42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state agency.

Driftless Area Land Conservancy v. Huebner, Tyler · filed 2020-11-20

Since plaintiffs’ claims are all brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and it is well-established that a state agency may not itself be sued under that section, this concession is both appropriate and prudent.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against the South Carolina Department of Corrections.

Wright v. South Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 2020-11-20

That same day, the magistrate judge also entered an order advising Plaintiff that his Complaint is subject to summary dismissal because Defendant South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) is not amendable to suit under § 1983. ... Thus, having thoroughly reviewed the Report and the record under the appropriate standards and, finding no clear error, the court adopts the Report in its entirety (ECF No. 17), and incorporates it herein.

A state agency such as the Tennessee Department of Corrections is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Brennan v. Mayes · filed 2020-11-23

Defendants move to dismiss the TDOC because it is not a proper party under Section 1983. (Doc. No. 48 at 2–3.) Defendants are correct. Hix v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 196 F. App’x 350, 355 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989)) (“The TDOC is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983, and is therefore not a proper defendant.”).

State entities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983 and are immune from federal damages suits.

Hernandez v. Kidwell · filed 2020-11-24

There is no private cause of action under PREA, and CCCF is immune from suit for damages in federal court. ... see also Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989) (stating that state entities are not “persons” for purposes of a § 1983 civil rights action and are immune from suit in federal court). Accordingly, defendants’ motion is granted with respect to these claims.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against Pennsylvania state courts because they are not persons under the statute and have Eleventh Amendment immunity.

NASH v. PHILA COMMON PLEAS COURT · filed 2020-11-25

However, Defendants are state courts and are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit and are not considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against the Michigan Department of Corrections because the department is immune under the Eleventh Amendment and is not a person subject to damages liability.

Burton 495156 v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2020-12-01

Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the MDOC.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state corrections department because it is not a person under the statute.

McNeal v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections · filed 2020-12-02

Thus, the DOC is not a person capable of being sued under § 1983. As such, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the DOC are futile and cannot be cured by amendment. Therefore, these claims are dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state department of corrections because it is an arm of the state, regardless of the relief sought.

McCain v. Department of Corrections · filed 2020-12-07

Because the DOC is an arm of Washington state, it cannot be sued under Section 1983—regardless of the type of relief Plaintiff seeks.

Section 1983 does not support supervisory or municipal liability claims against a state corrections department that is an arm of the state.

Mays v. McMaster · filed 2020-12-14

Additionally, Plaintiff’s claims for supervisor liability as to Defendant SCDC fail because SCDC is an arm of the state. Accordingly, theories of municipal liability have no application here.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a state agency that is an arm of the state because the agency is not a person under the statute.

Eaton v. Eynon · filed 2020-12-15

Moreover, a governmental agency that is an arm of the state is not a person for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state, state agency, or division of a state agency because it is not a “person” under the statute.

Wilson v. Connecticut Department of Corrections · filed 2020-12-16

The court must dismiss any section 1983 claim against the DOC because the state, a state agency, or a division of a state agency is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against a state corrections department because the department is not a “person” under the statute.

Coleman 787353 v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2020-12-16

In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages.

A state agency is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Bradley v. Wisconsin Department of Children and Families · filed 2020-12-18

The Seventh Circuit and district courts have told the plaintiff that the DCF is not a suable entity under §1983 because it is an agency of the state of Wisconsin. Bradley I, 528 F. Appx. at 681 (“the Department is not a person subject to liability under § 1983.”). It was true when those courts said it. It remains true now. The court will dismiss the DCF as a defendant.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its agencies because they are not persons subject to liability under the section.

Engel v. Probation & Parole of Missouri · filed 2020-12-22

The State of Missouri, however, is not a “person” for purposes of a § 1983 action and is absolutely immune from liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages against a state agency because a state is not a person under the section.

Wilson v. Wexford Health Sources Inc. · filed 2020-12-23

Even if he had, he cannot obtain money damages against a state governmental entity such as the IDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”).

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state hospital that is part of a state agency because the hospital is not a “person” under the statute.

Rankins v. Flores · filed 2020-12-28

Therefore, the hospital is part of a state agency, and is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or its corrections agencies because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

Engel v. MODOC · filed 2020-12-28

As such, these claims must be dismissed because a state is not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “person,” and because the State of Missouri is immune from suit.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against the Virginia Department of Corrections because it is not a person subject to suit and has Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Patrick v. Newton · filed 2020-12-29

Patrick’s claim against the VDOC also fails because VDOC has Eleventh Amendment immunity from any claim for damages and is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state agencies because they are not “persons” under the statute.

CURTIS v. NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE · filed 2020-12-30

States, and state entities and officials that are considered “arms of the state,” are not “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983. ... The Court, therefore, grants Defendants’ Motion to the extent it seeks to dismiss Curtis's ... Section 1983 and NJCRA claims against the NJSP.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state or its agencies because a state is not a person under the statute.

Engel v. ERDCC · filed 2020-12-31

As such, these claims must be dismissed because a state is not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “person,” and because the State of Missouri is immune from suit.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for money damages against a state corrections department.

Echols v. IDOC · filed 2021-01-04

While Plaintiff seeks to pursue this claim against the IDOC, he cannot sue a state governmental agency for money damages.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state agency because the agency is not a “person” under the statute.

Gorokhovsky v. State Public Defender Office · filed 2021-01-05

Section 1983 allows a citizen to sue a “person” who violates his civil rights under color of state law. The State Public Defender is not a “person.” It is an arm of the state.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation because it is not a person under the statute.

Matheis v. CDCR · filed 2021-01-05

The CDCR is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983 and it is entitled to immunity from suit for monetary damages under the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for money damages against a state department or state prison because neither is a person under the statute.

Engel v. Corizon · filed 2021-01-06

Because plaintiff is missing an essential element under § 1983, the claims against MDOC and the ERDCC must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state correctional agency because the agency is not a person under the statute.

Pierce v. Youngmen · filed 2021-01-14

Based on this authority, IDOC is not a“person” within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act and shall be dismissed from this action.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state agency because it is not a “person” subject to suit.

