42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a county policy or custom for municipal liability and joint action with a state actor for liability against a private inmate.

Hutchinson v. Jefferson Cty. Jail · filed 2000-12-13

Upon de novo review, see Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), we agree with the district court that Hutchinson failed to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the jail and the inmate, because she failed to allege that the constitutional deprivation she suffered was due to a custom or policy of Jefferson County or that the inmate was jointly engaged with a state actor.

Judges are absolutely immune from Section 1983 liability, and public defenders must act under color of state law to be liable under the section.

Chaidez v. Weil · filed 2001-02-21

Because judges are absolutely immune from section 1983 liability, ... and the public defender was not acting under color of state law within the meaning of section 1983, ... the district court properly dismissed Chaidez’s action.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state court because a state court is not a person under the statute.

Kinney v. City of Cleveland · filed 2001-05-04

A state court is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.

A county children and youth services agency that is merely a sub-unit of the county is not a separate defendant under § 1983.

Patterson v. Armstrong County Children and Youth Services · filed 2001-05-22

The Court agrees with CYS that it is merely a sub-unit of the responsible municipality, the County, which is a party to this suit, and that it therefore should be dismissed from this civil rights action, even as to the procedural due process claim.

A dog is not a person subject to suit under § 1983, even if it acts under color of state law.

Dye v. William B. Wargo, Jr., K-9 Named Frei, and City of Elkhart, Indiana · filed 2001-06-11

As for Frei: § 1983 applies only to a “person” who acts under color of state law. ... Under the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, “the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals”, but dogs are not on this list, whether or not they act under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat state agencies as persons who can be sued under the statute.

Bryant v. New York State Department of Correction Services Albany · filed 2001-06-14

Moreover, state agencies do not fall within the meaning of “persons” for purposes of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state college system’s board of trustees because the board is not a “person” subject to suit under the statute.

Capital Community College Student Senate v. Connecticut · filed 2001-09-21

Following the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, I agree with the defendants that the Board is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 and that the complaint against the Board must therefore be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against the Georgia Board of Public Safety or its vice chairman in his official capacity because neither is a person subject to suit.

Jordan v. Board of Public Safety · filed 2002-01-17

Neither the Board nor Wilson in his official capacity is a “person” subject to a claim for damages under 42 USC § 1983.

A § 1983 claim fails against a person who is not a state actor, officials with no alleged involvement in or notice of the violation, and a court clerk entitled to absolute immunity.

Donohue v. Pataki · filed 2002-01-22

The district court also properly determined that Donohue had failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that (1) Donohue’s wife was not a state actor, see West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-19, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); (2) Donohue did not allege that Governor Pataki or Attorney General Spitzer were involved in, or had notice of, the alleged constitutional violation, see, e.g., Meriwether v. Coughlin, 879 F.2d 1037, 1047-48 (2d Cir.1989); and (3) the Chief Clerk for the Rockland County Family Court is entitled to absolute immunity from this suit, see Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 39-40 (2d Cir.1988).

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against the United States because the United States is not a person under the statute.

Tinch v. United States · filed 2002-03-11

The United States is not a person, thus Plaintiff cannot bring a suit under § 1983 against the United States.

A state officer sued in his personal capacity qualifies as a person under Section 1983.

Winokur v. Office of Court Administration · filed 2002-03-14

The first element is met because Jano-sek qualifies as a person under Section 1983 because he was sued in his personal capacity.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against a state employee sued in an official capacity, although the state itself is not a person subject to suit.

C.J. v. Department of Human Services · filed 2002-05-24

While a state is not a “person” subject to a section 1983 lawsuit, a state employee in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, is a person under section 1983 because “official capacity” actions for prospective relief are not considered to be actions against the State.

States and state agencies are not persons subject to liability under § 1983.

Burgess v. Carmichael · filed 2002-06-07

States and state agencies are not “persons” subject to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not permit an action against the CNMI itself.

Hollman v. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands · filed 2002-07-16

The law is quite clear: a litigant cannot bring a § 1983 action against the CNMI.

A state agency and a state official sued in her official capacity are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

RUIZ v. McDONNELL · filed 2002-08-08

Because the Supreme Court's precedent in Will mandates that we conclude that neither the CDHS nor Ms. McDonnell, acting in her "official capacity," qualify as "persons" under § 1983, we affirm the district court's dismissal of those parties on that ground.

Section 1983 does not permit a state to be sued because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

IL Assoc Mortgage B v. Office of Banks & Re · filed 2002-10-21

Yet a state is not a “person” for purposes of §1983 and therefore may not be named as a defendant in a suit under that law.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state university that is an arm of the state because it is not a statutory “person”.

Severson v. Board of Trustees of Purdue University · filed 2002-11-07

As an arm of the state, Purdue is not a § 1983 “person” amenable to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against an arm of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands or its officers acting in their official capacities.

Aguon v. Commonwealth Ports Authority Antonio B. Cabrera · filed 2003-01-13

We hold that CPA is an arm of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and is therefore not a person within the meaning of § 1983. Thus, CPA and its officers in their official capacities may not be sued for damages under that statute.

Section 1983 permits suit against a state child welfare investigator performing governmental functions, subject to a qualified immunity defense.

Kauch v. Department for Children, Youth & Their Families · filed 2003-02-14

As such, she is amenable to suit under § 1983 and entitled to raise qualified immunity as a defense.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or state agency because neither is a person under the statute.

Davis v. Bruce · filed 2003-03-24

A state or state agency is not a “person” that Congress made amenable to suit in § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims against California sheriffs and sheriff’s departments for crime investigations because they act on behalf of the county in that function.

Venegas v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2003-04-16

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers of Sheriffs Department and Baca on the ground that as a matter of law they were acting as state actors and thus not liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state agency in state or federal court.

Nichols v. Danley · filed 2003-05-12

As a state agency, it could not be sued under § 1983 in either state or federal court.

Section 1983 permits claims against private physicians serving inmates as government contractors when they act under color of state law.

Johnson II v. Karnes · filed 2005-02-25

Accordingly, we hold that Dr. Spagna's actions relating to Johnson's care qualify as state action for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy against persons subject to suit who personally participate in depriving someone of constitutional rights.

Anderson v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2005-11-02

The judgment is affirmed as to the remaining defendants, however, because either they are not subject to suit under section 1983, or Anderson failed to allege how they personally were involved in the deprivation of his rights.

Section 1983 generally does not permit suits against private attorneys for independent judgments and actions taken while representing a defendant because they are not state actors.

Combs v. City of Dallas · filed 2008-07-23

Private attorneys, even when appointed by the court, are not official state actors and are generally not subject to suit under § 1983 for independent judgments and actions taken during the course of representing a defendant.

Section 1983 permits suit against persons acting under color of state law who deprive plaintiffs of federal rights, and does not impose respondeat superior liability without a policy causing the violation.

Nerswick v. CSX Transportation, Inc. · filed 2010-02-19

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws ...” To establish a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must prove that “(1) a person, (2) acting under color of state law, (3) deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.” ... The Court finds that defendants Dugger and Minges, though acting in their capacity as employees of a private corporation, CSXT, at the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit, are amenable to suit under § 1983. Defendants, who were appointed and commissioned to act as police officers pursuant to Ohio Rev.Code § 4973.17, were performing police powers traditionally reserved to the state. Accordingly, these defendants were acting under color of state for purposes of § 1983 when engaged in the activities giving rise to this lawsuit.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendants acted under color of state law and were personally involved in or caused the deprivation of a protected right.

