42 U.S.C. § 1983

Local legislators are entitled to legislative immunity from damages claims under § 1983.

Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County · filed 1991-02-07

Local legislators are entitled to legislative immunity in this Circuit. ... Nevertheless, in the present case, none of the plaintiffs' counts ask for an injunction against an individual Board member. ... We AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of the claims against the Board members in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 affords local legislators immunity from individual-capacity damages for legislative acts, even when discriminatory intent is alleged.

M. Riemer Calhoun, Jr. v. St. Bernard Parish, Randolph T. Odinet · filed 1991-08-01

The Police Jurors of St. Bernard Parish are entitled to a legislative immunity against damages in their individual capacities. This holds true regardless of the allegations of discriminatory intent.

Local legislators have legislative immunity from personal-capacity § 1983 suits for declining to introduce legislation to reassign a commissioner’s duties.

Sharon Yeldell and Karan J. Cremer v. Cooper Green Hospital · filed 1992-03-30

Thus, we hold that the decision of Commissioners Gunter, Katopodis, McNair, and Orange not to introduce a piece of legislation seeking a reshuffling of commission assignments is legislative activity protected by the doctrine of legislative immunity.

Section 1983 affords local legislators absolute immunity from damages for acts within their legislative duties, including a generally applicable zoning moratorium, regardless of bad faith or conspiracy.

Brown v. Crawford County · filed 1992-05-20

By enacting the subject resolution placing a temporary moratorium of general application on issuing mobile home permits for a specified area of Crawford County until a revised zoning development plan could be reviewed, the individual county commissioners were performing a traditional legislative function. Even if Brown could prove conspiracy or bad faith, an unworthy purpose does not preclude absolute immunity to legislators acting in their legislative capacity.

Local legislators are absolutely immune from individual § 1983 suits for voting on and adopting ordinances in their legislative capacity when they have no enforcement or administrative role.

West Virginia Pride, Inc. v. Wood County, W. Va. · filed 1993-01-14

The discretionary voting for and adoption of county ordinances represents the classic case for the interposition of the absolute immunity defense. Since Plaintiffs have failed to show that the Commission will exercise any enforcement or administrative powers in relation to the Ordinance, the Court concludes that Defendants Grapes, Grimm, and Shaver as individuals should be dismissed from this action.

Local legislators have absolute legislative immunity from Section 1983 claims for rezoning and construction moratorium ordinances, but not for denying a specific site plan.

Herman Corn, Cross-Appellee v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, Cross-Appellant · filed 1993-08-13

Therefore, the City Council members are absolutely immune from Corn's remaining claim, insofar as that claim attempts to impose liability because of any actions the Council members took in connection with the rezoning and construction moratorium ordinances. The same is not true concerning their actions relating to denial of the site plan.

Local legislators have absolute immunity from individual-capacity claims under Section 1983 for voting to abolish municipal positions through a budget resolution, even when political patronage is alleged.

Orange v. County of Suffolk · filed 1993-09-13

This Court finds that the act of voting for Resolution No. 53-1992 by the legislature defendants was a purely legislative function, and therefore absolutely immune from attack in a § 1983 action. ... Plaintiffs’ claims that the resolution did not achieve the projected savings and that political patronage was the underlying factor behind the resolution are insufficient to deprive the legislator defendants of absolute legislative immunity.

Local legislators have absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages for substantively and procedurally legislative rezoning, even when the ordinance affects only one property.

Acierno v. Cloutier · filed 1994-10-18

However, we did not intend this consideration as a bright-line rule which automatically overrides other important indications that an action is substantively legislative in character. ... In sum, we conclude that the members of the County Council are entitled to absolute legislative immunity for rezoning Acierno's property through the enactment of Substitute 1 to Ordinance 92-119 because that action was substantively and procedurally legislative in character.

Local legislators lack legislative immunity from § 1983 claims when they apply existing law to decide which specific bidder receives a public contract.

Lacorte v. Hudacs · filed 1995-04-19

While the initial decisions to undertake the airport project and to adopt certain contract specifications may properly be characterized as flowing from legislative decision-making and actions, adoption of the resolution denying the contract to these alleged low-bidders is more properly characterized as an administrative act. ... For all the foregoing reasons the Court finds that the defense of legislative immunity to plaintiffs’ allegations is unavailable to defendants Meyer and Commisso.

Local legislators have absolute immunity from a § 1983 suit for prospective policy decisions made in their legislative capacity, including immunity from defending the suit.

Suhre v. Board of Commissioners · filed 1995-06-28

Because the commissioners acted in their legislative capacity when they proclaimed the continued presence of the commandments, they are absolutely immune not just from liability but from defense of this suit.

Local legislators are not absolutely immune from § 1983 claims for administrative acts such as approving an offer to purchase property.

Chicago Miracle Temple Church, Inc. v. Fox · filed 1995-09-26

Accordingly, we conclude that the individual defendants’ actions in approving the purchase offer were administrative, not legislative, in nature and therefore the defendants are not entitled to absolute legislative immunity.

Local legislators are absolutely immune from individual-capacity § 1983 liability for legislative acts.

Kaczmarek v. Conroy · filed 1995-12-07

Based on the principles enunciated in these holdings, we conclude that local legislators are entitled to absolute legislative immunity within the Second Circuit for legislative acts done in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 provides local government directors absolute immunity for legislative acts but only qualified immunity for executive acts such as enforcement.

Lockary v. Kayfetz · filed 1984-01-20

Although its individual directors are absolutely immune from liability concerning their legislative acts, they enjoy only qualified immunity with respect to any executive activity in which they engaged, such as enforcement.

Section 1983 permits state-law immunity for local officials sued individually when the municipality remains liable for the same conduct.

Germann v. Stephens · filed 2006-06-13

Affording immunity from Germann’s federal claims to the Council Member’s under § 2-9-305(5), MCA, would not thwart the objectives of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity suits against local legislators, while legislative immunity shields them from individual liability for legislative activities.

Smith v. Cnty · filed 2008-11-24

Although plaintiffs may sue a local legislator in his or her official capacity under § 1983, local legislators may invoke legislative immunity to insulate themselves as individuals from liability based on their legislative activities.

Section 1983 entitles plaintiffs to injunctive relief against officials whose jury-selection practices systematically exclude qualified Black citizens from jury service.

White v. Crook · filed 1966-02-07

There is no question that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 these male plaintiffs under the evidence in this case are entitled to the relief they seek and are entitled to have the defendants adopt procedures that will ensure that they and all other qualified members of their class in Lowndes County, Alabama, serve on juries.

Section 1983 does not provide plenary review of a challenged state administrative procedure.

Whitsel v. Southeast Local School District · filed 1973-09-25

At the outset, we observe, as did the district court, that an action under the civil rights statutes is not a plenary review of a challenged state administrative procedure.

Section 1983 does not make a federal district court an appellate forum for reviewing adverse administrative decisions without evidence of constitutional infringement.

Whitsel v. Southeast Local School District · filed 1972-02-11

Section 1983 was not intended by Congress to constitute the District Court a forum to provide appellate review from every adverse decision of Boards of Education, or other boards, or administrative agencies when bare allegation of the Complaint are unsupported by evidence of constitutional infringement.

Section 1983 cannot be invoked to obtain federal district-court review of state-court proceedings.

