42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state judicial remedies before bringing a federal civil-rights action.

Maldonado v. County of Monterey · filed 1971-07-01

Defendants are urging this Court to go beyond Younger v. Harris, supra, and to rule, in effect, that plaintiffs must exhaust their state judicial remedies before they can proceed in the federal courts under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 et seq. This Court must decline to make such an unprecedented extension of the Younger v. Harris decision. Cf., Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 88 S.Ct. 526, 19 L.Ed.2d 647 (1967).

Section 1983 provides state prisoners a cause of action for constitutional deprivations and does not require exhaustion of state judicial remedies before they may pursue that action.

Royster v. McGinnis · filed 1971-08-23

The Civil Rights Act 'creates a cause of action precisely to relieve such a deprivation, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), and state prisoners fall clearly within its protection. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1964); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961). Moreover, unlike the federal habeas corpus statute (28 U.S.C. § 2254), the Civil Rights Act, when properly relied upon for federal jurisdiction, does not require the exhaustion of state judicial remedies. Wright v. McMann, supra, 387 F.2d at 522-523. Thus, this court has jurisdiction of the issues raised by the complaint herein and may determine the merits.

Section 1983 creates a supplementary federal cause of action, so a plaintiff need not exhaust state judicial remedies before seeking federal relief.

W.J. Hobbs v. Mayor Ronnie Thompson · filed 1971-09-16

However, as we specifically held in Hall v. Garson, 5 Cir. 1970, 430 F.2d 430, and reaffirmed in Moreno v. Henekel, supra, based upon a reading of Monroe v. Pape, 1961, 365 U. S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, exhaustion of state judicial remedies is not a prerequisite to the invocation of federal relief under section 1983 since the cause of action established by that statute is fully supplementary to any remedy, adequate or inadequate, that might exist under state law.

Section 1983 does not require a person alleging a civil-rights violation under color of state law to exhaust available state court remedies before bringing an action in federal court.

Cornist v. Richland Parish School Board · filed 1971-09-17

The only issue before us is whether under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person who alleges a violation of civil rights under color of state law must exhaust existing state court remedies prior to prosecuting an action in federal court. The law is well settled to the contrary. The Supreme Court said in the landmark decision Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 482, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), in discussing the import of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy supplementary to state remedies, so a plaintiff need not first seek and be denied relief in state court before invoking the federal remedy.

Lewis v. George F. Kugler, Jr., Individually and in His Official Capacity as Attorney General of the State of New Jersey · filed 1971-09-28

This is an action brought under the federal Civil Rights Act, raising federal constitutional claims and prior resort to the state courts is not required. ... The Supreme Court considered the availability of state remedies in the context of actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. ... It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked. Hence the fact that Illinois by its constitution and laws outlaws unreasonable searches and seizures is no barrier to the present suit in the federal court. ... We therefore hold that it was improper for the district court to invoke the abstention doctrine to dismiss any portions of the complaint other than those seeking an injunction against pending state criminal prosecutions and declaratory relief involving pending state criminal prosecutions.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state administrative remedies before bringing suit.

Moore v. Knowles · filed 1971-11-08

There is no requirement in this § 1983 case that the plaintiff exhaust the administrative remedies afforded by Texas laws. Cornist v. Richland Parish School Board et al., 448 F.2d 594 (5th Cir., 1971); Chisley v. Richland Parish School Board et al., 448 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir., 1971).

Section 1983 provides a supplementary federal remedy for constitutional deprivations by prison officials, and a plaintiff need not exhaust available state remedies before invoking it.

WILWORDING Et Al. v. SWENSON, WARDEN · filed 1971-12-14

Moreover, although cognizable in federal habeas corpus, see Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483 (1969), petitioners’ pleading may also be read to plead causes of action under the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and 28 U. S. C. §§ 1343 (3) and 1343 (4), for deprivation of constitutional rights by prison officials. ... Petitioners were therefore entitled to have their actions treated as claims for relief under the Civil Rights Acts, not subject, on the basis of their allegations, to exhaustion requirements. The remedy provided by these Acts “is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”

Section 1983 plaintiffs must exhaust available contractual administrative remedies before presenting their constitutional claims to federal court.

Steele v. Haley · filed 1972-01-06

... It is difficult to see any sound reason for not requiring a § 1983 plaintiff to exhaust his contractual administrative remedies as he is required to exhaust his statutory administrative remedies.

Section 1983 permits a federal civil-rights action to proceed without first exhausting an available state-court remedy.

Rocha v. Sowers · filed 1972-01-27

This ruling is clearly incorrect since, as Rocha stated in his pleadings below, the action is founded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq. See Woolsey v. Beto, 5th Cir. 1971, 450 F.2d 321. Even if the State of Louisiana provided a remedy for the relief Rocha seeks, federal jurisdiction can be invoked prior to seeking relief in State court. Jones v. Decker, 5th Cir. 1970, 436 F.2d 954, and cases cited therein.

Section 1983 cannot be used to circumvent exhaustion of state remedies when the requested prisoner relief is properly raised through habeas corpus.

Quarls v. Missouri · filed 1972-02-10

And, petitioner should not be entitled to circumvent the requirements of exhaustion of state remedies by presenting his contentions in the form of an equitable pleading under the Civil Rights Act when the relief requested is properly raised by means of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a federal court to entertain a secondary-school discipline suit when the plaintiff has adequate and available state remedies that have not been exhausted.

Egner v. Texas City Independent School District · filed 1972-02-11

It follows that this Court may not entertain the instant Section 1983 suit brought by a high school student whose unexhausted state remedies are both adequate and available.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of an inadequate state administrative remedy before a federal action is brought.

Potter v. McQueeney · filed 1972-02-28

I hold therefore, that plaintiff does not have an adequate administrative remedy and need not exhaust such a remedy before bringing this action.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust the state's avenues of litigation before bringing a federal civil-rights action when the asserted right is plainly federal in origin and no underlying state-law issue controls.

