapplicable to this case. Whatever other differences exist between the two statutes, for appellant’s purpose in this litigation, the only distinction is the remedy available under each.

Section 1983 does not override state preclusion law to permit federal claims to be litigated after a state court judgment.

Griffin v. State of Rhode Island · filed 1985-04-16

Section 1983 does not override state preclusion law by allowing plaintiffs to first proceed to judgment in state courts and then turn to federal courts for adjudication of federal claims.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by res judicata when claimants freely pursue state court appeals and have an adequate opportunity to raise their federal claims.

Fellowship Of Christ Church v. Thorburn · filed 1985-05-21

The state court defendants "freely and without reservation" appealed Judge Thorburn's order within the Michigan courts. They actively pursued appeals and motions for reconsideration before the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court. Therefore, the policy concern for the ability and willingness of states to vindicate constitutional rights, which Sec. 1983 embodies, is not implicated in the present case.

The defense of res judicata applies to actions under Section 1983.

Lesiak v. Thomas E. Ferguson, Aduitor · filed 1985-05-29

It is well settled that the defense of res judicata is applicable to actions under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 actions are subject to res judicata.

The Sewer Alert Committee v. Pierce County · filed 1986-06-12

Res judicata applies to Section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the claim-preclusive effect of an earlier state-court judgment.

Endsley v. City of Macon · filed 2008-11-20

Endsley concedes that the Superior Court of Bibb County is a court of competent jurisdiction that could have decided his § 1983 claims,1 and his contention that he was not required to assert his federal claims in state court is without merit.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by a prior state-court judgment under res judicata even when the plaintiff did not raise them in the earlier action.

Semler v. Klang · filed 2009-03-03

Of course, we are mindful that, in the earlier State Court action, the Plaintiff did not expressly include claims under Section 1983, and the Minnesota Constitution. Such a difference in the legal theories of recovery, however, does not vitiate the preclusive effect of the prior State Court Judgment.

Section 1983 claims are barred by res judicata when they arise from the same transactions as claims finally resolved in state grievance proceedings against a party in privity with the later defendants.

Brooks v. Arthur · filed 2009-04-14

Because the Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims arise from the same transactions as the retaliation claims that were resolved in final, valid judgments on the merits before the EDR hearing officer, and because the Defendants are in privity with the Department of Corrections, Counts I and II of the amended complaints are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and will be dismissed.

Section 1983 suits are subject to res judicata when a constitutional claim could have been litigated in a prior state court action that reached final judgment.

Mertes v. Mertes · filed 1972-11-02

Furthermore, res judicata is equally applicable to suits brought under the Civil Rights Act.

A § 1983 action is subject to res judicata when a prior state court judgment conclusively resolved the same federal issues.

Brown v. Georgia Power Company · filed 1973-08-15

Casting the complaint upon a civil rights jurisdictional basis, however, cannot operate to avoid the thrust of Angel that conclusively litigated federal questions are res judicata.

A state court’s dismissal of an untimely appeal from an agency decision does not give that decision res judicata effect in a § 1983 suit.

Darnell v. Lloyd · filed 1975-05-13

The fact that the Court of Common Pleas refused to reverse the Commissioner’s determination because Darnell’s appeal was taken late adds no res judicata effect to the determination.

A § 1983 claim is barred when the plaintiff unsuccessfully raised the identical issue in state proceedings.

Graves v. Ennis J. Olgiati, Chairman of the New York State Board of Parole · filed 1977-03-07

The district court was correct in asserting the principle of law that a claim under § 1983 will not be entertained in federal court once a litigant unsuccessfully has raised the identical issue in state proceedings.

Section 1983 claims are subject to res judicata when the same claims were actually litigated and determined in a prior state court proceeding.

Halprin v. New York City Conciliation & Appeals Board · filed 1981-02-26

The doctrine of res judicata, even as narrowly defined in the context of section 1983 civil rights actions, normally operates to preclude a federal court from adjudicating a claim that has been the subject of a prior adjudication in state court.

Section 1983 actions are subject to res judicata.

