42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 compensatory damages require proof of an injury caused by the violation of a legal right.

Pernas v. Parkview Towers Management Corp. · filed 1980-11-10

Damage awards under § 1983 should be determined by ordinary compensation principles. A person should be compensated fairly for the injuries caused by the violation of his legal rights.

Section 1983 compensatory damages cover only actual injuries caused by the violation and are ordinarily measured under common law tort principles.

Bogan v. City of Boston · filed 2007-06-12

Compensatory damages in § 1983 cases remedy only actual injuries caused by the violation, and the level of damages is ordinarily determined according to common law tort principles.

Section 1983 damages compensate for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.

J & B Entertainment v. City of Jackson, Miss. · filed 2010-03-31

So, “the basic purpose” of § 1983 damages is “to compensate persons for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.”

Section 1983 compensatory damages require an injury caused by the deprivation of a constitutional right; injuries caused by a law’s application do not support damages based solely on a facial challenge to that law.

Daskalea v. WASHINGTON HUMANE SOCIETY · filed 2010-05-02

Thus, while Plaintiffs may be entitled to compensatory damages in connection with their as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the Act, they are not entitled to compensatory damages in connection with their facial challenge.

Compensatory damages under § 1983 require proof of actual injury and a basis for determining the amount.

Christiansen v. Dir. Charles J. McRay · filed 2010-05-26

“[C]ompensatory damages under § 1983 may be awarded only based on actual injuries caused by the defendant and cannot be presumed or based on the abstract value of the constitutional rights that the defendant violated.” ... Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that Christiansen failed to establish a basis for a monetary award.

Section 1983 requires proof of injury to recover compensatory damages.

Windstead v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-07-02

In order for a plaintiff to recover such compensatory damages, he or she must have proof of the injury.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries, including embarrassment, humiliation, and loss of reputation.

Ellison v. Balinski · filed 2010-11-12

Despite Defendant’s apparent suggestion to the contrary, the law is clear that compensatory damages under § 1983 may include noneconomic injuries such as embarrassment, humiliation, or loss of reputation.

Section 1983 compensatory damages require proof of actual injury; an assertion that injury is obvious does not supply that proof.

Matthews v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-03-28

While the plaintiffs argue that “[t]he actual injuries caused by [the defendants’] long term and unexplained deprivation of [the plaintiffs’] disability benefits are sufficiently obvious to overcome a motion for summary judgment” (Pl.’s Mot. for Recons, at 9.), the plaintiffs do not provide any evidence of their injuries nor do they cite any authority holding that it is improper to dismiss a § 1983 action where the plaintiff provides absolutely no evidence of actual damages.

Section 1983 permits compensation for accrued sick days lost as a proximate result of unconstitutional retaliation.

Wallace v. Suffolk County Police Department · filed 2011-08-15

Accordingly, the Court finds that defendants’ retaliatory determination that plaintiff was fit for light duty proximately caused him to use one hundred and forty-four sick days, and plaintiff is entitled to damages for the amount he would have received as compensation for these sick days had they been part of his sick leave accruals at the time he retired.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for noneconomic harm in forms previously recognized and awarded in the common law of tort.

United States v. Vulcan Society, Inc. · filed 2012-09-18

In sum, the court concludes that §§ 1981 and 1983 authorize similar forms of damages to Title VII under § 1981a, namely forms that have been previously recognized and awarded in the common law of tort.

Section 1983 allows compensatory damages for proven actual injury, including mental anguish, but a violation alone does not establish entitlement to damages.

Thompson v. Memphis City Schools Board of Education · filed 2012-12-21

The Board is correct that litigants who wish to recover damages pursuant to § 1983 “must allege and prove more than a violation of federal law.” ... To recover damages, litigants must “prove that they personally suffered an actual injury to a federally protected right.” ... In addition to out-of-pocket losses, compensatory damages may also be recovered for injuries such as impairment of reputation, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for actual injuries from excessive force without proof of out-of-pocket loss.

Benton v. Rousseau · filed 2013-03-19

In other words, a federal district court may award compensatory damages based on actual injuries suffered, even if a plaintiff cannot present evidence of out-of-pocket loss or other monetary harms. ... Having considered the above elements of compensatory damages, the Court concludes that Benton is entitled to $45,012.

Section 1983 compensatory damages for excessive force require proof that the unreasonable force proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Adedeji v. Hoder · filed 2013-03-27

Thus, in an excessive force claim, to recover compensatory damages a plaintiff must prove that any injury suffered was proximately caused by the unreasonable force at issue and not by some other justifiable use of force.

Section 1983 does not compensate a person for distress from an arrest and detention resulting from evidence discovered in an unlawful search.

Silver v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2013-04-16

Plaintiff seeks to be compensated not for the invasion of a protected privacy interest but for the “stress, trouble, and pain” caused by his arrest following the MPD officers’ discovery of illegal drugs during the search. Under the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he evil of an unreasonable search or seizure is that it invades privacy, not that it uncovers crime, which is no evil.” Townes, 176 F.3d at 148. Hence, plaintiff’s injury is not compensable under § 1983.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must provide evidence supporting future medical costs to recover them as compensatory damages.

Stanczyk v. City of New York · filed 2014-06-03

To the extent Stanczyk sought a charge on future medical costs, as distinct from future pain and suffering, the district court correctly concluded that an award for medical costs would have been speculative and unsupported by the record.

Section 1983 allows compensatory damages only for actual injuries caused by a defendant’s illegal conduct, not for the abstract value of a violated constitutional right.

McKissick v. Warden · filed 2014-09-29

Compensatory damages under § 1983 may be awarded only for actual injuries caused by the defendants’ illegal conduct and cannot be based on the abstract value of the constitutional rights that were violated.

Section 1983 recognizes compensable injuries beyond emotional or mental harm.

Day v. Vaughn · filed 2014-10-22

However, the scope of com-pensable injuries recognized under § 1983 is broader than emotional or mental injuries.

A § 1983 plaintiff needs nonspeculative evidence of injury to recover compensatory damages.

Brown v. Metropolitan Tulsa Transit Authority · filed 2014-12-19

Mr. Brown challenges the district court’s conclusion that he failed to offer proof of anything more than nominal damages. But our examination of the record comports with the district court’s: it lacks any nonspeculative evidence of compensatory damages.

Section 1983 compensatory damages require proof of injury caused by a constitutional deprivation.

