42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 allows compensatory damages only for constitutional deprivations causing actual harm, not for the abstract value of constitutional rights.

Denny v. R.L. Hinton, Jr. John Doe-1 John Doe-2 John Doe-3 John Doe-4 John Doe-5 John Doe-6 James Woodard, · filed 1990-03-13

Under Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986), only constitutional deprivations resulting in actual harm are compensable; the abstract value of constitutional rights is not a permissible element of compensatory damages in Sec. 1983 actions.

Punitive damages under § 1983 may be denied when the defendant was not recklessly or callously indifferent to federally protected rights.

Bright v. Bishop Robinson Norma B. Gluckstern M. Cruz · filed 1990-03-29

Although the magistrate recommended that punitive damages be awarded against Director Gluckstern, the district court could properly find that Gluckstern was not recklessly or callously indifferent to any federally protected rights.

Punitive damages in a § 1983 action are discretionary with the finder of fact, even when the defendant’s conduct meets the threshold for such an award.

Hale v. Fish · filed 1990-04-30

As the question of whether punitive damages should be awarded is one left to the finder of fact, the district court did not err in denying to award them.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against defendants sued in their individual capacity if the plaintiff prevails and proves reckless or callous indifference to constitutionally protected rights.

Bourque v. Town of Bow · filed 1990-05-02

Finally, plaintiff may recover punitive damages under § 1983 against the defendants sued in their individual capacity, but only if plaintiff prevails on his § 1983 claim and establishes that the defendants’ actions involved reckless or callous indifference to plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights.

Punitive damages are not recoverable from a municipal corporation under section 1983.

Bradley v. County of Albany · filed 1990-05-31

Pleadings in actions against municipal corporations may request only general relief, and punitive damages are not recoverable from a municipal corporation for claims based on negligence (Sharapata v Town of Islip, 56 NY2d 332, 334) or 42 USC § 1983 (Newport v Fact Concerts, 453 US 247, 271).

Section 1983 permits back pay, interest, and seniority as compensatory damages when they represent actual injury from a constitutional deprivation.

Shirokey v. Marth · filed 1990-07-19

Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its award of back pay, plus interest thereon, and seniority because said damage award represents appellee's actual damages and is, therefore, permitted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not support punitive damages where the complaint alleges no malice or willful, wanton conduct by the defendant officials.

San Filippo v. Bongiovanni · filed 1990-07-25

Certainly, there is no allegation of malice or of willful, wanton conduct and Rutgers can have no malice apart from that of its officials. Defendants’ motion to strike the punitive damage claim will be granted.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities.

DiLoreto v. Borough of Oaklyn · filed 1990-08-21

Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages against Oaklyn because municipalities are immune from liability for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for evil intent or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights, but the issue goes to the jury only if the evidence could support that finding.

Gonzalez v. Romanisko · filed 1990-08-22

It is true, of course, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Wade held that a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the Defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when Defendant’s conduct involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others. Before a Court allows such an issue to go to a jury, however, it must be persuaded that there is sufficient evidence of the alleged conduct upon which a jury could base such a finding. In this case there is no evidence on the record upon which a jury could reasonably find evil motive or intent or upon which it could find reckless or callous indifference to the rights of the Plaintiffs exhibited in the conduct of the Defendants and, therefore, it would have been erroneous to allow such a question to go to the jury.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against an officer for excessive force only if the plaintiff proves that officer’s individual involvement in the force.

Posr v. New York City Police Officer Doherty · filed 1990-09-13

Where several police officers are charged with excessive force, the plaintiff must prove the involvement of each officer and the part that each particular officer played in inflicting excessive force upon ... the plaintiff in order to justify the award of punitive damages against that officer.

Federal common law governs punitive damage awards under § 1983.

Barnhill v. Board of Regents of UW System · filed 1990-09-27

The federal common law of damages controls a punitive damage award under sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide back pay or reinstatement for a procedural due process violation if the same discipline would have been imposed with adequate procedures.

Burka v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1990-10-03

Plaintiffs, however, are not entitled to back pay, reinstatement or any other form of compensation for those disciplinary actions, if the same discipline would have been imposed even if the TA had provided adequate procedural safeguards.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights without proof of malicious intent.

Front Royal & Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal · filed 1990-10-22

The plaintiffs’ contention that the defendants need only act with “reckless or callous indifference to the [plaintiffs’] federally protected rights” is correct; they need not show malicious or evil intent.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking compensatory damages for an arrest allegedly caused by fabricated evidence must show that the fabrication caused injury; independent probable cause that would have led to the arrest limits recovery to nominal damages.

Smith v. City of Chicago, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1990-11-16

In order to recover more than nominal damages, Smith must demonstrate that the fabricated evidence resulted in an absence of probable cause for his arrest, meaning that he would not have been lawfully arrested in the absence of the fabricated evidence.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when the defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with callous or reckless indifference to federally protected rights.

Wright v. Sheppard · filed 1990-12-18

Punitive damages are appropriate under § 1983 “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves callous or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983).

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipal defendants or individuals sued in their official or representative capacities.

Harris v. Board of Public Utilities of Kansas City · filed 1991-01-18

City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981), precludes an award of punitive damages against municipal defendants (the City and the BPU) on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Individual defendants sued in their official or representative capacity are likewise immune to punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for property loss, embarrassment, and mental anguish caused by a deprivation of rights.

Eyer v. City of Reynoldsburg · filed 1991-02-11

Allegation # 7 contained in Plaintiffs affidavit states that she “was forced to sell [her] property and move from the City of Reynoldsburg.” In addition, Allegation #11 states that the plaintiff “suffered ... extreme embarrasment and mental anguish as a result of the conduct of the [defendants].” Under Stachura, all of these allegations are elements of injury which are compensable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a jury to award punitive damages when officials act in callous disregard of a plaintiff’s federally protected rights.

Arnold R. Vasbinder, Cross-Appellee v. Gordon Ambach, Basil Y. Scott, and Richard M. Switzer, Basil Y. Scott and Richard · filed 1991-02-28

On this view of the record, it was not irrational or impermissible for the jury to infer that defendants’ personnel actions toward Vasbinder were in callous disregard of his rights, and were intended both to deter other potential whistle-blowers and to disguise the retaliatory nature of their action from outsiders. It was surely within the jury’s discretion to send a message, to Scott and Switzer and to others, that such retaliation is intolerable.