Williams v. Red Bank Board of Education · filed 1981-03-02

It is also clear that the principles of res judicata apply with full force to actions brought under Section 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by res judicata when the same constitutional issue was raised and implicitly resolved in prior state court proceedings.

Di Rosa v. Dodd · filed 1981-05-05

In addition to being without standing, Schiliro’s § 1983 claims are also barred by res judicata. ... While no state court specifically addressed the constitutional question in its opinion, Schiliro did raise the constitutional question, and further, the state court by implication ruled on the constitutional challenge in concluding that the nomination was proper. These factors are sufficient to trigger the res judicata bar and thereby preclude a relitigation of those constitutional claims before this court.

A § 1983 action is not barred by res judicata when applying the doctrine to an earlier state action would cause manifest unfairness.

Boucher v. Dramstad · filed 1981-09-17

Evaluation of the events which transpired in the state court proceedings convinces this court that it would be remiss to apply the doctrine of res judicata so as to bar the plaintiff’s § 1983 action, since to do so would result in manifest unfairness to the plaintiff.

Section 1983 claims are barred by res judicata when they arise from the same facts as a final state court action and could have been raised there.

Bews v. Town of Carroll · filed 2009-06-15

Similarly, the Bews failed to raise their § 1983 claims during the state court proceeding, and just as the doctrine of res judicata blocked Lovely from later asserting his constitutional claim in a new federal action, so too does that principle bar the Bews from now asserting their § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law.

Smith v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-06-29

The doctrine of res judicata precludes Smith’s section 1983 claim against the District in this case and, accordingly, the Court will grant the District’s motion to dismiss.

A § 1983 claim may be barred by res judicata when the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to litigate the issues before a state agency and did not appeal its final decision.

Olson v. Morris · filed 1999-08-27

We hold that the doctrine of res judicata prevents Dr. Olson from relitigating in federal court legal and factual issues that were, or could have been, litigated before the Board. ... Olson appeals only his S 1983 claim for a permanent injunction prohibiting the revocation of his license to practice psychology and prohibiting further conduct depriving Olson of his religious freedom.

Section 1983 does not prevent a prior state-court judgment from barring a claim that could have been raised in the state action.

Southfield Education Ass'n v. Southfield Board of Education · filed 2014-06-26

Thus, the district court was correct when it concluded that if state court decisions have preclusive effect on § 1983 claims that were not raised in a previous state court action, then Plaintiff’s federal due process claim is likewise precluded by the state court decision finding that Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s state due process claim.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims may be barred by res judicata when they were or could have been raised in an earlier administrative hearing between the same parties that resulted in a final judgment on the merits.

Earley v. Kirchmeyer · filed 2018-12-05

The district court properly dismissed the official-capacity claims against defendant Mitchell as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Earley’s claims were raised, or could have been raised, in the administrative hearing between the same parties that resulted in a final judgment on the merits.

A § 1983 claim may be barred by res judicata when it was or could have been raised in a final administrative proceeding between the same parties.

Ezor v. State Bar of California · filed 2019-02-22

The district court properly dismissed Ezor’s due process claim as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Ezor’s claim was raised, or could have been raised, in an administrative proceeding between the same parties that resulted in a final judgment on the merits.

A Section 1983 damages claim is not barred by an earlier Article 78 proceeding if the plaintiff may have been unable to seek those damages there.

Best Payphones, Inc. v. City of New York · filed 2019-10-04

Under these circumstances, the Court, like Magistrate Judge Tiscione, sees no reason to depart from binding Second Circuit precedent which holds that an Article 78 proceeding does not bar a subsequent civil-rights claim for damages where a plaintiff may have been barred from seeking such damages in the Article 78 proceeding.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to state a claim when a decision not to renew an otherwise terminable contract was based on the employee's exercise of constitutionally protected First Amendment freedoms.

Jacobs v. Stratton · filed 1980-08-20

It is clear that even though Jacobs could be discharged for no reason whatever, or for a variety of reasons, he may nonetheless state a claim under § 1983 if the decision not to renew his contract was based on his exercise of constitutionally protected First Amendment freedoms.

