42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 claim cannot proceed against the named defendants when the allegations identify only an unjoined person as a possible defendant.

Fridman v. City of New York · filed 2002-12-10

Based on Fridman’s allegations, it would seem that the only possible defendant to his § 1983 suit is Ms. Claxon, an employee of New York City’s Office of Employment Services. She was not, however, named as a defendant in the suit.

A § 1983 claim may fail because the named defendants cannot be sued for it, even if the underlying claims may be viable.

Bullock v. North Carolina General Assembly · filed 2004-06-16

However, to the extent Bullock has stated any potentially viable claims, those claims are not cognizable against the named defendants in a § 1983 action; instead, Bullock may be able to pursue these claims, if he is convicted, in a federal habeas action after he has exhausted his state remedies.

A Section 1983 claim against the Euless police department must name the City of Euless as the defendant.

Rogers v. Euless Police Department · filed 2004-08-18

The district court did not err in determining that the proper defendant was the City of Euless, Texas, not the Euless Police Department.

Section 1983 permits an injunction against officials authorized to enforce the challenged rule.

Family Trust Fndtn v. KY Judicial Conduct · filed 2004-10-27

Counsels' statement that Appellants are not authorized to enforce SCR 4.300 and thereby are not proper parties to an injunction under § 1983 is accordingly in error.

Officials authorized to enforce a challenged rule are proper parties to an action for injunctive relief under § 1983.

Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission · filed 2004-10-27

Counsels' statement that Appellants are not authorized to enforce SCR 4.300 and thereby are not proper parties to an injunction under § 1983 is accordingly in error.

A Section 1983 claim cannot rest on alleged misconduct by guards who are not named as defendants.

Parker v. Chester Mental Health Center · filed 2004-12-01

He includes references to the alleged assaults in 1991 and 2001, but, limitations issues aside, none of the guards who were involved are named as defendants in Parker’s complaint, and so we may ignore these incidents.

Section 1983 does not permit a police department to be sued as a defendant.

Joseph v. West Manheim Police Dept. · filed 2005-05-18

However, as the District Court determined, the Department is not a proper defendant in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In a Section 1983 suit, a plaintiff with a serious claim who names the wrong defendant should have an opportunity to amend when the proper defendants are readily identifiable, even without requesting amendment.

Riblet v. W.C. Seabold · filed 1989-03-22

However, Riblet raised a facially valid eighth amendment claim, and the proper parties-defendants, i.e., the offending guards, are readily discernable from the pleadings. Under these circumstances, where a plaintiff alleges a serious claim yet sues the wrong defendant, the action should not be dismissed on that basis, even when the plaintiff failed to file a motion to amend or respond to the motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 claims about a transferred prisoner’s classification and conditions of confinement must be brought against officials who can control those conditions.

Garcia v. LeMaster · filed 2006-03-02

New Mexico corrections officials have no say in his classification in California, nor can they take any affirmative action with respect to conditions of confinement. Garcia therefore brought these claims in the wrong federal district court and named the wrong defendants.

Section 1983 claims may be brought against law enforcement officials or other state actors, rather than the United States Government.

Jackson v. United States · filed 1995-09-25

This court neither makes nor intimates any decision concerning the merit of this allegation, but we note that in an action instituted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the proper defendants would be the law enforcement officials or other state actors rather than the United States Government.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil rights claim against a school district’s insurer when the insurer is neither a state actor nor a person within the section’s meaning.

Burreson v. Barneveld School District · filed 2006-06-08

Its only connection to this case is through its insurance contract with defendant Barneveld School District. Because it is neither a “state actor” nor a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, it is not a proper defendant to plaintiffs civil rights claims.

A plaintiff alleging unconstitutional searches does not state a valid § 1983 claim when the complaint brings no claim against a governmental entity.

Morris v. Goggans · filed 2006-08-09

Although Morris alleges violations of his constitutional rights arising out of allegedly unlawful searches, he did not bring any claim against a governmental entity and thus has not brought a valid claim pursuant to either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971).

An Ohio county sheriff’s office is not a separate entity that can be sued under § 1983, although the sheriff can be sued.

Petty v. County of Franklin, Ohio · filed 2007-03-06

Unlike a county sheriffs office, the sheriff himself may be considered a proper legal entity for purposes of suit under § 1983. In fact, that is exactly what the district court did in allowing Petty’s suit against Sheriff Karnes to proceed at least to the summary judgment stage. There is no merit, therefore, to Petty’s argument that the Franklin County Sheriffs Office be implicated as a separate legal entity in this suit.

A District of Columbia agency is not a suable defendant in a § 1983 action; the District of Columbia is the proper defendant.

Cason v. D.C. Department of Corrections · filed 2007-03-09

The DOC is an agency of the District of Columbia government. A District agency is not a suable entity. ... Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the DOC as a party to this action, and will substitute the District of Columbia as the proper party Defendant.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil rights claim against an insurer whose only connection to the alleged misconduct is an insurance contract and who neither acted for the state nor misused state power.

Brunner v. McKillip · filed 2007-05-17

Its only connection to this case appears to be through its unidentified insurance contract with one or both of the other defendants. Because it is neither a “state actor” nor a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, defendant Wausau Insurance Company is not a proper defendant to plaintiffs civil rights claims and will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not make a county’s insurer a proper defendant merely because it may indemnify county officials; the insurer must have acted under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Wagner v. Washington County · filed 2007-07-12

Furthermore, although the county’s insurance company may be obliged to indemnify county officials found liable in a suit under § 1983, the insurer is not an appropriate party to the suit because it is not a state actor, nor did it deprive Wagner of any constitutional rights while acting under the color of a state statute.