Turner v. Lafayette Parish Consolidated Government · filed 2014-12-23

However, damages awarded in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim must be designed to compensate injuries caused by a Constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 allows compensatory damages for physical injury, pain and suffering, humiliation, mental distress, and embarrassment.

Ray Benoit, Jr. v. Weber · filed 2015-01-06

“Physical injury, pain and suffering, personal humiliation, mental distress, and embarrassment” are all compensable under § 1983. ... Based on the evidence, the damage award here was not clearly erroneous or clearly excessive.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages when the prevailing party establishes an actual injury.

Jefferson County, Texas v. Ha Penny Nguyen · filed 2015-07-31

Compensatory damages are available to the prevailing party in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where actual injury is established.

Section 1983 compensatory damages require proof that the constitutional violation caused the injury; they do not cover injury that would have occurred under a later court order.

Watson v. City of San Jose · filed 2015-09-08

As applied to this case, the officers could be held liable for damages suffered from their failure to obtain a warrant or court order, but Plaintiffs were required to prove that the injuries suffered stemmed from that failure, as distinguished from the later separation of the family based upon the juvenile court order.

Section 1983 generally requires proof of actual injury for compensatory damages and does not allow damages based only on the abstract value of constitutional rights.

Acevedo-Luis v. Zayas · filed 2007-02-22

It is usually the case that "no compensatory damages may be awarded in a § 1983 suit absent proof of actual injury."

Section 1983 permits damages for monetary harm caused by a constitutional violation.

Campbell v. District of Columbia · filed 2016-05-25

Thus, here, because Dr. Campbell prevailed on a constitutional claim under § 1983, she was entitled to an award of damages to compensate her for any monetary harms she suffered because of the District’s constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for lost profits.

City of South Portland v. Maine Municipal Association Property & Casualty Pool · filed 2017-03-28

Compensatory lost-profits damages are an ... available remedy for a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 compensatory damages cover economic losses, impairment of reputation, humiliation, and mental anguish caused by a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Greisen v. Hanken · filed 2017-05-12

The basic purpose of § 1983 damages is to compensate persons for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights. Compensatory damages may include not only out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms (which are generally referred to as “economic” loss or damages), but also such injuries as impairment of reputation, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering (which are generally referred to as “non economic” loss or damages).

Section 1983 liability for excessive force does not by itself entitle a plaintiff to compensatory damages.

Ali v. Nyc Police Officer Donald Kipp · filed 2018-05-22

As discussed, Ali was not, as a matter of law, entitled to compensatory damages simply because the jury found liability.

Section 1983 compensatory damages require an actual injury caused by the defendant; the abstract value of a violated constitutional right is insufficient.

Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski · filed 2018-05-25

"[C]ompensatory damages in a § 1983 suit [must] be based on actual injury caused by the defendant rather than on the 'abstract value' of the constitutional rights that may have been violated." ... Plaintiffs do not allege in their First Amended Complaint that they suffered an actual injury, and instead, they plead that their constitutional rights have been violated.

Section 1983 plaintiffs seeking substantial compensatory damages for a procedural due process violation must prove actual injury caused by the violation.

Dollar Loan Ctr. of S.D., LLC v. Afdahl · filed 2018-05-29

Therefore, DLC must establish that the procedural due process violation has caused actual injury before substantial compensatory damages may be recovered.

Section 1983 requires a claimant seeking compensatory damages to show that the alleged violation caused actual harm.

Anderson v. Dillman · filed 2019-03-21

This cause-and-effect principle of prejudice factors into every § 1983 claim for compensatory damages.

Section 1983 compensatory damages for an unlawful search require an actual, compensable injury caused by the search.

Waters v. Madson · filed 2019-04-11

We therefore agree with the district court that Appellants failed to adequately plead a compensatory damages claim under § 1983 arising from the officers’ search of their vehicle’s trunk, and we affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim.

Section 1983 allows compensatory damages only for injuries proximately caused by the constitutional violation.

Carlton v. C.O. Pearson · filed 2019-06-19

It is well settled that in order to "recover compensatory damages under Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove that his injuries were proximately caused by the constitutional violation."

Compensatory damages under § 1983 require actual injury caused by the defendant; the abstract value of a constitutional right is insufficient.

Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski · filed 2019-07-01

As to the latter, the court correctly noted that “compensatory damages in a § 1983 suit [must] be based on actual injury caused by the defendant rather than on the ‘abstract value’ of the constitutional rights that may have been violated.” Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225, 1230 (11th Cir. 2000).

Section 1983 compensatory damages require a compensable injury; the abstract value of a constitutional right is not enough.

Brown v. Johnson · filed 2019-09-09

“‘[T]he basic purpose’ of § 1983 damages is ‘to compensate persons for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.’” Id. (quoting Cary, 435 U.S. at 254). “[D]amages based on the abstract ‘value’ or ‘importance’ of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in such cases.” Id. at 309. ... Because the plaintiff has not alleged a compensable injury, he is not entitled to compensatory damages.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for proven physical pain and mental anguish.

Bryant v. McCoig · filed 2019-09-20

In a § 1983 action, compensatory damages for actual injury may be awarded upon proper proof. ... The court finds that although Bryant did not incur any out-of-pocket expenses related to his injuries, he suffered mental anguish and suffering as well as lingering physical pain from the assault. Accordingly, the court awards Bryant $25,000 compensatory damages against McCoig, in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 permits lost profits as compensatory damages when they measure the injury caused by a violation of constitutional rights.

Eliason v. City of Rapid City · filed 2019-09-30

As an initial matter, the court concludes plaintiffs’ lost profits are an appropriate measure of damages. “[W]hen § 1983 plaintiffs seek damages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts.” ... Under these standards, lost profits can serve as a measure of the compensatory damages caused by the City’s deprivation of plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for pain and suffering when the plaintiff proves actual injury.

Sanders v. Pearson · filed 2019-10-09

Nevertheless, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages for pain and suffering if he provides proof of actual injury.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for emotional distress.

Gabriel v. El Paso Combined Courts · filed 2019-10-15

Such compensatory damages are awardable for claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for injuries actually and proximately caused by a constitutional violation, including legal expenses and harms suffered in custody.

Shay v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2019-10-21

As discussed above, § 1983 permits Shay to seek “compensatory damages for all injuries suffered as a consequence of” the constitutional violations he alleges.

Section 1983 compensatory damages require proof of actual injury caused by the constitutional violation.