Schroeder v. State Of Illinois · filed 1966-02-07

These allegations, even if true, do not present either a ground for a federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, since the state court admittedly had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, Chance v. County Board of School Trustees, 332 F.2d 971, 974 (7th Cir. 1964); or a ground upon which to obtain review of the state court proceedings by a federal district court under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 through invocation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Goss v. State of Illinois, 312 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir. 1963).

Section 1983 does not create an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283's bar on federal injunctions staying state-court proceedings.

Thomas v. District Court of Thirteenth Judicial District · filed 1967-07-06

The Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, does not create an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for federal review of alleged constitutional violations in state-court proceedings when those violations could be corrected through further state-court proceedings.

Boles v. Bank of Knoxville · filed 1969-10-10

Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (C. A.3, 1965) is the only case plaintiffs cite that involved a state court proceeding. Plaintiff alleged a false arrest and battery by a police captain. Plaintiff apparently had been convicted of assault and battery, but the record was not in evidence. In granting a directed verdict for defendant after a $1,500 jury verdict for plaintiff, the trial court used language similar to that used above by this Court. Both Bottone v. Lindsley, supra, and Johnson v. Stone, supra, were cited for the proposition that federal courts were not arbitrators of the correctness of state decisions. The Third Circuit stated that both these cases were inapposite because they “were civil actions brought in state courts and if they involved the violation of constitutional rights at all, the alleged violations were such as could have been corrected by further state court proceedings.” This principle is controlling of the case under consideration.

Section 1983 does not give a federal district court jurisdiction to review alleged errors in a state-court judgment.

Anderson v. Lecon Properties, Inc., a Minnesota Corporation · filed 1972-04-17

The plaintiffs thereupon instituted this § 1983 action in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, alleging that the Supreme Court of Minnesota had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus, and that its actions deprived plaintiffs of property without due process and denied them equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is not clear from plaintiffs’ complaint whether they seek damages from the defendants in the amount of the value of the property, alleged to be $400,000, or whether they seek reinstatement of the state court judgment of April 21, 1970. In any event the District Court held that plaintiffs were entitled to no relief, and we agree. We think it clear that the federal district court has no jurisdiction in this case. The parties concede that the Minnesota courts had personal jurisdiction over the parties to the action and it is also clear that they had subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy. The Minnesota Supreme Court has jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus by virtue of Minn.Stat. § 480.04. To the extent that there was any error of constitutional magnitude in the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision, plaintiffs’ sole recourse was to the Supreme Court of the United States. Federal courts of inferior jurisdiction have no jurisdiction to review alleged errors in state court judgments.

Section 1983 does not give a federal district court jurisdiction to collaterally attack a state criminal contempt conviction affirmed by the highest state court.

Thomas D. Goss A/K/A Thomas Duggan v. State of Illinois, Frank G. Sain, Sheriff of Cook County, and Daniel P. Ward, Stat · filed 1963-01-24

We hold the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) does not confer jurisdiction upon the federal district court to collaterally attack this state criminal contempt conviction which has been affirmed by the highest state court.

Section 1983 does not impose a flat bar on federal injunctions against state court proceedings, but equitable, comity, and federalism restraints still limit such relief.

1487 Amusement Corp. v. Redlich · filed 1972-11-06

In other words, although there is no flat statutory prohibition against enjoining state court actions in a § 1983 ease, there are restraints, which depend upon a weighing of the factors of “equity, comity, and federalism.”

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for a collateral attack in federal court on state-court proceedings when the constitutional defense can be raised in the underlying state controversy.

Louis Weber and Consumer Magazine, Inc. v. Consumers Digest, Inc., Van Leer Corporation, American Sales Company, and Albert Perry Company · filed 1971-03-18

The Civil Rights Act was not designed to provide such an unusual remedy.

Section 1983 does not, by itself, justify federal intervention in a state proceeding merely because the proceeding allegedly chills First Amendment activity.

Gebert v. Hoffman · filed 1971-06-07

The mere contention, in a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that First Amendment activity has been chilled by the pendency of a suit is not sufficient to justify intervention.

Section 1983 permits an action in federal court to redress violations of federal rights under color of state law and creates an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, but equitable, comity, and federalism principles still limit injunctions against state-court proceedings.

American Radio Association v. Mobile Steamship Association, Inc. · filed 1973-08-22

Mitchum v. Foster makes possible appellant’s instant § 1983 action in the federal courts; it does not approve unlimited federal intervention in pending state court proceedings.

Section 1983 permits federal collateral review of a state university disciplinary proceeding for compliance with minimal due process, but not a more penetrating review or substitution of the federal court's judgment for the school's fact finders.

McDonald v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois · filed 1974-03-14

While plaintiffs were entitled to a full and fair hearing before a sanction so severe as expulsion from medical school could be imposed against them, they are not entitled to a federal court collateral review of that hearing more penetrating than that required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... A federal court reviewing this record under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act is not free to substitute its judgment for that of the primary fact finders. Nor may it probe to ... determine if the findings are supported by substantial evidence. While a state court sitting in review of its own state’s educational institutions might fashion such a standard of review, a federal court, by reason of its limited jurisdiction, is confined to determining whether the challenged proceedings meet the minimal standards of due process of law. Clearly the proceedings of which plaintiffs complain meet those standards.

Section 1983 does not authorize an inferior federal court to review state-court attorney-discipline procedures or interfere with the resulting judgments.

Mildner v. Gulotta · filed 1976-03-29

With all respect for the Supremacy Clause, we do not construe § 1983 or our constitutional question jurisdiction as authorizing an inferior federal court to pass upon the procedure employed by the State courts to discipline attorneys who practice before them or to interfere with their judgments in such matters. Nor do we read the statute as in effect inserting a new form of federal review between the appellate courts of the State and the Supreme Court of the United States.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain federal district-court review of a valid state-court decree.

Environmental Aid, Inc. v. Goddard · filed 1977-05-19

In our opinion, § 1983 may not be used by AID to have a federal court review the underpinnings of the valid consent decrees entered by the state court in enforcing the police power of the Commonwealth as set forth in the Clean Streams Law.

Section 1983 does not give federal district courts jurisdiction to reverse or modify state-court judgments.

Lampkin-Asam v. The Supreme Court of Florida · filed 1979-08-27

This Court has held on numerous occasions that federal district courts do not have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other theory to reverse or modify the judgments of state courts.

Section 1983 actions may be pursued in state courts.

Harrah v. Leverette · filed 1980-10-07

It is also clear that 42 U.S.C. §1983 actions may be pursued in our state courts.

Section 1983 allows narrow federal review of a state-court attorney disqualification to determine whether the state acted arbitrarily in infringing a constitutional right.

Davis v. Stamler · filed 1981-05-07

We believe, however, that in a section 1983 action alleging that the disqualification of a state criminal defendant's attorney deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to retain counsel of his choice, a federal court must focus on whether the disqualification infringed a constitutional right, not whether it otherwise would have made the same decision as the state court. ... We believe that the arbitrary action standard articulated in Carey should also govern section 1983 actions such as the one brought by Davis. Disqualification of attorneys in state court proceedings is essentially a state matter and should not be subject to federal court regulation except in egregious cases. The arbitrary action standard provides protection for a state criminal defendant's choice of counsel while affording deference to the state's legitimate interests in regulating the professional conduct of attorneys appearing in its courts and in ensuring the proper administration of justice. We stress that in a section 1983 action alleging that disqualification of a state criminal defendant's attorney deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to counsel of his choice, the district court's scope of review is narrow because it is examining the state court decision only to determine if that court acted arbitrarily.