Section 1983 employment equal protection claims are brought against individual employees, while Title VII claims are brought against the employer.

Salas v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections · filed 2007-07-18

The only difference is that a Title VII claim is against an employer, while an equal protection claim is against individual employees.

Section 1983 allows actions only against persons; a statute is not a proper defendant.

Mahogany v. Louisiana State Supreme Court · filed 2008-01-25

Actions under § 1983 may be brought only against “persons,” so Mahogany has no private right of action against the statute, which is not a person.

A § 1983 claim cannot proceed against named defendants when the official responsible for the alleged violation was not named in the complaint.

Iota Xi Chapter of the Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Patterson · filed 2008-03-10

The claim cannot be prosecuted in this litigation because the proper party has not been named as a defendant. David Shaw, the director of judicial affairs, administratively adjudicated the charges related to the members’ display of Sigma Chi letters and imposed the allegedly unconstitutional sanction. He was not named in the Chapter’s complaint.

Section 1983 permits suit against the USPC commissioners in their official capacities for acts under the D.C. Revitalization Act, rather than against the Commission itself.

Sellmon v. Reilly · filed 2008-05-05

Following the authority of Fletcher I, plaintiffs here have properly sued the Chairman and the Commissioners of the USPC in their official capacities, and not the Commission itself, for acts taken by the defendants pursuant to their authority under the Revitalization Act.

A state official responsible for enforcing a challenged law is a proper defendant in a § 1983 action seeking to enjoin its enforcement.

Sherman Ex Rel. Sherman v. Township High School District 214 · filed 2008-06-02

For these reasons, the court concludes that Dr. Koch, in his official capacity as the State Superintendent of Education, is the responsible state officer for enforcing the period of silence statute, and is therefore a proper party defendant in this case.

Section 1983 claims pleaded against New York City’s HPD are treated as claims against the City because HPD is not a proper party.

Okolie v. Paikoff · filed 2008-12-11

HPD is an agency of the City of New York and as such it is not a proper party to this action. ... However, because the actions of HPD are, of course, attributable to the City of New York, the claims Okolie pleads against HPD are deemed to be pled against the City, as well.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against county jails because they are not legal entities amenable to suit.

Maxwell v. Linn County Corr. Center · filed 2009-02-04

Nevertheless, we affirm the dismissal because we conclude Maxwell’s complaint failed to state a viable claim. See Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining a dismissal may be affirmed “on any basis supported by the record”); Owens v. Scott County Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (deciding “county jails are not legal entities amenable to suit”).

A State is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action.

Amusement Devices Ass'n v. State of Ohio · filed 1977-07-26

The Court agrees with defendants when they assert that the State of Ohio is not a proper ... party defendant in this § 1983 action, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961).

State corrections officials who transfer a prisoner out of state remain proper defendants under § 1983 for a claim that the prisoner lacks meaningful access to the sending state’s courts.

Rich v. George A. Zitnay, Etc. · filed 1981-03-13

In view of the likelihood that Maine officials will necessarily have to play a role in the remedy and because of the fundamental nature of the right involved, we think that Maine authorities may not wash their hands of their obligation to insure access to Maine courts simply by transferring a prisoner out of state; ... They are therefore properly defendants. ... We hold only that these pro se plaintiffs have pleaded a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 relief requires suing the official whose acts caused the alleged constitutional injury.

Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Patterson · filed 2009-05-13

Thus, Shaw was the official who inflicted the alleged constitutional injury on the plaintiffs.

Section 1983 provides relief when official action deprives a person of First Amendment rights and requires suit against officials charged with enforcing the challenged state measure.

Stilp v. Contino · filed 2009-06-29

Section 1983 affords an entitlement to relief where official action deprives an individual of his or her First Amendment rights. ... To enjoin application of an unconstitutional state statute under § 1983, a plaintiff must bring suit against those officials charged with enforcement of the contested measure.

A state election commission sued as an entity is not a proper defendant under § 1983, but its commissioners sued in their official capacities may be defendants for injunctive relief.

South Carolina Green Party v. South Carolina State Election Commission · filed 2009-08-12

To the extent that SCSEC was sued as an entity, the court finds that SCSEC is not a proper defendant. ... The court finds that the SCSEC Commissioners are proper defendants only as to claims for injunctive relief in their official capacities.

The state labor secretary can be a proper defendant in a § 1983 challenge to labor regulations administered by that agency.

TRI-M GROUP, LLC v. Sharp · filed 2010-04-14

The court dismisses at the outset defendant’s various arguments that plaintiff lacks standing to bring the instant suit. ... defendant argues that the Secretary of Labor is an improper defendant in this § 1983 action. Defendant cites no authority supporting this position. (D.I. 79 at 3) The Secretary of Labor heads the DDOL, which administers the state’s labor laws.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to enjoin enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute to sue the officials charged with enforcing it.

Stilp v. Contino · filed 2010-09-30

To enjoin application of an unconstitutional state statute under § 1983, a plaintiff must bring suit against those officials charged with enforcement of the contested measure.

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed against a county department that is not a separate legal entity capable of being sued.

Tepeyac v. Montgomery County · filed 2011-03-15

The claims against the Department of Health and Human Services must be dismissed because that department is not a separate, legally cognizable unit capable of being sued.

Section 1983 permits constitutional claims against employees of the United States Parole Commission or CSOSA, but not against the United States or either agency.

Chandler v. James · filed 2011-05-04

As for Mr. Chandler’s constitutional claims, such claims may be brought against employees of the Parole Commission or of CSOSA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Such claims may not be brought against the United States itself or against either the Commission or CSOSA.