Ram v. Lal · filed 2012-11-21

In addition, there must be an allegation that the Federal Defendants were personally involved in or actually caused a deprivation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. ... Accordingly, it appears to the Court that the Federal Plaintiffs have not made out a cognizable Section 1983 claim against the Federal Defendants.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law and personally participated in the alleged deprivation of rights.

(PC) Sam v. Delacruz · filed 2019-08-08

First and foremost, although plaintiff names one Kimberly Delacruz as the sole defendant, he fails to identify who she is (i.e., whether she is a state actor) and how she personally participated in depriving him of his equal protection rights. The deprivation of a constitutional right by an individual acting under color of state law is essential to a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a defendant acted under color of law and was personally involved in depriving the plaintiff of federal rights.

Strujan v. Office of New York State Governor · filed 2020-05-19

“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a plaintiff must allege conduct that deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under the color of law.” ... Even if the Court were to assume that those defendants with addresses in the State Agency Building in Albany are state actors, the allegations in the pleading do not suggest that these individuals were personally involved in violations of plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a defendant personally participated in a deprivation of federal rights while acting under color of state law.

Phillips v. United State of America · filed 2020-08-19

A plaintiff must identify the right or privilege that was violated and the role of the defendant in the alleged violation, see Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 827 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005); Dunn v. Tenn., 697 F.2d 121, 128 (6th Cir. 1982), and Plaintiff has not alleged any specific personal involvement by these Defendants in the events described in the complaint. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged that these Defendants acted under color of state or federal law. Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Ritter, Childers, and Smith fail to state Section 1983 and Bivens claims upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 provides a supplementary remedy for constitutional violations, but it does not require federal courts to entertain claims lacking a substantial federal constitutional question.

Freeman v. Flake · filed 1971-09-28

The remedy provided by § 1983 is supplementary to any pertinent state remedy. ... The existence of the § 1983 remedy does not require that federal courts entertain all suits in which unconstitutional deprivations are asserted. A federal constitutional question must exist “not in mere form, but in substance, and not in mere assertion, but in essence and effect.” ... Complaints which are based on nothing more than school regulations of the length of a male student’s hair do not “directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values” and are not cognizable in federal courts under the principles stated in Epperson v. Arkansas. It follows that each of the complaints with which we are concerned should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a public employee alleging termination in retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights, with sufficient allegations to proceed to an evidentiary hearing.

Hirsch v. Green · filed 1973-12-28

However, this Court is of the opinion that plaintiff has stated a cause of action under § 1983 with regard to his first amendment claim. The “firing” occurred shortly after plaintiff’s grand jury testimony and defendant’s subsequent indictment. While a public employee may be subject to summary discharge, termination may not be in retribution for the exercise of constitutional rights. Brown v. Hirst, supra; Hodgin v. Noland, supra. The defendant Green challenges plaintiff’s allegations, reciting séveral factual reasons for the dismissal. Where there is a genuine dispute regarding a free speech claim, summary judgment, without full exploration of the issue, is improper. Wilderman v. Nelson, supra. The concurrence of protected speech and termination of the employment relationship is enough to invoke an inquiry into the circumstances of that termination. Chitwood v. Feaster, supra. This Court emphasizes that it is not finding that the plaintiff’s discharge was in fact the result of the exercise of first amendment rights. All that is being decided here is that the allegations are sufficient to entitle plaintiff to present evidence on this claim at a hearing.

Section 1983 allows a public-school teacher to sue when denied tenure because of exercising First Amendment rights.

Manchester v. Lewis · filed 1974-11-25

It is the well settled law of this Circuit that a public school teacher who is discharged or denied tenure because of the exercise of first amendment rights may maintain an action under § 1983.

Section 1983 makes a prisoner's First Amendment challenge to a prohibition on soliciting funds for educational programs cognizable.

French v. Robert E. Heyne, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Departmen · filed 1976-12-22

Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs have stated a claim for violation of the First Amendment cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that defendants are required to meet those standards enunciated in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413, 94 S.Ct. 1800, for justifying the prohibition against solicitation by plaintiffs of funds for educational programs.

Section 1983 does not make defamation actionable without a resulting constitutional-rights violation, but it provides a claim for properly pleaded harassment by a state official to abridge First Amendment rights.

Walter L. Kaylor, Freda Moore, and Juanita Rowe v. Ron Fields · filed 1981-10-19

Such a defamation, without some resultant denial of a constitutional right, is not actionable under § 1983. ... This allegation, if otherwise properly pleaded, would state a claim under § 1983 of harassment by a state official for the purpose of abridging First Amendment rights.

A campaign of harassment and an adverse transfer intended to chill a public employee's protected speech can be actionable under § 1983.

Allen v. Scribner · filed 1987-09-29

It is a question of fact whether the campaign reached the threshold of actionability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not extend a First Amendment employment discharge claim to an unfavorable reference letter written two years after discharge.

Compton v. Bowman · filed 1988-04-13

Moreover, Compton's Sec. 1983 claim of denial of his first amendment guarantee of free speech cannot be expanded to include a letter of reference written two years after his discharge.

Section 1983 does not automatically bar recovery on a First Amendment overbreadth claim because the plaintiff’s own conduct was unprotected.

Clarkson v. Town of Florence · filed 2002-05-02

The fact that an overbreadth plaintiffs own conduct was not privileged may be relevant to such issues as damages, but nothing in § 1983 or the overbreadth doctrine suggests that it automatically bars recovery.

Section 1983 permits recovery for a First Amendment violation when the defendant infringed the plaintiff’s rights and intended to do so, shown by actual harm or chilling of a person of ordinary firmness.

Rayford v. Omura · filed 2005-11-08

In short, § 1983 permits Rayford to recover from the Defendants if the Defendants infringed upon his First Amendment rights regardless of whether Rayford labels the violation as “chilling” or “retaliation.” Rayford must prove that the Defendants infringed upon his rights and that the Defendants intended to do so; to prove infringement, Ray-ford can prove either that he was actually harmed by the Defendants’ actions or that the Defendants’ actions would chill a person of ordinary firmness from speaking against the Defendants in the future.

Section 1983 provides a statutory vehicle to seek redress for alleged First Amendment violations.

BK v. New Hampshire Department of Health & Human Services · filed 2011-09-30

The defendants are incorrect, though, that the plaintiffs have failed to state a statutory basis for recovering for the defendants’ alleged violations of their First Amendment rights, because the amended complaint specifically cites just that vehicle, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be dismissed for claim splitting when they could have been raised in a pending state action arising from the same events.

Kanciper v. Suffolk County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc. · filed 2013-02-23

Here, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs Section 1983 claims against the SPCA, Gross, and Norkelun should be dismissed under the principle of claim splitting, on the basis that these claims would be barred by res judicata if the Suffolk County Action were to reach a final judgment.

A state criminal conviction can have a collateral estoppel effect on a § 1983 action.

Mastracchio v. Lieutenant Angelo Ricci and Providence Police Department · filed 1974-06-24

In this circuit a holding that a state criminal conviction can have a collateral estoppel effect upon a federal civil rights action can be reached simply by analytically combining our holdings in Bricker v. Crane, supra, and P. I. Enterprises v. Cataldo, supra (civil rights action preceded by state civil judgment), with our holding in Cardillo v. Zyla, supra (federal diversity action preceded by criminal conviction).