Sublett v. Green · filed 2019-12-04

A plaintiff who alleges the violation of a constitutional right is not entitled to compensatory damages unless he can prove actual injury caused by the violation.

Section 1983 does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to compensatory damages when an excessive-force claim is decided by default; the award depends on evidence of injury.

Mowett v. City of Detroit · filed 2020-02-19

Default on an excessive force claim “does not, as a matter of law, entitle the victim to an award of compensatory damages.” ... In light of the medical evidence, the Court in its discretion finds that Mowett is entitled to damages in the amount of $500.00 for his Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim against Saunders.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for excessive force only when the force proximately caused an actual, compensable injury; nominal damages may be awarded when it did not.

Girbes-Pierce v. City of New York · filed 2020-03-17

This Court has long recognized that, in order to obtain compensatory damages, a plaintiff must prove that the use of excessive force was the proximate cause of an actual, compensable injury to the plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for physical pain or emotional distress caused by excessive force, even without a broken bone.

Gomez v. Bell · filed 2020-07-20

First, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant Bell’s use of force (including his alleged taser deployment) caused Plaintiff “physical pain and suffering or mental and emotional anguish,” even if it did not result in a broken chest, back, or finger. Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000). That is enough to establish a compensable injury under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking compensatory damages for an unlawful search to allege an actual, compensable injury beyond conviction or imprisonment.

Lewis v. Hoppe · filed 2020-10-20

Without any allegation of actual, compensable injury, the court cannot allow him to sue the law enforcement defendants for damages for violating his Fourth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for physical injuries and emotional harm caused by a constitutional violation.

Anderson v. Osborne · filed 2020-10-20

“A plaintiff in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . is entitled to compensatory damages for pecuniary loss, humiliation, injuries, damage to reputation, mental anguish and suffering.” ... Here, the jury’s $75,000 compensatory damages award is reasonable in light of the jury’s assessment of the credible evidence, as discussed herein.

Section 1983 entitles a successful plaintiff to compensatory damages when they are properly pleaded and proved.

Vincent v. Yelich · filed 2020-12-04

A successful plaintiff in a Section 1983 action is entitled to compensatory damages, where properly pleaded and proved.

A person bringing a § 1983 claim on behalf of someone who died must have standing under the applicable state wrongful death or survival statute.

King Ex Rel. Chaney v. Texas Medical Board · filed 2014-07-25

A party must have standing under the state’s wrongful death or survival statutes to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not specify damages available to a deceased claimant’s estate, so a court may look to state law under § 1988 to determine them.

Pitzer v. City of East Peoria, Ill. · filed 2009-02-11

Section 1983 does not address what types of damages are available to the estate of a deceased claimant whose life was terminated by unconstitutional state action. ... However, it is well established in our Circuit that a federal court may look to state law, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, to answer this question of damages.

Section 1983 remedies for a deceased person may be pursued by the estate or eligible survivors when state survivorship law allows it.

Henning, Aliyana M. v. O'Leary, Timothy J. · filed 2007-02-16

Henning’s survivors might be able to step into his shoes and exercise his remedies, but this depends (at least in most cases) on a state’s survivorship statutes. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978). Wisconsin recog- nizes claims for wrongful death (which is effectively what the excessive force claim is), and the estate or those who would recover may bring the action for the deceased plaintiff.

A deceased plaintiff’s § 1983 claim belongs to the estate, and nonlawyer representatives may not pursue it for other beneficiaries without counsel.

Malone, Anthony v. Nielson, Robert · filed 2007-01-22

The § 1983 claim, therefore, properly belongs to Lance’s estate, and the Malones may not pursue this claim on behalf of Lance’s estate without securing the services of counsel.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action on behalf of a deceased person for events occurring after death.

Riley v. St. Louis Cty. · filed 1998-08-13

We note that, to the extent that Riley's complaint alleged that Appellees' actions violated her deceased son's constitutional rights, those claims were properly dismissed because section 1983 does not provide a cause of action on behalf of a deceased for events occurring after death.

A parent who was not dependent on the decedent cannot bring a § 1983 survivor claim when California wrongful death law governs standing.

Smoot v. City of Placentia · filed 1997-01-14

Neither can Decedent’s mother maintain a 1983 claim as Decedent’s survivor because she was not dependent on decedent.

A deceased victim’s personal representative has standing to bring the victim’s Section 1983 claim on behalf of the estate.

Sollars v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1992-06-05

Thus, the personal representative has standing to bring John Sollars’ Section 1983 claim and the Second Motion to Dismiss for lack of standing will be denied.

Section 1983 permits a deceased victim’s heirs to bring a survival action when the governing state survival statute authorizes heirs to sue.

Handley v. City of Seagoville, Tex. · filed 1992-01-13

The Court concludes that, pursuant to section 71.021 of the Texas Survival Statute, heirs have a cause of action under section 1983.

A Section 1983 damages claim arising from wrongful suspension survives the plaintiff’s death under Mississippi’s personal-action survival statute.

Curtis W. Caine, Jr., M.D. v. M.D. Hardy, M.D. · filed 1991-09-26

Under this analysis, then, that part of Dr. Caine's § 1983 action for damages resulting from the act of wrongful suspension itself survives Dr. Caine's death.

Section 1983 creates a personal cause of action for an injured person; where the alleged violation did not cause death, Idaho common law prevents that person’s claim from surviving death.

Evans v. Twin Falls County · filed 1990-09-07

The § 1983 cause of action, by virtue of the statute’s express language, is a personal cause of action, actionable only by persons whose civil rights have been violated. Thus, under Idaho law Mrs. Evans’ § 1983 action does not survive.

When the alleged constitutional violation is a killing, state law cannot bar survival of a Section 1983 claim for actual and punitive damages for the victim’s loss of life if that bar conflicts with federal compensation and deterrence policies.

Linzie v. City of Columbia, Mo. · filed 1986-12-04

For the foregoing reasons, Missouri law is inconsistent with federal law insofar as it precludes recovery for loss of life and punitive damages under the circumstances alleged in this complaint. Therefore, Missouri law cannot be applied to preclude the survival of a § 1983 action seeking actual and punitive damages for Kimberly Ann Linzie’s loss of life.

Section 1983 does not require an action to survive contrary to state survivorship law when abatement has no independent adverse effect on the policies underlying the statute.