Section 1983 permits a federal court to consider constitutional claims for monetary damages after a plaintiff failed to pursue available interlocutory state appellate review when those claims were peripheral in the state proceeding.

Kelser v. Anne Arundel County Department Of Social Services · filed 1982-06-07

We therefore hold that her inaction at that time does not bar the district court from now considering those claims in a § 1983 suit for monetary damages.

Section 1983 allows suits in federal district court to challenge state-court proceedings that allegedly violate federally protected rights.

Miofsky v. Superior Court of State of California · filed 1983-01-03

In light of Mitchum, we conclude that district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over suits brought under Sec. 1983 even when the state action allegedly violating plaintiff's federally protected rights takes the form of state court proceedings.

Section 1983 does not bar a federal-district-court action asserting federal constitutional claims that were not presented to the state court whose decision the action might otherwise be viewed as reviewing.

Dasher v. The Supreme Court of Texas, Etc. · filed 1981-10-13

Since Ms. Dasher’s § 1983 complaint states claims for relief grounded in federal constitutional rights, claims which were not presented to the Texas Supreme Court, her § 1983 suit does not constitute an impermissible effort to seek review of a state court judgment in a lower federal court.

Section 1983 does not permit a federal district court to review a final state-court judgment disciplining a particular lawyer.

Zimmerman v. Grievance Committee of the Fifth Judicial District of New York · filed 1983-06-13

Although Zimmerman brings this action under Title 42, Section 1983 for protection of federal constitutional rights, this court may not entertain his complaint.

A lower federal court lacks jurisdiction over a § 1983 action that in substance seeks review of a state supreme court decision reviewable by the United States Supreme Court.

Bense v. Richard Starling and Anthony Duchinski · filed 1983-10-06

If the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court could have been reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States, then no lower Federal court would have jurisdiction of a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 attacking that decision because such action would in substance be asking for a review of the state court decision.

Federal district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over nonfrivolous § 1983 claims even when the allegedly unconstitutional state action takes the form of state-court proceedings.

White v. Barbara White and Superior Court of the State of California, County of Merced, Honorable George · filed 1984-05-01

District courts have subject matter jurisdiction over suits brought under section 1983 even when the state action allegedly violating plaintiff’s federally protected rights takes the form of state court proceedings.

A federal district court has jurisdiction over a § 1983 general constitutional challenge to state bar disciplinary rules when deciding the claim does not require review of a particular state-court judgment.

Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court · filed 1984-10-29

Razatos thereafter commenced this section 1983 action in federal district court against the Colorado Supreme Court and its justices. ... In order to evaluate this claim, the district court need not review the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court. It need only look at Rule 252 as promulgated, and as construed by state case law. Razatos framed his constitutional challenge in such a way as to allow district court subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain federal district-court reversal of a state-court judgment by recasting the challenge as a civil-rights action.

Hagerty v. Succession of Laura McCloskey Clement · filed 1984-12-17

The record clearly reflects that Hagerty then ... used his section 1983 action to attack the validity of the state trial court’s dismissal of his suit contesting the probate of his aunt’s will. He did so notwithstanding the well settled rule that a plaintiff may not seek a reversal of a state court judgment simply by casting his complaint in the form of a civil rights action.

Section 1983 does not give a federal district court jurisdiction to review a state supreme court decision, even when the plaintiff raises federal constitutional issues.

Johns v. The Supreme Court of Ohio · filed 1985-01-30

A district court is without jurisdiction to review a decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio. This is true even if the plaintiff seeks to raise federal constitutional issues.

A federal court may hear Section 1983 constitutional claims that a state court refused to entertain without violating subject-matter jurisdiction or claim-preclusion principles.

Robinson v. George R. Ariyoshi, Governor, and McBryde Sugar Company, Limited · filed 1985-02-20

Where a state court has refused to entertain federal constitutional claims, a federal court violates the precepts of neither subject matter jurisdiction nor res judicata by hearing those claims.

A plaintiff cannot use a § 1983 civil-rights action to obtain federal-court reversal of a state-court judgment.

Charles Reed and Roland Duty v. Terrell · filed 1985-05-06

It is a well-settled principle that a plaintiff may not seek a reversal in federal court of a state court judgment simply by casting his complaint in the form of a civil rights action.

Federal courts must give state judgments the same preclusive effect the state's courts would give them, including in section 1983 actions raising federal constitutional questions.

Merrill v. Town of Addison, and State of New York, Intervenor-Appellee · filed 1985-05-24

Such preclusive effect, which protects parties from the “expense and vexation attend ... ing multiple lawsuits,” ... applies to federal questions decided by state courts, including claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A federal district court cannot entertain § 1983 claims inextricably intertwined with a state’s highest court judgment in an attorney-discipline proceeding.

Hermandad-Union De Empleados Del Fondo Del Seguro Del Estado v. Monge · filed 1985-06-10

Since the only claim presented in the amended complaint over which theoretically we could act — the constitutionality of Rule 13(e) — would require us to render an impermissible advisory opinion, we must dismiss the complaint. All of its claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the October 21, 1983 judgment.

A Section 1983 suit challenging state administrative action is an original federal action, not appellate review of the state proceeding.

Robert Hameetman, Cross-Appellee v. The City of Chicago, Cross-Appellants · filed 1985-09-30

But a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a review proceeding even when as here it challenges administrative action that has an adjudicative component. Federal courts have no general appellate authority over state courts or state agencies.

Section 1983 does not provide a means to obtain appellate review of state-court decisions.

Karpanty v. County of Lucas, Board of County Commissioners Judge Richard McQuade Jr. · filed 1986-01-28

Plaintiff's remedy was to appeal the dismissal of his state court action, not sue the judge under section 1983. Section 1983 does not serve as a means of appellate review of state decisions.

The bar against lower federal-court review of state judgments does not jurisdictionally foreclose a Section 1983 action when no final state judgment has been or is likely to be entered and federal rights cannot be vindicated in the state proceeding.

Lynk v. Laporte Superior Court No. 2, Hon. Don E. Harner, and Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana · filed 1986-04-24

The question, however, is the application of this principle to a case where no final judgment has been or is likely ever to be entered. ... But there will be no jurisdictional bar. The door will be open a crack, to make sure the state cannot block access to the federal courts by refusing to allow a state court litigant to raise federal questions in state court.

A § 1983 action cannot be used to obtain federal district-court review of a particular state judicial decision, though a general constitutional challenge to a state rule may fall within federal jurisdiction.

Nordgren v. Hafter · filed 1986-05-12

Nordgren’s quest for review of the specific action as to her own application, therefore, was beyond the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Otherwise we would be undertaking to review a state judicial decision. ... they do “have subject-matter jurisdiction over general challenges to state bar rules, promulgated by state courts in nonjudicial proceedings, which do not require review of a final state-court judgment in a particular case.”

Section 1983 cannot be used in federal district court to appeal a state-court decision or to litigate a constitutional claim inextricably intertwined with that decision.

Lewis v. East Feliciana Parish School Board · filed 1986-05-16

While the plaintiff had a right to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, he is not permitted to appeal a decision of the state court to the federal district court under § 1983. This is so whether the § 1983 suit seeks review of the state court decree or presents a constitutional claim which is inextricably intertwined with the state court’s grant or denial of relief.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain federal district-court appellate review of a state-court judgment when the constitutional issue could have been raised on state appeal.

