42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 damages claims against judicial officers are barred by absolute judicial immunity when the officers act in a judicial capacity and do not clearly exceed their subject matter jurisdiction.

Cohran v. State Bar of Georgia · filed 1992-03-05

When a judicial officer acts within his judicial capacity and his conduct does not clearly fall outside his subject matter jurisdiction, he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against a psychologist serving a parole board are barred by quasi-judicial immunity when the psychologist performs a function virtually identical to a court-appointed psychiatrist.

Hodgson v. Robbie Waters, Sacramento County Sheriff Detective Humphrey Mark G. Smith Tony Goodman Angela M. · filed 1992-03-23

Court-appointed psychologists and parole board officials are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for performing functions integral to the judicial process. ... Here, Curiale was serving the parole board in a function virtually identical to a court-appointed psychiatrist. Thus, the district court correctly found that she was immune from suit for damages.

Absolute judicial immunity does not bar injunctive relief against state court judges under § 1983.

Hudson v. State of N.C. · filed 1992-04-03

Although the absolute immunity of the state court judges named in this suit would not prevent the district court from awarding injunctive relief, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984); Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811, 813-14 (4th Cir.1975), "lower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions." District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n. 16 (1983) ( quoting Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 296 (1970)).

Judicial immunity protects a judge from Section 1983 civil rights actions for rulings made within the judge’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Irk v. George Deeds, Warden Brian McKay Ag · filed 1992-04-24

As Judge Thompson was within his subject matter jurisdiction in ruling on Irk's motions, he is protected from Section 1983 civil rights actions by judicial immunity.

Judicial immunity bars a § 1983 claim against defendants for their conduct during trial proceedings.

Dhamani v. Choing · filed 1992-05-13

Ms. Dhamani failed to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because defendants are entitled to judicial immunity for their conduct during trial proceedings.

Judges are absolutely immune from damages liability under Section 1983 for judicial acts taken within their jurisdiction.

Ridgway By and Through Ridgway v. Cordes · filed 1992-06-02

Here, Judge Fuller is entitled to absolute immunity because her acts were judicial and she was not acting in the absence of all jurisdiction.

Judges are immune from liability under Section 1983 for acts committed within the course of their judicial duties.

Rose Marie Adams-Ficarro v. Bert B. Bailey, Judge A. Richard Grant, Judge Cathy L. Naugle, Judge · filed 1992-06-03

It is firmly established that judges are immune from liability under section 1983 for acts committed within the course of their official duties.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against judges for their judicial acts because judges are absolutely immune from such liability.

Lawrence S. Krain, M.D. v. Robert Devich Vaino Spencer, Justice United States of America Herman Romm, M.D. · filed 1992-06-04

In addition, the justices are absolutely immune from section 1983 liability for damages for their judicial acts, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 386 (1978), and the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Krain's complaint to the extent the complaint requested the district court to review the state court's judgments, see Mackay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 543 (9th Cir.1987).

Judicial immunity does not bar claims for injunctive relief under Section 1983.

Borders v. Mark Allan Alan Traywick · filed 1992-06-19

Judicial immunity, however, does not bar claims for injunctive relief in section 1983 actions.

Judges are absolutely immune from section 1983 damages liability for judicial acts unless they act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Fatty v. State of Ariz. · filed 1992-06-26

Further, the judges are absolutely immune from section 1983 liability for damages for their judicial acts in ruling on Fatty's motion for his trial transcripts. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-62 (1978) (judges are subject to section 1983 liability for damages only when they act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction).

A judge is absolutely immune from damages under Section 1983 for judicial conduct within the court’s general subject matter jurisdiction, even without personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff.

Parker v. State · filed 1992-07-13

Upon this authority, and for these reasons, we conclude that, where an action is founded upon judicial conduct, a judge will enjoy absolute immunity from liability for damages if, in performing that conduct, the judge had general subject matter jurisdiction, whether or not he or she also possessed personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff.

Section 1983 claims against judges are barred by absolute immunity for protected judicial actions.

Ballantyne v. Winiecki · filed 1992-07-21

Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228 (1988) supports the court's finding that the judges were protected from this suit by their absolute immunity for certain of their judicial actions. Ballantyne has offered no reason why the doctrine of absolute immunity should not protect the defendants in this case.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against police officers for information they provide to Pretrial Services as part of a judicial function because they have absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Ennis E. White v. City of San Diego · filed 1992-08-04

The police officers were absolutely immune from damages arising out of the information that they provided to Pretrial Services.

A judge is absolutely immune from a § 1983 civil rights suit for judicial acts within a colorable claim of jurisdiction, even if accused of acting maliciously or corruptly.

J.T. Garner v. Thomas M. Tuggle, Washington County District Judge · filed 1992-08-06

"A judge acting in his judicial capacity is absolutely immune from civil rights suits unless the judge acts clearly without any colorable claim of jurisdiction." ... That immunity does not dissolve when the judge is accused of acting maliciously or corruptly.

Section 1983 judicial immunity protects a judge performing judicial acts even in excess of jurisdiction, unless the acts are done in clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Branson v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1992-08-06

Even if it did not, the Commissioner would have judicial immunity. Branson does not allege that Schwartz' actions were not judicial in nature, and we have held: "A judge is immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts in excess of his jurisdiction, so long as the acts themselves were judicial." Rosenthal v. Justices of the S.Ct. of Cal., 910 F.2d 561, 565-66 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 963 (1991). Only when a judicial act is made in "clear absence of all jurisdiction" is judicial immunity absent. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a judge for judicial acts performed within the judge’s jurisdiction.

Condict v. Lehman · filed 1992-08-21

Appellant purported to bring this action based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985; therefore, we will examine both federal and state cases on judicial immunity. ... Two factors must be satisfied for a defense of judicial immunity to prevail. A judge is immune for his acts if he had jurisdiction and a judicial act was involved. ... It is clear that Judge Lehman enjoyed absolute judicial immunity under the circumstances of this case according to both federal and state law.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a magistrate for judicial acts within her general subject-matter jurisdiction, even if she exceeds her authority.

King v. Myers · filed 1992-08-21

Therefore, we cannot conclude that Magistrate Myers acted in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter." In determining whether the act was judicial, we look to the nature of the function performed. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-29, 108 S.Ct. 538, 544, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). Her actions were judicial in that, while she may have exceeded her authority in the manner in which she ordered the arrest, she performed a function "normally performed by a judge." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 362, 98 S.Ct. at 1108. Therefore, the district court properly determined that Magistrate Myers was entitled to judicial immunity.

A magistrate has absolute judicial immunity from § 1983 damages for a judicial act within subject matter jurisdiction, even if the act exceeds the magistrate’s statutory authority.