Section 1983 claims may be subject to res judicata and collateral estoppel based on a prior administrative decision, which can preclude relitigation of issues actually decided while leaving a discrimination-based civil-rights claim available.

Snow v. Nevada Department of Prisons · filed 1982-06-28

Thus, neither Plaintiff nor defendant Nevada Department of Prisons may relitigate those issues actually determined by the hearing officer and necessary to his decision, insofar as the instant 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims are concerned. ... From the foregoing it can be seen that Plaintiff is precluded from here relitigating, pursuant to §§ 1983 and 1985, whether she violated her employer’s key procedure (she did), whether that violation endangered the security of the institution (it did), whether her refusal to return to work when ordered constituted an act of insubordination and willful disobedience (it did), and whether the Department of Prisons was justified in terminating Plaintiff for violating the Rules for State Personnel Administration (it was). ... However, both civil rights statutes may still be used by Plaintiff as remedies if she can prove discrimination by the State (through its Department of Prisons) based on sex.

Section 1983 claims based on the same operative facts are barred by res judicata when the plaintiff could have raised them in an earlier state-court action.

Harl v. City of LaSalle · filed 1980-12-24

In summary, since the September 3,1980, order entered by Chief Judge Flood against Harl in her state court action was a final judgment on the merits, and since Harl could have, but did not, raise § 1983 along with her hearing and her notice claims in the state court action that she initiated, she is now barred by res judicata from attempting to litigate these claims in federal court. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint is granted.

Section 1983 does not entitle a litigant to relitigate in federal court a foreclosure action already litigated and lost in state court.

Ellis v. Cassidy · filed 1980-06-20

Having litigated and lost the foreclosure action in state court, appellant is not entitled to federal relitigation under the ambit of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 actions are subject to res judicata, which bars relitigation of constitutional issues raised or that could have been raised in an earlier lawsuit arising from the same operative nucleus of fact.

Robbins v. District Court of Worth County, Iowa · filed 1979-02-21

While Green v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., supra, did not involve constitutional issues, this circuit and several other circuits have held that the principle of Res judicata applies to § 1983 actions and operates as a bar to the relitigation of constitutional issues actually raised as well as to constitutional issues that could have been raised in a prior lawsuit if the second suit concerns the same operative nucleus of fact.

A final judgment in a § 1983 action can bar a later § 1983 action arising from the same operative facts even when the later suit seeks damages instead of injunctive relief and names employees instead of their employer.

Lambert v. David R. Conrad and Martha Carlson · filed 1976-07-21

That injunctive relief was sought in the first action and damages are sought in this action is insufficient to distinguish the two actions for purposes of res judicata. ... Since both suits pertain to the same disputed facts and arise out of the same operative facts, they clearly are the same cause of action. ... We hold that the difference in the identity of the defendants in the present action from those in the prior action is insufficient reason to prevent plaintiff from being bound.

Section 1983 authorizes equitable relief against local law-enforcement officials acting under color of state law who use excessive force or make illegal arrests, and an unappealed state conviction does not collaterally estop a federal constitutional challenge.

Wecht v. Marsteller · filed 1973-09-20

Local law enforcement officials who act under color of state law and who use excessive force or who make illegal arrests are subject to the equity powers of this Court under 42 U. S.C. Section 1983. ... In civil rights matters under Section 1983, unappealed state convictions do not constitute collateral estoppel preventing the plaintiff from attacking the constitutional questions in the federal courts.

Section 1983 does not permit a lower federal court to relitigate issues already decided by a state's highest court through an action for injunctive relief.

Samuel T. Roy, Justice of the Peace v. Benjamin R. Jones, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · filed 1973-08-28

It is clear from a recitation of the facts of this case that the appellants have sought, through the vehicle of a section 1983 suit for injunctive relief, to have a lower federal court engage in what essentially constitutes relitigation of issues already decided by Pennsylvania’s highest court.

A § 1983 action does not avoid the res judicata effect of a prior state-court determination of the same constitutional issues.

Murray v. Oswald · filed 1971-10-29

The fact that these issues are now raised in a civil suit for declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S. C. §§ 2201-2202 does not debilitate the res judicata effects of the State determination.

Section 1983 does not allow a litigant to relitigate in federal court constitutional claims that were fully litigated and decided by a state court.

P I Enterprises, Inc. v. Cataldo · filed 1972-03-31

Thereafter the appellants filed their federal complaint, seeking declaratory relief and damages pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2201, 2202 (1970) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (1970). ... A complaint under the Civil Rights Act does not provide the springboard for an unhappy state litigant to raise his federal claims de novo in federal court.

A § 1983 plaintiff who elects to litigate a federal constitutional challenge in state court and pursues it through the state appellate system may be barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel from relitigating that challenge in federal court.

Thistlethwaite v. City of New York · filed 1973-07-25

Each litigant with at least a colorable constitutional challenge should be accorded his day in court; however, the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was not designed to sponsor career litigants or to allow duplicative efforts to prevail. ... Consequently, when the litigant has so elected, principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel, to the extent applicable to the factual setting, should limit subsequent relitigation of the constitutional claim, or the facts underlying it, in a federal civil rights suit. ... Since plaintiffs elected to pursd'e their challenge to the constitutionality of Section 13 in the state courts, the final determination entered by the state courts precludes further consideration of the challenge by this Court, and accordingly, the complaint must be dismissed.

Collateral estoppel bars a plaintiff in a § 1983 suit from relitigating issues, including federal-law issues, decided in prior state-court litigation.

Pueschel v. Leuba · filed 1974-10-16

The principle of collateral estoppel is generally held to bar a plaintiff in a § 1983 suit from relitigating issues, including issues of federal law, decided in prior state court litigation. ... Under all the circumstances, collateral estoppel should bar the suit.

Section 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to relitigate in a federal civil-rights action an issue already finally decided in state-court litigation.

Keith Chasteen, Transferee of Mojet, Inc., a Missouri Corporation v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. · filed 1975-07-02

Given this situation Judge Collinson correctly concluded that this attempt to relitigate the issue is barred upon principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. ... The Civil Rights Act was not designed to be used as a substitute for the right of appeal, or to collaterally attack a final judgment of the highest court of a state and relitigate issues which it decided.

Section 1983 civil rights actions are subject to res judicata when the plaintiff already litigated the same federal claims in state court.

E-C Tape Service, Inc. v. Barron · filed 1976-07-09

Such an alternative characterization will not defeat defendant’s motion to dismiss in this case since the amended complaint and other documents contained in the record reveal that plaintiffs fully participated in the state court proceedings outlined above and raised there the precise federal claims attempted to be raised here. Under such circumstances, principles of res judicata, applicable to civil rights actions, require dismissal of the action.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by collateral estoppel when a prior state suppression hearing finally decided the same constitutional issues against the plaintiff.

Rodriguez v. Beame · filed 1976-12-21

The Second Circuit has held that in Civil Rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal court should give a prior state court adjudication the res judicata effect that the state courts would give it. ... Three factors are required to support a defense of res judicata [collateral estoppel]: ... A decision rendered on a suppression motion, followed by conviction on the relevant criminal charges, is a “final judgment” for purposes of collateral estoppel. ... Accordingly, summary judgment is granted and the complaint is dismissed.