Section 1983 treats a municipality and its police department as a single entity for liability, so the department cannot be sued separately alongside the municipality.

Trafton v. City of Woodbury · filed 2011-06-29

For purposes of section 1983 liability, municipalities and its police departments are treated as a “single entity.”

Section 1983 does not make a county a proper defendant for alleged acts by an employee of a separate governmental entity.

El Paso County v. Solorzano · filed 2011-09-21

Having determined that the El Paso Juvenile Probation Department is a separate governmental entity apart from the County, we conclude that El Paso County was not a proper party to Ms. Solorzano’s Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state agency or state officers acting in their official capacities.

Tracy v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children Services · filed 2012-06-29

Because individuals acting in their official capacity are immune from suit under § 1983, the Tracys would not have been helped by amending their pleading.

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed against a city council that is not a political unit separate from the city.

Williamson v. Bade · filed 2012-11-29

Also, the City Council is not a separate political unit. Rather, it is Flint who owes Williamson unpaid compensation for the services as mayor, if any, and the obligation to indemnify him, if such is the ease, as described below. Thus, the first amended complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief against Bade, Walling, Brown and the City Council.

Section 1983 permits suits against municipalities, but a municipal department is not a proper defendant.

Nelson v. County of Sacramento · filed 2013-02-26

Because the Sheriffs Department is a subdivision of a local government entity (in this case the County), the Sheriffs Department is not a proper defendant for purposes of Plaintiffs § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 permits claims against state officials in their individual capacities, but the State cannot be a defendant.

Hernandez v. Palmer · filed 2013-09-19

Because the State cannot be a proper defendant to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, see Will, 491 U.S. at 64-70, NRS 41.031 and NRS 41.0337 necessarily do not apply to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions. Instead, to the extent that Hernandez's complaint was intended to institute a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action, Palmer, Widmar, and Olivas, in their individual capacities were the proper defendants to that action, not the State.

A state official is a proper defendant in a § 1983 official-capacity challenge to a state law only if the official has a particular duty to enforce it and a demonstrated willingness to do so.

Morris v. Livingston · filed 2014-02-10

The required “connection” is not “merely the general duty to see that the laws of the state are implemented,” but “the particular duty to enforce the statute in question and a demonstrated willingness to exercise that duty.” Id. at 416. ... Section 501.063 does not specially task Governor Perry with its enforcement, or suggest that he will play any role at all in its enforcement. As a result, Governor Perry is not a proper defendant.

Section 1983 permits an official responsible for carrying out injunctive relief to be named as a defendant even without personal involvement in the alleged violation.

Colwell v. Bannister · filed 2014-08-14

There are no facts indicating Director Skolnik was personally involved in Colwell’s medical care, but the current NDOC Director is still a proper defendant in Colwell’s claim for injunctive relief “because he would be responsible for ensuring that injunctive relief was carried out, even if he was not personally involved in the decision giving rise to [the plaintiffs] claims.”

Section 1983 does not allow suit against the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office as a separate entity or against its assistant district attorneys in their official capacities.

Estate of Tyler ex rel. Floyd v. Grossman · filed 2015-06-11

As stated above, however, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office is not a separate legal entity for the purposes of Section 1983. Because the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office must be dismissed, the official capacity claims against Dupree and Grossman must also be dismissed.

A Section 1983 claim cannot proceed against the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office as a separate defendant; Maricopa County is the proper party.

Ramirez v. Arpaio · filed 2015-09-02

The district court properly dismissed the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”), sued as the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department, because Maricopa County is the proper party.

A § 1983 plaintiff alleging excessive force must name the officers involved when the complaint states no claim against the defendants originally named.

Felton v. City of Chicago · filed 2016-06-28

Because Felton did not name the specific officers involved in his arrest, he must amend his complaint, so he will have the opportunity to add detail to his car chase allegations.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state, and an official-capacity claim for prospective declaratory relief requires the state officer to have a connection to enforcing the challenged law.

Thigpen v. Cooper · filed 2013-03-05

Under Ex Parte Young, plaintiffs must show that Attorney General Cooper has some connection with the enforcement of the marriage statutes alleged to be unconstitutional. ... In sum, neither the State nor Attorney General Cooper are “persons” for purposes of plaintiffs’ claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to name a warden in her official capacity when seeking an injunction that the warden would be responsible for carrying out.

Tolentino v. Baker · filed 2017-03-09

A warden, named officially, is a proper party in a suit where a prisoner seeks injunctive relief from prison staff- because the warden would be responsible for ensuring that the order is carried out, Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011).

A § 1983 claim must be directed at the person or entity responsible for the alleged deprivation.

McMillon v. Reinstein · filed 2017-03-09

To the extent McMillon alleges that Smet or another Wisconsin state employee or agency made an unauthorized disclosure downstream, again, that entity represents the proper defendant.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against non-state actors, and a claim against a housing authority must allege an official policy or custom.

Thermuthis Lee v. Petrolichio · filed 2017-09-21

We also note that Tomlin and Smith (as non-state actors) are not proper Defendants in a § 1983 action. Nor is the PHA—Lee did not allege an “official policy or custom.”

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a jail that is not a person; a claim against an administrator requires facts showing personal involvement or a basis for supervisory liability.

Brantner v. North Central Regional Jail · filed 2018-02-20

As an initial matter, he reasoned that NCRJ is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that Brantner never alleged any personal involvement or facts establishing that the NCRJ Administrator should be held liable in his supervisory capacity. ... Upon review of the R&R and the record for clear error, the Court: ... 1) ADOPTS the R&R (Dkt. No. 34); ... 4) DISMISSES the complaint WITH PREJUDICE (Dkt. No. 1).