Compensatory damages under § 1983 require proof that the constitutional deprivation caused actual injury.

Tedesco v. City of Stamford · filed 1991-04-02

It is well established that a plaintiff must prove more than a mere violation of a constitutional right in order to collect compensatory damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... He must demonstrate that the constitutional deprivation caused him some actual injury.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a municipality.

Hallstrom v. CITY OF GARDEN CITY, ID. · filed 1991-05-03

... a municipality may not be sued for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the punitive damages allegations asserted against Ada County shall be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit compensatory damages based on the abstract value or importance of constitutional rights.

Cuban Museum of Arts & Culture, Inc. v. City of Miami · filed 1991-05-21

Moreover, “damages based on the abstract ‘value’ or ‘importance’ of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages” in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against municipalities.

Winograd v. Clear Lake City Water Authority · filed 1991-05-30

However, we believe that municipalities are immune from liability for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when the defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Lucid v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 1991-07-17

The test for punitive damages in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is whether the defendant’s conduct is shown to have been motivated by an evil motive or intent or a reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.

Section 1983 does not allow compensatory damages for a procedural due process violation if an adequate hearing would have produced the same deprivation.

Ortiz v. Regan · filed 1991-08-01

On the other hand, to the extent that NYSLRS finds — after a constitutionally adequate hearing — that her birth date was September 10, 1932, she has suffered no compensable harm under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow compensatory damages for the deprivation of a right alone; the plaintiff must establish actual injury.

Davet v. MacCarone · filed 1991-10-08

Once we accept, as we must, that the deprivation of the right, in and of itself, cannot be cause for monetary redress, then the result attained herein is perfectly acceptable.

Section 1983 compensatory damages require proof that the violation caused the claimed injury; evidence of stress or economic loss alone does not establish that causal link.

Bertold J. Pembaur, M.D., Cross-Appellee v. City of Cincinnati, Hamilton County, Ohio, Cross-Appellant · filed 1991-10-25

Thus, Dr. Pembaur's argument fails unless he can demonstrate that his injuries resulted from the County's actions. Simply to demonstrate that stress or economic loss occurred does not suffice; without more, such evidence allows only speculation as to what damage, if any, should be attributed to the County. The whole purpose of judging § 1983 actions by tort principles is to prevent such speculation.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when an officer acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights; the award remains subject to review for excessiveness.

Nydam v. Joseph Lennerton, Jr., Etc., and Joseph F. Fontaine, Etc. · filed 1991-11-04

The Supreme Court has held that a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” ... Under the circumstances of this case neither the compensatory nor punitive damages awarded by the jury were excessive.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for conduct motivated by evil intent or marked by reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Ward v. City of San Jose · filed 1991-11-04

Punitive damages are proper under section 1983 “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” ... There is absolutely no evidence, however, that the officers acted with evil intent. A directed verdict on punitive damages was therefore appropriate, and we affirm the district court’s decision to grant it.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for pain and discomfort caused by a constitutional violation even without permanent injury.

Gordon v. Faber · filed 1991-11-05

However, as noted in the findings of fact plaintiffs have failed to prove the existence of any permanent injury resulting from exposure to the cold weather. The court believes, however, that plaintiffs experienced discomfort and pain. Some damages are therefore appropriate.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for a denial of procedural due process only if the plaintiff shows that proper process would have produced a favorable result.

Colorado Dog Fanciers, Inc. v. City & County of Denver Ex Rel. City Council · filed 1991-11-12

To the extent that the ordinance was unconstitutionally applied to a dog owner, the owner’s section 1983 claim is still viable. Compensatory damages, however, may be awarded only if a dog owner can show a denial of due process and that the dog owner would have succeeded in a proper hearing.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for mental and emotional distress, including humiliation and injury to reputation, even without a monetary loss.

Boger v. Wayne County Vernice Davis-Anthony · filed 1991-12-02

Quoting from earlier opinions, the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2543, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986), that “mental and emotional distress constitute compensable injury in § 1983 cases” and that compensatory damages in such cases “may include not only out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms, but also such injuries as ‘impairment of reputation ... personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.’ ” We recognized this element of section 1983 compensatory damages in Ratliff v. Wellington Exempted Village Schools Bd. of Educ., 820 F.2d 792, 797 (6th Cir.1987).

Section 1983 does not allow damages based on the abstract value of constitutional rights allegedly violated.

Hutchinson v. Stuckey · filed 1992-01-14

We note that section 1983 does not authorize recovery of damages based on the abstract value of the constitutional rights allegedly violated.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages without proof of actual damages.

Illinois Municipal League Risk Management Ass'n v. Seibert · filed 1992-01-16

In addition, Seibert correctly notes punitive damages can be awarded in civil rights litigation without proving actual damages.

Section 1983 punitive damages for unconstitutional force or arrest without probable cause require a finding that the officers intended to harm the plaintiff.

Wallace v. Mulholland · filed 1992-02-20

The defendants correctly note that jury awards of punitive damages for unconstitutional force (as to Michael) and arrest without probable cause (as to James) must be supported by a finding that the officers acted with the intent to harm.

Section 1983 permits compensation for mental and emotional distress caused by denial of procedural due process, but damages cannot be presumed from the denial alone.

Sutton v. Cleveland Board Of Education · filed 1992-03-19

Although mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of procedural due process may be compensable under section 1983, damages should not be presumed to flow from every deprivation of due process.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a procedural due process violation without proof of actual injury, but compensatory damages require actual harm caused by the violation.

Goff v. Dailey · filed 1992-03-27

The court finds, however, that Goff experienced no harm or actual damages as a result of this violation and is not entitled to compensatory damages. ... An award of nominal damages of $1.00 is appropriate compensation.

Section 1983 punitive damages for unconstitutional force or arrest without probable cause require evidence supporting a finding that the officer intended to harm.

Wallace v. Mulholland · filed 1992-03-30

The defendants correctly note that jury awards of punitive damages for unconstitutional force (as to Michael) and arrest without probable cause (as to James) must be supported by a finding that the officers acted with the intent to harm.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages beyond nominal damages for actual injuries caused by a deprivation of due process.