King v. Myers · filed 1992-08-21

Indeed, it would appear likely that Magistrate Myers may have exceeded the statutory grants of authority accorded to her by the allegedly questionable manner in which she effectuated the warrantless arrest of King. Nonetheless, however one may deprecate such an act, she did not perform a non-judicial act that was in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Judicial officers have absolute immunity from damages claims under § 1983 for judicial acts within their jurisdiction.

Corrigan v. Tompkins · filed 1992-09-22

The actions of Commissioner Tbmpkins and the panel of judges were judicial acts within their jurisdiction, protected from monetary claims by absolute immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against state bar bodies and disciplinary officials are barred by quasi-judicial immunity for acts integral to the judicial process.

Lebbos v. Arguelles · filed 1992-09-23

First, the California State Bar, the State Bar Court and Deward act in a quasi-judicial capacity as an arm of the California Supreme Court. Cal. Const., art. VI, § 9; Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 6001. Thus, they are shielded by quasi-judicial immunity from liability arising from the performance of their duties which are an integral part of the judicial process.

Judges are immune from § 1983 damages for judicial acts within their jurisdiction, even if the acts were allegedly malicious.

Miller v. Pamela Iles South Orange County Sml · filed 1992-10-16

Miller offers no evidence to indicate that these actions were either taken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or were not judicial in nature. See id. Furthermore, even if Judge Iles' actions were motivated by malice, she is nonetheless entitled to immunity from liability for those actions.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against judges despite judicial immunity, but a plaintiff must still show that such relief is appropriate.

Artes-Roy v. Aspen, City of · filed 1992-10-21

Although it is true that judges are not immune from injunctive relief, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984); Schepp v. Fremont County, 900 F.2d 1448, 1452 (10th Cir.1990), plaintiffs failed to show that injunctive relief would be appropriate in this case.

Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for their judicial actions.

Mallon v. Padova · filed 1992-11-17

Although not stated, Mr. Mallon may be attempting to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is, in fact, true that Judge Padova dismissed two of Mr. Mallon’s complaints as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(d); Judge Padova, however, is entitled to absolute immunity from suit for his judicial actions.

Judicial immunity is an absolute defense to damages claims under Section 1983 for a judge’s judicial acts.

Clay v. Yates · filed 1992-12-15

The doctrine of judicial immunity provides an absolute defense in civil actions for damages brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state court judge for judicial acts protected by judicial immunity, including denying in forma pauperis status.

Tamburro v. City of East Providence · filed 1992-12-18

And it cannot be disputed here that the actions of a state court judge in denying in forma pauperis status are protected by judicial immunity and thus provide no legitimate basis for § 1983 liability.

State judges have absolute judicial immunity from § 1983 suits for actions taken in their judicial capacities.

Judith Wolff and Judith Christianne Rea 1 v. Faris · filed 1992-12-23

We agree with the district court that these judges are protected by the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988). They possess absolute immunity from suit for all actions taken in their judicial capacities, including their decisions while presiding over this custody case.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on judges for acts taken in their judicial capacity.

Beals v. Seth Allen Town of Thatcher · filed 1992-12-28

Judges acting in their judicial capacity are immune from section 1983 liability.

Judicial immunity protects a judge from a § 1983 claim for actions taken within the judge’s judicial capacity.

Awwal v. Honorable Robert F. Niccum · filed 1992-12-28

As counsel admitted during argument that Judge Niccum acted within his judicial capacity when he directed the plaintiff to be removed from the courtroom, we adopt the reasoning of the decision by the district court on February 26, 1992, by Judge Alice M. Batchelder, finding Judge Niccum to be protected by judicial immunity under Mireles v. Waco, 112 S.Ct. 286 (1991).

Officers executing a facially valid court order have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from a Section 1983 suit.

Henson v. Joanne Corey Officer City of Phoenix George Bonsall, Judge Michael Fuschino, Sergeant · filed 1996-07-15

Because they were executing a facially valid court order, Corey and Fuschino were entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a court-appointed foreclosure referee for official acts sufficiently related to the judicial process because the referee has absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Green v. Kadilac Mortgage Bankers, Ltd. · filed 1996-07-31

In addition, plaintiffs’ claims against Eeonomou arising out of actions that he took in his capacity as a court-appointed referee must be dismissed because he is absolutely immune from liability.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred by absolute immunity when judges act within their judicial capacity and jurisdiction or court clerks act at the judges’ direction.

Glenn R. Waite, M.D. v. Judge Richard D. Sievers Judge D. Nick Caporale Lanet S. Asmussen · filed 1997-12-23

We conclude summary judgment was proper. The evidence showed the defendant judges acted within their judicial capacity and jurisdiction regarding the post-mandate document and notification to Waite of the procedure being followed. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (per curiam) (discussing parameters of judicial immunity). The evidence also established the defendant clerk acted at the judges' direction. See Rogers v. Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853, 856 (8th Cir.1988) (clerks absolutely immune from actions for damages arising from acts that "they are specifically required to do under court order or at judge's direction").

Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 liability for handling a judge’s dismissal order as part of the judicial process.

Sampson v. City of Xenia · filed 1999-03-19

First, the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity shields Grundy from § 1983 liability for failing to ensure that Sampson’s dismissal papers reached the Greene County jail.

Court employees whose acts are intertwined with the judicial process have quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 claims unless they act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or authority.

Thomas v. Palacios · filed 1999-09-13

Court employees whose acts are intertwined with the judicial process are entitled to “quasi-judicial” immunity, see Valdez v. City & County of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1287 (10th Cir. 1989), unless acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or authority, see Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 694 (10th Cir. 1990).

Court-appointed psychologists have quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 claims when the complaint alleges no misconduct outside their appointed duties.

Kelly v. Sweetland · filed 1999-10-07

Kelly’s complaint contained eleven counts including negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed her claims, holding that the defendants were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because Kelly’s pleadings failed to allege any misconduct outside the scope of the psychologists’ court appointed duties. We agree.

In § 1983 damages actions, officials executing a facially valid court order have quasi-judicial absolute immunity under federal law.

Reisdorff v. County of Yellowstone · filed 1999-11-23

To be immune from liability for claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the immunity must be found in federal law. ... Courts have consistently held that officials acting pursuant to a facially valid court order have a quasi-judicial absolute immunity from damages for actions taken to execute that order. ... The governmental Defendants were directly implementing the justice court's order of June 3, 1993. We conclude that the District Court did not err when it awarded summary judgment to governmental Defendants and the employees of those governmental entities based on quasi-judicial immunity.

Section 1983 permits absolute quasi-judicial immunity for court clerks performing acts integral to the judicial process pursuant to court orders.

Slate v. State · filed 1999-12-10

We find that under the authorities cited above, Bonnyman and Crowson were performing acts integral to the judicial process and pursuant to orders entered by the Chancery Court and Court of Appeals, respectively. We find that Bonnyman and Crowson are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from civil liability.

Section 1983 damages claims against a judge and a special master acting under the judge’s direction are barred by immunity for acts within their judicial duties.