Anderson v. The State of Colorado and the Judges of the First Judicial District, Jefferson County, Colorado · filed 1986-06-12

Where a constitutional issue could have been reviewed on direct appeal by the state appellate courts, a litigant may not seek to reverse or modify the state court judgment by bringing a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).

A federal district court lacks jurisdiction over a § 1983 claim that effectively seeks review of a prior state-court judgment.

Schafer v. City of Waupaca · filed 1986-06-25

Having considered the briefs submitted by the parties and having considered the question, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute and that, therefore, the complaint must be dismissed.

Section 1983 may not be used to obtain federal review of an unfavorable state-court decision properly rendered within that court’s jurisdiction, and a state court itself is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Polyak v. Jim T. Hamilton, Individually and in His Judicial Capacity as Circuit Judge, and Circuit Court of Lawr · filed 1986-08-15

We observe that Sec. 1983 cannot be used to gain review of an unfavorable state court decision properly rendered within the state court's jurisdiction and expertise. ... We also note that state courts per se are not "persons" susceptible to suit under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize a federal district court to review or set aside a final state-court judgment, even if that judgment is allegedly erroneous.

Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Detroit Marine Terminals, Inc. (In re Sun Valley Foods Co.) · filed 1986-09-11

Review of final determinations in state judicial proceedings can be obtained only in the United States Supreme Court. ... A United States district court “has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings.” ... This is true, even though the state court judgment may have been erroneous.

State-court adjudication of constitutional issues precludes candidates from relitigating those issues in a later Section 1983 action when there was no prior federal abstention preserving the claims for federal resolution.

Tarpley v. Salerno · filed 1986-10-06

For the reasons stated by the district court, the plaintiffs who were candidates are precluded by the New York state courts’ adjudication of the constitutional issues from relitigating those issues in this action. ... Nor was the ... attempt to reserve their federal constitutional claims in the state court proceedings effective to permit relitigation of them here.

A plaintiff cannot use Section 1983 to obtain lower-federal-court review of a state-court judgment; the jurisdictional bar applies to civil-rights suits as it does elsewhere.

Worldwide Church Of God v. Mcnair · filed 1986-12-05

Cases subsequent to Feldman make it clear that Feldman 's jurisdictional bar applies in the Sec. 1983 context, as elsewhere.

The civil-rights statutes do not give lower federal courts jurisdiction to review particular state-court decisions, even when the challenge alleges that the state court acted unconstitutionally.

Shrader v. State Supreme Court for the State of West Virginia Through Each of the Five Justices · filed 1987-02-05

The civil rights statutes do not afford the lower federal courts jurisdiction "over challenges to state-court decisions in particular cases even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional."

A Section 1983 claim seeking review of a particular state-court disbarment decision is outside federal district-court jurisdiction under Feldman.

Czura v. Supreme Court of South Carolina · filed 1987-03-11

Walter Murphy Czura, a disbarred South Carolina attorney, appeals the district court's order dismissing his civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, 632 F.Supp. 267. ... His action was, therefore, correctly construed by the district court as necessarily tied to his disbarment proceeding and was properly dismissed under Feldman.

A Section 1983 claim seeking review of a particular state-court disbarment decision is outside federal district-court jurisdiction under Feldman.

Czura v. Supreme Court · filed 1987-03-11

Walter Murphy Czura, a disbarred South Carolina attorney, appeals the district court’s order dismissing his civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, 632 F.Supp. 267. ... His action was, therefore, correctly construed by the district court as necessarily tied to his disbarment proceeding and was properly dismissed under ... Feldman.

A Section 1983 claim cannot be used to obtain federal district-court review of constitutional issues inextricably intertwined with a state-court judgment.

Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. Lyntel Products, Inc. · filed 1987-03-27

In Count II, it alleged that the judgment imposed was a denial of due process in violation 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Under ... Feldman, ... this court does not have jurisdiction over actions in which the constitutional claims presented are “inextricably intertwined” with a state court judgment.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for federal appellate review of a state-court judgment.

Simpson v. State of Tennessee, Financial Institution Services Incorporated and Martha Ann Zeliff Simpson · filed 1987-05-01

Review of state court decisions under the guise of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 actions is not appropriate.

A disappointed state-bar applicant cannot use § 1983 to obtain federal district-court review of how state admission rules were applied to the applicant’s particular case.

Hampton v. Tennessee Bd. of Law Examiners · filed 1987-05-22

Plaintiffs cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts merely by couching their claim for relief in terms of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 when they are actually seeking relief for their denial of admission to the bar.

Section 1983 cannot be used to reverse or modify a state-court judgment when the constitutional issue could have been reviewed on direct appeal through the state courts.

Dickerson v. Curtis · filed 1987-06-05

“Where,” as here, “a constitutional issue could have been reviewed on direct appeal by the state appellate courts, a litigant may not seek to reverse or modify the state court judgment by bringing a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

A federal court may abstain from a Section 1983 action that attempts to relitigate the same constitutional issue already reduced to judgment and on appeal in state court when the state proceeding can adequately protect the federal rights.

Oliver v. Fort Wayne Education Association, Inc. · filed 1987-06-09

We conclude that, in this case, the district court properly abstained because: the state court action has gone to judgment and it can adequately protect the plaintiffs' federal rights; and the Sec. 1983 suit may have been a method to collaterally attack a final state court judgment.

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot relitigate a zoning regulation's constitutionality after the plaintiff's predecessor in title had a full and fair opportunity to obtain a final state-court adjudication of the same issue.

Levy v. City of Cherry Hills Village · filed 1987-08-12

Even assuming every word of the complaint to be true, the complaint must be dismissed in its entirety because of the bar posed by collateral estoppel.

A federal district court hearing a § 1983 action may consider a general constitutional challenge to a state bar rule promulgated in a nonjudicial proceeding, though it may not review a state court’s decision in a particular judicial case.

Schneider v. Colegio De Abogados De Puerto Rico · filed 1987-08-21

Challenges to the former may only be raised in an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, while challenges to the latter may be raised in federal district court in the same manner as challenges to any state statute or regulation.

A federal district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a § 1983 claim that seeks appellate review of issues already considered and decided by a state court.

MacKay v. Pfeil · filed 1987-09-04

MacKay’s claims should be resolved by Alaska’s appellate courts, not by a federal court of original jurisdiction. ... the district court was without subject-matter jurisdiction over MacKay’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.

Section 1983 does not permit a federal district court to review claims inextricably intertwined with issues decided in a state forfeiture proceeding.

Ransom Hamlet, Jr. v. Charles L. Benton, Director of Finance of Baltimore City · filed 1988-04-06

Hamlet does not challenge the constitutionality of the Maryland forfeiture statutes; he complains only of the procedure afforded him personally. His claims are "inextricably interwined" with issues which were presented to the Maryland courts relative to the forfeiture. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486. As such, Hamlet's complaint is not cognizable under Sec. 1983 and therefore should have been dismissed by the district court due to lack of jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not authorize a federal district court to review a final state court judgment by recasting the challenge as a civil rights action.

Fleming v. Moore · filed 1989-01-03

Mitchum in no way authorized use of Sec. 1983 to obtain appellate review of final state court decisions in federal district courts.

In Oklahoma state court, a defendant in a § 1983 action may seek pretrial review of a denial of qualified immunity through an original action.

McLin v. Trimble · filed 1990-06-19

We therefore hold that the petitioners herein are not entitled to an interlocutory appeal, but may seek review of a trial court’s decision concerning qualified immunity via an original action.