Hoffer v. Commissioner of Correction · filed 1992-04-13

The defendants maintain that the plaintiff is entitled to no more than nominal damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the denial of due process. We do not agree. ... The judge correctly ruled that the plaintiff is entitled to receive compensation, beyond nominal damages, for the loss of liberties which resulted from the deprivation of due process.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Bogan v. Kenneth Stroud, Sheila Redd and Dwight Anderson · filed 1992-05-12

We also reject defendants’ argument that remittitur is appropriate because the punitive damages award was excessive. The Supreme Court has made clear that a “jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

Section 1983 permits punitive damages in the court's discretion.

Kelly v. Snider · filed 1992-05-28

The question of whether to award punitive damages is discretionary. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 52 (1983). ... Finding no manifest abuse of discretion, we affirm the district court's denial of punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when the defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Jolivet v. Deland · filed 1992-06-04

Punitive damages are available in § 1983 actions. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 35, 103 S.Ct. at 1629 (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1473, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980)). However, punitive damages are to be awarded only when "the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith, 461 U.S. at 56, 103 S.Ct. at 1640.

Section 1983 compensatory damages require proof of actual injury caused by the violation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Jolivet v. Deland · filed 1992-06-04

The purpose of § 1983 damages is to provide compensation for injuries caused by the violation of a plaintiff’s legal rights. ... No compensatory damages may be awarded absent proof of actual injury.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against defendants sued in their individual capacities, but not against a municipality or local officials sued in their official capacities.

Agresta v. Goode · filed 1992-06-15

To the extent that the complaint purports to state a claim for punitive damages against the City of Philadelphia and the individual defendants in their official capacity, that claim must be dismissed. Punitive damages are available, however, in a section 1983 action against a defendant in his or her individual capacity.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Ward v. City of San Jose · filed 1992-06-16

Punitive damages are proper under section 1983 "when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983); Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Department, 901 F.2d 702, 707 (9th Cir.1989) (Kennedy). ... There is absolutely no evidence, however, that the officers acted with evil intent. A directed verdict on punitive damages was therefore appropriate, and we affirm the district court's decision to grant it.

Punitive damages under § 1983 are governed by the federal standard rather than a state standard.

Lawrence Hill, (90-3923), Cross-Appellant (90-3826) v. Ronald C. Marshall, Terry Morris, (90-3803), Cross-Appellee · filed 1992-07-23

The correct standard to be applied in considering the issue of punitive damages under § 1983 is the federal one; Hill correctly argues that the district court erred in applying the Ohio standard.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when the defendant acts with ill will or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to constitutional rights.

Walker v. Butler · filed 1992-07-31

Punitive damages may be awarded in § 1983 cases when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by ill will or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Davet v. MacCarone · filed 1992-08-19

We start with the settled principle that the trier of fact may assess punitive damages in a section 1983 action “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

Punitive damages generally are unavailable against a city under Section 1983.

Darby v. City of Torrance · filed 1992-09-14

Plaintiff also admits in his opposition that punitive damages are generally not available against a city under Section 1983. ... Therefore, the Motion to Strike paragraph 20 is GRANTED only as to defendant City of Torrance.

Punitive damages in a § 1983 action may be excessive when the award consumes so much of a defendant’s wealth that it exceeds what is needed to punish and deter.

Vasbinder v. Basil Y. Scott and Richard M. Switzer · filed 1992-09-30

Reviewing the record in this case, we find the amount of punitive damages awarded by the jury, $150,000 against each defendant, to be excessive as a matter of law. The evidence presented at the second trial established that Switzer’s net worth is in the neighborhood of $270,000, including his equity in his home. He earns an annual income of $75,000 and receives an annual pension of $29,000; after retirement, he will receive an annual pension of $57,000. The award of $150,000 in punitive damages exceeds fifty percent of the Switzers’ total net worth. The dramatic reduction in the Switzers’ wealth and retirement expectations “shocks the judicial conscience” because it far exceeds what is needed to deter the defendants or similarly situated individuals from engaging in the wrongful conduct addressed in this action.

Punitive damages are available under § 1983 only when the defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Green v. Johnson · filed 1992-10-16

Punitive damages are available in § 1983 cases, but should "be awarded only when 'the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.' " Jolivet v. Deland, 966 F.2d 573, 577 (10th Cir.1992) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983)).

Federal standards for punitive damages in § 1983 claims displace inconsistent state law.

Nelson v. Emerald People's Utility District · filed 1992-11-12

Federal standards for imposing punitive damages in § 1983 claims preempt any inconsistent state law.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against an officer whose outrageous conduct shows the requisite culpable state of mind.

Giroux v. Sherman · filed 1992-12-07

Given the outrageousness of this conduct, as well as the presence of the requisite state of mind under Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1637-38, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1974), we believe punitive damages are necessary against David Sherman.

A § 1983 plaintiff must prove actual injury to recover compensatory damages.

Farrar v. Hobby · filed 1992-12-14

For this reason, no compensatory damages may be awarded in a § 1983 suit absent proof of actual injury.

A plaintiff who seeks punitive damages under Section 1983 without requesting compensatory damages cannot recover punitive damages.

Moore v. J.W. Trapp, Sheriff of Choctaw County at Hugo, Oklahoma · filed 1992-12-23

The district court properly dismissed plaintiff's original complaint. That complaint sought punitive damages as well as equitable relief. Because plaintiff did not include a prayer for compensatory damages, punitive damages were not available.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Hammond v. Town of Cicero · filed 1993-03-11

Municipalities may not be subject to punitive damage awards pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when the facts establish evil motive, intent, recklessness or callous indifference.

Torres v. City of Waterbury · filed 1993-03-16

An award of punitive damages pursuant to § 1983 must be predicated on facts establishing evil motive, intent, recklessness or callous indifference.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights, but the claim requires evidence supporting that standard.

WALTERS v. GROSSHEIM · filed 1993-04-01

We also reject Walters' argument that the District Court should have awarded him punitive damages. As the court recognized, punitive damages may be awarded in a § 1983 case "when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). Applying this standard, the District Court found a total lack of evidence to support Walters' claim for punitive damages. We agree with that assessment of the record, and conclude as a matter of law that Walters is not entitled to punitive damages.

Section 1983 allows punitive damages against individual defendants when their state of mind warrants such an award.