Section 1983 civil-rights suits by prisoners are subject to res judicata.

Niles Crowe and Daniel Colvin, Jr., on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. William D. Leeke, Direc · filed 1977-02-08

The principle of res judicata, although not wholly applicable in habeas corpus proceedings, is fully applicable in prisoners’ civil rights suits brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 actions may be barred by res judicata when the same issues were already decided by a state court.

Wiggins v. Murphy · filed 1978-06-01

This court recently held that the doctrine of res judicata does apply to § 1983 actions. Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Department, 567 F.2d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 1977). We perceive no reason why res judicata should not bar the relitigation in this case of the same issues which were decided by the state courts.

A claim under § 1983 is barred by res judicata when it raises the same issues already decided in state court.

Sinicropi v. Nassau County · filed 1979-06-12

But even if it had been, the § 1983 claim would have raised the same issues that have already been decided in state court, so that the error, if any, in not permitting the amendment was harmless because the § 1983 claim would also be barred by res judicata.

Section 1983 does not permit relitigation of a constitutional issue that was actually raised and necessarily decided in state court.

L. Paul Dieffenbach, Jr. v. Attorney General of Vermont, Hazel M. Stevenson, Robert B. Young, First National Bank of Orw · filed 1979-08-08

our decisions have rather clearly established that where a constitutional issue has been actually raised and determined in the state court and was necessary to that decision, it may not be relitigated in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 civil-rights actions are subject to res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Lomax v. Smith · filed 1980-10-10

Principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are fully applicable to civil rights actions brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are subject to collateral estoppel, so a defendant cannot relitigate issues directly determined by a prior criminal conviction.

Vela v. Alvarez · filed 1981-02-13

Thus, a criminal conviction can work an offensive estoppel in a subsequent civil proceeding if the issues for which estoppel is sought were put in issue and directly determined in the prior criminal proceeding. ... This is exactly the issue sought to be determined in the instant § 1983 and state law assault and battery claims. ... Therefore, with respect to the § 1983 claim, the conclusion is easily reached that the Defendant L. R. Alvarez is precluded from re-litigating those issues previously decided in his criminal conviction.

Section 1983 civil-rights actions cannot relitigate an issue already tried and rejected in state habeas corpus proceedings under collateral estoppel, even when federal habeas corpus relief is unavailable.

Sperl v. Deukmejian · filed 1981-03-23

Sperl's claim under § 1983 was also properly dismissed. Sperl's claim of prosecutorial misconduct was tried and rejected in state habeas corpus proceedings. The doctrine of collateral estoppel therefore precludes reconsideration of the issue in a federal civil rights action, even when federal habeas corpus relief is not available.

Section 1983 claims previously litigated in state court may be barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel when the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

Switlik v. Hardwicke Company · filed 1981-06-08

Having concluded that the district court entered an order granting summary judgment, that there existed no genuine issue of material fact, and that the record demonstrates that the plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their constitutional claims in state court, we hold that the district court correctly concluded that the claims presented by this section 1983 action are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred by collateral estoppel when the constitutional claim was previously adjudicated on the merits.

Seltzer v. State of Mo. · filed 1981-07-14

Prior adjudication of the merits of plaintiff's constitutional claim serves as a collateral estoppel defense to the § 1983 suit against defendants for damages. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980).

A preliminary probable-cause finding does not preclude a Section 1983 suit challenging the arresting officer's bad-faith investigation or misrepresentations rather than the legality of the arrest alone.

N. W. Whitley, Cross-Appellant v. George W. Seibel, Individually and as a Police Officer of the Chicago Police Departmen · filed 1982-03-24

Although we concede that there will be identical issues in a preliminary hearing and a Section 1983 suit when only the legality of the arrest is at issue, we do not find that proposition applicable to this case.

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant acted under color of state law and deprived a person of a federal right; a conviction that does not establish those elements cannot, by collateral estoppel, establish § 1983 liability.

Anderson v. Janovich · filed 1982-04-20

Neither conviction required proof that Janovich acted “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” or that he “deprived” any person of a federal right. Section 1962 does not even remotely contain any element which duplicates one of the elements of plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim. Hence collateral estoppel on the section 1983 claim cannot be predicated on Janovich’s conviction under Count I.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by collateral estoppel when a state criminal proceeding specifically determined the same issue, even if the state decision was erroneous.

Sesso v. Rapone · filed 1982-04-28

A prior criminal adjudication may bar to a subsequent civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... If the state court has specifically determined the issue in question in a prior criminal proceeding, the issue will not be relitigated in a civil rights action in federal court, even if that decision may have been erroneous.

Section 1983 actions may be dismissed on res judicata grounds when the same claims were litigated in another case and decided against the party by judgment.

Cairo v. Skow · filed 1982-08-02

Federal actions based jurisdictionally on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to dismissal when the same claims have been litigated in another case and determined by judgment against the party in the prior lawsuit.

Section 1983 actions are subject to collateral estoppel.

Cender v. Peters · filed 1982-10-05

The doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable in an action brought under 42 U.S.C., section 1983.

Section 1983 actions in federal court generally use the res judicata rules of the state court that issued the judgment, unless those rules violate due process.

Kuzinich v. County Of Santa Clara · filed 1983-01-24

It is settled law that, unless a state's res judicata rules violate due process, federal courts hearing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions apply the rules of the state court from which the judgment issues.

Section 1983 claims against a state department may be barred by res judicata when they could and should have been brought in an earlier federal action.

Morgan v. Department of Offender Rehabilitation · filed 1983-04-27

Similarly, the appellant’s claim against the Department alleging a violation of 42 USC § 1983 was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, because it could and should have been presented to the original federal court.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to pursue a civil-rights claim for post-confession denial of medical attention when that claim was not previously resolved by a state suppression ruling.

Langert v. Festa · filed 1983-05-10

Accordingly, Langert is not collaterally estopped from asserting a § 1983 claim for denial of medical attention for the period immediately following his confession until 4:00 A.M. when Langert was taken to the hospital.

Facts necessarily determined in a prior state proceeding may bind a federal court deciding a § 1983 claim even when the claim itself is not barred by res judicata.

Douglas N. Higgins, Inc. v. Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority · filed 1983-06-21

While the decision of the FKAA administrative tribunal and the District Court of Appeal in denying Plaintiff relief on Plaintiff’s state law claim did not act as res judicata on the section 1983 claim, since that cause of action was not presented in the state action, the findings of fact reached in determining the state law claim are binding on this Court in determining its section 1983 claim.

A criminal conviction collaterally estops a person from asserting § 1983 damages claims against those responsible for the arrest and conviction for that crime.

Reese v. York · filed 1983-09-22

A person is collaterally estopped from asserting damage claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against those who were responsible for his arrest and conviction for that particular crime.

Collateral estoppel may bar relitigation of probable cause in a § 1983 arrest claim.

Guenther v. Holmgreen · filed 1983-10-26

There was, therefore, every reason for the plaintiff to fully litigate the issue of probable cause at the hearing, and there is no indication that it was not.

Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) is available as a defense in a section 1983 action, barring relitigation of issues already decided in a prior state court proceeding after a full and fair hearing.

Baker v. McCoy · filed 1984-07-24

It is now beyond doubt that the defense of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) is available in a § 1983 action.