Section 1983 civil rights actions are exempt from the usual prohibition on federal court injunctions of state court proceedings.

Schroll v. Plunkett · filed 1991-02-07

Civil rights actions under section 1983 are exempt from the usual prohibition on federal court injunctions of state court proceedings.

Section 1983 permits a litigant who relied on a federal court’s Pullman stay and reserved federal claims during state proceedings to return to federal court to litigate those claims.

The Ivy Club v. W. Cary Edwards Pamela S. Poff, Sally Frank, Intervenor-Defendant. Sally Frank, Counter-Claimant v. The · filed 1991-09-16

In sum, in response to the question certified to this court, we hold that in the face of the Pullman abstention exercised by the district court followed by Ivy’s reliance on that abstention in the reservation of its right to litigate federal claims in federal court and not present them in the state proceedings, Ivy has neither waived nor had a full and fair opportunity to litigate its federal claims. Accordingly, we will affirm the district court’s order permitting Ivy to litigate its section 1983 action in federal court.

Section 1983 does not allow a litigant to use a federal constitutional claim to obtain appellate review of a state court decision that could have been reviewed through a direct state appeal.

Waterbury v. State of Kansas William Clements, 8th Judicial District · filed 1992-04-10

Section 1983's availability does not permit litigants to choose the forum in which they seek appellate review of state court decisions, even if there is a federal constitutional question presented.

Section 1983 does not give federal district courts jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify final state-court judgments.

Revere v. Foster · filed 2000-10-25

It is well settled, however, that federal district courts lack jurisdiction under § 1983 to review, modify, or nullify the final judgment of a state court.

Section 1983 falls within the Anti-Injunction Act’s express authorization exception, so that Act does not bar a federal court from considering an injunction against a prospective constitutional violation in a state criminal proceeding.

Lee v. Winston · filed 1982-11-12

Accordingly, the anti-injunction statute does not operate in this § 1983 action to bar this Court from restraining the respondents’ alleged prospective violation of petitioner’s constitutional rights in the state court criminal proceeding.

Section 1983 does not permit a federal district court to review a state court judgment.

Tang v. Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, First Department, and Honorable Justices Aron Steue · filed 1974-04-01

The fact that Tang brought his action under § 1983 does not alter the Rooker principle.

Section 1983 does not provide an appeal from a state court judgment, but a state administrative decision does not bar a federal suit under that rule.

Tiger Inn v. Edwards · filed 1986-06-09

It is certainly true that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is not an appropriate vehicle to appeal a state court judgment. ... However, nothing in this doctrine suggests that it applies to decisions made by state administrative agencies in administrative proceedings in addition to judgments rendered by state courts in judicial proceedings.

Territorial officials cannot be sued under § 1983 in their official capacities, but they may be sued individually for constitutional violations committed under color of territorial law.

Majhor v. Kempthorne · filed 2007-10-30

Thus, the American Samoa Defendants are right to suggest that they (and the LBJ Center Defendants, to the extent that they could act in any official capacity) are immune from suit under § 1983 in their official capacities, but they are wrong to think that this immunity insulates them from the statute’s reach altogether.

Section 1983 applies only to state action and does not provide a claim against the federal government or federal agents.

Ricca v. United States · filed 1980-04-29

Plaintiffs’ fourth and eighth causes of action asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, on the other hand, must be dismissed as against the federal defendants because applicable only to the State and to State action.

Section 1983 reaches only persons acting under color of state or territorial law and does not cover officials of the District of Columbia.

Sullivan v. C. Francis Murphy, Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia · filed 1973-05-09

The action cannot be maintained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The acts complained of are alleged to have been committed by District of Columbia officials under the cloak of public authority. Section 1983 reaches only those who act under color of state or territorial law. In District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 93 S.Ct. 602, 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973), the Supreme Court held that the phrase “State or Territory,” as contained in § 1983, does not include the District of Columbia. It stressed that the District of Columbia is neither a “State” nor a Territory that may be regarded as an inchoate State, but is a unique community established as the seat of the national government.

Section 1983 continues to cover a state's administration of a program as state action even when the federal government has approved the state's statutory and regulatory scheme.

Lidie v. State of California · filed 1973-04-10

However, federal approval of .the state statutory and regulatory scheme does not render the state’s administration of its program any less “state action” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover the District of Columbia because the District is not a “State or Territory” within the statute's meaning.

District of Columbia v. Carter · filed 1973-02-26

For the reasons stated below, we hold that the District of Columbia is not a “State or Territory” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize a suit against a federal official acting under color of federal law.

Roots v. J. A. Callahan, Inspector in Charge of Post Office Department · filed 1973-03-20

It is settled that a suit will not lie under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 against a federal official acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 reaches constitutional deprivations caused by persons acting under color of state law, but not the United States, a state, or federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Savage v. United States · filed 1971-02-12

To the extent plaintiff’s complaint is founded on the Civil Rights Act, it fails to state a claim against the United States since the statute applies only to deprivations of constitutional rights caused by other “persons.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. The United States is not such a “person.” ... Nor is the State of Minnesota a “person” within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act. ... In addition, as against defendants Lord and Nordin, to the extent the complaint attempts to state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act it fails to do so. The Act applies only to officials acting under the color of state law and has no application to federal officials acting under the color of federal law.

Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action for interference by state officials with the constitutional right to inform the federal government of possible federal-law violations.

Williams v. Ivan Allen, Jr. · filed 1971-03-18

In its order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Rule 12(b) (6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U. S. C., the district court correctly stated the applicable law and recognized the issue with which it was confronted: ... “Interference with the right to inform the government would justify equitable relief, Edwards v. Habib, D.C.A., 1965, [125 U.S.App.D.C. 49,] 366 F.2d 628, 629, Edwards v. Habib, D.C.A., 1968, [130 U.S.App.D.C. 126,] 397 F.2d 687 (dictum); might provide a cause of action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act in an appropriate case, Swanner v. United States, M.D.Ala., 1967, 275 F.Supp. 1007, reversed on other grounds, [5 Cir.,] 406 F.2d 716; and should afford a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is merely the civil side of criminal sections 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242. ... We agree with the district court that the resolution of Williams’ claim turns on the factual question of whether the police department discharged him for the constitutionally protected act of informing the Internal Revenue Service, or whether, in reality, he was dismissed for refusing to reveal the name of the informant and failing to make a timely disclosure of certain information.

Section 1983 treats the District of Columbia, when supervising its penal system, as a “State or Territory,” so it can apply to unconstitutional action by the District Government.

Edwards v. Sard · filed 1966-02-25

The District of Columbia, in its capacity as supervisor of a penal system, is a “State or Territory” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958), and therefore the section would apply should this Court find an abuse of constitutional power by the District Government.

Section 1983 permits suit only against a “person,” and a state-created corporation such as the Regents of the University of California is not a person under the statute.

Sellers v. Regents of University · filed 1970-09-17

As such, it is not a proper party since it is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for acts of omission by public officials as well as affirmative acts of commission.

Azar v. Conley · filed 1972-02-22

We think that Section 1983 is applicable in the case of acts of omission as well as commission. Insofar as the district court concluded otherwise we must express our disagreement.

Section 1983 permits damages against a person acting under color of state law who deprives someone of constitutional rights; actual damages are unnecessary because nominal and punitive damages may be recovered.