Stradley v. Richard R. Andersen, as Chief of the Division of Police, Department of Public Safety, City of Omaha, Nebraska · filed 1972-02-29

The law is well-settled that in such cases the very purpose of § 1983 precludes forcing a forum choice on the plaintiff by requiring exhaustion of the state’s avenues of litigation.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, and a plaintiff need not exhaust available state remedies before filing.

Melancon v. McKeithen · filed 1972-03-01

We hold that this Court properly has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3)14 of a cause of action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 15 alleging deprivation, under color of state law, of rights secured by the United States Constitution. ... Moreover, as we read the cases, state remedies need not be exhausted before commencing a suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 claims are entitled to a federal forum and may not be defeated merely because the claimant did not first seek relief under available state law.

Church v. Board of Education of Saline Area School District · filed 1972-03-09

In McNeese plaintiffs proceeded in the Illinois Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, alleging a deprivation of their civil rights by virtue of an allegedly segregated educational system. ... Thus it seems to this Court that even if the regulation in question were to be found illegal under the state law, the plaintiff is entitled to a federal forum for the claims which he herein asserts. In McNeese the Court stated that “[r]elief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because relief was not first sought under state law which provided a remedy. . . . [FJederal courts [are] the chief * * * tribunals for enforcement of federal rights.” 373 U.S. at 671-672, 83 S.Ct. at 1435-1436.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to an exhaustion requirement, so prisoners may invoke the federal civil-rights remedy without first seeking and being denied state or administrative relief.

Jones v. William Metzger, Homer Roberts · filed 1972-03-14

We agree that appellees should not have been required to exhaust any administrative remedies that may have been available to them. Claims for relief under the federal civil rights acts are not subject to exhaustion requirements. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed this principle in the context of a prison case, the Court stating that “[t]he remedy provided by these Acts is ‘supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.’ ” Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 92 S.Ct. 407, 30 L.Ed. 2d 418 (U.S. Dee. 14, 1971), quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961).

Section 1983 does not bar a suit for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies unless the available remedies are adequate or effective.

Hayes v. Cape Henlopen School District · filed 1972-04-11

Regardless of the existence of an exhaustion requirement, it is clear that the failure to resort to state administrative remedies will preclude a Section 1983 suit only when the available administrative remedies are “adequate” or “effective”.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing a civil-rights action.

Cook Ex Rel. Cook v. Edwards · filed 1972-04-14

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to proceeding under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state-law or state-administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court.

Harper v. Vance · filed 1972-04-21

Defendants contend that the Executive Committee of the Alabama Democratic Party has never been requested to provide an alternative to the payment of a qualifying fee. Rather than require plaintiff to exhaust such administrative steps, we adhere to the principles announced in McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 671, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 1435, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963), where the Supreme Court held that a section 1983 suit “may not be defeated because relief was not first sought under state law * * See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961).”

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge incidents of custody and constitutional deprivations by prison officials without first exhausting state remedies, unless the suit seeks collateral review of the conviction or outright release.

Padilla v. Ackerman · filed 1972-05-05

But this modern day expansion of habeas corpus does not, in our view, restrict a prisoner’s right to initially resort to a federal forum to remedy deprivations of his constitutional rights by prison officials. ... have held that a § 1983 action is proper unless the prisoner seeks collateral review of his conviction or outright release from custody. ... We construe this statement to mean that the doctrine of exhaustion applies to actions within the purview of § 1983. Both the Supreme Court and this court have held otherwise.

Section 1983 plaintiffs are not required to exhaust state judicial remedies, although this court held that they must exhaust available state administrative remedies.

James v. The Board of Education of Central District No. 1 of the Towns of Addison · filed 1972-05-24

It is no longer open to dispute that a plaintiff with a claim for relief under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S.C. § 1983, is not required to exhaust state judicial remedies. ... It is still the law in this Circuit, however, that a Civil Rights plaintiff must exhaust state administrative remedies.

Section 1983 provides a supplemental federal remedy, and exhaustion of state remedies may not be required before bringing an action under it.

Cooper v. Nix · filed 1972-05-29

While it is clear that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is supplemental to State relief, Moreno v. Henckel, 431 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir., 1970), and exhaustion may not be required, it is clear here that plaintiffs have made prior reference to institutional authority and have an authoritative institutional decision.

Section 1983 allows a federal civil-rights suit to proceed without exhausting state remedies when the constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial to require a three-judge court.

Nicholls v. Schaffer · filed 1972-06-01

Exhaustion of state remedies is not required in a suit under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, “where the constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial, as here, to require the convening of a three-judge court.” King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n. 4, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2131, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968).

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state remedies before bringing a civil-rights action.

Wells v. McGinnis · filed 1972-06-06

Nor need a civil rights plaintiff exhaust state remedies in an action brought under the civil rights statute.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on judicial officers for acts taken in their judicial capacities under the circumstances presented.

People of the State of Mississippi ex rel. Giles v. Thomas · filed 1972-07-06

The settlement agreement may not have extended to Giles's possible claims against the Justice of the Peace, the Sheriff, and their employees, but the trial court was correct in ruling that those defendants were immune from suit as judicial officers under the circumstances of this case.

Section 1983 claims against prosecutors acting in their official capacities are barred by absolute immunity.

Holloway v. Carey · filed 1979-12-14

But even assuming that this allegation is true, and that it is pleaded with sufficient specificity, nevertheless it fails to state a claim: the defendants Lefkowitz, Henneberry, and Miller are protected by the absolute immunity accorded to prosecutors acting in their official capacities.

Section 1983 preserves absolute immunity from damages for civil jurors and for judges acting within their judicial capacity.

Sunn v. Dean · filed 1984-09-27

Since the juror defendants enjoy absolute immunity to an action for damages, plaintiffs complaint against them fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ... As Judge Dean enjoys an absolute immunity from an action for damages for acts committed within the scope of his judicial capacity, plaintiff’s case is defeated at the outset.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred by absolute immunity for judges acting within subject-matter jurisdiction and prosecutors performing activities integral to the judicial process.

Black v. Cloose · filed 1984-11-28

Absolute judicial immunity applies when the challenged action is 1) a judicial act which is 2) performed under circumstances in which there is not “a clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter.” ... Similarly, a prosecutor is accorded absolute immunity for all activities which are an integral part of the judicial process.