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a sheriff’s department that has no legal existence separate from the municipality.

Keller v. Gruninger · filed 2018-06-21

The Winnebago County Sheriff’s Department, however, is not a proper defendant to this action. ... The Department is dismissed with prejudice.

A prison is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983, and a warden cannot be held liable under the section solely through respondeat superior.

Baskerville v. Dr. Young · filed 2018-07-09

The District Court correctly determined that Dauphin County Prison was not an entity subject to suit under § 1983, see Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973) (per curiam), and that liability could not be imposed on the Warden under § 1983 based on the principle of respondeat superior, see Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005).

Section 1983 permits suit against county judges who act as policymakers by promulgating bail schedules that cause an alleged constitutional violation.

Daves v. Dall. Cnty. · filed 2018-09-20

The administration of the schedules was thus, in other words, an official policy promulgated by a municipal policymaker that became the driving force behind an alleged constitutional violation. As such, the Court finds the judges are proper defendants under section 1983.

A sheriff’s office is not a suable entity and cannot be named as a defendant in a § 1983 claim.

Napier v. County Commission of Lincoln County · filed 2018-10-17

However, a sheriff’s office is not a proper party because it is not a suable entity.

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed against a county corrections department that is not a suable entity.

Miller II v. Loves Park Police Dept. · filed 2019-01-14

First, “Winnebago County Corrections” is not a suable entity.

A § 1983 complaint must name the people alleged to have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Salmons v. Western Regional Jail · filed 2019-01-16

As previously explained, to state a plausible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff needs to add as defendants the person or persons at the Western Regional Jail that she believes violated her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits claims against state employees in their individual capacities without naming the State, which is not a proper defendant.

CRAIG VS. DONNELLY · filed 2019-02-28

We hold that, while a plaintiff must name the State as a party to any state tort claims in order to comply with NRS 41.031 and NRS 41.0337, this statutory requirement does not apply to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, even when brought in the same complaint as a plaintiffs state tort claims. Indeed, the State cannot be named as a party to a plaintiffs § 1983 civil rights claims.

Section 1983 permits claims against state employees in their individual capacities without naming the State, which cannot be a defendant to those claims.

Craig v. Donnelly · filed 2019-02-28

Any claims brought pursuant to § 1983, however, need only name the state employees, in their individual capacities, as parties to the § 1983 claims. The plaintiff need not-and indeed cannot-name the State as a party to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a police department that is not a separate entity from its city.

Evariste v. Boston Police Department · filed 2019-03-27

The Boston Police Department is not an entity separate from the City of Boston, and therefore not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

A § 1983 claim may be dismissed without prejudice when it fails against the named defendants but the complaint identifies other individuals who may be responsible for the alleged violation.

Jackson v. Jackson · filed 2019-04-09

We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that Jackson failed to state a claim against the named defendants. We note, though, that Jackson alleges in her complaint that other individuals sought “revenge” against her for beating up a jail deputy by not treating Jackson’s keratoconus, “a permanent serious eye disease.” A jail official’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment and provides a cause of action under § 1983. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976); Jehovah v. Clarke, 798 F.3d 169, 181 (4th Cir. 2015). In order to preserve Jackson’s ability to file such a claim against the proper defendants, dismissal should be without prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a Mississippi jail that has no legal existence apart from its county.

Shead v. Washington County Correctional Facility · filed 2019-05-17

As an initial matter, Washington County Correctional Facility must be dismissed, as it is not a proper defendant in an action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires suit against a person; a state and its agency are not persons under the statute.

Miller v. State · filed 2019-06-12

And, stating a claim under section 1983 does require suit against "persons," not the state or its ORC.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a contractor that did not provide the care underlying the alleged violation.

Williams v. Magee · filed 2019-07-24

Upon review of the contracts between the DOC and CCS and MHM Services, Inc., the Court agrees that Plaintiff has misidentified CCS as the entity responsible for providing mental health services to DOC inmates. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief against CCS, and the Court will therefore grant CCS’s motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county correctional facility that lacks legal capacity; the county is the proper municipal defendant.

Rotchford v. Swanson Services Corporation · filed 2019-08-07

The Clallam County Correctional Facility is not a legal entity capable of being sued under § 1983. Rather, Clallam County, a municipality, would be the proper defendant.

Section 1983 requires a viable defendant responsible for the alleged rights violation.

Hill v. Rickman · filed 2019-08-07

Although Plaintiff now seeks to add new allegations to his original complaint, he does not name a defendant responsible for his placement in the stupid box. ... Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Section 1983 for such allegations.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim against a state agency because the agency is not a suable person under the statute.

Alspaugh v. Nebraska Department of Corrections · filed 2019-08-12

States or governmental entities that are considered arms of the state are not suable “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989), and suits for money damages against the state or its agencies are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. ... Accordingly, the NDCS must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 sex discrimination claims must be brought against the individual decisionmakers alleged to have discriminated against the plaintiff.

Purtue, Lisa v. State of Wisconsin Department of Corrections · filed 2019-08-16

The same standard applies to both types of claims, Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d 774, 788 n.13 (7th Cir. 2003), except that the Title VII claim must be brought against the former employer and the § 1983 claims must be brought against the individual decisionmakers who discriminated against the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against a jail because a jail is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Hall v. Neosho County Jail · filed 2019-08-30

In the MOSC, the Court found that: ... Prison and jail facilities are not proper defendants because none is a “person” subject to suit for money damages under § 1983. ... Plaintiff has failed to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons set forth in the MOSC.

A county detention facility is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action.