Washington v. Official Court Stenographer · filed 1966-03-30

Plaintiff’s complaint states a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The absence of actual damages, however, does not defeat an action under Section 1983. Even if no actual damages are sustained, nominal and punitive damages may be recovered.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private persons unless they act under color of state law.

Shakespeare v. Wilson · filed 1966-07-18

Nor could these private persons be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless they were acting under color of law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives another of constitutional rights, including through an unlawful beating by an arresting officer.

Bobbie J. Morgan and Robert E. Straight v. Labiak · filed 1966-11-07

Section 1983 makes every person liable, to the party injured, who, under color of any statute or ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory of the United States, subjects a person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... A person unlawfully beaten by an arresting officer is denied the right of due process of law. Therefore, since appellee’s complaint alleges an unlawful beating by arresting officers, a cause of action arises under the Act.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and a private attorney's status as an officer of the court does not make him a state actor.

Johnson v. Kreider · filed 1967-02-17

Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, the defendant must have acted under color of State law. For purposes of §§ 1983, 1985, an attorney is just another private individual. His status as an “officer of the court” does not make him an officer of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or of any governmental subdivision thereof. Pugliano v. Staziak, 231 F.Supp. 347, 351, n. 5 (W.D.Pa.1964) affirmed, 345 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1965); *189Kregger v. Posner, 248 F.Supp. 804, 806 (E.D.Mich.1966). Leonard Tinter, Esq., apparently was acting in his profession as an attorney at the time complained of, and the action also must be dismissed as to him.

Section 1983 reaches conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of federal rights; a private attorney or witness is not covered merely because of participation in a case.

Pritt v. Johnson · filed 1967-02-24

In order that a claim be stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, facts must be alleged which show that a person: (1) while acting under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State; (2) subjects or causes to be subjected,» any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... The professional acts performed by plaintiff’s counsel can not be considered acts done under color of state authority. ... Likewise, there is nothing in the complaint to indicate that the defendant, Dorothy Arlene Kriner, was acting under color of state law. Simply because she testified in the criminal case against plaintiff does not in any way cloak her with the authority of the state.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a state official acting under color of state law who deprives a person of constitutional rights, including by obstructing defense counsel’s access to willing witnesses.

Coppolino v. Helpern · filed 1967-02-24

This court will not infer a denial of the relief here requested when it is clear to this court that plaintiff here states a separate and distinct cause of action against Dr. Helpern, raising federal constitutional issues upon which the Florida court has not ruled, and stating a cause of action under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 over which this court does have jurisdiction under Title 28, U.S.C. § 1343(3). ... By a parity of reasoning we must hold that a state official, acting under color of his authority, cannot obstruct defense counsel from interviewing willing witnesses. ... Defendant Helpern by his conduct has violated the constitutional rights of the defendant to a fair trial and effective counsel.

Section 1983 makes a person acting under color of state law liable for depriving another of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.

Freeman v. The Gould Special School District of Lincoln County, Arkansas · filed 1969-01-15

We agree with the District Court that the evidence fails to sustain a cause of action under § 1343(3) as there has been no “deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution” or laws; or under sub-section (4) authorizing relief “for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote”; or under § 1981, the old civil rights section placing all persons on a par with “white citizens”; or under § 1983, another old civil rights section, referring to deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage. The plaintiffs’ complaint cast as a civil rights action fails to show any deprivation of rights or privileges (immunity is not claimed) under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom.

Section 1983 permits a cause of action, at least for equitable relief, against individuals acting under color of law when their acts deny equal protection or due process.

Lessard v. Van Dale · filed 1970-10-22

A cause of action, at least for equitable relief, can be stated under § 1983 against individuals whose acts under color of law result in the denial of equal protection and due process.

Section 1983 does not allow an Ohio school board, or a superintendent sued in his official capacity to vindicate others’ rights, to proceed as a person under the statute when the plaintiff alleges no deprivation of its own rights.

Akron Board v. State Board · filed 1972-09-01

“Neither the Akron Board of Education nor the Superintendent of Schools, in his official capacity, is a citizen or other person within the meaning of this section in this context. The Superintendent of Schools, if he is a person within Section 1983, has not been, in his official capacity, deprived of any rights, privileges, or immunities under color of state law.”

Section 1983 does not treat sovereign states as “persons” subject to liability under the statute.

Rothstein v. Wyman · filed 1972-09-07

Section 1983 itself is phrased in terms of the liabilities of persons as distinct from sovereign states, and it seems clear that states are ... not persons within the meaning of that statute.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for allegations that a defendant slandered the plaintiffs and their business without asserting a violation of a right protected by the Civil Rights Act.

Peoples Cab Co., a Corporation Qualified as a Public Utility Under the Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Georg · filed 1972-10-20

We agree with the district court that so much of the complaint as alleges in substance that the defendant has slandered the plaintiffs and their business does not assert the violation of any right protected by the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not treat a local jail complex as a suable person for injunctive relief.

Gibson v. Charlottesville-Albemarle Joint Security Complex · filed 1975-08-27

The initial holding of this court is that the Charlottesville-Albemarle Joint Security Complex is not a “person” under § 1983, since injunctive relief is sought here.

Section 1983 does not cover the District of Columbia because the District is not a “state or territory” within the statute's meaning.

Williams v. Howard University · filed 1976-01-06

The District of Columbia has been held not to be a “state or territory” within the meaning of § 1983, and appellant’s claim of jurisdiction under that provision fails.

Section 1983 applies only to a “person,” so a state university college itself is not a suable person under the statute.

Escobar v. State University of New York/College at Old Westbury · filed 1977-02-25

While the action is properly brought against defendant Todd who, as acting president of the college, is its chief administrative officer charged with responsibility for enforcement of the college’s disciplinary procedures, Rules § 535.7(a), the action must be dismissed against the college itself since it is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against the Texas Employment Commission because it is not a statutory person.

Gonzalez v. Texas Employment Commission · filed 1977-01-24

Defendants’ interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is correct; the TEC is not amenable to a claim for damages under that civil rights statute.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action on behalf of a deceased person for alleged civil-rights violations occurring after death, because a deceased is not a statutory person.

Guyton v. Phillips · filed 1979-08-16

We find that the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, does not provide a cause of action on behalf of a deceased based upon alleged violation of the deceased’s civil rights which occurred after his death. A “deceased” is not a “person” for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, nor for the constitutional rights which the Civil Rights Act serves to protect.

Section 1983 treats state officers acting under color of state law as persons subject to suit, including when they acted in their official capacities.

Morrow v. Sudler · filed 1980-12-31

Morrow has alleged that Sudler and Hornby violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process by terminating his employment as they did. Defendants argue that Sudler and Hornby are not “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983 since they were acting in their official capacities as officers and employees of the Society. This defense has no merit. Morrow’s Section 1983 claim must allege that the defendant deprived him of civil rights while acting under color of state law. Therefore, the defendants’ motion to dismiss Morrow’s claims against Sudler and Hornby on the grounds that they are not “persons” within Section 1983 is denied.

Section 1983 treats a viable fetus as a “person” eligible to pursue a civil-rights claim.

Douglas v. Town of Hartford, Conn. · filed 1982-07-02

The Court finds that a viable fetus is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore denies the defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims of the plaintiff Paul Douglas.

Section 1983 does not treat states or state agencies as persons, but individual state officials may be held responsible for constitutional violations caused by their management.