Summitt v. Longmire · filed 2021-01-14

However, neither a State nor an arm of its government is a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

CONTE v. GOODWIN · filed 2021-01-15

States and state agencies are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 65 (1989). Thus, Plaintiff’s failure-to-train claims against NJDOC and NJSP must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a State or its arms, including state prisons and their departments.

(PC) Dumont v. CDCR Health Care Tracy · filed 2021-01-19

“Will[v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)] establishes that the State and arms of the State, which have traditionally enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity, are not subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal court or state court.” Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990). Accordingly, since the CDCR, the prison, and the departments within the prison are arms of the State, they are immune, and plaintiff fails to state any claims against them.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Plourde v. Dirigo Counseling Clinic, LLC · filed 2021-01-20

The statute does not provide for a private cause of action against a State government or against state officials. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims against the State of Maine, and D.A. Lynch and A.D.A. Burlock to the extent they are sued in their official capacities as state officials, are dismissed pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

States and state agencies are not suable persons under § 1983.

Daugherty v. The United States · filed 2021-01-20

Such entities are not suable “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Engel v. State, Missouri · filed 2021-01-21

Engel’s complaint is legally frivolous against the State of Missouri; ERDCC (a prison within the Department of Corrections); and MDOC (a department of the State of Missouri) because a state and entities of the state cannot be sued under § 1983 and because the State of Missouri is immune from suit.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Cason v. Corizon Health Services · filed 2021-01-25

The DOC is an arm of the State, and accordingly, is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state through officials sued in their official capacities because the state is not a “person” under the statute.

Engel v. Desoto City Council · filed 2021-01-25

Because a state is not a person in an official capacity claim for money damages, plaintiff is missing an essential element of a § 1983 action. Therefore, the claim must be dismissed.

States and their agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Duncan v. Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 2021-01-26

A state and its agencies are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires proof of the elements for punitive damages by a preponderance of the evidence.

Price v. Boulder Valley School District R-2 · filed 1989-11-27

In the federal courts, § 1983 claims for punitive damages require that the jury find the requisite elements only by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a governmental body.

Rockford Principals & Supervisors Ass'n v. Board of Education of Rockford School District No. 205 · filed 1989-08-22

The defendants correctly assert that punitive damages are unavailable against a governmental body in a Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against a private hospital because the reasons for shielding municipalities from such damages do not apply to private hospitals.

Fletcher v. Eagle River Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 1989-04-11

The policy reasons for not imposing punitive damages against a municipality do not exist where the defendant is a private hospital.

Punitive damages may not be recovered from a municipality under Section 1983.

Martinez v. Cordova · filed 1987-12-09

The Supreme Court has clearly stated considerations of history and policy dictate that punitive damages may not be recovered from a municipality under Section 1983.

Punitive damages are not recoverable against a municipality under Section 1983.

Bernard B. Angell, Jr. v. James A. Leslie, Jr. City of Hinton, a Municipal Corp., and Harry Keaton · filed 1987-10-27

Punitive damages are not recoverable against a municipality under 1983.

Section 1983 damages are unavailable against a private party who institutes legal proceedings unless the plaintiff proves malice, such as an ulterior motive or other sufficient evidence of wrongfulness.

United States v. Morales · filed 1978-04-12

A plaintiff must prove malice when the wrong alleged to have been committed by a private party involves the institution of legal proceedings against the plaintiff. ... In light of these authorities, a plaintiff alleging a violation of his civil rights through a wrongful invocation of legal proceedings against him must, to obtain damages, prove more than the use of an attachment procedure which, although under attack in the courts as violative of recent Supreme Court interpretations of due process, had not yet been declared invalid. The plaintiff must show some kind of ulterior motive on the part of the defendant or other evidence of wrongfulness sufficient to establish malice.

Section 1983 authorizes damages against a person acting under color of state authority who violates an individual's due process rights, including actual or nominal damages.

Hester v. Rizzo · filed 1978-04-20

With respect to the individual claims for damages, the named’plaintiffs have all sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their personal due process rights. ... Defendant Alton Patterson was acting under the color of his authority as an airport regulator when the violation occurred, and is, therefore, personally liable for whatever actual damages Mr. Hester may be able to prove. ... Additionally, in the event that plaintiff is unable to prove any actual damages, he is entitled to recover nominal damages, not to exceed the sum of one dollar.

Section 1983 allows only nominal damages when a constitutional-right violation causes no actual injury; substantial compensatory damages require proof that the violation caused actual injury.

Carey v. Piphus · filed 1978-03-21

In this case, brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, we consider the elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages by students who were suspended from public elementary and secondary schools without procedural due process. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the students are entitled to recover substantial nonpunitive damages even if their suspensions were justified, and even if they do not prove that any other actual injury was caused by the denial of procedural due process. We disagree, and hold that in the absence of proof of actual injury, the students are entitled to recover only nominal damages.

For damages under § 1983, liability is measured by the constitutional standards in existence when the alleged violation occurred, so a later-developed constitutional right cannot be applied retroactively.

Collins v. Bensinger · filed 1974-03-27

“federal courts have reached a general consensus that liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be determined by the legal standards in existence at the time of an alleged violation of constitutional rights. * * * Retroactive application of fresh precedent has no place in fixing the standard of conduct for damage suits under Section 1983.”

Section 1983 permits compensatory and punitive damages for deprivation of federally protected rights; indirect injuries are recoverable only when they are the natural consequence of the deprivation, and punitive damages require a willful, grossly rights-disregarding pattern or practice.

Urbano v. McCorkle · filed 1971-11-17

Plaintiff has based this court’s jurisdiction, inter alia, upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This section allows the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages for deprivations of federally protected rights. ... But the test to determine whether one may recover for indirect injuries is whether the indirect injury was the natural consequence of the deprivation of the right. ... This court now directs itself to the issue of punitive damages. Punitive damages should not be awarded in a § 1983. proceeding unless there is a showing that the proscribed action has been a constant pattern or practice of behavior of defendants and that such practice has been willful and in gross disregard for the rights of plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages, and a federal court may not dismiss a civil-rights action merely because the damages appear minimal.

Chubbs v. City of New York · filed 1971-01-15

Punitive damages may be awarded and federal courts have no authority to dismiss federal civil rights eases merely because the damages seem de minimus.