Robertson v. Wegmann · filed 1978-05-31

Our holding today is a narrow one, limited to situations in which no claim is made that state law generally is inhospitable to survival of § 1983 actions and in which the particular application of state survivorship law, while it may cause abatement of the action, has no independent adverse effect on the policies underlying § 1983.

A § 1983 cause of action survives for the benefit of an estate when the forum state's law creates a right of survival, but a damages claim fails without an underlying constitutional deprivation.

Davis v. Oregon State University · filed 1978-11-13

It is correct that a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) survives for the benefit of the estate if the law of the forum state creates a right of survival. ... Even if we assume that petitioner’s interpretation of Oregon law is correct, she still must establish that her husband had a right to a pretermination hearing in order to sustain her § 1983 claim for damages. ... Since Davis did not have a protect-able liberty interest, he did not have a cause of action based upon a right to a pretermination hearing that could survive to his wife, even under her interpretation of Oregon law. It follows that there is no basis for her § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 itself does not create a wrongful-death action, but a deceased person's § 1983 claim may be enforced for the benefit of the surviving widow through § 1988's adoption of applicable state survival law.

Chess v. Nunley · filed 1970-12-16

While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide any action for wrongful death, this statute accords a right of action to a person deprived of his rights; and by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 the Congress has adopted as the federal law the effective state law on the general right of survival. Brazier v. Cherry, C.A.5th (1961), 293 F.2d 401, 405 [3], certiorari denied (1961), 368 U.S. 921, 82 S.Ct. 243, 7 L. Ed.2d 136.

Section 1983 actions for personal injury survive the injured person's death and may be maintained by the person's legal representative under applicable federal common law.

Myrtle Hall, Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Edward Hall, Deceased v. Honorable George Wooten, Judge · filed 1974-11-19

Since none of the exceptions is applicable here, we hold that the cause of action alleged in this case survived the death of the injured person and may be maintained by his legal representative.

Section 1983 permits a decedent’s parents to pursue a wrongful-death remedy under state law when § 1988 authorizes that remedy to effectuate the Civil Rights Act.

Smith v. Wickline · filed 1975-06-23

The Oklahoma Statutes provide for wrongful death actions by the “next of kin.” ... The Court concludes that resort to such remedy is appropriate in that it is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Civil Rights Act, and is therefore authorized by § 1988.

Section 1983 wrongful-death actions in federal court incorporate the forum state’s wrongful-death remedy, including its limitations on damages, and do not provide an independent federal wrongful-death remedy.

Jones v. Hildebrant · filed 1976-05-24

We therefore conclude that Colorado’s wrongful death remedy would be engrafted into a § 1983 action if brought in a federal court. ... Furthermore, because the allowable damages are such an integral part of the right to bring a wrongful death remedy, we believe the state’s law on damages should also apply.

Section 1983 does not itself govern survivorship of a civil-rights claim after the injured person dies; applicable state survivorship law determines who may maintain it.

Anderson v. Jones · filed 1980-09-19

The defendants accurately recite the general law: the right to sue lies clearly with the injured party, but if the injured party dies as a result of the deprivation of his civil rights, the state statutes on survivorship of tort claims govern.

A § 1983 action instituted by a plaintiff before death survives in favor of the plaintiff's estate as a matter of federal common law.

Shaw v. Garrison · filed 1977-01-24

We therefore hold that as a matter of federal common law, a § 1983 action instituted by a plaintiff prior to his death survives in favor of his estate.

Section 1983 claims survive for an estate when forum-state law creates a right of survival, but damages require an underlying protectable liberty or property interest.

Davis v. Oregon State University · filed 1979-02-28

It is correct that a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) survives for the benefit of the estate if the law of the forum state creates a right of survival. ... Even if we assume that petitioner's interpretation of Oregon law is correct, she still must establish that her husband had a right to a pretermination hearing in order to sustain her § 1983 claim for damages. This is possible only if she establishes that a liberty or property interest was implicated by her husband's termination. ... Since Davis did not have a protectable liberty interest, he did not have a cause of action based upon a right to a pretermination hearing that could survive to his wife, even under her interpretation of Oregon law. It follows that there is no basis for her § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims for civil-rights injuries suffered before a plaintiff's death survive under applicable state law when federal law is silent.

Bell v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1980-10-20

This provision means that in a § 1983 action where federal law is silent as to the resolution of a particular issue, the applicable law of the state in which the court sits will govern unless such law is inconsistent with the general purposes of § 1983. ... These deprivations may fairly be characterized as injuries to the person and as such, under Wisconsin law, survive his death. Thus, the estate will be permitted to continue to litigate those claims.

A § 1983 action’s survivability is governed by state law, and a state survival statute covering personal-injury claims permits the action to continue after the plaintiff’s death.

Roberts v. Rowe · filed 1981-02-17

Considerations involving the survivability of 1983 actions are to be made according to state law. ... The Court is of the opinion that this action does survive the plaintiff’s death and substitution is therefore proper.

Section 1983 allows children who suffer the deprivation of a constitutional liberty interest in their continuing relationship with a deceased parent to recover damages beyond a state wrongful-death net-pecuniary-loss limit, including punitive damages when they prove actual damages and malicious or wanton, reckless conduct.

Espinoza v. O'DELL · filed 1981-06-08

Therefore, we hold that the plaintiff children are not subject to a net pecuniary loss limitation on their right to recover damages in a § 1983 action brought in state court. ... We hold that it would be inconsistent with the deterrent policy of § 1983 to bar the award of exemplary or punitive damages in situations where the plaintiffs prove their entitlement to actual damages under § 1983 and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants acted maliciously or with a wanton and reckless disregard of their rights.

Section 1983 claims arising from constitutional violations that cause death are not limited by state wrongful-death or survival statutes’ damages restrictions.

Sager v. City of Woodland Park · filed 1982-06-30

Accordingly, I hold that the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are not limited by the Colorado wrongful death and survival damage restrictions. Therefore, the defendants’ fifteenth affirmative defense is stricken as applied to the § 1983 claims.

A Section 1983 action survives for the benefit of the estate when the forum state provides a right of survival, and a claim alleging that the decedent was deprived of life without due process qualifies as a claim for death by wrongful act under Kansas law.

Carter v. City of Emporia, Kan. · filed 1982-07-13

An action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 survives for the benefit of the estate if the law of the forum state creates a right of survival. ... In this limited context, the Court finds that plaintiff’s cause of action under § 1983 states a claim for a death by wrongful act.