DURANT v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 16 · filed 1993-04-05

In this case, the jury heard the evidence and decided the subjective state of mind of each participant warranted the relatively nominal award of punitive damages. The LeFlore District's unsupported arguments to the contrary do not displace this finding.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages even when the jury awards no compensatory or nominal damages.

Edward King, Also Known as Edward Kerr v. Michael MacRi Edward Kondek, Rudolf Marrero, Ann Tyler · filed 1993-05-05

In the circumstances of this case, the punitive awards were not vitiated by the absence of compensatory or nominal damages awards.

Section 1983 allows compensation for mental and emotional distress, but compensatory damages for a procedural due process violation require proof that the deprivation caused the injury.

Edgecomb v. Housing Authority of Town of Vernon · filed 1993-06-10

Mental and emotional distress are compensable under § 1983. ... Where the deprivation is of a procedural due process nature, it is not justifiable to award compensatory damages without proof that the injury actually was caused by the deprivation.

Compensatory damages under § 1983 may cover mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation, with the amount determined by the injuries and circumstances.

Ruscavage v. Zuratt · filed 1993-07-16

While the Court by no means wishes to diminish the seriousness of Defendant’s violation of Plaintiffs fundamental constitutional right to plead not guilty and request a hearing, the Court is convinced, upon reconsideration of the facts and circumstances of this case and upon examination of several damage awards in section 1983 cases, that an award of $10,-000 more fairly and justly compensates Plaintiff for the mental strain and anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation that she sustained as a direct result of Defendant’s bad faith issuance of the second traffic citation.

Section 1983 bars punitive damages against municipal officials in their official capacities but permits punitive damages claims against individual defendants.

Carroll v. Bristol Township · filed 1993-07-19

Because the claim against Officer Tegzes is brought against him in his official capacity, punitive damages are not available and this claim must be dismissed. ... Punitive damage claims may, however, be brought against individual defendants and therefore the claims against Officers Rink and Rantin may proceed.

Punitive damages under § 1983 require evil motive or intent or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights; evidence establishing liability alone does not necessarily satisfy that standard.

Standley v. Chilhowee R-IV School District · filed 1993-09-17

A jury may assess punitive damages under § 1983 “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” ... After a careful review of the record, we agree with the District Court that the evidence does not support an award of punitive damages. The evidence that appellants cite in support of the punitive damages award is simply evidence supporting the jury’s finding that appellants’ First Amendment activities were a motivating factor in the decision not to renew their teaching contracts. That evidence does not rise to the level of “evil motive” or “reckless or callous indifference.”

Punitive damages under § 1983 require evil motive or intent, or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Standley v. Chilhowee IV School District · filed 1993-10-26

A jury may assess punitive damages under Sec. 1983 "when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). After a careful review of the record, we agree with the District Court that the evidence does not support an award of punitive damages. The evidence that appellants cite in support of the punitive damages award is simply evidence supporting the jury's finding that appellants' First Amendment activities were a motivating factor in the decision not to renew their teaching contracts. That evidence does not rise to the level of "evil motive" or "reckless or callous indifference." We therefore affirm the District Court's decision to overturn the award of punitive damages against defendant Turnham.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to others' constitutional rights.

Huson v. The City of Castle Rock Gilbert R. Vaughn, in His Official Capacity and Individually · filed 1993-10-29

Punitive damages are recoverable under § 1983 either when a defendant's conduct was driven by evil motive or intent, or when it involved a reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others. ... Thus, we find that there was substantial evidence supporting a verdict on punitive damages in favor of Huson.

Punitive damages under § 1983 require evidence of egregious conduct, willfulness, or malice supporting an inference of evil motive or reckless or callous indifference to constitutional rights.

Caruso v. Forslund · filed 1994-01-10

Without evidence of egregious conduct, willfulness, or malice attributable to defendants, the jury was not entitled to find that they acted with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when the defendant acts with reckless or callous disregard for a federally protected right.

Holloway v. Wittry · filed 1994-01-27

In order for Holloway to be entitled to punitive damages under § 1983, he must, at a minimum, demonstrate that the conduct of Miller constituted a “reckless or callous disregard” for the federally protected right.

Punitive damages under § 1983 may be awarded when the defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights; the award remains discretionary.

Davis v. Marion · filed 1994-02-22

The trier of fact may award punitive damages in a cause of action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 upon a determination either that the defendant's conduct was "motivated by evil motive or intent, or [that] it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others."

Section 1983 permits punitive damages in suits filed in Louisiana state court.

Booze v. City of Alexandria · filed 1994-04-04

In light of Smith, we now overrule Ricard to this extent and hold that punitive damages are indeed recoverable in a suit filed in a Louisiana state court alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Punitive damages in a Section 1983 action may be awarded when the defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Bradford v. City of Los Angeles Michael Sirk · filed 1994-04-04

Punitive damages are appropriate in a section 1983 action " 'when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.' " Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 901 F.2d 702, 707 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1971)).

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for official conduct motivated by evil intent or showing reckless or callous indifference to a person's constitutional rights.

Sockwell v. Phelps · filed 1994-05-10

Under § 1983, punitive damages may be awarded only if the official conduct is "motivated by evil intent" or demonstrates "reckless or callous indifference" to a person's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Duncan v. Wells · filed 1994-06-03

Punitive damages may be awarded in a section 1983 action when “the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Walters v. Grossheim, 990 F.2d 381, 385 (8th Cir.1993) (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983)). The district court found a total failure of proof to support Duncan’s claim for punitive damages. We agree with that assessment of the record and conclude that the district court did not err in granting Wells’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a governmental entity.

Garrett v. Clarke County Board of Education · filed 1994-06-24

Punitive damages are not available under § 1983 from a governmental entity.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against an officer whose malicious conduct harms the plaintiff.

CULVER BY AND THROUGH BELL v. Fowler · filed 1994-09-02

The court has already found that Gerald Fowler acted with a malicious intent to harm Fred Culver. ... Accordingly, an award of punitive damages is appropriate.

Section 1983 bars punitive damages against a school district and against officials sued in their official capacities.