Section 1983 actions permit recovery of punitive damages under federal law, and state common-law damages rules may be used when they better serve federal civil-rights policies.

McDaniel v. Carroll · filed 1972-04-11

The actions in the District Court were brought under the Civil Rights Act1 against the Sheriff of Blount County, Tennessee, the Deputy Sheriff, and the surety on the Sheriff’s bond, to recover compensatory and punitive damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiffs when they were shot by the Deputy as he was endeavoring to serve an arrest warrant. ... Federal law permits the recovery of punitive damages in actions under the Civil Rights Acts. ... Furthermore, in Civil Rights cases the common law of a state may be used on the issue of damages where it better serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes. ... We find no error in the Court’s instructions to the jury on punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits recovery of punitive or exemplary damages, subject to narrow limits such as willful, malicious, bad-faith, or deterrence-related conduct.

Keker v. Procunier · filed 1975-08-08

As in initial matter, it is established law that punitive or exemplary damages are recoverable in § 1983 actions. ... Punitive damages have been held permissible where defendants have acted wilfully or in gross disregard for the rights of the parties; where the defendants acted maliciously or in bad faith or for an improper motive; or where an award is necessary to prevent future occurrences.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when aggravating circumstances show reckless indifference, ill will, intent to injure, or malice, even without actual loss.

Joe Silver, and Cross-Appellants v. Paul S. Cormier, and Cross-Appellee · filed 1976-01-30

Punitive damages are recoverable in a section 1983 action provided such aggravating circumstances are found. ... Recovery of punitive damages has been held to be permitted in actions under section 1983 even in the absence of actual loss.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages only when the defendant acted with actual knowledge that they were violating a federally protected right or with reckless disregard of that possibility.

Cochetti v. John Desmond, Walter M. Phillips, Jr. And Robert P. Kane · filed 1978-02-21

This test, requiring that the defendant acted with actual knowledge that he was violating a federally protected right or with reckless disregard of whether he was doing so, seems to us appropriate.

Section 1983 permits substantial punitive damages in appropriate cases; its civil-rights character does not preclude them.

Zarcone v. William M. Perry, James Windsor, Robert J. Anderson and Patrick Giambalvo · filed 1978-03-03

Therefore, we reject the notion that there is something inherent in civil rights cases, whether or not based on race discrimination, which precludes the award of substantial punitive damages in appropriate instances.

Section 1983 permits punitive or exemplary damages when the defendant acts willfully, maliciously, with reckless disregard of the claimant’s rights, or not in good faith.

Falkenstein v. City of Bismarck · filed 1978-08-10

It is clear, beyond dispute, that punitive or exemplary damages are available in a 1983 action where the defendant has acted wilfully, or with malice, or with reckless disregard of the rights of the complaining party, or where he has not acted in good faith.

Section 1983 provides a remedy that includes at least compensatory damages for the natural consequences of a constitutional violation.

Fact Concerts, Inc. v. City of Newport · filed 1980-06-17

This somewhat ingenuous argument ignores the fact that section 1983 provides that violators “shall be liable . . . for redress” and that the Supreme Court has construed section 1983 to comprehend, at the least, the payment of compensatory damages.

Section 1983 permits an award of punitive damages even when the plaintiff has suffered no actual loss, notwithstanding contrary state law.

Carl McCulloch and Nora Dell McCulloch Cross-Appellants v. Thomas Glasgow, Cross-Appellees · filed 1980-06-23

Punitive damages may also be awarded in a § 1983 action even without actual loss, despite local law to the contrary.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages, in the court's discretion, when a constitutional-rights violation is aggravated by actual malice, evil intent, deliberate oppression, wilful or wanton misconduct, or reckless disregard for the plaintiff's civil rights.

Rzeznik v. Chief of Police · filed 1980-07-24

Under applicable Federal law, punitive damages may be awarded in certain circumstances when the violation of an individual’s constitutional rights is aggravated by actual malice, evil intent, deliberate oppression, wilful or wanton misconduct, or a reckless disregard for the civil rights of the plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits exemplary or punitive damages to deter or punish constitutional-rights violations in a proper case, including when aggravating circumstances or malicious intent are shown.

Endicott v. Huddleston · filed 1980-09-25

In the proper case under § 1983, exemplary or punitive damages may be awarded with the specific purpose of deterring or punishing violations of constitutional rights. ... These damages may be available even in the absence of actual loss to the plaintiff. ... This court has required the showing of aggravating circumstances or malicious intent in order to justify the recovery of punitive damages. ... Viewing the entire record in the light most favorable to Endicott, we agree with the district court that there was simply no evidence of aggravating circumstances or malicious intent in the initial denial of due process from which a jury could award punitive damages.

In a § 1983 suit brought in a state court, punitive or exemplary damages may not be awarded.

Ricard v. State · filed 1980-11-10

In sum, we conclude, as did the courts below, that punitive or exemplary damages may not be awarded in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in our state courts.

Section 1983 authorizes punitive damages when the factfinder finds that defendants acted with actual knowledge that they were violating a federally protected right or with reckless disregard of whether they were doing so.

Scott v. Plante · filed 1981-02-05

The admonitory standard requires that the factfinder determine that the defendants “acted with actual knowledge that he was violating a federally protected right or with reckless disregard of whether he was doing so.... ”

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when the factfinder determines that defendants acted with actual knowledge that they were violating a federally protected right or with reckless disregard of whether they were doing so.

Scott v. Plante · filed 1981-03-09

In addition, we must be mindful of the legal standards governing the award of punitive damages in § 1983 actions. The award of punitive damages is authorized by that aspect of the law of torts having to do with admonition rather than compensation. Such an award punishes wrongdoing beyond the requirements of compensation both as a discouragement of private retribution and as a deterrent against future misconduct. The admonitory standard requires that the factfinder determine that the defendants "acted with actual knowledge that he was violating a federally protected right or with reckless disregard of whether he was doing so...." Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1978).

Section 1983 makes a municipality immune from punitive damages.

City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. · filed 1981-06-26

In sum, we find that considerations of history and policy do not support exposing a municipality to punitive damages for the bad-faith actions of its officials. Because absolute immunity from such damages obtained at common law and was undisturbed by the 42d Congress, and because that immunity is compatible with both the purposes of § 1983 and general.principles of public policy, we hold that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an award of punitive damages even when the state law governing the violation would not ordinarily permit recovery.