Section 1983 permits a teacher without tenure to challenge a school’s refusal to reemploy him when it is arbitrary and capricious without substantial evidentiary support in violation of due process, or is retaliation for protected speech.

Boyce v. ALEXIS I. duPONT SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 1972-04-28

The Court accepts the principle that even though a teacher is without tenure it is a violation of the Civil Rights Act for a school to refuse to reemploy him (a) arbitrarily and capriciously for a reason not supported by substantial evidence in derogation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, or (b) because he has exercised First Amendment rights of free speech. See cases cited at page 6 of the summary judgment opinion dated March 23, 1972.

Section 1983 requires a non-tenured teacher challenging an arbitrary and capricious contract non-renewal to attack each stated reason on an identified ground of arbitrariness or capriciousness.

Drown v. Portsmouth School District · filed 1971-12-01

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that a non-renewal was arbitrary and capricious, a teacher must at least attack each of the stated reasons on one of the grounds indicated above.

Section 1983 discrimination claims require proof of discriminatory purpose, and intentional gender-based discrimination can support relief.

Vanguard Justice Society, Inc. v. Hughes · filed 1979-03-20

In their light, even if plaintiffs’ claims are considered under the standards of § 1983 which require a showing of discriminatory purpose, plaintiffs have made the requisite showing of intent.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging racially discriminatory procedures to show both that the procedures burden the plaintiff's race more than others and that they were instituted or maintained for a discriminatory purpose.

Walker v. Robbins Hose Co. No. 1, Inc. · filed 1979-02-08

To make out a claim under § 1983, Walker must show that the recruiting and membership procedures burden blacks more than whites and that those procedures were instituted or maintained for a discriminatory purpose.

Section 1983 requires proof of discriminatory intent, in addition to discriminatory impact, when an Equal Protection claim challenges allegedly discriminatory employment practices.

Chavez v. Tempe Union High School District No. 213 · filed 1977-12-05

Because section 1983 incorporates by reference the terms of the Constitution itself, 11 it appears that an action under this statute at least to the extent it relies upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires proof not only of discriminatory impact, but also of discriminatory intent as established by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976).

Section 1983 requires proof of purposeful discriminatory acts, not merely discriminatory impact, when the claim alleges sex discrimination.

Perham v. Ladd · filed 1977-07-28

An additional element, however, is required in a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (1970). The plaintiff must show purposeful discriminatory acts. Something more than discriminatory impact must be shown.

Section 1983 permits an equal-protection claim based on racially discriminatory practices without alleging or proving that defendants intended or were motivated to discriminate.

Castro v. Beecher · filed 1971-12-06

All parties recognize and this court holds that to succeed in an action alleging that, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, defendants by racially discriminatory practices deprived plaintiffs of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to the equal protection of the laws plaintiffs need neither allege nor prove that defendants acted with intent or motive to discriminate.

A § 1983 claim based on racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause requires purposeful discrimination, not merely differential impact.

Gomez v. Illinois State Board of Education · filed 1985-07-24

This rule applies to § 1983 claims where the underlying cause of action is for racial discrimination as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. ... Therefore, the plaintiffs’ complaint, based on Title VI, the Equal Protection Clause and § 1983, is dismissed because it does not allege purposeful discrimination.

An equal-protection claim under § 1983 requires purposeful or intentional discrimination.

Minority Police Officers Ass'n v. City of South Bend · filed 1985-09-05

The same basic standard, purposeful or intentional discrimination, is also applicable to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on equal protection grounds.

A § 1983 employment-discrimination claim based on intentional sex discrimination fails without sufficient proof of discriminatory intent.

Brunet v. City of Columbus · filed 1986-07-14

In light of the evidence before it, the Court cannot draw the inference of intentional discrimination suggested by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ evidence of intent to discriminate is at best impressionistic. Further, there is substantial evidence suggesting the absence of discrimination. Accordingly, judgment must be rendered for the defendants on plaintiffs’ claim of intentional discrimination under § 1983.