Kessler v. Monsour · filed 1994-09-06

Defendants Monsour, Menio, and Line Mountain School District next argue that they are immune from claims for punitive damages under § 1983. Plaintiffs have not responded to this aspect of defendants’ motion. The law in this area is clear. ... The claims against defendants Monsour and Menio in their official capacity for punitive damages will be dismissed. The claims for punitive damages against defendant Line Mountain School District will be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for actual injuries caused by a deprivation of constitutional rights, including mental anguish, suffering, impaired reputation, and out-of-pocket losses, but not for the abstract value of the rights.

Terri L. Gillentine, Debra Young v. Vanzant · filed 1994-12-09

Congress intended that Section 1983 damages compensate persons injured by the deprivation of their constitutional rights if such damages flow from actual injury to the Plaintiff and are not based on the abstract value of constitutional rights allegedly violated. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986). A Section 1983 Plaintiff can also recover damages for mental anguish, suffering, impairment of reputation, and out of pocket losses. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986).

Section 1983 permits punitive damages only when the defendant acted with evil intent or reckless disregard.

Bradley v. Lewis · filed 1995-01-31

Bradley's contention that he is also entitled to punitive damages against prison officials for failing to expedite his relief under Casey is foreclosed by Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (punitive damages allowed only if plaintiff shows defendant's conduct motivated by evil intent or reckless disregard).

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference to, the rights or safety of others.

Thorne v. Wise · filed 1995-02-03

Punitive damages are available in Sec. 1983 cases if a defendant has acted with "reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference to, the rights or safety of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit · filed 1995-02-15

In a Sec. 1983 action: ... [A] jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages * * * when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages only when the plaintiff proves actual injury caused by a constitutional violation.

Sisneros v. Nix · filed 1995-03-06

Therefore, only a § 1983 plaintiff who can prove actual injury caused by a constitutional violation is entitled to compensatory damages.

Section 1983 compensatory damages require an injury caused by the alleged constitutional violation.

Wilson v. Cook County Board of Commissioners · filed 1995-03-15

Because plaintiff has failed to allege that he has suffered any injury as the result of the allegations contained in these counts, he cannot maintain a claim for compensatory damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Grimm v. Lane · filed 1995-03-24

The Supreme Court has stated that punitive damages are appropriate under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). Substantial evidence existed for the jury to find that each defendant acted with callous indifference to the Plaintiffs constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages to punish or deter a deliberate violation of constitutional rights.

Frazier v. Forgione · filed 1995-04-03

Furthermore, I find that the circumstances of this case entitle plaintiff to punitive damages. Punitive damages can be awarded “in a proper case under § 1983 for the purpose of deterring or punishing violation of constitutional rights.”

Punitive damages in a § 1983 action are appropriate when the defendant acted with evil intent or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Gene Vontell Graham and Sidney Wilson v. Gene Satkoski, Charlie Wright · filed 1995-04-04

Punitive damages are appropriate in § 1983 cases if the judge finds “conduct motivated by evil intent or callous indifference to the federally-protected rights of plaintiffs.”

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality or against individual defendants sued in their official capacities.

Davis v. Olin · filed 1995-04-20

In Counts I through IV, the plaintiff seeks punitive damages. The defendants argue, and the plaintiff concedes, that punitive damages may not be assessed against a municipality or against individual defendants sued in their official capacities. See Butcher v. McAlester, 956 F.2d 973, 976 n. 1 (10th Cir.1992) (“A municipality is not liable for punitive damages in a proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Wulf, 883 F.2d 842. This portion of the defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a municipality or a redevelopment authority that functions as a hybrid governmental entity.

PVI Associates v. Redevelopment Authority (In Re PVI Associates) · filed 1995-04-28

The punitive damages claim as to the municipal defendant, i.e., the Borough, will be dismissed consistent with City of Newport, supra. As to the Redevelopment Authority, no compelling argument has been advanced as to why the general rule of City of Newport should not be applied in this instance, and extended as was done in Bolden v. SEPTA supra. Indeed, in this respect, the Court finds that the activities of the Redevelopment Authority do constitute it a hybrid entity with certain similarities to SEPTA such that neither the retributive nor the deterrent functions of punitive damages would be significantly advanced in permitting their award in this instance.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking compensatory damages for excessive force to prove that the unconstitutional force caused a compensable injury.

Haywood v. Koehler · filed 1995-05-10

The fact that Haywood was injured during the events surrounding Garcia’s use of excessive force does not in any way satisfy the plaintiffs burden of proving that the use of excessive of force caused him injury, nor does it shift that burden to the defendant.

Punitive damages in a § 1983 action are left to the jury’s discretion and are not awarded as of right.

Hynes v. LaBoy · filed 1995-05-30

To the lay-persons on the jury, it would not have been apparent that punitive damages are available in § 1983 claims, but not with respect to a state law claim for battery, an intentional tort. ... It is well-settled, and the Court instructed the jury, that an award of punitive damages is left to the sound discretion of the jury.

Punitive damages under § 1983 may be denied when the defendants’ conduct does not warrant punishment beyond the damages already awarded.

Scott v. Jerry L. Horton, Kershaw County Sheriff Harold Brown Joel Gainey James Truesdale, Jailer · filed 1995-07-10

The district court's denial of punitive damages neither shocked the conscience of this court nor did it amount to a manifest abuse of discretion. E.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 52 (1983); Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir.1990). The Defendants' conduct did not call for punishment over and above that actually imposed; therefore, punitive damages were properly denied.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a county government.

Scheideman v. Shawnee County Board of County Commissioners · filed 1995-07-18

Accordingly, plaintiffs request for punitive damages based on his § 1983 claims against Defendant Shawnee County Board of County Commissioners is dismissed.

Section 1983 compensatory damages require proof that the constitutional deprivation caused a compensable injury.

Gerritsen v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1995-09-14

To receive compensatory damages, however, the party seeking such damages must prove that the constitutional deprivation resulted in an injury for which compensation traditionally would have been provided at common law--e.g., physical harm, emotional distress, loss of reputation, or monetary loss.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against individual defendants when the underlying constitutional claims against them fail.

Mitchell v. Coffey County Hospital · filed 1995-09-25

With the aforementioned rulings on plaintiffs First Amendment and due process claims, the court finds that plaintiff also cannot recover punitive damages against the individual defendants on his § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against individual state officers.