John Joseph Garrick, Jr. v. City and County of Denver Manager of Safety, Daniel P. Cronin Chief of Police, Arthur G. Dil · filed 1981-06-29

Punitive damages may be awarded under section 1983 even where they would not normally be recoverable under the local law in the state where the violation occurred.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when an official's reckless and callous disregard of known dangers supports a finding of malice.

Wade v. Haynes · filed 1981-11-09

Generally, punitive damages are available in section 1983 actions where there are aggravated circumstances. ... Thus we conclude a finding of malice may be found from an official's reckless and callous disregard of known dangers.

Section 1983’s deterrence purpose prevents a state survivorship rule from denying punitive damages.

Larson v. Wind · filed 1982-05-13

Section 1983’s purpose of deterrence would be subverted by slavish application of a state survivorship rule denying punitive damages.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking compensatory damages must prove that the constitutional deprivation caused actual injury, not merely that a constitutional violation occurred.

Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. T. Coughlin, Iii, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees · filed 1983-01-06

It is well established that to collect compensatory damages in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove more than a mere violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a jury to assess punitive damages when the defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights, even if compensatory liability rests on recklessness.

Smith v. Wade · filed 1983-04-20

We hold that a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others. We further hold that this threshold applies even when the underlying standard of liability for compensatory damages is one of recklessness.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive or exemplary damages in an action brought in a Louisiana state court.

Williams v. McNeil · filed 1983-05-16

The court determined that state law, specifically La. C.C. art. 1934(3), was the correct standard to be applied in an award of damages in a § 1983 action filed in state court. The court decreed that punitive or exemplary damages may not be awarded in such a suit. ... Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court as to the award of punitive damages.

Punitive-damages liability and the amount of punitive damages in a § 1983 action must be determined separately for each defendant.

McFADDEN v. SANCHEZ · filed 1983-06-14

Because we conclude that in section 1983 actions liability for punitive damages and their amount must be determined on an individual basis, we vacate the award of punitive damages and remand for a new trial limited to punitive damages.

Punitive damages are available in a § 1983 action when the defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Clark v. Taylor · filed 1983-06-17

Punitive damages in a section 1983 suit are appropriate where there is evidence that the defendants’ conduct is motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.

A Section 1983 plaintiff seeking punitive damages for deprivation of a reputational liberty interest must establish every element of the underlying liberty-deprivation claim and show malicious conduct.

Wells v. Jack v. Doland · filed 1983-08-08

Moreover, to recover punitive damages, Wells must establish all other elements of his liberty interest claim in addition to showing that the individual defendants made the charges maliciously.

A school board is immune from punitive damages under Section 1983 because the municipal-immunity rationale applies equally to school boards.

Okeson v. Tolley School Dist. No. 25 · filed 1983-08-11

It is this Court's opinion that the rationale of Fact Concerts applies equally to school boards. Therefore, on the Court's own motion, Tolley School District No. 25 is hereby granted summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages.

A municipality remains immune from punitive damages under Section 1983 when taxpayers were not directly responsible for the alleged constitutional violation.

Wade v. Cicero, Illinois · filed 1983-08-11

While we do not wish to denigrate the seriousness of the constitutional violation alleged by plaintiff, this case is not one “where the taxpayers are directly responsible” for perpetrating the constitutional violation.

A school board is immune from punitive damages under Section 1983 because the municipal-immunity rationale applies equally to school boards.

Okeson v. Tolley School District No. 25 · filed 1983-08-11

The United States Supreme Court recently held that municipalities are immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Therefore, on the Court’s own motion, Tolley School District No. 25 is hereby granted summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages.

Reckless conduct is sufficient to support punitive damages against a Section 1983 defendant; intentional conduct is not required.

Grimm v. Q v. Leinart and Ernest Phillips · filed 1983-09-23

The Supreme Court expressly stated in Wade that it is unnecessary that a § 1983 defendant act intentionally. A showing of reckless conduct is sufficient to support an award of punitive damages.

Section 1983 does not permit an additional general-damages award for injury to civil rights when the plaintiff’s actual losses and suffering have already been compensated; only nominal damages remain available for that item.

Crawford v. Garnier · filed 1983-09-26

In these circumstances, on the basis of ... Kincaid ... we hold that plaintiff was not entitled to an additional award of $10,000 for “injury to [his] civil rights.” That award should be reduced to $1.00.

Punitive damages are available in an appropriate Section 1983 case.

Otis Merritt, Jr. v. Lt. Alfredo De Los Santos · filed 1983-11-17

Punitive damages are recoverable in a § 1983 suit in an appropriate case.

A municipality is not liable for punitive damages in a § 1983 action.

Korotki v. Goughan · filed 1984-09-28

Thus, plaintiffs state-based claims for punitive damages against defendant Town of Fenwick Island, ... as well as plaintiffs § 1983 claims for such damages against that defendant, may not prevail. Accordingly, the motion of defendant Town of Fenwick Island to strike the jury’s $100,000 award against it will be granted.

Punitive damages may be awarded under § 1983 in appropriate circumstances, but the decision is entrusted to the factfinder’s discretion.

Dillon v. Coles · filed 1984-10-29

Punitive damages under section 1983 may be awarded in appropriate circumstances. The matter, however, is one entrusted to the discretion of the fact finder. ... Plaintiff has failed to show an abuse of discretion by the trial court, and we reject her challenge to the denial of punitive damages.

A plaintiff whose property was unconstitutionally taken and whose § 1983 liability judgment was affirmed is entitled to damages, leaving only their amount for determination.

Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove · filed 1984-11-12

We find it hard to believe that a court which expressly found that plaintiffs’ property had been taken unconstitutionally, ... somehow failed to decide whether or not plaintiffs were entitled to damages under § 1983. The only question remaining on remand was the ... of damages sustained by the plaintiffs.

A plaintiff whose property was unconstitutionally taken and whose § 1983 liability judgment was affirmed is entitled to damages, leaving only their amount for determination.