David R. Ruiz, United States of America, Intervenor-Appellee v. W. J. Estelle, Jr. · filed 1982-06-23

Thus neither states nor state agencies are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. ... It is, therefore, neither a “person” nor, consequently, a proper party defendant. ... The individual members of the Board, however, are of course persons. Although the Texas statute vests management of the prison system in the Board, the Board members are responsible as individuals, in the same manner as the Director of TDC, for any violation of constitutional rights caused by their management.

For § 1983, a “State” means a state of the United States rather than a foreign government, and close government regulation alone does not turn a private business’s conduct into state action.

Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines · filed 1983-06-20

In the context of Section 1983, however, the term “state” is not intended to include foreign governments; it clearly is a reference to a state of the United States. Moreover, the fact that a business is closely regulated by government is not a sufficient basis for attributing its activities to the state.

The Government of the Virgin Islands and its entities are not persons subject to a direct § 1983 action.

Hobson v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 1984-04-05

Although not raised by either of the parties, it is well-settled that a § 1983 cause of action cannot be asserted directly against the Government of the Virgin Islands or the entities through which it operates. This conclusion is based on the fact that the Virgin Islands, as a territory, does not fall within § 1983’s meaing of a “person,” and, accordingly, is immune from the direct reach of that section.

Section 1983 does not permit a direct suit against the Government of Guam because it is not a person under the statute, regardless of the relief sought.

Marcelo Carlos Adela Carlos v. Government of Guam Paul McDonald and Marcelo Carlos Adela Carlos v. Government of Guam Pa · filed 1997-08-18

Regardless of the nature of the relief sought, a suit under § 1983 may not be brought directly against a State government, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1124 (1996); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-101 (1984), nor, of course, may such a suit be brought against the Government of Guam.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state attorney for conduct consisting solely of asserting a recognized legal defense in litigation, because that conduct is immune as an integral part of the judicial process.

Ellison v. Stephens · filed 1978-08-17

Regardless, however, of our opinion of the sovereign immunity doctrine, it is absolutely clear to us that the Attorney General may not be sued under § 1983 simply for raising the doctrine as a defense to plaintiff’s wrongful death action. The Attorney General does not infringe any constitutional provision or federal law when he asserts in a lawsuit against the state a defense heretofore recognized for centuries in our law. Moreover, the imposition of a legal defense, whether valid or not, is unquestionably "an integral part of the judicial process" and may not be the basis of a civil rights action against the state's attorney who is immune under § 1983 for such conduct.

Section 1983 does not automatically immunize a sheriff or the sheriff’s deputies from civil suit.

Hazo v. Geltz · filed 1976-06-17

A sheriff or his deputies are not necessarily immune from civil suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 judicial immunity generally protects judicial officers from damages claims but does not bar suits seeking injunctive or other equitable relief.

Nicholson v. Board of Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar Ass'n · filed 1972-02-01

The rule of judicial immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 generally is restricted to damage suits and does not .apply to suits for injunctive and protective relief.

Section 1983 gives a federal cause of action for deprivation by a state officer of a federal right, but judicial immunity bars damages claims against a judge while not barring suits seeking equitable relief alone.

Haley v. Troy · filed 1972-02-02

The complaint alleges claims under the Civil Rights enactments now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under that statute a federal cause of action is given to a person who has been deprived by a state officer of a federal right, such as due process of law, or the equal protection of the laws of the state. ... The defendant as such justice is immune from an action brought against him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking recovery of damages. ... The doctrine of judicial immunity, however, has not been extended to cases in which equitable relief alone has been sought. ... Thus the court determines it has jurisdiction of this case under the federal statutes invoked.

Section 1983 does not abolish common-law immunity for quasi-judicial officers such as prosecutors; officials acting with probable cause and in good faith are immune from damages.

Wilhelm v. Turner · filed 1970-06-08

With the record in this state, we need not determine whether our previous holdings should be modified to comport with the Ninth Circuit approach inasmuch as under any approach the law is settled that when the Attorney General, his assistants and those acting under him, acted with probable cause and in good faith they are immune whether their actions constituted an investigative procedure or not.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against officials for misconduct committed while performing quasi-judicial acts authorized or required by state law, even when the officials acted with conspiratorial motives.

Maniaci v. Warren · filed 1970-07-20

I find that defendants Warren and Peshek were acting in a manner specifically authorized and required by state law and solely in connection with their quasi-judicial duties. I hold that defendants Warren and Peshek are immune from a suit for damages based on alleged misconduct while performing these quasi-judicial acts. ... An official performing quasi-judicial acts is immune regardless of his motives. ... Therefore a conspiratorial motive or intent cannot make him liable.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against a district attorney for acts performed in the discharge of official prosecutorial duties.

United States ex rel. Rauch v. Deutsch · filed 1972-02-24

Further, we agree with the order of the district court that Deutseh, as District Attorney, was immune from suits under the Civil Rights Act while performing his official duties.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for constitutional-rights deprivations under color of state law, and a plaintiff need not exhaust state remedies before invoking it.

Rivers v. M. L. Royster, Assistant Superintendent Virginia State Farm · filed 1966-04-25

The action is based upon the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which proscribes the denial of equal rights to all United States citizens under color of any statute. ... The petitioner’s rights are federal constitutional rights based upon the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; therefore, no exhaustion of state remedies is required. ... “It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”

Section 1983 actions are not subject to an exhaustion-of-state-remedies requirement.

Randell v. Newark Housing Authority · filed 1967-10-03

Our decision in this case is not based on the rationale of exhaustion of state remedies, which is not applicable to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 59 S.Ct. 872, 83 L.Ed. 1281 (1939); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1965).

Section 1983 plaintiffs presenting a substantial constitutional question need not exhaust state administrative remedies before seeking convening of a three-judge federal court.

Alexander v. Swank · filed 1969-03-28

The short answer to this point is that plaintiffs who bring an action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which raises a substantial constitutional question are not required to exhaust state administrative remedies before a three-judge court will be convened.

Section 1983 cannot be used as a substitute for habeas corpus to avoid the requirement that state remedies be exhausted.

Grayson ex rel. Grayson v. Eisenstadt · filed 1969-06-17

The law is settled, however, that the civil rights act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, may not be used as a substitute for habeas corpus so as to circumvent the familiar doctrine requiring the exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy supplementary to state remedies, so relief under the statute cannot be defeated for failure to exhaust available state administrative remedies.

James v. Goldberg · filed 1969-08-18

However, one of the purposes of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, is “to provide a remedy i'n the federal courts supplementary to any remedy any State might have.” McNeese v. Board of Ed., 373 U.S. 668, 672, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 1435, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963). Relief under the Civil Rights Act may not, therefore, be defeated for failure to exhaust available state administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to seek relief in state courts before seeking relief in federal court.

Liles v. The South Carolina Department of Corrections, and William D. Leeke, Director · filed 1969-08-28

Liberally construing Liles’ complaint, he seeks relief under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Resort to state courts before seeking relief in the federal courts is not required in cases arising under either Act.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek relief in federal court without first exhausting state administrative or judicial remedies.

Sostre v. Rockefeller · filed 1969-09-04

This court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Those statutes entail no requirement that state remedies, administrative or judicial, be exhausted before seeking relief in this court.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative or judicial remedies before bringing a federal claim, even when seeking injunctive relief.