Garrison v. Saline County Detention Center · filed 2019-09-05

The Court adopts Judge Kearney’s Proposed Findings and Recommendations to the extent Judge Kearney recommends dismissing Mr. Garrison’s claims against the Saline County Detention Facility, which is not a proper defendant (Dkt. No. 10).

A § 1983 complaint against officers must identify the specific person alleged to have committed the constitutional violation.

Beckett v. Unknown Police Officer · filed 2019-09-05

Accordingly, the proper defendant in a § 1983 action is the specific person who is alleged to have committed a constitutional violation. Accordingly, I will give Beckett thirty days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint in C18-0117-LTS.

A jail building is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Stull, Brandon v. Mahoney, David · filed 2019-09-12

Similarly, with respect to his assertion that his medical needs were ignored at the Dane County Jail, the Dane County Jail is a building; it is not a “person” as defined by § 1983.

A jail cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is a building that cannot accept service of a complaint.

Moen, Zachary v. Rock County Jail · filed 2019-09-12

First, the only named defendant -- the Rock County Jail -- cannot be sued under § 1983 because a jail is a building and cannot accept service of the complaint.

A § 1983 complaint must name a proper defendant even when its allegations could establish a constitutional violation.

(PC) Dunbar v. California Corrections Department · filed 2019-09-20

The complaint contains allegations that could state a claim for excessive force and deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. However, the complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend because plaintiff has failed to name a proper defendant in this action.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a police department or its unit when they are merely parts of a municipality.

LEWIS v. HERRERIAS · filed 2019-09-20

A police department, and similarly a unit within a police department, are not proper parties to a § 1983 action because they are merely sub-units of government that are not distinct from the municipality of which they are a part.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a person acting under color of state law; Napa State Hospital is not a person for this purpose.

Silverman v. Napa State Hospital · filed 2019-09-23

However, Plaintiff has again failed to satisfy the second element to state a § 1983 claim, i.e., that a person acting under the color of state law committed the Eighth Amendment violation. Plaintiff again names NHS as the defendant, but NHS is not an individual nor a “person” to satisfy the second element.

Section 1983 does not allow a local law enforcement department to be sued as a separate defendant.

Haag v. San Diego Sheriff Dep · filed 2019-09-23

Local law enforcement departments, like the San Diego Sheriff’s Department, municipal agencies, or subdivisions of that department or agency, are not proper defendants under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county correctional facility that is only an administrative arm of the county and has no independent legal identity.

Williams v. Suffolk County · filed 2019-09-25

Because the Suffolk County Correctional Facility is merely an administrative arm of the municipality, Suffolk County, it does not have an independent legal identity and cannot be sued.

Section 1983 does not allow a county jail to be sued as a legal entity separate from the county it serves.

Chase v. Blue · filed 2019-10-08

First, he recommended that this court dismiss the jail as a defendant because it is not a suable entity under §1983. Dkt. No. 10 at 3–4. The court agrees. Jails, and sheriff’s departments, are not “legal entit[ies] separable from the county government which [they] serve [] . . . .” Whiting v. Marathon Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 382 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 2004).

A claim under Section 1983 against state officers is insufficient when the plaintiff names only DOJ as a defendant.

Patterson v. Harris · filed 2019-10-08

While Plaintiff does generally refer to actions taken by unnamed U.S. Marshals, see Am. Compl., ¶¶ 44–50, he asserts this claim only against DOJ. Id., ¶ 15. ... For the same reason, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a claim against state officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A police department or a unit within it is not a proper defendant under § 1983 because it is not distinct from its municipality.

MCLAUGHLIN v. WARDEN · filed 2019-10-10

A police department, and similarly a unit within a police department, are not proper parties to a § 1983 action because they are merely sub-units of government that are not distinct from the municipality of which they are a part.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a police department or one of its units because it is not distinct from the municipality.

MCINTOSH v. ATLANTIC CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT · filed 2019-10-11

A police department, and similarly a unit within a police department, are not proper parties to a § 1983 action because they are merely sub-units of government that are not distinct from the municipality of which they are a part.

Section 1983 claims require defendants who acted under color of state law and are not immune from suit.

Walker v. Dudek · filed 2019-10-11

Further, dismissal without leave to amend is proper because Defendants are not state actors or are immune from suit under § 1983, and Plaintiff would be unable to allege facts to show that these Defendants are proper Defendants in such an action.

A county detention center is not an entity subject to suit under Section 1983; claims against it are treated as claims against the county.

Boyer v. Daviess County Detention Center · filed 2019-10-16

DCDC, the only named Defendant, is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

A sheriff’s department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Smith v. Madison County Sheriff's Department · filed 2019-10-22

The Madison County Sheriff’s Department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a local law enforcement department to be sued as a separate defendant.

Spatcher v. Baird · filed 2019-10-24

Local law enforcement departments, municipal agencies, or subdivisions of that department or agency, are not proper defendants under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a city police department or county sheriff’s department to be sued as a separate defendant when the municipality is named.

Batyukova v. Doege · filed 2019-10-29

Finally, the Medina County Sheriff’s Department and the Castroville Police Department are not proper defendants under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against police departments, sheriff’s departments, or county jails that are not separate legal entities.

Smith v. Clinton Police Department · filed 2019-11-06

Plaintiff is advised that the Clinton Police Department, the Madison County Sheriff’s Department, and the Warren County Jail are not separate legal entities that may be sued under § 1983.

A county sheriff’s department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Greer, Sr. v. Madison County Sheriff's Department · filed 2019-11-06

The Madison County Sheriff’s Department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a suit against election officials whose duties sufficiently connect them to the challenged ballot-access rules.