Alvarez v. Snyder · filed 2000-01-13

The dispositive ground for dismissal is that the complaint fails to breach the shield of immunity protecting Justice Snyder, and by delegation Bodek, from personal liability for their actions falling well within the scope of appropriate judicial duties, especially for actions ensuring the integrity of court proceedings, under the facts of this case.

Administrative board members performing judicial functions are immune from § 1983 damages claims when acting in their judicial capacities.

Vakas v. Rodriquez · filed 1984-03-07

However, it is well established that members of administrative boards who perform judicial functions are immune from damages in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action when acting in their judicial capacities.

Section 1983 claims against a court clerk and prosecutor are barred by quasi-judicial and prosecutorial immunity when the alleged conduct involves adjudication of a criminal case.

Smith v. Shelby County · filed 2001-02-06

The district court properly found that the individual defendants were protected by quasi-judicial and prosecutorial immunity. ... This argument fails because the defendants’ alleged actions clearly involved the adjudication of his criminal case.

Quasi-judicial immunity can bar a Section 1983 claim against an individual defendant.

Vinson v. Vinson · filed 2001-08-23

With respect to the individual defendant, Reedy, the facts support that he was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.

Absolute quasi-judicial immunity can bar a § 1983 access-to-courts claim against a court clerk.

Berger v. Correctional Medical · filed 2001-08-28

Upon a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the district court that dismissal of the access-to-courts claim was proper based on absolute quasi-judicial immunity, see Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720, 721 (8th Cir. 1997), and failure to state a constitutional violation.

A zoning board sued under Section 1983 in its official capacity has no quasi-judicial immunity.

Schiazza v. Zoning Hearing Board Fairview Township · filed 2001-10-18

However, when a zoning board itself is sued, it is sued in its official capacity and is entitled to no immunity whatsoever.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against a court clerk performing a quasi-judicial function because the clerk has absolute immunity.

Fish v. Murphy · filed 2001-10-26

Kenneth Murphy is clearly being sued in his capacity as court clerk performing a quasi-judicial function and, as such, is entitled to a grant of absolute immunity from a suit for monetary damages.

Section 1983 bars monetary damages against bar investigators performing the quasi-judicial function of investigating unauthorized practice of law.

Bailey v. Columbus Bar Ass'n · filed 2001-11-08

Considering first the motions to dismiss presented by the Bar defendants, the district court found that these defendants were immune from suit for monetary damages under § 1983 because they were performing the quasi-judicial function of investigating Bailey for the alleged unauthorized practice of law. ... Upon review, we affirm the district court’s judgment for the reasons stated therein.

Judges performing judicial functions and court clerks performing quasi-judicial duties are immune from monetary damages in a § 1983 action.

Sirbaugh v. Young · filed 2001-12-07

First, a judge performing his or her judicial functions is absolutely immune from suits seeking monetary damages. ... Second, judicial employees are immune from damages for the performance of quasi-judicial duties.

Licensing board members may be entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 claims.

Williams v. Michigan Board of Dentistry · filed 2002-05-07

The district court also properly concluded that the individual defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity on Williams’s § 1983 claims, Watts v. Burkhart, M.D., 978 F.2d 269, 278 (6th Cir.1992).

Judges and courts acting in their judicial capacity are absolutely immune from damages liability in a Section 1983 action.

Alfred Banks v. Jim Ryan, Dave Uhlmeyer Hughes-Calihan Corp. Schall, Boudreau and Gore Inc. · filed 1993-02-01

The district court's dismissal of the complaint against the second set of defendants was proper because these defendants were courts and judges acting in their judicial capacity. Therefore, they enjoy absolute immunity from civil damage liability.

Court reporters have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from Section 1983 claims for transcribing trial testimony within the scope of their duties.

Cook v. Smith · filed 1993-02-10

When Defendant transcribed Plaintiff’s criminal trial, she was performing one of her statutory duties as a court reporter. Defendant’s actions are clearly within her general subject matter jurisdiction and responsibilities as a court reporter. Therefore, this action must be dismissed since Defendant is immune from suit based upon absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Judges are immune from § 1983 claims for acts taken in their judicial capacities when the allegations do not show that they acted without jurisdiction.

Isakson v. First National Bank · filed 1993-02-16

We conclude, therefore, that the Isaksons have failed to allege any facts that, if accepted as true, would suggest that the South Dakota courts improperly exercised jurisdiction in the foreclosure proceedings. Consequently, Chief Justice Miller and Judge Tapken are entitled to judicial immunity for the action they took in their judicial capacities.

State judges have absolute immunity from a Section 1983 claim when they have not acted in the absence of jurisdiction.

Phillips v. Canaday · filed 1993-02-23

Those judges are not shown to have acted in the absence of jurisdiction and therefore have absolute immunity.

Judges are immune from § 1983 claims for actions taken in their judicial capacities when they do not act in the complete absence of jurisdiction.

Sveeegen v. United States · filed 1993-03-11

Because Sveeggen has failed to allege any facts that, if accepted as true, would suggest that the South Dakota courts improperly exercised jurisdiction in the foreclosure proceedings, Chief Justice Miller and Judge Tapken are entitled to judicial immunity for the action they took in their judicial capacities.

Judges are immune from § 1983 claims for actions taken in their judicial capacities when the complaint alleges no facts showing a complete absence of jurisdiction.

Sveeggen v. United States · filed 1993-03-11

Because Sveeggen has failed to allege any facts that, if accepted as true, would suggest that the South Dakota courts improperly exercised jurisdiction in the foreclosure proceedings, Chief Justice Miller and Judge Tapken are entitled to judicial immunity for the action they took in their judicial capacities.

Judges are immune from § 1983 claims for acts taken in their judicial capacities when the court had jurisdiction.

Isakson v. First National Bank · filed 1993-03-22

We conclude, therefore, that the Isaksons have failed to allege any facts that, if accepted as true, would suggest that the South Dakota courts improperly exercised jurisdiction in the foreclosure proceedings. Consequently, Chief Justice Miller and Judge Tapken are entitled to judicial immunity for the action they took in their judicial capacities.

A state judge is absolutely immune from a Section 1983 damages claim arising from a contempt ruling.

McCready v. Claude R. Thomas Jill Eaton Weathers Elaine Stocking Ronald Retzloff · filed 1993-03-23

Thomas is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for judicial acts within their jurisdiction, even if they allegedly violate state procedural rules.

Chapman v. Burton Berger & Associates (In Re Chapman) · filed 1993-04-04

If a completely ex parte motion did not deprive a judge of his immunity, then certainly an asserted failure to comply with the technical requirements of Illinois procedural law could not deprive Judge Smith of his immunity for entering the February 6 and June 26 orders. Thus, Judge Smith was absolutely immune from any civil action instituted by Debtors when he entered the orders in Mr. Chapman’s case.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer despite judicial immunity.