Westley v. Rossi · filed 1969-10-09

It has been repeatedly held that exhaustion of state remedies is not required to sustain federal court jurisdiction of claims asserted under 42 U.S. C. § 1983. ... These and other cases are rather clear that where an action is brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the exhaustion of State remedies is not necessary, even though injunctive relief is sought. ... The court therefore does not believe that the defense of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies constitutes a defense in this case.

Section 1983 authorizes recovery only when available state remedies are inadequate, so a state prisoner must exhaust adequate state remedies before obtaining federal relief under the statute.

Holland v. Beto · filed 1970-02-12

But these statutes authorize recovery only if state remedies are inadequate. ... It appears that the remedies provided by the State of Texas for persons with claims like plaintiff's are available and fully adequate.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy only when state procedures are inadequate to afford redress, so available adequate state administrative and judicial remedies must be pursued first.

Schwartz v. Galveston Independent School District · filed 1970-03-10

In holding as I do that § 1983 provides a remedy in federal court only where state procedures are inadequate to afford redress, I do not mean to imply that the 42d Congress could not, had it wished to do so, have provided exclusive or general concurrent jurisdiction in federal court for all or some category of federal question cases.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies, but a coerced-confession claim is not stated unless the confession is used in a way that deprives the person of constitutional rights.

Ransom v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1970-03-20

The charge against William Thornton and Edward Funk is that they coerced a confession from Ransom. There is no averment as to what use, if any, was made of the allegedly illegally obtained confession. There is no obligation to exhaust state remedies before instituting suit under the Civil Rights Act, but unless and until some use is made of an illegally obtained confession in such a way as to deprive a person of constitutional rights, no claim is stated under the Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff may have to await the outcome of his state court criminal proceedings before he may base a claim upon the allegedly improperly obtained confession. See United States ex rel. Dabney v. Rundle, 295 F.Supp. 920 (E.D.Pa.1969); United States ex rel. Williamson v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 298 F.Supp. 1141 (E.D.Pa.1969).

Section 1983 permits a federal court to require exhaustion when adequate state remedies will provide consideration of the federally protected rights.

Burnett v. Short · filed 1970-04-02

Upon examination of the Texas authorities, I conclude that state remedies available to plaintiff are equivalent to the federal remedy provided by § 1983. He therefore must pursue his claim in state court, not here.

Section 1983 relief is unavailable when available state remedies have not been exhausted and are adequate.

Bailey v. Beto · filed 1970-04-14

However, construed liberally, his claim falls within this Court’s civil rights, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; or habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, jurisdiction. But, assuming jurisdiction exists, a federal claim does not exist under these statutes unless available state remedies are either exhausted or inadequate.

Section 1983 claims must first be pursued in state courts when adequate state remedies equivalent or superior to the federal remedy are available.

Quarles v. State of Texas · filed 1970-05-11

Likewise, Quarles fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he has not exhausted the adequate state remedies available to afford him relief. ... State remedies should be considered adequate if state courts would hear claims similar to the federal claims presented under § 1983, ‘with as compassionate a concern as a federal court would, and suffer from no shortcomings not shared by federal courts which might prevent them from reaching a just result.’ ... Upon examination of the Texas authorities, I conclude that these remedies are available to plaintiff and are either equivalent or superior to the federal remedy provided in § 1983. Quarles must therefore pursue his § 1983 claims in state courts, not here.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state remedies before asserting a cause of action under the statute.

Hamilton v. Schiro · filed 1970-06-25

Plaintiffs did not need to exhaust state remedies as a condition precedent to this court’s asserting jurisdiction over their cause of action grounded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative or judicial remedies before seeking relief in federal court.

Little v. Schafer · filed 1970-09-08

We are thus left with no room for doubt that exhaustion is not a prerequisite to relief under § 1983. It follows that jurisdiction has properly been invoked in this court against the defendant police officers.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a guilty plea before the plaintiff obtains habeas corpus relief and satisfies the requirement to exhaust state remedies.

United States ex rel. Kopystecki v. Lamb · filed 1970-09-22

This procedure is one which is properly the subject of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, rather than a claim under the civil rights act. The court should not be required to pass upon the validity of plaintiff’s guilty plea in a civil rights action prior to his seeking and establishing that fact by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. ... “The civil rights statutes are not a substitute for habeas corpus relief, and cannot be used to circumvent the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies.”

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state administrative remedies when the constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial to require a three-judge court.

Rodriguez v. Swank · filed 1970-09-23

His first contention is that plaintiffs, by failing to pursue the state administrative appeal allowed by 23 Ill.Rev.Stat. § 11-8, have failed to exhaust their state remedies and are precluded from suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, we think that this argument is foreclosed by King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2131, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968), holding that a plaintiff suing under § 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies “where the constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial, as here, to require the convening of a three-judge court.”

Section 1983 provides a federal forum for constitutional civil-rights claims without requiring exhaustion of available state remedies.

Moreno v. Gerald C. Henckel, Jr. · filed 1970-09-23

Whatever this senator or that senator may have said in the debates, the language of the act is unqualified and provides no basis for a judge-made limitation requiring exhaustion of state remedies. ... The necessary effect of § 1983 is to make federal courts accessible for the protection of federal personal rights. ... Congress, in unqualified terms, has provided a federal forum for civil wrongs of constitutional dimensions and for violations of specific civil rights laws.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state remedies before seeking federal relief for constitutional violations under color of state law.

Simmons v. Jones · filed 1970-10-01

Moreover, the plaintiff is not required to exhaust his state remedies before applying to a federal court for relief against infringement of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. This action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivation of federal constitutional rights by officials acting under color of state law. In such cases there is not any exhaustion requirement.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state judicial remedies before seeking relief, although the availability of state judicial review may bear on whether due process was adequate.

Brockway v. Tofany · filed 1970-10-05

Furthermore, while we recognize that exhaustion of state judicial remedies is not required as a condition to seeking relief here, Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 88 S.Ct. 2119, 20 L.Ed.2d 1319 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 88 S.Ct. 526, 19 L.Ed.2d 647 (1967) ; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), the availability of judicial review by way of an Article 78 proceeding in the New York state courts is a factor which we are entitled to consider in determining whether due process exists.

Section 1983 does not require a claimant to exhaust administrative remedies when the official responsible for the deprivation denied or discouraged access to the available procedure.

Dunham v. Philip B. Crosby, Jr. · filed 1970-12-18

These procedures are self-starting: appellant is not required to request a hearing; he can be dismissed only after a hearing. None of these procedures were complied with. ... In this case, assuming there was a remedy, the Superintendent cannot rely on appellant’s failure to exhaust because-he took steps to deny appellant access to the procedure. ... Having ignored appellant’s procedural rights, the Superintendent can not now rely on exhaustion. Even the strongest judicial supporters of exhaustion in section 1983 actions acknowledge that the doctrine is not to be applied woodenly.

Section 1983 permits a person alleging deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law to seek a federal remedy even when a state forum is available.

Roumani v. Leestamper · filed 1971-08-03

Plaintiff grounds his complaint upon the premise that the manner in which defendants have determined not to renew his contract, incontrovertibly action under color of state law, operates to deprive him of the specifically enumerated constitutional right to due process of law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants take the contrary position that plaintiff’s injury, if any, arises out of a contract dispute more properly litigated in the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and is not colored by a constitutional claim sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this court. Even if plaintiff has a readily available state forum in which to litigate these matters, he is not precluded from seeking a federal remedy here. See Monroe v. Pape, 1961, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492; McNeese v. Board of Education, 1963, 373 U.S. 668, 671, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622.