Prisco v. State of NY · filed 1995-10-11

Since punitive damages are permissible under § 1983 actions against individual state officers, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1473, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), defendants’ motion is denied as to these claims.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for malicious prosecution, and an award within a reasonable range that does not shock the court’s conscience need not be reduced.

Lee v. Edwards · filed 1995-10-27

A punitive award “may be an integral part of the remedy in a civil rights action.” ... The punitive damage award neither shocks this court’s conscience nor is outside the maximum limit of a reasonable range.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Cornell v. Woods · filed 1995-11-08

Punitive damages are appropriate in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case “ “when the defendants’] conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’ ” ... The district court correctly observed that the prison officials’ conduct in this ease, though certainly not to be commended, did not rise to a level of egregiousness sufficient to justify the imposition of punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when defendants act with reckless or callous indifference to protected rights.

Abdullah v. Rapone · filed 1995-11-15

I award punitive damages in the sum of $25,000 as I find that defendants’ actions reflect a reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs rights.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against an individual defendant who acts with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights or with evil motive or intent.

Crockett v. Thorne · filed 1995-11-27

A defendant who demonstrates "reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others" or is "motivated by evil motive or intent" can be liable for punitive damages under § 1983. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Based on Crockett's allegations that Thorne used excessive force, Crockett was entitled to seek punitive damages from Thorne.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Ricketts v. City of Hartford · filed 1996-01-17

Second, punitive damages are generally available in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages against municipalities but bars punitive damages against them.

MITCHELL v. DUPNIK · filed 1996-01-26

Although a municipality may be liable for compensatory damages in § 1983 actions, it is immune from punitive damages under the statute.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages on a showing of reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiff’s civil rights.

Green v. Zendrian · filed 1996-02-14

Punitive damages may be recovered in a § 1983 action based on a showing of reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiffs civil rights.

Section 1983 punitive damages are unavailable without an underlying finding of liability, so excluding evidence relevant only to punitive damages is harmless when the verdict rejects the underlying claim.

Ricketts v. City of Hartford · filed 1996-02-14

We note also that with respect to Ricketts' claims for punitive damages, because we uphold the jury's verdict as to the use of excessive force in the first instance, the erroneous exclusion of evidence relevant to the secondary question whether punitive damages are warranted would be harmless.

A plaintiff seeking punitive damages under § 1983 need not introduce evidence of the defendant’s net worth.

Kemezy v. Peters · filed 1996-03-05

Peters’ appeal challenges only the award of punitive damages, and that on the narrowest of grounds: that it was the plaintiffs burden to introduce evidence concerning the defendant’s net worth for purposes of equipping the jury with information essential to a just measurement of punitive damages. ... But we think the majority rule, which places no burden of production on the plaintiff, is sound, and we take this opportunity to make clear that it is indeed the law of this circuit.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against a state actor for reckless or callous disregard of a plaintiff’s rights and safety or for intentional violations of law.

Moody v. Philadelphia Housing Authority · filed 1996-03-08

Punitive damages are available against a state actor, under Section 1983, upon a showing of reckless or callous disregard or indifference to the plaintiffs rights and safety, as well as intentional violations of law.

Section 1983 permits monetary damages to compensate for a constitutional violation.

Lord-Butcher v. City of Newport Beach · filed 1996-03-13

Second, contrary to defendants' contention, monetary damages are appropriate compensation for a constitutional violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require compensatory damages for an excessive-force violation unless the excessive force caused compensable injury.

Haywood v. Richard Koehler, Captain Garcia, Captain Small · filed 1996-03-18

Stated that broadly, however, his position is untenable, since we have ruled that a finding of excessive force does not, as a matter of law, entitle the victim to an award of compensatory damages.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities, authorities, or individuals sued in their official capacities.

Bell Atlantic Mobile Systems, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board of O'Hara · filed 1996-05-21

Municipalities, authorities and individual defendants sued in their official capacities are absolutely immune from awards of punitive damages under Section 1983.

Section 1983 compensatory damages for emotional distress require proof that the rights violation caused the distress.

Richard Lee Sisk James Piatt v. Cso Branch R. Austin Lt. Hilton · filed 1996-05-29

Sisk admitted that he suffered no "hard, tangible losses" from the denial of due process, but sought compensatory damages based upon emotional distress. However, Sisk failed to prove that his alleged emotional distress was caused by any violation.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages, and a $1,000 award may fall within the district court’s discretion.

Shabazz v. Jerry Crane, Sheriff David Peters, Deputy Sheriff Richard Thomas, Chief of Police James Purtle · filed 1996-06-24

Melchizedek L. Shabazz appeals from the final judgment entered in the district court 1 following a bench trial in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that no error of law appears and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Shabazz compensatory damages in the amount of $1,000.

Section 1983 damages may compensate an inmate for prison privileges lost during segregation caused by a retaliatory transfer.

Goff v. Burton · filed 1996-08-08

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in valuing Goff's lost privileges at ten dollars per day.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Annis v. County of Westchester · filed 1996-09-05

Punitive damages may be awarded in a section 1983 case “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless ... or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

Section 1983 permits punitive damages if the defendant acted with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Ali v. DuBois · filed 1996-09-24

In the alternative, I hold that under the facts of this case, Ali is also entitled to summary judgment against defendants Coalter, Luongo, Higgins, and Rahim on his §1983 claim. On the alternative basis of this ruling, then, I hold that Ali is entitled under Miga to recover punitive damages, if he can prove evil motive or intent, or reckless or callous indifference, at a later trial or hearing to assess damages.

Section 1983 does not require compensatory damages to be apportioned among defendants when their combined conduct causes indivisible pain.

Darnell Cooper and Anthony Davis v. Casey · filed 1996-10-02

One that signally lacks merit is that the judge should have asked the jurors to apportion the compensatory damages among the defendants. This was impossible because the kicking and punching and macing and refusal to provide prompt medical assistance coalesced to produce a quantity of pain in which the contributions of the individual defendants could not be distinguished.

Section 1983 permits a higher ratio of punitive to compensatory damages when compensatory damages are nominal, with the award measured against punitive awards in comparable civil rights cases.

Lee v. Edwards · filed 1996-10-31

However, in a § 1983 case in which the compensatory damages are nominal, a much higher ratio can be contemplated while maintaining normal respiration. Since the use of a multiplier to assess punitive damages is not the best tool here, we must look to the punitive damage awards in other civil rights cases to find limits and proportions.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking compensatory damages to prove that the rights violation proximately caused injury.