Guarino v. Larsen · filed 1993-04-16

The doctrine of judicial immunity is not a bar, however, to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages claims for acts performed within their judicial jurisdiction.

Schlosser v. Coleman · filed 1993-04-20

Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 damage liability for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction. ... Therefore, Defendant Parker is immune from Plaintiffs § 1983 damages claims.

State court judges have absolute immunity from § 1983 suits when they do not act in clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Andrisani v. State of California · filed 1993-05-06

Furthermore, dismissal of the claims against the California state court judges was entirely appropriate because those judges have absolute immunity from § 1983 suit. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). The state court judges were not acting in "clear absence of all jurisdiction" and thus are accorded absolute immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges are barred by absolute judicial immunity for acts within the apparent scope of their judicial duties.

Sligar v. Perugino · filed 1993-05-06

The district court found, and we agree, that Sligar's allegations against Judge Perugino revolve around the judge's involvement in the state court criminal proceeding brought against Sligar, and that Judge Perugino is absolutely immune from liability for damages for acts committed within the apparent scope of his judicial duties, citing and relying on Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) and Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).

Section 1983 claims against licensing board members and the board’s prosecutor are barred by absolute immunity for conduct performed as part of a judicial or quasi-judicial disciplinary hearing.

Pippen v. Scales · filed 1993-05-17

In the instant case, the Board Defendants, including defendant Fountain as the Board’s prosecutor, exercised their judicial authority in conducting an evidentiary hearing and rendering a decision to suspend plaintiffs H-3 Heating License. Clearly, the conduct of which plaintiff complains occurred during this process and involved the performance by each Board Defendant of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Therefore, with the exclusion of defendant Tomlinson, the Court finds that the Board Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity and can not be civilly liable in this action under any theory put forth by plaintiff.

Judges are immune from damages claims under Section 1983 for judicial acts unless they acted without any jurisdiction.

Andrisani v. Lucas · filed 1993-05-18

Judges are absolutely immune from civil damage liability unless they act in absence of all jurisdiction or perform acts that are not judicial in nature. ... Because, however, the acts that Andrisani complains of were judicial in nature, judicial immunity bars his claim.

Judges are immune from § 1983 damages claims for actions within the scope of their judicial duties.

Kennerly v. Gherini · filed 1993-05-21

Because these actions were within the scope of Judge Hadden's employment, we agree with the district court that he is immune from Kennerly's $150,000,000 claim for damages.

Section 1983 affords absolute immunity to Texas civil service commissioners for acts performed in their adjudicative duties.

Mylett v. Mullican · filed 1993-05-28

After considering these factors and the Commission’s role in this case, we conclude and hold that the individual Commissioners are entitled to absolute immunity for the performance of them official duties.

Absolute judicial immunity bars damages claims under § 1983 against judicial officials acting in their judicial capacity.

Barnes v. John C. Scott, Clerk · filed 1993-06-25

Absolute immunity clearly bars any action for damages against the judicial officials sued here.

A trial judge is absolutely immune from a § 1983 claim alleging a conspiracy to maliciously prosecute through fabricated evidence.

Thomas v. Dutrow · filed 1993-06-30

We agree that Judge Sandstead is absolutely immune.

Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity under § 1983 for failing to issue a summons pursuant to a court-ordered stay when they do not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Overly v. Jack L. Wagner, District Court Clerk · filed 1993-07-13

Here, the clerk failed to issue a summons on Overly's previous complaint because the action was stayed by order of the court. Because the clerk did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, he is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit.

Michigan professional prison hearing officers have absolute judicial immunity from damages under § 1983 for discretionary, quasi-judicial acts within their jurisdiction.

Sullivan v. Ford · filed 1993-07-27

The defendants’ actions taken in adjudicating plaintiffs major misconduct hearings were discretionary, quasi-judicial acts which were clearly within the defendants’ jurisdiction as professional hearing officers. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their actions taken in the adjudication of plaintiffs major misconduct hearings.

Judges are immune from damages liability under section 1983 for performing judicial functions within their jurisdiction.

Kukes v. Blease · filed 1993-08-03

Because Blease was performing a judicial function when he reviewed Kukes' petition, we conclude that Blease is immune from damage liability.

Judicial immunity does not bar claims under Section 1983 seeking prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against a judge acting in a judicial capacity.

Wallace v. David Hayse, in His Official Capacity as Judge in Fayette District Court · filed 1993-08-06

Therefore, we conclude that the district court committed error when it dismissed Wallace's suit based upon the determination that Judge Hayse enjoyed absolute immunity against Sec. 1983 suits which request injunctive and declaratory relief.

Judges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damages liability under Section 1983 for acts performed in their judicial capacities.

O'COnnOr v. Yamashita · filed 1993-08-23

It is well settled that judges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 damage liability for acts performed in their judicial capacities.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred by quasi-judicial immunity for teacher-disciplinary adjudications and for notice duties functionally equivalent to those of a court clerk.

Ambus v. Utah State Board of Education · filed 1993-08-24

Ambus next contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his § 1983 civil rights action for damages. We affirm the dismissal of this claim on the ground that the Board, the Commission, and their members are protected by quasi-judicial immunity. ... That a decision to admit evidence is subsequently held to be erroneous does not alter the adjudicatory nature of that decision. Thus, for the reasons stated above with respect to the controversial nature of disciplinary proceedings and the existence of adequate safeguards, we hold that the Commission’s decision to admit evidence derived from the expunged record is also protected by quasi-judicial immunity. ... Similarly, when sending notice of an adjudicatory determination, the Executive Secretary is an administrative official performing a task functionally equivalent to that of a court clerk. As such, the Executive Secretary’s actions in sending the complaint and notice to Ambus are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.

Under § 1983, judges have absolute immunity from damages for judicial acts unless they act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, and court clerks receive derivative absolute immunity when acting under judicial orders or direction.

Battle v. Whitehurst · filed 1993-08-26

Judges will incur liability for money damages only when they act in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” ... The court finds that this conduct, whether considered separately or, as appears to be the intent of the complaint, collectively, constitutes judicial action as to which Judge Whitehurst enjoys absolute immunity from claims for money damages. ... Court clerks, such as Mr. Wright, are accorded derivative absolute immunity when they act in obedience to judicial order or under the court’s direction. ... For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that Mr. Wright is entitled to derivative judicial immunity and, there being no claim for injunctive relief against Mr. Wright, the entire action as to him is dismissed with prejudice.

Judicial immunity bars liability under § 1983 for a judge acting in a judicial capacity unless wholly without jurisdiction and protects a sheriff following an immune judge’s orders.

Nelson v. McDaniel · filed 1993-09-21

Judge Williams acted in his capacity as a judge when he sentenced Nelson. So long as a judge does not act wholly without jurisdiction, judicial immunity protects him or her from liability. ... The trial court also correctly assessed Nelson’s claim against McDaniel. Judicial immunity protects a sheriff who is following a protected judge’s orders.