Friend of the Court employees acting within the scope of their quasi-judicial capacities are absolutely immune from suit under § 1983.

Wagner v. GENESEE COUNTY BD. OF COM'RS · filed 1985-04-23

Thus, it is clear that the individual employees of the Friend of the Court, when acting within the scope of their quasi-judicial capacities, are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Friend of the Court employees acting within the scope of their quasi-judicial capacities are absolutely immune from suit under § 1983.

Wagner v. Genesee County Board of Commissioners · filed 1985-04-23

Thus, it is clear that the individual employees of the Friend of the Court, when acting within the scope of their quasi-judicial capacities, are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages for judicial acts, although that immunity does not bar injunctive relief.

Wahl v. McIver · filed 1985-10-15

This immunity applies to proceedings under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The immunity, however, concerns only monetary liability and does not bar injunctive relief against judicial officers acting in their judicial capacity.

Probation officers preparing presentence reports for state courts have quasi-judicial absolute immunity from § 1983 suits for acts within their official duties.

Demoran v. F.A. Witt and John Does 1-4. · filed 1985-12-10

Probation officers preparing reports for the use of state courts possess a quasi-judicial absolute immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts performed within the scope of their official duties.

A judge is absolutely immune from § 1983 damages for judicial acts unless acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Freeman v. Fuller · filed 1985-12-20

A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages claims based on their handling of motions presented in their judicial capacity.

Dyson v. Sposeep · filed 1986-05-27

The defendant judges are immune from this suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 for damages claimed to have resulted from their handling of a motion presented to them in their judicial capacity.

Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for judicial acts unless they act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, even if their acts are erroneous, malicious, or exceed their authority.

Van Sickle v. Holloway · filed 1986-05-28

Stated differently, judges are liable only when they act in "clear absence of all jurisdiction"; they are absolutely immune even when their action is erroneous, malicious, or in excess of their judicial authority.

Judges are absolutely immune from Section 1983 damages for acts within their judicial jurisdiction, and Section 1983 liability cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Miner v. Baker · filed 1986-07-18

A judge is absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for any acts taken within his or her judicial jurisdiction. ... Section 1983 liability cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior, ... therefore defendant Peach cannot be held liable for allegedly tortious conduct engaged in by his subordinate.

A state government attorney defending an ongoing civil action is absolutely immune under § 1983 for conduct undertaken as the state's advocate in that litigation.

Barrett v. United States · filed 1986-07-31

Under the governing principles we have outlined, the district court's decision upholding his claim of absolute immunity must be upheld. The fact that he may or may not have engaged in questionable or harmful conduct during the course of his representation of the State in that litigation is irrelevant. The immunity attaches to his function, not to the manner in which he performed it.

Judges are absolutely immune from Section 1983 damages for judicial acts, prosecutors are immune for acts within their role initiating and prosecuting criminal cases, and defense attorneys do not act under color of state law merely by conducting a criminal defense.

Muhammad v. Geraldine Ford, Kathleen Donahue, Jeffrey L. Edison · filed 1986-09-29

Defendant Ford is a judge who is absolutely immune from liability for damages for acts performed within the scope of her judicial functions. ... Defendant Donahue is a prosecuting attorney who is also immune from damages liability where actions taken were within the scope of her duties in initiating and prosecuting criminal actions. ... Finally, defendant Edison, the defense attorney, is not subject to liability under Sec. 1983 because an attorney conducting a criminal defense, whether he is retained or appointed, does not act under color of state law.

A judge is immune from § 1983 damages for judicial acts unless acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Turner v. Fuerst · filed 1987-03-02

Even if that allegation were true, the appellee, Judge Fuerst, is immune from liability for damages based on the denial of that writ because he was acting in his judicial capacity and did not act in "clear absence of all jurisdiction."

The principle of judicial immunity survived the enactment of § 1983.

Richard N. Pushard, Sr. v. Judge Ronald Russell · filed 1987-03-24

The law is well settled that the principle of judicial immunity survived the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A public official executing a facially valid court order has the judge's absolute immunity from § 1983 damages liability.

Nance v. Lane · filed 1987-04-14

Furthermore, Lane, as a public official acting pursuant to a facially valid court order, enjoys the immunity possessed by the judge who entered the order. ... Therefore, Lane is absolutely immune from damages liability.

A judge is absolutely immune from Section 1983 damages for actions taken in an official judicial capacity.

Beasley v. State of Cal. · filed 1987-04-28

Plaintiff's claim against Judge Byers is based solely upon actions taken by the judge within his official capacity as a California municipal court judge serving on the San Leandro-Hayward Judicial District Court. Judge Byers enjoys a grant of absolute immunity on these facts.

A judge has absolute immunity from § 1983 damages for judicial acts unless the judge acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Donna Crooks and Brenda Holmes v. Honorable John H. Maynard · filed 1987-06-24

The immunity is absolute; it applies even where a judge acts maliciously. ... The second part of the test, assuming the judge was acting in his judicial capacity, is whether he was acting in “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”

Judges have absolute § 1983 immunity for rulings made in their judicial capacity and within subject-matter jurisdiction, even if the rulings are erroneous or injurious.

Houghton v. Glenn Osborne, Frank Tuss, H. William Coder, Joel G. Roth and Gladys M. Vance · filed 1987-12-14

As long as the judge’s ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, immunity applies.

Public officers who carry out a judge's orders are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages for conduct authorized by those orders.

Mary D.S. Peters v. Morgan J. McCutcheon W. Henry Jackson, C.C. Mattox, Beaufort County South Carolina, Luke N. Brown, J · filed 1987-12-15

Public officers acting at the direction of a judge also enjoy absolute immunity. ... For carrying out these judicial orders, the sheriff and jail administrator are absolutely immune from damages.

A child-protective-services worker has absolute immunity from § 1983 damages for seeking and obtaining a child-custody order within the worker's statutory authority as a quasi-prosecutor.