Wheeler v. City Of Pleasant Grove · filed 1984-11-13

We find it hard to believe that a court which expressly found that plaintiffs' property had been taken unconstitutionally, which expressly reversed that segment of the district court's opinion "dealing with the plaintiff's [sic] claim for damages," id. at 100, and which expressly remanded the case "for a determination of damages sustained by the plaintiffs," id. at 106, somehow failed to decide whether or not plaintiffs were entitled to damages under Sec. 1983. The only question remaining on remand was the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiffs.

Punitive damages are recoverable in a Section 1983 action.

Webb v. Arresting Officers · filed 1984-12-04

There is no longer any doubt about the propriety of punitive damage awards in Sec. 1983 actions; they are recoverable.

Punitive damages against an individual under Section 1983 require malice, reckless disregard for, or callous indifference to the plaintiff's rights.

Blessing v. County of Lancaster · filed 1985-01-10

With respect to the assessment of punitive damages against defendant Reedy individually, pursuant to § 1983, defendants argue correctly that plaintiff must show either malice, reckless disregard for, or callous indifference to plaintiffs rights.

Punitive damages may be awarded under § 1983 when the defendant acted with evil intent or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Jeffrey Young, Cross-Appellee v. City of New Orleans v. Howard Martin, Keith Perniciaro and Judy Dowdell, Cross · filed 1985-02-01

A jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.

The Trust Territory government is immune from punitive damages under Section 1983 for the same policy reasons that protect municipalities.

Temengil v. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands · filed 1985-02-04

The concerns expressed by the Court regarding the punitive effect on the blameless citizenry, the questionable deterrence value and the threat to tne financial integrity of government bodies are applicable as well to the Trust Territory.

Section 1983 permits a public school teacher to recover compensatory damages for financial loss, emotional distress, community humiliation, and reputational injury caused by infringement of protected speech.

Knapp v. Whitaker · filed 1985-03-05

A public school teacher may recover compensatory damages, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for out-of-pocket expenses, mental and emotional distress, community humiliation, and loss of professional reputation caused by the infringement of his constitutionally protected speech.

Compensatory damages under § 1983 may include out-of-pocket losses, mental and emotional distress, community humiliation, and loss of professional reputation caused by infringement of protected speech.

Knapp v. Whitaker · filed 1985-04-02

A public school teacher may recover compensatory damages, under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, for out-of-pocket expenses, mental and emotional distress, community humiliation, and loss of professional reputation caused by the infringement of his constitutionally protected speech.

Punitive damages may be awarded under Section 1983 for reckless or callous indifference even when recklessness is also the standard for liability on the underlying claim.

Thomas v. Booker · filed 1985-08-07

Additionally, because the reckless or callous indifference threshold for awarding punitive damages applies even where the standard of liability on the underlying claim is one of recklessness, ... the jury could award punitive damages if, by exercising its "discretionary moral judgment," it determined that Booker's conduct called for "deterrence and punishment over and above that provided by compensatory awards." ... The issue of punitive damages thus was properly submitted to the jury.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim supports only nominal damages unless the plaintiff proves actual injury caused by denial of the procedural right.

Robinson v. Palmer · filed 1985-08-08

In their § 1983 claim, plaintiffs seek damages as well as equitable relief. ... The weight of authority as to damages suggests that for denial of procedural due process, the plaintiffs are entitled only to nominal damages absent a showing of actual injury resulting from denial of ... rights.

Punitive damages under Section 1983 require proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted with ill will or reckless indifference to federally protected rights.

Hopkins v. City of Wilmington · filed 1985-08-20

Punitive damages are recoverable only upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted with ill will or reckless indifference to another’s federally protected rights.

A plaintiff seeking compensatory damages under § 1983 for a procedural due process violation must prove that the violation caused the claimed injury or deprivation.

Graham v. Jack Baughman, Former Warden, Iowa State Penitentiary Harold Farrier George Potts John Sanders and Co · filed 1985-10-09

In order for a plaintiff in a § 1983 action to be entitled to compensatory damages for a violation of procedural due process, he must prove that the violation actually was the cause of his injury or deprivation.

Punitive damages are available under § 1983 when the defendant acted with gross negligence, intent, or malice.

Thomas Lewis, Cross-Appellants v. J.D. Downs and V.W. Geil, Cross-Appellees · filed 1985-10-09

Punitive damages are available under Section 1983 if the defendant’s conduct is grossly negligent, intentional, or malicious.

Punitive damages may be assessed in a Section 1983 action when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Thomas v. Booker · filed 1986-02-14

Similarly, "a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under Sec. 1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others."

When punitive damages are sought in a Section 1983 action, the ultimate source of payment is relevant to assessing the award.

Perrin v. Anderson · filed 1986-02-27

Here, however, punitive damages were requested; the ultimate source of payment therefore is relevant.

When punitive damages are sought in a Section 1983 action, the ultimate source of payment is relevant to assessing the award.

Perrin v. Anderson · filed 1986-02-27

The jury must know the impact an award will have on the defendant to properly assess punitive damages.

Section 1983 authorizes compensatory damages for proven emotional and mental distress caused by a constitutional deprivation.

Agosto v. Roque · filed 1986-03-19

If proven, compensatory damages are available under Section 1983 for emotional and mental distress.

Punitive damages under Section 1983 require evil motive or intent, or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Cornelius v. La Croix · filed 1986-04-03

Punitive damages may be assessed in a § 1983 action “when the defendant’s con ... duct is shown to be motivated by evil force or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifflrence to the federally protected rights of others.”

Punitive damages in a § 1983 action are governed by federal rather than state law.

Kemp v. Ervin · filed 1986-04-22

At the outset it must be pointed out that all issues in this case, including punitive damages, are governed by the applicable principles of federal law rather than state law.

Federal damages standards govern Section 1983, permitting punitive damages even when state law would not ordinarily allow them.

Gordon v. Doug Norman, Harold Prows, Ken Martin (85-5175), and J. Anderson (85-5186) · filed 1986-04-23

Federal standards govern the determination of damages under the civil rights statutes. ... Thus, punitive damages may be awarded under § 1983 even where they would not normally be recoverable under the local law in the state where the violation occurred.