Constitution Party v. Cortes · filed 2016-06-02

Our case law likewise supports the notion that the Appellants in this case play a sufficient role in administering § 2911(b) and other ballot-access provisions to be named as the defendants in Appellees’ § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against police or sheriff’s departments as separate entities.

Bugg v. Pulaski Police Department · filed 2019-11-13

Plaintiff names as Defendants the Pulaski Police Department and the Giles County Sheriff’s Department, neither of which is an entity subject to suit under Section 1983.

In a § 1983 suit seeking prospective relief, a state official’s general executive authority and shared power to appoint the official who enforces a challenged law do not make that official a proper defendant.

Osterback v. Rick Scott · filed 2019-07-30

The Governor’s general authority to enforce Florida’s laws and his shared responsibility for appointing the director of the DAH do not make the Governor a proper party because, as we have held, a governor’s general executive authority, or even partial responsibility for administering a challenged statute, is insufficient to make the governor a proper party under Ex Parte Young.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a jail building because it is neither an individual nor a policymaking unit of government.

Polk v. Elkhart County Jail · filed 2019-11-14

He cannot proceed against this defendant because it is a building rather than an individual or a policymaking unit of government that can be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The NYPD cannot be sued in its own name in a § 1983 action because it is not a suable entity.

Strachn v. NYPD · filed 2019-11-14

Plaintiff’s claims against the NYPD must be dismissed because it cannot be sued in its own name.

Section 1983 permits suit only against officials directly responsible for a constitutional violation.

Key v. Kohl · filed 2019-11-15

The Milwaukee County Jail is not the correct defendant in this matter and will be dismissed. Only those officials who are directly responsible for a constitutional violation may be sued under Section 1983.

A county sheriff’s department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Elam v. Lake County Sheriff's Department · filed 2019-12-05

The Lake County Sheriff’s Department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against a municipality, but not its police department.

Cabasquini v. New Haven Police Department · filed 2019-12-11

While a municipality is subject to suit under section 1983, see Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), a municipal police department is not, see Reed v. Hartford Police Dep’t, 2004 WL 813028, at *2 (D. Conn. 2004) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the claim against the NHPD is dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a sheriff’s department, jail, or police department as separate entities.

Williams v. Chester County Sheriff Department/Chester County Criminal Justice Complex · filed 2019-12-18

Neither the Chester County Sheriff’s Department, the CCJC, nor the Henderson Police Department is an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

In a Section 1983 suit seeking injunctive relief, the court may retain the prison official able to implement the injunction and dismiss other officials whose conduct the injunction would bind.

Hoffman, III v. TDCJ · filed 2019-12-20

Hoffman’s objections to dismissing other parties who allegedly cause him harm are understandable but not necessary. ... The Court overrules Hoffman’s objections regarding the defendants and ADOPTS the M&R’s recommendation to retain the deliberate indifference claims.

A city police department that is a division of the city is not separately subject to suit under § 1983.

Oyadomari v. Choy · filed 2020-01-06

The Honolulu Police Department is a division of the City and County of Honolulu and is not separately subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an institution’s medical staff as a whole.

(PC) Lopez v. Brown · filed 2020-01-14

This objection is without merit, however, since plaintiff has not brought, nor could he bring, a claim against the medical staff as a whole at his institution of confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a county sheriff’s department that is not a separate suable entity.

Brena v. Johnson · filed 2020-01-21

However, “[c]ourts routinely dismiss § 1983 claims that name and seek to impose liability directly upon municipal and county police departments because police departments are not separate suable entities.” ... Therefore, Defendant Carter County Sheriff’s Office is DISMISSED from this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against the Philadelphia Prison System because it is not a “person” under the statute.

HOLMES v. PHILADELPHIA PRISON SYSTEM · filed 2020-01-23

The Philadelphia Prison System is not considered a “person” for purposes of § 1983.

A county jail is not a proper defendant under § 1983.

Neal v. Shaw · filed 2020-01-24

As the Court previously stated, the Yakima County Jail is not a proper Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to name defendants who are amenable to suit.

Thomason v. State of Washington County of Spokane Superior Courts · filed 2020-01-27

Specifically, Plaintiff failed to name as Defendants persons who are amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A detention center is not a proper defendant in a Section 1983 lawsuit.

McLemore v. Wagner · filed 2020-01-27

The Clerk is also directed to dismiss Defendant Kankakee County Detention Center since the jail is an improper Defendant in a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to name a defendant amenable to suit under the statute.

Thomason v. State of Washington · filed 2020-01-29

Specifically, Plaintiff fails to name as Defendants persons who are amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to name defendants amenable to suit under it.

Thomason v. State of Washington · filed 2020-01-31

Specifically, Plaintiff failed to name as Defendants persons who are amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a county jail or its medical staff to be sued as entities.

(PC) Tanksley v. Sacramento County Jail · filed 2020-02-06

Additionally, from what can be discerned from the document plaintiff has sued two entities – the Sacramento County Jail and the Sacramento County Jail Medical Staff – who are not proper defendants in a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county correctional center that is merely an administrative arm of the county and lacks an independent legal identity.

Ramjas v. Nassau County Correctional Center · filed 2020-02-07

However, because the Nassau County Correctional Center is merely an administrative arm of the municipality, Nassau County, it does not have an independent legal identity and cannot be sued.

Section 1983 suits seeking to change CDCR policy must name an official who can carry out the requested injunction, such as the CDCR Secretary in his official capacity.

(PC) O'Connor v. CDCR · filed 2020-02-10

The proper defendant for injunctive relief in a suit seeking a change of CDCR policy is the CDCR Secretary in his official capacity.