Coverdell v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 1987-12-15

Because McLaughlin’s actions in seeking and obtaining a court order were within the scope of her statutory authority as a quasi-prosecutor, she is entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability for her quasi-prosecutorial conduct.

A judge's decisions to demote and discharge a subordinate court employee are administrative employment acts, not judicial acts protected by absolute immunity from § 1983 damages.

Forrester v. White · filed 1988-01-12

In the case before us, we think it clear that Judge White was acting in an administrative capacity when he demoted and discharged Forrester. ... The decisions at issue, however, were not themselves judicial or adjudicative.

Section 1983 claims for damages are barred by absolute immunity when county prosecutors and probation officers act as part of the judicial process.

Kipp v. Saetre · filed 1990-05-01

Denying the absolute immunity of county prosecutors and county probation officers who are acting as part of the judicial system would set a precedent inimical to the functioning of our system. We therefore reverse the denial of appellants’ motion for summary judgment and remand for entry of judgment for appellants.

Judges and criminal prosecutors have absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages claims for acts taken in their official functions.

Weeks v. Shipman · filed 1995-10-17

Judges and criminal prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from claims for damages asserted under § 1983 for actions taken in their official functions.

A deputy sheriff performing the ministerial task of enforcing a judgment execution cannot claim absolute or qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for seizing the wrong person’s property.

Cady v. Marcella · filed 2000-06-07

Marcella proposes that the directed verdict in his favor for the § 1983 claim should be affirmed on the ground of either absolute or qualified immunity under Federal law, and that directed verdicts in his favor on the State tort claims should be affirmed on the ground of qualified immunity under State law. However, immunity in any of these forms is available only to officials performing discretionary, rather than ministerial, acts. ... Enforcing an execution on a judgment is a ministerial, rather than a discretionary, act. ... Marcella’s appeal for immunity must fail.

Section 1983 affords probation officers absolute immunity from damages for official acts integral to the judicial process.

Long v. Bolten · filed 2009-02-24

Like judges and other court officials, probation officers "are absolutely immune from liability for damages" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for actions taken, as alleged here, within the scope of their official duties as "an integral part of the judicial process." Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Section 1983 claims against assistant district attorneys may be dismissed when sovereign immunity bars official-capacity claims and absolute prosecutorial immunity bars individual-capacity claims.

Malone v. Shelby County · filed 2019-08-08

As such, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the Plaintiffs’ claims against the ADA Defendants should likewise be dismissed because the ADA Defendants are immune from suit.

The prosecutor and judge in this § 1983 suit were entitled to immunity.

Nally v. Davis · filed 2020-02-21

Further, the Magistrate Judge is correct that Davis (the prosecutor) and Cuomo (the judge) are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for injuries allegedly suffered before a plaintiff’s birth, even if the plaintiff is later born alive.

Romero v. Caraballo · filed 1988-03-11

This Court finds the reasoning of Har-man persuasive. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the federal claims of Emanuel José Acevedo Ruiz.

Section 1983 permits a child born alive to seek relief for a continuous injury sustained during delivery, including the portion sustained before birth.

Havard v. Puntuer · filed 2009-01-22

The Court also finds that the plaintiff has also stated a claim for those injuries which Chelsie Barker may have received during the delivery process prior to birth. Because the injury was a continuous one, and given the Court’s finding that she is entitled to maintain an action under Section 1983, there is no principled reason to distinguish those injuries sustained before the birth from those sustained after birth.

Section 1983 employment discrimination claims require an adverse employment action; an investigation, a change in hours, and a rescinded reprimand do not qualify.

Moore v. Hopper · filed 2000-08-11

Under § 1983, an investigation, a change in hours, and a rescinded reprimand do not constitute adverse employment actions.

Section 1983 does not require an adverse employment action for a retaliation claim based on the exercise of free speech.

Power, David v. Summers, Phillip M. · filed 2000-09-05

There is no similar limitation in section 1983, or the constitutional doctrines that it is a vehicle for enforcing.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff alleging First Amendment retaliation to show an adverse employment action.

Power v. Summers · filed 2000-09-05

We decline to hold as a matter of law that the denial of such a raise (or of the full raise that the plaintiffs could have expected had it not been for the defendants’ retaliatory animus toward them) cannot be an adverse employment action — and we repeat that no such action need be shown in a suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 retaliation claims require an adverse employment action, which includes decisions about hiring, discharge, promotion, demotion, and compensation.

Banks v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board · filed 2003-02-19

Section 1983's definition of adverse employment action, like Title VII’s definition, includes ultimate employment decisions, such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, demoting, and compensating.

Section 1983 defines adverse employment action more broadly than Title VII and includes discharges and refusals to hire.

McCullough v. Houston County Texas · filed 2008-10-17

Although “adverse employment action” is defined more broadly under § 1983 than it is under Title VII, its definition likewise includes discharges and refusals to hire.

Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claims require a deprivation likely to deter free speech rather than an adverse employment action.

Matrisciano v. Randle, Micheal P. · filed 2009-06-26

A case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First Amendment retaliation does not require a plaintiff to show an “adverse employment action.”

Section 1983 permits individual liability for an informal adverse employment decision by a final decision-maker when motivated by impermissible considerations.

Juarez v. Aguilar · filed 2011-12-23

However, neither of these cases held that the “adverse employment decisions” of collective bodies can only result from recorded votes. Such a rule finds support neither from our case law nor from the purposes of § 1983. ... For these reasons, we will not extend our precedent to exempt decisions made through informal procedures from the category of “adverse employment decisions” that can result in liability under § 1983. Even if an adverse governmental decision does not result from a formal vote, the “final decision-maker” responsible for that adverse employment decision is subject to individual liability if her decision was motivated by impermissible considerations.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to bring a claim for a retaliatory, demotion-like transfer that constitutes an adverse employment action.

Burnside v. Nueces County, Texas · filed 2014-12-09

This Circuit has clearly established that that a retaliatory, demotion-like transfer may constitute an adverse employment action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for a constitutional rights violation committed under color of state law.

Burnside v. Nueces County, Texas · filed 2014-12-11

Given the facts and reasonable inferences drawn from Burnside’s complaint, his transfer alleges an adverse employment action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 employment discrimination claims require an adverse employment action, as Title VII claims do.