Section 1983 does not preempt Oregon’s statutory prohibition on punitive damages in state-court actions against public employees for torts committed in their duties.

Nelson v. Lane County · filed 1986-06-11

We find no basis for concluding that Congress intended section 1983 to preempt the Oregon statutory direction that its courts not award punitive damages in actions against its employes for torts committed in the performance of their duties.

Section 1983 damages may compensate a particular injury caused by denial of a constitutional right but may not be based on the right's abstract value or importance.

City Of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council · filed 1986-07-18

In Stachura, the Court held that a section 1983 plaintiff could not recover damages based upon the "abstract 'value' or 'importance' of constitutional rights." ... The Court did not limit compensatory damages, however, even in cases where the monetary value of the particular injury is difficult to ascertain. ... Judge Baker's order makes it clear that he was awarding IPAC damages because Watseka "prevented [IPAC] from exercising its First Amendment rights in this case;" he did not base the award on any abstract value of the constitutional right.

Punitive damages may be submitted to the jury in a Section 1983 action upon evidence of reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff’s rights or an intentional violation of federal law.

Wren v. W. Nyles Spurlock, Hugh Simmons and Carbon County School District Number One · filed 1986-08-11

Punitive damages are available in § 1983 actions, and evidence of “reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff’s rights, as well as intentional violations of federal law, should be sufficient to trigger a jury’s consideration of the appropriateness” of such an award.

Section 1983 compensatory damages must compensate actual injury caused by the constitutional deprivation; damages based only on a constitutional right’s abstract value or importance are impermissible.

City of Riviera Beach v. Fitzgerald · filed 1986-08-27

We therefore hold that damages based on the abstract "value" or "importance" of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in such cases.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Biver v. Saginaw Township Community Schools, Board of Education for the Saginaw Township Community Schools, Ronal · filed 1986-10-27

In Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983), the Supreme Court stated: "a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under Sec. 1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." While there was no evidence to support a conclusion that appellant's acted with "evil motive or intent," a jury question was presented as to the "reckless or callous indifference" of Stelter and Hinkin with respect to Biver's right to be free of discrimination on the basis of sex. Cf. Burkhart v. Randles, 764 F.2d 1196, 1201-02 (6th Cir.1985). Therefore, we hold no error occurred in allowing jury consideration of the punitive damage issue.

Section 1983 permits both compensatory and punitive damages upon proper proof, governed by principles derived from the common law.

Cunningham v. City of Overland · filed 1986-11-14

In a section 1983 action, both compensatory and punitive damages are available upon proper proof. Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986). The principles governing the propriety of compensatory and punitive damages under section 1983 are derived from the common law.

A Section 1983 plaintiff may recover damages for violation of a substantive constitutional right that caused specific pain and suffering even without permanent injury.

Burris v. Kirkpatrick · filed 1986-12-11

An examination of the foregoing authorities convinces this court that even in the absence of permanent injuries, this plaintiff is entitled to damages for the mere act of violating substantial constitutional rights which did cause him specific personal pain and suffering.

Punitive damages are available under Section 1983 when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Gierbolini Colon v. Roque · filed 1987-06-11

Punitive damages are available under section 1983 when the defendants’ conduct is shown to have been motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.

Punitive damages under § 1983 may be imposed on individual defendants, but municipalities are immune from punitive-damages liability.

Voorhees v. Shull · filed 1987-10-13

Only individual defendants are liable for punitive damages under § 1983; municipalities are immune from such liability.

Section 1983 does not permit compensatory damages based solely on the abstract value or importance of a constitutional right.

Case v. Calvin Smith, Rebecca Hackney, Robert Martin, the Board of Supervisors, William K. Stovall, Richard-R · filed 1987-10-16

However, the abstract value of constitutional rights is not a permissible element of damages in a Sec. 1983 case.

Oregon courts may apply the Oregon Tort Claims Act's prohibition on punitive damages and $100,000 compensatory-damages cap to § 1983 claims brought under that act.

Rogers v. Saylor · filed 1987-12-09

“basis for concluding that Congress intended section 1983 to preempt the Oregon statutory direction that its courts not award punitive damages in actions against its employes.” ... However, we conclude now that our holding and our reasoning in ... were correct, and we adhere to them. Plaintiff may not recover punitive damages. Our reasoning in ... applies equally to plaintiffs quest for compensatory damages in excess of the limits established by ORS 30.270, and the trial court correctly ruled that he is not entitled to seek damages exceeding $100,000.

Substantial § 1983 compensatory damages must be proportional to actual injury, while nominal damages are available for any § 1983 violation.

Piver v. Pender County Board Of Education · filed 1987-12-22

However, an award of substantial compensatory damages, as opposed to nominal damages, must be proportional to the actual injury incurred. Nominal damages may be awarded for any Sec. 1983 violation.

Punitive damages under § 1983 are available for conduct motivated by evil intent or involving reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Sepulveda v. Purcell · filed 1988-01-12

Punitive damages are available under section 1983 when the defendants’ conduct is shown to have been motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.

Punitive damages in a Section 1983 action require intentional or reckless conduct marked by evil motive, ill will, spitefulness, harshness, or callous disregard.

Odato v. Vargo · filed 1988-01-25

However, since it was the jury’s function to resolve the credibility issues, we are required to determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, established intentional or reckless conduct with evil motive, ill-will, spitefulness, harshness, or callous disregard, which must be the basis for an award of punitive damages.

In a Section 1983 Eighth Amendment case, the deliberate-indifference or reckless-disregard culpability required for liability also satisfies the punitive-damages standard.

Walsh v. Nicholas Mellas and Harry Martin · filed 1988-01-21

Because this case involves the Eighth Amendment, the level of culpability required for a liability finding is the same as the punitive damage standard: both require a determination that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference or reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s right to security.

Punitive damages may be awarded under Section 1983 to deter or punish constitutional violations when the defendant maliciously intended to deprive the plaintiff of rights.

Baez v. Rapping · filed 1988-02-10

However, “[t]his is not to say that exemplary or punitive damages might not be awarded in a proper case under § 1983 with the specific purpose of deterring or punishing violations of constitutional rights” or “when there is a malicious intention to deprive [plaintiffs] of their rights.”

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights.