A county sheriff’s office is not a suable entity under Section 1983.

Montgomery v. Wellpath Medical · filed 2020-02-10

Furthermore, “the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office is not a suable entity under § 1983.”

Section 1983 requires a prisoner to identify the officials who personally participated in the alleged deprivation; the state corrections department cannot be named as a defendant.

(PC) Sahm v. Ruff · filed 2020-02-11

In pleading for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, petitioner must again identify each individual government official who he believes specifically took part in the alleged acts. Petitioner is cautioned that he cannot bring suit against a government agency, such as California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, but must instead specifically identify each individual government official.

A municipal police department is not a proper defendant under § 1983 because it is a subunit of the municipality.

MATTIA v. JOINT DRUG TASK FORCE · filed 2020-02-14

Thus, while a municipality may be liable under § 1983, a police department, as a mere sub-unit of the municipality, may not.

A § 1983 claim against a police department that is a division of city government is treated as a claim against the city.

Young v. Hicks · filed 2020-02-18

However, since the Hopkinsville Police Department is a division of the city government, Plaintiff’s claims against the department are actually brought against the City of Hopkinsville, and the Court will construe them as such.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county jail that is not a legal entity amenable to suit.

Cox v. Day · filed 2020-02-20

Plaintiff sued the Mississippi County Jail, but the Jail is not a legal entity amenable to suit.

Section 1983 permits suits against municipalities, but a police department is not a separate proper defendant because it is a sub-unit of the municipality.

GAYLE v. OFFICER DORWARD · filed 2020-02-24

Accordingly, the Slatington Police Department is not a proper defendant in this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit for money damages against a prison because a prison is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Jackson, DeBradre v. Sousek, Robert · filed 2020-02-25

But the prison is not a “person” subject to suit for money damages under § 1983.

A sheriff’s office is not an entity capable of being sued under Section 1983.

Welker v. Davidson County Sheriff Office · filed 2020-03-11

The sheriff’s office is not an entity capable of being sued under Section 1983.

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed against a facility that is not a legal entity capable of being sued.

Snodgrass v. The Medical/Dental Facility at the Regional Medical Center · filed 2020-03-16

As Defendant is not a legal entity that can be sued, Snodgrass fails to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 permits suits against municipalities but not municipal police departments, which are not “persons” under the section.

Verdun v. City of San Diego · filed 2020-03-23

42 U.S.C. § 1983 permits suit against a “person” acting under the color of law. While local governmental units such as cities or municipalities are considered “persons,” municipal departments and sub-units are not.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a municipal police department because it is not a person under the statute.

Murray v. Scranton Police Department · filed 2020-03-24

At the outset, we note that the Scranton Police Department is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983.

A police department that lacks capacity to be sued under state law is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action.

Walker v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2020-03-27

Thus, because the police department is an agency of the City of Milwaukee, the MPD is not a proper defendant in this case. As to the remaining defendants, however, Walker’s complaint states a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a municipal police department that is merely an administrative arm of the municipality; the municipality is the proper defendant.

ESTATE OF JAMMIE NAJIER SALAAM v. CITY OF NEWARK · filed 2020-03-31

Plaintiff cannot assert § 1983 or tort claims against the Newark PD because it is not a proper party; Newark is the correct party.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county administrative subdivision that is not a legal person.

Trotter v. Arpaio · filed 2020-04-01

Nor is CHS a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983.

A county department of corrections is not a proper defendant under § 1983.

ECHEVARRIA v. ESSEX COUNTY DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2020-04-09

As the Department remains an improper defendant under § 1983, ... the Department shall once again be dismissed from this matter with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not allow a county prison to be sued separately from the county.

Carbaugh v. Franklin County Prison · filed 2020-04-13

Franklin County Prison is a department of Franklin County itself so cannot be sued separately in a § 1983 action and is an improper defendant.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a prison building because it is not an entity that can be sued.

Smith v. Indiana State Prison · filed 2020-04-17

Mr. Smith may be able to assert a valid Eighth Amendment claim, he has not done so here because the Indiana State Prison is a building, not an individual, corporation, or governmental entity that can be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State officials who retain ultimate control over public education can be proper defendants in a § 1983 suit seeking injunctive relief despite delegating school management to local authorities.

Gary B. v. Whitmer · filed 2020-04-23

Furthermore, under this circuit’s precedents, Defendants are proper parties to sue in this case.

A correctional facility is not a suable entity under § 1983.

Williams v. Lanamin · filed 2020-04-23

First, MCCX is not a suable entity under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a jail building because it is not a person.

Kolczak v. Melloy · filed 2020-04-28

In addition, the TCJC is not a proper Defendant because it is a building and not a person what may be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In a prisoner medical care claim under § 1983, defendants must be personally involved in the challenged care; a correctional institution is not a suable person.

Swanson, Christopher v. Waupun Correctional Institution · filed 2020-05-05

As I explained in that order, only individuals who are personally involved with a prisoner’s medical care or treatment can be held liable for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.S. § 1983. ... Instead, he named only Waupun Correctional Institution, which is not a person that may be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims concerning management of a county jail may be brought against the sheriff in his official capacity; a duplicative claim against the county board may be dismissed.

Bowens v. Board of County Commissioners of Custer County · filed 2020-06-02

After that revision, it is clear that actions for alleged failure to properly manage a jail and/or jail staff should be brought against the sheriff of the county rather than the board. Plaintiffs claims against Sheriff Tidwell in his official capacity and those against Defendant Board are duplicative. Defendant Board’s request for dismissal will be granted on this issue.

A jail that is a governmental sub-unit cannot be sued under Section 1983.