Ford v. County of Hudson · filed 2018-04-05

The District Court was mistaken in its statement that the adverse employment action requirement did not apply here. The analysis of employment discrimination claims under § 1983 mirrors the Title VII analysis.

In a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim, an employment action is adverse if it would deter a reasonably hardy employee from exercising constitutional rights.

Slattery v. Town of Framingham · filed 2020-11-09

“Thus, the pertinent question in a § 1983 retaliation case based on the First Amendment is whether the defendant’s actions would deter ‘a reasonably hardy individual[ ]’ from exercising his constitutional rights.”

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their personal capacities.

Ashann-Ra v. Com. of Va. · filed 2000-08-22

However, sued in their personal capacities, defendants are subject to Ra’s suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state agency or its members in their official capacities.

Ex Parte Alabama Bd. of Exm'rs in Counseling · filed 2000-11-03

We note, however, that the Board and the Board members, to the extent that they are sued in their official capacities, are not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state department or a state official acting in an official capacity.

Texas Department of Public Safety v. Petta · filed 2001-06-07

Finally, we agree that the Department is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. And because we conclude that Rivera, in his official capacity, is also not subject to suit under section 1983, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment that Petta take nothing from the Department or Rivera, in his official capacity, on the section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because such claims are against the state, which is not a person under the statute.

Dajani v. Montgomery County, Kentucky · filed 2003-03-06

As to Plaintiffs damages claims against Defendants Sheridan and Kassulke in their official capacities, such a claim is against the State, which is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Gean v. Hattaway · filed 2003-06-06

To the extent, then, that the plaintiffs' claims against the defendants in this case are § 1983 claims against those persons in their official capacities, as agents of state administrative departments, they are noncognizable.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state officials in their official capacities because those claims are treated as suits against the state.

Neuburger v. Thompson · filed 2004-02-23

Thus, claims against state officials in their official capacities are treated as claims against the state itself and cannot be brought under § 1983.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983.

Gorman v. Office of the Insurance Commissioner · filed 2006-01-17

To the extent Appellants sued the OIC defendants in their official capacities, their claims were properly dismissed because state officials acting in their official capacities are not considered ‘persons’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State officials sued in their personal capacities are persons who may be sued for damages under § 1983 when the complaint fairly shows an intent to hold them personally liable.

Victors v. Kronmiller · filed 2008-03-06

Thus, under the three-factor test and the reasoning of Biggs, it can be fairly ascertained that plaintiffs intended to sue State Defendants in their personal capacities. Accordingly, I decline to dismiss plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim on the ground that State Defendants are allegedly not “persons” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against state employees may proceed in their individual capacities but not their official capacities.

Bock v. Gold · filed 2008-06-10

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs § 1983 claim against defendants in their official capacities. The amended complaint also named defendants in their individual capacities, however, and insofar as it did so was sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek monetary damages from state officials in their personal capacities, but not from the State through an official-capacity suit.

Bruton v. Minor · filed 2008-07-30

Since plaintiff is seeking retroactive relief in the form of monetary damages, he can only recover by suing defendants in their personal capacities. Although plaintiff does not specify under what capacity he is suing defendants, the court will construe his complaint liberally as suing defendants in their personal capacities.

Section 1983 does not treat state officials acting in their official capacities as persons who may be sued under the section.

Lee Testing & Engineering, Inc. v. Ohio Department of Transportation · filed 2012-02-29

Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims fail on the merits, in any event, because state officials acting in their official capacities are not "persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against states or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Kailey v. Ritter · filed 2012-10-24

Neither the State, nor state officials who are sued in their official capacities, can be proceeded against under § 1983 because they are not “persons” within the meaning of the statute (and therefore, the Eleventh Amendment bars such suit in federal court).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state official sued in an official capacity.

McAllister v. Los Angeles Unified School District · filed 2013-06-03

Thus, an official sued in his official capacity is not subject to liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires personal participation before a state official can incur personal liability for an alleged constitutional violation.

Fellon v. Lampert · filed 2016-01-04

The state defendants could incur personal liability only if they participated in the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Meyer v. Pfeifle · filed 2019-03-14

Thus, section 1983 does not allow Meyer to sue Ravnsborg in his official capacity for damages.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Alford v. Mecklenburg County Clerk of Superior Court · filed 2019-07-02

It is well settled that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state and its officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” under Section 1983.

Woodard v. Villmer · filed 2019-08-28

As noted above, however, neither a State nor its officials are “persons” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State employees sued in their official capacities are not persons under § 1983.

Hicks v. Washington State Human Rights Commission · filed 2019-12-12

The Court agrees that Will controls the disposition in this case but, contrary to the R&R conclusions regarding sovereign immunity, Will controls because Defendant state employees are not persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat state officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

United Coalition for Social Equality Inc v. Lake Station City of · filed 2019-12-13

State officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” under the statute.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a governor or staff member based on general supervisory authority without a direct connection to the alleged wrongdoing.

(PC) Brown v. Newsom · filed 2020-02-05

Governor Newsom’s general supervisory powers do not extend to criminal investigations requested by individual state prisoners. ... However, despite plaintiff's objections, the undersigned finds no cognizable § 1983 claim against the Governor and his staff person “Adrian,” and therefore declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state law claims.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to damages claims under § 1983.

McGee v. Schmitt · filed 2020-04-17

To the extent plaintiff seeks monetary relief, this action is subject to dismissal because the defendants are not “persons” who can be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Rollin v. Office of Commissioner · filed 2020-06-24

Moreover, the KDOC Commissioner is not a “person” subject to suit within the meaning of § 1983 when sued in his official capacity for monetary damages.

Section 1983 does not authorize damages suits against state officials acting in their official capacities.

Schwake v. Arizona Board of Regents · filed 2020-07-29

However, a § 1983 damages action does not lie against these defendants in their official capacities because state officials acting in their official capacity are not “persons” for the purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities when any liability would be paid from the public treasury.