State supreme court judges are immune from damages under § 1983 for delay in deciding an appeal.

Allen v. Duckworth · filed 1993-09-29

The judges of the state supreme court themselves are neither culpable nor suable for the damages caused by the delay.

A municipal judge has absolute immunity from a Section 1983 suit for judicial acts within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, even if the judge exceeds his authority by reimposing a sentence without a hearing.

Russell v. Batsche · filed 1993-10-27

Applying these rules to the instant case, Russell was properly before Batsche, and the latter was therefore entitled to absolute immunity. Whether Batsche exceeded his authority by reimposing sentence without a hearing is immaterial.

A judge is immune from liability under § 1983 for an erroneous habeas corpus ruling, and the state is not liable under the section.

Falcone v. State · filed 1993-10-28

The claim under § 1983 was properly dismissed because Judge Hall was immune from liability under that section. ... The state was also not liable.

A probation officer preparing and submitting a probation report in a criminal case is absolutely immune from damages liability under § 1983.

Todd v. Kenneth E. Jones Edward Irvin W. Rand Schuft Martin J. Sorenson Michael C. Jenkins · filed 1993-10-29

These claims fail because a probation officer preparing and submitting a probation report in a criminal case is absolutely immune from damages liability under § 1983.

Under § 1983, the Ohio Probate Court is absolutely immune for the judicial actions of its individual defendants, and probate judges and referees have judicial immunity from monetary damages.

Ruby H. Harris, Sister on Behalf of the Heirs of the Real Estate Lucretia Hand, Deceased v. Heidi Koneig, Referee, Cuyah · filed 1993-11-12

The Ohio Probate Court is absolutely immune because Harris sought to hold it liable for the actions of the individual defendants, and not for any extra-judicial actions. See, e.g., Sparks v. Character and Fitness Comm., 859 F.2d 428, 434 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1011 (1989). The remaining individual defendants are entitled to judicial immunity as to Harris's request for monetary damages. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 361-62 (1978).

State court judges have absolute immunity from Section 1983 liability for acts essential to their adjudicative functions performed within their subject matter jurisdiction.

Keplinger v. Richard K. Wilson William H. Wolff, Jr. Mike Fain State of Ohio · filed 1993-11-22

However, as explained by the magistrate judge, this court may not supersede the law as handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States, which law still bestows absolute immunity upon state court judges performing acts essential to their adjudicative functions, as the judges were, in this case.

Under § 1983, absolute judicial immunity protects judicial acts not taken in the complete absence of jurisdiction from damages liability, but does not bar prospective injunctive relief.

Rose v. Village of Peninsula · filed 1993-12-01

Therefore, absolute judicial immunity should apply to the claim for monetary damages made under Count I. Mayor Ruoff is not, however, dismissed from Count I, because it also seeks prospective injunctive relief which is exempted from the judicial immunity doctrine.

Judges have absolute immunity from money damages under § 1983 for acts performed in their judicial capacity unless they act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Cook v. DiNubile · filed 1993-12-07

Judges are entitled to absolute immunity in § 1983 actions, such as this, in which money damages are sought for actions performed by judges in their judicial capacity. ... Only if a judge acts in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction” is that immunity forfeited.

Section 1983 affords judges absolute immunity from civil liability for actions taken in their judicial capacity, and a constitutional challenge to a state judicial-discipline statute cannot abrogate that immunity.

Hurley v. Fuyat · filed 1993-12-17

Finally, Fuyat has absolute immunity from civil liability under §1983 for actions taken in his judicial capacity. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 355-56, 362-63. Plaintiff cannot abrogate this immunity through the "back door" of a constitutional challenge to the Rhode Island statute.

Judges are immune from civil liability under Section 1983 for acts performed in their judicial capacities.

Rodriguez v. Patricia Lilienthal Laura Austin Charles James Michael Hogan · filed 1993-12-21

Judicial immunity is a defense in a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55, 555 n. 9 (1967). "Judges are immune from civil liability in section 1983 actions for acts performed in their judicial capacities." Sherman v. Babbitt, 772 F.2d 1476, 1477 (9th Cir.1985). Judge Hogan was acting in his judicial capacity when he took the actions which form the basis of Rodriguez's claim that Hogan conspired with the other defendants to violate his constitutional rights. Therefore, he was entitled to protection under the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, as United States District Judge Redden correctly held in dismissing Hogan sua sponte from the action.

Judges are immune from damages under Section 1983 for judicial acts performed within their court's jurisdiction.

Mayer v. Meehan · filed 1993-12-28

In addition, Mayer's suit for damages is barred because all the acts complained of were judicial acts that Judge Meehan performed within the jurisdiction of the court.

A bailiff has absolute quasi-judicial immunity from a § 1983 claim for conduct specifically ordered by the trial judge and related to the judicial function; otherwise, the bailiff has only qualified immunity.

Robinson v. Bobby Freeze, Deputy Sheriff, Little River County · filed 1994-01-28

Freeze would enjoy only qualified immunity for those actions unless they were specifically ordered by the trial judge and related to the judicial function.

Judicial immunity bars a § 1983 claim against a judge for conduct in a case over which the judge presided.

Keith L. Gerlach, Sr. Sharon K. Gerlach v. Farmers State Bank Robert Bormann Scott Bormann Roger W. Damgaard Paul J. Ker · filed 1994-03-03

In this action against the Bank and those officers, another Bank employee, the Bank's attorney in the state action, and Judge Paul J. Kern, who presided over the state action, the Gerlachs again allege that the Bank's loan documents are "contracts of adhesion," and further allege that defendants have violated their constitutional rights and their rights under numerous federal statutes, including 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and certain consumer credit statutes. ... The Gerlachs' claim against Judge Kern is barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against a judge for judicial rulings are barred by judicial immunity.

Gulley v. State of Wisconsin, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, Gary J. Maier and Laurence C. Gra · filed 1994-03-04

We do agree, however, that Judge Gram is entitled to summary judgment in his favor. As the district court pointed out in its July 16, 1992 order, Judge Gram is protected by judicial immunity from damage suits under Sec. 1983.

Judges have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims for judicial acts unless they act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Nelson v. Joan G. Seitz Thomas Kolberg Ronald Poole · filed 1994-04-14

Judges have absolute immunity from suits for damages for their judicial acts unless the judge acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. ... Because the defendant judges have absolute judicial immunity from Nelson's claims, the district court properly dismissed this action as frivolous.

Law enforcement personnel acting within their official duties have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from a section 1983 suit when they execute a facially valid court order.

Roland v. E.W. Phillips David Benjamin Lin Harrell · filed 1994-04-15

Therefore, law enforcement personnel, acting in furtherance of their official duties and relying on a facially valid court order, are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit in a section 1983 action.