A § 1983 employment-discrimination claim requires proof of purposeful discrimination.

Daniels v. Board Of Education Of The Ravenna City School District · filed 1987-01-23

Like disparate treatment under Title VII, sections 1981 and 1983 require proof of purposeful discrimination.

A § 1983 sex-discrimination claimant must prove intentional less-favorable treatment because of sex; disparate impact alone is insufficient.

Catlett v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission · filed 1987-09-09

To prevail under section 1983 the individuals and the class had to prove Missouri intentionally treated them less favorably because of their sex.

Section 1983 requires intentional discrimination for an equal protection employment claim; disparate impact alone does not establish liability.

Armstrong v. Chicago Park District · filed 1988-08-12

That “disparate impact” theory of liability is not available under Section 1983, because only intentional discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause (American Nurses’ Association v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 722 (7th Cir.1986)).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that discriminatory purpose motivated the decision, after which the defendant bears the burden of showing the same decision would have been made without discrimination.

Berl v. County of Westchester · filed 1987-09-14

Under § 1983, plaintiffs claim that the defendant violated their Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. In this dual-motivation situation, plaintiffs must show that a sexually discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the County’s decision. If the County then fails to carry the burden of establishing that the same decision would have been made absent the discriminatory motive, an equal protection violation is established. Hervey v. City of Little Rock, 787 F.2d 1223, 1233 (8th Cir.1986), citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 270-71 n. 21, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563-64, 566 n. 21, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). For the reasons discussed above, the County has carried its burden, and accordingly the § 1983 claim is dismissed.

Section 1983 requires gross or culpable conduct for liability based on a constitutional deprivation; mere negligence or omission is insufficient.

Mullins v. City of River Rouge · filed 1972-02-22

Assuming simple negligence, the question that is presented is whether this is sufficient to impose liability under Section 1983. ... So Monroe lends no support to the proposition that negligence, or omission, is sufficient to create liability. ... It is perhaps difficult to create an all encompassing rule of constitutional fault. Nonetheless, this court would adopt the principles enunciated in Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970), in an opinion by Judge Sobeloff. The court there stated that gross or culpable conduct was the proper standard to apply in judging police officers’ conduct. ... It is with this guideline that defendant officers’ conduct must be judged. Mere negligence is insufficient. ... It is apparent from the facts of this case that there is no gross negligence. A failure to correctly diagnose and treat plaintiff, when no request for aid was made, and plaintiff’s injuries were not obvious, cannot and does not constitute gross negligence.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a mere difference of opinion between a physician and a patient, absent allegations suggesting shocking or barbarous conduct.

Webb v. Oswald · filed 1971-12-09

The plaintiff’s allegation that he was refused proper therapy and counseling fails to suggest even by fair implication the possibility of “shocking conduct” or “barbarous acts.” ... “A difference of opinion between a physician and a patient does not give rise to a constitutional right or sustain a claim under § 1983.” ... That claim must, therefore, be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of constitutional or federally protected rights under color of state law, but does not redress mere negligence or inadequate medical treatment.

Brown v. Cliff · filed 1972-01-18

Viewing plaintiff’s complaint and supporting affidavit with the most favorable inference to plaintiff, I conclude, at most, plaintiff indicates possible negligence, or inadequate medical treatment by the defendants. Such purported harm is not one cognizable under § 1983, ... as stated in Nettles v. Rundle, 453 F.2d 889 (3 Cir., 1971): ... “While such negligence is a tort, cognizable under state law, it does not amount to such a denial of a constitutional or federally protected right as can be redressed under the Civil Rights Act.”

Section 1983 makes a properly alleged constitutional violation involving a convict’s denial of medical treatment by a custodian justiciable in federal court.

Frank v. Mracek · filed 1973-01-15

Proper allegations thereof by a convict against his custodian would state a violation of a constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment justiciable in federal courts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a pretrial detainee when prison officials knowingly deny medically accepted treatment or ignore prescribed treatment, violating due process.