Section 1983 claims for wrongful death may be limited by a state wrongful-death rule under § 1988 when the state is not generally inhospitable to survival of § 1983 actions and the rule does not independently undermine § 1983's policies.

Gates v. Montalbano · filed 1982-10-21

Viewed in that way the Illinois Wrongful Death Act appears enforceable here. Certainly Illinois law is not “generally ... inhospitable to survival of § 1983 actions.” Nor does application of the Wrongful Death Act have any “independent adverse effect on the policies underlying § 1983.”

Section 1983 requires a federal survivorship and damages rule when state law would undermine compensation and deterrence for a constitutional deprivation causing death.

Heath v. City of Hialeah · filed 1983-04-07

Considerations of deterrence and federal supremacy, as well as justice, require us to grant plaintiff’s motion. Hereafter, the federal common law will govern any future assessment of damages in this case.

When federal law is silent on survival, proper plaintiffs, or damages for a § 1983 death claim, state law governs under § 1988 unless inconsistent with federal law.

Ascani v. Hughes · filed 1985-05-08

Because federal statutory law does not address the survival of § 1983 claims, who the injured parties are when the victim is killed, or the measure of available damages, resort must be made to state law unless it is inconsistent with federal law.

Federal law may require application of state wrongful-death and survival rules to Section 1983 claims through Section 1988.

Delesma v. City of Dallas and the State Fair of Texas · filed 1985-09-16

Because of the interaction between sections 1983 and 1988 of 42 U.S.C., federal law requires application of Texas law to the section 1983 claims.

A state survival law that abates a § 1983 malicious-prosecution action upon the injured plaintiff's death applies when it is not inconsistent with federal civil-rights law.

Rita Susan Parkerson, of Estate of Carl R. Parkerson, Deceased v. Don Carrouth and Malone & Hyde, Inc. Of Arkansas · filed 1986-01-31

We conclude that the Arkansas law of survival is not inconsistent with the federal civil rights laws and we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

State wrongful-death and survival restrictions must be disregarded in a § 1983 death case when they would defeat federal compensation and deterrence policies, including dependency requirements and exclusions of pain-and-suffering damages.

Davis v. City of Ellensburg · filed 1987-01-16

The fundamental policies behind § 1983 “include compensation of persons injured by deprivation of federal rights and prevention of abuses of power by those acting under color of state law.” ... These considerations lead the court to hold that the wrongful death action brought on behalf of decedent’s parents is not barred by the failure of plaintiffs to allege dependency, and that the limitations imposed by the statute are inconsistent with the purposes of § 1983.

A state survivorship rule may abate a § 1983 claim when the alleged constitutional deprivation did not cause death and the rule does not independently undermine § 1983's compensatory or deterrent policies.

Strickland v. Deaconess Hospital · filed 1987-04-02

We recognize the policies behind section 1983 go beyond compensating the individual and seek to deter state abuse; nonetheless, the damages available under this section are personal and in the nature of anxiety, emotional distress, and humiliation. ... The summary judgment ruling was correct.

A § 1983 claim survives a plaintiff's death when the forum state's personal-injury survival law so provides and is consistent with federal law.

Bennett v. Tucker · filed 1987-08-11

Accordingly, we conclude that, in order to determine whether a § 1983 claim survives, we must look to the state law governing whether a personal injury claim survives. The Illinois Survivorship Act, Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 110½ ¶ 27-6 (Smith-Hurd 1978), provides that personal injury claims survive the death of the plaintiff. Because this provision is not inconsistent with federal law, we adopt its rule of survivorship and conclude, as a matter of federal law, that Hattie Cunningham’s § 1983 claim survives.

Whether a § 1983 action survives the plaintiff's death is decided by looking to state law.

Grandbouche v. Clancy · filed 1987-08-13

In suits against state officials brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), questions of survivorship are decided by looking to state law.

Section 1983 provides a federal survival remedy brought by the deceased victim’s estate when a constitutional violation causes death.

Berry v. City of Muskogee · filed 1990-04-10

The remedy should be a survival action, brought by the ... estate of the deceased victim, in accord with § 1983’s express statement that the liability is “to the party injured.”

Section 1983 claims for punitive damages survive the plaintiff’s death when denying survival would undermine the statute’s deterrent purpose.

Thomas v. Frederick · filed 1991-06-04

For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that Mary Thomas’ claims for attorney’s fees and punitive damages survive her death, for to do otherwise would be to subvert a major purpose of § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are subject to Indiana’s survival statute; a decedent’s personal injury claim does not survive when the alleged injury also caused the death.

CULVER-UNION TP. AMBULANCE SERV. v. Steindler · filed 1993-04-08

The Indiana non-survival provision is therefore not "inconsistent" with § 1983.

A § 1983 claim alleging injury to a person’s right to live does not survive under Indiana law when the alleged injury and cause of death are the same.

Culver-Union Township Ambulance Service v. Steindler · filed 1993-04-08

As a personal injury claim, the claim here must be rejected because, as earlier noted, the alleged cause of death was not different from the alleged personal injury. In the case before us the injury to Popple-well's "right to live", and the "wrongful death" itself are inextricably intertwined. They cannot be legitimately separated so as to create a survivable cause of action.

For a § 1983 wrongful-death claim in Alabama, state wrongful-death law governs survivability unless it unduly restricts the federal claim; Alabama’s Wrongful Death Act is not inconsistent with federal law.

City of Tarrant v. Jefferson · filed 1996-07-12

This Court held in Carter that § 6-5-410 , Ala. Code 1975, is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. We reaffirmed that holding in Blair v. City of Rainbow City , 542 So.2d at 275 (Ala. 1989). We have re-examined the principles of law stated in Carter and Blair , and we conclude that the holding in those cases is still sound.

A § 1983 action survives a plaintiff’s death only when state law permits the claim to survive.

Dixon for Stafford v. Benjamin · filed 1997-03-31

Therefore, Chris Stafford's § 1983 action does not survive to his father because the action would not survive under Washington state law, 1 and the district court correctly granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the remaining state-law claims.

Whether a § 1983 claim survives the claimant’s death is determined by applicable state law.

Hutchinson v. Spink · filed 1997-09-23

The question whether a § 1983 claim survives the tort victim's death (like many background questions in federal statutes) follows state law.

Section 1983 permits an estate representative to bring a claim for a violation of the decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Estate of Lee Ex Rel. Lee v. Spokane · filed 2000-06-15

As the representative of the estate, Ms. Lee then has standing to bring a § 1983 claim for violation of Mr. Lee's Fourth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 allows an estate representative to bring a decedent’s Fourth Amendment claim for excessive police force.