Shreeve v. Ducey · filed 2020-08-04

The Court concluded that because the suit was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought damages from three state officials sued in their official capacities, such that any liability would be paid from the public treasury, the named defendants were not “persons” under the statute and furthermore the suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. ... To the extent Plaintiff was seeking to reassert the § 1983 claims that appeared in his original complaint, those claims fail for the reasons already set forth in the July 16, 2020 order.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Daniels v. Varela · filed 2020-09-10

Moreover, a state and state officers sued in their official capacity, are not “persons” under Section 1983.

For lead-paint claims, Section 1983 permits suit by plaintiffs in subsidized or public housing, but not private housing.

Valerio v. City of New York · filed 2000-08-28

Applying the United States Supreme Court’s three-pronged test in Blessing v Freestone (520 US 329, 340-341) to the lead paint situation, only plaintiffs in subsidized or public housing have a right of action under 42 USC § 1983 (see German v Federal Home Loan Mtge. Corp., 1999 WL 1095595, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 19029 [SD NY, Dec. 2, 1999, Buchwald, J.]; Roman v Morace, 1997 WL 777844, 1997 US Dist LEXIS 19926 [SD NY, Dec. 16, 1997, Cote, J.]). Plaintiffs in private housing cannot state such a claim (see Santiago v Hernandez, 53 F Supp 2d 264, supra).

In a § 1983 suit seeking injunctive relief, former officials sued in their official capacities are not proper defendants when they no longer have authority to implement the injunction.

Pruitt v. Wilder · filed 1994-01-20

Because Wilder and Milliken were both sued in their official capacities, and because both have subsequently left their respective offices and therefore would have no power to implement any injunctive relief granted to the plaintiff by the Court, neither Wilder nor Milliken is properly before the Court.

Section 1983 covers county officials sued in their official capacities as persons within the meaning of the statute.

Lytle v. Commissioners of Election of Union County · filed 1976-02-10

The Commissioners’ argument that in their official capacities they are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is similarly without merit. We have held otherwise.

Section 1983 permits suits against municipal officials in their official capacities when the plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief.

Penn v. Stumpf · filed 1970-02-03

Where the relief sought is, as here, in the nature of a declaratory judgment and/or injunction, no sound reason presents itself for immunizing municipal officials from suit under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 permits suits for injunctive relief and damages against municipal and county officials to restrain violations of the federal Constitution.

Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, and Cityof Euclid · filed 1974-07-09

It is clear, however, that suits for injunctive relief (and damages) under § 1983 do indeed lie against municipal and county officials to restrain them from violating provisions of the federal constitution.

The court applies § 1983’s official-capacity and municipal-person limits to the defendants’ damages claims.

Raffety v. Prince George's County · filed 1976-11-01

The court agrees with this argument as to § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a Fourteenth Amendment purposeful-sex-discrimination claim to be supported by all the facts and circumstances and permits suit against municipal officials in their official capacities when the local government is suable.

Stathos v. Bowden · filed 1981-05-27

The purposeful discrimination required to maintain a cause of action under the fourteenth amendment and under § 1983 may be shown by all the facts and circumstances of the case. ... As local government or municipal officials, it is now settled that the Commissioners may be sued in their official capacity under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state officials to be sued in their individual capacities when monetary damages are sought.

Constance A. Adler, Roosevelt Lathan and Pearline Lathan, Etc. v. Andrew Lewis, Secretary of Transportation · filed 1982-04-30

The district court is correct in remarking that defendant State officials must be sued in their individual capacity in an action for monetary damages. ... Following our independent review, we find there is neither a basis in the arguments of the appellants nor in the record to support a § 1983 claim.

A city and its officials sued in their official capacities have no good-faith defense under § 1983, but municipal liability still requires a policy or custom; officers sued personally retain qualified immunity.

Varela v. Jones · filed 1984-10-24

What Owen did was eliminate good faith as a defense when a city is sued, and we treat suits against city officials in their official capacities as suits against the city. But the city is not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, rather it is liable only if its employees deprived plaintiff of her constitutional rights pursuant to a policy or custom of the city. ... Plaintiff also sued the police officers in their personal capacities, and no decision has eliminated public officials' qualified immunity in such a case.

A § 1983 damages judgment against a public servant in an official capacity imposes liability on the represented government entity if that entity had notice and an opportunity to respond.

Brandon v. Holt · filed 1985-01-21

In at least three recent cases arising under § 1983, we have plainly implied that a judgment against a public servant “in his official capacity” imposes liability on the entity that he represents provided, of course, the public entity received ... notice and an opportunity to respond. ... We now make that point explicit.

An official-capacity Section 1983 claim requires a constitutional violation caused by governmental custom or policy, and a municipal officer's single decision creates liability only if the officer has final policymaking authority over that action.

Tarantino v. North Carolina · filed 1986-07-09

Therefore, in order to maintain an action under § 1983 against the officer in his official capacity the plaintiff must allege and prove that the constitutional violation was caused by some custom or policy of the governmental entity. ... “[W]e hasten to emphasize that not every decision by municipal officers automatically subjects the municipality to § 1983 liability. Municipal liability attaches only where the decision-maker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.”

An official-capacity § 1983 suit is treated as a suit against the local government entity the official represents.

Mairena v. Charles Foti, Criminal Sheriff for the Parish of Orleans, Harry Connick, District Attorney for the Par · filed 1987-05-18

For purposes of liability, a suit against a public official in his official capacity is in effect a suit against the local government entity he represents.

State courts of general jurisdiction may hear § 1983 official-capacity claims seeking prospective injunctive relief against state officers.

Schwarz v. Board of Trustees of Ohio State Univ. · filed 1987-07-22

Therefore, we hold that the courts of common pleas possess jurisdiction to entertain federal claims seeking prospective injunctive relief brought under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code, against individual state officers in their official capacities, in order to redress alleged deprivations of rights, privileges or immunities guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

A state official sued only in an official capacity is not a person subject to Section 1983 liability when the judgment would in substance run against the state.

Jackson v. Va. Department of Social Services · filed 1987-12-07

Since a judgment against state officers in their official capacity would be in essence a judgment against the State and the State is not a "person" within the meaning of the statute, it follows that an action against state officers in their official capacity does not lie under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits against officials in their official capacities when the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief.