Goodman v. Wagner · filed 1982-12-15

We conclude that these allegations properly state a claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Medically directed isolation of a prisoner reasonably suspected of carrying AIDS does not violate a federal constitutional or statutory right actionable under § 1983.

Judd v. Packard · filed 1987-09-24

In short, the conduct complained of here violated no federal constitutional or statutory right for which recovery of damages may be had under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a prisoner's disagreement with medical treatment, or negligence in that treatment, actionable.

Collins v. Leeves · filed 1998-05-25

Collins’ assertion amounts to a disagreement with the medical treatment provided, or, at most, negligence, which is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a committed patient to challenge treatment decisions in a damages suit after exhausting administrative remedies.

Matter of Kolodrubetz · filed 1987-09-01

Treatment decisions may be challenged by the patient before the review board and by a suit for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after administrative remedies have been exhausted.

Section 1983 creates liability for redress in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding, but does not itself provide or alter rights to attorney fees.

Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of City of Jackson, Tennessee · filed 1972-01-07

The Civil Rights Statute under which this suit was brought, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, does not provide for counsel fees, but does create liability ". . . in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." This statute therefore neither creates nor changes any rights with respect to attorney fees, apart from prevailing equitable principles.

Section 1983 creates liability in an action for redress but does not provide for or alter rights to attorney fees, which remain governed by prevailing equitable principles.

Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of Jackson · filed 1972-01-07

The Civil Rights Statute under which this suit was brought, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, does not provide for counsel fees, but does create liability “ . . . in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” This statute therefore neither creates nor changes any rights with respect to attorney fees, apart from prevailing equitable principles.

Section 1983 does not itself carry authority to award attorney’s fees into a case resolved purely by construction of state law.

Davis v. Coffee City, Texas · filed 1972-08-10

In the first place, the decision of the court does not rest on federal law. Whatever authority a federal equity court might exercise under § 1983 to award attorney’s fees does not automatically carry over to decisions resting purely on construction of a state statutory scheme.

Section 1983 does not expressly provide for attorney’s fees, but a court may award a reasonable attorney’s fee to a successful civil-rights litigant suing under § 1983.

Lyle v. Teresi · filed 1971-04-17

Section 1983 has no provision for allowance of attorneys fees. There is a line of cases, however, where attorneys fees have been awarded to a successful civil rights litigant where the action has been brought under § 1983. For the most part these authorities relate to racial discrimination in educational institutions, but they are none the less Section 1983 cases and fees are allowed in the court’s discretion. They are allowed not simply to penalize litigants, but to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief.

Section 1983 does not itself specifically provide for attorney-fee awards, and judicial immunity bars an attorney-fee award against judges for acts performed in their judicial capacity.

Smith v. Smith · filed 1973-09-09

Attorney fees have been awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even though the statute does not specifically provide for such awards. ... Plaintiffs do not dispute the proposition that judicial immunity bars a damage action against a judge for actions within his legal capacity. Rather they assert that because judicial immunity does not bar injunctive relief against judicial officers, ... the doctrine should not bar an award of attorney fees incidental thereto. The former proposition does not compel the latter. On the contrary, the same policies which underlie judicial immunity to damage actions prohibit the award of attorney fees in this case.

Section 1983 permits a court to award attorney’s fees in a § 1983 action under the private-attorney-general or public-interest rationale, even when the action does not challenge racial discrimination.

Pennsylvania v. Charleroi Area School District · filed 1973-10-05

The case before the Court was commenced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute which does not specifically provide for the award of attorney’s fees to the successful litigant.1 Nevertheless, a number of federal courts have awarded counsel fees in § 1983 suits, utilizing both the Newman and Mills guidelines outlined above as the basis for their decisions. ... Although some of the cases cited above involved actions against racial discrimination, the argument that attorney’s fees are warranted only in racial discrimination cases is without merit. The broad formulation of both the Newman and Mills decisions in terms of the furtherance of the public interest, whatever the particular focus of the statute involved, taken together with the broad language of § 1983 itself, serve on their face to negate the proposition that fees may be awarded only when racial discrimination is challenged.