The equitable nature of a § 1983 suit does not prevent application of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Dowell v. BD. OF EDUC. OF OKLAHOMA CITY PUB. SCH. · filed 1985-04-25

The Supreme Court has approved the view that the fact that a case is in the nature of a suit in equity, authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as is this one, "presents no categorical bar to the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel concepts."

The equitable nature of a § 1983 suit does not prevent application of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Dowell v. Board of Education · filed 1985-04-25

The Supreme Court has approved the view that the fact that a case is in the nature of a suit in equity, authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as is this one, “presents no categorical bar to the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel concepts.”

A vacated criminal judgment has no collateral-estoppel effect in a later § 1983 action, even when the reversal did not address the trial’s factual findings.

Dodrill v. Robert Ludt, Niles Police Department John A. Ross, Niles Police Department and City of Niles · filed 1985-06-11

The reversal, however, vacates the judgment entirely, technically leaving nothing to which we may accord preclusive effect. ... Dodrill is not estopped from litigating the issues raised in his complaint.

A § 1983 claim is barred by claim preclusion when the plaintiff could have raised the same federal theory in an earlier state action based on identical facts.

Mears v. Town of Oxford, Maryland · filed 1985-06-20

Mears did not frame the theory of his declaratory judgment action in terms of a Sec. 1983 action for damages, but he certainly could have done so because a Maryland state court has jurisdiction to hear Sec. 1983 claims. ... These claims are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.

State issue preclusion can defeat a section 1983 due-process or equal-protection claim by conclusively eliminating the liberty or property interest required for that claim.

Marino v. McDonald · filed 1985-06-20

Applying the applicable law to the case at bar, the Court finds that the Michigan doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the plaintiffs from raising any argument before this Court that they were entitled either to a special land use permit in this case or to not have the issued permit revoked. ... In resolving against the plaintiffs, the question of whether they were entitled to any benefit under state law, the Court has removed a necessary element of the Section 1983 claims in this case. For the plaintiffs will necessarily be unable to establish a Due Process or Equal Protection claim if they are unable to show that they were deprived of a cognizible liberty or property interest.

A section 1983 claim that could have been raised in an earlier state proceeding is precluded when the rendering state’s courts would give the judgment claim-preclusive effect.

Doyel v. City of Marianna · filed 1985-06-20

Plaintiff could have raised her claim of racial discrimination in the state court proceeding because state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Constitution. ... The Court finds the Arkansas Chancery Court judgment would preclude this action in another Arkansas court and, therefore precludes it here.

Claim preclusion bars a later § 1983 action asserting a constitutional defense that could have been raised in an earlier state enforcement proceeding involving the same facts and cause of action.

City of Canton v. Maynard · filed 1985-06-28

Applying this standard, we conclude that this cause of action is the same as in the prior state court judgment. In both eases, the only real issue was the enforceability of the Ohio fluoridation legislation to Canton. The equal protection clause argument proffered by the appellants in this case is nothing more than a defense to enforcement of the fluoridation law that could have been raised in state court.

A prior medical-indifference suit does not bar a later section 1983 claim based on a different period and different facts merely because the claims are similar.

Shapley v. Nevada Board of State Prison Commissioners, an Administrative Body · filed 1985-07-16

We therefore hold that the court below abused its discretion in finding that res judicata rendered Shapley’s deliberate medical indifference claim frivolous under section 1915(d). ... As is clear from our discussion above, the delay in surgery issue underlying the deliberate medical indifference claim is not identical to any of the issues litigated in the first action.

Collateral estoppel applies in § 1983 actions only when the prior case decided the identical issue on the merits and the same party had a full and fair opportunity to present the claim.

Jones v. Logue · filed 1985-08-14

It is now firmly established that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable to actions brought under § 1983. ... Collateral estoppel applies when 1) the issue decided in the prior litigation is identical to the issue presently before the court; 2) the prior litigation resulted in a judgment on the merits; 3) the party against whom estoppel is asserted is á party, or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding; and 4) the opportunity to present the claim in the prior proceeding was full and fair.

A prior state judgment precludes a § 1983 action only to the extent that the rendering state's law would give it preclusive effect.

Lundblad v. Celeste · filed 1985-08-22

The district court properly understood that its task was to give the prior state court judgment the preclusive effect that other courts of the state would apply under state law. ... The Supreme Court has expressly applied this rule in actions brought under section 1983.

A prior state judgment precludes a later § 1983 action when state law treats both suits as one cause of action arising from the same operative facts and the federal theory could have been joined in the first suit.

Charles Frier, Jr. v. City of Vandalia, Illinois · filed 1985-08-23

The “operative facts” in the replevin and § 1983 actions therefore are the same. ... If Frier had filed the current suit in state court, he would have lost under the doctrine of claim preclusion. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 he therefore loses in federal court as well.

Offensive collateral estoppel should not establish Section 1983 liability from a still-pending class action whose judgment lacks sufficient finality and whose issues may not be identical.

Polk v. Montgomery County · filed 1986-02-06

We find that the doctrine of collateral estoppel was applied prematurely in this case. We remand the case to the district court, where it may address the constitutional issue ab initio or it may hold the case in abeyance pending a final judgment in the Smith case.

A later decision that merely adheres to an earlier denial does not create a new transaction that avoids claim preclusion in a § 1983 action.

Gargiul v. Tompkins · filed 1986-05-14

When the Board decided in 1977 to adhere to the decision it had reached in 1975, it did not generate any new fact bearing on the validity of the suspension pay claim, and no separate transaction occurred.

A § 1983 claim arising from the same transaction as a prior state proceeding is barred by claim preclusion if it could have been litigated in that proceeding.

Albenga v. Ward · filed 1986-05-22

If it could have been litigated there, and if it arises from the “same congeries of facts” he cannot maintain a separate suit in this court now.

A § 1983 claim decided on the merits in a prior federal action cannot be relitigated in a later state action under res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Montauk-Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Hope · filed 1986-06-03

Therefore, pursuant to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, plaintiff is precluded from relitigating the second and third causes of action in this lawsuit ... and they are dismissed as to all defendants.

Federal courts hearing § 1983 claims must give state administrative factfinding the same preclusive effect available in state court when the agency acted judicially and the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate.

University of Tennessee v. Elliott · filed 1986-07-07

Accordingly, we hold that when a state agency “acting in a judicial capacity ... resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,” ... federal courts must give the agency’s factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State’s courts.

A prior child-custody habeas action does not bar a later § 1983 challenge to an agency's allegedly unconstitutional child-removal practice when the two actions present different causes of action.

Coe v. Ziegler · filed 1987-03-17

Plaintiffs argue persuasively that the only cause of action which the named plaintiffs could have raised in their habeas corpus complaint was whether the parents were unlawfully deprived of the custody of their children. By contrast, the instant § 1983 claim alleges that the Hamilton County Welfare Department engaged in a practice of removing children prior to the filing a complaint that was unconstitutional. Res judicata is therefore not a bar to the instant action.

A state agency’s judicial factfinding precludes relitigation of a § 1983 claim when the agency resolved properly presented disputed facts and the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate.

Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers, Inc., Roger Thomas Kiekhofer, & Robert Friend · filed 1987-05-29

From our reading of the Supreme Court’s decision in ... and our own research we have not discovered any legislative history establishing that Congress intended that the civil rights statutes were to foreclose application of the common-law doctrine of preclusion in discharge cases like Buckhalter, and therefore Buck-halter is precluded from relitigating his section 1983 claim in federal courts if: (1) the State agency has acted in a judicial capacity; (2) has resolved disputed issues of fact properly before it; and (3) the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate the issues.

Section 1983 does not displace state claim-preclusion law or guarantee a second federal forum for constitutional claims omitted from prior state litigation.

Hasenstab v. City of New York · filed 1987-06-26

Section 1983, however, does not overrule state preclusion law and guarantee [plaintiff] a right to proceed to judgment in state court on [his] state claims and then turn to federal court for adjudication of [his] federal claims....

A state judgment precludes a § 1983 claim when the prior proceedings met minimum due-process requirements and the same claim was litigated there.

Wool v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission · filed 1987-07-13

Because the state proceedings satisfied the minimum procedural requirements of the due process clause, this Court must accord the Maryland judicial decisions full faith and credit. ... This is precisely the claim litigated in the state proceedings and, as such, is barred by res judicata.

Res judicata bars a later § 1983 action between the same parties that raises the same issues as a prior case.

Perry v. David Higby, Detroit Prosecutor, Gretchen Solai, Badge No. 96, Detroit Police Officer · filed 1987-08-17

Res judicata bars subsequent cases between the same parties which raise the same issues.

Section 1983 claims are subject to collateral estoppel for issues fully litigated in state court, with the state judgment given the same effect it would receive under state law.

Hamm-Bey v. Michael Joseph Cole, Corporal · filed 1988-06-24

Because the principle of collateral estoppel applies to Sec. 1983 actions, Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), and the district court was required to give the state court judgment the same effect as would Maryland courts, Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1983), the district court correctly found Hamm-Bey's claim precluded.

Section 1983 actions are subject to collateral estoppel, which can give preclusive effect to state criminal judgments.

Webb v. William P. Ethridge and Charles Gay · filed 1988-07-13

It is settled that rules of collateral estoppel apply to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and can give preclusive effect to judgments rendered in state criminal proceedings.

A § 1983 claim is subject to collateral estoppel based on issues decided in earlier criminal proceedings.

Rudolph v. Dussault · filed 1988-11-01

Though it does not expressly name the statute, Mr. Rudolph's complaint, broadly viewed, states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 for violation of civil rights. In such a case, col- lateral estoppel applies as to previous criminal proceedings.

Section 1983 claims are subject to collateral estoppel when an identical issue was necessarily litigated and decided in an earlier state court action.

Farmer v. Michael Lane, Doug Brown, Linda Williamson, Jay Delicandro, Rocco Biscaglia, and Reid Paxson · filed 1988-12-14

The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata are, of course, applicable in section 1983 cases. ... Resolution of the political retaliation claim was necessary to the state court’s conclusion on Count III; the claim was squarely raised and decided; and the identical issue—retaliation for political activities—is involved in both cases. Thus collateral estoppel applies to the substantive claim.

Section 1983 affords no relief on an issue actually and fairly litigated on direct appeal when collateral estoppel precludes relitigation.

Lane v. Kerry Rowland, Officer Joseph Hoffman Nick Clooney, Anchorman, Defendants · filed 1989-02-01

Lane cannot obtain relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 based on his issue regarding defendants' alteration of his recorded personal statement because the issue was actually and fairly litigated in Lane's direct appeal and he is precluded from further litigating the issue under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

Collateral estoppel can bar relitigation of constitutional claims in a Section 1983 action when the claims were fully and fairly litigated and decided in a prior state criminal proceeding.

Grant v. Farnsworth · filed 1989-03-15

We affirm. Tyler v. Harper, 744 F.2d 653, 655 (8th Cir.1984), holds that “collateral estoppel can bar relitigation of constitutional claims in a section 1983 action when they were fully and fairly litigated and decided in a prior state criminal proceeding.” Here Grant attempted to retry the validity of his arrest, for a crime of which he was convicted in state court.

Constitutional claims under Section 1983 may be barred by collateral estoppel when they were fully and fairly litigated and decided in a prior state criminal proceeding.

Grant v. Farnsworth · filed 1989-04-20

We affirm. Tyler v. Harper, 744 F.2d 653, 655 (8th Cir.1984), holds that "collateral estoppel can bar relitigation of constitutional claims in a section 1983 action when they were fully and fairly litigated and decided in a prior state criminal proceeding." Here Grant attempted to retry the validity of his arrest, for a crime of which he was convicted in state court.

A criminal jury’s general verdict does not preclude a Section 1983 plaintiff from relitigating alleged police brutality when the verdict did not necessarily decide that issue.

Owens v. Treder · filed 1989-04-20

Consequently, the jury's general verdict does not preclude Owens from relitigating in this Sec. 1983 action the issue of whether police brutality coerced his confession.

Section 1983 claims can be barred by res judicata when they could have been litigated in a prior state court action.

Benline v. City of Deland · filed 1989-04-27

Under res judicata, causes of actions which were or could have been litigated are deemed precluded if in a prior case there has been a final judgment rendered and there was no question as to the jurisdiction of the earlier forum to entertain the later filed cause of action. ... This is clearly the case concerning Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which could have been litigated in the second state court proceeding.

Section 1983 claims are barred by collateral estoppel when the plaintiff seeks to relitigate facts and issues already decided against him in a criminal trial.

Roberts v. City of Maplewood Chief of Police · filed 1989-05-03

A plaintiff attempting to rely upon certain facts and issues which have previously been decided against him during a criminal trial is barred from relitigating the same facts and issues in a subsequent § 1983 action.

Collateral estoppel can bar a Section 1983 plaintiff from relitigating constitutional claims resolved in a prior state criminal proceeding.

Carver v. A.J. Peterson Herbert Hopkins Richard R. Lofty · filed 1989-05-18

We agree with the district court that collateral estoppel precludes Carver from relitigating the claims presented in his suppression motion to the North Carolina trial court.

A guilty plea can preclude a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim under applicable federal and state preclusion law.

Brown v. De Fillipis · filed 1989-07-07

For these reasons, under both federal and New York law Brown’s guilty plea precludes him from obtaining federal court review of his § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest.

Section 1983 claims are subject to collateral estoppel based on issues fully and fairly litigated in a prior state tort claims proceeding.

Solomon v. Dixon · filed 1989-09-05

Consequently, plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating the same issue in his § 1983 suit. Plaintiff, accordingly, cannot maintain a claim under § 1983 alleging that defendants violated his constitutional rights based on the same facts presented in support of his claim brought under the North Carolina Tort Claims Act.

Section 1983 actions receive the same preclusive effect from prior state court judgments that the courts of the rendering state would give those judgments.

Louis Peregoff, Individually and on Behalf of All Persons Similarly Situated v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company · filed 1989-09-15

With respect to Sec. 1983 actions, federal courts are required to give the same preclusive effect to prior state court decisions as would be applied in the state court where the original judgment was rendered.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to relitigate an issue necessarily decided in a state criminal conviction when the plaintiff had an opportunity to contest it.

Green v. City of New York Medical Examiner's Office · filed 1989-10-06

The principal reason for granting summary judgment is that the plaintiff’s criminal conviction collaterally estops him from maintaining this action. ... Consequently, the plaintiff is collaterally estopped from raising the claim that the autopsy report was falsified and that the decedent died a natural death.