A judge is immune from damages under § 1983 for acts performed in a judicial capacity, including orders setting hearings and collecting adjudged attorney’s fees.

Shelly L. Mann Robert W. Thorson, Beverly Kish, Proposed Intervenor-Appellant v. Conlin · filed 1994-04-15

Thus, we hold that Judge Conlin was acting in his judicial capacity and is entitled to immunity for each of the allegedly “administrative” acts.

Section 1983 judicial immunity does not bar suits seeking only injunctive relief.

Butler v. John Mowbray, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Nevada Supreme Court of the State of Nevada · filed 1994-04-22

On appeal, Butler correctly argues that judicial immunity does not extend to suits seeking only injunctive relief.

Section 1983 claims against judges for administrative employment decisions are not barred by absolute judicial immunity.

Rosenbarger v. Shipman · filed 1994-05-06

As an administrative function, employment decisions by judges are not entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

Judicial immunity may protect a judicial officer from damages under § 1983, but it does not foreclose injunctive or declaratory relief.

Maniaci v. Michael D. Schwartz Connie K. Duboise Edna Miller · filed 1994-05-11

We note further that the doctrine of judicial immunity may protect a defendant judicial officer from a damages claim, but it does not foreclose possible injunctive or declaratory judgment relief.

Judicial immunity does not bar claims for injunctive relief under section 1983.

Ronald Branson, M.D. v. Haber · filed 1994-05-13

Judicial immunity does not bar claims for injunctive relief in section 1983 actions.

Judges are immune from § 1983 suit for judicial acts taken within their courts' subject matter jurisdiction.

Fore v. Blackmer · filed 1994-05-16

All of the acts Fore alleged Judges Roberts and Fields committed were judicial in nature because they involved functions normally performed by a judge and were part of a judicial proceeding. See id. Moreover, Fore has not alleged that the judges failed to act within the scope of their subject matter jurisdiction. See id.; Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040 (1988). Thus, Judges Roberts and Fields were entitled to immunity from suit.

Section 1983 claims against a judge are barred by judicial immunity when the challenged conduct is a judicial act within the judge’s jurisdiction.

Livingston v. Guice · filed 1994-06-15

However abhorrent one might view Judge Guice’s actions as alleged, this court is of the opinion that Guiee performed a “judicial act” when he restricted use of the intra-bar door to only court personnel, and that this was in relation to matters over which there was not “a clear absence of jurisdiction over the subject-matter.” Defendant Guiee is thus clothed with judicial immunity, and all Plaintiffs claims against him will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Judges are protected by absolute judicial immunity from § 1983 claims for actions within their jurisdiction.

Mason v. Waukesha County · filed 1994-06-16

The court further finds that Judge Davis was acting in his official capacity and is protected by absolute judicial immunity. Under Wisconsin law, a court may exercise jurisdiction over a custodial parent in a CHIPS proceeding and was thus not acting outside his jurisdiction in requiring that the Plaintiff produce her son.

A judge has absolute immunity from a Section 1983 suit for judicial acts within the judge’s jurisdiction, including an ex parte communication about pending cases.

Seto v. McMahon · filed 1994-07-14

As such, the letter and each of the statements therein constitute an ex parte communication appropriately considered a “judicial act” qualifying Judge McMahon for absolute immunity.

Judges are immune from damages liability in a Section 1983 action for acts performed in their official capacities.

Chapman v. Stephen McNamee Roger Strand · filed 1994-07-25

Because the defendants were acting in their official capacities when they denied Chapman's request for counsel, they are immune from damage liability.

Section 1983 permits claims for injunctive relief against judges despite judicial immunity.

Caton v. Leroy A. Davies, Keith C. Pepper and Robert W. Weir, Superior Court Judge · filed 1994-07-25

Judicial immunity, however, does not bar claims for injunctive relief in actions brought under section 1983.

Section 1983 claims against a judge are barred by judicial immunity when the challenged act is judicial and within the judge’s jurisdiction.

Battle v. Whitehurst · filed 1994-09-08

Because the nature of the function performed was judicial, see King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 357 (4th Cir.1992), we find that the district court properly granted judicial immunity.

A magistrate has absolute immunity from a § 1983 claim for acts performed in a judicial capacity.

Langston v. Rufus Fleming W. M. Riddle Virginia Department of Corrections · filed 1994-10-14

Likewise, Langston's claim against the state magistrate for failure to issue warrants against the guards is frivolous because of Riddle's absolute immunity for acts performed in his judicial capacity. Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir.1987).

A judge is absolutely immune from § 1983 damages claims based on actions taken in a judicial capacity.

Cindy L. Cameron and Lawrence M. Cameron v. James McCauley Seitz, Monroe County Probate Court · filed 1994-10-21

Because we conclude that all of Seitz’s actions with respect to Larry that are complained of were judicial in nature, the district court should have granted Seitz’s motion to dismiss Larry’s claims on the ground of absolute judicial immunity.

Court officials executing a judicial order as an arm of the court have quasi-judicial immunity from Section 1983 damages claims.

Charlene Bush, Wife John Bush, Husband v. David Rauch D. Brad Campbell, Individually and Officially · filed 1994-10-26

We agree with the district court. As other circuits have held, enforcing or executing a court order is intrinsically associated with a judicial proceeding. ... Since we agree with the trial court that Campbell was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, summary judgment was properly entered without allowing further discovery.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges are barred by judicial immunity when the challenged acts are judicial and the judges had subject matter jurisdiction.

Johnson v. State of New Jersey · filed 1994-11-30

The two criteria of Stump being met, it is clear that the defendant judges are absolutely immune from plaintiff’s claims for damages.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a judge for judicial acts within the judge’s jurisdiction, even if the plaintiff alleges malicious motives.

Jackson v. Gardner · filed 1994-12-07

The immunity point is straightforward. Judge Gardner acted exclusively in a judicial capacity, within his jurisdiction, and so is not amenable to damages. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). Jackson asserts that Judge Gardner acted maliciously, and in cahoots with her former husband, but an immunity pierced by allegations that are so easily made would not be worth much. Many cases hold that the motives of judges who act within their jurisdiction do not open a pathway to liability--which is why judicial immunity is called an "absolute" immunity.

Section 1983 claims against state officials are barred by judicial immunity when the officials make quasi-judicial decisions to invoke statutory suspension remedies.

Gensburg v. Miller · filed 1994-12-12

State officials making a decision whether to invoke suspension remedies pursuant to statute are acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, and are entitled to judicial immunity from section 1983 claims.

Judicial immunity does not bar a Section 1983 claim for prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity.

NBD Bank, N.A. v. Bennett · filed 1994-12-27

This argument is without merit under the explicit holding of the Supreme Court in Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 1980, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984), that “judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity.”

A guardian ad litem is immune from § 1983 liability for conduct within the judicial process, including alleged misrepresentations to the judge.