Ealy v. City of Dayton · filed 1996-12-16

A violation of a constitutional right does not necessarily establish that a plaintiff is entitled to recover damages under § 1983. ... Therefore, the District Court properly instructed the jury that the plaintiff still had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's use of excessive force proximately caused damages.

Punitive damages against individuals under § 1983 are not intended to compensate the victim.

Marderosian v. Shamshak · filed 1997-01-16

Furthermore, as pointed out by Chief Shamshak, the policy of awarding punitive damages against individuals in Section 1983 claims is not intended to compensate the victim.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or with reckless or callous disregard for federally protected rights.

Bills Ex Rel. Bills v. Hommer Consolidated School District Number 33-C · filed 1997-03-14

Punitive damages are available in a § 1983 action when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or when it involves reckless or callous disregard to the federally protected rights of others.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities or municipal officials sued in their official capacities.

Rankin v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1997-03-31

Finally, I have found that Rankin cannot recover punitive damages from the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that he cannot recover punitive damages against Gordon and Coleman in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore I will grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss Rankin’s claim for punitive damages under count I of the complaint against the City and against Gordon and Coleman in their official capacities.

Section 1983 allowed compensatory damages for mental and emotional harm caused by a constitutional violation without a showing of physical injury before the PLRA.

Thomas v. Hill · filed 1997-04-04

Prior to the PLRA, mental and emotional stress caused by a Constitutional violation was compensable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a punitive damages issue to reach the jury on evidence of reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff’s rights or an intentional violation of federal law.

Thigpen v. Shields · filed 1997-04-11

Evidence of either "reckless or callous disregard for the plain- tiff's rights" or "intentional violations of federal law" is sufficient to present a jury issue as to punitive damages in a§ 1983 action. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 50 (1983). Therefore, the district court should have permitted Ms. Thigpen to argue both standards to the jury.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality or a sheriff sued in his official capacity.

Dillon v. Jefferson County Sheriff's Department · filed 1997-04-23

Punitive damages also are not allowed against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The same reasoning leads to the conclusion that plaintiffs claim for punitive damages against Griffith based upon his section 1983 claims is also barred.

Section 1983 allows punitive damages for sufficiently culpable conduct, but a finding of deliberate indifference that establishes liability does not itself require punitive damages.

Coleman v. Nurse Ruth Rahija · filed 1997-06-05

A finding of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, while establishing liability under § 1983, does not necessitate a finding of callous indifference warranting punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when the defendant acts with malicious or evil intent or with reckless or careless disregard for an inmate’s rights or safety.

Estate of Davis Ex Rel. Ostenfeld v. Delo · filed 1997-06-16

Punitive damages may be recovered in a § 1983 case when a defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by malicious or evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or careless disregard or indifference to an inmate’s rights or safety.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when the defendant acts with malicious or evil intent or with reckless or careless disregard or indifference to an inmate’s rights or safety.

ESTATE OF · filed 1997-06-16

Punitive damages may be recovered in a § 1983 case when a defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by malicious or evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or careless disregard or indifference to an inmate's rights or safety.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Williams v. Brimeyer · filed 1997-06-25

Punitive damages may be awarded when a defendant's conduct is motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for a specific injury to First Amendment rights beyond lost revenue.

City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council · filed 1986-07-18

The specific compensable, non-abstract harm to IPAC can be seen from the specific injuries alleged by IPAC which we noted above.

Section 1983 permits lost earnings as compensatory damages for a First Amendment injury caused under color of state law.

Bent v. Commissioner · filed 1986-07-28

It is abundantly clear that “lost earnings” is a proper element of compensatory damages that may be awarded under sec. 1983 in order to redress the party who has been injured by a deprivation of First Amendment rights under color of State law.

Section 1983 permits an organization to recover for injury to its mission caused by a constitutional tort if it establishes an actual loss.

Housing Works, Inc. v. Turner · filed 2005-03-30

Although none of these cases involved public contracts, they make clear that injury to an organization’s ability to fulfill its mission as a result of a constitutional tort may be compensable under Section 1983 provided that the plaintiff can establish an actual loss.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages only when the plaintiff proves actual injury caused by the denial of constitutional rights.

Robinson v. Young · filed 1987-02-24

I find that there is insufficient evidence in the record on which to determine whether plaintiff is entitled to more than nominal damages and, if so, in what amount. The United States Supreme Court has held recently that a plaintiff may recover compensatory damages in a § 1983 action only if he is able to prove “actual injury caused by the denial of his constitutional rights.”

Section 1983 compensatory damages for denial of a pre-deprivation hearing require harm attributable to that denial.

Kassim v. City of Schenectady and Michael T. Brockbank · filed 2005-07-18

Having shown no harm or loss attributable to the failure to give him a pre-deprivation hearing, he has shown no reason why the court’s restriction on compensatory damages deprived him of any entitlement.

Section 1983 allows compensatory damages only for actual injury caused by the defendant's actions.

Brooks v. Andolina · filed 1987-08-17

In Memphis Community School District, the Supreme Court held that a section 1983 plaintiff may not recover compensatory damages based on the abstract value of the constitutional right that was violated. Rather, compensatory damages must be grounded in the actual injury suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's actions.

Section 1983 permits separate compensation for emotional distress and loss of liberty caused by false arrest.

Martinez v. The Port Authority Of New York And New Jersey · filed 2006-04-13

Nor did the District Court err in evaluating plaintiff's emotional distress and loss of liberty as separate components of his false arrest claim, inasmuch as we have held previously that such components are "separable" and thus separately compensable, see Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Gardner v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 907 F.2d 1348, 1353 (2d Cir. 1990) (evaluating separately the plaintiff's damages for "past pain and suffering," which included "an atypical anxiety disorder," from the plaintiff's damages for "deprivation of liberty").

Section 1983 permits separate damages awards for emotional injuries from false arrest and malicious prosecution when the injuries are distinct.

Martinez v. Port Authority · filed 2006-04-13

Finally, in upholding separate damage awards for the emotional injuries that plaintiff sustained with respect to his false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, the District Court did not sanction the awarding of duplicative compensatory damage awards.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for an unlawful detention when the plaintiff proves actual injury, even if the arrest was supported by probable cause.