Estate of Lee v. City of Spokane · filed 2000-06-15

As the representative of the estate, Ms. Lee then has standing to bring a § 1983 claim for violation of Mr. Lee’s Fourth Amendment rights.

In a § 1983 action, a decedent’s spouse and children may assert his Fourth Amendment rights when California law authorizes a survival action.

Little v. City of Manhattan Beach · filed 2001-10-19

Because California Civil Procedure Code § 377.60 (effective May 23, 1997) authorizes such actions, decedent’s wife and children have standing to assert Little’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a parent an individual claim for loss derived from a child's death when the parent alleges no separate constitutional injury.

Ward v. Greene, No. X04-Cv-99-0120118-S (Feb. 21, 2002) · filed 2002-02-21

With respect to Patrice Ward individually, there are no factual allegations which support the mere conclusion of law that substantive due process rights were violated. Any loss suffered by Ms. Ward individually which is the direct consequence of her daughter's death is a derivative claim and, therefore, not compensable under the statute. ... For the foregoing reasons, the court follows the holding in Perkins and grants The Village's motion for summary judgment as to count sixteen of the plaintiffs' amended complaint.

A § 1983 wrongful death claimant must prove a constitutional deprivation and a causal link between the defendant’s unconstitutional conduct and the death, as required by the state wrongful death statute.

Phillips v. Monroe County, MS · filed 2002-11-18

Accordingly, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a wrongful death claim under § 1983 must prove both ... the alleged constitutional deprivation required by § 1983 and the causal link between the defendant’s unconstitutional acts or omissions and the death of the victim, as required by the state’s wrongful death statute.

A wrongful death claim under § 1983 requires proof of a constitutional deprivation and a causal link between the defendant's unconstitutional conduct and the death, as required by the state's wrongful death statute.

Phillips v. Monroe County · filed 2002-12-09

Accordingly, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a wrongful death claim under § 1983 must prove both the alleged constitutional deprivation required by § 1983 and the causal link between the defendant's unconstitutional acts or omissions and the death of the victim, as required by the state's wrongful death statute.

A § 1983 claim survives a plaintiff’s death if state law permits survival, but a personal representative must be substituted to pursue it.

Murray v. Connetquot Central School District of Islip · filed 2002-12-16

A § 1983 claim survives death “if applicable state law creates a right of survival.” ... Even if death occurs between the filing of the suit and the time of the appeal, a personal representative still must be substituted. ... No personal representative has been substituted for either John Murray or Richard Markfelder. Their claims are therefore dismissed without prejudice.

A parent eligible to bring a wrongful death claim has standing under § 1983 to seek recovery for personal injuries from a deceased child’s alleged constitutional deprivation; a pro se wrongful death complaint can implicitly allege those injuries.

Diaz v. Mayor of Corpus Christi · filed 2005-01-19

Thus, although Diaz did not explicitly enumerate injuries that he had suffered personally, we conclude that the district court should have liberally construed his “wrongful death” action such that it inherently alleged such losses. We therefore hold that Diaz has standing to assert claims for the wrongful death of his son.

Section 1983 permits a representative to pursue a wrongful death claim when an alleged constitutional violation caused the victim’s death, even if the decedent’s personal injury claims abate under state law.

Green Ex Rel. Estate of Green v. City of Welch · filed 2006-12-22

Accordingly, to the extent plaintiffs 28 U.S.C. § 1983 claims (Counts II and III) seek recovery under a theory of wrongful death, defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.

Section 1983 personal injury claims abate under applicable state law when a related wrongful death remedy satisfies section 1983’s policies, while the wrongful death claim survives.

Jones v. George · filed 1982-03-12

Accordingly, and adopting West Virginia law as 42 U.S.C. § 1988 instructs, the court ORDERS that plaintiff’s claims founded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, save any portion of that claim seeking recovery for wrongful death, have abated and are hereby DISMISSED.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for constitutional rights violations by state actors, and a wrongful death claim under it survives the victim’s death.

Pethtel v. West Virginia State Police · filed 2008-07-29

This Court is persuaded by the analysis undertaken by the Green court. Thus, to the extent that the plaintiffs claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeks recovery under a theory of wrongful death, it survives Pethtel’s death.

Section 1983 permits an estate to recover damages for a victim’s pre-death pain and suffering when the alleged civil rights violation caused the victim’s death, despite a state survival statute barring those damages.

Gotbaum Ex Rel. Gotbaum v. City of Phoenix · filed 2008-10-17

Given the broad intent of section 1983, and particularly the fact that Congress sought to provide an effective remedy for unconstitutional killings, the Court concludes that application of the Arizona survival statute and its elimination of pain and suffering damages in cases where death is alleged would be contrary to the purposes of section 1983. The Court therefore will apply a federal remedy that permits the recovery of such damages.

In Alabama, a § 1983 claim arising from a death proceeds through the state’s wrongful death statute, so the decedent’s personal representative must bring it.

Burns v. City of Alexander City · filed 2015-06-05

As to the § 1983 claims, Gilliam provides authority that Alabama’s wrongful death statute applies by virtue of § 1988. Therefore, Plaintiff G.C. does not have standing to assert those claims under Alabama law as she is not the personal representative of Mr. Crayton’s estate.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff bringing a wrongful death or survival action to have standing under the applicable state statutes.

Turk v. Mangum · filed 2017-07-17

In a wrongful death or survival action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a party must have standing under the state wrongful death and survival statutes.

Section 1983 permits a successor to pursue a decedent’s excessive-force claim as a survival action, but does not permit a personal wrongful-death claim based on the decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Herd v. Cnty. of San Bernardino · filed 2018-04-27

If the underlying constitutional violation alleged is excessive force, then the § 1983 claim may not be brought as a wrongful death action to vindicate the rights of Plaintiff A.G. because Fourth Amendment rights are personal to the decedent.

Section 1983 provides a survival action brought by a deceased victim’s estate, but no separate wrongful death claim.

Ostler v. Harris · filed 2019-06-07

This court finds Berry is not so limited and applies as the Tenth Circuit standard. ... Plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim under § 1983 is therefore dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit a surviving relative to seek damages for personal injuries by asserting the decedent’s constitutional rights through a wrongful death claim.