Reynard v. Neosho County Jail · filed 2020-06-05

As a governmental sub-unit, the jail cannot sue or be sued, and it is subject to dismissal from this action.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a prison facility that lacks a separate legal identity.

Rutledge v. c/o Elson · filed 2020-06-05

As an initial matter, defendant MCI is not a legal entity capable of being sued under § 1983.

A sheriff’s department that is not a separate legal entity cannot be sued under Section 1983; the county itself must be named.

Gossett v. Pierce County · filed 2020-06-09

Defendant Pierce County Sherriff’s Department is not a legal entity subject to suit.

Section 1983 allows claims against persons acting under color of state law, but a county jail is not a person that can be sued.

McClellon v. Bennett · filed 2020-06-15

As an initial matter, the CCJ is not a proper defendant under Section 1983, which creates a cause of action only against persons acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county sheriff’s department as a separate entity.

Rosenbalm v. Reagan · filed 2020-06-23

First, the Claiborne County Sheriff’s Department cannot be sued under § 1983.

A jail that is not an independent legal entity cannot be sued under § 1983.

Redmond v. Salt Lake County Jail · filed 2020-06-25

The court notes that the Complaint: ... (f) improperly names Salt Lake County Jail as § 1983 defendant, when it is not independent legal entity that can sue or be sued.

A county jail is not a person subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Needham v. Butler County Jail · filed 2020-06-30

The Magistrate Judge concluded that plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because: ... the Butler County Jail cannot be sued because the jail is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and no facts were alleged as to how Sheriff Jones or Attorney General Barr participated in any alleged violation of federal statutory rights. ... Based on the foregoing and upon a de novo review, the Court OVERRULES plaintiff’s objections and the Magistrate Judge’s November 8, 2019 R&R is ADOPTED in its entirety.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a Michigan police department because the department is not a separate legal entity capable of being sued.

Schwab v. Wyoming Police Department · filed 2020-07-02

It is well settled in Michigan that a police department is not a legal entity capable of being sued in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not allow a county jail to be sued because a jail is not a person under the statute.

Bradley v. Rutherford County Jail · filed 2020-07-13

To begin with, the Rutherford County Jail is not a proper defendant under Section 1983, which creates a cause of action against “[e]very person” who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A prison facility is not a person that can be sued under § 1983.

Perkins v. Washburn · filed 2020-07-14

The TTCC “is a building, ‘not a person or legal entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.’” ... Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claims against TTCC will be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a claim for prospective injunctive relief against the state official responsible for carrying out that relief.

Williams 124345 v. Ryan · filed 2020-07-15

Defendant Shinn, in his official capacity, is the proper Defendant with respect to Plaintiff’s injunctive relief claim.

Section 1983 claims challenging a Washington county sheriff’s office must name the county because the office is not a separate legal entity.

Hordon v. Kitsap County Sheriff's Department · filed 2020-07-27

The cases cited under § C(4), above, are persuasive. The Plaintiff fails to point to a Washington statute which indicates that the Washington legislature intended county sheriff’s offices to be a legal entity which was separate from the county itself. ... The Kitsap County Sheriff’s Office should be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county prison that has no legal existence separate from the county.

BARNES v. ERIE COUNTY PRISON ADMINISTRATIVE · filed 2020-08-03

The prison has no legal or corporate existence apart from Erie County itself; therefore, it is not subject to suit under §1983.

A jail facility is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Guinn, Jr. v. Madison County Jail · filed 2020-08-04

The CJC is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

A prison medical department that is not an entity subject to suit cannot be named as a defendant in a Section 1983 action.

HUNTER v. RIVERBEND CORRECTIONAL FACILITY · filed 2020-08-05

The claims against Defendant Riverbend Medical Department were dismissed because Riverbend Medical Department is not an entity subject to suit. ... However, as the Court noted above, the amended complaint does not change the Court’s analysis in its screening order (Doc. 15) for the claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities or the claims against Riverbend Medical Department. Because those claims were dismissed as frivolous, amendment would be futile to the extent it seeks to assert those claims again.

A county jail is not a proper defendant in a Section 1983 action.

LOFTSON v. VIGO COUNTY JAIL · filed 2020-08-11

Furthermore, Vigo County Jail is not a proper defendant in a civil rights action proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

County jails and sheriff’s departments in Michigan are not legal entities subject to suit under § 1983.

Arnold v. St. Clair County Intervention Center · filed 2020-08-13

Section 1983 imposes liability on any “person” who violates an individual’s federal constitutional or statutory rights. It is well-settled under Michigan law that county jails and sheriff’s departments are not legal entities amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a county correctional facility or its medical department because they are arms of the county.

Monroe v. Rockland County Correctional Facility · filed 2020-08-25

Plaintiff sues the RCCF and the RCCF’s Medical Department, which are not proper defendants for claims under § 1983, and are arms of the County of Rockland.

A county jail cannot be sued under Section 1983 because it is not a person subject to suit.

Brown v. Clark · filed 2020-08-27

First, the Milwaukee County Jail is not a proper defendant because § 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a “person” who, acting under color of law, violates his constitutional rights. The jail is not a person. It is not an individual subject to suit under §1983.

Section 1983 permits a pre-enforcement claim against an attorney general when the plaintiff sufficiently alleges a credible threat of enforcement by that official.

California Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta · filed 2020-08-27

Because plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show a credible threat of enforcement by the Attorney General, defendant’s motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim on this basis is DENIED. Moreover, because the Attorney General is a proper defendant for this claim, the court need not address defendant’s arguments with respect to the private enforcers, who are not named as defendants in the operative complaint.