Lopez, Joseph v. City of Chicago · filed 2006-09-22

On remand, Lopez may recover compensatory damages for the unlawful duration of his confinement. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-55 (1978) (compensatory damages are the norm when a plaintiff prevails on a § 1983 claim for constitutional violations and can prove actual damages).

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for proven injuries from unconstitutional detention even when the arrest was supported by probable cause.

Lopez v. City of Chicago, Jennifer Delucia, James Delafont, Daniel Jacobs, and Hector Vergara · filed 2006-09-22

On remand, Lopez may recover compensatory damages for the unlawful duration of his confinement. ... The defendants argue that Lopez is entitled to only nominal damages because he stipulated there was probable cause to arrest him. This argument is weak. Lopez presented evidence that he suffered physical and mental injuries as a result of his extended detention in the interrogation room.

Section 1983 compensatory damages for lost business profits must be supported with reasonable certainty, but uncertainty about the precise amount does not bar recovery.

Benson v. City of Wellston · filed 2006-11-06

Damages must be established to a reasonable certainty, but the existence of some uncertainty as to the amount of damages does not foreclose recovery.

Section 1983 compensatory damages for delayed medical care cover aggravation of existing injuries and pain proximately caused by an unreasonable delay.

Shannon v. Lester · filed 1975-07-08

He can recover damages only for any aggravation of his pre-existing injuries, or for pain and suffering proximately caused by any unreasonable delay in taking him to the hospital.

Section 1983 does not allow compensatory damages in a death case maintained through Alabama's wrongful death act.

Brown v. Morgan County, Ala. · filed 1981-08-26

In summary, the court finds that federal law is deficient with respect to survival, that the Alabama wrongful death act may be adopted by reference through § 1988, that the policies of the federal civil rights statutes and the Alabama wrongful death act are not inconsistent, and that the Alabama act should be adopted in toto. Compensatory damages are not available to a plaintiff maintaining a 1983 case in reliance on the Alabama wrongful death act.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show actual injury caused by the rights deprivation to recover compensatory damages.

Pino v. Dalsheim · filed 1984-07-25

Under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove more than a mere violation of his constitutional rights in order to collect an award of monetary damages; he must demonstrate that the deprivation caused him actual injury.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for emotional injury from an unconstitutional strip search, but an award may be set aside as grossly excessive.

Levka v. City of Chicago, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1985-01-02

Plaintiff brought this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that defendant-appellee, the City of Chicago, violated her civil rights when Chicago police officers subjected her to a strip search after her arrest for a misdemeanor offense. ... For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the jury’s award of $50,000 compensatory damages for emotional injury must be set aside as grossly excessive.

Section 1983 does not allow recovery of damages caused by a suspension when the plaintiff would have been suspended even after a proper hearing.

Dargis v. Sheahan · filed 2008-05-16

For this reason, where a plaintiff would have suffered the same fate had the required hearing been held, he is not entitled to recover damages caused by the suspension.

Section 1983 requires a claimant seeking compensatory damages to show that the violation of their rights caused actual harm.

AMANDA C. v. Case · filed 2008-05-23

To recover compensatory damages in a § 1983 action, the claimant must show that the violation of his or her rights resulted in some actual harm.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages only for actual injury caused by the defendant.

Hicks v. Ferrero · filed 2008-07-03

“[C]ompensatory damages under § 1983 may be awarded only based on actual injuries caused by the defendant and cannot be presumed or based on the abstract value of the constitutional rights that the defendant violated.” ... He did not allege any physical injury, monetary loss, or other actual injury related to the retaliation claim.

Section 1983 compensatory damages require an injury caused by the constitutional violation.

Murakowski v. University of Delaware · filed 2008-09-04

As a result, the compensatory damages allegedly incurred were not proximately caused by a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for emotional injury caused by a constitutional deprivation.

H.C. ex rel. Hewett v. Jarrard · filed 1986-04-15

Emotional injury is actionable under section 1983 for humiliation, embarrassment, and mental distress resulting from the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 limits compensatory damages to injuries caused by a constitutional deprivation; when the violation causes no actual damages, only nominal damages are available.

Roma Outdoor Creations, Inc. v. City of Cumming · filed 2009-03-02

Accordingly, when a constitutional violation does not cause actual damages, nominal damages constitute the only relief available. ... In this case, a jury must determine whether plaintiff suffered any compensatory damages as a result of the City’s delayed processing of plaintiffs applications.

Section 1983 does not permit compensatory damages based on the abstract value of a constitutional right.

Vosburg v. Herman Solem and Richard Rist · filed 1988-09-22

In Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a jury instruction authorizing an award of compensatory damages based upon the fact-finding assessment of the value or importance of a substantive constitutional right constituted an erroneous charge. We find little variance between the instruction given here and the charge rendered in Stachura. We therefore hold that the instruction given by the trial court was in fact erroneous.

Section 1983 does not permit damages based solely on the intrinsic value of a violated constitutional right.

Hay ex rel. Hay v. City of Irving · filed 1990-02-08

Special verdict questions 11a and 14a which followed the damages instruction allowed the jury to compensate Hay for the intrinsic value of the deprivation of his right not to be subjected to excessive force. ... This was error. We correct it by eliminating the award from the judgment.

Section 1983 allows compensatory damages for actual losses or injuries under common law tort principles.

Griffith v. Teran · filed 1992-11-16

Compensatory damages under § 1983 are determined according to the principles of common law tort, which allows recovery of compensatory damages only for actual losses or injuries.

Section 1983 permits only nominal damages for a procedural due process violation when the underlying deprivation was justified and no substantive violation was shown.

Johnson v. Swinney · filed 1993-06-28

Nevertheless, even though Johnson was denied procedural due process in connection with his placement in segregation, he was not entitled to compensatory damages because there was no showing of a substantive violation.

Section 1983 permits damages for mental or emotional distress caused by a denial of procedural due process when the claimant proves the denial caused the injury.

Newman v. The Board of Education of the City School District of New York · filed 1979-02-21

Compensable damages are also available under § 1983 for mental or emotional distress caused by a denial of procedural due process. There must be proof, however, that such injury actually was caused by the denial.