Fleming v. Asbill · filed 1994-12-29

All of the actions complained of occurred within the judicial process; in short, Asbill lied about X to procure order Y. Even if Asbill lied to the judge in open court, she was still acting as the guardian, and is immune from Sec. 1983 liability.

Judges are immune from damages under § 1983 for acts performed in their judicial capacity and within their jurisdiction.

Couch v. Cobb County Superior Court · filed 1995-01-09

Simply put, Judge Robinson is absolutely immune from damage claims if Judge Robinson (1) acted in her judicial capacity, and (2) did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

A judge is absolutely immune from a § 1983 damages claim for a judicial act taken at most in excess of jurisdiction, where the judge has general authority to perform that type of act.

James A. Duty Opal Duty v. City of Springdale, Arkansas Stanley Ludwig, Individually and in His Capacity as Municipal Ju · filed 1995-01-25

Even accepting as true Duty’s contention that an Arkansas municipal judge lacks authority to enforce the circuit court’s judgment, we hold that Ludwig is entitled to absolute immunity. Because Arkansas law authorizes municipal judges to issue arrest warrants, it is clear that in these circumstances Ludwig acted, at most, in excess of jurisdiction and not in the clear absence of jurisdiction.

Section 1983 claims against judges are barred by absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts within their jurisdiction.

Cok v. Forte · filed 1995-02-03

Plaintiffs have not pleaded any facts to overcome judicial immunity for Judge Forte and he is entitled to absolute immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on state court judges for actions taken in their judicial capacity because they have absolute judicial immunity.

Evans v. Panioto · filed 1995-02-09

To the extent monetary relief was sought, the district court also properly dismissed Evans's complaint as the defendants are not subject to suit. The state court judges are absolutely immune from liability for actions taken in their judicial capacity.

Judicial immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against an administrative law judge for acts taken in that judicial capacity.

Cosgrave v. State of California · filed 1995-02-16

In addition, Cosgrave's claim against the ALJ alleging bias and seeking damages is barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 297 (9th Cir.1985). The ALJ took no actions with respect to Cosgrave outside of his capacity as an administrative law judge.

Section 1983 civil liability is barred by absolute judicial immunity for a judicial officer’s act of issuing an arrest warrant.

Davis v. Dipino · filed 1995-03-13

With regard to Davis’s claims against Turner, we recognize that Turner is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from civil liability for violations of both Maryland law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his actions as a judicial officer in issuing the arrest warrant.

A judge is absolutely immune from damages in a Section 1983 action when acting within judicial discretion.

Rudd v. Jones · filed 1995-03-15

Under no circumstances can this complaint be maintained against the named defendant Bill Jones, who is the Circuit Court Judge for Greene County, Mississippi. It is clearly established law that a judge is absolutely immune from damages when he was acting within his judicial discretion.

Officials carrying out a judge’s orders may have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from a Section 1983 claim.

Neidigh v. David Tatum, Sheriff, Lawrence County, Mo · filed 1995-03-17

Having reviewed the record and the parties' arguments, we agree with the District Court's conclusion that Tatum is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Section 1983 claims against a judge are barred by judicial immunity when the challenged decisions were made in the judge’s judicial function.

Flatt on Behalf of Flatt v. Schma · filed 1995-03-22

Judge Schma is entitled to judicial immunity as it is clear that his decisions were issued pursuant to his judicial function as a presiding judge.

Section 1983 quasi-judicial immunity protects probation officers who submit evidence to a court at a probation modification hearing.

Fields v. Elizabeth MacEo Richard Rogers Lee Fischler Robert McCannally Claudia Holband · filed 1995-03-28

In past decisions, we have extended quasi-judicial immunity to probation officers when they prepare a presentence report for submission to a judge. Id. at 158; Burkes, 433 F.2d at 319. The structure of Arizona law persuades us that this immunity should also extend to the submission of evidence at a probation modification hearing.

Judges are absolutely immune from damages under Section 1983 for acts performed in a judicial capacity.

Wilkins v. Cowell · filed 1995-04-04

It is well-settled that judges are absolutely immune from liability for damages under section 1983 for acts performed in a judicial capacity.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a judge for judicial acts performed within the judge’s jurisdiction.

Offutt v. Kaplan · filed 1995-04-12

In the instant case, there is nothing alleged in the petition to suggest that Judge Kaplan has acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction which would subject him to liability.

Officials who carry out a facially valid court order are protected by quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 damages liability, even when sued only in their official capacities.

Shelton v. Wallace · filed 1995-04-19

Finally, this court finds that the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity applies to the defendants at hand, even though they are sued only in their official capacities.

Section 1983 claims against a judge are barred when the judge is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

Joiner v. Allen Hobart Scott West Charles Bobbit, Jr. Robert Mann, Police Chief, White House, Tn Cindy Spivey · filed 1995-04-20

The district court properly dismissed Judge Bobbit on the basis that he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges are barred by absolute judicial immunity for acts within their jurisdiction.

Herring v. Douglas · filed 1995-05-05

Judicial officers are entitled to absolute immunity from damages brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against judges are barred by judicial immunity for acts in their official capacity unless the judge acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

De Young v. Lorentz · filed 1995-05-10

To the extent the court construes the notice of removal as a complaint against Judge Lorentz, the notice seems to contemplate an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Mr. and Mrs. De Young challenge acts done in Judge Lorentz’s official capacity; however, they fail to demonstrate in their complaint that Judge Lorentz acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, as is necessary to deprive a judge of immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against a judge are barred by judicial immunity for acts taken within the judge’s judicial capacity.

Smith v. Corns · filed 1995-05-30

Secondly, it is clear from the record that all actions by Judge Corns were taken within his judicial capacity, so that he is protected under the doctrine of judicial immunity.

Judges have absolute immunity from damages claims under § 1983 arising from their judicial acts.

Nowicki v. Lucy Cooper, Assistant Family Court Commissioner, Milwaukee County, Both Personally and in Her Offic · filed 1995-06-01

Her act of which Nowicki complains was judicial, and judges have absolute immunity from suits for damages that complain of their judicial acts.

Judges have absolute immunity from Section 1983 suits for judicial acts such as issuing arrest warrants, even when they act in excess of their jurisdiction.

Terrell v. Rainbolt · filed 1995-06-09

As municipal judges are also authorized to issue arrest warrants, Martin acted, at most, in excess of his jurisdiction, and is still entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a judicial officer for judge-like acts that are not clearly outside the officer’s jurisdiction.

Ernest J. Franceschi, Jr., Esq. v. Kenneth Schwartz, Commissioner of South Orange County Municipal Court · filed 1995-06-14

As a person performing “judge-like functions” that were not clearly outside the scope of his jurisdiction, Commissioner Schwartz is judicially immune from damage liability in this action.

Judicial immunity can bar a § 1983 claim against court clerks.