Joseph Martin and Mamie Martin v. Harris · filed 1988-03-17

Defendant's first contention, that there was insufficient evidence to permit submission of punitive damages to the jury, is not well taken. A jury may assess punitive damages in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 when a defendant's conduct is shown to involve reckless or callous indifference to the federally-protected rights of the plaintiff. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Plaintiff's testimony that defendant charged up the steps, banged on the side of the house, entered the house without identifying himself or stating his purpose, searched a bedroom, and then cocked his rifle and pointed it at plaintiff, was sufficient to support punitive damages.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities or municipal agencies.

Friedman v. New York City Department of Housing & Development Administration · filed 1988-06-08

Because punitive damages in actions under Section 1983 are available against neither municipalities, ... nor municipal agencies, ... the proposed amendment seeking such damages would be futile.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages only when the defendant acted with at least reckless or callous disregard for federally protected rights.

Reutcke v. Dahm · filed 1988-06-15

For that reason, in order for the plaintiff to be entitled to punitive damages under § 1983, at a minimum he must demonstrate that the conduct of the defendant involved a “reckless or callous disregard” for his federally protected rights.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages in appropriate circumstances, but the plaintiff must plead facts supporting an inference of the required motive.

Luckett v. City of Harrisonburg School Board · filed 1988-08-05

Under certain circumstances, punitive damages in a § 1983 action can be recovered by a plaintiff. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983). The plaintiff and the defendants both agree with the Wade decision. However, the plaintiff must not merely make allegations of certain type conduct by the defendants but must plead with reasonable certainty the facts which, if proven, would allow an inference of the motives necessary to award punitive damages in accordance with Kamlar Corp. v. Haley, 224 Va. 699, 706 (1983). The allegations in the plaintiff’s bill of complaint are insufficient as a matter of law to survive the defendants’ demurrer.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against individual officers who violate constitutional rights.

Valliere v. Kaplan · filed 1988-09-08

The Court thus plainly suggested that punitive damages are available against defendants such as the Unknown Officers and Officer Perciabosco.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipal officials sued in their official capacities.

Walsh v. City of Chicago · filed 1988-09-30

For this reason, Walsh cannot claim punitive damages from Rice and Zaleski in their official capacities under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for reckless or callous disregard of a plaintiff’s rights or intentional violations of federal law.

Gutzwiller v. Fenik · filed 1988-11-01

The Supreme Court addressed the issue of punitive damages in section 1983 actions in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). In that case, the Court concluded that punitive damages are appropriately considered by the jury when there has been "reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff's rights, as well as intentional violations of federal law...." Id. at 51, 103 S.Ct. at 1638. ... In this case, the jury's finding that Fenik and Cohen acted recklessly and with callous disregard for Gutzwiller's rights is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the district court's decision setting aside the punitive damages award as to Fenik and Cohen is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court with directions to reinstate the jury's award.

A municipality is immune from punitive damages under Section 1983.

Estate of Callahan v. City of Detroit · filed 1988-11-16

This argument is patently frivolous because the Supreme Court clearly held in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when the defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Johansen v. City of Bartlesville, Oklahoma · filed 1988-12-09

It is permissible "to assess punitive damages in an action under Sec. 1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). ... We are satisfied that no viable federal claim for punitive damages under Sec. 1983 is stated and therefore uphold the dismissal as to that claim.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when the defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Johansen v. City of Bartlesville · filed 1988-12-09

It is permissible “to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983).

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with reckless indifference to others’ rights.

Carrie Melear and Willie Stewart v. Wayne Spears, Etc., Ron Averitt, Etc. · filed 1989-01-12

Based on the evidence in the record, a reasonable jury could have properly assessed punitive damages by finding that Avirett was recklessly indifferent to the rights of Stewart and Melear.

Section 1983 compensatory damages address actual injuries caused by a constitutional deprivation; a state wrongful death measure need not govern recovery for the decedent’s injuries.

Gilmere v. City of Atlanta · filed 1989-01-30

The focus of any award of damages under § 1983 is to compensate for the actual injuries caused by the particular constitutional deprivation. ... For the above-stated reasons, we hold that the district court did not err in refusing to award the state wrongful death measure of damages to compensate for the violation of the decedent’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not allow compensatory damages based solely on the abstract value of a constitutional right without proof of actual injury.

Bacon v. Bradley-Bourbonnais High School District No. 307 · filed 1989-02-10

Because Stachura precludes awards of compensatory damages for abstract deprivations of constitutional rights, Bacon is not entitled to recover compensatory damages for the deprivation of his First Amendment right to free speech.

Section 1983 ordinarily provides compensatory damages as the remedy for a violation.

Hohe v. Casey · filed 1989-02-16

We observe that the standard remedy for violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is compensatory damages.

Section 1983 ordinarily provides compensatory damages as the remedy for a violation.

Hohe v. Casey · filed 1989-02-16

We observe that the standard remedy for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is compensatory damages.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for mental and emotional distress caused by a denial of procedural due process.

Crump v. Board of Education · filed 1989-03-21

Mental and emotional distress caused by a denial of procedural due process is compensable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when the defendant acts with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Tammy Brown v. Pamela Joy Byer, (Officer)--Euless, Bob Bracken, Jesse E. Carter, and Don Byrd · filed 1989-04-24

Punitive damages are available in section 1983 actions when the defendant’s conduct “involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983).

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a local governmental entity.

Lewandowski v. Two Rivers Public School District · filed 1989-04-25

It is true that punitive damages are not available from a local governmental entity sued pursuant to section 1983.

Punitive damages under § 1983 are unavailable for a political discharge when the legality of the policy was uncertain and there is no evidence that the defendant intended to discharge employees in violation of their First Amendment rights.

Marin-Piazza v. Aponte-Roque · filed 1989-04-26

Where the legal status of a program with substantial legitimate policy objectives is as sufficiently cloudy as that presented here, punitive damages are not permissible absent evidence that the defendant actually intended to bring about the discharge of current employees in violation of their First Amendment rights.

Punitive damages under § 1983 require reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights.