Perez v. Ortiz · filed 1988-06-27

Although it is difficult to assess the nature of plaintiffs' claims on the scanty record before us, we note that at least one set of plaintiffs, in Carter, seeks an injunction ordering the return of property, and that it is entirely proper, when seeking injunctive relief, to sue officials in their official capacities.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing an official in his official capacity to allege facts linking the challenged conduct to a governmental policy or custom.

B.H. v. Johnson · filed 1989-05-30

To state a claim under § 1983 against a government entity, plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to suggest that the unconstitutional and illegal acts of Johnson were done pursuant to a governmental custom or policy.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim against a state official for injunctive relief.

Gray v. University of Kansas Medical Center · filed 1989-06-27

The court went on to note that although state officials are not “persons” under section 1983, they are “persons” under the statute when sued for injunctive relief. ... Therefore, in the present suit, plaintiff’s claim against the individual defendants in their official capacities for injunctive relief remains a valid claim.

Section 1983 permits damages against a state official in an individual capacity, but not in an official capacity.

Braggs v. Lane · filed 1989-07-14

By definition a Section 1983 action does not lie against a state official such as Lane in his “official” capacity (Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311-12, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)). Instead damages in this action are recoverable from Lane, if at all, only in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity suit against state officials seeking prospective injunctive relief.

Providence Journal Co. v. Newton · filed 1989-07-14

This action, which seeks only to make permanent the temporary injunction blocking enforcement of the challenged provisions, is thus properly brought under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state officer sued in an official capacity as a person for a retrospective claim.

Illinois Health Care Ass'n v. Suter · filed 1989-08-04

If plaintiffs are not seeking exclusively prospective injunctive relief, they cannot charge Suter as a Section 1983 “person” under Will’s footnote 10.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state official sued solely in an official capacity because that official is not a person under the section.

Abid Al-Marayati v. University of Toledo Glen Driscoll Karl Vezner and Sharron E. Doerner · filed 1989-08-29

As the Supreme Court has recently held in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2310-11 (1989), state officials acting in their official capacities are not "persons" under section 1983. In this instance, the alleged First Amendment deprivation was the decision by President Driscoll to prohibit Al-Marayati from commenting on matters affecting the University. President Driscoll was sued solely in his official capacity and, under the holding in Will, was clothed with immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that allowing the amendment would be futile.

Section 1983 does not provide damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the section.

Smith v. Dodrill · filed 1989-08-31

In that decision, the Supreme Court held that neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983. Therefore, to the extent that plaintiffs are requesting damages from the defendant in his official capacity, the remedies provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not available.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to damages liability under § 1983.

Saunders v. Reeher (In Re Saunders) · filed 1989-09-27

In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, — U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), the Supreme Court has just held that, insofar as damages (as opposed to injunctive relief) are sought, state officials acting in their official capacities ... are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, as “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” 109 S.Ct. at 2311. That being so, the debtor here has failed to state a claim for damages under § 1983 regardless of whether violations of the bankruptcy code are actionable under that statute.

State officials sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief are not persons who may be sued under Section 1983.

Norton v. Jennings · filed 1989-10-11

In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989), the Supreme Court concluded "that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under Sec. 1983," who may be sued for depriving a citizen of constitutional or statutory rights while acting under the color of state law. Accordingly, to the extent that Norton's lawsuit is against the defendants in their official capacities seeking prospective injunctive relief the decision of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary relief against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute; such officials may be sued in their individual capacities.

Strouth v. Alexander · filed 1989-10-13

The Supreme Court has recently held that state officials sued in their official capacities for monetary relief are not persons for purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311-12 (1989). Therefore, the defendants are subject to this suit only in their individual capacities.

A state prison warden sued in his official capacity is not a person subject to a § 1983 claim for monetary damages.

Wilson v. John Brown, Warden A.C.I. · filed 1989-11-21

Since Wilson clearly sued John Brown in his official capacity of Warden of ACI, asking for monetary damages rather than for injunctive relief, ... appellant has no cognizable claim under § 1983, and the instant appeal must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not allow money damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the section.

Williams v. Robert Brown John Jabe · filed 1989-11-29

Upon consideration, we conclude that the district court's judgment must be affirmed as state officials acting in their official capacity cannot be sued for money damages as "persons" under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not persons under § 1983, except when sued for prospective injunctive relief.

Derechin v. State University of New York · filed 1989-12-07

Further, state officials acting in their official capacities are likewise not “persons” within the meaning of section 1983, except insofar as they are sued for prospective injunctive relief.

A § 1983 suit against government officials in their official capacities is treated as a suit against the governmental entity.

Moses v. Flanagan · filed 1989-12-21

Suits against government officials in their official capacities are suits against the governmental entity.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Gomm v. DeLand · filed 1990-01-12

Nevertheless, Gomm cannot maintain his § 1983 action against the defendants in their official capacity. The Supreme Court recently ruled that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against states or state officials acting in their official capacity because states are not persons under the statute.

You Vang Yang v. Sturner · filed 1990-01-12

Dr. Sturner argues, correctly, that the Supreme Court in Will foreclosed § 1983 suits for damages against states, and state officials acting in their official capacity, because states are not “persons” for the purpose of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize damages suits against state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Jose Santiago, Cross-Appellee v. Michael P. Lane, Cross-Appellants · filed 1990-01-23

In addition, the Supreme Court has recently held that neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacities are "persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Plaintiffs suit against these defendants in their official capacities is thus barred by the U.S. Constitution and is not authorized by federal statute.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Harwood v. Johnson · filed 1990-02-07

To the extent that plaintiff alleges that defendants acted in their official capacities as officials of the State, the complaint fails to state a claim for relief for monetary damages, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against local officials require an unconstitutional action based on the government entity’s policy or custom, without a showing of the official’s supervisory liability.

Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff and Mayor of Shelby County, Tennessee · filed 1990-02-08

We find that an official capacity suit does not require a showing of supervisory liability. Since an official capacity suit is, for our purpose here, a suit against a governmental entity, the allegedly unconstitutional action need only be based on a policy or custom of that entity for liability to attach.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against state officers acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Fite v. Alton Hesson, Acting Warden Ray Hatfield Turney Center Hospital Staff Tennessee Department of Corrections · filed 1990-03-16

State officers acting in their official capacities are not persons under section 1983 and cannot be sued for damages under that statute.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against state officers acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Haynie v. Bass · filed 1990-05-02

State officers acting in their official capacities are not persons under Sec. 1983 and cannot be sued for damages under that statute.

A state official acting in an official capacity is not a person subject to a damages suit under § 1983.

Lindsay v. Northern Virginia Mental Health Institute · filed 1990-05-10

Thus, the court is satisfied that there does not appear to be a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant Strange was acting in his official capacity. The court therefore finds that, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, defendant Strange is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is thus not subject to suit under § 1983.

State officials sued in their official capacity for prospective relief are persons under Section 1983.

Henne ex rel. Henne v. Wright · filed 1990-05-23

In an action for prospective relief such as this, however, state officials sued in their official capacity are treated as "persons" under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits state officials to be sued in their individual capacities for claimed constitutional deprivations arising from their official conduct.

Swader v. Com. of Va. · filed 1990-07-19

Accordingly, the defendants are amenable to suit in their individual capacities for the claimed deprivations of plaintiffs constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officers acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Green v. Stephen T. Smith Domingo C. Baisas John Wigginton · filed 1990-08-13

State officers acting in their official capacities are not persons under section 1983 and cannot be sued for damages under that statute.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state prison officials sued in their official capacities.

Gene T. Favors, Michael H. Woods, John E. Thompson, Arthur Rex-El v. Robert Brown, Jr., Mr. Abramajtys, Dan Chaffer, Dr. · filed 1990-08-13

Upon review we conclude that the defendants are not subject to suit in this case as Favors sought to hold them liable in their official capacity for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages suits against a state corrections official sued in her official capacity.

Hughes v. Avery · filed 1990-08-13

The defendant, sued in her official capacity, is not subject to suit for monetary damages under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat state officials sued in their official capacities for damages or retroactive relief as persons, because those claims are against the state.

American Federation Of State, County And Municipal Employees v. Tristano · filed 1990-08-21

Under the Supreme Court's decision in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, --- U.S. ----, ----, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311-12, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), this is precisely the type of allegation, when made for damages or retroactive relief, 5 that is treated as an allegation against the state itself and therefore is not against a "person" as required under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim for reinstatement against a state official in her official capacity and a damages claim against her in her individual capacity.

Melo v. Hafer · filed 1990-08-21

In short, .we hold that a section 1983 claim for reinstatement may be maintained against Hafer in her official capacity, that a damage claim under section 1983 alleging civil rights violations may be maintained against Hafer in her individual capacity, that the allegations in the complaints adequately put her on notice of that claim, and that such a claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Chandler v. C. Clark, Sgt Frank Elo · filed 1990-09-24

Upon review, we conclude that the defendants are not subject to suit, as Chandler sought to hold them liable in their official capacity for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a state officer in an individual capacity for wrongs committed while performing official duties.

Price v. Akaka · filed 1990-09-25

Clearly, under Sec. 1983, a plaintiff may sue a state officer in his individual capacity for alleged wrongs committed by the officer in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary relief against state employees sued in their official capacities.

Walton v. Dallman · filed 1990-10-03

To the extent Walton seeks monetary relief, the defendants are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state official sued only in an official capacity because that defendant is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Davis v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 1990-10-04

Because plaintiff sued defendant in his official capacity, plaintiff has failed to sue a “person” subject to suit under § 1983; therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued only in their official capacities for actions within the scope of their official duties.

Carter v. Jabe · filed 1990-10-11

Furthermore, since Carter has not named the defendants in their individual capacity, they may not be held liable for monetary damages for actions taken within the scope of their official duties.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials presumed sued in their official capacities when the complaint does not specify the capacity in which they are sued.

Dickens v. Pam Withrow, Warden, Rivers, Deputy Warden, Dr. Shillinglaw, Mick Rynd, Medical Supervisor, Adams, · filed 1990-10-11

Moreover, Dickens did not plead the capacity in which the defendants were sued, as he was required to do. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593-94 (6th Cir.1989). Under these circumstances, the defendants are not subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for actions taken presumably in their official capacity. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311-12 (1989).

When a municipality is already named as a defendant in a § 1983 suit, naming its officials in their official capacities is surplusage.

Havens v. City of Newcastle · filed 1990-10-19

Here, the City of Newcastle is a named defendant. It is but surplusage that John Thompson and Tom Sherrill are named defendants in their representative capacities, and it is of no ultimate consequence to the moving individuals.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state actors sued in their official capacity.

Crawford v. Gunnoe · filed 1990-11-01

In addition to the reasons cited by the district court, we note that all defendants in this case which are state actors were sued in their official capacity and thus are not subject to suit under Sec. 1983.

State employees sued only in their official capacity are immune from monetary damages under Section 1983; a complaint that does not indicate a personal-capacity suit may be treated as an official-capacity suit.

Hughes v. Perry · filed 1990-11-20

Under the eleventh amendment, state employees are immune from damages when a Sec. 1983 action is brought against them in their official capacity. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592 (6th Cir.1989). It may be assumed that the defendant is being sued in his official capacity because the complaint does not indicate that he is being sued personally. See id. He is therefore not even subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages or retroactive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Burmeister v. Stone · filed 1990-12-03

As state (rather than county or municipal) employees, Stone, Biebel and Comerford are not considered “persons” under Sec. 1983, and therefore, none can be sued in their official capacities for damages or retroactive relief under that statute.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Bradford-Bey v. Theodore H. Koehler, Travis Jones · filed 1990-12-07

We note that in actuality defendants are being sued in their official capacities because the alleged wrongdoing, denying Bradford-Bey out-of-cell exercise, fell within the authorized scope of the defendants' official duties. Therefore, because Bradford-Bey sought only monetary damages from the defendant, they are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.