Cole v. Rudy Tesar, Clerk of Douglas County Court Richard Kutilek, Deputy Clerk of Douglas County Court · filed 1995-06-14

Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude the District Court correctly determined that defendants were entitled to judicial immunity.

Judges are immune from § 1983 damages for judicial acts unless they act in clear absence of all jurisdiction, and court officers acting at their direction have derivative immunity.

Gantt v. Messitte · filed 1995-06-27

We agree that, with respect to Appellant's damages claim, the Defendants were immune from suit. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (holding that judges enjoy absolute judicial immunity from damages liability for judicial acts unless done in clear absence of all jurisdiction); McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 5 (4th Cir.1972) (finding derivative immunity for public officers acting at direction of court).

Judicial immunity bars a Section 1983 claim against a judge who had subject-matter jurisdiction and acted in a judicial role.

Homola v. McNamara · filed 1995-07-05

Judge Stack had subject-matter jurisdiction and played a judicial role. That is sufficient for immunity.

A judge who issues an arrest warrant in a judicial capacity is immune from a § 1983 claim unless the judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Ireland v. Tunis · filed 1995-07-13

In short, Judge Kuhn clearly acted in a judicial capacity when he issued the arrest warrant. Although it is unclear if he acted in excess of his authority, it is clear that he did not act in “complete absence of all jurisdiction.”

Section 1983 claims against commissioners in chancery are barred by judicial immunity when the challenged acts fall within their quasi-judicial roles.

Davis v. Hudgins · filed 1995-08-02

Assuming that these events occurred, the Court finds that Defendants Weaver and Hornsby were acting within the scope of their quasi-judicial roles, and are therefore immune from suit.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges are barred by absolute judicial immunity for acts performed within their judicial functions and jurisdiction.

Clark v. Lindsay · filed 1995-08-25

Judge Lindsay's actions in refusing to issue a bench warrant, denying Clark's motion for the appointment of counsel, and refusing to allow Clark to call state appellate judges to testify on his behalf were within the scope of Judge Lindsay's jurisdiction, thus affording her absolute judicial immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges are barred by absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts performed within their jurisdiction.

Concepcion v. Cintron · filed 1995-08-25

Hence, absolute judicial immunity hinders any suit for money damages against individual judicial defendants, when the judge has jurisdiction over the subject matter and is performing a judicial act.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state bar judges and prosecutors performing functions comparable to those of judges and prosecutors in a courtlike setting.

Hirsh v. Justices of the Supreme Court of California · filed 1995-09-07

The Bar Court judges and prosecutors have quasi-judicial immunity from monetary damages. Administrative law judges and agency prosecuting attorneys are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity so long as they perform functions similar to judges and prosecutors in a setting like that of a court.

Section 1983 affords a judge absolute immunity from liability for judicial acts even when those acts involve grave procedural errors.

Brandley v. Keeshan · filed 1995-09-15

Martin, as a state district judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by grave procedural errors.

Judges are immune from damages under Section 1983 for acts within their judicial duties unless they act in the clear absence of all subject-matter jurisdiction.

Chirila v. Zenoff · filed 1995-09-27

Judges are immune from liability for damages in section 1983 actions for acts committed within the scope of their judicial duties, "even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).

Alleging that a judge conspired to deprive a litigant of rights does not overcome judicial immunity in a section 1983 action.

Kenney v. Stark · filed 1995-09-27

Allegations that a judge has conspired with others to deprive a litigant of his rights are insufficient to pierce the immunity extended to judges.

Section 1983 does not allow money damages against a judge for acts undertaken in a judicial capacity within the judge’s jurisdiction.

McPherson v. Thomas S. Eveland, Chief Judge Douglas A. Vandlen Henry A. Crisenbery Eaton County Board of Comm · filed 1995-10-05

First, the defendant state judge is entitled to absolute immunity from suit for money damages for acts undertaken within his jurisdiction as judge. ... However, plaintiff alleged no act undertaken beyond the defendant judge's jurisdiction that would give rise to a claim for money damages under Sec. 1983.

Judicial defendants are entitled to dismissal of § 1983 claims against them on immunity grounds.

Nesses v. Shepard · filed 1995-10-10

The judicial defendants were of course entitled to have the suit dismissed against them on grounds of immunity.

Judges are absolutely immune from damages claims under Section 1983 for acts within their judicial jurisdiction, but judicial immunity does not bar claims for injunctive relief against them.

Burton v. Peter C. Economus, Judge, Mahoning County Common Pleas Court · filed 1995-10-13

Generally, judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for money damages for acts undertaken within their jurisdiction as judge. ... However, plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief against the defendant state judge is not barred by judicial immunity.

A bond commissioner performing the judicial function of setting bond is absolutely immune from damages under Section 1983.

Beaven v. Phillip K. Scrogham, and Howard N. Bernstein, Commissioner · filed 1995-10-25

Bernstein's conduct in imposing a bond after an arrest still falls within his quasi-judicial functions and is protected by the doctrine of absolute immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against a judge for judicial acts are barred by judicial immunity in a personal capacity and by the Eleventh Amendment in an official capacity.

Nowicki v. Ullsvik · filed 1995-11-07

Judicial immunity and the Eleventh Amendment bar such claims against Judge Ullsvik in his personal and official capacities respectively.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges are barred by judicial immunity for acts taken in their judicial capacity and within their subject matter jurisdiction.

Baumgarten v. Michael W. Brennan, Norman L. Saracoff, Cathy J. Gorst, Joan D. Eloranta, and Judith Baumgarten · filed 1995-11-16

Judges are immune from suit for actions taken in their judicial capacity and within their subject matter jurisdiction. ... Brennan and Saracoff therefore were properly granted judicial immunity.

State judges sued for damages under Section 1983 in their individual capacities are entitled to judicial immunity.

Caliendo v. Matt Rodriguez, Superintendent of Police of the City of Chicago, and the City of Chicago · filed 1995-11-30

If sued for damages in their individual capacities, the judges would be entitled to judicial immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose civil liability on a judge for actions taken in an official capacity and within the scope of the judge’s jurisdiction.

Childs v. State of Ohio · filed 1995-12-07

Having acted within his official capacity and within the scope of his jurisdiction, Judge West is protected by absolute immunity from civil liability for actions taken in relation to the allegations set forth in Childs's amended complaint.

Section 1983 claims against a state hearing officer are barred by absolute judicial immunity for conduct in the hearing officer role.

Loftin v. United States · filed 1995-12-15

Because Madden's alleged wrongdoing involved his role as hearing officer, we conclude Madden was entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

A probation officer sued under Section 1983 is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for failing to convey an inmate’s health information to corrections officials merely because the officer was preparing a dispositional report.

Viero v. Bufano · filed 1995-12-28

Merely because she was also preparing a report for use at a dispositional hearing, she is not shielded from the responsibility of conveying to Department the critical information that she had about Rosario’s mental and physical health.