Charron v. Medium SEC. Inst. · filed 1989-04-28

Punitive damages may be awarded in § 1983 actions when a defendant's conduct involves reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiff's federal protected rights. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35, 51, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1629, 1637, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). The record does not disclose defendants' conduct here involved reckless or callous indifference to plaintiff's federally protected rights.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Ismail v. Cohen · filed 1989-05-03

Punitive damages are permitted when the defendant’s conduct was “motivated by evil motive or intent, or ... reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

Section 1983 requires a claimant who seeks a punitive monetary remedy to satisfy the standards for punitive damages, even if the claimant calls the remedy restitution.

Gilpin v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Afl-Cio · filed 1989-05-24

The constitutional violation was a technical one at worst, and a punitive remedy is not called for. What the plaintiffs call restitution we call punitive damages, and the Supreme Court has set forth standards for the award of punitive damages in civil rights cases that the plaintiffs have not attempted to satisfy.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for conduct that is at least reckless or callous; an evil motive or intentional misconduct is not required.

Savarese v. Agriss · filed 1989-08-31

Thus, for a plaintiff in a section 1983 case to qualify for a punitive award, the defendant’s conduct must be, at a minimum, reckless or callous. Punitive damages might also be allowed if the conduct is intentional or motivated by evil motive, but the defendant’s action need not necessarily meet this higher standard.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages only for actual injury caused by a constitutional violation, not for the abstract importance of the right.

Wilder v. Tanouye · filed 1989-09-22

Since damages based on the abstract importance of First Amendment rights arc not awardablc in a section 1983 suit, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the claim for compensator}' damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with at least reckless or callous disregard of protected rights; intentional or evil conduct is not required.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit · filed 1989-09-29

Thus, for a plaintiff in a section 1983 case to qualify for a punitive award, the defendant's conduct must be, at a minimum, reckless or callous. Punitive damages might also be allowed if the conduct is intentional or motivated by evil motive, but the defendant's action need not necessarily meet this higher standard.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for physical and psychological suffering and deprivations of liberty or property caused by a constitutional violation.

Patterson v. Coughlin · filed 1989-10-17

Compensatory damages under § 1983 “may include amounts for a plaintiff’s physical and pyschic suffering, as well as amounts for deprivations of property and liberty.”

Section 1983 punitive damages are unavailable in Louisiana state courts under binding Louisiana Supreme Court precedent.

Moresi v. STATE, DEPT. OF WILDLIFE & FISHERIES · filed 1989-11-15

The issue of whether punitive damages may be awarded in a suit brought under 41 U.S.C. § 1983, in the Louisiana State Courts, was directly addressed by our Louisiana Supreme Court in Ricard v. State, 390 So.2d 882 (La.1980). In that case the Court clearly ruled that such damages are not allowable under our law. Absent legislative or judicial overturning of this decision, we are bound by it. Therefore, the award of punitive damages by the trial court is overturned.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Moody v. Ferguson · filed 1989-11-20

Punitive damages may be awarded under section 1983 if a defendant’s conduct “is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” ... The Court finds that both constitutional deprivations here warrant an award of punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages upon a showing of reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff’s rights or an intentional violation of federal law.

Boylan v. Samuel A. Lewis, Director at Adoc John Doe Jane Doe, Accountant/bookkeeper at Adoc, Alhambra Recept · filed 1989-12-13

A claim for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a showing of "reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff's rights, as well as intentional violations of federal law". Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983); Roberts v. College of the Desert, 870 F.2d 1411, 1417 (CA9 1988). Here, the appellant has neither alleged nor shown that the appellees' administrative act of freezing his prison account following his escape from prison rose to such a level of misconduct.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for emotional distress and humiliation.

International Insurance Co. v. Allied Van Lines, Inc. · filed 1997-11-17

A section 1983 action, unlike an action brought under the ADEA, permits recovery of compensatory damages for emotional distress, humiliation and the like.

In Colorado courts, a plaintiff seeking punitive damages in a Section 1983 action must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the reckless conduct.

Boulder Valley School District R-2 v. Price · filed 1991-01-28

Thus, the state law standard requiring that the plaintiff prove that the defendant committed the reckless conduct “beyond a reasonable doubt” is not inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a municipality.

Loria v. Town of Irondequoit · filed 1990-10-19

It is by now well settled that a municipality cannot be held liable for punitive damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against individual defendants but not municipalities.

Uryevick v. Rozzi · filed 1990-10-01

However, only individual defendants are liable for punitive damages under Section 1983; municipalities are immune from such liability.

The Oregon Tort Claims Act does not bar punitive damages on a § 1983 claim.

Shockey v. City of Portland · filed 1990-01-17

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in. striking his request for attorney fees under § 1988 and in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on his claim for punitive damages under § 1983. The trial court based those rulings on its determination that such damages are prohibited by the Oregon Tort Claims Act (OTCA). Under Rogers v. Saylor, 306 Or 267, 760 P2d 232 (1988), and our opinion in the same case, 88 Or App 480, 746 P2d 718 (1987), both rulings were in error.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for actual harm proximately caused by a deprivation of due process.

Jacobsen v. Petersen · filed 1990-01-19

Plaintiff is entitled to recover compensatory damages against defendants for actual damages sustained by him as a proximate result of the deprivation of due process.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for therapy and emotional distress within the court’s discretion.

Jones v. Rivers · filed 1990-01-31

As correctly pointed out by plaintiff, compensatory damages for therapy and emotional distress are appropriate in the § 1983 context, and within the Court’s discretion.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages only when the defendant was motivated by an evil motive or intent.

Hanna v. County of Wood · filed 1990-02-06

Punitive damages are available under Sec. 1983 only when the defendant was motivated by an evil motive or intent.

Section 1983 does not bar a municipality from paying punitive damages awarded against its employees or entitle a successful plaintiff to insist that the employees pay instead.

Fetus Cornwell, and Brenda Cornwell v. City of Riverside, and Carmen Andrade Gary Crawford Benjamin Reiser Jackie Bell R · filed 1990-02-15

This appeal from an order of the district court staying the collection of damages in a civil rights case presents a new question of law: Can a plaintiff successful in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and awarded punitive damages by the jury compel their payment to be made by the individual defendants rather than by the city that employed them? We agree with the district court that there is no federal prohibition against the city paying the punitive damages.