J.K.J. v. City of San Diego · filed 2020-02-13

Thus, “‘wrongful death’ actions by a surviving relative cannot be brought under Section 1983, as constitutional rights cannot be vicariously asserted.”

Section 1983 wrongful death claims may be brought by representatives of the deceased person’s estate, but family beneficiaries cannot bring those claims in their individual capacities.

Speakman v. Williams · filed 2020-02-21

Thus, given the Third Circuit’s guidance, the Court finds that Family Member Plaintiffs’ lack standing to bring § 1983 wrongful death claims in this action. Such claims, however, may be brought by the representatives of the deceased Firefighter Plaintiffs’ estates, in that capacity.

Section 1983 gives a public employee a claim for relief when summary dismissal without a hearing injures substantial interests such as reputation and the ability to pursue a profession effectively.

Newcomer v. Coleman · filed 1970-12-23

Defendants’ contention that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 is rejected in light of the Second Circuit's decision in Birnbaum v. Trussed, supra, 371 F.2d 672. In that case, the court specifically held that § 1983 6 affords a right of action to a public employee to obtain relief for injuries suffered in consequence of his summary dismissal, without hearing, whenever there is a “substantial interest” involved in his discharge. Id. at 679. The substantial interests involved in Birnbaum were two: “reputation and the ability to pursue a profession effectively.” Id. at 678 n. 13. ... Therefore, plaintiff has stated a claim upon which this court can grant relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.

Section 1983 permits reinstatement with back pay for denial of promised pretermination procedures without requiring the court to decide whether the employee deserved termination.

Skeets v. Johnson · filed 1985-05-23

He seeks the equitable remedy of reinstatement with back pay, and the Court is therefore not required to inquire into the merits of the underlying substantive dispute concerning his job performance.

A public employer's description of an at-will appointment as permanent does not by itself create a property interest protected through § 1983.

Wright v. Peter J. Cayan, Individually and as President of the State University of New York College of · filed 1987-05-04

Both the August 14, 1973 and November 9, 1973 letters stated that Wright had been accorded a “permanent appointment;” we agree with the district court that this falls well short of an express limitation upon the right to terminate.

An ultra vires public-employment contract granting more tenure than state law permits creates no property interest protected through Section 1983.

Montez v. South San Antonio Independent School District · filed 1987-05-04

Any contract purporting to give him more than that allowed by Texas law was beyond the power of the school district and was thus ... ultra vires. ... The invalid contracts bestowed no property interest on Montez.

A public employer is not constitutionally required to establish a grievance procedure or respond favorably to employee grievances.

Town of South Padre Island v. Jacobs · filed 1987-07-06

[a] public employer is also not required by the United States constitution to establish a grievance procedure or respond to grievances lodged by its employees or their union....

A discharged public employee has no § 1983 right to a name-clearing hearing unless the government publicized stigmatizing charges in connection with the discharge.

Amedee v. Litchfield · filed 1987-08-31

However, if the stigmatizing matter is not made public by the employer in connection with the discharge, no “name clearing” hearing is required.

A § 1983 damages claim against an individual requires proof that the defendant acted under color of state law and caused or contributed to the alleged constitutional violation.

Jenkins v. Wood · filed 1996-04-16

To prevail on a claim for damages for a constitutional violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish the defendant acted under color of state law and caused or contributed to the alleged violation.

States and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to damages under § 1983.

Schley v. College of Charles · filed 1996-04-23

Also, neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacities are persons within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a respondent that is not a “person” within the meaning of the statute.

Jacobs v. State · filed 1996-06-18

Respondent is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. section 1983.

State agencies are arms of the state and are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Furgeson v. Bisbee · filed 1996-08-06

States, “arms of the state”, and state officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The Department is an “arm of the state” because it is an agency of the State of South Dakota. Summary judgment is appropriate for the Department on plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a police department alongside its municipality when the department is merely an arm of that municipality.

Irvin v. Borough of Darby · filed 1996-09-09

Applying this to the facts presented, plaintiff may not assert a section 1983 claim against both defendants Darby Police and the Borough of Darby since Darby Police is an arm of the Borough of Darby.

Section 1983 does not treat Indiana county juvenile courts as persons subject to suit because they are state entities.

Lake County Juvenile Court v. Swanson · filed 1996-09-16

Thus, the juvenile court is not a "person" for purposes of § 1983.

States and state agencies with Eleventh Amendment immunity are not persons suable under § 1983.

United States v. City of Yonkers · filed 1996-09-23

To the extent that plaintiffs’ claims were asserted against New York State, SED, and the Board of Regents, (collectively the “State institutional defendants”), the claims properly were not upheld under § 1983, for those defendants have Eleventh Amendment immunity and hence are not considered to be persons suable under § 1983.

A state is not a person that may be sued under Section 1983.

Lamar Chapman, III v. State of Illinois · filed 1996-10-10

It is sufficient to note that Chapman can not sue the state of Illinois under section 1983 because the state is not a "person" within the meaning of the statute, Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989).

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a school district treated under the complaint’s allegations as an agency of the state.

Bennett v. School Directors of Dist. 204 · filed 1996-10-24

For that reason District cannot be sued under Section 1983, and Bennett’s attempt to invoke Section 1983 to that end must be rejected.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its employees acting in their official capacity.

Carter v. Peace Officers Standards & Training Board · filed 1997-01-14

Because neither a state nor its employees acting in their official capacity may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on this claim.

Section 1983 permits claims against Northern Mariana Islands officers in their individual capacities.

Magana v. Northern Mariana Islands · filed 1997-03-06

Thus, Magana may proceed under § 1983 against Abraham and Chong only in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not treat a county corrections department that is only part of the county as a person who can be sued.

Kane v. Lancaster County Department of Corrections · filed 1997-04-18

The “Lancaster County Department of Corrections” is not a “person” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it is only a part of Lancaster County, Nebraska.

Section 1983 permits suits against CNMI officers in their individual capacities, but not against the CNMI or its officers in their official capacities.

Magana v. Commonwealth Of The Northern Mariana Islands · filed 1997-05-01

We have made clear that although "[n]either the CNMI nor its officers acting in their official capacity can be sued under § 1983," officers may be sued under that statute in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an immune state prison, and a prison health provider must be connected to the alleged constitutional violations.