Section 1983 authorizes damages when a defendant acting under color of state law deprives a plaintiff of a constitutional right, and permits counsel fees under the Newman v. Piggie Park standard unless special circumstances would make an award unjust.

Thonen v. Jenkins · filed 1974-04-11

This Court is of the opinion that the “unreasonable obdurate obstinacy” standard is no longer applicable to a § 1983 action. ... This Court holds today that recent interpretations of the Civil Rights Act and public policy dictate that the standards regarding an award of counsel fees as set in Newman v. Piggie Park be applied to § 1983 eases. ... The only elements which need to be present in order to establish a claim for damages under the Civil Rights Act are that the defendant has deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right and that the defendant’s conduct was under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a court to award attorney’s fees as part of an equitable remedy when a successful civil-rights action benefits the plaintiff class and effectuates strong congressional policy, regardless of defendants’ good or bad faith.

Wallace v. House · filed 1974-06-06

Understandably, the “private attorney general” rationale increasingly has been applied to statutes which did not provide for attorney’s fees, but which do embody strong national policy to vindicate personal rights — most specifically, the Civil Rights Acts passed in the wake of the Civil War: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983. ... The three-judge court in Alabama, in awarding attorney’s fees under § 1983, summarized the rule: “If, pursuant to this action, plaintiffs have benefited their class and have effectuated a strong congressional policy, they are entitled to attorneys’ fees regardless of defendants’ good or bad faith. Indeed, under such circumstances, the award loses much of its discretionary character and becomes part of the effective remedy a court should fashion to encourage public-minded suits . and to carry out congressional policy.” Sims v. Amos, 340 F.Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala., 1972), aff’d sub nom. Amos v. Sims, 409 U.S. 942, 93 S.Ct. 290, 34 L.Ed.2d 215 (1972). ... While the Board of Aldermen’s steadfast adherence to a constitutionally unacceptable plan during the course of this litigation would amount to bad faith, and despite the availability of that ground, we have decided to base our award on the far broader-considerations of equity contained in the common benefit and “private attorney general” notions. ... We further conclude that attorney’s fees should be allowed to plaintiffs’ attorney under the circumstances of this case for the reasons indicated.

Section 1983 gives a court discretionary authority to award attorney’s fees in an appropriate case, although the statute itself provides no explicit encouragement for such an award.

McAuliffe v. Carlson · filed 1975-01-16

The Court does have discretionary authority to award fees in a § 1983 suit, Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service Commission, 497 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1974), but the facts of the present case do not make such an award appropriate.

Section 1983 does not by itself entitle a successful plaintiff to an award of attorney’s fees.

Roane v. Callisburg Independent School District · filed 1975-04-18

The mere fact that the litigation in this case involves issues of civil rights does not in itself justify an award of attorney’s fees. The plaintiff sued only in his own behalf and the judgment does not directly benefit any other persons or class. This is not a case in which a damage award was unlikely or in which the costs of proving a case for injunctive relief were disproportionately high. The applicability of § 1983 does not automatically justify an award of attorney’s fees to the injured party.

A § 1983 violation in this case did not entitle the plaintiffs to attorney fees, and any proven § 1983 violation was also a Title VII violation.

Peltier v. City of Fargo · filed 1975-06-25

Under the facts of the present case, plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney fees for any part of the suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nonetheless, it is the finding of this Court that any proven violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is also a violation of Title VII. For the purpose of determining attorney fees, the Court will consider all relief granted as being granted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

Section 1983's successful invocation alone does not justify an award of attorneys’ fees.

Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, Etc. · filed 1975-09-12

As we suggested in Roane v. Callisburg Independent School District, 511 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1975), the successful invocation of § 1983 is in itself insufficient to justify an award of attorneys’ fees.

Section 1983 does not provide for attorneys’ fees.

United States v. School Bd. of City of Suffolk · filed 1976-08-20

The plaintiffs are suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which does not provide for attorneys’ fees.