Section 1983 actions give state court judgments the same preclusive effect those judgments would receive under the law of the rendering state.

Dennison v. County of Frederick · filed 1989-12-01

It is “settled that a federal court must give to a state court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.” Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 896, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). The rule is no different in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A final state court determination that a government decision was lawful can bar a § 1983 claim premised on the unlawfulness of that decision under res judicata.

Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill · filed 1990-01-18

Applying this law to the plaintiff’s cause of action alleged in her complaint, we conclude that she is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from reasserting her claim that the town unlawfully denied approval of her subdivision plan. ... Furthermore, the fact that plaintiff’s complaint alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not affect our holding.

Section 1983 claims are barred from relitigation when state law gives a prior state criminal ruling preclusive effect and the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues.

Smith v. Howard Barrett Frank O'Neil · filed 1990-05-08

We agree that Haring and Allen bar relitigation of such claims, but only if state law (here, South Carolina) would accord preclusive effect in this context. ... His lack of success is irrelevant--he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim and he is barred from relitigating the same claims in later proceedings.

A Section 1983 claim for compensatory and punitive damages may be barred by res judicata when the claimant had a fair opportunity to litigate the same issues and obtain relief in an earlier action.

D'Amico v. Stow · filed 1990-05-19

Thus we decide whether those issues decided by the trial court and affirmed by us as well as those upon which we reversed and ordered relief, bar further actions on the 1983 action as it relates to compensatory and punitive damages. ... Here, where Gillespie has had a fair opportunity to fully litigate these issues and receive relief, judicial economy requires an end. We will certainly not permit a relitigation of identical issues solely because the remedy has been unsatisfectory.

Section 1983 claims are subject to res judicata, so a prior state court judgment may foreclose a later federal action.

Leonard v. Suthard · filed 1990-05-22

It is true that plaintiff’s § 1983 action will be foreclosed, but as the Supreme Court made clear in Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84-85, 104 S.Ct. 892, 897-98, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984) the rules of res judicata apply equally to § 1983 cases.

Collateral estoppel may bar a § 1983 claim when an issue was necessarily decided in a prior state-court proceeding after a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

Mosley v. LaMastus · filed 1990-05-30

Moreover, collateral estoppel may be applied to constitutional claims brought pursuant to § 1983, as well as to state law claims. ... Consequently, Mosley is collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue, as it has already been fully adjudicated in the prior state court proceeding.

In Virginia, a state criminal conviction can preclude a § 1983 claim on issues actually litigated and necessarily determined in the state proceedings.

Grochowski v. Virginia · filed 1990-07-18

In order to determine whether Gro-chowski’s criminal conviction in the state courts collaterally estops him from bringing a § 1983 claim in federal court, the court must consider what issues of law and fact the state courts actually litigated or necessarily determined.

Section 1983 actions are subject to res judicata, so a prior state-court judgment can bar claims that could have been raised there.

Mr. Four Hundred v. D.J. Howe, James A. Chrans, Mary Ann Quoz, Kenneth McGinnis Joseph Galassi and Allen Saddoris · filed 1990-07-23

We agree with the district court that appellant's claims are barred by res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata is clearly applicable to Sec. 1983 actions.

State res judicata law determines whether a workers’ compensation award for emotional injuries bars a § 1983 claim for emotional-distress damages.

Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana · filed 1990-09-25

Whether Sanchez’s compensation award for emotional injuries bars under res judicata principles his section 1983 claim for damages for emotional distress is answered by state law.

Section 1983 does not exempt claims from collateral estoppel or from the requirement to apply state preclusion rules under 28 U.S.C. § 1738.

Roman A. Grochowski v. T.S. Dewitt-Rickards, and Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 1991-03-13

There is no implicit exception in Sec. 1983 to the applicability of collateral estoppel to bar relitigation in federal court of issues finally adjudicated in a state criminal conviction. See Haring, supra. However, there is also no exception inherent in Sec. 1983 to the mandate of Sec. 1738, requiring the use of state collateral estoppel rules.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by collateral estoppel when a state court has decided central issues after the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate them.

Temple Of The Lost Sheep Inc. v. Abrams · filed 1991-04-05

It is clear to us, however, that the district court properly found that appellants were collaterally estopped from pursuing their section 1983 claims, since the record shows that the state court directly decided issues that are central to appellants' section 1983 claims and that appellants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate those issues.

Section 1983 claims are subject to collateral estoppel when the claimant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the same issue in a prior state action.

Washington v. Chrans · filed 1991-06-27

The plaintiff is estopped from relitigating this issue in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims for constitutional violations are subject to the preclusive effect of res judicata.

Jama Construction v. City Of Los Angeles · filed 1991-07-15

Section 1983 claims for violations of constitutional rights are not immune from the preclusive effect of res judicata.

A Section 1983 damages claim is not barred by a prior zoning appeal in which damages were unavailable.

Hunt v. Town of Easton, No. Cv89 0259831s (Aug. 16, 1991) · filed 1991-08-16

The remedy for a 1983 claim is damages, which are precisely what Hunt seeks in his complaint. Because Hunt could not have sought damages from the Board or on appeal in the first instance, (See discussion on fourth special defense), he could not have raised his 1983 claim earlier. Therefore, the Fifth Special Defense is also stricken.

Final state agency adjudications can preclude later § 1983 actions in state or federal court.

DeNardo v. Johnstone · filed 1991-09-06

Therefore, it necessarily follows that final agency adjudications are res judicata in both state and federal court in later actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by res judicata when they arise from the same transaction as an earlier state court action in which they could have been raised.

Mulrain v. Board of Selectmen of the Town of Leicester · filed 1991-09-10

Additionally, nothing prevented him from bringing his § 1983 claim in state court. The state court would have had jurisdiction over the claim and been able to award full relief. ... There is thus no reason why all of petitioner’s claims could not have been raised in one case.

A § 1983 damages claim challenging an arrest may be barred by issue preclusion when a state criminal suppression hearing gave the plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate probable cause.

Arnold v. City of Chicago · filed 1991-10-03

Arnold had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the legality of his arrest at his pretrial suppression hearing. Having lost once on the issue, he cannot again seek to relitigate his claim in the guise of a § 1983 damage action against the officers who arrested him.

Whether a prior state judgment precludes a Section 1983 claim depends on the preclusion rules of that state.

Williams v. Borg · filed 1991-10-03

Whether a prior state court judgment bars litigation of a section 1983 claim depends on the preclusion rules of the state, not those of the federal courts.

A prior state proceeding does not bar a section 1983 claim when the plaintiff had no legitimate opportunity to litigate that claim in state court.

Adams v. Sewell · filed 1991-11-04

Under these circumstances, res judicata does not apply because Adams did not receive a legitimate opportunity to litigate his section 1983 claims in state court.

A state criminal court’s necessary determination of probable cause can collaterally estop a plaintiff from relitigating that issue in a § 1983 action.

Williams v. James Mobley Jean Stillwagon Patricia Lyons Sergeant Pate · filed 1991-11-04

However, Williams's complaint is barred because his litigation of the issue of probable cause in the Kentucky courts collaterally estops him from relitigating it in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by res judicata when they seek relief for the same injury finally adjudicated in a state administrative proceeding.

Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego · filed 1992-02-20

Inasmuch as the primary right at stake was her right to continued employment and the harm suffered was loss of that employment, her fifth cause of action does not present a separate injury from that litigated before the Commission. ... By invoking the Constitution and 42 United States Code sections 1983 and 1985, Swartzendruber has merely presented a new legal theory upon which she seeks recovery. ... For these reasons, we conclude the trial court was correct in applying principles of res judicata to Swartzendruber’s federal civil rights cause of action.

A § 1983 plaintiff may be collaterally estopped from relitigating injury causation when a state agency acting judicially decided the identical issue after a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

Crot v. Jane Byrne, City of Chicago, an Illinois Municipal Corporation, John Donovan, and John Winkler · filed 1992-02-28

Given the requirements of Elliott and Ray, it is clear that collateral estoppel was appropriate in this action. ... The district court, then, properly es-topped Crot from relitigating the causation issue in this action.

A prior state-court decision has the same issue-preclusive effect in a Section 1983 action that it would have under the rendering state’s law.

Favors v. Larry Spurgeon, Robert J. Stout, John Doe · filed 1992-03-17

Issues that were litigated in a state court proceeding are entitled to the same preclusive effect in a subsequent federal civil rights action as they enjoy in the courts of the state where judgment was rendered.

Section 1983 claims are subject to res judicata, including the preclusive effect of a prior state court judgment under applicable state law.

Stumpf v. Roger v. Endell, Commissioner · filed 1992-04-24

Res judicata applies to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Federal courts give state court judgments res judicata effect in § 1983 actions, so a prior judgment can bar a claim based on the same alleged violations.

Howard v. Barrows · filed 1992-05-08

Federal courts hearing § 1983 and § 1985 actions must give res judicata effect to state court judgments.

A section 1983 suit is barred by res judicata when the plaintiff could have raised the same federal constitutional claims in an earlier state court action involving the same wrong and parties.

Busch v. City of Long Beach · filed 1992-06-10

Plaintiffs were free to raise all their federal constitutional claims before the state court. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that plaintiffs are now barred by the doctrine of res judicata from bringing a section 1983 suit in federal court.

A Section 1983 claim arising from a public employee’s dismissal is barred by res judicata when the employee had an adequate opportunity to litigate before a civil service commission and failed to seek mandamus review of its decision.

Miller v. County of Santa Cruz · filed 1992-07-29

Therefore, retroactive application of Swartzendruber barring plaintiff from pursing his Section 1983 claim in this court is not substantially inequitable. ... Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata/coWsXexsX estoppel since he had an adequate opportunity to litigate his claim before the Civil Service Commission and he failed to seek mandamus review of the Commission’s decision upholding his dismissal.

A § 1983 action may be barred by res judicata after an adverse federal habeas judgment on the same claim, despite a difference in named defendants.

Evans v. Thomas D. Richards and Indiana Attorney General, Ronald W. Evans v. Thomas D. Richards, Ronald E. Hag · filed 1992-08-03

Because of the decision in the habeas corpus proceeding, the district court dismissed Mr. Evans' civil rights claim as res judicata. Despite the variance in the named defendants, as Mr. Evans himself acknowledges, "both causes are identical except for the relief." (Reply Brief at 2). The district court's action was appropriate. See Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1153-54 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977) (principles of res judicata may bar § 1983 action after prior adverse judgment in federal habeas proceeding).

Collateral estoppel applies to § 1983 actions alleging Fourth Amendment violations.

Munz v. Parr · filed 1992-08-14

To the contrary, the Supreme Court has made clear that collateral estoppel applies to section 1983 actions involving alleged Fourth Amendment violations.

Section 1983 claims can be barred by an issue decided in a state postconviction proceeding when the state would give that decision preclusive effect.

Schertz v. Crispus Nix Jim Helling John Henry John Emmett Paul Hedgepeth · filed 1992-09-25

The issue was actually litigated in the state postcon-viction proceeding and is entitled to the same preclusive effect in the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as would have been available in the state where the judgment was rendered.

A state habeas decision on the merits can preclude a later § 1983 claim that seeks to relitigate the same issues if the prisoner had a full and fair opportunity to be heard.

Moses Johnson, AKA Musa Mata v. Charles D. Marshall, Warden · filed 1992-10-05

Although Johnson's case was litigated in the state courts as a habeas proceeding, a state habeas proceeding decided on the merits can be the basis for precluding a § 1983 claim in federal court.

A § 1983 claim is subject to claim preclusion when the same cause of action could have been fully litigated in an earlier state court suit.

Osborn v. Ashland County Board of Alcohol, Drug Addiction and Mental Health Services · filed 1992-10-29

In the instant case, Osborn similarly had the opportunity to litigate all aspects of his due process cause of action in state courts. Thus, this court is precluded, by res judica-ta and the Full Faith and Credit Act, from addressing Osborn’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims related to prior state court judgments may be barred by res judicata, but the bar does not apply where state courts were unable or unwilling to protect federal rights.

Donald Steeg Irene Steeg v. City of Dearborn Heights James R. Briggs · filed 1992-11-13

While, generally, the doctrine of res judicata forecloses relitigation of matters that were determined, or should have been raised, in a prior suit in which a court entered a final judgment on the merits, see Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 82-84 (1984), section 1983 suits that raise claims related to prior state court judgments are not precluded without qualifications. See Fellowship of Christ Church v. Thorburn, 758 F.2d 1140, 1143 (6th Cir.1985). A prior state court judgment would not preclude the federal courts from acting where the state courts were unable or unwilling to protect federal rights.

Collateral estoppel applies to Section 1983 claims, but a prior state court ruling must be a final judgment on the merits to bar the claim.

Nelson v. Howard · filed 1992-12-11

Defendants are correct that collateral estoppel principles apply to § 1983 actions and require a federal district court to give binding effect to the decision of a state court in some circumstances. ... However, it is fundamental that in order for a claim to be barred by collateral estoppel there must have been a prior final judgment on the merits of the claim. ... Because the Court of Common Pleas’ denial of plaintiff’s motion to suppress is not a final judgment, it cannot be used to estop plaintiff from making a fourth amendment claim in this court.

A Section 1983 claim may be barred by collateral estoppel when the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in state court.

Murphy v. William Pettijohn Tim Dennis Douglas Farmer Ed Schesslemen John Doe · filed 1992-12-11

Mr. Murphy had a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate the issues in the state court proceedings and to take an appeal. The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies. For substantially the same reasons as the district court gave, we hold that Mr. Murphy's claims are barred by collateral estoppel.

A Section 1983 claim may be barred by collateral estoppel when a state criminal court already resolved the same Fourth Amendment search issue after a full and fair opportunity to litigate it.

Carlton v. John Pytell Jerry Reynard Robert J. Winter City of Ann Arbor Ann Arbor Police Department · filed 1993-02-22

However, a claim in a section 1983 suit may be subject to the preclusive effect of collateral estoppel when a motion to suppress the evidence based on a Fourth Amendment challenge was denied in the state criminal proceeding, as it was in this case.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by res judicata and estoppel by record based on an unreviewed state administrative decision when the claimant had an adequate opportunity to litigate and state law gives the decision preclusive effect.

Lindas v. Cady · filed 1993-03-11

Thus, pursuant to Acharya, res judicata and estoppel by record prevent Lindas from relitigating her sec. 1983 claim in this action.