Hallquist v. SD State · filed 1997-05-21

Because the prison is immune from ... section 1983 liability, and Hallquist did not delineate how Prison Health Services was responsible for any alleged constitutional violations, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or its officials acting in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Boyett v. Troy State University at Montgomery · filed 1997-07-09

Neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

De La Rosa v. State · filed 1997-07-14

In fact, a State is not a "person” as that term is used in 42 USC § 1983 (Ferrick v State of New York, 198 AD2d 822).

State agencies are not persons amenable to suit under § 1983.

Klein v. University of Kansas Medical Center · filed 1997-08-22

It is well established that state agencies are not “persons” amenable to suit within the meaning of § 1983.

An Oklahoma sheriff’s department is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 suit.

Reid v. Hamby · filed 1997-09-02

We now hold that an Oklahoma “sheriff’s department” is not a proper entity for purposes of a § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state parole board because it is not a person, and parole board members are absolutely immune from suit.

Talk v. John W. Gillis California State Board of Pardons Eugene v. Luttrell Robert Z. Patterson Ron E. Koerry · filed 1997-09-03

Because the Board is not a "person" under § 1983, Will v. Michigan Dep't State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989), and because the members of the Board are absolutely immune from suit, Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir.1981), Talk's claims against these defendants must be dismissed as frivolous.

A municipal police department, as an agency of the municipality, is not a suable entity under § 1983.

Lewis v. City of Mount Vernon, Mount Vernon Police Dept. · filed 1997-11-13

In addition, the Mount Vernon Police Department, as an agency of the municipality, is not a "suable entity” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal entities such as HUD.

Raso v. Lago · filed 1998-01-29

HUD is a federal entity not subject to section 1983, but its officials are directly constrained by equal protection principles.

Section 1983 treats a voluntary high school athletic association as a person subject to suit.

Catherine Walsh, Etc. v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, Lutheran High School Association of Greater New Orl · filed 1980-04-30

We therefore conclude that the LHSAA is a person for the purposes of § 1983, see Wright v. Arkansas Activities Ass’n, 501 F.2d 25, 28 (8th Cir. 1974), and that as to the LHSAA there exists a “civil action authorized by law” within the meaning of § 1343(3).

A state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Evans v. Wright · filed 1998-07-21

We conclude that the district court properly dismissed the State of North Carolina because it was not a "person" under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against states, state entities, or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Long v. Durnil · filed 1998-07-24

However, § 1983 does not provide a remedy against states, state entities or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against the New York Police Department because it lacks a legal existence separate from the City.

Ladner v. City of New York · filed 1998-09-14

The New York Police Department is not a sua-ble entity, but rather an organizational subdivision of the City of New York lacking independent legal existence.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against states, state agencies, or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Johnson v. State Technology Center at Memphis · filed 1998-10-06

States, state agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against individual officials, but not against the State.

Brady v. State · filed 1998-10-09

Only individual officials, and not the State, can be liable in damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages suits against states or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Rosenfeld v. Montgomery County Public Schools · filed 1999-03-04

Section 1983, however, creates only a right of action against “persons.” Neither states nor state officials, sued in their official capacities, are considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983.

This court treated the Lindenhurst school board and members sued officially as unavailable defendants for § 1983 damages.

Montefusco v. Nassau County · filed 1999-03-11

It is beyond dispute that there is no cause of action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages against a school board or its members in their official capacities.

A county council, permits department, and zoning commissioner’s office are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore County, Md. · filed 1999-08-09

A somewhat closer question is. whether the remaining governmental defendants — the County Council, the Permits Department, and the Office of Zoning Commissioner — are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. The court concludes that they are not.

Section 1983 permits Davidson’s damages claim against the mayor in his individual capacity; his damages claims against the city and the mayor in his official capacity fail.

Davidson v. Perron · filed 1999-08-23

Because Davidson seeks only money damages for his alleged injuries rather than declaratory or injunctive relief, Davidson may only pursue his § 1983 action against the Mayor in his individual capacity. Our review of Davidson's amended complaint reveals that Davidson states a § 1983 claim against the Mayor in his individual capacity. To the extent that Davidson’s complaint may be read as a § 1983 claim against either the City or the Mayor in his official capacity, Davidson fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a federal agency.

Abram v. Dept. of Agriculture · filed 1999-09-27

We affirm the dismissal of this claim because Mr. Abram may not seek such relief against USDA, a federal agency, under section 1983.

A sheriff's department is not a suable entity under Section 1983.

Bradford v. Gardner · filed 1984-01-31

... the Sheriffs department itself is not a suable entity under Section 1983 and is accordingly DISMISSED.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or its agencies as persons who can be sued under the statute.

Davis v. State of MO · filed 1999-10-20

... complaint because the State of Missouri and its agencies are not “persons” under sections 1983 and 1985(3).

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state or its agencies because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Denson v. T.D.C.J-I.D. · filed 1999-12-29

Furthermore, neither can Denson successfully pursue a claim as to the TDCJ-ID under Section 1983 because a state and its agencies are not “persons” for the purpose of such claims.

Section 1983 does not treat a state university or a state official acting in an official capacity as a person subject to suit.

Seybert v. West Chester University · filed 2000-02-11

In addition, as arms of the state, West Chester University and Dr. Moore acting in his official capacity are not “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against the Arkansas State Hospital because it is not a person, and a court-appointed psychiatrist who finds a defendant competent to stand trial is immune from damages.

Marcus L. Walker, Jr v. AR State Hospital · filed 2000-06-29

Because defendant Arkansas State Hospital is not a person for purposes of § 1983, see Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. granted in part, 120 S. Ct. 1003, and dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1265 (2000), and defendant psychiatrist is immune from damages under § 1983, see Moses v. Parwatikar, 813 F.2d 891, 892 (8th Cir. 1987), the district court properly dismissed Walker's lawsuit.

State agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Wilson v. Oklahoma Dept of Cor · filed 2000-09-19

The court also concluded that defendants were not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Upon de novo review of Plaintiffs’ complaint and appellate brief, the R & R dated January 25, 2000, the district court’s Order dated March 29, 2000, and the entire record on appeal, this court affirms the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint for substantially those reasons set forth in the R & R and the district court’s Order.

States are not persons who may be sued under § 1983.

Porter Ex Rel. Porter v. Board of Trustees of Manhattan Beach Unified School District · filed 2000-12-12

A state is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore may not properly be named as a defendant in a § 1983 action. ... Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim must be dismissed in its entirety against the CDE and the California Board of Education because both entities are state agencies and therefore cloaked by Eleventh Amendment immunity.