Section 1983 permits an award of attorney’s fees in the court’s discretion.

Ramey v. Harber · filed 1977-04-22

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an allowance of attorney’s fees is within the discretion of the court.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff who proves a constitutional violation but no actual damages to seek nominal damages and attorney fees, subject to qualified immunity for individual state defendants.

Murray Iii v. Board Of Trustees, University Of Louisville · filed 1981-09-09

While we accept as not clearly erroneous his finding that plaintiff failed to prove actual damages, the Supreme Court's holdings in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.11, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1049 n.11, 1053, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), require remand for the District Judge to consider in this § 1983 action plaintiff's claims for nominal damages and attorney fees. In addition, in considering judgments against the individual state defendants, the District Judge must (but apparently did not) grant such defendants the "qualified immunity" required by Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), and Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975).

Section 1983 permits recovery of attorney’s fees and expenses that are intimately connected with a constitutional deprivation.

Winkler v. County of DeKalb · filed 1981-12-23

These attorney’s fees and expenses are losses intimately connected with that deprivation and are compensable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support prevailing-party status for a cause of action added after the relevant decisions and later dismissed.

Van Emmerik v. Montana Dakota Utilities Co. · filed 1983-04-13

It is impossible, therefore, to conclude that appellant prevailed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 does not entitle a party who fails to prevail to recover attorney fees.

Stein v. James · filed 1983-04-12

This reversal also disposes of Stein’s appeal, in that she is not ... entitled to recover attorney fees under § 1983 because of her failure to prevail.

Section 1983 does not provide a route to recover attorney fees incurred to enforce the EAHCA when the EAHCA remedy is exclusive.

Anderson v. Community Unit District No. 228 · filed 1983-05-24

This court accepts the decision of the Anderson court, insofar as it applies to attorney fees under EAHCA, and holds that attorney fees incurred as a result of an attempt to enforce the provisions of EAHCA are not allowable either under the terms of EAHCA, or via a related section 1983 action.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 action may be assessed the defendant's attorney's fees when the action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe · filed 1985-02-26

The plaintiff bringing an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be assessed the defendant’s attorneys’ fees if “the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”

A § 1983 plaintiff may be required to pay the defendant's attorney fees when the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe · filed 1985-05-22

The plaintiff bringing an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 may be assessed the defendant's attorneys' fees if "the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation."

A prevailing § 1983 plaintiff may settle the right to attorney fees, and counsel cannot later seek § 1988 fees after consenting to dismissal with each side bearing its own costs.

Blackwell ex rel. Blackwell v. Board of Offender Rehabilitation · filed 1985-05-22

When Roberson permitted an Order to be entered dismissing the case, his right to submit a motion for fees ended.

A § 1983 theory cannot support recovery of attorney's fees when the record and pleadings contain no evidentiary basis for a civil-rights violation.

White v. Commissioners Court of Kimble County · filed 1986-02-05

We find no evidentiary basis in the record or pleadings before us to support White’s complaint of a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).

Joint and several liability for attorney fees and costs is appropriate where defendants conspired to violate § 1983 rights.

Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County · filed 1986-05-14

In light of the above finding that a conspiracy among all defendants existed to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, the Court holds that the imposition of joint and several liability against all defendants for fees and costs is appropriate.

A complaint alleging section 1983 claims and entitlement to attorney fees need not identify section 1988 expressly to preserve the fee remedy.

Kay v. David Douglas School District No. 40 · filed 1986-05-21

Here, plaintiffs clearly alleged claims under section 1983, among others, and also alleged entitlement to attorney fees, an integral part of their remedy. Defendants were not prejudiced.

A plaintiff who fails to allege a cognizable cause of action under § 1983 is not entitled to attorney's fees under § 1988.

Milton v. John Dempsey, Director of Michigan Dep't of Social Services S. Martin Taylor, Director of Michigan Em · filed 1988-06-21

After reviewing the briefs and record in its entirety, this court concludes that the district court correctly determined that the appellant had failed to allege a cognizable cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, and was therefore not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Sec. 1988.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff that prevails to some extent on a First Amendment challenge to recover costs and attorney’s fees.

Suburban Video, Inc. v. City of Delafield · filed 1988-08-29

But because it is to some extent a prevailing party, and to avoid any chilling of legitimate first amendment challenges, Superb Video is entitled to costs and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S. C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred defending criminal charges as compensatory damages when they result from the defendant’s unlawful conduct.

George Borunda and Richard Borunda v. Michael Richmond and Richard Way, Police Officers, City of Salinas · filed 1989-09-12

A plaintiff who establishes liability for deprivations of constitutional rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is entitled to recover compensatory damages for all injuries suffered as a consequence of those deprivations. ... The reasonable amount of these expenditures, if proved to the jury’s satisfaction to be the consequence of appellants’ illegal conduct, is recoverable as compensatory damages.

A challenge to a home care services determination as arbitrary and capricious and contrary to state and federal law is not a substantial § 1983 claim supporting attorney’s fees.

Axelrod v. Grinker · filed 1990-01-22

The petitioner’s claim that the city’s determination granting her 12-hour-a-day ... home care services was arbitrary and capricious and a violation of State and Federal law (see, Social Services Law § 365-a; 42 USC § 1396 et seq.; 42 CFR 440.170 [f]) does not constitute a substantial claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 so as to warrant an award of attorney’s fees (see, Matter of Gelin v Perales, 149 AD2d 593; Matter of Rozier v Perales, 149 AD2d 710; Matter of Misuraca v Perales, 120 AD2d 592).

Section 1983 does not itself authorize recovery of attorney fees.

Rogers v. Sylvester · filed 1990-02-09

Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not authorize the recovery of attorney fees, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 permits a court to award attorney fees to prevailing parties as part of the costs in an action to enforce section 1983.

A defendant in a § 1983 action may recover attorney’s fees from the plaintiff only if the court finds that the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Lyman v. State · filed 1992-01-24

For claims IV and V, filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 respectively, DeNardo, 775 P.2d at 518, is controlling “[A] civil rights defendant may recover attorney’s fees from the plaintiff only if the court finds ‘that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. ...’” Id., quoting, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15, 101 S.Ct. 173, 178, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980).

Section 1983 does not independently authorize recovery of attorney fees; fee recovery for a § 1983 action is governed by § 1988.

Shearin v. United States · filed 1992-02-14

Nor is § 1983 an independent basis for recovery of legal fees. Instead, the statutory provision for payment of fees in connection with § 1983 actions is found in 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

A party cannot obtain attorney's fees under § 1988 for an ERISA preemption victory without showing an ERISA right it sought to enforce through § 1983.

Dillingham Construction v. County of Sonoma · filed 1995-06-07

Additionally, we hold that Dillingham is not entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 because Dillingham has shown no right under section 1983 in ERISA which it has sought to enforce.

Section 1983 does not permit an award of attorney fees against a public body.

Latullas v. State · filed 1995-06-23

The State's liability as a solidary obligor does not extend to the trial court's award of attorney fees in the amount of $35,000.00 as awards of this nature are not recoverable against a public body under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support attorney fees against an insurer for a separate contract claim when the insurer is not accused of violating civil rights.

Isdoll v. Scottsdale Insurance · filed 1995-12-05

We also find no merit to Isdoll’s contention that she is entitled to additional attorney fees from Scottsdale under 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1988. It is undisputed that Scottsdale has not been accused of any civil rights violations, and the claims Isdoll has made against Scottsdale in this case are contractual in nature and totally discrete from her civil rights claim against McBerry.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages and attorney’s fees for unjustified force during custodial interrogation even when the plaintiff suffers only de minimis physical injury.

Riley v. Dorton · filed 1996-08-16

In the custodial interrogation context, the severity of a § 1983 plaintiffs injuries is relevant only to the question of damages, and a plaintiff may be awarded nominal damages and attorney’s fees even if his physical injury is de minimis.